1 //! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
2 //! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys message signing
5 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
6 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType};
8 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
9 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
11 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
12 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13 use bitcoin_hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
14 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
15 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
17 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
18 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
19 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
22 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
23 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
26 pub(super) const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
27 pub(super) const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
30 pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
36 /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
37 pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) -> Option<HTLCType> {
38 if witness_script_len == 133 {
39 Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
40 } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
41 Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
48 // Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
49 // used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
51 pub(super) fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
52 let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
55 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
56 res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
57 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
63 /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
64 /// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
66 /// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of counterarties in just 50*32 bytes
69 pub(super) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
70 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
73 impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
74 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
75 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
76 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
84 impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
85 pub(super) fn new() -> Self {
86 Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
90 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
92 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
99 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
100 //TODO This can be optimized?
101 let mut min = 1 << 48;
102 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
111 pub(super) fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
112 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
114 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
115 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
116 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
117 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
123 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
124 let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
126 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
127 if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
131 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
134 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
138 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
139 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
140 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
141 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
142 return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
145 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
150 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
151 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
152 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
153 writer.write_all(secret)?;
154 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
159 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
160 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
161 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
162 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
163 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
164 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
167 Ok(Self { old_secrets })
171 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or payment key) from the base
172 /// private key for that type of key and the per_commitment_point (available in TxCreationKeys)
173 pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
174 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
175 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
176 sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
177 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
179 let mut key = base_secret.clone();
180 key.add_assign(&res)?;
184 pub(super) fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
185 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
186 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
187 sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
188 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
190 let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
191 base_point.combine(&hashkey)
194 /// Derives a revocation key from its constituent parts.
195 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
196 /// generated (ie our own).
197 pub(super) fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
198 let revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &revocation_base_secret);
199 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
201 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
202 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
203 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
204 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
206 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
208 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
209 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
210 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
211 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
213 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
216 let mut part_a = revocation_base_secret.clone();
217 part_a.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
218 let mut part_b = per_commitment_secret.clone();
219 part_b.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
220 part_a.add_assign(&part_b[..])?;
224 pub(super) fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
225 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
226 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
227 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
228 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
230 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
232 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
233 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
234 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
235 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
237 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
240 let mut part_a = revocation_base_point.clone();
241 part_a.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
242 let mut part_b = per_commitment_point.clone();
243 part_b.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
244 part_a.combine(&part_b)
247 /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
248 /// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
249 #[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
250 pub struct TxCreationKeys {
251 /// The per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
252 pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
253 /// The revocation key which is used to allow the owner of the commitment transaction to
254 /// provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast an old state.
255 pub(crate) revocation_key: PublicKey,
257 pub(crate) a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
259 pub(crate) b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
260 /// A's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
261 pub(crate) a_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
263 pub(crate) b_payment_key: PublicKey,
265 impl_writeable!(TxCreationKeys, 33*6,
266 { per_commitment_point, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, a_delayed_payment_key, b_payment_key });
268 /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
269 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
270 pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
271 /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
272 /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
273 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
274 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
275 /// revocation keys. The per-commitment revocation private key is then revealed by the owner of
276 /// a commitment transaction so that their counterparty can claim all available funds if they
277 /// broadcast an old state.
278 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
279 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
280 /// public key which receives immediately-spendable non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
281 pub payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
282 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
283 /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
284 /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
285 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
286 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
287 /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
288 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
291 impl_writeable!(ChannelPublicKeys, 33*5, {
293 revocation_basepoint,
295 delayed_payment_basepoint,
300 impl TxCreationKeys {
301 pub(crate) fn new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, a_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, a_htlc_base: &PublicKey, b_revocation_base: &PublicKey, b_payment_base: &PublicKey, b_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, secp256k1::Error> {
303 per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
304 revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_revocation_base)?,
305 a_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_htlc_base)?,
306 b_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_htlc_base)?,
307 a_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_delayed_payment_base)?,
308 b_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_payment_base)?,
313 /// Gets the "to_local" output redeemscript, ie the script which is time-locked or spendable by
314 /// the revocation key
315 pub(super) fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u16, delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
316 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
317 .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
318 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
319 .push_int(to_self_delay as i64)
320 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
321 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
322 .push_slice(&delayed_payment_key.serialize())
323 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
324 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
328 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
329 /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
330 pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
331 /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
332 /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
333 /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
334 /// the remote party or our own.
336 /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
337 /// this divided by 1000.
338 pub amount_msat: u64,
339 /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
340 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
341 /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
342 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
343 /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
344 /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
345 /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
346 pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
349 impl_writeable!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, 1 + 8 + 4 + 32 + 5, {
354 transaction_output_index
358 pub(super) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_htlc_key: &PublicKey, b_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
359 let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
361 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
362 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
363 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
364 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
365 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
366 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
367 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
368 .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
369 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
370 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
372 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
373 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
374 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
376 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
377 .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
379 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
380 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
381 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
382 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
383 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
384 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
385 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
386 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
389 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
390 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
391 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
392 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
393 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
394 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
395 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
396 .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
397 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
398 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
400 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
401 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
402 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
403 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
404 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
406 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
407 .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
409 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
410 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
411 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
412 .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
413 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
414 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
415 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
416 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
417 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
422 /// note here that 'a_revocation_key' is generated using b_revocation_basepoint and a's
423 /// commitment secret. 'htlc' does *not* need to have its previous_output_index filled.
425 pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
426 get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.a_htlc_key, &keys.b_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
429 /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
430 /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
431 pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(a: &PublicKey, b: &PublicKey) -> Script {
432 let our_funding_key = a.serialize();
433 let their_funding_key = b.serialize();
435 let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
436 if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
437 builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
438 .push_slice(&their_funding_key)
440 builder.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
441 .push_slice(&our_funding_key)
442 }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
445 /// panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()!
446 pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Sha256dHash, feerate_per_kw: u64, to_self_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
447 let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
449 previous_output: OutPoint {
450 txid: prev_hash.clone(),
451 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
453 script_sig: Script::new(),
458 let total_fee = if htlc.offered {
459 feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
461 feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
464 let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
466 script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, to_self_delay, a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
467 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
472 lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
478 /// Signs a transaction created by build_htlc_transaction. If the transaction is an
479 /// HTLC-Success transaction (ie htlc.offered is false), preimage must be set!
480 pub(crate) fn sign_htlc_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing>(tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_htlc_key: &PublicKey, b_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Script), ()> {
481 if tx.input.len() != 1 { return Err(()); }
482 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { return Err(()); }
484 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, revocation_key);
486 let our_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
487 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
488 let local_tx = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key) == *a_htlc_key;
489 let our_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key);
491 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
493 if local_tx { // b, then a
494 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
495 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
497 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
498 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
500 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
501 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
504 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
505 assert!(preimage.is_none());
507 tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
510 tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
512 Ok((our_sig, htlc_redeemscript))
516 /// We use this to track local commitment transactions and put off signing them until we are ready
517 /// to broadcast. Eventually this will require a signer which is possibly external, but for now we
518 /// just pass in the SecretKeys required.
519 pub struct LocalCommitmentTransaction {
522 impl LocalCommitmentTransaction {
524 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
525 Self { tx: Transaction {
533 /// Generate a new LocalCommitmentTransaction based on a raw commitment transaction,
534 /// remote signature and both parties keys
535 pub(crate) fn new_missing_local_sig(mut tx: Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, our_funding_key: &PublicKey, their_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> LocalCommitmentTransaction {
536 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to store a commitment transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
537 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to store a signed commitment transaction?"); }
539 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
541 if our_funding_key.serialize()[..] < their_funding_key.serialize()[..] {
542 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
543 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
544 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
546 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
547 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
548 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
554 /// Get the txid of the local commitment transaction contained in this
555 /// LocalCommitmentTransaction
556 pub fn txid(&self) -> Sha256dHash {
560 /// Check if LocalCommitmentTransaction has already been signed by us
561 pub fn has_local_sig(&self) -> bool {
562 if self.tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Commitment transactions must have input count == 1!"); }
563 if self.tx.input[0].witness.len() == 4 {
564 assert!(!self.tx.input[0].witness[1].is_empty());
565 assert!(!self.tx.input[0].witness[2].is_empty());
568 assert_eq!(self.tx.input[0].witness.len(), 3);
569 assert!(self.tx.input[0].witness[0].is_empty());
570 assert!(self.tx.input[0].witness[1].is_empty() || self.tx.input[0].witness[2].is_empty());
575 /// Add local signature for LocalCommitmentTransaction, do nothing if signature is already
578 /// Funding key is your key included in the 2-2 funding_outpoint lock. Should be provided
579 /// by your ChannelKeys.
580 /// Funding redeemscript is script locking funding_outpoint. This is the mutlsig script
581 /// between your own funding key and your counterparty's. Currently, this is provided in
582 /// ChannelKeys::sign_local_commitment() calls directly.
583 /// Channel value is amount locked in funding_outpoint.
584 pub fn add_local_sig<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&mut self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) {
585 if self.has_local_sig() { return; }
586 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&self.tx)
587 .sighash_all(&self.tx.input[0], funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
588 let our_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key);
590 if self.tx.input[0].witness[1].is_empty() {
591 self.tx.input[0].witness[1] = our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
592 self.tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
594 self.tx.input[0].witness[2] = our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
595 self.tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
598 self.tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
601 /// Get raw transaction without asserting if witness is complete
602 pub(crate) fn without_valid_witness(&self) -> &Transaction { &self.tx }
603 /// Get raw transaction with panics if witness is incomplete
604 pub fn with_valid_witness(&self) -> &Transaction {
605 assert!(self.has_local_sig());
609 impl PartialEq for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
610 // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
611 fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
612 self.txid() == o.txid()
615 impl Writeable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
616 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
617 if let Err(e) = self.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
619 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
620 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
626 impl Readable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
627 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
628 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
631 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
632 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
636 if tx.input.len() != 1 {
637 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
638 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
646 use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
650 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
651 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
652 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
655 macro_rules! test_secrets {
657 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
658 for secret in secrets.iter() {
659 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
662 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
663 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
668 // insert_secret correct sequence
669 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
672 secrets.push([0; 32]);
673 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
674 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
677 secrets.push([0; 32]);
678 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
679 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
682 secrets.push([0; 32]);
683 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
684 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
687 secrets.push([0; 32]);
688 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
689 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
692 secrets.push([0; 32]);
693 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
694 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
697 secrets.push([0; 32]);
698 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
699 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
702 secrets.push([0; 32]);
703 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
704 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
707 secrets.push([0; 32]);
708 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
709 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
714 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
715 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
718 secrets.push([0; 32]);
719 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
720 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
723 secrets.push([0; 32]);
724 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
725 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
729 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
730 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
733 secrets.push([0; 32]);
734 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
735 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
738 secrets.push([0; 32]);
739 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
740 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
743 secrets.push([0; 32]);
744 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
745 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
748 secrets.push([0; 32]);
749 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
750 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
754 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
755 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
758 secrets.push([0; 32]);
759 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
760 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
763 secrets.push([0; 32]);
764 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
765 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
768 secrets.push([0; 32]);
769 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
770 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
773 secrets.push([0; 32]);
774 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
775 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
779 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
780 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
783 secrets.push([0; 32]);
784 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
785 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
788 secrets.push([0; 32]);
789 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
790 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
793 secrets.push([0; 32]);
794 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
795 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
798 secrets.push([0; 32]);
799 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
800 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
803 secrets.push([0; 32]);
804 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
805 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
808 secrets.push([0; 32]);
809 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
810 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
813 secrets.push([0; 32]);
814 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
815 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
818 secrets.push([0; 32]);
819 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
820 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
824 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
825 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
828 secrets.push([0; 32]);
829 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
830 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
833 secrets.push([0; 32]);
834 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
835 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
838 secrets.push([0; 32]);
839 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
840 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
843 secrets.push([0; 32]);
844 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
845 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
848 secrets.push([0; 32]);
849 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
850 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
853 secrets.push([0; 32]);
854 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
855 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
859 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
860 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
863 secrets.push([0; 32]);
864 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
865 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
868 secrets.push([0; 32]);
869 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
870 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
873 secrets.push([0; 32]);
874 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
875 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
878 secrets.push([0; 32]);
879 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
880 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
883 secrets.push([0; 32]);
884 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
885 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
888 secrets.push([0; 32]);
889 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
890 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
893 secrets.push([0; 32]);
894 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
895 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
898 secrets.push([0; 32]);
899 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
900 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
904 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
905 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
908 secrets.push([0; 32]);
909 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
910 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
913 secrets.push([0; 32]);
914 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
915 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
918 secrets.push([0; 32]);
919 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
920 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
923 secrets.push([0; 32]);
924 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
925 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
928 secrets.push([0; 32]);
929 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
930 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
933 secrets.push([0; 32]);
934 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
935 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
938 secrets.push([0; 32]);
939 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
940 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
943 secrets.push([0; 32]);
944 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
945 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
949 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
950 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
953 secrets.push([0; 32]);
954 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
955 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
958 secrets.push([0; 32]);
959 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
960 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
963 secrets.push([0; 32]);
964 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
965 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
968 secrets.push([0; 32]);
969 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
970 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
973 secrets.push([0; 32]);
974 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
975 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
978 secrets.push([0; 32]);
979 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
980 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
983 secrets.push([0; 32]);
984 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
985 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
988 secrets.push([0; 32]);
989 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
990 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());