1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, TrustedCommitmentTransaction, ClosingTransaction};
11 use ln::{chan_utils, msgs};
12 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, InMemorySigner, BaseSign};
16 use sync::{Mutex, Arc};
17 #[cfg(test)] use sync::MutexGuard;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, SigHashType};
20 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
25 use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer};
28 /// Initial value for revoked commitment downward counter
29 pub const INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 1 << 48;
31 /// An implementation of Sign that enforces some policy checks. The current checks
32 /// are an incomplete set. They include:
34 /// - When signing, the holder transaction has not been revoked
35 /// - When revoking, the holder transaction has not been signed
36 /// - The holder commitment number is monotonic and without gaps
37 /// - The revoked holder commitment number is monotonic and without gaps
38 /// - There is at least one unrevoked holder transaction at all times
39 /// - The counterparty commitment number is monotonic and without gaps
40 /// - The pre-derived keys and pre-built transaction in CommitmentTransaction were correctly built
42 /// Eventually we will probably want to expose a variant of this which would essentially
43 /// be what you'd want to run on a hardware wallet.
45 /// Note that counterparty signatures on the holder transaction are not checked, but it should
46 /// be in a complete implementation.
48 /// Note that before we do so we should ensure its serialization format has backwards- and
49 /// forwards-compatibility prefix/suffixes!
51 pub struct EnforcingSigner {
52 pub inner: InMemorySigner,
53 /// Channel state used for policy enforcement
54 pub state: Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>>,
55 pub disable_revocation_policy_check: bool,
58 impl EnforcingSigner {
59 /// Construct an EnforcingSigner
60 pub fn new(inner: InMemorySigner) -> Self {
61 let state = Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new()));
65 disable_revocation_policy_check: false
69 /// Construct an EnforcingSigner with externally managed storage
71 /// Since there are multiple copies of this struct for each channel, some coordination is needed
72 /// so that all copies are aware of enforcement state. A pointer to this state is provided
73 /// here, usually by an implementation of KeysInterface.
74 pub fn new_with_revoked(inner: InMemorySigner, state: Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>>, disable_revocation_policy_check: bool) -> Self {
78 disable_revocation_policy_check
83 pub fn get_enforcement_state(&self) -> MutexGuard<EnforcementState> {
84 self.state.lock().unwrap()
88 impl BaseSign for EnforcingSigner {
89 fn get_per_commitment_point(&self, idx: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> PublicKey {
90 self.inner.get_per_commitment_point(idx, secp_ctx)
93 fn release_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
95 let mut state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
96 assert!(idx == state.last_holder_revoked_commitment || idx == state.last_holder_revoked_commitment - 1, "can only revoke the current or next unrevoked commitment - trying {}, last revoked {}", idx, state.last_holder_revoked_commitment);
97 assert!(idx > state.last_holder_commitment, "cannot revoke the last holder commitment - attempted to revoke {} last commitment {}", idx, state.last_holder_commitment);
98 state.last_holder_revoked_commitment = idx;
100 self.inner.release_commitment_secret(idx)
103 fn validate_holder_commitment(&self, holder_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction) -> Result<(), ()> {
104 let mut state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
105 let idx = holder_tx.commitment_number();
106 assert!(idx == state.last_holder_commitment || idx == state.last_holder_commitment - 1, "expecting to validate the current or next holder commitment - trying {}, current {}", idx, state.last_holder_commitment);
107 state.last_holder_commitment = idx;
111 fn pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { self.inner.pubkeys() }
112 fn channel_keys_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { self.inner.channel_keys_id() }
114 fn sign_counterparty_commitment(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
115 self.verify_counterparty_commitment_tx(commitment_tx, secp_ctx);
118 let mut state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
119 let actual_commitment_number = commitment_tx.commitment_number();
120 let last_commitment_number = state.last_counterparty_commitment;
121 // These commitment numbers are backwards counting. We expect either the same as the previously encountered,
123 assert!(last_commitment_number == actual_commitment_number || last_commitment_number - 1 == actual_commitment_number, "{} doesn't come after {}", actual_commitment_number, last_commitment_number);
124 // Ensure that the counterparty doesn't get more than two broadcastable commitments -
125 // the last and the one we are trying to sign
126 assert!(actual_commitment_number >= state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment - 2, "cannot sign a commitment if second to last wasn't revoked - signing {} revoked {}", actual_commitment_number, state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment);
127 state.last_counterparty_commitment = cmp::min(last_commitment_number, actual_commitment_number)
130 Ok(self.inner.sign_counterparty_commitment(commitment_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
133 fn validate_counterparty_revocation(&self, idx: u64, _secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<(), ()> {
134 let mut state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
135 assert!(idx == state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment || idx == state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment - 1, "expecting to validate the current or next counterparty revocation - trying {}, current {}", idx, state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment);
136 state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment = idx;
140 fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
141 let trusted_tx = self.verify_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx, secp_ctx);
142 let commitment_txid = trusted_tx.txid();
143 let holder_csv = self.inner.counterparty_selected_contest_delay();
145 let state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
146 let commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
147 if state.last_holder_revoked_commitment - 1 != commitment_number && state.last_holder_revoked_commitment - 2 != commitment_number {
148 if !self.disable_revocation_policy_check {
149 panic!("can only sign the next two unrevoked commitment numbers, revoked={} vs requested={} for {}",
150 state.last_holder_revoked_commitment, commitment_number, self.inner.commitment_seed[0])
154 for (this_htlc, sig) in trusted_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs) {
155 assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
156 let keys = trusted_tx.keys();
157 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(), holder_csv, &this_htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
159 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&this_htlc, &keys);
161 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
162 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, sig, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
165 Ok(self.inner.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(commitment_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
168 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
169 fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
170 Ok(self.inner.unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(commitment_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
173 fn sign_justice_revoked_output(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
174 Ok(self.inner.sign_justice_revoked_output(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, secp_ctx).unwrap())
177 fn sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
178 Ok(self.inner.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc, secp_ctx).unwrap())
181 fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
182 Ok(self.inner.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_point, htlc, secp_ctx).unwrap())
185 fn sign_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
186 closing_tx.verify(self.inner.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint())
187 .expect("derived different closing transaction");
188 Ok(self.inner.sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
191 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
192 self.inner.sign_channel_announcement(msg, secp_ctx)
195 fn ready_channel(&mut self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters) {
196 self.inner.ready_channel(channel_parameters)
200 impl Sign for EnforcingSigner {}
202 impl Writeable for EnforcingSigner {
203 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
204 // EnforcingSigner has two fields - `inner` ([`InMemorySigner`]) and `state`
205 // ([`EnforcementState`]). `inner` is serialized here and deserialized by
206 // [`KeysInterface::read_chan_signer`]. `state` is managed by [`KeysInterface`]
207 // and will be serialized as needed by the implementation of that trait.
208 self.inner.write(writer)?;
213 impl EnforcingSigner {
214 fn verify_counterparty_commitment_tx<'a, T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &'a CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
215 commitment_tx.verify(&self.inner.get_channel_parameters().as_counterparty_broadcastable(),
216 self.inner.counterparty_pubkeys(), self.inner.pubkeys(), secp_ctx)
217 .expect("derived different per-tx keys or built transaction")
220 fn verify_holder_commitment_tx<'a, T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &'a CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
221 commitment_tx.verify(&self.inner.get_channel_parameters().as_holder_broadcastable(),
222 self.inner.pubkeys(), self.inner.counterparty_pubkeys(), secp_ctx)
223 .expect("derived different per-tx keys or built transaction")
227 /// The state used by [`EnforcingSigner`] in order to enforce policy checks
229 /// This structure is maintained by KeysInterface since we may have multiple copies of
230 /// the signer and they must coordinate their state.
232 pub struct EnforcementState {
233 /// The last counterparty commitment number we signed, backwards counting
234 pub last_counterparty_commitment: u64,
235 /// The last counterparty commitment they revoked, backwards counting
236 pub last_counterparty_revoked_commitment: u64,
237 /// The last holder commitment number we revoked, backwards counting
238 pub last_holder_revoked_commitment: u64,
239 /// The last validated holder commitment number, backwards counting
240 pub last_holder_commitment: u64,
243 impl EnforcementState {
244 /// Enforcement state for a new channel
245 pub fn new() -> Self {
247 last_counterparty_commitment: INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
248 last_counterparty_revoked_commitment: INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
249 last_holder_revoked_commitment: INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
250 last_holder_commitment: INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,