Add `ChannelMonitor::is_fully_resolved` function

[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / chain / channelmonitor.rs

// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
// history.
//
// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
// licenses.

//! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
//! here.
//!
//! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
//! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
//! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
//!
//! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
//! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
//! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
//! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
//! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.

use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint, TxOut, Transaction};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf};

use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};

use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;

use crate::ln::channel::INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER;
use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, ChannelId};
use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentKey, DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, HtlcKey, RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self,CommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys};
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, SentHTLCId};
use crate::chain;
use crate::chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, SignerProvider, EntropySource};
use crate::chain::onchaintx::{ClaimEvent, FeerateStrategy, OnchainTxHandler};
use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
use crate::chain::Filter;
use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, RequiredWrapper, MaybeReadable, UpgradableRequired, Writer, Writeable, U48};
use crate::util::byte_utils;
use crate::events::{ClosureReason, Event, EventHandler};
use crate::events::bump_transaction::{AnchorDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};

#[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;

use core::{cmp, mem};
use crate::io::{self, Error};
use core::ops::Deref;
use crate::sync::{Mutex, LockTestExt};

/// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
/// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
///
/// Because this represents only a small number of updates to the underlying state, it is generally
/// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
/// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
/// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[must_use]
pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
        pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
        /// Historically, [`ChannelMonitor`]s didn't know their counterparty node id. However,
        /// `ChannelManager` really wants to know it so that it can easily look up the corresponding
        /// channel. For now, this results in a temporary map in `ChannelManager` to look up channels
        /// by only the funding outpoint.
        ///
        /// To eventually remove that, we repeat the counterparty node id here so that we can upgrade
        /// `ChannelMonitor`s to become aware of the counterparty node id if they were generated prior
        /// to when it was stored directly in them.
        pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
        /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
        /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
        /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with two exceptions specified below.
        ///
        /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
        /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] have been applied to all copies of a given
        /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
        ///
        /// The only instances we allow where update_id values are not strictly increasing have a
        /// special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. This update ID is used for updates that
        /// will force close the channel by broadcasting the latest commitment transaction or
        /// special post-force-close updates, like providing preimages necessary to claim outputs on the
        /// broadcast commitment transaction. See its docs for more details.
        ///
        /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
        pub update_id: u64,
        /// The channel ID associated with these updates.
        ///
        /// Will be `None` for `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.121 and
        /// always `Some` otherwise.
        pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
}

/// The update ID used for a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] that is either:
///
///     (1) attempting to force close the channel by broadcasting our latest commitment transaction or
///     (2) providing a preimage (after the channel has been force closed) from a forward link that
///             allows us to spend an HTLC output on this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted
///             commitment transaction.
///
/// No other [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are allowed after force-close.
pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;

impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
        fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
                write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
                self.update_id.write(w)?;
                (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
                for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
                        update_step.write(w)?;
                }
                write_tlv_fields!(w, {
                        (1, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
                        (3, self.channel_id, option),
                });
                Ok(())
        }
}
impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
        fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
                let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
                let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
                let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
                let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
                for _ in 0..len {
                        if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
                                updates.push(upd);
                        }
                }
                let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
                let mut channel_id = None;
                read_tlv_fields!(r, {
                        (1, counterparty_node_id, option),
                        (3, channel_id, option),
                });
                Ok(Self { update_id, counterparty_node_id, updates, channel_id })
        }
}

/// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum MonitorEvent {
        /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
        HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),

        /// Indicates we broadcasted the channel's latest commitment transaction and thus closed the
        /// channel. Holds information about the channel and why it was closed.
        HolderForceClosedWithInfo {
                /// The reason the channel was closed.
                reason: ClosureReason,
                /// The funding outpoint of the channel.
                outpoint: OutPoint,
                /// The channel ID of the channel.
                channel_id: ChannelId,
        },

        /// Indicates we broadcasted the channel's latest commitment transaction and thus closed the
        /// channel.
        HolderForceClosed(OutPoint),

        /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
        /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] for more information on how this is used.
        ///
        /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
        Completed {
                /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
                funding_txo: OutPoint,
                /// The channel ID of the channel associated with the [`ChannelMonitor`]
                channel_id: ChannelId,
                /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
                /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
                ///
                /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
                /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
                monitor_update_id: u64,
        },
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
        // Note that Completed is currently never serialized to disk as it is generated only in
        // ChainMonitor.
        (0, Completed) => {
                (0, funding_txo, required),
                (2, monitor_update_id, required),
                (4, channel_id, required),
        },
        (5, HolderForceClosedWithInfo) => {
                (0, reason, upgradable_required),
                (2, outpoint, required),
                (4, channel_id, required),
        },
;
        (2, HTLCEvent),
        (4, HolderForceClosed),
        // 6 was `UpdateFailed` until LDK 0.0.117
);

/// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
/// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
/// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct HTLCUpdate {
        pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
        pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
        pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
        pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
        (0, payment_hash, required),
        (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
        (2, source, required),
        (4, payment_preimage, option),
});

/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
/// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
/// HTLC-Success transaction.
/// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
/// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
/// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
/// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
/// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
/// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
/// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
/// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
/// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
/// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
/// accurate block height.
/// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
/// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
/// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
/// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
/// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
/// losing money.
///
/// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
/// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
/// by a  [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
// We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
// It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
// keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
/// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
/// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
///
/// This is used for a few separate purposes:
/// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
///    waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
///    fail this HTLC,
/// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
///    condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
///
/// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
/// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
///
/// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
/// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
/// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;

// TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct HolderSignedTx {
        /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
        txid: Txid,
        revocation_key: RevocationKey,
        a_htlc_key: HtlcKey,
        b_htlc_key: HtlcKey,
        delayed_payment_key: DelayedPaymentKey,
        per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
        htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
        to_self_value_sat: u64,
        feerate_per_kw: u32,
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
        (0, txid, required),
        // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
        // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
        (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
        (2, revocation_key, required),
        (4, a_htlc_key, required),
        (6, b_htlc_key, required),
        (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
        (10, per_commitment_point, required),
        (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
        (14, htlc_outputs, required_vec)
});

impl HolderSignedTx {
        fn non_dust_htlcs(&self) -> Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
                self.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _, _)| {
                        if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
                                Some(htlc.clone())
                        } else {
                                None
                        }
                })
                .collect()
        }
}

/// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
/// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
        counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: DelayedPaymentBasepoint,
        counterparty_htlc_base_key: HtlcBasepoint,
        on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
}

impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
        fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
                w.write_all(&(0 as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
                write_tlv_fields!(w, {
                        (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
                        (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
                        (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
                });
                Ok(())
        }
}
impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
        fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
                let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
                        // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
                        // used. Read it for compatibility.
                        let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
                        for _  in 0..per_htlc_len {
                                let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
                                let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
                                for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
                                        let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
                                }
                        }

                        let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
                        let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
                        let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
                        read_tlv_fields!(r, {
                                (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
                                (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
                                (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
                        });
                        CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
                                counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
                                counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
                                on_counterparty_tx_csv,
                        }
                };
                Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
        }
}

/// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height and hash when the event was
/// observed, as well as the transaction causing it.
///
/// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct OnchainEventEntry {
        txid: Txid,
        height: u32,
        block_hash: Option<BlockHash>, // Added as optional, will be filled in for any entry generated on 0.0.113 or after
        event: OnchainEvent,
        transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
}

impl OnchainEventEntry {
        fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
                let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
                match self.event {
                        OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
                                descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
                        } => {
                                // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
                                // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
                                conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
                        },
                        OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
                        OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
                                // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
                                // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
                                conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
                        },
                        _ => {},
                }
                conf_threshold
        }

        fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
                best_block.height >= self.confirmation_threshold()
        }
}

/// The (output index, sats value) for the counterparty's output in a commitment transaction.
///
/// This was added as an `Option` in 0.0.110.
type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;

/// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
/// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum OnchainEvent {
        /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
        ///  * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
        ///  * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
        ///    on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
        /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
        /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
        HTLCUpdate {
                source: HTLCSource,
                payment_hash: PaymentHash,
                htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
                /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
                /// transaction which appeared on chain.
                commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
        },
        /// An output waiting on [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations before we hand the user the
        /// [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`].
        MaturingOutput {
                descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
        },
        /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
        /// transaction.
        FundingSpendConfirmation {
                /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
                /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
                on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
                /// If the funding spend transaction was a known remote commitment transaction, we track
                /// the output index and amount of the counterparty's `to_self` output here.
                ///
                /// This allows us to generate a [`Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`] for the
                /// counterparty output.
                commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
        },
        /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
        /// is constructed. This is used when
        ///  * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
        ///    immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
        ///  * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
        ///  * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
        ///  * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
        ///    signature.
        ///  * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by an
        ///    HTLC-Success/HTLC-Failure transaction (and is still claimable with a revocation
        ///    signature).
        HTLCSpendConfirmation {
                commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
                /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
                preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
                /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
                /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
                /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
                on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
        },
}

impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
        fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
                write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
                        (0, self.txid, required),
                        (1, self.transaction, option),
                        (2, self.height, required),
                        (3, self.block_hash, option),
                        (4, self.event, required),
                });
                Ok(())
        }
}

impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
        fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
                let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
                let mut transaction = None;
                let mut block_hash = None;
                let mut height = 0;
                let mut event = UpgradableRequired(None);
                read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
                        (0, txid, required),
                        (1, transaction, option),
                        (2, height, required),
                        (3, block_hash, option),
                        (4, event, upgradable_required),
                });
                Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, block_hash, event: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(event, upgradable_required) }))
        }
}

impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
        (0, HTLCUpdate) => {
                (0, source, required),
                (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
                (2, payment_hash, required),
                (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
        },
        (1, MaturingOutput) => {
                (0, descriptor, required),
        },
        (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
                (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
                (1, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, option),
        },
        (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
                (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
                (2, preimage, option),
                (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
        },

);

#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
        LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
                commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
                /// Note that LDK after 0.0.115 supports this only containing dust HTLCs (implying the
                /// `Signature` field is never filled in). At that point, non-dust HTLCs are implied by the
                /// HTLC fields in `commitment_tx` and the sources passed via `nondust_htlc_sources`.
                htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
                claimed_htlcs: Vec<(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)>,
                nondust_htlc_sources: Vec<HTLCSource>,
        },
        LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
                commitment_txid: Txid,
                htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
                commitment_number: u64,
                their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
                feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>,
                to_broadcaster_value_sat: Option<u64>,
                to_countersignatory_value_sat: Option<u64>,
        },
        PaymentPreimage {
                payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
        },
        CommitmentSecret {
                idx: u64,
                secret: [u8; 32],
        },
        /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
        /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
        ChannelForceClosed {
                /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
                /// think we've fallen behind!
                should_broadcast: bool,
        },
        ShutdownScript {
                scriptpubkey: ScriptBuf,
        },
}

impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
        fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
                match self {
                        ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
                        ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
                        ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
                        ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
                        ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
                        ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
                }
        }
}

impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
        (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
                (0, commitment_tx, required),
                (1, claimed_htlcs, optional_vec),
                (2, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
                (4, nondust_htlc_sources, optional_vec),
        },
        (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
                (0, commitment_txid, required),
                (1, feerate_per_kw, option),
                (2, commitment_number, required),
                (3, to_broadcaster_value_sat, option),
                (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
                (5, to_countersignatory_value_sat, option),
                (6, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
        },
        (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
                (0, payment_preimage, required),
        },
        (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
                (0, idx, required),
                (2, secret, required),
        },
        (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
                (0, should_broadcast, required),
        },
        (5, ShutdownScript) => {
                (0, scriptpubkey, required),
        },
);

/// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
///
/// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
/// be provided.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
pub enum Balance {
        /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
        /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
        /// force-closed now.
        ClaimableOnChannelClose {
                /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
                /// required to do so.
                amount_satoshis: u64,
        },
        /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
        /// we consider it spendable.
        ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
                /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
                amount_satoshis: u64,
                /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
                /// amount.
                confirmation_height: u32,
        },
        /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
        /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
        /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
        ///
        /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
        /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
        /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
        ContentiousClaimable {
                /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
                /// required to do so.
                amount_satoshis: u64,
                /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
                /// done so.
                timeout_height: u32,
                /// The payment hash that locks this HTLC.
                payment_hash: PaymentHash,
                /// The preimage that can be used to claim this HTLC.
                payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
        },
        /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
        /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
        /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
        MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
                /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
                /// which will be required to do so.
                amount_satoshis: u64,
                /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
                /// done so.
                claimable_height: u32,
                /// The payment hash whose preimage our counterparty needs to claim this HTLC.
                payment_hash: PaymentHash,
        },
        /// HTLCs which we received from our counterparty which are claimable with a preimage which we
        /// do not currently have. This will only be claimable if we receive the preimage from the node
        /// to which we forwarded this HTLC before the timeout.
        MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
                /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
                /// which will be required to do so.
                amount_satoshis: u64,
                /// The height at which our counterparty will be able to claim the balance if we have not
                /// yet received the preimage and claimed it ourselves.
                expiry_height: u32,
                /// The payment hash whose preimage we need to claim this HTLC.
                payment_hash: PaymentHash,
        },
        /// The channel has been closed, and our counterparty broadcasted a revoked commitment
        /// transaction.
        ///
        /// Thus, we're able to claim all outputs in the commitment transaction, one of which has the
        /// following amount.
        CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
                /// The amount, in satoshis, of the output which we can claim.
                ///
                /// Note that for outputs from HTLC balances this may be excluding some on-chain fees that
                /// were already spent.
                amount_satoshis: u64,
        },
}

impl Balance {
        /// The amount claimable, in satoshis. This excludes balances that we are unsure if we are able
        /// to claim, this is because we are waiting for a preimage or for a timeout to expire. For more
        /// information on these balances see [`Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC`] and
        /// [`Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC`].
        ///
        /// On-chain fees required to claim the balance are not included in this amount.
        pub fn claimable_amount_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
                match self {
                        Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis, .. }|
                        Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. }|
                        Balance::ContentiousClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }|
                        Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }
                                => *amount_satoshis,
                        Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { .. }|
                        Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { .. }
                                => 0,
                }
        }
}

/// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
        commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
        /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
        /// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
        /// transaction.
        resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
        resolving_tx: Option<Transaction>,
        /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
        payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
}

// In LDK versions prior to 0.0.111 commitment_tx_output_idx was not Option-al and
// IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC objects only existed for non-dust HTLCs. This was a bug, but to maintain
// backwards compatibility we must ensure we always write out a commitment_tx_output_idx field,
// using `u32::max_value()` as a sentinal to indicate the HTLC was dust.
impl Writeable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
        fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
                let mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = self.commitment_tx_output_idx.unwrap_or(u32::max_value());
                write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
                        (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
                        (1, self.resolving_txid, option),
                        (2, self.payment_preimage, option),
                        (3, self.resolving_tx, option),
                });
                Ok(())
        }
}

impl Readable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
        fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
                let mut mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = 0;
                let mut resolving_txid = None;
                let mut payment_preimage = None;
                let mut resolving_tx = None;
                read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
                        (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
                        (1, resolving_txid, option),
                        (2, payment_preimage, option),
                        (3, resolving_tx, option),
                });
                Ok(Self {
                        commitment_tx_output_idx: if mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx == u32::max_value() { None } else { Some(mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx) },
                        resolving_txid,
                        payment_preimage,
                        resolving_tx,
                })
        }
}

/// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
/// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
///
/// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
/// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
///
/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
/// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
/// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
/// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
/// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
        #[cfg(test)]
        pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
        #[cfg(not(test))]
        pub(super) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
}

impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Clone for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: Clone {
        fn clone(&self) -> Self {
                let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap().clone();
                ChannelMonitor::from_impl(inner)
        }
}

#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
        latest_update_id: u64,
        commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,

        destination_script: ScriptBuf,
        broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(ScriptBuf, PublicKey, RevocationKey)>,
        counterparty_payment_script: ScriptBuf,
        shutdown_script: Option<ScriptBuf>,

        channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
        holder_revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint,
        channel_id: ChannelId,
        funding_info: (OutPoint, ScriptBuf),
        current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
        prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,

        counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
        funding_redeemscript: ScriptBuf,
        channel_value_satoshis: u64,
        // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
        their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,

        on_holder_tx_csv: u16,

        commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
        /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
        /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
        /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
        counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
        /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
        /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
        /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
        /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
        /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
        counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
        /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
        /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
        /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
        /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
        counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,

        counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: HashMap<SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage>,

        // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
        // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
        // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
        // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
        prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
        current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,

        // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
        // deserialization
        current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
        // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
        // deserialization
        current_holder_commitment_number: u64,

        /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
        /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
        /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
        /// revoked.
        payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,

        // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
        // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
        // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
        // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
        // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
        // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
        // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
        // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
        // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
        pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,

        pub(super) pending_events: Vec<Event>,
        pub(super) is_processing_pending_events: bool,

        // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
        // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
        // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
        onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,

        // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
        // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
        // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
        // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
        outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>>,

        #[cfg(test)]
        pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
        #[cfg(not(test))]
        onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,

        // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
        // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
        // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
        lockdown_from_offchain: bool,

        // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
        // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
        // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
        //
        // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
        // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
        // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
        holder_tx_signed: bool,

        // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
        // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
        // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
        funding_spend_seen: bool,

        /// Set to `Some` of the confirmed transaction spending the funding input of the channel after
        /// reaching `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` confirmations.
        funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,

        confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
        /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
        /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
        /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
        htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,

        /// The set of `SpendableOutput` events which we have already passed upstream to be claimed.
        /// These are tracked explicitly to ensure that we don't generate the same events redundantly
        /// if users duplicatively confirm old transactions. Specifically for transactions claiming a
        /// revoked remote outpoint we otherwise have no tracking at all once they've reached
        /// [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`], so we have to track them here.
        spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec<Txid>,

        // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
        // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
        // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
        // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
        // the full block_connected).
        best_block: BestBlock,

        /// The node_id of our counterparty
        counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,

        /// Initial counterparty commmitment data needed to recreate the commitment tx
        /// in the persistence pipeline for third-party watchtowers. This will only be present on
        /// monitors created after 0.0.117.
        ///
        /// Ordering of tuple data: (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_sats,
        /// to_countersignatory_sats)
        initial_counterparty_commitment_info: Option<(PublicKey, u32, u64, u64)>,

        /// The first block height at which we had no remaining claimable balances.
        balances_empty_height: Option<u32>,
}

/// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);

impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: PartialEq {
        fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
                // We need some kind of total lockorder. Absent a better idea, we sort by position in
                // memory and take locks in that order (assuming that we can't move within memory while a
                // lock is held).
                let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
                let a = if ord { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
                let b = if ord { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
                a.eq(&b)
        }
}

impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
        fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
                self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
        }
}

// These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;

impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
        fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
                write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);

                self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;

                // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
                U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;

                self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
                if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
                        writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
                        broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
                        broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
                        broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
                } else {
                        writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
                }

                self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
                match &self.shutdown_script {
                        Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
                        None => ScriptBuf::new().write(writer)?,
                }

                self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
                self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
                writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
                writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.index.to_be_bytes())?;
                self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
                self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
                self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;

                self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
                self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
                self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;

                match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
                        Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
                                writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
                                writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
                                match second_option {
                                        Some(second_pubkey) => {
                                                writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
                                        },
                                        None => {
                                                writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
                                        },
                                }
                        },
                        None => {
                                writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
                        },
                }

                writer.write_all(&self.on_holder_tx_csv.to_be_bytes())?;

                self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;

                macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
                        ($htlc_output: expr) => {
                                writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
                                writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.amount_msat.to_be_bytes())?;
                                writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes())?;
                                writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
                                $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
                        }
                }

                writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
                for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
                        writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
                        writer.write_all(&(htlc_infos.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
                        for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
                                debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
                                                || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
                                        "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
                                serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
                                htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
                        }
                }

                writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
                for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
                        writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
                        writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
                }

                writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
                for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
                        writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
                        writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
                }

                if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
                        writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
                        prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
                } else {
                        writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
                }

                self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;

                writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
                writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;

                writer.write_all(&(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
                for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
                        writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
                }

                writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
                        MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
                        MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) => true,
                        MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => true,
                        _ => false,
                }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
                for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
                        match event {
                                MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
                                        0u8.write(writer)?;
                                        upd.write(writer)?;
                                },
                                MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
                                // `HolderForceClosedWithInfo` replaced `HolderForceClosed` in v0.0.122. To keep
                                // backwards compatibility, we write a `HolderForceClosed` event along with the
                                // `HolderForceClosedWithInfo` event. This is deduplicated in the reader.
                                MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => 1u8.write(writer)?,
                                _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
                        }
                }

                writer.write_all(&(self.pending_events.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
                for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
                        event.write(writer)?;
                }

                self.best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
                writer.write_all(&self.best_block.height.to_be_bytes())?;

                writer.write_all(&(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
                for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
                        entry.write(writer)?;
                }

                (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
                for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
                        txid.write(writer)?;
                        (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
                        for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
                                idx.write(writer)?;
                                script.write(writer)?;
                        }
                }
                self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;

                self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
                self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;

                // If we have a `HolderForceClosedWithInfo` event, we need to write the `HolderForceClosed` for backwards compatibility.
                let pending_monitor_events = match self.pending_monitor_events.iter().find(|ev| match ev {
                        MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => true,
                        _ => false,
                }) {
                        Some(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { outpoint, .. }) => {
                                let mut pending_monitor_events = self.pending_monitor_events.clone();
                                pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(*outpoint));
                                pending_monitor_events
                        }
                        _ => self.pending_monitor_events.clone(),
                };

                write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
                        (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
                        (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, required_vec),
                        (5, pending_monitor_events, required_vec),
                        (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
                        (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
                        (11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
                        (13, self.spendable_txids_confirmed, required_vec),
                        (15, self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, required),
                        (17, self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option),
                        (19, self.channel_id, required),
                        (21, self.balances_empty_height, option),
                });

                Ok(())
        }
}

macro_rules! _process_events_body {
        ($self_opt: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
                loop {
                        let (pending_events, repeated_events);
                        if let Some(us) = $self_opt {
                                let mut inner = us.inner.lock().unwrap();
                                if inner.is_processing_pending_events {
                                        break;
                                }
                                inner.is_processing_pending_events = true;

                                pending_events = inner.pending_events.clone();
                                repeated_events = inner.get_repeated_events();
                        } else { break; }
                        let num_events = pending_events.len();

                        for event in pending_events.into_iter().chain(repeated_events.into_iter()) {
                                $event_to_handle = event;
                                $handle_event;
                        }

                        if let Some(us) = $self_opt {
                                let mut inner = us.inner.lock().unwrap();
                                inner.pending_events.drain(..num_events);
                                inner.is_processing_pending_events = false;
                                if !inner.pending_events.is_empty() {
                                        // If there's more events to process, go ahead and do so.
                                        continue;
                                }
                        }
                        break;
                }
        }
}
pub(super) use _process_events_body as process_events_body;

pub(crate) struct WithChannelMonitor<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
        logger: &'a L,
        peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
        channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
}

impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelMonitor<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
        fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
                record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
                record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
                self.logger.log(record)
        }
}

impl<'a, L: Deref> WithChannelMonitor<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
        pub(crate) fn from<S: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(logger: &'a L, monitor: &ChannelMonitor<S>) -> Self {
                Self::from_impl(logger, &*monitor.inner.lock().unwrap())
        }

        pub(crate) fn from_impl<S: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(logger: &'a L, monitor_impl: &ChannelMonitorImpl<S>) -> Self {
                let peer_id = monitor_impl.counterparty_node_id;
                let channel_id = Some(monitor_impl.channel_id());
                WithChannelMonitor {
                        logger, peer_id, channel_id,
                }
        }
}

impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
        /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
        /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
        /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
        fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
                ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
        }

        pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<ScriptBuf>,
                          on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, ScriptBuf),
                          channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
                          funding_redeemscript: ScriptBuf, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
                          commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
                          initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
                          best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId,
        ) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {

                assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
                let counterparty_payment_script = chan_utils::get_counterparty_payment_script(
                        &channel_parameters.channel_type_features, &keys.pubkeys().payment_point
                );

                let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
                let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
                let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
                let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };

                let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
                let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;

                // block for Rust 1.34 compat
                let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
                        let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
                        let txid = trusted_tx.txid();

                        let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
                        let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
                                txid,
                                revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
                                a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
                                b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
                                delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
                                per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
                                htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
                                to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
                                feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
                        };
                        (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
                };

                let onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(
                        channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id, destination_script.into(), keys,
                        channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx
                );

                let mut outputs_to_watch = new_hash_map();
                outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);

                Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
                        latest_update_id: 0,
                        commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,

                        destination_script: destination_script.into(),
                        broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
                        counterparty_payment_script,
                        shutdown_script,

                        channel_keys_id,
                        holder_revocation_basepoint,
                        channel_id,
                        funding_info,
                        current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
                        prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,

                        counterparty_commitment_params,
                        funding_redeemscript,
                        channel_value_satoshis,
                        their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,

                        on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,

                        commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
                        counterparty_claimable_outpoints: new_hash_map(),
                        counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: new_hash_map(),
                        counterparty_hash_commitment_number: new_hash_map(),
                        counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: new_hash_map(),

                        prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
                        current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
                        current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
                        current_holder_commitment_number,

                        payment_preimages: new_hash_map(),
                        pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
                        pending_events: Vec::new(),
                        is_processing_pending_events: false,

                        onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
                        outputs_to_watch,

                        onchain_tx_handler,

                        lockdown_from_offchain: false,
                        holder_tx_signed: false,
                        funding_spend_seen: false,
                        funding_spend_confirmed: None,
                        confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: None,
                        htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
                        spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec::new(),

                        best_block,
                        counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
                        initial_counterparty_commitment_info: None,
                        balances_empty_height: None,
                })
        }

        #[cfg(test)]
        fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
                self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
        }

        /// A variant of `Self::provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx` used to provide
        /// additional information to the monitor to store in order to recreate the initial
        /// counterparty commitment transaction during persistence (mainly for use in third-party
        /// watchtowers).
        ///
        /// This is used to provide the counterparty commitment information directly to the monitor
        /// before the initial persistence of a new channel.
        pub(crate) fn provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
                &self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
                commitment_number: u64, their_cur_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u32,
                to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, logger: &L,
        )
        where L::Target: Logger
        {
                let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
                let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
                inner.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(txid,
                        htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_cur_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
                        to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, &logger);
        }

        /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
        /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
        /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
        /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
        #[cfg(test)]
        fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
                &self,
                txid: Txid,
                htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
                commitment_number: u64,
                their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
                logger: &L,
        ) where L::Target: Logger {
                let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
                let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
                inner.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
                        txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, &logger)
        }

        #[cfg(test)]
        fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
                &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
                htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
        ) -> Result<(), ()> {
                self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, &Vec::new(), Vec::new()).map_err(|_| ())
        }

        /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
        /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
        pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
                &self,
                payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
                payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
                broadcaster: &B,
                fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
                logger: &L,
        ) where
                B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
                F::Target: FeeEstimator,
                L::Target: Logger,
        {
                let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
                let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
                inner.provide_payment_preimage(
                        payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
        }

        /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
        /// itself.
        ///
        /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
        pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
                &self,
                updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
                broadcaster: &B,
                fee_estimator: &F,
                logger: &L,
        ) -> Result<(), ()>
        where
                B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
                F::Target: FeeEstimator,
                L::Target: Logger,
        {
                let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
                let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
                inner.update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
        }

        /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
        /// ChannelMonitor.
        pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
                self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
        }

        /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
        pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, ScriptBuf) {
                self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
        }

        /// Gets the channel_id of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
        pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
                self.inner.lock().unwrap().channel_id()
        }

        /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
        /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
        pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>)> {
                self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
                        .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
        }

        /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
        /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
        /// have been registered.
        pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&self, filter: &F, logger: &L)
        where
                F::Target: chain::Filter, L::Target: Logger,
        {
                let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
                let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*lock);
                log_trace!(&logger, "Registering funding outpoint {}", &lock.get_funding_txo().0);
                filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
                for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
                        for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
                                assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
                                let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 };
                                log_trace!(logger, "Registering outpoint {} with the filter for monitoring spends", outpoint);
                                filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
                                        block_hash: None,
                                        outpoint,
                                        script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
                                });
                        }
                }
        }

        /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
        /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
        pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
                self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
        }

        /// Processes [`SpendableOutputs`] events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] upon maturity.
        ///
        /// For channels featuring anchor outputs, this method will also process [`BumpTransaction`]
        /// events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] while there is a balance to claim onchain
        /// within each channel. As the confirmation of a commitment transaction may be critical to the
        /// safety of funds, we recommend invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an
        /// environment with spotty connections, like on mobile.
        ///
        /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider, though this shouldn't be needed in
        /// order to handle these events.
        ///
        /// [`SpendableOutputs`]: crate::events::Event::SpendableOutputs
        /// [`BumpTransaction`]: crate::events::Event::BumpTransaction
        pub fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: &H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
                let mut ev;
                process_events_body!(Some(self), ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
        }

        /// Processes any events asynchronously.
        ///
        /// See [`Self::process_pending_events`] for more information.
        pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
                &self, handler: &H
        ) {
                let mut ev;
                process_events_body!(Some(self), ev, { handler(ev).await });
        }

        #[cfg(test)]
        pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
                let mut ret = Vec::new();
                let mut lck = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
                mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut lck.pending_events);
                ret.append(&mut lck.get_repeated_events());
                ret
        }

        /// Gets the counterparty's initial commitment transaction. The returned commitment
        /// transaction is unsigned. This is intended to be called during the initial persistence of
        /// the monitor (inside an implementation of [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]), to allow for
        /// watchtowers in the persistence pipeline to have enough data to form justice transactions.
        ///
        /// This is similar to [`Self::counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update`], except
        /// that for the initial commitment transaction, we don't have a corresponding update.
        ///
        /// This will only return `Some` for channel monitors that have been created after upgrading
        /// to LDK 0.0.117+.
        ///
        /// [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::persist_new_channel
        pub fn initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(&self) -> Option<CommitmentTransaction> {
                self.inner.lock().unwrap().initial_counterparty_commitment_tx()
        }

        /// Gets all of the counterparty commitment transactions provided by the given update. This
        /// may be empty if the update doesn't include any new counterparty commitments. Returned
        /// commitment transactions are unsigned.
        ///
        /// This is provided so that watchtower clients in the persistence pipeline are able to build
        /// justice transactions for each counterparty commitment upon each update. It's intended to be
        /// used within an implementation of [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`], which is provided
        /// with a monitor and an update. Once revoked, signing a justice transaction can be done using
        /// [`Self::sign_to_local_justice_tx`].
        ///
        /// It is expected that a watchtower client may use this method to retrieve the latest counterparty
        /// commitment transaction(s), and then hold the necessary data until a later update in which
        /// the monitor has been updated with the corresponding revocation data, at which point the
        /// monitor can sign the justice transaction.
        ///
        /// This will only return a non-empty list for monitor updates that have been created after
        /// upgrading to LDK 0.0.117+. Note that no restriction lies on the monitors themselves, which
        /// may have been created prior to upgrading.
        ///
        /// [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::update_persisted_channel
        pub fn counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(&self, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Vec<CommitmentTransaction> {
                self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(update)
        }

        /// Wrapper around [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output`] to make
        /// signing the justice transaction easier for implementors of
        /// [`chain::chainmonitor::Persist`]. On success this method returns the provided transaction
        /// signing the input at `input_idx`. This method will only produce a valid signature for
        /// a transaction spending the `to_local` output of a commitment transaction, i.e. this cannot
        /// be used for revoked HTLC outputs.
        ///
        /// `Value` is the value of the output being spent by the input at `input_idx`, committed
        /// in the BIP 143 signature.
        ///
        /// This method will only succeed if this monitor has received the revocation secret for the
        /// provided `commitment_number`. If a commitment number is provided that does not correspond
        /// to the commitment transaction being revoked, this will return a signed transaction, but
        /// the signature will not be valid.
        ///
        /// [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output`]: crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output
        /// [`Persist`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist
        pub fn sign_to_local_justice_tx(&self, justice_tx: Transaction, input_idx: usize, value: u64, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
                self.inner.lock().unwrap().sign_to_local_justice_tx(justice_tx, input_idx, value, commitment_number)
        }

        pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
                self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
        }

        pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
                self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
        }

        pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
                self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
        }

        /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
        ///
        /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
        /// otherwise.
        pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
                self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
        }

        /// You may use this to broadcast the latest local commitment transaction, either because
        /// a monitor update failed or because we've fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our
        /// counterparty side knows a revocation secret we gave them that they shouldn't know).
        ///
        /// Broadcasting these transactions in this manner is UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty
        /// side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to broadcast them if counterparty doesn't
        /// close channel with their commitment transaction after a substantial amount of time. Best
        /// may be to contact the other node operator out-of-band to coordinate other options available
        /// to you.
        pub fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
                &self, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L
        )
        where
                B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
                F::Target: FeeEstimator,
                L::Target: Logger
        {
                let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
                let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&**fee_estimator);
                let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
                inner.queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast(broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger);
        }

        /// Unsafe test-only version of `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` used by our test framework
        /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
        /// revoked commitment transaction.
        #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
        pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
        where L::Target: Logger {
                let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
                let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
                inner.unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&logger)
        }

        /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
        /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
        /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
        /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
        /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
        /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
        ///
        /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
        /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
        ///
        /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
        pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
                &self,
                header: &Header,
                txdata: &TransactionData,
                height: u32,
                broadcaster: B,
                fee_estimator: F,
                logger: &L,
        ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
        where
                B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
                F::Target: FeeEstimator,
                L::Target: Logger,
        {
                let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
                let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
                inner.block_connected(
                        header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
        }

        /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
        /// appropriately.
        pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
                &self,
                header: &Header,
                height: u32,
                broadcaster: B,
                fee_estimator: F,
                logger: &L,
        ) where
                B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
                F::Target: FeeEstimator,
                L::Target: Logger,
        {
                let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
                let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
                inner.block_disconnected(
                        header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
        }

        /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
        /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
        ///
        /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
        /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
        ///
        /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
        pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
                &self,
                header: &Header,
                txdata: &TransactionData,
                height: u32,
                broadcaster: B,
                fee_estimator: F,
                logger: &L,
        ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
        where
                B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
                F::Target: FeeEstimator,
                L::Target: Logger,
        {
                let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
                let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
                let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
                inner.transactions_confirmed(
                        header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger)
        }

        /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
        ///
        /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
        /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
        ///
        /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
        pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
                &self,
                txid: &Txid,
                broadcaster: B,
                fee_estimator: F,
                logger: &L,
        ) where
                B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
                F::Target: FeeEstimator,
                L::Target: Logger,
        {
                let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
                let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
                let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
                inner.transaction_unconfirmed(
                        txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger
                );
        }

        /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
        /// [`block_connected`] for details.
        ///
        /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
        /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
        ///
        /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
        pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
                &self,
                header: &Header,
                height: u32,
                broadcaster: B,
                fee_estimator: F,
                logger: &L,
        ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
        where
                B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
                F::Target: FeeEstimator,
                L::Target: Logger,
        {
                let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
                let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
                let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
                inner.best_block_updated(
                        header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger
                )
        }

        /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
        pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
                let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
                let mut txids: Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
                        .iter()
                        .map(|entry| (entry.txid, entry.height, entry.block_hash))
                        .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
                        .collect();
                txids.sort_unstable_by(|a, b| a.0.cmp(&b.0).then(b.1.cmp(&a.1)));
                txids.dedup_by_key(|(txid, _, _)| *txid);
                txids
        }

        /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
        /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
        pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
                self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
        }

        /// Triggers rebroadcasts/fee-bumps of pending claims from a force-closed channel. This is
        /// crucial in preventing certain classes of pinning attacks, detecting substantial mempool
        /// feerate changes between blocks, and ensuring reliability if broadcasting fails. We recommend
        /// invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an environment with spotty
        /// connections, like on mobile.
        pub fn rebroadcast_pending_claims<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
                &self, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L,
        )
        where
                B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
                F::Target: FeeEstimator,
                L::Target: Logger,
        {
                let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
                let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
                let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
                let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
                inner.onchain_tx_handler.rebroadcast_pending_claims(
                        current_height, FeerateStrategy::HighestOfPreviousOrNew, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger,
                );
        }

        /// Triggers rebroadcasts of pending claims from a force-closed channel after a transaction
        /// signature generation failure.
        pub fn signer_unblocked<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
                &self, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L,
        )
        where
                B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
                F::Target: FeeEstimator,
                L::Target: Logger,
        {
                let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
                let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
                let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
                let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
                inner.onchain_tx_handler.rebroadcast_pending_claims(
                        current_height, FeerateStrategy::RetryPrevious, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger,
                );
        }

        /// Returns the descriptors for relevant outputs (i.e., those that we can spend) within the
        /// transaction if they exist and the transaction has at least [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`]
        /// confirmations. For [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] descriptors to be
        /// returned, the transaction must have at least `max(ANTI_REORG_DELAY, to_self_delay)`
        /// confirmations.
        ///
        /// Descriptors returned by this method are primarily exposed via [`Event::SpendableOutputs`]
        /// once they are no longer under reorg risk. This method serves as a way to retrieve these
        /// descriptors at a later time, either for historical purposes, or to replay any
        /// missed/unhandled descriptors. For the purpose of gathering historical records, if the
        /// channel close has fully resolved (i.e., [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] returns
        /// an empty set), you can retrieve all spendable outputs by providing all descendant spending
        /// transactions starting from the channel's funding transaction and going down three levels.
        ///
        /// `tx` is a transaction we'll scan the outputs of. Any transaction can be provided. If any
        /// outputs which can be spent by us are found, at least one descriptor is returned.
        ///
        /// `confirmation_height` must be the height of the block in which `tx` was included in.
        pub fn get_spendable_outputs(&self, tx: &Transaction, confirmation_height: u32) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
                let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
                let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
                let mut spendable_outputs = inner.get_spendable_outputs(tx);
                spendable_outputs.retain(|descriptor| {
                        let mut conf_threshold = current_height.saturating_sub(ANTI_REORG_DELAY) + 1;
                        if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) = descriptor {
                                conf_threshold = cmp::min(conf_threshold,
                                        current_height.saturating_sub(descriptor.to_self_delay as u32) + 1);
                        }
                        conf_threshold >= confirmation_height
                });
                spendable_outputs
        }

        /// Checks if the monitor is fully resolved. Resolved monitor is one that has claimed all of
        /// its outputs and balances (i.e. [`Self::get_claimable_balances`] returns an empty set).
        ///
        /// This function returns true only if [`Self::get_claimable_balances`] has been empty for at least
        /// 2016 blocks as an additional protection against any bugs resulting in spuriously empty balance sets.
        pub fn is_fully_resolved<L: Logger>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool {
                let mut is_all_funds_claimed = self.get_claimable_balances().is_empty();
                let current_height = self.current_best_block().height;
                let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();

                if is_all_funds_claimed {
                        if !inner.funding_spend_seen {
                                debug_assert!(false, "We should see funding spend by the time a monitor clears out");
                                is_all_funds_claimed = false;
                        }
                }

                match (inner.balances_empty_height, is_all_funds_claimed) {
                        (Some(balances_empty_height), true) => {
                                // Claimed all funds, check if reached the blocks threshold.
                                const BLOCKS_THRESHOLD: u32 = 4032; // ~four weeks
                                return current_height >= balances_empty_height + BLOCKS_THRESHOLD;
                        },
                        (Some(_), false) => {
                                // previously assumed we claimed all funds, but we have new funds to claim.
                                // Should not happen in practice.
                                debug_assert!(false, "Thought we were done claiming funds, but claimable_balances now has entries");
                                log_error!(logger,
                                        "WARNING: LDK thought it was done claiming all the available funds in the ChannelMonitor for channel {}, but later decided it had more to claim. This is potentially an important bug in LDK, please report it at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/new",
                                        inner.get_funding_txo().0);
                                inner.balances_empty_height = None;
                                false
                        },
                        (None, true) => {
                                // Claimed all funds but `balances_empty_height` is None. It is set to the
                                // current block height.
                                inner.balances_empty_height = Some(current_height);
                                false
                        },
                        (None, false) => {
                                // Have funds to claim.
                                false
                        },
                }
        }

        #[cfg(test)]
        pub fn get_counterparty_payment_script(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
                self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script.clone()
        }

        #[cfg(test)]
        pub fn set_counterparty_payment_script(&self, script: ScriptBuf) {
                self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script = script;
        }

        #[cfg(test)]
        pub fn do_signer_call<F: FnMut(&Signer) -> ()>(&self, mut f: F) {
                let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
                f(&inner.onchain_tx_handler.signer);
        }
}

impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
        /// Helper for get_claimable_balances which does the work for an individual HTLC, generating up
        /// to one `Balance` for the HTLC.
        fn get_htlc_balance(&self, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, holder_commitment: bool,
                counterparty_revoked_commitment: bool, confirmed_txid: Option<Txid>)
        -> Option<Balance> {
                let htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx =
                        if let Some(v) = htlc.transaction_output_index { v } else { return None; };

                let mut htlc_spend_txid_opt = None;
                let mut htlc_spend_tx_opt = None;
                let mut holder_timeout_spend_pending = None;
                let mut htlc_spend_pending = None;
                let mut holder_delayed_output_pending = None;
                for event in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
                        match event.event {
                                OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx, htlc_value_satoshis, .. }
                                if commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) => {
                                        debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
                                        htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
                                        debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
                                        htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
                                        debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
                                        debug_assert_eq!(htlc_value_satoshis.unwrap(), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
                                        holder_timeout_spend_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
                                },
                                OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. }
                                if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
                                        debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
                                        htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
                                        debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
                                        htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
                                        debug_assert!(htlc_spend_pending.is_none());
                                        htlc_spend_pending = Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()));
                                },
                                OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
                                        descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) }
                                if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().enumerate()
                                        .any(|(input_idx, inp)|
                                                 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
                                                        inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx &&
                                                                // A maturing output for an HTLC claim will always be at the same
                                                                // index as the HTLC input. This is true pre-anchors, as there's
                                                                // only 1 input and 1 output. This is also true post-anchors,
                                                                // because we have a SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY signature from our
                                                                // channel counterparty.
                                                                descriptor.outpoint.index as usize == input_idx
                                        ))
                                        .unwrap_or(false)
                                => {
                                        debug_assert!(holder_delayed_output_pending.is_none());
                                        holder_delayed_output_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
                                },
                                _ => {},
                        }
                }
                let htlc_resolved = self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter()
                        .find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
                                debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
                                htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid.as_ref();
                                debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
                                htlc_spend_tx_opt = v.resolving_tx.as_ref();
                                true
                        } else { false });
                debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_resolved.is_some() as u8 <= 1);

                let htlc_commitment_outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx);
                let htlc_output_to_spend =
                        if let Some(txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
                                // Because HTLC transactions either only have 1 input and 1 output (pre-anchors) or
                                // are signed with SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY under BIP-0143 (post-anchors), we can
                                // locate the correct output by ensuring its adjacent input spends the HTLC output
                                // in the commitment.
                                if let Some(ref tx) = htlc_spend_tx_opt {
                                        let htlc_input_idx_opt = tx.input.iter().enumerate()
                                                .find(|(_, input)| input.previous_output == htlc_commitment_outpoint)
                                                .map(|(idx, _)| idx as u32);
                                        debug_assert!(htlc_input_idx_opt.is_some());
                                        BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, htlc_input_idx_opt.unwrap_or(0))
                                } else {
                                        debug_assert!(!self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
                                        BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, 0)
                                }
                        } else {
                                htlc_commitment_outpoint
                        };
                let htlc_output_spend_pending = self.onchain_tx_handler.is_output_spend_pending(&htlc_output_to_spend);

                if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_delayed_output_pending {
                        debug_assert!(holder_commitment);
                        return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                                amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
                                confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
                        });
                } else if htlc_resolved.is_some() && !htlc_output_spend_pending {
                        // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
                        // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
                        // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
                        // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
                        // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
                        debug_assert!(holder_commitment || self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
                } else if counterparty_revoked_commitment {
                        let htlc_output_claim_pending = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
                                if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
                                        descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { .. }
                                } = &event.event {
                                        if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| {
                                                if let Some(htlc_spend_txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
                                                        tx.txid() == *htlc_spend_txid || inp.previous_output.txid == *htlc_spend_txid
                                                } else {
                                                        Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
                                                                inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx
                                                }
                                        })).unwrap_or(false) {
                                                Some(())
                                        } else { None }
                                } else { None }
                        });
                        if htlc_output_claim_pending.is_some() {
                                // We already push `Balance`s onto the `res` list for every
                                // `StaticOutput` in a `MaturingOutput` in the revoked
                                // counterparty commitment transaction case generally, so don't
                                // need to do so again here.
                        } else {
                                debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none(),
                                        "HTLCUpdate OnchainEvents should never appear for preimage claims");
                                debug_assert!(!htlc.offered || htlc_spend_pending.is_none() || !htlc_spend_pending.unwrap().1,
                                        "We don't (currently) generate preimage claims against revoked outputs, where did you get one?!");
                                return Some(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
                                        amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
                                });
                        }
                } else if htlc.offered == holder_commitment {
                        // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
                        // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
                        // and awaiting confirmations on it.
                        if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_timeout_spend_pending {
                                return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                                        amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
                                        confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
                                });
                        } else {
                                return Some(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
                                        amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
                                        claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
                                        payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
                                });
                        }
                } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
                        // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
                        // we know the preimage.
                        // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
                        // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
                        // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
                        debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
                        if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
                                return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                                        amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
                                        confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
                                });
                        } else {
                                return Some(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
                                        amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
                                        timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
                                        payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
                                        payment_preimage: *payment_preimage,
                                });
                        }
                } else if htlc_resolved.is_none() {
                        return Some(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
                                amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
                                expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
                                payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
                        });
                }
                None
        }
}

impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
        /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
        /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
        /// confirmation).
        ///
        /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
        /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
        /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
        /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
        ///
        /// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
        /// LDK prior to 0.0.111, not all or excess balances may be included.
        ///
        /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
        /// may be returned here and their meanings.
        pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
                let mut res = Vec::new();
                let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();

                let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
                let mut confirmed_counterparty_output = us.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output;
                let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
                let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
                        if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } =
                                event.event
                        {
                                confirmed_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
                                Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
                        } else { None }
                });
                if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
                        debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
                                "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
                        confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
                        pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
                }

                macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
                        ($holder_commitment: expr, $counterparty_revoked_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
                                for htlc in $htlc_iter {
                                        if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() {

                                                if let Some(bal) = us.get_htlc_balance(htlc, $holder_commitment, $counterparty_revoked_commitment, confirmed_txid) {
                                                        res.push(bal);
                                                }
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                }

                if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
                        let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
                        if let Some(counterparty_tx_htlcs) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
                                // First look for the to_remote output back to us.
                                if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
                                        if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
                                                if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
                                                        descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
                                                } = &event.event {
                                                        Some(descriptor.output.value)
                                                } else { None }
                                        }) {
                                                res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                                                        amount_satoshis: value,
                                                        confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
                                                });
                                        } else {
                                                // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
                                                // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
                                                // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
                                        }
                                }
                                if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
                                        walk_htlcs!(false, false, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
                                } else {
                                        walk_htlcs!(false, true, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
                                        // The counterparty broadcasted a revoked state!
                                        // Look for any StaticOutputs first, generating claimable balances for those.
                                        // If any match the confirmed counterparty revoked to_self output, skip
                                        // generating a CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable.
                                        let mut spent_counterparty_output = false;
                                        for event in us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
                                                if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
                                                        descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { output, .. }
                                                } = &event.event {
                                                        res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                                                                amount_satoshis: output.value,
                                                                confirmation_height: event.confirmation_threshold(),
                                                        });
                                                        if let Some(confirmed_to_self_idx) = confirmed_counterparty_output.map(|(idx, _)| idx) {
                                                                if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx|
                                                                        tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.vout == confirmed_to_self_idx)
                                                                ).unwrap_or(false) {
                                                                        spent_counterparty_output = true;
                                                                }
                                                        }
                                                }
                                        }

                                        if spent_counterparty_output {
                                        } else if let Some((confirmed_to_self_idx, amt)) = confirmed_counterparty_output {
                                                let output_spendable = us.onchain_tx_handler
                                                        .is_output_spend_pending(&BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, confirmed_to_self_idx));
                                                if output_spendable {
                                                        res.push(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
                                                                amount_satoshis: amt,
                                                        });
                                                }
                                        } else {
                                                // Counterparty output is missing, either it was broadcasted on a
                                                // previous version of LDK or the counterparty hadn't met dust.
                                        }
                                }
                                found_commitment_tx = true;
                        } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
                                walk_htlcs!(true, false, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
                                if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
                                        res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                                                amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
                                                confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
                                        });
                                }
                                found_commitment_tx = true;
                        } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
                                if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
                                        walk_htlcs!(true, false, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
                                        if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
                                                res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                                                        amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
                                                        confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
                                                });
                                        }
                                        found_commitment_tx = true;
                                }
                        }
                        if !found_commitment_tx {
                                if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
                                        // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
                                        // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
                                        // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
                                        res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
                                                amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
                                                confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
                                        });
                                }
                        }
                } else {
                        let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
                        for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
                                if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
                                if htlc.offered {
                                        res.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
                                                amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
                                                claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
                                                payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
                                        });
                                } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
                                        claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
                                } else {
                                        // As long as the HTLC is still in our latest commitment state, treat
                                        // it as potentially claimable, even if it has long-since expired.
                                        res.push(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
                                                amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
                                                expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
                                                payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
                                        });
                                }
                        }
                        res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
                                amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
                        });
                }

                res
        }

        /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which can be (or have been) resolved by this
        /// `ChannelMonitor`. This is used to determine if an HTLC was removed from the channel prior
        /// to the `ChannelManager` having been persisted.
        ///
        /// This is similar to [`Self::get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs`] except it includes
        /// HTLCs which were resolved on-chain (i.e. where the final HTLC resolution was done by an
        /// event from this `ChannelMonitor`).
        pub(crate) fn get_all_current_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
                let mut res = new_hash_map();
                // Just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs on
                // `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
                let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
                macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
                        ($txid: expr) => {
                                if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
                                        for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
                                                if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
                                                        res.insert((**source).clone(), (htlc.clone(),
                                                                us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned()));
                                                }
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                }
                if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
                        walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
                }
                if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
                        walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
                }
                res
        }

        /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel or which were
        /// resolved with a preimage from our counterparty.
        ///
        /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
        ///
        /// Currently, the preimage is unused, however if it is present in the relevant internal state
        /// an HTLC is always included even if it has been resolved.
        pub(crate) fn get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
                let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
                // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
                // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
                // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
                let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
                        us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
                                if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
                                        Some(event.txid)
                                } else { None }
                        })
                });

                if confirmed_txid.is_none() {
                        // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
                        // closed), just get the full set.
                        mem::drop(us);
                        return self.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs();
                }

                let mut res = new_hash_map();
                macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
                        ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
                                for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
                                        if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
                                                // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
                                                // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
                                                // would fail.
                                                // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
                                                // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
                                        } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
                                                // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
                                                // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
                                                // and awaiting confirmations on it.
                                                let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
                                                        if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
                                                                // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
                                                                // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
                                                                // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
                                                                Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
                                                                        us.best_block.height >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
                                                        } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
                                                                // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
                                                                // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
                                                                // the preimage.
                                                                Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
                                                        } else { false }
                                                });
                                                let counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt =
                                                        us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned();
                                                if !htlc_update_confd || counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt.is_some() {
                                                        res.insert(source.clone(), (htlc.clone(), counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt));
                                                }
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                }

                let txid = confirmed_txid.unwrap();
                if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
                        walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
                                if let &Some(ref source) = b {
                                        Some((a, &**source))
                                } else { None }
                        }));
                } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
                        walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
                                if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
                        }));
                } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
                        if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
                                walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
                                        if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
                                }));
                        }
                }

                res
        }

        pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
                self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
        }
}

/// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
/// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
/// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
///
/// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
/// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
/// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
/// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
/// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
/// broadcasted commitment transaction.
///
/// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
/// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
/// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
/// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
        ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
         $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_hash: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
                debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);

                macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
                        ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
                                if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
                                        for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
                                                if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
                                                        // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
                                                        // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
                                                        // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
                                                        // payment_preimage.
                                                        // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
                                                        // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
                                                        // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
                                                        // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
                                                        // need to here.
                                                        let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut dyn Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;

                                                        let mut matched_htlc = false;
                                                        for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
                                                                if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
                                                                        (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
                                                                         (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
                                                                          broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
                                                                          broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
                                                                        matched_htlc = true;
                                                                        break;
                                                                }
                                                        }
                                                        if matched_htlc { continue; }
                                                        if $self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).is_some() {
                                                                continue;
                                                        }
                                                        $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
                                                                if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
                                                                match entry.event {
                                                                        OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
                                                                                *update_source != **source
                                                                        },
                                                                        _ => true,
                                                                }
                                                        });
                                                        let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
                                                                txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
                                                                transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
                                                                height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
                                                                block_hash: Some(*$commitment_tx_conf_hash),
                                                                event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
                                                                        source: (**source).clone(),
                                                                        payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
                                                                        htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
                                                                        commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
                                                                },
                                                        };
                                                        log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
                                                                &htlc.payment_hash, $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
                                                                $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
                                                        $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
                                                }
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                }
                if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
                        check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
                }
                if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
                        check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
                }
        } }
}

// In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
// witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
// in-line tests later.

#[cfg(test)]
pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
        use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
        let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
        ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
        ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
        ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
        ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
        ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.to_u8();
        Vec::from(&ret[..])
}

#[cfg(test)]
pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
        vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
}

impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
        /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
        /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
        /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
        fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
                if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
                        return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
                }

                // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
                // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
                if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
                        if self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap() != txid {
                                let cur_claimables = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
                                        &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
                                for (_, ref source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
                                        if let Some(source) = source_opt {
                                                if !cur_claimables.iter()
                                                        .any(|(_, cur_source_opt)| cur_source_opt == source_opt)
                                                {
                                                        self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.remove(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source));
                                                }
                                        }
                                }
                                for &mut (_, ref mut source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
                                        *source_opt = None;
                                }
                        } else {
                                assert!(cfg!(fuzzing), "Commitment txids are unique outside of fuzzing, where hashes can collide");
                        }
                }

                if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
                        let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
                        let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
                        let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
                        let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;

                        self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
                                for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
                                        if k == htlc.payment_hash {
                                                return true
                                        }
                                }
                                if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
                                        for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
                                                if k == htlc.payment_hash {
                                                        return true
                                                }
                                        }
                                }
                                let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
                                        if *cn < min_idx {
                                                return true
                                        }
                                        true
                                } else { false };
                                if contains {
                                        counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
                                }
                                false
                        });
                }

                Ok(())
        }

        fn provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
                &mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
                commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u32,
                to_broadcaster_value: u64, to_countersignatory_value: u64, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
        ) where L::Target: Logger {
                self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info = Some((their_per_commitment_point.clone(),
                        feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value));

                #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
                        let rebuilt_commitment_tx = self.initial_counterparty_commitment_tx().unwrap();
                        debug_assert_eq!(rebuilt_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), txid);
                }

                self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number,
                                their_per_commitment_point, logger);
        }

        fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
                &mut self, txid: Txid,
                htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
                commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
        ) where L::Target: Logger {
                // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
                // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
                // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
                // timeouts)
                for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
                        self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
                }

                log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
                self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
                self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
                self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
                self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
                //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
                match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
                        Some(old_points) => {
                                if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
                                        self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
                                } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
                                        if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
                                                self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
                                        } else {
                                                self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
                                        }
                                } else {
                                        self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
                                }
                        },
                        None => {
                                self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
                        }
                }
                let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
                for htlc in htlc_outputs {
                        if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
                                htlcs.push(htlc.0);
                        }
                }
        }

        /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
        /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
        /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
        /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
        /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
        fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, mut htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>, claimed_htlcs: &[(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)], nondust_htlc_sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
                if htlc_outputs.iter().any(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()) {
                        // If we have non-dust HTLCs in htlc_outputs, ensure they match the HTLCs in the
                        // `holder_commitment_tx`. In the future, we'll no longer provide the redundant data
                        // and just pass in source data via `nondust_htlc_sources`.
                        debug_assert_eq!(htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).count(), holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().len());
                        for (a, b) in htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).map(|(h, _, _)| h).zip(holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter()) {
                                debug_assert_eq!(a, b);
                        }
                        debug_assert_eq!(htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).count(), holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.len());
                        for (a, b) in htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(_, s, _)| s.as_ref()).zip(holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter()) {
                                debug_assert_eq!(a, b);
                        }
                        debug_assert!(nondust_htlc_sources.is_empty());
                } else {
                        // If we don't have any non-dust HTLCs in htlc_outputs, assume they were all passed via
                        // `nondust_htlc_sources`, building up the final htlc_outputs by combining
                        // `nondust_htlc_sources` and the `holder_commitment_tx`
                        #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
                                let mut prev = -1;
                                for htlc in holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter() {
                                        assert!(htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as i32 > prev);
                                        prev = htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as i32;
                                }
                        }
                        debug_assert!(htlc_outputs.iter().all(|(htlc, _, _)| htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()));
                        debug_assert!(htlc_outputs.iter().all(|(_, sig_opt, _)| sig_opt.is_none()));
                        debug_assert_eq!(holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().len(), holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.len());

                        let mut sources_iter = nondust_htlc_sources.into_iter();

                        for (htlc, counterparty_sig) in holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter()
                                .zip(holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter())
                        {
                                if htlc.offered {
                                        let source = sources_iter.next().expect("Non-dust HTLC sources didn't match commitment tx");
                                        #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
                                                assert!(source.possibly_matches_output(htlc));
                                        }
                                        htlc_outputs.push((htlc.clone(), Some(counterparty_sig.clone()), Some(source)));
                                } else {
                                        htlc_outputs.push((htlc.clone(), Some(counterparty_sig.clone()), None));
                                }
                        }
                        debug_assert!(sources_iter.next().is_none());
                }

                let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
                let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
                let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
                self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
                let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
                        txid,
                        revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
                        a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
                        b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
                        delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
                        per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
                        htlc_outputs,
                        to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
                        feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
                };
                self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
                mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
                self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
                for (claimed_htlc_id, claimed_preimage) in claimed_htlcs {
                        #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
                                let cur_counterparty_htlcs = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
                                                &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
                                assert!(cur_counterparty_htlcs.iter().any(|(_, source_opt)| {
                                        if let Some(source) = source_opt {
                                                SentHTLCId::from_source(source) == *claimed_htlc_id
                                        } else { false }
                                }));
                        }
                        self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.insert(*claimed_htlc_id, *claimed_preimage);
                }
                if self.holder_tx_signed {
                        return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
                }
                Ok(())
        }

        /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
        /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
        fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
                &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
                fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>)
        where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
                    F::Target: FeeEstimator,
                    L::Target: Logger,
        {
                self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());

                let confirmed_spend_txid = self.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
                        self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| match event.event {
                                OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => Some(event.txid),
                                _ => None,
                        })
                });
                let confirmed_spend_txid = if let Some(txid) = confirmed_spend_txid {
                        txid
                } else {
                        return;
                };

                // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
                // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
                macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
                        ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
                                let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None);
                                self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height, self.best_block.height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
                        }
                }
                if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
                        if txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
                                if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
                                        claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
                                } else {
                                        debug_assert!(false);
                                        log_error!(logger, "Detected counterparty commitment tx on-chain without tracking commitment number");
                                }
                                return;
                        }
                }
                if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
                        if txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
                                if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
                                        claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
                                } else {
                                        debug_assert!(false);
                                        log_error!(logger, "Detected counterparty commitment tx on-chain without tracking commitment number");
                                }
                                return;
                        }
                }

                // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
                // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
                // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
                // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
                // holder commitment transactions.
                if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
                        let holder_commitment_tx = if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
                                Some(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx)
                        } else if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
                                if prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
                                        Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx)
                                } else {
                                        None
                                }
                        } else {
                                None
                        };
                        if let Some(holder_commitment_tx) = holder_commitment_tx {
                                // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
                                // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
                                // transactions.
                                let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height);
                                self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height, self.best_block.height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
                        }
                }
        }

        fn generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs(&mut self, reason: ClosureReason) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Vec<TransactionOutputs>) {
                let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(
                        self.funding_redeemscript.clone(),
                        self.channel_value_satoshis,
                        self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
                );
                let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
                        self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32,
                        PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp),
                        self.best_block.height, self.best_block.height
                );
                let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![commitment_package];
                let event = MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo {
                        reason,
                        outpoint: self.funding_info.0,
                        channel_id: self.channel_id,
                };
                self.pending_monitor_events.push(event);

                // Although we aren't signing the transaction directly here, the transaction will be signed
                // in the claim that is queued to OnchainTxHandler. We set holder_tx_signed here to reject
                // new channel updates.
                self.holder_tx_signed = true;
                let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
                // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is
                // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in
                // `transactions_confirmed`.
                if !self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
                        // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
                        // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
                        // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
                        let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(
                                &self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height
                        );
                        let unsigned_commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_unsigned_holder_commitment_tx();
                        let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(
                                &self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &unsigned_commitment_tx
                        );
                        if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
                                watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
                        }
                        claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
                }
                (claimable_outpoints, watch_outputs)
        }

        pub(crate) fn queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
                &mut self, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
        )
        where
                B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
                F::Target: FeeEstimator,
                L::Target: Logger,
        {
                let (claimable_outpoints, _) = self.generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs(ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
                self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(
                        claimable_outpoints, self.best_block.height, self.best_block.height, broadcaster,
                        fee_estimator, logger
                );
        }

        fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
                &mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
        ) -> Result<(), ()>
        where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
                F::Target: FeeEstimator,
                L::Target: Logger,
        {
                if self.latest_update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
                        log_info!(logger, "Applying post-force-closed update to monitor {} with {} change(s).",
                                log_funding_info!(self), updates.updates.len());
                } else if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
                        log_info!(logger, "Applying force close update to monitor {} with {} change(s).",
                                log_funding_info!(self), updates.updates.len());
                } else {
                        log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} change(s).",
                                log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
                }

                if updates.counterparty_node_id.is_some() {
                        if self.counterparty_node_id.is_none() {
                                self.counterparty_node_id = updates.counterparty_node_id;
                        } else {
                                debug_assert_eq!(self.counterparty_node_id, updates.counterparty_node_id);
                        }
                }

                // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a preimage for a
                // broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd like to claim on-chain. If this
                // is the case, we no longer have guaranteed access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a
                // sentinel value instead.
                //
                // The `ChannelManager` may also queue redundant `ChannelForceClosed` updates if it still
                // thinks the channel needs to have its commitment transaction broadcast, so we'll allow
                // them as well.
                if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
                        assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
                        match updates.updates[0] {
                                ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {},
                                // We should have already seen a `ChannelForceClosed` update if we're trying to
                                // provide a preimage at this point.
                                ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } =>
                                        debug_assert_eq!(self.latest_update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID),
                                _ => {
                                        log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
                                        panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
                                },
                        }
                } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
                        panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
                }
                let mut ret = Ok(());
                let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&**fee_estimator);
                for update in updates.updates.iter() {
                        match update {
                                ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources } => {
                                        log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
                                        if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
                                        if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone(), &claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources.clone()) {
                                                log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
                                                log_error!(logger, "    {}", e);
                                                ret = Err(());
                                        }
                                }
                                ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
                                        log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
                                        self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
                                },
                                ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
                                        log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
                                        self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
                                },
                                ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
                                        log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
                                        if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
                                                debug_assert!(false, "Latest counterparty commitment secret was invalid");
                                                log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
                                                log_error!(logger, "    {}", e);
                                                ret = Err(());
                                        }
                                },
                                ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
                                        log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
                                        self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
                                        if *should_broadcast {
                                                // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one
                                                // confirmed (even with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as
                                                // duplicate/conflicting.
                                                let detected_funding_spend = self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
                                                        self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
                                                                OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
                                                                _ => false,
                                                        }).is_some();
                                                if detected_funding_spend {
                                                        log_trace!(logger, "Avoiding commitment broadcast, already detected confirmed spend onchain");
                                                        continue;
                                                }
                                                self.queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast(broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
                                        } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
                                                log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast");
                                                log_error!(logger, "    in channel monitor for channel {}!", &self.channel_id());
                                                log_error!(logger, "    Read the docs for ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn to take manual action!");
                                        } else {
                                                // If we generated a MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed, the ChannelManager
                                                // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
                                                // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
                                                log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
                                        }
                                },
                                ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
                                        log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
                                        if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
                                                panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
                                        }
                                },
                        }
                }

                #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
                        self.counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(updates);
                }

                // If the updates succeeded and we were in an already closed channel state, then there's no
                // need to refuse any updates we expect to receive afer seeing a confirmed commitment.
                if ret.is_ok() && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && self.latest_update_id == updates.update_id {
                        return Ok(());
                }

                self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;

                // Refuse updates after we've detected a spend onchain, but only if we haven't processed a
                // force closed monitor update yet.
                if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen && self.latest_update_id != CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
                        log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
                        Err(())
                } else { ret }
        }

        fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
                self.latest_update_id
        }

        fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, ScriptBuf) {
                &self.funding_info
        }

        pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
                self.channel_id
        }

        fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>> {
                // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
                // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
                // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
                for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
                        self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
                }
                &self.outputs_to_watch
        }

        fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
                let mut ret = Vec::new();
                mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
                ret
        }

        /// Gets the set of events that are repeated regularly (e.g. those which RBF bump
        /// transactions). We're okay if we lose these on restart as they'll be regenerated for us at
        /// some regular interval via [`ChannelMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims`].
        pub(super) fn get_repeated_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
                let pending_claim_events = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_and_clear_pending_claim_events();
                let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(pending_claim_events.len());
                for (claim_id, claim_event) in pending_claim_events {
                        match claim_event {
                                ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment {
                                        package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, commitment_tx, anchor_output_idx,
                                } => {
                                        let channel_id = self.channel_id;
                                        // unwrap safety: `ClaimEvent`s are only available for Anchor channels,
                                        // introduced with v0.0.116. counterparty_node_id is guaranteed to be `Some`
                                        // since v0.0.110.
                                        let counterparty_node_id = self.counterparty_node_id.unwrap();
                                        let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.txid();
                                        debug_assert_eq!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, commitment_txid);
                                        let pending_htlcs = self.current_holder_commitment_tx.non_dust_htlcs();
                                        let commitment_tx_fee_satoshis = self.channel_value_satoshis -
                                                commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0u64, |sum, output| sum + output.value);
                                        ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose {
                                                channel_id,
                                                counterparty_node_id,
                                                claim_id,
                                                package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
                                                commitment_tx,
                                                commitment_tx_fee_satoshis,
                                                anchor_descriptor: AnchorDescriptor {
                                                        channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
                                                                keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
                                                                value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
                                                                transaction_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
                                                        },
                                                        outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint {
                                                                txid: commitment_txid,
                                                                vout: anchor_output_idx,
                                                        },
                                                },
                                                pending_htlcs,
                                        }));
                                },
                                ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC {
                                        target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, htlcs, tx_lock_time,
                                } => {
                                        let channel_id = self.channel_id;
                                        // unwrap safety: `ClaimEvent`s are only available for Anchor channels,
                                        // introduced with v0.0.116. counterparty_node_id is guaranteed to be `Some`
                                        // since v0.0.110.
                                        let counterparty_node_id = self.counterparty_node_id.unwrap();
                                        let mut htlc_descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs.len());
                                        for htlc in htlcs {
                                                htlc_descriptors.push(HTLCDescriptor {
                                                        channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
                                                                keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
                                                                value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
                                                                transaction_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
                                                        },
                                                        commitment_txid: htlc.commitment_txid,
                                                        per_commitment_number: htlc.per_commitment_number,
                                                        per_commitment_point: self.onchain_tx_handler.signer.get_per_commitment_point(
                                                                htlc.per_commitment_number, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
                                                        ),
                                                        feerate_per_kw: 0,
                                                        htlc: htlc.htlc,
                                                        preimage: htlc.preimage,
                                                        counterparty_sig: htlc.counterparty_sig,
                                                });
                                        }
                                        ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution {
                                                channel_id,
                                                counterparty_node_id,
                                                claim_id,
                                                target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
                                                htlc_descriptors,
                                                tx_lock_time,
                                        }));
                                }
                        }
                }
                ret
        }

        fn initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(&mut self) -> Option<CommitmentTransaction> {
                let (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_value,
                        to_countersignatory_value) = self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info?;
                let htlc_outputs = vec![];

                let commitment_tx = self.build_counterparty_commitment_tx(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
                        &their_per_commitment_point, to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value,
                        feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs);
                Some(commitment_tx)
        }

        fn build_counterparty_commitment_tx(
                &self, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: &PublicKey,
                to_broadcaster_value: u64, to_countersignatory_value: u64, feerate_per_kw: u32,
                mut nondust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>
        ) -> CommitmentTransaction {
                let broadcaster_keys = &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters
                        .counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys;
                let countersignatory_keys =
                        &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys;

                let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster_keys.funding_pubkey;
                let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory_keys.funding_pubkey;
                let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&their_per_commitment_point,
                        &broadcaster_keys, &countersignatory_keys, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx);
                let channel_parameters =
                        &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable();

                CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
                        to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value, broadcaster_funding_key,
                        countersignatory_funding_key, keys, feerate_per_kw, &mut nondust_htlcs,
                        channel_parameters)
        }

        fn counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(&self, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Vec<CommitmentTransaction> {
                update.updates.iter().filter_map(|update| {
                        match update {
                                &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid,
                                        ref htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point,
                                        feerate_per_kw: Some(feerate_per_kw),
                                        to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(to_broadcaster_value),
                                        to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(to_countersignatory_value) } => {

                                        let nondust_htlcs = htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _)| {
                                                htlc.transaction_output_index.map(|_| (htlc.clone(), None))
                                        }).collect::<Vec<_>>();

                                        let commitment_tx = self.build_counterparty_commitment_tx(commitment_number,
                                                        &their_per_commitment_point, to_broadcaster_value,
                                                        to_countersignatory_value, feerate_per_kw, nondust_htlcs);

                                        debug_assert_eq!(commitment_tx.trust().txid(), commitment_txid);

                                        Some(commitment_tx)
                                },
                                _ => None,
                        }
                }).collect()
        }

        fn sign_to_local_justice_tx(
                &self, mut justice_tx: Transaction, input_idx: usize, value: u64, commitment_number: u64
        ) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
                let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).ok_or(())?;
                let per_commitment_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secret).map_err(|_| ())?;
                let their_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(
                        &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);

                let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
                        &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &their_per_commitment_point);
                let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
                        &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &their_per_commitment_point);
                let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
                        self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);

                let sig = self.onchain_tx_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_output(
                        &justice_tx, input_idx, value, &per_commitment_key, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx)?;
                justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
                justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(&[1u8]);
                justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(revokeable_redeemscript.as_bytes());
                Ok(justice_tx)
        }

        /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
        fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
                self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
        }

        fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
                self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
        }

        fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
                self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
        }

        fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
                self.current_holder_commitment_number
        }

        /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
        /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
        /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
        /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
        ///
        /// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s), as well as additional outputs to watch and
        /// general information about the output that is to the counterparty in the commitment
        /// transaction.
        fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L)
                -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo)
        where L::Target: Logger {
                // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
                // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
                let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
                let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
                let mut to_counterparty_output_info = None;

                let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
                let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);

                macro_rules! ignore_error {
                        ( $thing : expr ) => {
                                match $thing {
                                        Ok(a) => a,
                                        Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
                                }
                        };
                }

                let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
                if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
                        let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
                        let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
                        let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
                        let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,  &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &per_commitment_point,);
                        let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));

                        let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
                        let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();

                        // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
                        for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
                                if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
                                        let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
                                        let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, height);
                                        claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
                                        to_counterparty_output_info =
                                                Some((idx.try_into().expect("Txn can't have more than 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
                                }
                        }

                        // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
                        if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
                                for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
                                        if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
                                                if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
                                                                tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
                                                        // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
                                                        return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs),
                                                                to_counterparty_output_info);
                                                }
                                                let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
                                                let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, height);
                                                claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
                                        }
                                }
                        }

                        // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
                        if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
                                // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
                                log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
                                for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
                                        watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
                                }
                                self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);

                                if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
                                        fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
                                                block_hash, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
                                                        (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
                                                ), logger);
                                } else {
                                        // Our fuzzers aren't constrained by pesky things like valid signatures, so can
                                        // spend our funding output with a transaction which doesn't match our past
                                        // commitment transactions. Thus, we can only debug-assert here when not
                                        // fuzzing.
                                        debug_assert!(cfg!(fuzzing), "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
                                        fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
                                                block_hash, [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
                                }
                        }
                } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
                        // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
                        // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
                        // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
                        // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
                        // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
                        // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
                        // insert it here.
                        for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
                                watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
                        }
                        self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);

                        log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
                        fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
                                per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
                                        (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
                                ), logger);

                        let (htlc_claim_reqs, counterparty_output_info) =
                                self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
                        to_counterparty_output_info = counterparty_output_info;
                        for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
                                claimable_outpoints.push(req);
                        }

                }
                (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
        }

        /// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
        fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>)
        -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
                let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
                let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;

                let htlc_outputs = match self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
                        Some(outputs) => outputs,
                        None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
                };
                let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
                        Some(points) => points,
                        None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
                };

                let per_commitment_point =
                        // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
                        // per-commitment point
                        if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
                        else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
                                // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
                                // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
                                // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
                                if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
                                        point
                                } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
                        } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };

                if let Some(transaction) = tx {
                        let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(
                                &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,  &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &per_commitment_point);

                        let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &per_commitment_point);

                        let revokeable_p2wsh = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
                                self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
                                &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh();
                        for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
                                if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
                                        to_counterparty_output_info =
                                                Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
                                }
                        }
                }

                for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
                        if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
                                if let Some(transaction) = tx {
                                        if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
                                                transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
                                                        // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
                                                        return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
                                                }
                                }
                                let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
                                if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
                                        let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
                                                PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
                                                        CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
                                                                self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
                                                                self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
                                                                preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()))
                                        } else {
                                                PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
                                                        CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
                                                                self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
                                                                self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
                                                                htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()))
                                        };
                                        let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry, 0);
                                        claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
                                }
                        }
                }

                (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
        }

        /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
        fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(
                &mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: &Txid, height: u32, logger: &L
        ) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
                let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
                let per_commitment_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(&secret) {
                        Ok(key) => key,
                        Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
                };
                let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);

                let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
                let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![];
                let mut outputs_to_watch = None;
                // Previously, we would only claim HTLCs from revoked HTLC transactions if they had 1 input
                // with a witness of 5 elements and 1 output. This wasn't enough for anchor outputs, as the
                // counterparty can now aggregate multiple HTLCs into a single transaction thanks to
                // `SIGHASH_SINGLE` remote signatures, leading us to not claim any HTLCs upon seeing a
                // confirmed revoked HTLC transaction (for more details, see
                // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2022-April/003561.html).
                //
                // We make sure we're not vulnerable to this case by checking all inputs of the transaction,
                // and claim those which spend the commitment transaction, have a witness of 5 elements, and
                // have a corresponding output at the same index within the transaction.
                for (idx, input) in tx.input.iter().enumerate() {
                        if input.previous_output.txid == *commitment_txid && input.witness.len() == 5 && tx.output.get(idx).is_some() {
                                log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, idx);
                                let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(
                                        per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
                                        self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key,
                                        tx.output[idx].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
                                        false
                                );
                                let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
                                        htlc_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp),
                                        height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, height
                                );
                                claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
                                if outputs_to_watch.is_none() {
                                        outputs_to_watch = Some((htlc_txid, vec![]));
                                }
                                outputs_to_watch.as_mut().unwrap().1.push((idx as u32, tx.output[idx].clone()));
                        }
                }
                (claimable_outpoints, outputs_to_watch)
        }

        // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnchainTxHandler, so that the handler can
        // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
        // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
        fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(ScriptBuf, PublicKey, RevocationKey)>) {
                let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());

                let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
                let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));

                for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
                        if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
                                let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
                                        let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(
                                                htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
                                        );
                                        htlc_output
                                } else {
                                        let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
                                                preimage.clone()
                                        } else {
                                                // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
                                                continue;
                                        };
                                        let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(
                                                payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
                                        );
                                        htlc_output
                                };
                                let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
                                        holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index,
                                        PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output),
                                        htlc.cltv_expiry, conf_height
                                );
                                claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
                        }
                }

                (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
        }

        // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
        fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
                let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
                for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
                        if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
                                watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
                        }
                }
                watch_outputs
        }

        /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
        /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
        /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
        /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
        fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
                let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
                let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
                let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();

                macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
                        ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
                                claim_requests = $updates.0;
                                self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
                                watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
                        }
                }

                // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
                let mut is_holder_tx = false;

                if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
                        is_holder_tx = true;
                        log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
                        let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
                        let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
                        append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
                        fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
                                block_hash, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
                                .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
                } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
                        if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
                                is_holder_tx = true;
                                log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
                                let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
                                let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
                                append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
                                fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
                                        holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
                                        logger);
                        }
                }

                if is_holder_tx {
                        Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
                } else {
                        None
                }
        }

        /// Cancels any existing pending claims for a commitment that previously confirmed and has now
        /// been replaced by another.
        pub fn cancel_prev_commitment_claims<L: Deref>(
                &mut self, logger: &L, confirmed_commitment_txid: &Txid
        ) where L::Target: Logger {
                for (counterparty_commitment_txid, _) in &self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain {
                        // Cancel any pending claims for counterparty commitments we've seen confirm.
                        if counterparty_commitment_txid == confirmed_commitment_txid {
                                continue;
                        }
                        for (htlc, _) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(counterparty_commitment_txid).unwrap_or(&vec![]) {
                                log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously confirmed counterparty commitment {}",
                                        counterparty_commitment_txid);
                                let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: *counterparty_commitment_txid, vout: 0 };
                                if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
                                        outpoint.vout = vout;
                                        self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
                                }
                        }
                }
                if self.holder_tx_signed {
                        // If we've signed, we may have broadcast either commitment (prev or current), and
                        // attempted to claim from it immediately without waiting for a confirmation.
                        if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid != *confirmed_commitment_txid {
                                log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously broadcast holder commitment {}",
                                        self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid);
                                let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, vout: 0 };
                                for (htlc, _, _) in &self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
                                        if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
                                                outpoint.vout = vout;
                                                self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                        if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
                                if prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid != *confirmed_commitment_txid {
                                        log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously broadcast holder commitment {}",
                                                prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid);
                                        let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid, vout: 0 };
                                        for (htlc, _, _) in &prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
                                                if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
                                                        outpoint.vout = vout;
                                                        self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
                                                }
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                } else {
                        // No previous claim.
                }
        }

        #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
        /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
        fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(
                &mut self, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
        ) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
                log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
                let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
                let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
                let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
                // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only final once the commitment
                // transaction confirms due to the CSV 1 encumberance.
                if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
                        return holder_transactions;
                }
                for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
                        if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
                                let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
                                        if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
                                                // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
                                                continue;
                                        }
                                } else { None };
                                if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_maybe_signed_htlc_tx(
                                        &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage
                                ) {
                                        if htlc_tx.is_fully_signed() {
                                                holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx.0);
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                }
                holder_transactions
        }

        fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
                &mut self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B,
                fee_estimator: F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
        ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
                where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
                        F::Target: FeeEstimator,
                        L::Target: Logger,
        {
                let block_hash = header.block_hash();
                self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);

                let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
                self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
        }

        fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
                &mut self,
                header: &Header,
                height: u32,
                broadcaster: B,
                fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
                logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
        ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
        where
                B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
                F::Target: FeeEstimator,
                L::Target: Logger,
        {
                let block_hash = header.block_hash();

                if height > self.best_block.height {
                        self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
                        log_trace!(logger, "Connecting new block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
                        self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, logger)
                } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash {
                        self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
                        log_trace!(logger, "Best block re-orged, replaced with new block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
                        self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
                        self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
                        Vec::new()
                } else { Vec::new() }
        }

        fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
                &mut self,
                header: &Header,
                txdata: &TransactionData,
                height: u32,
                broadcaster: B,
                fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
                logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
        ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
        where
                B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
                F::Target: FeeEstimator,
                L::Target: Logger,
        {
                let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
                for tx in &txn_matched {
                        let mut output_val = 0;
                        for out in tx.output.iter() {
                                if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
                                output_val += out.value;
                                if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
                        }
                }

                let block_hash = header.block_hash();

                let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
                let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
                'tx_iter: for tx in &txn_matched {
                        let txid = tx.txid();
                        log_trace!(logger, "Transaction {} confirmed in block {}", txid , block_hash);
                        // If a transaction has already been confirmed, ensure we don't bother processing it duplicatively.
                        if Some(txid) == self.funding_spend_confirmed {
                                log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of funding-spend tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
                                continue 'tx_iter;
                        }
                        for ev in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
                                if ev.txid == txid {
                                        if let Some(conf_hash) = ev.block_hash {
                                                assert_eq!(header.block_hash(), conf_hash,
                                                        "Transaction {} was already confirmed and is being re-confirmed in a different block.\n\
                                                        This indicates a severe bug in the transaction connection logic - a reorg should have been processed first!", ev.txid);
                                        }
                                        log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of confirming tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
                                        continue 'tx_iter;
                                }
                        }
                        for htlc in self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter() {
                                if Some(txid) == htlc.resolving_txid {
                                        log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of HTLC resolution tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
                                        continue 'tx_iter;
                                }
                        }
                        for spendable_txid in self.spendable_txids_confirmed.iter() {
                                if txid == *spendable_txid {
                                        log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of spendable tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
                                        continue 'tx_iter;
                                }
                        }

                        if tx.input.len() == 1 {
                                // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
                                // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input
                                // (except for HTLC transactions for channels with anchor outputs), which is an easy
                                // way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy filters.
                                let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
                                if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
                                        let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
                                        log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
                                                &self.channel_id(), txid);
                                        self.funding_spend_seen = true;
                                        let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
                                        if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
                                                let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
                                                        self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
                                                commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
                                                if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
                                                        watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
                                                }
                                                claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
                                                if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
                                                        if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger) {
                                                                #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
                                                                debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(),
                                                                        "A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?");
                                                                if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
                                                                        watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
                                                                }
                                                                claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
                                                                balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
                                                        }
                                                }
                                        }
                                        self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
                                                txid,
                                                transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
                                                height,
                                                block_hash: Some(block_hash),
                                                event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
                                                        on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
                                                        commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
                                                },
                                        });
                                        // Now that we've detected a confirmed commitment transaction, attempt to cancel
                                        // pending claims for any commitments that were previously confirmed such that
                                        // we don't continue claiming inputs that no longer exist.
                                        self.cancel_prev_commitment_claims(&logger, &txid);
                                }
                        }
                        if tx.input.len() >= 1 {
                                // While all commitment transactions have one input, HTLC transactions may have more
                                // if the HTLC was present in an anchor channel. HTLCs can also be resolved in a few
                                // other ways which can have more than one output.
                                for tx_input in &tx.input {
                                        let commitment_txid = tx_input.previous_output.txid;
                                        if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&commitment_txid) {
                                                let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(
                                                        &tx, commitment_number, &commitment_txid, height, &logger
                                                );
                                                claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
                                                if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
                                                        watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
                                                }
                                                // Since there may be multiple HTLCs for this channel (all spending the
                                                // same commitment tx) being claimed by the counterparty within the same
                                                // transaction, and `check_spend_counterparty_htlc` already checks all the
                                                // ones relevant to this channel, we can safely break from our loop.
                                                break;
                                        }
                                }
                                self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, logger);

                                self.check_tx_and_push_spendable_outputs(&tx, height, &block_hash, logger);
                        }
                }

                if height > self.best_block.height {
                        self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
                }

                self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, logger)
        }

        /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
        /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
        /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
        /// complexity especially in
        /// `OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_requests`/`OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_matched_txn`.
        ///
        /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
        /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
        fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
                &mut self,
                conf_height: u32,
                conf_hash: BlockHash,
                txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
                mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
                mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
                broadcaster: &B,
                fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
                logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
        ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
        where
                B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
                F::Target: FeeEstimator,
                L::Target: Logger,
        {
                log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
                debug_assert!(self.best_block.height >= conf_height);

                let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
                if should_broadcast {
                        let (mut new_outpoints, mut new_outputs) = self.generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs(ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut);
                        claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
                        watch_outputs.append(&mut new_outputs);
                }

                // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
                let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
                        self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
                let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
                for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
                        if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
                                onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
                        } else {
                                self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
                        }
                }

                // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
                #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
                let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
                        .iter()
                        .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
                                OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
                                _ => None,
                        })
                        .collect();
                #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
                let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();

                // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
                for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
                        match entry.event {
                                OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
                                        // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
                                        #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
                                        {
                                                debug_assert!(
                                                        unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
                                                        "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
                                                         call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
                                                         or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
                                                debug_assert!(
                                                        matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
                                                        "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
                                                         call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
                                                         or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
                                                matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
                                        }

                                        log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
                                                &payment_hash, entry.txid);
                                        self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
                                                payment_hash,
                                                payment_preimage: None,
                                                source: source.clone(),
                                                htlc_value_satoshis,
                                        }));
                                        self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
                                                commitment_tx_output_idx,
                                                resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
                                                resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
                                                payment_preimage: None,
                                        });
                                },
                                OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
                                        log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
                                        self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
                                                outputs: vec![descriptor],
                                                channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
                                        });
                                        self.spendable_txids_confirmed.push(entry.txid);
                                },
                                OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
                                        self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
                                                commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx),
                                                resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
                                                resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
                                                payment_preimage: preimage,
                                        });
                                },
                                OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } => {
                                        self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
                                        self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
                                },
                        }
                }

                self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
                self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_matched_txn(&txn_matched, conf_height, conf_hash, self.best_block.height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);

                // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
                // updating the latter in the process.
                watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
                        let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
                        self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
                });
                #[cfg(test)]
                {
                        // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
                        // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
                        // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
                        for tx in &txn_matched {
                                if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
                                        for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
                                                assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
                                                assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                }
                watch_outputs
        }

        fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
                &mut self, header: &Header, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
        ) where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
                F::Target: FeeEstimator,
                L::Target: Logger,
        {
                log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);

                //We may discard:
                //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
                //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
                self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);

                let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
                self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);

                self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
        }

        fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
                &mut self,
                txid: &Txid,
                broadcaster: B,
                fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
                logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
        ) where
                B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
                F::Target: FeeEstimator,
                L::Target: Logger,
        {
                let mut removed_height = None;
                for entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
                        if entry.txid == *txid {
                                removed_height = Some(entry.height);
                                break;
                        }
                }

                if let Some(removed_height) = removed_height {
                        log_info!(logger, "transaction_unconfirmed of txid {} implies height {} was reorg'd out", txid, removed_height);
                        self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.height >= removed_height {
                                log_info!(logger, "Transaction {} reorg'd out", entry.txid);
                                false
                        } else { true });
                }

                debug_assert!(!self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|ref entry| entry.txid == *txid));

                self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
        }

        /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
        /// transactions thereof.
        fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
                let mut matched_txn = new_hash_set();
                txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
                        let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
                        for input in tx.input.iter() {
                                if matches { break; }
                                if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
                                        matches = true;
                                }
                        }
                        if matches {
                                matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
                        }
                        matches
                }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
        }

        /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
        fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
                for input in tx.input.iter() {
                        if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
                                for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
                                        if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
                                                #[cfg(test)]
                                                {
                                                        // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
                                                        // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
                                                        // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
                                                        if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
                                                                if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
                                                                        // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
                                                                        // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
                                                                        // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
                                                                        return true;
                                                                }

                                                                assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&ScriptBuf::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
                                                        } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
                                                                assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
                                                        } else { panic!(); }
                                                }
                                                return true;
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                }

                false
        }

        fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(
                &self, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
        ) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
                // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one confirmed (even
                // with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as duplicate/conflicting.
                if self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
                        self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
                                OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
                                _ => false,
                        }).is_some()
                {
                        return false;
                }
                // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
                //  * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
                //    transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
                //  * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
                //    broadcast if we go on-chain.
                // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
                // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
                // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
                // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
                // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
                let height = self.best_block.height;
                macro_rules! scan_commitment {
                        ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
                                for ref htlc in $htlcs {
                                        // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
                                        // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
                                        // time out the HTLC first.
                                        // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
                                        // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
                                        // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
                                        // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
                                        // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
                                        // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
                                        // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
                                        // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
                                        // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
                                        // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
                                        // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
                                        // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
                                        //  aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
                                        //      inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
                                        //      outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
                                        //      LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
                                        //      CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
                                        //      LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
                                        //  The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
                                        //  with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
                                        let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
                                        if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
                                           (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
                                                log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
                                                return true;
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                }

                scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);

                if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
                        if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
                                scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
                        }
                }
                if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
                        if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
                                scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
                        }
                }

                false
        }

        /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
        /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
        fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(
                &mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
        ) where L::Target: Logger {
                'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
                        let mut payment_data = None;
                        let htlc_claim = HTLCClaim::from_witness(&input.witness);
                        let revocation_sig_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::Revocation);
                        let accepted_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedPreimage);
                        #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
                        let accepted_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedTimeout);
                        let offered_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedPreimage);
                        #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
                        let offered_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedTimeout);

                        let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
                        if offered_preimage_claim || accepted_preimage_claim {
                                payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
                        }

                        macro_rules! log_claim {
                                ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
                                        let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
                                        // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
                                        // revocation path:
                                        #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
                                        debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
                                        #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
                                        debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
                                        // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
                                        // matched by any HTLC spend:
                                        #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
                                        debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
                                                         offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
                                                         revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
                                        if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
                                                        (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
                                                log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
                                                        $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
                                                        if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, &$htlc.payment_hash,
                                                        if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
                                        } else {
                                                log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
                                                        $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
                                                        if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, &$htlc.payment_hash,
                                                        if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
                                        }
                                }
                        }

                        macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
                                ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
                                        if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
                                                for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
                                                        if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
                                                                if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
                                                                        log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
                                                                        payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
                                                                        break;
                                                                }
                                                        }
                                                }
                                        }
                                }
                        }

                        macro_rules! scan_commitment {
                                ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
                                        for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
                                                if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
                                                        if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
                                                                log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
                                                                // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
                                                                // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
                                                                // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
                                                                // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
                                                                // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
                                                                payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
                                                        } else if !$holder_tx {
                                                                check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
                                                                if payment_data.is_none() {
                                                                        check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
                                                                }
                                                        }
                                                        if payment_data.is_none() {
                                                                log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
                                                                let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
                                                                self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
                                                                        txid: tx.txid(), height, block_hash: Some(*block_hash), transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
                                                                        event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
                                                                                commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
                                                                                preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
                                                                                        Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
                                                                                // If this is a payment to us (ie !outbound_htlc), wait for
                                                                                // the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from claimable
                                                                                // balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success transaction (ie
                                                                                // accepted_preimage_claim).
                                                                                on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim && !outbound_htlc {
                                                                                        Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
                                                                        },
                                                                });
                                                                continue 'outer_loop;
                                                        }
                                                }
                                        }
                                }
                        }

                        if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
                                scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
                                        "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
                        }
                        if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
                                if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
                                        scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
                                                "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
                                }
                        }
                        if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
                                scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
                                        "counterparty commitment tx", false);
                        }

                        // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
                        // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
                        if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
                                if accepted_preimage_claim {
                                        if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
                                                |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
                                                self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
                                                        txid: tx.txid(),
                                                        height,
                                                        block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
                                                        transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
                                                        event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
                                                                commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
                                                                preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
                                                                on_to_local_output_csv: None,
                                                        },
                                                });
                                                self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
                                                        source,
                                                        payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
                                                        payment_hash,
                                                        htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
                                                }));
                                        }
                                } else if offered_preimage_claim {
                                        if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
                                                |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
                                                        upd.source == source
                                                } else { false }) {
                                                self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
                                                        txid: tx.txid(),
                                                        transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
                                                        height,
                                                        block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
                                                        event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
                                                                commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
                                                                preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
                                                                on_to_local_output_csv: None,
                                                        },
                                                });
                                                self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
                                                        source,
                                                        payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
                                                        payment_hash,
                                                        htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
                                                }));
                                        }
                                } else {
                                        self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
                                                if entry.height != height { return true; }
                                                match entry.event {
                                                        OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
                                                                *htlc_source != source
                                                        },
                                                        _ => true,
                                                }
                                        });
                                        let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
                                                txid: tx.txid(),
                                                transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
                                                height,
                                                block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
                                                event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
                                                        source, payment_hash,
                                                        htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
                                                        commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
                                                },
                                        };
                                        log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", &payment_hash, entry.confirmation_threshold());
                                        self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
                                }
                        }
                }
        }

        fn get_spendable_outputs(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
                let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
                for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
                        if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
                                spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
                                        outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
                                        output: outp.clone(),
                                        channel_keys_id: Some(self.channel_keys_id),
                                });
                        }
                        if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
                                if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
                                        spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
                                                outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
                                                per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
                                                to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
                                                output: outp.clone(),
                                                revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2,
                                                channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
                                                channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
                                        }));
                                }
                        }
                        if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
                                spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
                                        outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
                                        output: outp.clone(),
                                        channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
                                        channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
                                        channel_transaction_parameters: Some(self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone()),
                                }));
                        }
                        if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
                                spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
                                        outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
                                        output: outp.clone(),
                                        channel_keys_id: Some(self.channel_keys_id),
                                });
                        }
                }
                spendable_outputs
        }

        /// Checks if the confirmed transaction is paying funds back to some address we can assume to
        /// own.
        fn check_tx_and_push_spendable_outputs<L: Deref>(
                &mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
        ) where L::Target: Logger {
                for spendable_output in self.get_spendable_outputs(tx) {
                        let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
                                txid: tx.txid(),
                                transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
                                height,
                                block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
                                event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
                        };
                        log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
                        self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
                }
        }
}

impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
where
        T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
        F::Target: FeeEstimator,
        L::Target: Logger,
{
        fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
                self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
        }

        fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
                self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
        }
}

impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, M, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (M, T, F, L)
where
        M: Deref<Target = ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
        T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
        F::Target: FeeEstimator,
        L::Target: Logger,
{
        fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
                self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
        }

        fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
                self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
        }

        fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
                self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
        }

        fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
                self.0.get_relevant_txids()
        }
}

const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;

impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP)>
                for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<SP::EcdsaSigner>) {
        fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
                macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
                        ($key: expr) => {
                                match $key {
                                        Ok(res) => res,
                                        Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
                                }
                        }
                }

                let (entropy_source, signer_provider) = args;

                let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);

                let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;

                let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
                        0 => {
                                let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
                                let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
                                let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
                                Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
                        },
                        1 => { None },
                        _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
                };
                let mut counterparty_payment_script: ScriptBuf = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let shutdown_script = {
                        let script = <ScriptBuf as Readable>::read(reader)?;
                        if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
                };

                let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
                // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
                // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
                let outpoint = OutPoint {
                        txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
                        index: Readable::read(reader)?,
                };
                let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
                let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;

                let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;

                let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
                        let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
                        if first_idx == 0 {
                                None
                        } else {
                                let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
                                let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
                                if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
                                        Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
                                } else {
                                        Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
                                }
                        }
                };

                let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;

                let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;

                macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
                        () => {
                                {
                                        let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
                                        let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                                        let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                                        let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
                                        let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;

                                        HTLCOutputInCommitment {
                                                offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                }

                let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
                for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
                        let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
                        let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                        let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
                        for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
                                htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
                        }
                        if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
                                return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
                        }
                }

                let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
                for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
                        let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
                        let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
                        if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
                                return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
                        }
                }

                let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
                for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
                        let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
                        let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
                        if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
                                return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
                        }
                }

                let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
                        match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
                                0 => None,
                                1 => {
                                        Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
                                },
                                _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
                        };
                let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;

                let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
                let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;

                let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let mut payment_preimages = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
                for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
                        let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
                        let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
                        if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
                                return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
                        }
                }

                let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
                        Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
                for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
                        let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
                                0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
                                1 => MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_info.0),
                                _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
                        };
                        pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
                }

                let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
                for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
                        if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
                                pending_events.push(event);
                        }
                }

                let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);

                let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
                for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
                        if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
                                onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
                        }
                }

                let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let mut outputs_to_watch = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<ScriptBuf>>())));
                for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
                        let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
                        let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
                        let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<ScriptBuf>())));
                        for _ in 0..outputs_len {
                                outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
                        }
                        if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
                                return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
                        }
                }
                let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<SP::EcdsaSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(
                        reader, (entropy_source, signer_provider, channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id)
                )?;

                let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
                let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;

                if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
                        let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
                        if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
                        if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
                                prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
                        } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
                                return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
                        }
                }

                let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
                if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
                        current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
                } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
                        return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
                }

                let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
                let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
                let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
                let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
                let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
                let mut spendable_txids_confirmed = Some(Vec::new());
                let mut counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs = Some(new_hash_map());
                let mut initial_counterparty_commitment_info = None;
                let mut balances_empty_height = None;
                let mut channel_id = None;
                read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
                        (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
                        (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, optional_vec),
                        (5, pending_monitor_events, optional_vec),
                        (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
                        (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
                        (11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
                        (13, spendable_txids_confirmed, optional_vec),
                        (15, counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, option),
                        (17, initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option),
                        (19, channel_id, option),
                        (21, balances_empty_height, option),
                });

                // `HolderForceClosedWithInfo` replaced `HolderForceClosed` in v0.0.122. If we have both
                // events, we can remove the `HolderForceClosed` event and just keep the `HolderForceClosedWithInfo`.
                if let Some(ref mut pending_monitor_events) = pending_monitor_events {
                        if pending_monitor_events.iter().any(|e| matches!(e, MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_))) &&
                                pending_monitor_events.iter().any(|e| matches!(e, MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. }))
                        {
                                pending_monitor_events.retain(|e| !matches!(e, MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_)));
                        }
                }

                // Monitors for anchor outputs channels opened in v0.0.116 suffered from a bug in which the
                // wrong `counterparty_payment_script` was being tracked. Fix it now on deserialization to
                // give them a chance to recognize the spendable output.
                if onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() &&
                        counterparty_payment_script.is_v0_p2wpkh()
                {
                        let payment_point = onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys.payment_point;
                        counterparty_payment_script =
                                chan_utils::get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh();
                }

                Ok((best_block.block_hash, ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
                        latest_update_id,
                        commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,

                        destination_script,
                        broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
                        counterparty_payment_script,
                        shutdown_script,

                        channel_keys_id,
                        holder_revocation_basepoint,
                        channel_id: channel_id.unwrap_or(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint)),
                        funding_info,
                        current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
                        prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,

                        counterparty_commitment_params,
                        funding_redeemscript,
                        channel_value_satoshis,
                        their_cur_per_commitment_points,

                        on_holder_tx_csv,

                        commitment_secrets,
                        counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
                        counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
                        counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
                        counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.unwrap(),

                        prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
                        current_holder_commitment_tx,
                        current_counterparty_commitment_number,
                        current_holder_commitment_number,

                        payment_preimages,
                        pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
                        pending_events,
                        is_processing_pending_events: false,

                        onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
                        outputs_to_watch,

                        onchain_tx_handler,

                        lockdown_from_offchain,
                        holder_tx_signed,
                        funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
                        funding_spend_confirmed,
                        confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output,
                        htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
                        spendable_txids_confirmed: spendable_txids_confirmed.unwrap(),

                        best_block,
                        counterparty_node_id,
                        initial_counterparty_commitment_info,
                        balances_empty_height,
                })))
        }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
        use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
        use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
        use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
        use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut};
        use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
        use bitcoin::sighash;
        use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
        use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
        use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
        use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
        use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
        use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
        use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
        use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
        use bitcoin::{Sequence, Witness};

        use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;

        use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
        use crate::{check_added_monitors, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
        use crate::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
        use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, WithChannelMonitor};
        use crate::chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
        use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
        use crate::sign::InMemorySigner;
        use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, ChannelId};
        use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, DelayedPaymentKey, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint, RevocationKey};
        use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self,HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
        use crate::ln::channelmanager::{PaymentSendFailure, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
        use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
        use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
        use crate::util::errors::APIError;
        use crate::util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
        use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
        use crate::util::logger::Logger;
        use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
        use crate::io;
        use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;

        #[allow(unused_imports)]
        use crate::prelude::*;

        use std::str::FromStr;

        fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
                // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
                // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
                // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
                // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
                // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
                // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
                // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
                // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
                //
                // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
                // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
                let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
                let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
                let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
                let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
                let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
                create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);

                // Rebalance somewhat
                send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);

                // First route two payments for testing at the end
                let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
                let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;

                let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
                assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
                let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
                assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
                check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
                check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
                let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };

                // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
                // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
                let new_header = create_dummy_header(nodes[0].best_block_info().0, 0);
                let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
                nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
                        &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);

                let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
                                                &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
                                                (&nodes[1].keys_manager.backing, &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing)).unwrap();

                // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
                // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
                let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
                unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
                                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
                        ), false, APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress, {});
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
                // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
                // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
                let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
                let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().next().unwrap().clone();
                assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
                if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
                } else { panic!(); }
                replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
                replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });

                let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
                assert!(
                        pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &&chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
                        .is_err());
                // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
                // transaction
                let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
                assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
                let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
                        assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
                        tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
                }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
                assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
                check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
                check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
        }
        #[test]
        fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
                do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
                do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_prune_preimages() {
                let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
                let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
                let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster::new(Network::Testnet));
                let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };

                let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());

                let mut preimages = Vec::new();
                {
                        for i in 0..20 {
                                let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
                                let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
                                preimages.push((preimage, hash));
                        }
                }

                macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlcs {
                        ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
                                {
                                        let mut res = Vec::new();
                                        for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
                                                res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
                                                        offered: true,
                                                        amount_msat: 0,
                                                        cltv_expiry: 0,
                                                        payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
                                                        transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
                                                }, ()));
                                        }
                                        res
                                }
                        }
                }
                macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
                        ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
                                preimages_slice_to_htlcs!($preimages_slice).into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, None)).collect()
                        }
                }
                let dummy_sig = crate::crypto::utils::sign(&secp_ctx,
                        &bitcoin::secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(),
                        &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());

                macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
                        ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
                                for preimage in $preimages_slice {
                                        assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
                                }
                        }
                }

                let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
                        &secp_ctx,
                        SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
                        SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
                        SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
                        SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
                        SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
                        [41; 32],
                        0,
                        [0; 32],
                        [0; 32],
                );

                let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
                        funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
                        revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap())),
                        payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
                        delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap())),
                        htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap()))
                };
                let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
                let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint);
                let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
                        holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
                        holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
                        is_outbound_from_holder: true,
                        counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
                                pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
                                selected_contest_delay: 67,
                        }),
                        funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
                        channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key()
                };
                // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
                // old state.
                let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
                let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(Network::Testnet);
                let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
                        Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &ScriptBuf::new(),
                        (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, ScriptBuf::new()),
                        &channel_parameters, ScriptBuf::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
                        best_block, dummy_key, channel_id);

                let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]);
                let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);

                monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
                        htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
                monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"1").to_byte_array()),
                        preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
                monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"2").to_byte_array()),
                        preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
                for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
                        let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
                        monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
                }

                // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
                let mut secret = [0; 32];
                secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
                monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
                assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
                test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
                test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);

                monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"3").to_byte_array()),
                        preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);

                // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
                secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
                monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
                assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
                test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
                test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);

                monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"4").to_byte_array()),
                        preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);

                // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
                // previous commitment tx's preimages too
                let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]);
                let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
                monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
                        htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
                secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
                monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
                assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
                test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
                test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);

                // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
                let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]);
                let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
                monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx,
                        htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
                secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
                monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
                assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
                test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
                // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
                // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.

                let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
                let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
                let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);

                use crate::ln::channel_keys::{HtlcKey, HtlcBasepoint};
                macro_rules! sign_input {
                        ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
                                let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
                                        offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
                                        amount_msat: 0,
                                        cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
                                        payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
                                        transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
                                };
                                let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), 256, &DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey)) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &HtlcBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), &HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &HtlcBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), &RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey)) };
                                let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
                                let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
                                let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
                                ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
                                $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len() as u64;
                                let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
                                witness.push(ser_sig);
                                if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
                                        witness.push(vec!(1));
                                } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
                                        witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
                                } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
                                        witness.push(vec![0]);
                                } else {
                                        witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
                                }
                                witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
                                let witness = witness.to_vec();
                                println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
                                println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
                                println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
                        }
                }

                let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
                let txid = Txid::from_str("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();

                // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
                for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
                        let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
                        let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
                        for i in 0..4 {
                                claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
                                        previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
                                                txid,
                                                vout: i,
                                        },
                                        script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
                                        sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
                                        witness: Witness::new(),
                                });
                        }
                        claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
                                script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
                                value: 0,
                        });
                        let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
                        let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
                        let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
                        {
                                let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
                                for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
                                        sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
                                        inputs_total_weight += inp;
                                }
                        }
                        assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
                }

                // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
                for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
                        let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
                        let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
                        for i in 0..4 {
                                claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
                                        previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
                                                txid,
                                                vout: i,
                                        },
                                        script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
                                        sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
                                        witness: Witness::new(),
                                });
                        }
                        claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
                                script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
                                value: 0,
                        });
                        let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
                        let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
                        let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
                        {
                                let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
                                for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
                                        sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
                                        inputs_total_weight += inp;
                                }
                        }
                        assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
                }

                // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
                for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
                        let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
                        let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
                        claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
                                previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
                                        txid,
                                        vout: 0,
                                },
                                script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
                                sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
                                witness: Witness::new(),
                        });
                        claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
                                script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
                                value: 0,
                        });
                        let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
                        let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
                        let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
                        {
                                let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
                                for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
                                        sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
                                        inputs_total_weight += inp;
                                }
                        }
                        assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
                }
        }

        #[test]
        fn test_with_channel_monitor_impl_logger() {
                let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
                let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());

                let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());

                let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
                        &secp_ctx,
                        SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
                        SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
                        SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
                        SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
                        SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
                        [41; 32],
                        0,
                        [0; 32],
                        [0; 32],
                );

                let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
                        funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
                        revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap())),
                        payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
                        delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap())),
                        htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())),
                };
                let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
                let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint);
                let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
                        holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
                        holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
                        is_outbound_from_holder: true,
                        counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
                                pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
                                selected_contest_delay: 67,
                        }),
                        funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
                        channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key()
                };
                let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
                let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(Network::Testnet);
                let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
                        Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &ScriptBuf::new(),
                        (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, ScriptBuf::new()),
                        &channel_parameters, ScriptBuf::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
                        best_block, dummy_key, channel_id);

                let chan_id = monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().channel_id();
                let context_logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&logger, &monitor);
                log_error!(context_logger, "This is an error");
                log_warn!(context_logger, "This is an error");
                log_debug!(context_logger, "This is an error");
                log_trace!(context_logger, "This is an error");
                log_gossip!(context_logger, "This is an error");
                log_info!(context_logger, "This is an error");
                logger.assert_log_context_contains("lightning::chain::channelmonitor::tests", Some(dummy_key), Some(chan_id), 6);
        }
        // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
}