1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint, TxOut, Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
36 use crate::ln::channel::INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER;
37 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, ChannelId};
38 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
39 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentKey, DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, HtlcKey, RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
40 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self,CommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys};
41 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, SentHTLCId};
43 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
44 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
45 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
46 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, SignerProvider, EntropySource};
47 use crate::chain::onchaintx::{ClaimEvent, FeerateStrategy, OnchainTxHandler};
48 use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
49 use crate::chain::Filter;
50 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
51 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, RequiredWrapper, MaybeReadable, UpgradableRequired, Writer, Writeable, U48};
52 use crate::util::byte_utils;
53 use crate::events::{ClosureReason, Event, EventHandler};
54 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{AnchorDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
56 #[allow(unused_imports)]
57 use crate::prelude::*;
60 use crate::io::{self, Error};
61 use core::convert::TryInto;
63 use crate::sync::{Mutex, LockTestExt};
65 /// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
66 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
68 /// Because this represents only a small number of updates to the underlying state, it is generally
69 /// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
70 /// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
71 /// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
72 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
74 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
75 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
76 /// Historically, [`ChannelMonitor`]s didn't know their counterparty node id. However,
77 /// `ChannelManager` really wants to know it so that it can easily look up the corresponding
78 /// channel. For now, this results in a temporary map in `ChannelManager` to look up channels
79 /// by only the funding outpoint.
81 /// To eventually remove that, we repeat the counterparty node id here so that we can upgrade
82 /// `ChannelMonitor`s to become aware of the counterparty node id if they were generated prior
83 /// to when it was stored directly in them.
84 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
85 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
86 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
87 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with two exceptions specified below.
89 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
90 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] have been applied to all copies of a given
91 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
93 /// The only instances we allow where update_id values are not strictly increasing have a
94 /// special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. This update ID is used for updates that
95 /// will force close the channel by broadcasting the latest commitment transaction or
96 /// special post-force-close updates, like providing preimages necessary to claim outputs on the
97 /// broadcast commitment transaction. See its docs for more details.
99 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
101 /// The channel ID associated with these updates.
103 /// Will be `None` for `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.121 and
104 /// always `Some` otherwise.
105 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
108 /// The update ID used for a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] that is either:
110 /// (1) attempting to force close the channel by broadcasting our latest commitment transaction or
111 /// (2) providing a preimage (after the channel has been force closed) from a forward link that
112 /// allows us to spend an HTLC output on this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted
113 /// commitment transaction.
115 /// No other [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are allowed after force-close.
116 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
118 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
119 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
120 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
121 self.update_id.write(w)?;
122 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
123 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
124 update_step.write(w)?;
126 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
127 (1, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
128 (3, self.channel_id, option),
133 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
134 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
135 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
136 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
137 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
138 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
140 if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
144 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
145 let mut channel_id = None;
146 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
147 (1, counterparty_node_id, option),
148 (3, channel_id, option),
150 Ok(Self { update_id, counterparty_node_id, updates, channel_id })
154 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
155 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
156 pub enum MonitorEvent {
157 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
158 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
160 /// Indicates we broadcasted the channel's latest commitment transaction and thus closed the
161 /// channel. Holds information about the channel and why it was closed.
162 HolderForceClosedWithInfo {
163 /// The reason the channel was closed.
164 reason: ClosureReason,
165 /// The funding outpoint of the channel.
167 /// The channel ID of the channel.
168 channel_id: ChannelId,
171 /// Indicates we broadcasted the channel's latest commitment transaction and thus closed the
173 HolderForceClosed(OutPoint),
175 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
176 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] for more information on how this is used.
178 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
180 /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
181 funding_txo: OutPoint,
182 /// The channel ID of the channel associated with the [`ChannelMonitor`]
183 channel_id: ChannelId,
184 /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
185 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
187 /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
188 /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
189 monitor_update_id: u64,
192 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
193 // Note that Completed is currently never serialized to disk as it is generated only in
196 (0, funding_txo, required),
197 (2, monitor_update_id, required),
198 (4, channel_id, required),
200 (5, HolderForceClosedWithInfo) => {
201 (0, reason, upgradable_required),
202 (2, outpoint, required),
203 (4, channel_id, required),
207 (4, HolderForceClosed),
208 // 6 was `UpdateFailed` until LDK 0.0.117
211 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
212 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
213 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
214 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
215 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
216 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
217 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
218 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
219 pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
221 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
222 (0, payment_hash, required),
223 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
224 (2, source, required),
225 (4, payment_preimage, option),
228 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
229 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
230 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
231 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
232 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
233 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
234 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
235 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
236 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
237 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
238 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
239 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
240 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
241 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
242 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
243 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
244 /// accurate block height.
245 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
246 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
247 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
248 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
249 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
250 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
253 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
254 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
255 /// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
256 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
257 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
258 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
259 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
260 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
261 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
262 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
264 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
265 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
266 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
268 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
269 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
271 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
272 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
274 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
275 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
276 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
277 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
279 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
280 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
281 struct HolderSignedTx {
282 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
284 revocation_key: RevocationKey,
287 delayed_payment_key: DelayedPaymentKey,
288 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
289 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
290 to_self_value_sat: u64,
293 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
295 // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
296 // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
297 (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
298 (2, revocation_key, required),
299 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
300 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
301 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
302 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
303 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
304 (14, htlc_outputs, required_vec)
307 impl HolderSignedTx {
308 fn non_dust_htlcs(&self) -> Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
309 self.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _, _)| {
310 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
320 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
321 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
322 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
323 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
324 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: DelayedPaymentBasepoint,
325 counterparty_htlc_base_key: HtlcBasepoint,
326 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
329 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
330 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
331 w.write_all(&(0 as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
332 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
333 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
334 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
335 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
340 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
341 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
342 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
343 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
344 // used. Read it for compatibility.
345 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
346 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
347 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
348 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
349 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
350 let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
354 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
355 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
356 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
357 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
358 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
359 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
360 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
362 CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
363 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
364 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
365 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
368 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
372 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height and hash when the event was
373 /// observed, as well as the transaction causing it.
375 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
376 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
377 struct OnchainEventEntry {
380 block_hash: Option<BlockHash>, // Added as optional, will be filled in for any entry generated on 0.0.113 or after
382 transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
385 impl OnchainEventEntry {
386 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
387 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
389 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
390 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
392 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
393 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
394 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
396 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
397 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
398 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
399 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
400 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
407 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
408 best_block.height >= self.confirmation_threshold()
412 /// The (output index, sats value) for the counterparty's output in a commitment transaction.
414 /// This was added as an `Option` in 0.0.110.
415 type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;
417 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
418 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
419 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
421 /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
422 /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
423 /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
424 /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
425 /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
426 /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
429 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
430 htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
431 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
432 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
433 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
435 /// An output waiting on [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations before we hand the user the
436 /// [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`].
438 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
440 /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
442 FundingSpendConfirmation {
443 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
444 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
445 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
446 /// If the funding spend transaction was a known remote commitment transaction, we track
447 /// the output index and amount of the counterparty's `to_self` output here.
449 /// This allows us to generate a [`Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`] for the
450 /// counterparty output.
451 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
453 /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
454 /// is constructed. This is used when
455 /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
456 /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
457 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
458 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
459 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
461 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by an
462 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Failure transaction (and is still claimable with a revocation
464 HTLCSpendConfirmation {
465 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
466 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
467 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
468 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
469 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
470 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
471 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
475 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
476 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
477 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
478 (0, self.txid, required),
479 (1, self.transaction, option),
480 (2, self.height, required),
481 (3, self.block_hash, option),
482 (4, self.event, required),
488 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
489 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
490 let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
491 let mut transaction = None;
492 let mut block_hash = None;
494 let mut event = UpgradableRequired(None);
495 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
497 (1, transaction, option),
498 (2, height, required),
499 (3, block_hash, option),
500 (4, event, upgradable_required),
502 Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, block_hash, event: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(event, upgradable_required) }))
506 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
508 (0, source, required),
509 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
510 (2, payment_hash, required),
511 (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
513 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
514 (0, descriptor, required),
516 (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
517 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
518 (1, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, option),
520 (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
521 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
522 (2, preimage, option),
523 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
528 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
529 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
530 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
531 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
532 /// Note that LDK after 0.0.115 supports this only containing dust HTLCs (implying the
533 /// `Signature` field is never filled in). At that point, non-dust HTLCs are implied by the
534 /// HTLC fields in `commitment_tx` and the sources passed via `nondust_htlc_sources`.
535 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
536 claimed_htlcs: Vec<(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)>,
537 nondust_htlc_sources: Vec<HTLCSource>,
539 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
540 commitment_txid: Txid,
541 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
542 commitment_number: u64,
543 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
544 feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>,
545 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Option<u64>,
546 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Option<u64>,
549 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
555 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
556 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
558 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
559 /// think we've fallen behind!
560 should_broadcast: bool,
563 scriptpubkey: ScriptBuf,
567 impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
568 fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
570 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
571 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
572 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
573 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
574 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
575 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
580 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
581 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
582 (0, commitment_tx, required),
583 (1, claimed_htlcs, optional_vec),
584 (2, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
585 (4, nondust_htlc_sources, optional_vec),
587 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
588 (0, commitment_txid, required),
589 (1, feerate_per_kw, option),
590 (2, commitment_number, required),
591 (3, to_broadcaster_value_sat, option),
592 (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
593 (5, to_countersignatory_value_sat, option),
594 (6, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
596 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
597 (0, payment_preimage, required),
599 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
601 (2, secret, required),
603 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
604 (0, should_broadcast, required),
606 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
607 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
611 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
613 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
615 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
616 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
618 /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
619 /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
620 /// force-closed now.
621 ClaimableOnChannelClose {
622 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
623 /// required to do so.
624 amount_satoshis: u64,
626 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
627 /// we consider it spendable.
628 ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
629 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
630 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
631 amount_satoshis: u64,
632 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
634 confirmation_height: u32,
636 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
637 /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
638 /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
640 /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
641 /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
642 /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
643 ContentiousClaimable {
644 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
645 /// required to do so.
646 amount_satoshis: u64,
647 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
650 /// The payment hash that locks this HTLC.
651 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
652 /// The preimage that can be used to claim this HTLC.
653 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
655 /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
656 /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
657 /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
658 MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
659 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
660 /// which will be required to do so.
661 amount_satoshis: u64,
662 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
664 claimable_height: u32,
665 /// The payment hash whose preimage our counterparty needs to claim this HTLC.
666 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
668 /// HTLCs which we received from our counterparty which are claimable with a preimage which we
669 /// do not currently have. This will only be claimable if we receive the preimage from the node
670 /// to which we forwarded this HTLC before the timeout.
671 MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
672 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
673 /// which will be required to do so.
674 amount_satoshis: u64,
675 /// The height at which our counterparty will be able to claim the balance if we have not
676 /// yet received the preimage and claimed it ourselves.
678 /// The payment hash whose preimage we need to claim this HTLC.
679 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
681 /// The channel has been closed, and our counterparty broadcasted a revoked commitment
684 /// Thus, we're able to claim all outputs in the commitment transaction, one of which has the
685 /// following amount.
686 CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
687 /// The amount, in satoshis, of the output which we can claim.
689 /// Note that for outputs from HTLC balances this may be excluding some on-chain fees that
690 /// were already spent.
691 amount_satoshis: u64,
696 /// The amount claimable, in satoshis. This excludes balances that we are unsure if we are able
697 /// to claim, this is because we are waiting for a preimage or for a timeout to expire. For more
698 /// information on these balances see [`Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC`] and
699 /// [`Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC`].
701 /// On-chain fees required to claim the balance are not included in this amount.
702 pub fn claimable_amount_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
704 Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis, .. }|
705 Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. }|
706 Balance::ContentiousClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }|
707 Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }
709 Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { .. }|
710 Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { .. }
716 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
717 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
718 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
719 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
720 /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
721 /// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
723 resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
724 resolving_tx: Option<Transaction>,
725 /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
726 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
729 // In LDK versions prior to 0.0.111 commitment_tx_output_idx was not Option-al and
730 // IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC objects only existed for non-dust HTLCs. This was a bug, but to maintain
731 // backwards compatibility we must ensure we always write out a commitment_tx_output_idx field,
732 // using `u32::max_value()` as a sentinal to indicate the HTLC was dust.
733 impl Writeable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
734 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
735 let mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = self.commitment_tx_output_idx.unwrap_or(u32::max_value());
736 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
737 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
738 (1, self.resolving_txid, option),
739 (2, self.payment_preimage, option),
740 (3, self.resolving_tx, option),
746 impl Readable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
747 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
748 let mut mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = 0;
749 let mut resolving_txid = None;
750 let mut payment_preimage = None;
751 let mut resolving_tx = None;
752 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
753 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
754 (1, resolving_txid, option),
755 (2, payment_preimage, option),
756 (3, resolving_tx, option),
759 commitment_tx_output_idx: if mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx == u32::max_value() { None } else { Some(mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx) },
767 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
768 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
770 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
771 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
773 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
774 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
775 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
776 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
777 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
778 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
780 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
782 pub(super) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
785 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Clone for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: Clone {
786 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
787 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap().clone();
788 ChannelMonitor::from_impl(inner)
792 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
793 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
794 latest_update_id: u64,
795 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
797 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
798 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(ScriptBuf, PublicKey, RevocationKey)>,
799 counterparty_payment_script: ScriptBuf,
800 shutdown_script: Option<ScriptBuf>,
802 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
803 holder_revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint,
804 channel_id: ChannelId,
805 funding_info: (OutPoint, ScriptBuf),
806 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
807 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
809 counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
810 funding_redeemscript: ScriptBuf,
811 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
812 // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
813 their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
815 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
817 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
818 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
819 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
820 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
821 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
822 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
823 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
824 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
825 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
826 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
827 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
828 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
829 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
830 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
831 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
832 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
834 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: HashMap<SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage>,
836 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
837 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
838 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
839 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
840 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
841 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
843 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
845 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
846 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
848 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
850 /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
851 /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
852 /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
854 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
856 // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
857 // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
858 // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
859 // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
860 // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
861 // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
862 // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
863 // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
864 // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
865 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
867 pub(super) pending_events: Vec<Event>,
868 pub(super) is_processing_pending_events: bool,
870 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
871 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
872 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
873 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
875 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
876 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
877 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
878 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
879 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>>,
882 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
884 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
886 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
887 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
888 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
889 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
891 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
892 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
893 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
895 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
896 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
897 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
898 holder_tx_signed: bool,
900 // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
901 // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
902 // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
903 funding_spend_seen: bool,
905 /// Set to `Some` of the confirmed transaction spending the funding input of the channel after
906 /// reaching `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` confirmations.
907 funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
909 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
910 /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
911 /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
912 /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
913 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
915 /// The set of `SpendableOutput` events which we have already passed upstream to be claimed.
916 /// These are tracked explicitly to ensure that we don't generate the same events redundantly
917 /// if users duplicatively confirm old transactions. Specifically for transactions claiming a
918 /// revoked remote outpoint we otherwise have no tracking at all once they've reached
919 /// [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`], so we have to track them here.
920 spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec<Txid>,
922 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
923 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
924 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
925 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
926 // the full block_connected).
927 best_block: BestBlock,
929 /// The node_id of our counterparty
930 counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
932 /// Initial counterparty commmitment data needed to recreate the commitment tx
933 /// in the persistence pipeline for third-party watchtowers. This will only be present on
934 /// monitors created after 0.0.117.
936 /// Ordering of tuple data: (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_sats,
937 /// to_countersignatory_sats)
938 initial_counterparty_commitment_info: Option<(PublicKey, u32, u64, u64)>,
941 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
942 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
944 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: PartialEq {
945 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
946 // We need some kind of total lockorder. Absent a better idea, we sort by position in
947 // memory and take locks in that order (assuming that we can't move within memory while a
949 let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
950 let a = if ord { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
951 let b = if ord { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
956 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
957 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
958 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
962 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
963 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
964 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
966 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
967 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
968 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
970 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
972 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
973 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
975 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
976 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
977 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
978 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
979 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
980 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
982 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
985 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
986 match &self.shutdown_script {
987 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
988 None => ScriptBuf::new().write(writer)?,
991 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
992 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
993 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
994 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.index.to_be_bytes())?;
995 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
996 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
997 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
999 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
1000 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
1001 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
1003 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
1004 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
1005 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
1006 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
1007 match second_option {
1008 Some(second_pubkey) => {
1009 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
1012 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
1017 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1021 writer.write_all(&self.on_holder_tx_csv.to_be_bytes())?;
1023 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
1025 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
1026 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
1027 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
1028 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.amount_msat.to_be_bytes())?;
1029 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes())?;
1030 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
1031 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
1035 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1036 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1037 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1038 writer.write_all(&(htlc_infos.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1039 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
1040 debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
1041 || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
1042 "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
1043 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1044 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
1048 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1049 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1050 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1051 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1054 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1055 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1056 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1057 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1060 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1061 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1062 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
1064 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1067 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
1069 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
1070 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
1072 writer.write_all(&(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1073 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1074 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1077 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
1078 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
1079 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) => true,
1080 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => true,
1082 }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1083 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
1085 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
1089 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
1090 // `HolderForceClosedWithInfo` replaced `HolderForceClosed` in v0.0.122. To keep
1091 // backwards compatibility, we write a `HolderForceClosed` event along with the
1092 // `HolderForceClosedWithInfo` event. This is deduplicated in the reader.
1093 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => 1u8.write(writer)?,
1094 _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
1098 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_events.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1099 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1100 event.write(writer)?;
1103 self.best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
1104 writer.write_all(&self.best_block.height.to_be_bytes())?;
1106 writer.write_all(&(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1107 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1108 entry.write(writer)?;
1111 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1112 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1113 txid.write(writer)?;
1114 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1115 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
1117 script.write(writer)?;
1120 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1122 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1123 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1125 // If we have a `HolderForceClosedWithInfo` event, we need to write the `HolderForceClosed` for backwards compatibility.
1126 let pending_monitor_events = match self.pending_monitor_events.iter().find(|ev| match ev {
1127 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => true,
1130 Some(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { outpoint, .. }) => {
1131 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.pending_monitor_events.clone();
1132 pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(*outpoint));
1133 pending_monitor_events
1135 _ => self.pending_monitor_events.clone(),
1138 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1139 (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
1140 (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, required_vec),
1141 (5, pending_monitor_events, required_vec),
1142 (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
1143 (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
1144 (11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
1145 (13, self.spendable_txids_confirmed, required_vec),
1146 (15, self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, required),
1147 (17, self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option),
1148 (19, self.channel_id, required),
1155 macro_rules! _process_events_body {
1156 ($self_opt: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1158 let (pending_events, repeated_events);
1159 if let Some(us) = $self_opt {
1160 let mut inner = us.inner.lock().unwrap();
1161 if inner.is_processing_pending_events {
1164 inner.is_processing_pending_events = true;
1166 pending_events = inner.pending_events.clone();
1167 repeated_events = inner.get_repeated_events();
1169 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1171 for event in pending_events.into_iter().chain(repeated_events.into_iter()) {
1172 $event_to_handle = event;
1176 if let Some(us) = $self_opt {
1177 let mut inner = us.inner.lock().unwrap();
1178 inner.pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1179 inner.is_processing_pending_events = false;
1180 if !inner.pending_events.is_empty() {
1181 // If there's more events to process, go ahead and do so.
1189 pub(super) use _process_events_body as process_events_body;
1191 pub(crate) struct WithChannelMonitor<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
1193 peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
1194 channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1197 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelMonitor<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
1198 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
1199 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
1200 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
1201 self.logger.log(record)
1205 impl<'a, L: Deref> WithChannelMonitor<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
1206 pub(crate) fn from<S: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(logger: &'a L, monitor: &ChannelMonitor<S>) -> Self {
1207 Self::from_impl(logger, &*monitor.inner.lock().unwrap())
1210 pub(crate) fn from_impl<S: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(logger: &'a L, monitor_impl: &ChannelMonitorImpl<S>) -> Self {
1211 let peer_id = monitor_impl.counterparty_node_id;
1212 let channel_id = Some(monitor_impl.channel_id());
1213 WithChannelMonitor {
1214 logger, peer_id, channel_id,
1219 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1220 /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
1221 /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
1222 /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
1223 fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
1224 ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
1227 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1228 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, ScriptBuf),
1229 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
1230 funding_redeemscript: ScriptBuf, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1231 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1232 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1233 best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId,
1234 ) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1236 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1237 let counterparty_payment_script = chan_utils::get_counterparty_payment_script(
1238 &channel_parameters.channel_type_features, &keys.pubkeys().payment_point
1241 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
1242 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
1243 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
1244 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1246 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
1247 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1249 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1250 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1251 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1252 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1254 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1255 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1257 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1258 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1259 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1260 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1261 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1262 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1263 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1264 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1266 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1269 let onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(
1270 channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id, destination_script.into(), keys,
1271 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx
1274 let mut outputs_to_watch = new_hash_map();
1275 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1277 Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1278 latest_update_id: 0,
1279 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1281 destination_script: destination_script.into(),
1282 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1283 counterparty_payment_script,
1287 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1290 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1291 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1293 counterparty_commitment_params,
1294 funding_redeemscript,
1295 channel_value_satoshis,
1296 their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
1298 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1300 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1301 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: new_hash_map(),
1302 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: new_hash_map(),
1303 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: new_hash_map(),
1304 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: new_hash_map(),
1306 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1307 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1308 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1309 current_holder_commitment_number,
1311 payment_preimages: new_hash_map(),
1312 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1313 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1314 is_processing_pending_events: false,
1316 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1321 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1322 holder_tx_signed: false,
1323 funding_spend_seen: false,
1324 funding_spend_confirmed: None,
1325 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: None,
1326 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1327 spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec::new(),
1330 counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
1331 initial_counterparty_commitment_info: None,
1336 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1337 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1340 /// A variant of `Self::provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx` used to provide
1341 /// additional information to the monitor to store in order to recreate the initial
1342 /// counterparty commitment transaction during persistence (mainly for use in third-party
1345 /// This is used to provide the counterparty commitment information directly to the monitor
1346 /// before the initial persistence of a new channel.
1347 pub(crate) fn provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1348 &self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1349 commitment_number: u64, their_cur_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u32,
1350 to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, logger: &L,
1352 where L::Target: Logger
1354 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1355 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1356 inner.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(txid,
1357 htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_cur_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
1358 to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, &logger);
1361 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1362 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1363 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1364 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1366 fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1369 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1370 commitment_number: u64,
1371 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
1373 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1374 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1375 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1376 inner.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1377 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, &logger)
1381 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1382 &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1383 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1384 ) -> Result<(), ()> {
1385 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, &Vec::new(), Vec::new()).map_err(|_| ())
1388 /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
1389 /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
1390 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1392 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1393 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1395 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1398 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1399 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1402 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1403 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1404 inner.provide_payment_preimage(
1405 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1408 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1411 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1412 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1414 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1420 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1421 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1424 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1425 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1426 inner.update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1429 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1431 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1432 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1435 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1436 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, ScriptBuf) {
1437 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1440 /// Gets the channel_id of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1441 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1442 self.inner.lock().unwrap().channel_id()
1445 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1446 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1447 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>)> {
1448 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1449 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1452 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1453 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1454 /// have been registered.
1455 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&self, filter: &F, logger: &L)
1457 F::Target: chain::Filter, L::Target: Logger,
1459 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1460 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*lock);
1461 log_trace!(&logger, "Registering funding outpoint {}", &lock.get_funding_txo().0);
1462 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1463 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1464 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1465 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1466 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 };
1467 log_trace!(logger, "Registering outpoint {} with the filter for monitoring spends", outpoint);
1468 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1471 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1477 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1478 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1479 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1480 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1483 /// Processes [`SpendableOutputs`] events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] upon maturity.
1485 /// For channels featuring anchor outputs, this method will also process [`BumpTransaction`]
1486 /// events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] while there is a balance to claim onchain
1487 /// within each channel. As the confirmation of a commitment transaction may be critical to the
1488 /// safety of funds, we recommend invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an
1489 /// environment with spotty connections, like on mobile.
1491 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider, though this shouldn't be needed in
1492 /// order to handle these events.
1494 /// [`SpendableOutputs`]: crate::events::Event::SpendableOutputs
1495 /// [`BumpTransaction`]: crate::events::Event::BumpTransaction
1496 pub fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: &H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
1498 process_events_body!(Some(self), ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
1501 /// Processes any events asynchronously.
1503 /// See [`Self::process_pending_events`] for more information.
1504 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
1508 process_events_body!(Some(self), ev, { handler(ev).await });
1512 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1513 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1514 let mut lck = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1515 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut lck.pending_events);
1516 ret.append(&mut lck.get_repeated_events());
1520 /// Gets the counterparty's initial commitment transaction. The returned commitment
1521 /// transaction is unsigned. This is intended to be called during the initial persistence of
1522 /// the monitor (inside an implementation of [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]), to allow for
1523 /// watchtowers in the persistence pipeline to have enough data to form justice transactions.
1525 /// This is similar to [`Self::counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update`], except
1526 /// that for the initial commitment transaction, we don't have a corresponding update.
1528 /// This will only return `Some` for channel monitors that have been created after upgrading
1529 /// to LDK 0.0.117+.
1531 /// [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::persist_new_channel
1532 pub fn initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(&self) -> Option<CommitmentTransaction> {
1533 self.inner.lock().unwrap().initial_counterparty_commitment_tx()
1536 /// Gets all of the counterparty commitment transactions provided by the given update. This
1537 /// may be empty if the update doesn't include any new counterparty commitments. Returned
1538 /// commitment transactions are unsigned.
1540 /// This is provided so that watchtower clients in the persistence pipeline are able to build
1541 /// justice transactions for each counterparty commitment upon each update. It's intended to be
1542 /// used within an implementation of [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`], which is provided
1543 /// with a monitor and an update. Once revoked, signing a justice transaction can be done using
1544 /// [`Self::sign_to_local_justice_tx`].
1546 /// It is expected that a watchtower client may use this method to retrieve the latest counterparty
1547 /// commitment transaction(s), and then hold the necessary data until a later update in which
1548 /// the monitor has been updated with the corresponding revocation data, at which point the
1549 /// monitor can sign the justice transaction.
1551 /// This will only return a non-empty list for monitor updates that have been created after
1552 /// upgrading to LDK 0.0.117+. Note that no restriction lies on the monitors themselves, which
1553 /// may have been created prior to upgrading.
1555 /// [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::update_persisted_channel
1556 pub fn counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(&self, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Vec<CommitmentTransaction> {
1557 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(update)
1560 /// Wrapper around [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output`] to make
1561 /// signing the justice transaction easier for implementors of
1562 /// [`chain::chainmonitor::Persist`]. On success this method returns the provided transaction
1563 /// signing the input at `input_idx`. This method will only produce a valid signature for
1564 /// a transaction spending the `to_local` output of a commitment transaction, i.e. this cannot
1565 /// be used for revoked HTLC outputs.
1567 /// `Value` is the value of the output being spent by the input at `input_idx`, committed
1568 /// in the BIP 143 signature.
1570 /// This method will only succeed if this monitor has received the revocation secret for the
1571 /// provided `commitment_number`. If a commitment number is provided that does not correspond
1572 /// to the commitment transaction being revoked, this will return a signed transaction, but
1573 /// the signature will not be valid.
1575 /// [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output`]: crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output
1576 /// [`Persist`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist
1577 pub fn sign_to_local_justice_tx(&self, justice_tx: Transaction, input_idx: usize, value: u64, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
1578 self.inner.lock().unwrap().sign_to_local_justice_tx(justice_tx, input_idx, value, commitment_number)
1581 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1582 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1585 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1586 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1589 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1590 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1593 /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
1595 /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
1597 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
1598 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
1601 /// You may use this to broadcast the latest local commitment transaction, either because
1602 /// a monitor update failed or because we've fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our
1603 /// counterparty side knows a revocation secret we gave them that they shouldn't know).
1605 /// Broadcasting these transactions in this manner is UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty
1606 /// side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to broadcast them if counterparty doesn't
1607 /// close channel with their commitment transaction after a substantial amount of time. Best
1608 /// may be to contact the other node operator out-of-band to coordinate other options available
1610 pub fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1611 &self, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L
1614 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1615 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1618 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1619 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&**fee_estimator);
1620 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1621 inner.queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast(broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger);
1624 /// Unsafe test-only version of `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` used by our test framework
1625 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1626 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1627 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1628 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1629 where L::Target: Logger {
1630 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1631 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1632 inner.unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&logger)
1635 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1636 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1637 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1638 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1639 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1640 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1642 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1643 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1645 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1646 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1649 txdata: &TransactionData,
1654 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1656 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1657 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1660 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1661 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1662 inner.block_connected(
1663 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1666 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1668 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1676 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1677 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1680 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1681 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1682 inner.block_disconnected(
1683 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1686 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1687 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1689 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1690 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1692 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1693 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1696 txdata: &TransactionData,
1701 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1703 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1704 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1707 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1708 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1709 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1710 inner.transactions_confirmed(
1711 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger)
1714 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1716 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1717 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1719 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1720 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1727 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1728 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1731 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1732 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1733 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1734 inner.transaction_unconfirmed(
1735 txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger
1739 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1740 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1742 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1743 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1745 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1746 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1753 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1755 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1756 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1759 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1760 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1761 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1762 inner.best_block_updated(
1763 header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger
1767 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1768 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
1769 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1770 let mut txids: Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1772 .map(|entry| (entry.txid, entry.height, entry.block_hash))
1773 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1775 txids.sort_unstable_by(|a, b| a.0.cmp(&b.0).then(b.1.cmp(&a.1)));
1776 txids.dedup_by_key(|(txid, _, _)| *txid);
1780 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1781 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1782 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1783 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1786 /// Triggers rebroadcasts/fee-bumps of pending claims from a force-closed channel. This is
1787 /// crucial in preventing certain classes of pinning attacks, detecting substantial mempool
1788 /// feerate changes between blocks, and ensuring reliability if broadcasting fails. We recommend
1789 /// invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an environment with spotty
1790 /// connections, like on mobile.
1791 pub fn rebroadcast_pending_claims<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1792 &self, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L,
1795 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1796 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1799 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1800 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1801 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1802 let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
1803 inner.onchain_tx_handler.rebroadcast_pending_claims(
1804 current_height, FeerateStrategy::HighestOfPreviousOrNew, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger,
1808 /// Triggers rebroadcasts of pending claims from a force-closed channel after a transaction
1809 /// signature generation failure.
1810 pub fn signer_unblocked<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1811 &self, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L,
1814 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1815 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1818 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1819 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1820 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1821 let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
1822 inner.onchain_tx_handler.rebroadcast_pending_claims(
1823 current_height, FeerateStrategy::RetryPrevious, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger,
1827 /// Returns the descriptors for relevant outputs (i.e., those that we can spend) within the
1828 /// transaction if they exist and the transaction has at least [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`]
1829 /// confirmations. For [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] descriptors to be
1830 /// returned, the transaction must have at least `max(ANTI_REORG_DELAY, to_self_delay)`
1833 /// Descriptors returned by this method are primarily exposed via [`Event::SpendableOutputs`]
1834 /// once they are no longer under reorg risk. This method serves as a way to retrieve these
1835 /// descriptors at a later time, either for historical purposes, or to replay any
1836 /// missed/unhandled descriptors. For the purpose of gathering historical records, if the
1837 /// channel close has fully resolved (i.e., [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] returns
1838 /// an empty set), you can retrieve all spendable outputs by providing all descendant spending
1839 /// transactions starting from the channel's funding transaction and going down three levels.
1841 /// `tx` is a transaction we'll scan the outputs of. Any transaction can be provided. If any
1842 /// outputs which can be spent by us are found, at least one descriptor is returned.
1844 /// `confirmation_height` must be the height of the block in which `tx` was included in.
1845 pub fn get_spendable_outputs(&self, tx: &Transaction, confirmation_height: u32) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
1846 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1847 let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
1848 let mut spendable_outputs = inner.get_spendable_outputs(tx);
1849 spendable_outputs.retain(|descriptor| {
1850 let mut conf_threshold = current_height.saturating_sub(ANTI_REORG_DELAY) + 1;
1851 if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) = descriptor {
1852 conf_threshold = cmp::min(conf_threshold,
1853 current_height.saturating_sub(descriptor.to_self_delay as u32) + 1);
1855 conf_threshold >= confirmation_height
1861 pub fn get_counterparty_payment_script(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1862 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script.clone()
1866 pub fn set_counterparty_payment_script(&self, script: ScriptBuf) {
1867 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script = script;
1871 pub fn do_signer_call<F: FnMut(&Signer) -> ()>(&self, mut f: F) {
1872 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1873 f(&inner.onchain_tx_handler.signer);
1877 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1878 /// Helper for get_claimable_balances which does the work for an individual HTLC, generating up
1879 /// to one `Balance` for the HTLC.
1880 fn get_htlc_balance(&self, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, holder_commitment: bool,
1881 counterparty_revoked_commitment: bool, confirmed_txid: Option<Txid>)
1882 -> Option<Balance> {
1883 let htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx =
1884 if let Some(v) = htlc.transaction_output_index { v } else { return None; };
1886 let mut htlc_spend_txid_opt = None;
1887 let mut htlc_spend_tx_opt = None;
1888 let mut holder_timeout_spend_pending = None;
1889 let mut htlc_spend_pending = None;
1890 let mut holder_delayed_output_pending = None;
1891 for event in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1893 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx, htlc_value_satoshis, .. }
1894 if commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) => {
1895 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1896 htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
1897 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1898 htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
1899 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1900 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_value_satoshis.unwrap(), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1901 holder_timeout_spend_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1903 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. }
1904 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1905 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1906 htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
1907 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1908 htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
1909 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_pending.is_none());
1910 htlc_spend_pending = Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()));
1912 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1913 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) }
1914 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().enumerate()
1915 .any(|(input_idx, inp)|
1916 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
1917 inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx &&
1918 // A maturing output for an HTLC claim will always be at the same
1919 // index as the HTLC input. This is true pre-anchors, as there's
1920 // only 1 input and 1 output. This is also true post-anchors,
1921 // because we have a SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY signature from our
1922 // channel counterparty.
1923 descriptor.outpoint.index as usize == input_idx
1927 debug_assert!(holder_delayed_output_pending.is_none());
1928 holder_delayed_output_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1933 let htlc_resolved = self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter()
1934 .find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
1935 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1936 htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid.as_ref();
1937 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1938 htlc_spend_tx_opt = v.resolving_tx.as_ref();
1941 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_resolved.is_some() as u8 <= 1);
1943 let htlc_commitment_outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx);
1944 let htlc_output_to_spend =
1945 if let Some(txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1946 // Because HTLC transactions either only have 1 input and 1 output (pre-anchors) or
1947 // are signed with SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY under BIP-0143 (post-anchors), we can
1948 // locate the correct output by ensuring its adjacent input spends the HTLC output
1949 // in the commitment.
1950 if let Some(ref tx) = htlc_spend_tx_opt {
1951 let htlc_input_idx_opt = tx.input.iter().enumerate()
1952 .find(|(_, input)| input.previous_output == htlc_commitment_outpoint)
1953 .map(|(idx, _)| idx as u32);
1954 debug_assert!(htlc_input_idx_opt.is_some());
1955 BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, htlc_input_idx_opt.unwrap_or(0))
1957 debug_assert!(!self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
1958 BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, 0)
1961 htlc_commitment_outpoint
1963 let htlc_output_spend_pending = self.onchain_tx_handler.is_output_spend_pending(&htlc_output_to_spend);
1965 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_delayed_output_pending {
1966 debug_assert!(holder_commitment);
1967 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1968 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1969 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1971 } else if htlc_resolved.is_some() && !htlc_output_spend_pending {
1972 // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
1973 // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
1974 // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
1975 // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
1976 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
1977 debug_assert!(holder_commitment || self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
1978 } else if counterparty_revoked_commitment {
1979 let htlc_output_claim_pending = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1980 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1981 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { .. }
1983 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| {
1984 if let Some(htlc_spend_txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1985 tx.txid() == *htlc_spend_txid || inp.previous_output.txid == *htlc_spend_txid
1987 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
1988 inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx
1990 })).unwrap_or(false) {
1995 if htlc_output_claim_pending.is_some() {
1996 // We already push `Balance`s onto the `res` list for every
1997 // `StaticOutput` in a `MaturingOutput` in the revoked
1998 // counterparty commitment transaction case generally, so don't
1999 // need to do so again here.
2001 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none(),
2002 "HTLCUpdate OnchainEvents should never appear for preimage claims");
2003 debug_assert!(!htlc.offered || htlc_spend_pending.is_none() || !htlc_spend_pending.unwrap().1,
2004 "We don't (currently) generate preimage claims against revoked outputs, where did you get one?!");
2005 return Some(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
2006 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2009 } else if htlc.offered == holder_commitment {
2010 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
2011 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
2012 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
2013 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_timeout_spend_pending {
2014 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2015 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2016 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2019 return Some(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
2020 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2021 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2022 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2025 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2026 // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
2027 // we know the preimage.
2028 // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
2029 // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
2030 // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2031 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
2032 if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
2033 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2034 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2035 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2038 return Some(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
2039 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2040 timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2041 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2042 payment_preimage: *payment_preimage,
2045 } else if htlc_resolved.is_none() {
2046 return Some(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
2047 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2048 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2049 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2056 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
2057 /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
2058 /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
2061 /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
2062 /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
2063 /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
2064 /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
2066 /// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
2067 /// LDK prior to 0.0.111, not all or excess balances may be included.
2069 /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
2070 /// may be returned here and their meanings.
2071 pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
2072 let mut res = Vec::new();
2073 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
2075 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
2076 let mut confirmed_counterparty_output = us.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output;
2077 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
2078 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
2079 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } =
2082 confirmed_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
2083 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
2086 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
2087 debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
2088 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
2089 confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
2090 pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
2093 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
2094 ($holder_commitment: expr, $counterparty_revoked_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
2095 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
2096 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2098 if let Some(bal) = us.get_htlc_balance(htlc, $holder_commitment, $counterparty_revoked_commitment, confirmed_txid) {
2106 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
2107 let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
2108 if let Some(counterparty_tx_htlcs) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
2109 // First look for the to_remote output back to us.
2110 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2111 if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
2112 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2113 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
2115 Some(descriptor.output.value)
2118 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2119 amount_satoshis: value,
2120 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2123 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
2124 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
2125 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
2128 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2129 walk_htlcs!(false, false, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
2131 walk_htlcs!(false, true, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
2132 // The counterparty broadcasted a revoked state!
2133 // Look for any StaticOutputs first, generating claimable balances for those.
2134 // If any match the confirmed counterparty revoked to_self output, skip
2135 // generating a CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable.
2136 let mut spent_counterparty_output = false;
2137 for event in us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
2138 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2139 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { output, .. }
2141 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2142 amount_satoshis: output.value,
2143 confirmation_height: event.confirmation_threshold(),
2145 if let Some(confirmed_to_self_idx) = confirmed_counterparty_output.map(|(idx, _)| idx) {
2146 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx|
2147 tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.vout == confirmed_to_self_idx)
2148 ).unwrap_or(false) {
2149 spent_counterparty_output = true;
2155 if spent_counterparty_output {
2156 } else if let Some((confirmed_to_self_idx, amt)) = confirmed_counterparty_output {
2157 let output_spendable = us.onchain_tx_handler
2158 .is_output_spend_pending(&BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, confirmed_to_self_idx));
2159 if output_spendable {
2160 res.push(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
2161 amount_satoshis: amt,
2165 // Counterparty output is missing, either it was broadcasted on a
2166 // previous version of LDK or the counterparty hadn't met dust.
2169 found_commitment_tx = true;
2170 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2171 walk_htlcs!(true, false, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
2172 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2173 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2174 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
2175 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2178 found_commitment_tx = true;
2179 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2180 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
2181 walk_htlcs!(true, false, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
2182 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2183 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2184 amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
2185 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2188 found_commitment_tx = true;
2191 if !found_commitment_tx {
2192 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2193 // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
2194 // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
2195 // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
2196 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2197 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
2198 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2203 let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
2204 for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2205 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
2207 res.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
2208 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2209 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2210 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2212 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
2213 claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
2215 // As long as the HTLC is still in our latest commitment state, treat
2216 // it as potentially claimable, even if it has long-since expired.
2217 res.push(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
2218 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2219 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2220 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2224 res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
2225 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
2232 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which can be (or have been) resolved by this
2233 /// `ChannelMonitor`. This is used to determine if an HTLC was removed from the channel prior
2234 /// to the `ChannelManager` having been persisted.
2236 /// This is similar to [`Self::get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs`] except it includes
2237 /// HTLCs which were resolved on-chain (i.e. where the final HTLC resolution was done by an
2238 /// event from this `ChannelMonitor`).
2239 pub(crate) fn get_all_current_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
2240 let mut res = new_hash_map();
2241 // Just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs on
2242 // `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
2243 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
2244 macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
2246 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
2247 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
2248 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
2249 res.insert((**source).clone(), (htlc.clone(),
2250 us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned()));
2256 if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2257 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
2259 if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2260 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
2265 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel or which were
2266 /// resolved with a preimage from our counterparty.
2268 /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
2270 /// Currently, the preimage is unused, however if it is present in the relevant internal state
2271 /// an HTLC is always included even if it has been resolved.
2272 pub(crate) fn get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
2273 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
2274 // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
2275 // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
2276 // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
2277 let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
2278 us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
2279 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
2285 if confirmed_txid.is_none() {
2286 // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
2287 // closed), just get the full set.
2289 return self.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs();
2292 let mut res = new_hash_map();
2293 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
2294 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
2295 for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
2296 if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
2297 // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
2298 // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
2300 // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
2301 // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
2302 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
2303 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
2304 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
2305 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
2306 let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
2307 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
2308 // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
2309 // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
2310 // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
2311 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
2312 us.best_block.height >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
2313 } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
2314 // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
2315 // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
2317 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
2320 let counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt =
2321 us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned();
2322 if !htlc_update_confd || counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt.is_some() {
2323 res.insert(source.clone(), (htlc.clone(), counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt));
2330 let txid = confirmed_txid.unwrap();
2331 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2332 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
2333 if let &Some(ref source) = b {
2334 Some((a, &**source))
2337 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2338 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
2339 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
2341 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2342 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
2343 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
2344 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
2352 pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
2353 self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
2357 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
2358 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
2359 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
2361 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
2362 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
2363 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
2364 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
2365 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
2366 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
2368 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
2369 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
2370 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
2371 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
2372 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
2373 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
2374 $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_hash: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
2375 debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);
2377 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
2378 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
2379 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
2380 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
2381 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
2382 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
2383 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
2384 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
2385 // payment_preimage.
2386 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
2387 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
2388 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
2389 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
2391 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut dyn Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
2393 let mut matched_htlc = false;
2394 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
2395 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
2396 (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
2397 (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
2398 broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
2399 broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
2400 matched_htlc = true;
2404 if matched_htlc { continue; }
2405 if $self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).is_some() {
2408 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
2409 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
2411 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
2412 *update_source != **source
2417 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2418 txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
2419 transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
2420 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
2421 block_hash: Some(*$commitment_tx_conf_hash),
2422 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2423 source: (**source).clone(),
2424 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
2425 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
2426 commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
2429 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
2430 &htlc.payment_hash, $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
2431 $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
2432 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2438 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2439 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
2441 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2442 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
2447 // In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
2448 // witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
2449 // in-line tests later.
2452 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
2453 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2454 let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
2455 ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2456 ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2457 ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2458 ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2459 ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.to_u8();
2464 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
2465 vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
2468 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
2469 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
2470 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
2471 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
2472 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2473 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
2474 return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
2477 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
2478 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
2479 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
2480 if self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap() != txid {
2481 let cur_claimables = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
2482 &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
2483 for (_, ref source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2484 if let Some(source) = source_opt {
2485 if !cur_claimables.iter()
2486 .any(|(_, cur_source_opt)| cur_source_opt == source_opt)
2488 self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.remove(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source));
2492 for &mut (_, ref mut source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
2496 assert!(cfg!(fuzzing), "Commitment txids are unique outside of fuzzing, where hashes can collide");
2500 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
2501 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
2502 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
2503 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
2504 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
2506 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
2507 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2508 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2512 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2513 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2514 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2519 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
2526 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
2535 fn provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
2536 &mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
2537 commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u32,
2538 to_broadcaster_value: u64, to_countersignatory_value: u64, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
2539 ) where L::Target: Logger {
2540 self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info = Some((their_per_commitment_point.clone(),
2541 feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value));
2543 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2544 let rebuilt_commitment_tx = self.initial_counterparty_commitment_tx().unwrap();
2545 debug_assert_eq!(rebuilt_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), txid);
2548 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number,
2549 their_per_commitment_point, logger);
2552 fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
2553 &mut self, txid: Txid,
2554 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
2555 commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
2556 ) where L::Target: Logger {
2557 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
2558 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
2559 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
2561 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
2562 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
2565 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
2566 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
2567 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
2568 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
2569 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
2570 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
2571 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2572 Some(old_points) => {
2573 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2574 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2575 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
2576 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
2577 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2579 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2582 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2586 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2589 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
2590 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
2591 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2597 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
2598 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
2599 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
2600 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
2601 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
2602 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, mut htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>, claimed_htlcs: &[(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)], nondust_htlc_sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2603 if htlc_outputs.iter().any(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()) {
2604 // If we have non-dust HTLCs in htlc_outputs, ensure they match the HTLCs in the
2605 // `holder_commitment_tx`. In the future, we'll no longer provide the redundant data
2606 // and just pass in source data via `nondust_htlc_sources`.
2607 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).count(), holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().len());
2608 for (a, b) in htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).map(|(h, _, _)| h).zip(holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter()) {
2609 debug_assert_eq!(a, b);
2611 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).count(), holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.len());
2612 for (a, b) in htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(_, s, _)| s.as_ref()).zip(holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter()) {
2613 debug_assert_eq!(a, b);
2615 debug_assert!(nondust_htlc_sources.is_empty());
2617 // If we don't have any non-dust HTLCs in htlc_outputs, assume they were all passed via
2618 // `nondust_htlc_sources`, building up the final htlc_outputs by combining
2619 // `nondust_htlc_sources` and the `holder_commitment_tx`
2620 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2622 for htlc in holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter() {
2623 assert!(htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as i32 > prev);
2624 prev = htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as i32;
2627 debug_assert!(htlc_outputs.iter().all(|(htlc, _, _)| htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()));
2628 debug_assert!(htlc_outputs.iter().all(|(_, sig_opt, _)| sig_opt.is_none()));
2629 debug_assert_eq!(holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().len(), holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.len());
2631 let mut sources_iter = nondust_htlc_sources.into_iter();
2633 for (htlc, counterparty_sig) in holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter()
2634 .zip(holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter())
2637 let source = sources_iter.next().expect("Non-dust HTLC sources didn't match commitment tx");
2638 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2639 assert!(source.possibly_matches_output(htlc));
2641 htlc_outputs.push((htlc.clone(), Some(counterparty_sig.clone()), Some(source)));
2643 htlc_outputs.push((htlc.clone(), Some(counterparty_sig.clone()), None));
2646 debug_assert!(sources_iter.next().is_none());
2649 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
2650 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
2651 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
2652 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
2653 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
2655 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
2656 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
2657 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
2658 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
2659 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
2661 to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2662 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2664 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
2665 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2666 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
2667 for (claimed_htlc_id, claimed_preimage) in claimed_htlcs {
2668 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2669 let cur_counterparty_htlcs = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
2670 &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
2671 assert!(cur_counterparty_htlcs.iter().any(|(_, source_opt)| {
2672 if let Some(source) = source_opt {
2673 SentHTLCId::from_source(source) == *claimed_htlc_id
2677 self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.insert(*claimed_htlc_id, *claimed_preimage);
2679 if self.holder_tx_signed {
2680 return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
2685 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
2686 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
2687 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2688 &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
2689 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>)
2690 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2691 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2694 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
2696 let confirmed_spend_txid = self.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
2697 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| match event.event {
2698 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => Some(event.txid),
2702 let confirmed_spend_txid = if let Some(txid) = confirmed_spend_txid {
2708 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
2709 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
2710 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
2711 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
2712 let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None);
2713 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height, self.best_block.height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2716 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2717 if txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2718 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2719 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2721 debug_assert!(false);
2722 log_error!(logger, "Detected counterparty commitment tx on-chain without tracking commitment number");
2727 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2728 if txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2729 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2730 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2732 debug_assert!(false);
2733 log_error!(logger, "Detected counterparty commitment tx on-chain without tracking commitment number");
2739 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
2740 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
2741 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
2742 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
2743 // holder commitment transactions.
2744 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
2745 let holder_commitment_tx = if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2746 Some(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx)
2747 } else if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2748 if prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2749 Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx)
2756 if let Some(holder_commitment_tx) = holder_commitment_tx {
2757 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
2758 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
2760 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height);
2761 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height, self.best_block.height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2766 fn generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs(&mut self, reason: ClosureReason) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Vec<TransactionOutputs>) {
2767 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(
2768 self.funding_redeemscript.clone(),
2769 self.channel_value_satoshis,
2770 self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
2772 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
2773 self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32,
2774 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp),
2775 self.best_block.height, self.best_block.height
2777 let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![commitment_package];
2778 let event = MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo {
2780 outpoint: self.funding_info.0,
2781 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2783 self.pending_monitor_events.push(event);
2785 // Although we aren't signing the transaction directly here, the transaction will be signed
2786 // in the claim that is queued to OnchainTxHandler. We set holder_tx_signed here to reject
2787 // new channel updates.
2788 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2789 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2790 // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is
2791 // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in
2792 // `transactions_confirmed`.
2793 if !self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2794 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
2795 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
2796 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
2797 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(
2798 &self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height
2800 let unsigned_commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_unsigned_holder_commitment_tx();
2801 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(
2802 &self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &unsigned_commitment_tx
2804 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2805 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2807 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2809 (claimable_outpoints, watch_outputs)
2812 pub(crate) fn queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2813 &mut self, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
2816 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2817 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2820 let (claimable_outpoints, _) = self.generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs(ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2821 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(
2822 claimable_outpoints, self.best_block.height, self.best_block.height, broadcaster,
2823 fee_estimator, logger
2827 fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2828 &mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
2830 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2831 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2834 if self.latest_update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2835 log_info!(logger, "Applying post-force-closed update to monitor {} with {} change(s).",
2836 log_funding_info!(self), updates.updates.len());
2837 } else if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2838 log_info!(logger, "Applying force close update to monitor {} with {} change(s).",
2839 log_funding_info!(self), updates.updates.len());
2841 log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} change(s).",
2842 log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
2845 if updates.counterparty_node_id.is_some() {
2846 if self.counterparty_node_id.is_none() {
2847 self.counterparty_node_id = updates.counterparty_node_id;
2849 debug_assert_eq!(self.counterparty_node_id, updates.counterparty_node_id);
2853 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a preimage for a
2854 // broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd like to claim on-chain. If this
2855 // is the case, we no longer have guaranteed access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a
2856 // sentinel value instead.
2858 // The `ChannelManager` may also queue redundant `ChannelForceClosed` updates if it still
2859 // thinks the channel needs to have its commitment transaction broadcast, so we'll allow
2861 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2862 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
2863 match updates.updates[0] {
2864 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {},
2865 // We should have already seen a `ChannelForceClosed` update if we're trying to
2866 // provide a preimage at this point.
2867 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } =>
2868 debug_assert_eq!(self.latest_update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID),
2870 log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
2871 panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
2874 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
2875 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
2877 let mut ret = Ok(());
2878 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&**fee_estimator);
2879 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
2881 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources } => {
2882 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
2883 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
2884 if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone(), &claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources.clone()) {
2885 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
2886 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2890 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2891 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
2892 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
2894 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
2895 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
2896 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2898 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
2899 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
2900 if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
2901 debug_assert!(false, "Latest counterparty commitment secret was invalid");
2902 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
2903 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2907 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
2908 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
2909 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
2910 if *should_broadcast {
2911 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one
2912 // confirmed (even with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as
2913 // duplicate/conflicting.
2914 let detected_funding_spend = self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
2915 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
2916 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
2919 if detected_funding_spend {
2920 log_trace!(logger, "Avoiding commitment broadcast, already detected confirmed spend onchain");
2923 self.queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast(broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
2924 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
2925 log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast");
2926 log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", &self.channel_id());
2927 log_error!(logger, " Read the docs for ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn to take manual action!");
2929 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed, the ChannelManager
2930 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
2931 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
2932 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
2935 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
2936 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
2937 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
2938 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
2944 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2945 self.counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(updates);
2948 // If the updates succeeded and we were in an already closed channel state, then there's no
2949 // need to refuse any updates we expect to receive afer seeing a confirmed commitment.
2950 if ret.is_ok() && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && self.latest_update_id == updates.update_id {
2954 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
2956 // Refuse updates after we've detected a spend onchain, but only if we haven't processed a
2957 // force closed monitor update yet.
2958 if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen && self.latest_update_id != CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2959 log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
2964 fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2965 self.latest_update_id
2968 fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, ScriptBuf) {
2972 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
2976 fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>> {
2977 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
2978 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
2979 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
2980 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
2981 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
2983 &self.outputs_to_watch
2986 fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
2987 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2988 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
2992 /// Gets the set of events that are repeated regularly (e.g. those which RBF bump
2993 /// transactions). We're okay if we lose these on restart as they'll be regenerated for us at
2994 /// some regular interval via [`ChannelMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims`].
2995 pub(super) fn get_repeated_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
2996 let pending_claim_events = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_and_clear_pending_claim_events();
2997 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(pending_claim_events.len());
2998 for (claim_id, claim_event) in pending_claim_events {
3000 ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment {
3001 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, commitment_tx, anchor_output_idx,
3003 let channel_id = self.channel_id;
3004 // unwrap safety: `ClaimEvent`s are only available for Anchor channels,
3005 // introduced with v0.0.116. counterparty_node_id is guaranteed to be `Some`
3007 let counterparty_node_id = self.counterparty_node_id.unwrap();
3008 let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.txid();
3009 debug_assert_eq!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, commitment_txid);
3010 let pending_htlcs = self.current_holder_commitment_tx.non_dust_htlcs();
3011 let commitment_tx_fee_satoshis = self.channel_value_satoshis -
3012 commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0u64, |sum, output| sum + output.value);
3013 ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose {
3015 counterparty_node_id,
3017 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
3019 commitment_tx_fee_satoshis,
3020 anchor_descriptor: AnchorDescriptor {
3021 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
3022 keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3023 value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3024 transaction_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
3026 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint {
3027 txid: commitment_txid,
3028 vout: anchor_output_idx,
3034 ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC {
3035 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, htlcs, tx_lock_time,
3037 let channel_id = self.channel_id;
3038 // unwrap safety: `ClaimEvent`s are only available for Anchor channels,
3039 // introduced with v0.0.116. counterparty_node_id is guaranteed to be `Some`
3041 let counterparty_node_id = self.counterparty_node_id.unwrap();
3042 let mut htlc_descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs.len());
3044 htlc_descriptors.push(HTLCDescriptor {
3045 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
3046 keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3047 value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3048 transaction_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
3050 commitment_txid: htlc.commitment_txid,
3051 per_commitment_number: htlc.per_commitment_number,
3052 per_commitment_point: self.onchain_tx_handler.signer.get_per_commitment_point(
3053 htlc.per_commitment_number, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
3057 preimage: htlc.preimage,
3058 counterparty_sig: htlc.counterparty_sig,
3061 ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution {
3063 counterparty_node_id,
3065 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
3075 fn initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(&mut self) -> Option<CommitmentTransaction> {
3076 let (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_value,
3077 to_countersignatory_value) = self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info?;
3078 let htlc_outputs = vec![];
3080 let commitment_tx = self.build_counterparty_commitment_tx(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
3081 &their_per_commitment_point, to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value,
3082 feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs);
3086 fn build_counterparty_commitment_tx(
3087 &self, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: &PublicKey,
3088 to_broadcaster_value: u64, to_countersignatory_value: u64, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3089 mut nondust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>
3090 ) -> CommitmentTransaction {
3091 let broadcaster_keys = &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters
3092 .counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys;
3093 let countersignatory_keys =
3094 &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys;
3096 let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster_keys.funding_pubkey;
3097 let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory_keys.funding_pubkey;
3098 let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&their_per_commitment_point,
3099 &broadcaster_keys, &countersignatory_keys, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx);
3100 let channel_parameters =
3101 &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable();
3103 CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
3104 to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value, broadcaster_funding_key,
3105 countersignatory_funding_key, keys, feerate_per_kw, &mut nondust_htlcs,
3109 fn counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(&self, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Vec<CommitmentTransaction> {
3110 update.updates.iter().filter_map(|update| {
3112 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid,
3113 ref htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point,
3114 feerate_per_kw: Some(feerate_per_kw),
3115 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(to_broadcaster_value),
3116 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(to_countersignatory_value) } => {
3118 let nondust_htlcs = htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _)| {
3119 htlc.transaction_output_index.map(|_| (htlc.clone(), None))
3120 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3122 let commitment_tx = self.build_counterparty_commitment_tx(commitment_number,
3123 &their_per_commitment_point, to_broadcaster_value,
3124 to_countersignatory_value, feerate_per_kw, nondust_htlcs);
3126 debug_assert_eq!(commitment_tx.trust().txid(), commitment_txid);
3135 fn sign_to_local_justice_tx(
3136 &self, mut justice_tx: Transaction, input_idx: usize, value: u64, commitment_number: u64
3137 ) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
3138 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).ok_or(())?;
3139 let per_commitment_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secret).map_err(|_| ())?;
3140 let their_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(
3141 &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
3143 let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
3144 &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &their_per_commitment_point);
3145 let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
3146 &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &their_per_commitment_point);
3147 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
3148 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
3150 let sig = self.onchain_tx_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_output(
3151 &justice_tx, input_idx, value, &per_commitment_key, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx)?;
3152 justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
3153 justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(&[1u8]);
3154 justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(revokeable_redeemscript.as_bytes());
3158 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
3159 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
3160 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
3163 fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
3164 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
3167 fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
3168 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
3171 fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
3172 self.current_holder_commitment_number
3175 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
3176 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
3177 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
3178 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
3180 /// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s), as well as additional outputs to watch and
3181 /// general information about the output that is to the counterparty in the commitment
3183 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L)
3184 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo)
3185 where L::Target: Logger {
3186 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
3187 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
3188 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3189 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3190 let mut to_counterparty_output_info = None;
3192 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
3193 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
3195 macro_rules! ignore_error {
3196 ( $thing : expr ) => {
3199 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
3204 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
3205 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
3206 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
3207 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
3208 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
3209 let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &per_commitment_point,);
3210 let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
3212 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
3213 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
3215 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
3216 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3217 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
3218 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
3219 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, height);
3220 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
3221 to_counterparty_output_info =
3222 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Txn can't have more than 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
3226 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
3227 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
3228 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
3229 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3230 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
3231 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
3232 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
3233 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs),
3234 to_counterparty_output_info);
3236 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
3237 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, height);
3238 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
3243 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
3244 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
3245 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
3246 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
3247 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3248 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
3250 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
3252 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
3253 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
3254 block_hash, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
3255 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
3258 // Our fuzzers aren't constrained by pesky things like valid signatures, so can
3259 // spend our funding output with a transaction which doesn't match our past
3260 // commitment transactions. Thus, we can only debug-assert here when not
3262 debug_assert!(cfg!(fuzzing), "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
3263 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
3264 block_hash, [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
3267 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
3268 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
3269 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
3270 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
3271 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
3272 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
3273 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
3275 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3276 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
3278 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
3280 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
3281 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
3282 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
3283 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
3286 let (htlc_claim_reqs, counterparty_output_info) =
3287 self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
3288 to_counterparty_output_info = counterparty_output_info;
3289 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
3290 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
3294 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
3297 /// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
3298 fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>)
3299 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
3300 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3301 let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
3303 let htlc_outputs = match self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
3304 Some(outputs) => outputs,
3305 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
3307 let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
3308 Some(points) => points,
3309 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
3312 let per_commitment_point =
3313 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
3314 // per-commitment point
3315 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
3316 else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
3317 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
3318 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
3319 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
3320 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
3322 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
3323 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
3325 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
3326 let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(
3327 &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &per_commitment_point);
3329 let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &per_commitment_point);
3331 let revokeable_p2wsh = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
3332 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
3333 &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh();
3334 for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
3335 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
3336 to_counterparty_output_info =
3337 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
3342 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
3343 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3344 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
3345 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
3346 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
3347 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
3348 return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
3351 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
3352 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
3353 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
3354 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
3355 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
3356 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3357 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
3358 preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()))
3360 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
3361 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
3362 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3363 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
3364 htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()))
3366 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry, 0);
3367 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
3372 (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
3375 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
3376 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(
3377 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: &Txid, height: u32, logger: &L
3378 ) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
3379 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
3380 let per_commitment_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(&secret) {
3382 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
3384 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
3386 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
3387 let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![];
3388 let mut outputs_to_watch = None;
3389 // Previously, we would only claim HTLCs from revoked HTLC transactions if they had 1 input
3390 // with a witness of 5 elements and 1 output. This wasn't enough for anchor outputs, as the
3391 // counterparty can now aggregate multiple HTLCs into a single transaction thanks to
3392 // `SIGHASH_SINGLE` remote signatures, leading us to not claim any HTLCs upon seeing a
3393 // confirmed revoked HTLC transaction (for more details, see
3394 // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2022-April/003561.html).
3396 // We make sure we're not vulnerable to this case by checking all inputs of the transaction,
3397 // and claim those which spend the commitment transaction, have a witness of 5 elements, and
3398 // have a corresponding output at the same index within the transaction.
3399 for (idx, input) in tx.input.iter().enumerate() {
3400 if input.previous_output.txid == *commitment_txid && input.witness.len() == 5 && tx.output.get(idx).is_some() {
3401 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, idx);
3402 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(
3403 per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3404 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key,
3405 tx.output[idx].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
3408 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
3409 htlc_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp),
3410 height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, height
3412 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
3413 if outputs_to_watch.is_none() {
3414 outputs_to_watch = Some((htlc_txid, vec![]));
3416 outputs_to_watch.as_mut().unwrap().1.push((idx as u32, tx.output[idx].clone()));
3419 (claimable_outpoints, outputs_to_watch)
3422 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnchainTxHandler, so that the handler can
3423 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
3424 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
3425 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(ScriptBuf, PublicKey, RevocationKey)>) {
3426 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
3428 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
3429 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
3431 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3432 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3433 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
3434 let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(
3435 htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
3439 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
3442 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
3445 let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(
3446 payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
3450 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
3451 holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index,
3452 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output),
3453 htlc.cltv_expiry, conf_height
3455 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
3459 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
3462 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
3463 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
3464 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
3465 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3466 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3467 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
3473 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
3474 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
3475 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
3476 /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
3477 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
3478 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
3479 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
3480 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3482 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
3483 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
3484 claim_requests = $updates.0;
3485 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
3486 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
3490 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
3491 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
3493 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
3494 is_holder_tx = true;
3495 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
3496 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
3497 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
3498 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
3499 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
3500 block_hash, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
3501 .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
3502 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3503 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
3504 is_holder_tx = true;
3505 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
3506 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
3507 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
3508 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
3509 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
3510 holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
3516 Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
3522 /// Cancels any existing pending claims for a commitment that previously confirmed and has now
3523 /// been replaced by another.
3524 pub fn cancel_prev_commitment_claims<L: Deref>(
3525 &mut self, logger: &L, confirmed_commitment_txid: &Txid
3526 ) where L::Target: Logger {
3527 for (counterparty_commitment_txid, _) in &self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain {
3528 // Cancel any pending claims for counterparty commitments we've seen confirm.
3529 if counterparty_commitment_txid == confirmed_commitment_txid {
3532 for (htlc, _) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(counterparty_commitment_txid).unwrap_or(&vec![]) {
3533 log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously confirmed counterparty commitment {}",
3534 counterparty_commitment_txid);
3535 let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: *counterparty_commitment_txid, vout: 0 };
3536 if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3537 outpoint.vout = vout;
3538 self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
3542 if self.holder_tx_signed {
3543 // If we've signed, we may have broadcast either commitment (prev or current), and
3544 // attempted to claim from it immediately without waiting for a confirmation.
3545 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid != *confirmed_commitment_txid {
3546 log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously broadcast holder commitment {}",
3547 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid);
3548 let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, vout: 0 };
3549 for (htlc, _, _) in &self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
3550 if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3551 outpoint.vout = vout;
3552 self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
3556 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3557 if prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid != *confirmed_commitment_txid {
3558 log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously broadcast holder commitment {}",
3559 prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid);
3560 let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid, vout: 0 };
3561 for (htlc, _, _) in &prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
3562 if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3563 outpoint.vout = vout;
3564 self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
3570 // No previous claim.
3574 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
3575 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
3576 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(
3577 &mut self, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
3578 ) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
3579 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
3580 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
3581 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
3582 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
3583 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only final once the commitment
3584 // transaction confirms due to the CSV 1 encumberance.
3585 if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3586 return holder_transactions;
3588 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3589 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
3590 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
3591 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
3592 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
3596 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_maybe_signed_htlc_tx(
3597 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage
3599 if htlc_tx.is_fully_signed() {
3600 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx.0);
3608 fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3609 &mut self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B,
3610 fee_estimator: F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3611 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3612 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3613 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3616 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3617 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3619 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3620 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
3623 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3628 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3629 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3630 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3632 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3633 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3636 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3638 if height > self.best_block.height {
3639 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3640 log_trace!(logger, "Connecting new block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3641 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, logger)
3642 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash {
3643 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3644 log_trace!(logger, "Best block re-orged, replaced with new block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3645 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
3646 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3648 } else { Vec::new() }
3651 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3654 txdata: &TransactionData,
3657 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3658 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3659 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3661 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3662 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3665 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
3666 for tx in &txn_matched {
3667 let mut output_val = 0;
3668 for out in tx.output.iter() {
3669 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
3670 output_val += out.value;
3671 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
3675 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3677 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3678 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3679 'tx_iter: for tx in &txn_matched {
3680 let txid = tx.txid();
3681 log_trace!(logger, "Transaction {} confirmed in block {}", txid , block_hash);
3682 // If a transaction has already been confirmed, ensure we don't bother processing it duplicatively.
3683 if Some(txid) == self.funding_spend_confirmed {
3684 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of funding-spend tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3687 for ev in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
3688 if ev.txid == txid {
3689 if let Some(conf_hash) = ev.block_hash {
3690 assert_eq!(header.block_hash(), conf_hash,
3691 "Transaction {} was already confirmed and is being re-confirmed in a different block.\n\
3692 This indicates a severe bug in the transaction connection logic - a reorg should have been processed first!", ev.txid);
3694 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of confirming tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3698 for htlc in self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter() {
3699 if Some(txid) == htlc.resolving_txid {
3700 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of HTLC resolution tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3704 for spendable_txid in self.spendable_txids_confirmed.iter() {
3705 if txid == *spendable_txid {
3706 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of spendable tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3711 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
3712 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
3713 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input
3714 // (except for HTLC transactions for channels with anchor outputs), which is an easy
3715 // way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy filters.
3716 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
3717 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
3718 let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
3719 log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
3720 &self.channel_id(), txid);
3721 self.funding_spend_seen = true;
3722 let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
3723 if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
3724 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
3725 self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
3726 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
3727 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
3728 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3730 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3731 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
3732 if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger) {
3733 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3734 debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(),
3735 "A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?");
3736 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
3737 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3739 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3740 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
3744 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3746 transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
3748 block_hash: Some(block_hash),
3749 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
3750 on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
3751 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
3754 // Now that we've detected a confirmed commitment transaction, attempt to cancel
3755 // pending claims for any commitments that were previously confirmed such that
3756 // we don't continue claiming inputs that no longer exist.
3757 self.cancel_prev_commitment_claims(&logger, &txid);
3760 if tx.input.len() >= 1 {
3761 // While all commitment transactions have one input, HTLC transactions may have more
3762 // if the HTLC was present in an anchor channel. HTLCs can also be resolved in a few
3763 // other ways which can have more than one output.
3764 for tx_input in &tx.input {
3765 let commitment_txid = tx_input.previous_output.txid;
3766 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&commitment_txid) {
3767 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(
3768 &tx, commitment_number, &commitment_txid, height, &logger
3770 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3771 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
3772 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3774 // Since there may be multiple HTLCs for this channel (all spending the
3775 // same commitment tx) being claimed by the counterparty within the same
3776 // transaction, and `check_spend_counterparty_htlc` already checks all the
3777 // ones relevant to this channel, we can safely break from our loop.
3781 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, logger);
3783 self.check_tx_and_push_spendable_outputs(&tx, height, &block_hash, logger);
3787 if height > self.best_block.height {
3788 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3791 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, logger)
3794 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
3795 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
3796 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
3797 /// complexity especially in
3798 /// `OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_requests`/`OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_matched_txn`.
3800 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
3801 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
3802 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3805 conf_hash: BlockHash,
3806 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
3807 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
3808 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
3810 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3811 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3812 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3814 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3815 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3818 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
3819 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height >= conf_height);
3821 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
3822 if should_broadcast {
3823 let (mut new_outpoints, mut new_outputs) = self.generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs(ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut);
3824 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3825 watch_outputs.append(&mut new_outputs);
3828 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
3829 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
3830 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3831 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
3832 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
3833 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
3834 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3836 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3840 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3841 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3842 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
3844 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
3845 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
3849 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3850 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
3852 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
3853 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
3855 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
3856 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3857 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3860 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
3861 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3862 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3863 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3865 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
3866 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3867 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3868 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3869 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
3872 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
3873 &payment_hash, entry.txid);
3874 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3876 payment_preimage: None,
3877 source: source.clone(),
3878 htlc_value_satoshis,
3880 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3881 commitment_tx_output_idx,
3882 resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3883 resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
3884 payment_preimage: None,
3887 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
3888 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
3889 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
3890 outputs: vec![descriptor],
3891 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
3893 self.spendable_txids_confirmed.push(entry.txid);
3895 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
3896 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3897 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx),
3898 resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3899 resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
3900 payment_preimage: preimage,
3903 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } => {
3904 self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
3905 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
3910 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3911 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_matched_txn(&txn_matched, conf_height, conf_hash, self.best_block.height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3913 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
3914 // updating the latter in the process.
3915 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
3916 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
3917 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
3921 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
3922 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
3923 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
3924 for tx in &txn_matched {
3925 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
3926 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
3927 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
3928 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
3936 fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3937 &mut self, header: &Header, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
3938 ) where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3939 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3942 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
3945 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
3946 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
3947 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
3949 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3950 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
3952 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
3955 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3959 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3960 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3962 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3963 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3966 let mut removed_height = None;
3967 for entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
3968 if entry.txid == *txid {
3969 removed_height = Some(entry.height);
3974 if let Some(removed_height) = removed_height {
3975 log_info!(logger, "transaction_unconfirmed of txid {} implies height {} was reorg'd out", txid, removed_height);
3976 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.height >= removed_height {
3977 log_info!(logger, "Transaction {} reorg'd out", entry.txid);
3982 debug_assert!(!self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|ref entry| entry.txid == *txid));
3984 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3987 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
3988 /// transactions thereof.
3989 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
3990 let mut matched_txn = new_hash_set();
3991 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
3992 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
3993 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3994 if matches { break; }
3995 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
4000 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
4003 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
4006 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
4007 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
4008 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4009 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
4010 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
4011 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
4014 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
4015 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
4016 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
4017 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
4018 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
4019 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
4020 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
4021 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
4025 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&ScriptBuf::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
4026 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
4027 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
4028 } else { panic!(); }
4039 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(
4040 &self, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
4041 ) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
4042 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one confirmed (even
4043 // with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as duplicate/conflicting.
4044 if self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
4045 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
4046 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
4052 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
4053 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
4054 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
4055 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
4056 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
4057 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
4058 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
4059 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
4060 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
4061 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
4062 let height = self.best_block.height;
4063 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
4064 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
4065 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
4066 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
4067 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
4068 // time out the HTLC first.
4069 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
4070 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
4071 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
4072 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
4073 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
4074 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
4075 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
4076 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
4077 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
4078 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
4079 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
4080 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
4081 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
4082 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
4083 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
4084 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
4085 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
4086 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
4087 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
4088 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
4089 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
4090 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
4091 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
4092 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4099 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
4101 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
4102 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
4103 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
4106 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
4107 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
4108 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
4115 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
4116 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
4117 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(
4118 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
4119 ) where L::Target: Logger {
4120 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
4121 let mut payment_data = None;
4122 let htlc_claim = HTLCClaim::from_witness(&input.witness);
4123 let revocation_sig_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::Revocation);
4124 let accepted_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedPreimage);
4125 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4126 let accepted_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedTimeout);
4127 let offered_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedPreimage);
4128 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4129 let offered_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedTimeout);
4131 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
4132 if offered_preimage_claim || accepted_preimage_claim {
4133 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
4136 macro_rules! log_claim {
4137 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
4138 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
4139 // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
4141 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
4142 debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
4143 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
4144 debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
4145 // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
4146 // matched by any HTLC spend:
4147 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
4148 debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
4149 offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
4150 revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
4151 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
4152 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
4153 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
4154 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
4155 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, &$htlc.payment_hash,
4156 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
4158 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
4159 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
4160 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, &$htlc.payment_hash,
4161 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
4166 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
4167 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
4168 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
4169 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
4170 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
4171 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
4172 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
4173 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
4182 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
4183 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
4184 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
4185 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
4186 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
4187 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
4188 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
4189 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
4190 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
4191 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
4192 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
4193 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
4194 } else if !$holder_tx {
4195 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
4196 if payment_data.is_none() {
4197 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
4200 if payment_data.is_none() {
4201 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
4202 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
4203 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
4204 txid: tx.txid(), height, block_hash: Some(*block_hash), transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4205 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
4206 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
4207 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
4208 Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
4209 // If this is a payment to us (ie !outbound_htlc), wait for
4210 // the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from claimable
4211 // balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success transaction (ie
4212 // accepted_preimage_claim).
4213 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim && !outbound_htlc {
4214 Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
4217 continue 'outer_loop;
4224 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
4225 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
4226 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
4228 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
4229 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
4230 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
4231 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
4234 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
4235 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
4236 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
4239 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
4240 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
4241 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
4242 if accepted_preimage_claim {
4243 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
4244 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
4245 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
4248 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4249 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4250 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
4251 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
4252 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4253 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
4256 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
4258 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4260 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
4263 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
4264 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
4265 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
4266 upd.source == source
4268 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
4270 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4272 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4273 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
4274 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
4275 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4276 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
4279 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
4281 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4283 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
4287 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
4288 if entry.height != height { return true; }
4290 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
4291 *htlc_source != source
4296 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
4298 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4300 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4301 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
4302 source, payment_hash,
4303 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
4304 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
4307 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", &payment_hash, entry.confirmation_threshold());
4308 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
4314 fn get_spendable_outputs(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
4315 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
4316 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4317 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
4318 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
4319 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4320 output: outp.clone(),
4321 channel_keys_id: Some(self.channel_keys_id),
4324 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
4325 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
4326 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
4327 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4328 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
4329 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
4330 output: outp.clone(),
4331 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2,
4332 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
4333 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
4337 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
4338 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
4339 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4340 output: outp.clone(),
4341 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
4342 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
4343 channel_transaction_parameters: Some(self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone()),
4346 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
4347 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
4348 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4349 output: outp.clone(),
4350 channel_keys_id: Some(self.channel_keys_id),
4357 /// Checks if the confirmed transaction is paying funds back to some address we can assume to
4359 fn check_tx_and_push_spendable_outputs<L: Deref>(
4360 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
4361 ) where L::Target: Logger {
4362 for spendable_output in self.get_spendable_outputs(tx) {
4363 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
4365 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4367 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4368 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
4370 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
4371 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
4376 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
4378 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4379 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4382 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4383 self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4386 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
4387 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4391 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, M, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (M, T, F, L)
4393 M: Deref<Target = ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4394 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4395 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4398 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4399 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4402 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4403 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4406 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
4407 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4410 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
4411 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
4415 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4417 impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP)>
4418 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<SP::EcdsaSigner>) {
4419 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4420 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
4424 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4429 let (entropy_source, signer_provider) = args;
4431 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4433 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4434 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4436 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4437 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4439 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
4440 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4441 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4442 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
4445 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4447 let mut counterparty_payment_script: ScriptBuf = Readable::read(reader)?;
4448 let shutdown_script = {
4449 let script = <ScriptBuf as Readable>::read(reader)?;
4450 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
4453 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4454 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
4455 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
4456 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
4457 let outpoint = OutPoint {
4458 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
4459 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
4461 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
4462 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4463 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4465 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
4466 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
4467 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4469 let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
4470 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4474 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4475 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
4476 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
4477 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
4479 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
4484 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4486 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4488 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
4491 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
4492 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4493 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4494 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4495 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
4497 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4498 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
4504 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4505 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
4506 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
4507 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4508 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4509 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4510 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
4511 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
4513 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
4514 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4518 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4519 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4520 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
4521 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4522 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4523 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
4524 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4528 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4529 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4530 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
4531 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4532 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4533 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
4534 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4538 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
4539 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4542 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
4544 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4546 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
4548 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4549 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4551 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4552 let mut payment_preimages = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4553 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
4554 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
4555 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4556 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
4557 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4561 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4562 let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
4563 Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
4564 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
4565 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4566 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
4567 1 => MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_info.0),
4568 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4570 pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
4573 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4574 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
4575 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
4576 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4577 pending_events.push(event);
4581 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
4583 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4584 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
4585 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
4586 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4587 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
4591 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4592 let mut outputs_to_watch = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<ScriptBuf>>())));
4593 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
4594 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4595 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4596 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<ScriptBuf>())));
4597 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
4598 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4600 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
4601 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4604 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<SP::EcdsaSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(
4605 reader, (entropy_source, signer_provider, channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id)
4608 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
4609 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4611 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
4612 let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
4613 if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
4614 if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
4615 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
4616 } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
4617 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4621 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
4622 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
4623 current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
4624 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
4625 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4628 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
4629 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
4630 let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
4631 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
4632 let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
4633 let mut spendable_txids_confirmed = Some(Vec::new());
4634 let mut counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs = Some(new_hash_map());
4635 let mut initial_counterparty_commitment_info = None;
4636 let mut channel_id = None;
4637 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
4638 (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
4639 (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, optional_vec),
4640 (5, pending_monitor_events, optional_vec),
4641 (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
4642 (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
4643 (11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
4644 (13, spendable_txids_confirmed, optional_vec),
4645 (15, counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, option),
4646 (17, initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option),
4647 (19, channel_id, option),
4650 // `HolderForceClosedWithInfo` replaced `HolderForceClosed` in v0.0.122. If we have both
4651 // events, we can remove the `HolderForceClosed` event and just keep the `HolderForceClosedWithInfo`.
4652 if let Some(ref mut pending_monitor_events) = pending_monitor_events {
4653 if pending_monitor_events.iter().any(|e| matches!(e, MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_))) &&
4654 pending_monitor_events.iter().any(|e| matches!(e, MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. }))
4656 pending_monitor_events.retain(|e| !matches!(e, MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_)));
4660 // Monitors for anchor outputs channels opened in v0.0.116 suffered from a bug in which the
4661 // wrong `counterparty_payment_script` was being tracked. Fix it now on deserialization to
4662 // give them a chance to recognize the spendable output.
4663 if onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() &&
4664 counterparty_payment_script.is_v0_p2wpkh()
4666 let payment_point = onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys.payment_point;
4667 counterparty_payment_script =
4668 chan_utils::get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh();
4671 Ok((best_block.block_hash, ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
4673 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
4676 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
4677 counterparty_payment_script,
4681 holder_revocation_basepoint,
4682 channel_id: channel_id.unwrap_or(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint)),
4684 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
4685 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
4687 counterparty_commitment_params,
4688 funding_redeemscript,
4689 channel_value_satoshis,
4690 their_cur_per_commitment_points,
4695 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
4696 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
4697 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
4698 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.unwrap(),
4700 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
4701 current_holder_commitment_tx,
4702 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
4703 current_holder_commitment_number,
4706 pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
4708 is_processing_pending_events: false,
4710 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
4715 lockdown_from_offchain,
4717 funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
4718 funding_spend_confirmed,
4719 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output,
4720 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
4721 spendable_txids_confirmed: spendable_txids_confirmed.unwrap(),
4724 counterparty_node_id,
4725 initial_counterparty_commitment_info,
4732 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
4733 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
4734 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4735 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut};
4736 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
4737 use bitcoin::sighash;
4738 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
4739 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4740 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4741 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4742 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
4743 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4744 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4745 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
4746 use bitcoin::{Sequence, Witness};
4748 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
4750 use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
4751 use crate::{check_added_monitors, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
4752 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
4753 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, WithChannelMonitor};
4754 use crate::chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
4755 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4756 use crate::sign::InMemorySigner;
4757 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, ChannelId};
4758 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, DelayedPaymentKey, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint, RevocationKey};
4759 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self,HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
4760 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{PaymentSendFailure, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
4761 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4762 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
4763 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
4764 use crate::util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
4765 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
4766 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
4767 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
4769 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
4771 #[allow(unused_imports)]
4772 use crate::prelude::*;
4774 use std::str::FromStr;
4776 fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
4777 // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
4778 // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
4779 // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
4780 // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
4781 // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
4782 // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
4783 // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
4784 // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
4786 // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
4787 // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
4788 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4789 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4790 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4791 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4792 let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4793 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4795 // Rebalance somewhat
4796 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
4798 // First route two payments for testing at the end
4799 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
4800 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
4802 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
4803 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4804 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
4805 assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
4806 check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
4807 check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
4808 let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
4810 // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
4811 // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
4812 let new_header = create_dummy_header(nodes[0].best_block_info().0, 0);
4813 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4814 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
4815 &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
4817 let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
4818 &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
4819 (&nodes[1].keys_manager.backing, &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing)).unwrap();
4821 // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
4822 // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
4823 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
4824 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
4825 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
4826 ), false, APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress, {});
4827 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4829 // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
4830 // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
4831 // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
4832 let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
4833 let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().next().unwrap().clone();
4834 assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
4835 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
4836 } else { panic!(); }
4837 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
4838 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
4840 let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
4842 pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &&chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
4844 // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
4846 let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4847 assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
4848 let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
4849 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
4850 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
4851 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
4852 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4853 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
4854 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
4857 fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
4858 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
4859 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
4863 fn test_prune_preimages() {
4864 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4865 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
4866 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster::new(Network::Testnet));
4867 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4869 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4871 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
4874 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
4875 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4876 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
4880 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlcs {
4881 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4883 let mut res = Vec::new();
4884 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
4885 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4889 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
4890 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
4897 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
4898 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4899 preimages_slice_to_htlcs!($preimages_slice).into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, None)).collect()
4902 let dummy_sig = crate::crypto::utils::sign(&secp_ctx,
4903 &bitcoin::secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(),
4904 &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4906 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
4907 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
4908 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
4909 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
4914 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
4916 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4917 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4918 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4919 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4920 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4927 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
4928 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
4929 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap())),
4930 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
4931 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap())),
4932 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap()))
4934 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
4935 let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint);
4936 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
4937 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
4938 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
4939 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
4940 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
4941 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
4942 selected_contest_delay: 67,
4944 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
4945 channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key()
4947 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
4949 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4950 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(Network::Testnet);
4951 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
4952 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &ScriptBuf::new(),
4953 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, ScriptBuf::new()),
4954 &channel_parameters, ScriptBuf::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
4955 best_block, dummy_key, channel_id);
4957 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]);
4958 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4960 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
4961 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4962 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"1").to_byte_array()),
4963 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
4964 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"2").to_byte_array()),
4965 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
4966 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
4967 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
4968 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
4971 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
4972 let mut secret = [0; 32];
4973 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
4974 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4975 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
4976 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4977 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
4979 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"3").to_byte_array()),
4980 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
4982 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
4983 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
4984 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4985 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
4986 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4987 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
4989 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"4").to_byte_array()),
4990 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
4992 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
4993 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
4994 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]);
4995 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4996 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
4997 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4998 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
4999 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
5000 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
5001 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
5002 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
5004 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
5005 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]);
5006 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
5007 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx,
5008 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
5009 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
5010 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
5011 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
5012 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
5016 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
5017 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
5018 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
5020 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5021 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5022 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
5024 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{HtlcKey, HtlcBasepoint};
5025 macro_rules! sign_input {
5026 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
5027 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
5028 offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
5030 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
5031 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
5032 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
5034 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), 256, &DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey)) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &HtlcBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), &HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &HtlcBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), &RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey)) };
5035 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
5036 let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
5037 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5038 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5039 $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len() as u64;
5040 let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
5041 witness.push(ser_sig);
5042 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
5043 witness.push(vec!(1));
5044 } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
5045 witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
5046 } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
5047 witness.push(vec![0]);
5049 witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
5051 witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
5052 let witness = witness.to_vec();
5053 println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
5054 println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
5055 println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
5059 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
5060 let txid = Txid::from_str("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
5062 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
5063 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
5064 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
5065 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
5067 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
5068 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
5072 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
5073 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
5074 witness: Witness::new(),
5077 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
5078 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
5081 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
5082 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
5083 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
5085 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
5086 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
5087 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
5088 inputs_total_weight += inp;
5091 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
5094 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
5095 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
5096 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
5097 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
5099 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
5100 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
5104 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
5105 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
5106 witness: Witness::new(),
5109 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
5110 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
5113 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
5114 let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
5115 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
5117 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
5118 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
5119 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
5120 inputs_total_weight += inp;
5123 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
5126 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
5127 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
5128 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
5129 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
5130 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
5131 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
5135 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
5136 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
5137 witness: Witness::new(),
5139 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
5140 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
5143 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
5144 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
5145 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
5147 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
5148 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
5149 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
5150 inputs_total_weight += inp;
5153 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
5158 fn test_with_channel_monitor_impl_logger() {
5159 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5160 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
5162 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5164 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
5166 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5167 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5168 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5169 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5170 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5177 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5178 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
5179 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap())),
5180 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
5181 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap())),
5182 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())),
5184 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
5185 let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint);
5186 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
5187 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
5188 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
5189 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5190 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5191 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5192 selected_contest_delay: 67,
5194 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
5195 channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key()
5197 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5198 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(Network::Testnet);
5199 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
5200 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &ScriptBuf::new(),
5201 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, ScriptBuf::new()),
5202 &channel_parameters, ScriptBuf::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
5203 best_block, dummy_key, channel_id);
5205 let chan_id = monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().channel_id();
5206 let context_logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&logger, &monitor);
5207 log_error!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5208 log_warn!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5209 log_debug!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5210 log_trace!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5211 log_gossip!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5212 log_info!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5213 logger.assert_log_context_contains("lightning::chain::channelmonitor::tests", Some(dummy_key), Some(chan_id), 6);
5215 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.