Test that EnforcingChannelKeys doesn't panic on duplicate RAAs
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / functional_tests.rs
index 06621986495c14fed048c0d983972d7b7292f5a3..4006c87a684a62d5d1a82a6e202a5a900bdd2f86 100644 (file)
@@ -3,13 +3,13 @@
 //! claim outputs on-chain.
 
 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
+use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, BlockNotifier};
 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,HTLCForwardInfo,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
-use ln::onion_utils;
+use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop};
 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
 use ln::msgs;
@@ -3432,8 +3432,8 @@ fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
 
        nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
 
-       let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().inner.funding_key);
-       let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().inner.funding_key);
+       let as_bitcoin_key = as_chan.get_local_keys().inner.local_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey;
+       let bs_bitcoin_key = bs_chan.get_local_keys().inner.local_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey;
 
        let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
        let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
@@ -3460,8 +3460,8 @@ fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
        macro_rules! sign_msg {
                ($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
                        let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::hash(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
-                       let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().inner.funding_key);
-                       let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().inner.funding_key);
+                       let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().inner.funding_key());
+                       let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().inner.funding_key());
                        let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].keys_manager.get_node_secret());
                        let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].keys_manager.get_node_secret());
                        chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
@@ -3510,7 +3510,7 @@ fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
        new_chan_monitor = test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }));
        nodes[0].chan_monitor = &new_chan_monitor;
        let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
-       let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
+       let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys>)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
        assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
 
        let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
@@ -3580,7 +3580,7 @@ fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
        new_chan_monitor = test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }));
        nodes[0].chan_monitor = &new_chan_monitor;
        let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
-       let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
+       let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys>)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
        assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
 
        let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
@@ -3647,7 +3647,7 @@ fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
        let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
        for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
                let mut read = &serialized[..];
-               let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
+               let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys>)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
                assert!(read.is_empty());
                node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
        }
@@ -6310,7 +6310,7 @@ fn test_data_loss_protect() {
 
        // Restore node A from previous state
        let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0)));
-       let mut chan_monitor = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(previous_chan_monitor_state.0), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap().1;
+       let mut chan_monitor = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys>)>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(previous_chan_monitor_state.0), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap().1;
        let chain_monitor = Arc::new(ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
        let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
        let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
@@ -6692,30 +6692,46 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
 
        // Connect three more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
        let header_132 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 3, 129, true, header_129.bitcoin_hash());
-       let node_txn = {
+       let penalty_local_tx;
+       {
                let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
-               assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 2 bumped penalty txn on offered/received HTLC outputs of revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tx on to_local of revoked commitment tx + 2 bumped penalty tx on revoked HTLC txn
+               assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // 2 bumped penalty txn on offered/received HTLC outputs of revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tx on to_local of revoked commitment tx + 2 bumped penalty tx on revoked HTLC txn
 
                check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
                check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
 
-               let mut penalty_local = ::std::usize::MAX;
+               check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+
+               penalty_local_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
+               node_txn.clear();
+       };
+       // Few more blocks to broadcast and confirm penalty_local_tx
+       let header_133 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_132, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+       nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_133, txdata: vec![penalty_local_tx] }, 133);
+       let header_135 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 2, 133, true, header_133.bitcoin_hash());
+       {
+               let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+               assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+               check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+               node_txn.clear();
+       }
+       let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 9, 135, true, header_135);
+       let node_txn = {
+               let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+               assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
+
                let mut penalty_offered = ::std::usize::MAX;
                let mut penalty_received = ::std::usize::MAX;
 
                {
-                       let iter_txn = node_txn[2..].iter();
-                       for (i, tx) in iter_txn.enumerate() {
-                               if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_local_txn[0].txid() {
-                                       penalty_local = 2 + i;
-                               } else if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[offered].txid() {
-                                       penalty_offered = 2+ i;
+                       for (i, tx) in node_txn.iter().enumerate() {
+                               if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[offered].txid() {
+                                       penalty_offered = i;
                                } else if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[received].txid() {
-                                       penalty_received = 2 + i;
+                                       penalty_received = i;
                                }
                        }
                }
-               check_spends!(node_txn[penalty_local], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
 
                assert_eq!(node_txn[penalty_received].input.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[penalty_received].output.len(), 1);
@@ -6733,24 +6749,17 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
                let fee = revoked_htlc_txn[received].output[0].value - node_txn[penalty_received].output[0].value;
                let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[penalty_received].get_weight() as u64;
                assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_2 * 125);
-               let txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[3].clone(), node_txn[4].clone()];
+               let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()];
                node_txn.clear();
                txn
        };
        // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
-       let header_133 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_132, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
-       nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_133, txdata: node_txn }, 133);
-       let header_140 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 6, 134, true, header_133.bitcoin_hash());
-       {
-               let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
-               node_txn.clear();
-       }
-
-       // Connect few more blocks and check only penalty transaction for to_local output have been issued
-       connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 7, 140, true, header_140);
+       let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+       nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn }, 145);
+       connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 20, 145, true, header_145.bitcoin_hash());
        {
                let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
-               assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //TODO: should be zero when we fix check_spend_remote_htlc
+               assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //TODO: fix check_spend_remote_htlc lack of watch output
                node_txn.clear();
        }
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
@@ -6963,6 +6972,32 @@ fn test_set_outpoints_partial_claiming() {
        }
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
+       // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
+       // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
+       // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
+       // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
+       // EnforcingChannelKeys would have paniced as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
+       // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
+       // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
+       // implement that).
+       let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2);
+       let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+       let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+       let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::supported(), InitFeatures::supported()).2;
+
+       let commitment_seed = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().local_keys.commitment_seed().clone();
+       const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
+       let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
+               &SecretKey::from_slice(&chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&commitment_seed, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
+       let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&commitment_seed, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
+
+       nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
+               &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
+       assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
        // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,