1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
36 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
37 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
39 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCType, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
40 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, HTLCSource};
41 use ln::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
42 use ln::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
44 use chain::WatchedOutput;
45 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
46 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
47 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
49 use util::logger::Logger;
50 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
52 use util::events::Event;
54 use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
60 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
61 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
62 #[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
65 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
66 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
67 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
68 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
69 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
71 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
72 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
73 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
75 /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
76 /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
77 /// its docs for more details.
82 /// (1) a channel has been force closed and
83 /// (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
84 /// this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
85 /// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
86 /// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
88 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
90 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
91 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
92 self.update_id.write(w)?;
93 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
94 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
95 update_step.write(w)?;
100 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
101 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
102 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
103 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
104 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
106 updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
108 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
112 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
113 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
114 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
115 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
116 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
118 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
119 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the counterparty. Once the update(s) which failed
120 /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
121 /// restore the channel to an operational state.
123 /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
124 /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
125 /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
127 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
128 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
129 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
130 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
131 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
132 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
135 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
136 /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
139 /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
140 /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
141 /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
142 /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
143 /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
146 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
147 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
148 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
150 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
151 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
152 /// of this channel).
154 /// At reception of this error, ChannelManager will force-close the channel and return at
155 /// least a final ChannelMonitorUpdate::ChannelForceClosed which must be delivered to at
156 /// least one ChannelMonitor copy. Revocation secret MUST NOT be released and offchain channel
157 /// update must be rejected.
159 /// This failure may also signal a failure to update the local persisted copy of one of
160 /// the channel monitor instance.
162 /// Note that even when you fail a holder commitment transaction update, you must store the
163 /// update to ensure you can claim from it in case of a duplicate copy of this ChannelMonitor
164 /// broadcasts it (e.g distributed channel-monitor deployment)
166 /// In case of distributed watchtowers deployment, the new version must be written to disk, as
167 /// state may have been stored but rejected due to a block forcing a commitment broadcast. This
168 /// storage is used to claim outputs of rejected state confirmed onchain by another watchtower,
169 /// lagging behind on block processing.
173 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
174 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
175 /// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
177 /// Contains a developer-readable error message.
178 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
179 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
181 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
182 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
183 pub enum MonitorEvent {
184 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
185 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
187 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was broadcasted.
188 CommitmentTxBroadcasted(OutPoint),
191 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
192 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
193 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
194 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
195 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
196 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
197 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
198 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource
200 impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
202 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
203 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
204 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
205 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
206 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
207 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
208 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
209 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
210 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
211 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
212 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
213 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
214 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
215 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
216 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
217 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
218 /// accurate block height.
219 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
220 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
221 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
222 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
223 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
224 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
225 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
226 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
227 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
228 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
229 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
230 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
231 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
233 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
234 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
235 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
237 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
238 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
239 /// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
240 /// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
242 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
243 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
245 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
246 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
247 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
249 /// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
250 /// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
251 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
253 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
254 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
255 struct HolderSignedTx {
256 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
258 revocation_key: PublicKey,
259 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
260 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
261 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
262 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
264 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
267 /// We use this to track counterparty commitment transactions and htlcs outputs and
268 /// use it to generate any justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
270 struct CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
271 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
272 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
273 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
274 per_htlc: HashMap<Txid, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>
277 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
278 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
279 self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.write(w)?;
280 self.counterparty_htlc_base_key.write(w)?;
281 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_counterparty_tx_csv))?;
282 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
283 for (ref txid, ref htlcs) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
284 w.write_all(&txid[..])?;
285 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlcs.len() as u64))?;
286 for &ref htlc in htlcs.iter() {
293 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
294 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
295 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
296 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
297 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(r)?;
298 let on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
299 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
300 let mut per_htlc = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_htlc_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
301 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
302 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
303 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
304 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
305 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
306 let htlc = Readable::read(r)?;
309 if let Some(_) = per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs) {
310 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
313 CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction {
314 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
315 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
316 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
320 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
324 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the
325 /// transaction causing it.
327 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
329 struct OnchainEventEntry {
335 impl OnchainEventEntry {
336 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
337 self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
340 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
341 height >= self.confirmation_threshold()
345 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
346 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
349 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
350 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
351 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
353 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
356 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
360 #[cfg_attr(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
362 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
363 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
364 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
365 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
367 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
368 commitment_txid: Txid,
369 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
370 commitment_number: u64,
371 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
374 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
380 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
381 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
383 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
384 /// think we've fallen behind!
385 should_broadcast: bool,
389 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
390 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
392 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
394 commitment_tx.write(w)?;
395 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
396 for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
402 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
404 commitment_txid.write(w)?;
405 commitment_number.write(w)?;
406 their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
407 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
408 for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
410 source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?;
413 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
415 payment_preimage.write(w)?;
417 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
422 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => {
424 should_broadcast.write(w)?;
430 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
431 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
432 match Readable::read(r)? {
434 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
435 commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
437 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
438 let mut res = Vec::new();
440 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
447 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
448 commitment_txid: Readable::read(r)?,
449 commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
450 their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
452 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
453 let mut res = Vec::new();
455 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
462 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
463 payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
467 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
468 idx: Readable::read(r)?,
469 secret: Readable::read(r)?,
473 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed {
474 should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)?
477 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
482 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
483 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
485 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
486 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
488 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
489 /// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
490 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
491 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
493 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
494 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
495 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
496 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
497 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
498 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
500 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
502 inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
505 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
506 latest_update_id: u64,
507 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
509 destination_script: Script,
510 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
511 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
512 shutdown_script: Script,
514 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
515 holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
516 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
517 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
518 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
520 counterparty_tx_cache: CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction,
521 funding_redeemscript: Script,
522 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
523 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
524 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
526 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
528 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
529 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
530 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
531 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
532 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
533 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
534 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
535 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
536 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
537 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
538 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
539 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
540 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
542 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
543 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
544 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
545 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
546 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
547 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
549 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
551 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
552 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
554 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
556 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
558 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
559 pending_events: Vec<Event>,
561 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
562 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
563 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
564 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
566 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
567 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
568 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
569 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
570 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
573 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
575 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
577 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
578 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
579 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
580 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
582 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
583 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
584 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
586 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
587 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
588 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
589 holder_tx_signed: bool,
591 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
592 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
593 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
594 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
595 // the full block_connected).
596 best_block: BestBlock,
598 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
601 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
602 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
604 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
605 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
606 /// underlying object
607 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
608 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
609 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
610 let other = other.inner.lock().unwrap();
615 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
616 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
617 /// underlying object
618 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
619 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
620 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
621 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
622 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
623 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
624 self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
625 self.channel_keys_id != other.channel_keys_id ||
626 self.holder_revocation_basepoint != other.holder_revocation_basepoint ||
627 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
628 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
629 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
630 self.counterparty_tx_cache != other.counterparty_tx_cache ||
631 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
632 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
633 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
634 self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
635 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
636 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
637 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
638 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
639 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
640 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
641 self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
642 self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
643 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
644 self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
645 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
646 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf ||
647 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
648 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
649 self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed
658 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
659 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
660 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
664 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
665 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
667 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
668 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
669 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
671 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
673 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
674 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
676 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
677 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
678 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
679 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
680 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
681 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
683 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
686 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
687 self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
689 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
690 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
691 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
692 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
693 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
694 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
695 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
697 self.counterparty_tx_cache.write(writer)?;
698 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
699 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
701 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
702 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
703 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
704 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
705 match second_option {
706 Some(second_pubkey) => {
707 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
710 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
715 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
719 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
721 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
723 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
724 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
725 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
726 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
727 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
728 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
729 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
733 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
734 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
735 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
736 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
737 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
738 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
739 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
743 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
744 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
745 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
746 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
749 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
750 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
751 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
752 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
755 macro_rules! serialize_holder_tx {
756 ($holder_tx: expr) => {
757 $holder_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
758 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
759 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
760 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
761 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
762 writer.write_all(&$holder_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
764 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($holder_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
765 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
766 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
767 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
768 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
770 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
774 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
779 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
780 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
781 serialize_holder_tx!(prev_holder_tx);
783 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
786 serialize_holder_tx!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
788 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
789 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
791 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
792 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
793 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
796 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_monitor_events.len() as u64))?;
797 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
799 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
803 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?
807 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
808 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
809 event.write(writer)?;
812 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
813 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.height()))?;
815 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
816 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
817 entry.txid.write(writer)?;
818 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(entry.height))?;
820 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
822 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
823 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
825 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { ref descriptor } => {
827 descriptor.write(writer)?;
832 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
833 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
835 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
836 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
838 script.write(writer)?;
841 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
843 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
844 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
846 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {}, {});
852 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
853 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
854 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
855 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
856 funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
857 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
858 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
859 best_block: BestBlock) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
861 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
862 let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
863 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
864 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
865 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
867 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
868 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
869 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
870 let counterparty_tx_cache = CounterpartyCommitmentTransaction { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv, per_htlc: HashMap::new() };
872 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
873 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
875 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
876 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
877 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
878 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
880 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
881 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
883 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
884 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
885 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
886 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
887 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
888 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
889 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
891 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
894 let onchain_tx_handler =
895 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
896 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx.clone());
898 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
899 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
902 inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
904 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
906 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
907 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
908 counterparty_payment_script,
912 holder_revocation_basepoint,
914 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
915 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
917 counterparty_tx_cache,
918 funding_redeemscript,
919 channel_value_satoshis,
920 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
922 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
924 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
925 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
926 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
927 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
929 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
930 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
931 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
932 current_holder_commitment_number,
934 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
935 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
936 pending_events: Vec::new(),
938 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
943 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
944 holder_tx_signed: false,
954 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
955 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
958 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
959 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
960 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
961 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
962 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
965 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
966 commitment_number: u64,
967 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
969 ) where L::Target: Logger {
970 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
971 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger)
975 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
977 holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
978 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
979 ) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
980 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
981 holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)
985 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
987 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
988 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
993 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
994 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
997 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_payment_preimage(
998 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1001 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(
1006 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1009 self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger)
1012 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1015 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1016 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1018 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1022 ) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1024 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1025 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1028 self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1031 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1033 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1034 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1037 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1038 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
1039 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1042 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1043 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1044 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
1045 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1046 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1049 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1050 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1051 /// have been registered.
1052 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref>(&self, filter: &F) where F::Target: chain::Filter {
1053 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1054 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1055 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1056 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1057 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1058 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1060 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 },
1061 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1067 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1068 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1069 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1070 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1073 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1076 /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1077 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1078 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1079 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1080 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_events()
1083 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1084 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1087 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1088 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1091 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1092 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1095 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1096 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
1097 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
1098 /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1099 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1100 /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1101 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1102 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1103 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1104 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1105 where L::Target: Logger {
1106 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1109 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1110 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1111 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1112 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1113 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1114 where L::Target: Logger {
1115 self.inner.lock().unwrap().unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1118 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1119 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1120 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1121 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1122 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1123 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1125 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1126 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1128 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1129 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1131 header: &BlockHeader,
1132 txdata: &TransactionData,
1137 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1139 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1140 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1143 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_connected(
1144 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1147 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1149 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1151 header: &BlockHeader,
1157 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1158 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1161 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_disconnected(
1162 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1165 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1166 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1168 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1169 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1171 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1172 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1174 header: &BlockHeader,
1175 txdata: &TransactionData,
1180 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1182 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1183 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1186 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
1187 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1190 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1192 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1193 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1195 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1196 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1203 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1204 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1207 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
1208 txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1211 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1212 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1214 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1215 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1217 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1218 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1220 header: &BlockHeader,
1225 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1227 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1228 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1231 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
1232 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1235 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1236 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
1237 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1238 let mut txids: Vec<Txid> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1240 .map(|entry| entry.txid)
1241 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1243 txids.sort_unstable();
1249 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1250 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1251 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
1252 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1253 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1254 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1255 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1258 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1259 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1260 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
1261 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1266 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1267 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
1268 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1269 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1270 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
1272 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1273 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1274 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1278 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1279 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1280 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1285 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1292 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1301 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1302 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1303 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1304 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1306 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1307 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1310 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1311 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
1312 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
1313 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
1314 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1315 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
1316 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1317 Some(old_points) => {
1318 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1319 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1320 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1321 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1322 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1324 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1327 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1331 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1334 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
1335 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
1336 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1340 self.counterparty_tx_cache.per_htlc.insert(txid, htlcs);
1343 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1344 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1345 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1346 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
1347 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
1348 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1349 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1350 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
1351 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1352 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1353 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1354 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
1357 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1358 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1359 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1360 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1361 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1362 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1366 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
1367 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1368 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
1369 if self.holder_tx_signed {
1370 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected"));
1375 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1376 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1377 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
1378 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1379 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1382 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1384 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
1385 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
1386 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
1387 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
1388 let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs($commitment_number, $txid, None);
1389 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, None, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1392 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1393 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1394 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1398 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1399 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1400 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1405 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
1406 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
1407 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
1408 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
1409 // holder commitment transactions.
1410 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
1411 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, 0);
1412 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, None, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1413 if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1414 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx, 0);
1415 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, None, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1420 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
1421 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1424 for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
1425 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
1426 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1428 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
1431 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1432 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1433 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1436 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
1437 // preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
1438 // like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
1439 // access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
1440 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
1441 match updates.updates[0] {
1442 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
1443 _ => panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage"),
1445 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
1446 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1447 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1449 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
1451 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1452 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
1453 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1454 self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone())?
1456 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => {
1457 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
1458 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_revocation_point, logger)
1460 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
1461 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
1462 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1464 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
1465 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
1466 self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret)?
1468 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
1469 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
1470 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
1471 if *should_broadcast {
1472 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
1473 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
1474 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
1476 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted, the ChannelManager
1477 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
1478 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
1479 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
1484 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1488 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1489 self.latest_update_id
1492 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
1496 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
1497 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
1498 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
1499 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
1500 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1501 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
1503 &self.outputs_to_watch
1506 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1507 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1508 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
1512 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
1513 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1514 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
1518 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1519 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1520 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
1523 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1524 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
1527 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1528 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
1531 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1532 self.current_holder_commitment_number
1535 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1536 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1537 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1538 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1539 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1540 /// revoked counterparty commitment tx
1541 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs) where L::Target: Logger {
1542 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1543 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1544 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1545 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1547 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1548 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1550 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1551 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1554 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1559 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1560 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1561 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1562 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1563 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1564 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint));
1565 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
1567 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
1568 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1570 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
1571 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1572 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1573 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
1574 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
1575 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
1579 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
1580 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1581 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1582 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1583 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1584 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1585 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1587 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone());
1588 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, true, height);
1589 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
1594 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
1595 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1596 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
1597 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
1598 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1599 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
1601 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1603 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1604 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1605 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1606 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1607 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1608 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1609 if entry.height != height { return true; }
1611 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1612 htlc_update.0 != **source
1617 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
1620 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
1621 htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())
1624 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, entry.confirmation_threshold());
1625 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
1631 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1632 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1634 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1635 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "counterparty");
1637 // No need to check holder commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on counterparty commitment tx
1639 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1640 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1641 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1642 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1643 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1644 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1645 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1647 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1648 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
1650 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
1652 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1654 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1655 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1656 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1657 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1658 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1659 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1660 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1661 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1662 // payment_preimage.
1663 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1664 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1665 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1666 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1668 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1669 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1673 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of counterparty commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1674 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1675 if entry.height != height { return true; }
1677 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1678 htlc_update.0 != **source
1683 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
1686 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
1687 htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())
1695 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1696 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1698 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1699 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1702 let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
1703 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
1704 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
1708 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1711 fn get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>) -> Vec<PackageTemplate> {
1712 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1713 if let Some(htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
1714 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1715 let revocation_point_option =
1716 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
1717 // per-commitment point
1718 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1719 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1720 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
1721 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
1722 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
1723 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1725 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1726 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1727 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1728 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
1729 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
1730 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
1731 return claimable_outpoints; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1734 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
1735 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
1736 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone())) } else { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, htlc.clone())) };
1737 let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
1738 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
1739 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
1749 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1750 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
1751 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
1752 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
1753 return (Vec::new(), None)
1756 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1757 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1760 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
1765 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
1766 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1767 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1769 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
1770 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, tx.output[0].value, self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
1771 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(htlc_txid, 0, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_tx_cache.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
1772 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(justice_package);
1773 let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
1774 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
1777 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnChainTxHandler, so that the handler can
1778 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
1779 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
1780 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
1781 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1783 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1784 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
1786 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1787 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1788 let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build(if !htlc.offered {
1789 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1790 Some(preimage.clone())
1792 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1795 } else { None }, htlc.amount_msat);
1796 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output), height, false, height);
1797 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
1801 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
1804 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
1805 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
1806 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1807 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1808 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1809 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
1815 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1816 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
1817 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1818 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs) where L::Target: Logger {
1819 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1820 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
1821 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1823 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
1824 ($source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
1825 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1826 if entry.height != height { return true; }
1828 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1829 htlc_update.0 != $source
1834 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
1835 txid: commitment_txid,
1837 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash) },
1839 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} holder commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, entry.confirmation_threshold());
1840 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
1844 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
1845 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
1846 claim_requests = $updates.0;
1847 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
1848 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
1852 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
1853 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
1855 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1856 is_holder_tx = true;
1857 log_trace!(logger, "Got latest holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1858 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
1859 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
1860 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
1861 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1862 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1863 is_holder_tx = true;
1864 log_trace!(logger, "Got previous holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1865 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
1866 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
1867 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
1871 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
1872 ($holder_tx: expr) => {
1873 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$holder_tx.htlc_outputs {
1874 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
1875 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
1876 wait_threshold_conf!(source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
1884 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1885 if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1886 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(holder_tx);
1890 (claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1893 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
1894 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
1895 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
1896 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
1897 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1898 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1899 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1900 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1901 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1902 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1903 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1907 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1908 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1913 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
1914 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
1918 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1919 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
1920 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
1921 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
1922 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1923 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1924 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1925 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1926 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1927 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1928 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1932 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1933 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1941 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1942 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1943 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1946 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
1947 log_trace!(logger, "New best block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
1948 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
1950 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1953 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1955 header: &BlockHeader,
1960 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1962 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1963 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1966 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
1967 log_trace!(logger, "New best block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
1969 if height > self.best_block.height() {
1970 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
1971 self.block_confirmed(height, vec![], vec![], vec![], broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1973 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
1974 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
1975 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1980 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1982 header: &BlockHeader,
1983 txdata: &TransactionData,
1988 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1990 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1991 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1994 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
1995 for tx in &txn_matched {
1996 let mut output_val = 0;
1997 for out in tx.output.iter() {
1998 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1999 output_val += out.value;
2000 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2004 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2005 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2007 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2008 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2009 for tx in &txn_matched {
2010 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2011 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2012 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2013 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2015 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2016 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
2017 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2018 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
2019 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2020 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2022 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
2023 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
2024 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2025 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2027 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2029 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2032 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2033 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
2034 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2035 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
2036 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2041 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2042 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2043 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2044 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2046 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2049 self.block_confirmed(height, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
2052 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2055 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
2056 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
2057 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
2061 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2063 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2064 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2067 let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height, &logger);
2068 if should_broadcast {
2069 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone());
2070 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), height, false, height);
2071 claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
2072 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
2073 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2074 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2075 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
2076 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
2077 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2078 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2080 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2083 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
2084 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
2085 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2086 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
2087 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
2088 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(height) {
2089 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2091 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2095 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2096 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2097 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
2099 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
2100 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => Some(htlc_update.0.clone()),
2101 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { .. } => None,
2104 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2105 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
2107 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
2108 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
2110 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
2111 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2112 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2115 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &htlc_update.0).is_none(),
2116 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2117 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2118 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2120 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &htlc_update.0).is_none(),
2121 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2122 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2123 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2124 matured_htlcs.push(htlc_update.0.clone());
2127 log_trace!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
2128 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2129 payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
2130 payment_preimage: None,
2131 source: htlc_update.0,
2134 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
2135 log_trace!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
2136 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
2137 outputs: vec![descriptor]
2143 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, Some(height), &&*broadcaster, &&*fee_estimator, &&*logger);
2145 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
2146 // updating the latter in the process.
2147 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
2148 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
2149 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
2153 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
2154 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
2155 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
2156 for tx in &txn_matched {
2157 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
2158 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
2159 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
2160 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
2168 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
2169 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2170 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2173 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
2176 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2177 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
2178 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
2180 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2182 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
2185 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2192 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2193 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2196 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.txid != *txid);
2197 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2200 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
2201 /// transactions thereof.
2202 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
2203 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
2204 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
2205 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
2206 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2207 if matches { break; }
2208 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2213 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
2216 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
2219 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
2220 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
2221 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2222 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2223 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
2224 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
2227 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
2228 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
2229 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
2230 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2231 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().clone()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2232 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
2233 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2234 } else { panic!(); }
2245 fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
2246 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2247 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2248 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2249 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2250 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2251 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2252 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2253 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2254 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2255 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2256 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2257 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2258 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2259 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2260 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2261 // time out the HTLC first.
2262 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2263 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2264 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2265 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2266 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2267 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2268 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2269 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2270 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2271 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2272 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2273 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2274 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2275 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2276 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2277 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2278 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2279 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2280 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2281 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2282 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
2283 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2284 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2285 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2292 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2294 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2295 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2296 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2299 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2300 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2301 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2308 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
2309 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2310 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2311 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2312 let mut payment_data = None;
2313 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2314 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2315 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
2316 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2318 macro_rules! log_claim {
2319 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2320 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2321 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid counterparty commitment txid
2322 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2323 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2324 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
2325 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2326 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2327 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2328 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2329 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2330 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2332 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2333 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2334 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2335 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2340 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
2341 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2342 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
2343 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2344 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2345 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2346 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2347 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2356 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2357 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2358 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2359 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2360 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2361 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
2362 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2363 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
2364 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2365 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2366 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2367 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2368 } else if !$holder_tx {
2369 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2370 if payment_data.is_none() {
2371 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2374 if payment_data.is_none() {
2375 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
2376 continue 'outer_loop;
2383 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2384 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2385 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
2387 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2388 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2389 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2390 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
2393 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2394 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2395 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
2398 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2399 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2400 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2401 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2402 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2403 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2404 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
2405 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2406 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2408 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2412 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2413 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2414 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
2415 upd.source == source
2417 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2418 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2420 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2425 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
2426 if entry.height != height { return true; }
2428 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2429 htlc_update.0 != source
2434 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2437 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash) },
2439 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
2440 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2446 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
2447 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2448 let mut spendable_output = None;
2449 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
2450 if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize {
2451 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
2452 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
2453 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
2454 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
2455 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
2456 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
2457 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
2458 // non-standard due to their size.
2459 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
2460 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
2461 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
2464 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
2465 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2466 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2467 output: outp.clone(),
2470 } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
2471 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2472 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
2473 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2474 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
2475 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
2476 output: outp.clone(),
2477 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
2478 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2479 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2483 } else if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
2484 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
2485 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2486 output: outp.clone(),
2487 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2488 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2491 } else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
2492 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2493 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2494 output: outp.clone(),
2498 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2499 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2502 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
2504 log_trace!(logger, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
2505 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2510 /// `Persist` defines behavior for persisting channel monitors: this could mean
2511 /// writing once to disk, and/or uploading to one or more backup services.
2513 /// Note that for every new monitor, you **must** persist the new `ChannelMonitor`
2514 /// to disk/backups. And, on every update, you **must** persist either the
2515 /// `ChannelMonitorUpdate` or the updated monitor itself. Otherwise, there is risk
2516 /// of situations such as revoking a transaction, then crashing before this
2517 /// revocation can be persisted, then unintentionally broadcasting a revoked
2518 /// transaction and losing money. This is a risk because previous channel states
2519 /// are toxic, so it's important that whatever channel state is persisted is
2520 /// kept up-to-date.
2521 pub trait Persist<ChannelSigner: Sign> {
2522 /// Persist a new channel's data. The data can be stored any way you want, but
2523 /// the identifier provided by Rust-Lightning is the channel's outpoint (and
2524 /// it is up to you to maintain a correct mapping between the outpoint and the
2525 /// stored channel data). Note that you **must** persist every new monitor to
2526 /// disk. See the `Persist` trait documentation for more details.
2528 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::write`] for writing out a `ChannelMonitor`,
2529 /// and [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`] for requirements when returning errors.
2530 fn persist_new_channel(&self, id: OutPoint, data: &ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
2532 /// Update one channel's data. The provided `ChannelMonitor` has already
2533 /// applied the given update.
2535 /// Note that on every update, you **must** persist either the
2536 /// `ChannelMonitorUpdate` or the updated monitor itself to disk/backups. See
2537 /// the `Persist` trait documentation for more details.
2539 /// If an implementer chooses to persist the updates only, they need to make
2540 /// sure that all the updates are applied to the `ChannelMonitors` *before*
2541 /// the set of channel monitors is given to the `ChannelManager`
2542 /// deserialization routine. See [`ChannelMonitor::update_monitor`] for
2543 /// applying a monitor update to a monitor. If full `ChannelMonitors` are
2544 /// persisted, then there is no need to persist individual updates.
2546 /// Note that there could be a performance tradeoff between persisting complete
2547 /// channel monitors on every update vs. persisting only updates and applying
2548 /// them in batches. The size of each monitor grows `O(number of state updates)`
2549 /// whereas updates are small and `O(1)`.
2551 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::write`] for writing out a `ChannelMonitor`,
2552 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::write`] for writing out an update, and
2553 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr`] for requirements when returning errors.
2554 fn update_persisted_channel(&self, id: OutPoint, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, data: &ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
2557 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
2559 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2560 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2563 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
2564 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
2565 self.0.block_connected(&block.header, &txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2568 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
2569 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2573 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
2575 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2576 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2579 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
2580 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2583 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
2584 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2587 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
2588 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
2591 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
2592 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
2596 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2598 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
2599 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Signer>) {
2600 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2601 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2605 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2610 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
2612 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2613 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2615 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2616 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2618 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
2619 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2620 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2621 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
2624 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2626 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2627 let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2629 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
2630 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
2631 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2632 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2633 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2634 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2635 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2637 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
2638 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2639 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2641 let counterparty_tx_cache = Readable::read(reader)?;
2642 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
2643 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
2645 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2646 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2650 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2651 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2652 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2653 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2655 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2660 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2662 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
2664 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2667 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2668 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2669 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2670 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2671 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2673 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2674 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2680 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2681 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2682 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
2683 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2684 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2685 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2686 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2687 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2689 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2690 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2694 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2695 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2696 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2697 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2698 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2699 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
2700 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2704 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2705 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2706 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
2707 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2708 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2709 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2710 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2714 macro_rules! read_holder_tx {
2717 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2718 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2719 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2720 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2721 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2722 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2723 let feerate_per_kw: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2725 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2726 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2727 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2728 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2729 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2731 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
2732 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2734 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2739 revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
2746 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2749 Some(read_holder_tx!())
2751 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2753 let current_holder_commitment_tx = read_holder_tx!();
2755 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2756 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2758 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2759 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2760 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2761 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2762 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2763 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2764 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2768 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2769 let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
2770 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
2771 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2772 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
2773 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_info.0),
2774 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
2776 pending_monitor_events.push(ev);
2779 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2780 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
2781 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
2782 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
2783 pending_events.push(event);
2787 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
2789 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2790 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2791 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2792 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2793 let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
2794 let event = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2796 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2797 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2798 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2799 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
2803 let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
2804 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2808 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2810 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry { txid, height, event });
2813 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2814 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
2815 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
2816 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2817 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2818 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
2819 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
2820 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
2822 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
2823 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2826 let onchain_tx_handler = ReadableArgs::read(reader, keys_manager)?;
2828 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
2829 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
2831 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {}, {});
2833 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2834 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2836 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor {
2837 inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
2839 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2842 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
2843 counterparty_payment_script,
2847 holder_revocation_basepoint,
2849 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
2850 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
2852 counterparty_tx_cache,
2853 funding_redeemscript,
2854 channel_value_satoshis,
2855 their_cur_revocation_points,
2860 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
2861 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2862 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
2864 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
2865 current_holder_commitment_tx,
2866 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
2867 current_holder_commitment_number,
2870 pending_monitor_events,
2873 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
2878 lockdown_from_offchain,
2891 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2892 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2893 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2894 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2895 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2896 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2897 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2898 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2899 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
2900 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
2902 use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
2903 use chain::onchain_utils::{WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
2904 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2905 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2906 use ln::channelmanager::BestBlock;
2908 use ln::package::InputDescriptors;
2910 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
2911 use util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
2912 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2913 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2914 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
2915 use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
2918 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2919 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2920 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2921 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
2922 let fee_estimator = Arc::new(TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
2924 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
2925 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2927 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2930 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
2931 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2932 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2936 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2937 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2939 let mut res = Vec::new();
2940 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2941 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2945 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2946 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
2953 macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
2954 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2956 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2957 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
2963 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2964 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2965 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2966 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2971 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
2973 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2974 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2975 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2976 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2977 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2983 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2984 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
2985 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
2986 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
2987 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
2988 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
2990 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Default::default(), index: u16::max_value() };
2991 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
2992 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
2993 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
2994 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
2995 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2996 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2997 selected_contest_delay: 67,
2999 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
3001 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3003 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(Network::Testnet);
3004 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
3005 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
3006 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
3007 &channel_parameters,
3008 Script::new(), 46, 0,
3009 HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block);
3011 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
3012 let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
3013 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
3014 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
3015 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
3016 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
3017 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3018 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger);
3021 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3022 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3023 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3024 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3025 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3026 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3027 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3029 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3030 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3031 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3032 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3033 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3034 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3036 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3037 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3038 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
3039 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3040 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3041 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3042 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3043 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3045 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3046 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
3047 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3048 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3049 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3050 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3054 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3055 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3056 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3058 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3059 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3060 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3061 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3063 macro_rules! sign_input {
3064 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
3065 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3066 offered: if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC || *$weight == WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC { true } else { false },
3068 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3069 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3070 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
3072 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3073 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3074 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3075 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3076 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3077 sum_actual_sigs += $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len();
3078 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
3079 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec!(1));
3080 } else if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC || *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC {
3081 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3082 } else if *$weight == WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC {
3083 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(vec![0]);
3085 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3087 $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx).push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3088 println!("witness[0] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[0].len());
3089 println!("witness[1] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[1].len());
3090 println!("witness[2] {}", $sighash_parts.access_witness($idx)[2].len());
3094 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3095 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3097 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3098 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3100 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3101 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3105 script_sig: Script::new(),
3106 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3107 witness: Vec::new(),
3110 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3111 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3114 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3115 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC];
3116 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3118 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3119 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3120 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
3121 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3124 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3126 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3127 claim_tx.input.clear();
3128 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3130 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3131 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3135 script_sig: Script::new(),
3136 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3137 witness: Vec::new(),
3140 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3141 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC];
3142 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3144 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3145 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3146 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
3147 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3150 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3152 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3153 claim_tx.input.clear();
3154 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3155 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3156 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3160 script_sig: Script::new(),
3161 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3162 witness: Vec::new(),
3164 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3165 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
3166 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3168 let mut sighash_parts = bip143::SigHashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3169 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3170 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs);
3171 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3174 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3177 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.