Test that EnforcingChannelKeys doesn't panic on duplicate RAAs

diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs
index ec2071428eb2701fa3c2a931ed232d8cea776fc1..231ee832befe77a32c1166c8ab2ba87151623934 100644 (file)
--- a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs
@@ -240,7 +240,10 @@ pub(super) struct Channel<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
        secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
        channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 
+       #[cfg(not(test))]
        local_keys: ChanSigner,
+       #[cfg(test)]
+       pub(super) local_keys: ChanSigner,
        shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
 
        // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction

diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
index ddd5f56b19959e1f5b9025f62c9354ea6aeacd00..4006c87a684a62d5d1a82a6e202a5a900bdd2f86 100644 (file)
--- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,HTLCForwardInfo,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
-use ln::onion_utils;
+use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop};
 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
 use ln::msgs;
@@ -6972,6 +6972,32 @@ fn test_set_outpoints_partial_claiming() {
        }
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
+       // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
+       // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
+       // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
+       // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
+       // EnforcingChannelKeys would have paniced as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
+       // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
+       // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
+       // implement that).
+       let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2);
+       let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+       let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+       let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::supported(), InitFeatures::supported()).2;
+
+       let commitment_seed = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().local_keys.commitment_seed().clone();
+       const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
+       let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
+               &SecretKey::from_slice(&chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&commitment_seed, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
+       let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&commitment_seed, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
+
+       nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
+               &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
+       assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
        // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,