},
);
+/// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
+///
+/// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
+/// be provided.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
+pub enum Balance {
+ /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
+ /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
+ /// force-closed now.
+ ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
+ /// required to do so.
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
+ },
+ /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
+ /// we consider it spendable.
+ ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
+ /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
+ /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
+ /// amount.
+ confirmation_height: u32,
+ },
+ /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
+ /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
+ /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
+ ///
+ /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
+ /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
+ /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
+ ContentiousClaimable {
+ /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
+ /// required to do so.
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
+ /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
+ /// done so.
+ timeout_height: u32,
+ },
+ /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
+ /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
+ /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
+ MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
+ /// required to do so.
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
+ /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
+ /// done so.
+ claimable_height: u32,
+ },
+}
+
/// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
#[derive(PartialEq)]
struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
}
+
+ /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
+ /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
+ /// confirmation).
+ ///
+ /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
+ /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
+ /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
+ /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
+ ///
+ /// Note that the balances available when you or your counterparty have broadcasted revoked
+ /// state(s) may not be fully captured here.
+ // TODO, fix that ^
+ ///
+ /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
+ /// may be returned here and their meanings.
+ pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
+ let mut res = Vec::new();
+ let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
+
+ let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
+ let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
+ let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
+ if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
+ Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
+ } else { None }
+ });
+ if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
+ debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
+ "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
+ confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
+ pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
+ ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
+ for htlc in $htlc_iter {
+ if let Some(htlc_input_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.input_idx == htlc_input_idx) {
+ assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
+ } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
+ // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
+ // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
+ // and awaiting confirmations on it.
+ let htlc_update_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
+ if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { input_idx: Some(input_idx), .. } = event.event {
+ if input_idx == htlc_input_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
+ } else { None }
+ });
+ if let Some(conf_thresh) = htlc_update_pending {
+ res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+ });
+ } else {
+ res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+ });
+ }
+ } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
+ // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
+ // we know the preimage.
+ // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
+ // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
+ // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
+ let htlc_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
+ if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, preimage, .. } = event.event {
+ if input_idx == htlc_input_idx {
+ Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()))
+ } else { None }
+ } else { None }
+ });
+ if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
+ res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+ });
+ } else {
+ res.push(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
+ let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
+ if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+ walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
+ if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
+ if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
+ if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
+ descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
+ } = &event.event {
+ Some(descriptor.output.value)
+ } else { None }
+ }) {
+ res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: value,
+ confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+ });
+ } else {
+ // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
+ // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
+ // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
+ }
+ }
+ found_commitment_tx = true;
+ } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
+ walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
+ if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
+ res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
+ confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+ });
+ }
+ found_commitment_tx = true;
+ } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
+ if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
+ walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
+ if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
+ res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
+ confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+ });
+ }
+ found_commitment_tx = true;
+ }
+ }
+ if !found_commitment_tx {
+ if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
+ // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
+ // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
+ // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
+ res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
+ confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ // TODO: Add logic to provide claimable balances for counterparty broadcasting revoked
+ // outputs.
+ } else {
+ let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
+ for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
+ if htlc.offered {
+ res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+ claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+ });
+ } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
+ claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
+ }
+ }
+ res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
+ });
+ }
+
+ res
+ }
}
/// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
// we've already failed the HTLC as the commitment transaction
// which was broadcasted was revoked. In that case, we should
// spend the HTLC output here immediately, and expose that fact
- // as a ClaimableBalance, something which we do not yet do.
+ // as a Balance, something which we do not yet do.
// TODO: Track the above as claimable!
}
continue 'outer_loop;
//! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
-use chain::channelmonitor::ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
-use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
+use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+use ln::{channel, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
use ln::features::InitFeatures;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, HTLCFailChannelUpdate, ErrorAction};
use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+
use prelude::*;
use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
expect_payment_failure_chan_update!(nodes[0], update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
}
+
+#[test]
+fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
+ // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
+ // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
+ // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
+ // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+ assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
+
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
+
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000
+ }],
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id).unwrap();
+ let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
+ let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown);
+
+ let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
+ let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
+ let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
+ let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
+
+ let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
+ assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
+
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
+ }],
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
+ }],
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+
+ assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+ assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+
+ let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+ assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
+ }
+
+ let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+ assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
+ }
+}
+
+fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
+ v.sort_unstable();
+ v
+}
+
+fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
+ // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
+ // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
+ // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ if prev_commitment_tx {
+ // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
+ // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
+ // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
+ // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
+ }
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+ assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
+
+ // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
+ let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
+ // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
+ // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
+ let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
+ // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
+ let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
+
+ let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
+
+ let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
+
+ let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
+ // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
+ // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
+ }],
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+
+ nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
+ // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
+ nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ if prev_commitment_tx {
+ // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
+ expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
+ let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
+ let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ }
+
+ // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
+ // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
+ let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
+ 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
+ 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
+ 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
+ 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
+ // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
+ chan_feerate * (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT +
+ if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
+ channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }];
+ if !prev_commitment_tx {
+ a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ });
+ }
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
+ }],
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+
+ // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
+ // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
+ let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
+
+ let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), if prev_commitment_tx { 4 } else { 5 });
+ if prev_commitment_tx {
+ check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[3], b_broadcast_txn[2]);
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0], b_broadcast_txn[3]);
+ assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1], b_broadcast_txn[4]);
+ }
+ // b_broadcast_txn[0] should spend the HTLC output of the commitment tx for 3_000 sats
+ check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
+ check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
+ assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
+ assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
+ check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[2], funding_tx);
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+ // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
+ // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
+ // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
+ // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
+ (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
+ }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+ // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
+ // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
+ confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
+ },
+ // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
+ // long.
+ Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, true);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+
+ // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
+ // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
+ confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
+ }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+ assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
+ }
+
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+ // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
+ // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
+ if !prev_commitment_tx {
+ expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
+ }
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }],
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+
+ // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
+ let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 3);
+ check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], funding_tx);
+ assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
+ assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
+ assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout,
+ a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
+ // a_broadcast_txn [1] and [2] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
+ assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
+ assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
+
+ // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
+ // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
+ }],
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+ // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
+ // balance entry.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, true);
+
+ let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+ assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, a_broadcast_txn[2]);
+ } else { panic!(); }
+
+ // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
+ // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
+ // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
+ let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
+ confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
+ }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
+ }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
+ // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
+
+ let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+ assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
+ }
+
+ assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+ confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
+ }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }]),
+ sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+ // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
+ // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
+
+ let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
+ if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+ assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+ let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
+ check_spends!(spend_tx, b_broadcast_txn[0]);
+ } else { panic!(); }
+
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }],
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+
+ // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
+ // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
+ // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
+ mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
+ assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+ claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+ timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+ }],
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+ assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
+ do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
+ do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
+}
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff