1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 //! [`chain::Watch`]: ../trait.Watch.html
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
27 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
28 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
29 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
30 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
32 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
33 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
34 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
37 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
38 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
40 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
42 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
43 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
44 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
45 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
46 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
47 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
48 use util::logger::Logger;
49 use util::ser::{Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
51 use util::events::Event;
53 use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet, hash_map};
58 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
59 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
60 #[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
63 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
64 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
65 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
66 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
67 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
69 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
70 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
71 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
73 /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
74 /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
75 /// its docs for more details.
77 /// [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]: constant.CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID.html
82 /// (1) a channel has been force closed and
83 /// (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
84 /// this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
85 /// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
86 /// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
88 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = std::u64::MAX;
90 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
91 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
92 self.update_id.write(w)?;
93 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
94 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
95 update_step.write(w)?;
100 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
101 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
102 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
103 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
104 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
106 updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
108 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
112 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
113 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
114 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
115 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
116 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
118 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
119 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the counterparty. Once the update(s) which failed
120 /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
121 /// restore the channel to an operational state.
123 /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
124 /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
125 /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
127 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
128 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
129 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
130 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
131 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
132 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
135 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
136 /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
139 /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
140 /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
141 /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
142 /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
143 /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
146 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
147 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
148 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
150 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
151 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
152 /// of this channel).
154 /// At reception of this error, ChannelManager will force-close the channel and return at
155 /// least a final ChannelMonitorUpdate::ChannelForceClosed which must be delivered to at
156 /// least one ChannelMonitor copy. Revocation secret MUST NOT be released and offchain channel
157 /// update must be rejected.
159 /// This failure may also signal a failure to update the local persisted copy of one of
160 /// the channel monitor instance.
162 /// Note that even when you fail a holder commitment transaction update, you must store the
163 /// update to ensure you can claim from it in case of a duplicate copy of this ChannelMonitor
164 /// broadcasts it (e.g distributed channel-monitor deployment)
166 /// In case of distributed watchtowers deployment, the new version must be written to disk, as
167 /// state may have been stored but rejected due to a block forcing a commitment broadcast. This
168 /// storage is used to claim outputs of rejected state confirmed onchain by another watchtower,
169 /// lagging behind on block processing.
173 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
174 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
175 /// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
177 /// Contains a developer-readable error message.
179 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
181 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
183 pub enum MonitorEvent {
184 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
185 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
187 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was broadcasted.
188 CommitmentTxBroadcasted(OutPoint),
191 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
192 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
193 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
195 /// [`chain::Watch`]: ../trait.Watch.html
196 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
197 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
198 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
199 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
200 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource
202 impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
204 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
205 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
206 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
207 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
208 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
209 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
210 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
211 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
212 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
213 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
214 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
215 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
216 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
217 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
218 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
219 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
220 /// accurate block height.
221 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
222 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
223 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
224 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
225 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
226 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
227 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
228 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
229 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
230 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
231 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
232 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
233 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
235 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
236 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
237 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
239 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
240 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
241 /// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
242 /// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
244 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
245 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
247 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
248 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
249 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
251 /// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
252 /// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
253 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
255 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
256 struct HolderSignedTx {
257 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
259 revocation_key: PublicKey,
260 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
261 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
262 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
263 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
265 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
268 /// We use this to track counterparty commitment transactions and htlcs outputs and
269 /// use it to generate any justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
271 struct CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
272 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
273 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
274 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
275 per_htlc: HashMap<Txid, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>
278 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
279 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
280 self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(w)?;
281 self.counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(w)?;
282 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_counterparty_tx_csv))?;
283 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
284 for (ref txid, ref htlcs) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
285 w.write_all(&txid[..])?;
286 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlcs.len() as u64))?;
287 for &ref htlc in htlcs.iter() {
294 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
295 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
296 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
297 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
298 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
299 let on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
300 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
301 let mut per_htlc = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_htlc_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
302 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
303 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
304 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
305 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
306 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
307 let htlc = Readable::read(r)?;
310 if let Some(_) = per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs) {
311 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
314 CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
315 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
316 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
317 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
321 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
325 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
326 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
327 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
328 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
329 pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
331 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
332 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
333 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
334 per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
335 input_descriptor: InputDescriptors,
337 htlc: Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
338 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
341 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
342 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
343 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
344 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
345 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
348 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
352 funding_redeemscript: Script,
356 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
357 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
359 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref per_commitment_key, ref input_descriptor, ref amount, ref htlc, ref on_counterparty_tx_csv} => {
360 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
361 per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
362 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
363 counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
364 writer.write_all(&per_commitment_key[..])?;
365 input_descriptor.write(writer)?;
366 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
368 on_counterparty_tx_csv.write(writer)?;
370 &InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { ref per_commitment_point, ref counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, ref counterparty_htlc_base_key, ref preimage, ref htlc} => {
371 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
372 per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
373 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(writer)?;
374 counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(writer)?;
375 preimage.write(writer)?;
378 &InputMaterial::HolderHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
379 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
380 preimage.write(writer)?;
381 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
383 &InputMaterial::Funding { ref funding_redeemscript } => {
384 writer.write_all(&[3; 1])?;
385 funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
392 impl Readable for InputMaterial {
393 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
394 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
396 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
397 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
398 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
399 let per_commitment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
400 let input_descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
401 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
402 let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
403 let on_counterparty_tx_csv = Readable::read(reader)?;
404 InputMaterial::Revoked {
405 per_commitment_point,
406 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
407 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
412 on_counterparty_tx_csv
416 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
417 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
418 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
419 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
420 let htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
421 InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC {
422 per_commitment_point,
423 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
424 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
430 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
431 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
432 InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
438 InputMaterial::Funding {
439 funding_redeemscript: Readable::read(reader)?,
442 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
448 /// ClaimRequest is a descriptor structure to communicate between detection
449 /// and reaction module. They are generated by ChannelMonitor while parsing
450 /// onchain txn leaked from a channel and handed over to OnchainTxHandler which
451 /// is responsible for opportunistic aggregation, selecting and enforcing
452 /// bumping logic, building and signing transactions.
453 pub(crate) struct ClaimRequest {
454 // Block height before which claiming is exclusive to one party,
455 // after reaching it, claiming may be contentious.
456 pub(crate) absolute_timelock: u32,
457 // Timeout tx must have nLocktime set which means aggregating multiple
458 // ones must take the higher nLocktime among them to satisfy all of them.
459 // Sadly it has few pitfalls, a) it takes longuer to get fund back b) CLTV_DELTA
460 // of a sooner-HTLC could be swallowed by the highest nLocktime of the HTLC set.
461 // Do simplify we mark them as non-aggregable.
462 pub(crate) aggregable: bool,
463 // Basic bitcoin outpoint (txid, vout)
464 pub(crate) outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
465 // Following outpoint type, set of data needed to generate transaction digest
466 // and satisfy witness program.
467 pub(crate) witness_data: InputMaterial
470 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
471 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
472 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
474 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
475 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
476 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
478 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
481 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
485 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
486 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
488 #[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
490 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
491 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
492 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
493 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
495 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
496 unsigned_commitment_tx: Transaction, // TODO: We should actually only need the txid here
497 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
498 commitment_number: u64,
499 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
502 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
508 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
509 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
511 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
512 /// think we've fallen behind!
513 should_broadcast: bool,
517 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
518 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
520 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
522 commitment_tx.write(w)?;
523 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
524 for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
530 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
532 unsigned_commitment_tx.write(w)?;
533 commitment_number.write(w)?;
534 their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
535 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
536 for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
538 source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?;
541 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
543 payment_preimage.write(w)?;
545 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
550 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => {
552 should_broadcast.write(w)?;
558 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
559 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
560 match Readable::read(r)? {
562 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
563 commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
565 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
566 let mut res = Vec::new();
568 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
575 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
576 unsigned_commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
577 commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
578 their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
580 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
581 let mut res = Vec::new();
583 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
590 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
591 payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
595 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
596 idx: Readable::read(r)?,
597 secret: Readable::read(r)?,
601 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed {
602 should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)?
605 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
610 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
611 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
613 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
614 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
616 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
617 /// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
618 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
619 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
620 pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
621 latest_update_id: u64,
622 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
624 destination_script: Script,
625 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
626 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
627 shutdown_script: Script,
630 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
631 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
632 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
634 counterparty_tx_cache: CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction,
635 funding_redeemscript: Script,
636 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
637 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
638 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
640 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
642 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
643 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
644 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
645 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
646 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
647 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
648 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
649 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
650 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
651 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
652 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
653 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
654 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
656 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
657 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
658 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
659 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
660 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
661 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
663 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
665 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
666 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
668 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
670 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
672 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
673 pending_events: Vec<Event>,
675 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
676 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
677 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
678 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
680 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
681 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
682 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
683 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
684 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
687 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
689 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
691 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
692 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
693 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
694 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
696 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
697 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
698 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
700 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
701 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
702 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
703 holder_tx_signed: bool,
705 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
706 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
707 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
708 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
709 // the full block_connected).
710 last_block_hash: BlockHash,
711 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
714 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
715 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
716 /// underlying object
717 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
718 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
719 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
720 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
721 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
722 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
723 self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
724 self.keys.pubkeys() != other.keys.pubkeys() ||
725 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
726 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
727 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
728 self.counterparty_tx_cache != other.counterparty_tx_cache ||
729 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
730 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
731 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
732 self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
733 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
734 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
735 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
736 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
737 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
738 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
739 self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
740 self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
741 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
742 self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
743 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
744 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
745 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
746 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
747 self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed
756 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
757 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
759 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
760 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
761 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
762 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
763 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
764 pub fn serialize_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
765 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
766 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
767 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
768 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
770 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
772 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
773 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
775 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
776 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
777 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
778 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
779 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
780 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
782 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
785 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
786 self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
788 self.keys.write(writer)?;
789 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
790 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
791 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
792 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
793 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
795 self.counterparty_tx_cache.write(writer)?;
796 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
797 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
799 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
800 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
801 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
802 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
803 match second_option {
804 Some(second_pubkey) => {
805 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
808 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
813 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
817 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
819 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
821 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
822 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
823 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
824 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
825 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
826 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
827 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
831 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
832 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
833 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
834 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
835 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
836 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
837 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
841 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
842 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
843 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
844 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
847 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
848 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
849 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
850 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
853 macro_rules! serialize_holder_tx {
854 ($holder_tx: expr) => {
855 $holder_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
856 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
857 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
858 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
859 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
860 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
862 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($holder_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
863 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
864 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
865 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
866 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
868 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
872 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
877 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
878 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
879 serialize_holder_tx!(prev_holder_tx);
881 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
884 serialize_holder_tx!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
886 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
887 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
889 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
890 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
891 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
894 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_monitor_events.len() as u64))?;
895 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
897 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
901 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?
905 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
906 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
907 event.write(writer)?;
910 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
912 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
913 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
914 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
915 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
916 for ev in events.iter() {
918 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
920 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
921 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
923 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { ref descriptor } => {
925 descriptor.write(writer)?;
931 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
932 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
934 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
935 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
937 script.write(writer)?;
940 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
942 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
943 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
949 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
950 pub(crate) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
951 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
952 counterparty_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey,
953 on_holder_tx_csv: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
954 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
955 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
957 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
958 let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
959 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
960 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
961 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
963 let counterparty_tx_cache = CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: *counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: *counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv, per_htlc: HashMap::new() };
965 let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), on_holder_tx_csv);
967 let holder_tx_sequence = initial_holder_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
968 let holder_tx_locktime = initial_holder_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
969 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
970 txid: initial_holder_commitment_tx.txid(),
971 revocation_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.revocation_key,
972 a_htlc_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
973 b_htlc_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
974 delayed_payment_key: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
975 per_commitment_point: initial_holder_commitment_tx.keys.per_commitment_point,
976 feerate_per_kw: initial_holder_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
977 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
979 onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(initial_holder_commitment_tx);
981 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
982 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
986 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
988 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
989 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
990 counterparty_payment_script,
995 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
996 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
998 counterparty_tx_cache,
999 funding_redeemscript,
1000 channel_value_satoshis,
1001 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
1005 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1006 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1007 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1008 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1010 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1011 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1012 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1013 current_holder_commitment_number: 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((holder_tx_sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (holder_tx_locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor),
1015 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1016 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1017 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1019 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
1024 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1025 holder_tx_signed: false,
1027 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
1028 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
1032 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1033 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
1034 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1035 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1036 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1037 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1040 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1041 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1042 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
1043 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1048 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1049 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
1050 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1051 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1052 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
1054 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1055 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1056 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1060 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1061 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1062 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1067 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1074 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1083 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1084 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1085 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1086 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1087 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info<L: Deref>(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1088 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1089 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1090 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1092 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1093 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1096 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
1097 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1098 log_trace!(logger, "New potential counterparty commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
1099 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
1100 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
1101 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
1102 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1103 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
1104 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1105 Some(old_points) => {
1106 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1107 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1108 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1109 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1110 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1112 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1115 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1119 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1122 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
1123 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
1124 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1128 self.counterparty_tx_cache.per_htlc.insert(new_txid, htlcs);
1131 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1132 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1133 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1134 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
1135 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
1136 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1137 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1138 let sequence = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
1139 let locktime = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
1140 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1142 revocation_key: commitment_tx.keys.revocation_key,
1143 a_htlc_key: commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1144 b_htlc_key: commitment_tx.keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1145 delayed_payment_key: commitment_tx.keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1146 per_commitment_point: commitment_tx.keys.per_commitment_point,
1147 feerate_per_kw: commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
1150 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(commitment_tx);
1151 self.current_holder_commitment_number = 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1152 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1153 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
1154 if self.holder_tx_signed {
1155 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected"));
1160 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1161 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1162 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
1163 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1166 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
1167 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1170 for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
1171 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1173 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
1176 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1179 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1180 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1181 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1184 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
1185 // preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
1186 // like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
1187 // access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
1188 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
1189 match updates.updates[0] {
1190 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
1191 _ => panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage"),
1193 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
1194 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1195 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1197 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
1199 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1200 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1201 self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone())?
1203 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1204 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_revocation_point, logger),
1205 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1206 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1207 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1208 self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret)?,
1209 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
1210 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
1211 if *should_broadcast {
1212 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
1214 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
1219 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1223 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1225 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1226 self.latest_update_id
1229 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1230 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
1234 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1235 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1237 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
1238 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
1239 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
1240 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
1241 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
1242 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1243 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
1245 &self.outputs_to_watch
1248 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1249 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1251 /// [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`]: ../trait.Watch.html#tymethod.release_pending_monitor_events
1252 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1253 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1254 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
1258 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1261 /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1262 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1263 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1264 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
1265 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1266 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
1270 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1271 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1272 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
1275 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1276 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
1279 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1280 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
1283 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1284 self.current_holder_commitment_number
1287 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1288 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1289 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1290 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1291 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1292 /// revoked counterparty commitment tx
1293 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)) where L::Target: Logger {
1294 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1295 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1296 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1297 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1299 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1300 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1302 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1303 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1306 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1311 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1312 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1313 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1314 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1315 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1316 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
1317 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
1319 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
1320 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1322 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
1323 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1324 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1325 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: outp.value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
1326 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
1330 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
1331 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1332 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1333 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1334 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1335 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1336 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1338 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc: Some(htlc.clone()), on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv};
1339 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1344 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
1345 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1346 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
1347 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
1348 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1349 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
1351 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1353 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1354 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1355 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1356 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1357 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1358 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1359 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1360 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1361 let e = entry.get_mut();
1362 e.retain(|ref event| {
1364 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1365 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1370 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1372 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1373 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1381 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1382 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1384 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1385 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "counterparty");
1387 // No need to check holder commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on counterparty commitment tx
1389 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1390 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1391 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1392 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1393 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1394 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1395 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1397 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1398 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
1400 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1402 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1404 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1405 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1406 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1407 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1408 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1409 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1410 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1411 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1412 // payment_preimage.
1413 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1414 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1415 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1416 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1418 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1419 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1423 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of counterparty commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1424 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1425 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1426 let e = entry.get_mut();
1427 e.retain(|ref event| {
1429 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1430 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1435 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1437 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1438 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1446 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1447 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1449 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1450 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1453 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1454 let revocation_point_option =
1455 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1456 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1457 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1459 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1460 self.counterparty_payment_script = {
1461 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1462 // script_pubkey version
1463 let payment_hash160 = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1464 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script()
1467 // Then, try to find htlc outputs
1468 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1469 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1470 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1471 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1472 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1474 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
1475 let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
1476 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
1477 let witness_data = InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { per_commitment_point: *revocation_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage, htlc: htlc.clone() };
1478 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1485 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1488 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1489 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
1490 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
1491 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
1492 return (Vec::new(), None)
1495 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1496 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1499 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
1504 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
1505 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1506 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1508 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
1509 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { per_commitment_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, input_descriptor: InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, amount: tx.output[0].value, htlc: None, on_counterparty_tx_csv: self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1510 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
1511 let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
1512 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
1515 fn broadcast_by_holder_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
1516 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1517 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1519 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1520 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
1522 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1523 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1524 claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: holder_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 },
1525 witness_data: InputMaterial::HolderHTLC {
1526 preimage: if !htlc.offered {
1527 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1528 Some(preimage.clone())
1530 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1534 amount: htlc.amount_msat,
1536 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
1540 (claim_requests, watch_outputs, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
1543 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1544 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
1545 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1546 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)) where L::Target: Logger {
1547 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1548 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
1549 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1551 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
1552 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
1553 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} holder commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1554 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1555 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1556 let e = entry.get_mut();
1557 e.retain(|ref event| {
1559 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1560 return htlc_update.0 != $source
1565 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
1567 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1568 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
1574 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
1575 ($updates: expr) => {
1576 claim_requests = $updates.0;
1577 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
1578 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.2;
1582 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
1583 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
1585 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1586 is_holder_tx = true;
1587 log_trace!(logger, "Got latest holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1588 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(tx, &self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1589 append_onchain_update!(res);
1590 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1591 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1592 is_holder_tx = true;
1593 log_trace!(logger, "Got previous holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1594 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(tx, holder_tx);
1595 append_onchain_update!(res);
1599 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
1600 ($holder_tx: expr) => {
1601 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$holder_tx.htlc_outputs {
1602 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
1603 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
1604 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
1612 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1613 if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1614 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(holder_tx);
1618 (claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1621 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1622 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
1623 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
1624 /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1625 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1626 /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1627 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1628 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1629 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1630 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
1631 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
1632 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
1633 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1634 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1635 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1636 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1637 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1638 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1639 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1640 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1644 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1645 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1650 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
1651 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
1657 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1658 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1659 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1660 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1661 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
1662 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
1663 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1664 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1665 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1666 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1667 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1668 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1669 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1670 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1674 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1675 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1685 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1686 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1687 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1688 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1689 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1690 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1692 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1693 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1695 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1696 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)-> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)>
1697 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1698 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1701 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
1702 for tx in &txn_matched {
1703 let mut output_val = 0;
1704 for out in tx.output.iter() {
1705 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1706 output_val += out.value;
1707 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1711 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
1712 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
1714 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1715 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1716 for tx in &txn_matched {
1717 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1718 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1719 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1720 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1722 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1723 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
1724 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
1725 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
1726 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1727 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1729 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
1730 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
1731 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1732 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1734 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1736 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1739 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1740 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
1741 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1742 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
1743 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1748 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
1749 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
1750 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
1751 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
1753 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
1755 let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height, &logger);
1756 if should_broadcast {
1757 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding { funding_redeemscript: self.funding_redeemscript.clone() }});
1759 if should_broadcast {
1760 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
1761 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1762 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
1763 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1764 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1765 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1767 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1770 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
1773 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
1774 log_trace!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
1775 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
1776 payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
1777 payment_preimage: None,
1778 source: htlc_update.0,
1781 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
1782 log_trace!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
1783 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
1784 outputs: vec![descriptor]
1791 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator, &*logger);
1792 self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
1794 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
1795 // updating the latter in the process.
1796 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
1797 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
1798 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
1802 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
1803 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
1804 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
1805 for tx in &txn_matched {
1806 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
1807 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
1808 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
1809 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
1817 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1819 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
1820 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1821 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1824 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
1825 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
1827 if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
1829 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
1830 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
1833 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1835 self.last_block_hash = block_hash;
1838 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
1839 /// transactions thereof.
1840 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
1841 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
1842 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
1843 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
1844 for input in tx.input.iter() {
1845 if matches { break; }
1846 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
1851 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
1854 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
1857 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
1858 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
1859 for input in tx.input.iter() {
1860 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
1861 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1862 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
1865 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
1866 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
1867 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
1868 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
1869 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().clone()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
1870 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1871 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
1872 } else { panic!(); }
1883 fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
1884 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
1885 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
1886 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
1887 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
1888 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
1889 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
1890 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
1891 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
1892 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
1893 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
1894 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
1895 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
1896 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
1897 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1898 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1899 // time out the HTLC first.
1900 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1901 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1902 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1903 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1904 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1905 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1906 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1907 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1908 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1909 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1910 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1911 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1912 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1913 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1914 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1915 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1916 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
1917 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1918 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
1919 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
1920 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
1921 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1922 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1923 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1930 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
1932 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1933 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
1934 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
1937 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1938 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
1939 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
1946 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
1947 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
1948 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1949 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
1950 let mut payment_data = None;
1951 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
1952 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
1953 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
1954 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
1956 macro_rules! log_claim {
1957 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
1958 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
1959 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid counterparty commitment txid
1960 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
1961 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
1962 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
1963 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
1964 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
1965 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
1966 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
1967 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
1968 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
1970 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
1971 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
1972 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
1973 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
1978 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
1979 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
1980 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
1981 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
1982 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
1983 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
1984 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
1985 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
1994 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
1995 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
1996 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
1997 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
1998 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
1999 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
2000 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2001 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
2002 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2003 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2004 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2005 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2006 } else if !$holder_tx {
2007 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2008 if payment_data.is_none() {
2009 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2012 if payment_data.is_none() {
2013 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
2014 continue 'outer_loop;
2021 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2022 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2023 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
2025 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2026 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2027 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2028 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
2031 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2032 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2033 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
2036 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2037 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2038 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2039 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2040 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2041 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2042 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
2043 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2044 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2046 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2050 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2051 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2052 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
2053 upd.source == source
2055 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2056 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2058 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2063 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2064 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2065 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2066 let e = entry.get_mut();
2067 e.retain(|ref event| {
2069 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2070 return htlc_update.0 != source
2075 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2077 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2078 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2086 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
2087 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2088 let mut spendable_output = None;
2089 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
2090 if i > ::std::u16::MAX as usize {
2091 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
2092 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
2093 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
2094 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
2095 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
2096 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
2097 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
2098 // non-standard due to their size.
2099 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
2100 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
2101 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
2104 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
2105 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2106 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2107 output: outp.clone(),
2110 } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
2111 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2112 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
2113 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2114 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
2115 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
2116 output: outp.clone(),
2117 key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
2118 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
2122 } else if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
2123 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutputCounterpartyPayment {
2124 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2125 output: outp.clone(),
2126 key_derivation_params: self.keys.key_derivation_params(),
2129 } else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
2130 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2131 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2132 output: outp.clone(),
2136 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2137 log_trace!(logger, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2138 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2139 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2140 let e = entry.get_mut();
2141 e.push(OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output });
2143 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2144 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output }]);
2151 /// `Persist` defines behavior for persisting channel monitors: this could mean
2152 /// writing once to disk, and/or uploading to one or more backup services.
2154 /// Note that for every new monitor, you **must** persist the new `ChannelMonitor`
2155 /// to disk/backups. And, on every update, you **must** persist either the
2156 /// `ChannelMonitorUpdate` or the updated monitor itself. Otherwise, there is risk
2157 /// of situations such as revoking a transaction, then crashing before this
2158 /// revocation can be persisted, then unintentionally broadcasting a revoked
2159 /// transaction and losing money. This is a risk because previous channel states
2160 /// are toxic, so it's important that whatever channel state is persisted is
2161 /// kept up-to-date.
2162 pub trait Persist<Keys: ChannelKeys>: Send + Sync {
2163 /// Persist a new channel's data. The data can be stored any way you want, but
2164 /// the identifier provided by Rust-Lightning is the channel's outpoint (and
2165 /// it is up to you to maintain a correct mapping between the outpoint and the
2166 /// stored channel data). Note that you **must** persist every new monitor to
2167 /// disk. See the `Persist` trait documentation for more details.
2169 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::serialize_for_disk`] for writing out a `ChannelMonitor`,
2170 /// and [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`] for requirements when returning errors.
2172 /// [`ChannelMonitor::serialize_for_disk`]: struct.ChannelMonitor.html#method.serialize_for_disk
2173 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`]: enum.ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.html
2174 fn persist_new_channel(&self, id: OutPoint, data: &ChannelMonitor<Keys>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
2176 /// Update one channel's data. The provided `ChannelMonitor` has already
2177 /// applied the given update.
2179 /// Note that on every update, you **must** persist either the
2180 /// `ChannelMonitorUpdate` or the updated monitor itself to disk/backups. See
2181 /// the `Persist` trait documentation for more details.
2183 /// If an implementer chooses to persist the updates only, they need to make
2184 /// sure that all the updates are applied to the `ChannelMonitors` *before*
2185 /// the set of channel monitors is given to the `ChannelManager`
2186 /// deserialization routine. See [`ChannelMonitor::update_monitor`] for
2187 /// applying a monitor update to a monitor. If full `ChannelMonitors` are
2188 /// persisted, then there is no need to persist individual updates.
2190 /// Note that there could be a performance tradeoff between persisting complete
2191 /// channel monitors on every update vs. persisting only updates and applying
2192 /// them in batches. The size of each monitor grows `O(number of state updates)`
2193 /// whereas updates are small and `O(1)`.
2195 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::serialize_for_disk`] for writing out a `ChannelMonitor`,
2196 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::write`] for writing out an update, and
2197 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`] for requirements when returning errors.
2199 /// [`ChannelMonitor::update_monitor`]: struct.ChannelMonitor.html#impl-1
2200 /// [`ChannelMonitor::serialize_for_disk`]: struct.ChannelMonitor.html#method.serialize_for_disk
2201 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::write`]: struct.ChannelMonitorUpdate.html#method.write
2202 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`]: enum.ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.html
2203 fn update_persisted_channel(&self, id: OutPoint, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, data: &ChannelMonitor<Keys>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
2206 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2208 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
2209 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2210 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2214 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2219 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2220 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2221 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2222 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2225 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2226 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2228 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2229 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2231 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
2232 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2233 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2234 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
2237 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2239 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2240 let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2242 let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
2243 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2244 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2245 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2246 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2247 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2249 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
2250 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2251 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2253 let counterparty_tx_cache = Readable::read(reader)?;
2254 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
2255 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
2257 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2258 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2262 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2263 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2264 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2265 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2267 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2272 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2274 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
2276 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2279 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2280 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2281 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2282 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2283 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2285 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2286 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2292 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2293 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2294 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
2295 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2296 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2297 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2298 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2299 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2301 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2302 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2306 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2307 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2308 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2309 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2310 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2311 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
2312 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2316 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2317 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2318 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
2319 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2320 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2321 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2322 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2326 macro_rules! read_holder_tx {
2329 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2330 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2331 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2332 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2333 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2334 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2335 let feerate_per_kw: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2337 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2338 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2339 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2340 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2341 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2343 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
2344 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2346 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2351 revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
2358 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2361 Some(read_holder_tx!())
2363 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2365 let current_holder_commitment_tx = read_holder_tx!();
2367 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2368 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2370 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2371 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2372 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2373 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2374 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2375 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2376 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2380 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2381 let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
2382 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
2383 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2384 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
2385 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_info.0),
2386 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
2388 pending_monitor_events.push(ev);
2391 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2392 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
2393 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
2394 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
2395 pending_events.push(event);
2399 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2401 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2402 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2403 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2404 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2405 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2406 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2407 for _ in 0..events_len {
2408 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2410 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2411 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2412 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2413 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
2417 let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
2418 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2422 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2426 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
2429 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2430 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
2431 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
2432 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2433 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2434 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
2435 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
2436 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
2438 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
2439 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2442 let onchain_tx_handler = Readable::read(reader)?;
2444 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
2445 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
2447 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2449 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2452 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
2453 counterparty_payment_script,
2458 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
2459 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
2461 counterparty_tx_cache,
2462 funding_redeemscript,
2463 channel_value_satoshis,
2464 their_cur_revocation_points,
2469 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
2470 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2471 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
2473 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
2474 current_holder_commitment_tx,
2475 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
2476 current_holder_commitment_number,
2479 pending_monitor_events,
2482 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
2487 lockdown_from_offchain,
2491 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
2498 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2499 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2500 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2501 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2502 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2503 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2504 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2505 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2506 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
2508 use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
2509 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2510 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2511 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
2513 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
2514 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2515 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2516 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2518 use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
2521 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2522 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2523 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2525 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
2526 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2528 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2531 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
2532 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2533 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2537 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2538 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2540 let mut res = Vec::new();
2541 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2542 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2546 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2547 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
2554 macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
2555 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2557 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2558 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
2564 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2565 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2566 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2567 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2572 let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
2574 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2575 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2576 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2577 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2578 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2584 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2586 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys,
2587 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
2588 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
2589 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
2590 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
2591 10, Script::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy());
2593 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
2594 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
2595 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
2596 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
2597 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
2598 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2599 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2602 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2603 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2604 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2605 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2606 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2607 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2608 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2610 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2611 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2612 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2613 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2614 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2615 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2617 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2618 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2619 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
2620 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2621 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2622 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2623 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2624 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2626 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2627 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
2628 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2629 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2630 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2631 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2635 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
2636 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
2637 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
2639 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2640 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2641 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
2642 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2644 macro_rules! sign_input {
2645 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
2646 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2647 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
2649 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
2650 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2651 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
2653 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
2654 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2655 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
2656 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2657 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2658 sum_actual_sigs += $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len();
2659 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
2660 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec!(1));
2661 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
2662 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
2663 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
2664 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec![0]);
2666 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
2668 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
2669 println!("witness[0] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len());
2670 println!("witness[1] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[1].len());
2671 println!("witness[2] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[2].len());
2675 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
2676 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
2678 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
2679 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2681 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2682 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2686 script_sig: Script::new(),
2687 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2688 witness: Vec::new(),
2691 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
2692 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
2695 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2696 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
2698 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
2699 for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
2700 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
2703 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2705 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
2706 claim_tx.input.clear();
2707 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2709 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2710 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2714 script_sig: Script::new(),
2715 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2716 witness: Vec::new(),
2719 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2720 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
2722 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
2723 for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
2724 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
2727 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2729 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
2730 claim_tx.input.clear();
2731 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2732 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2733 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2737 script_sig: Script::new(),
2738 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2739 witness: Vec::new(),
2741 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2742 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
2744 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
2745 for (idx, inp) in inputs_des.iter().enumerate() {
2746 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
2749 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2752 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.