_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/chan_utils.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
  11 //! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys message signing
  12 //! by hand.
  13
  14 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
  15 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType};
  17 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  18
  19 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
  20 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  21 use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
  22 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
  23
  24 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
  25 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
  26 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer, MAX_BUF_SIZE};
  27 use util::byte_utils;
  28
  29 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
  30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
  31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature, Message};
  32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Error as SecpError;
  33 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
  34
  35 use std::cmp;
  36 use ln::chan_utils;
  37 use util::transaction_utils::sort_outputs;
  38 use ln::channel::INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER;
  39 use std::io::Read;
  40 use std::ops::Deref;
  41 use chain;
  42
  43 const HTLC_OUTPUT_IN_COMMITMENT_SIZE: usize = 1 + 8 + 4 + 32 + 5;
  44
  45 pub(crate) const MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 483;
  46
  47 // This checks that the buffer size is greater than the maximum possible size for serialized HTLCS
  48 const _EXCESS_BUFFER_SIZE: usize = MAX_BUF_SIZE - MAX_HTLCS as usize * HTLC_OUTPUT_IN_COMMITMENT_SIZE;
  49
  50 pub(super) const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
  51 pub(super) const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
  52
  53 #[derive(PartialEq)]
  54 pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
  55         AcceptedHTLC,
  56         OfferedHTLC
  57 }
  58
  59 impl HTLCType {
  60         /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
  61         pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) ->  Option<HTLCType> {
  62                 if witness_script_len == 133 {
  63                         Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
  64                 } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
  65                         Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
  66                 } else {
  67                         None
  68                 }
  69         }
  70 }
  71
  72 // Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
  73 // used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
  74
  75 /// Build the commitment secret from the seed and the commitment number
  76 pub fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
  77         let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
  78         for i in 0..48 {
  79                 let bitpos = 47 - i;
  80                 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
  81                         res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
  82                         res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
  83                 }
  84         }
  85         res
  86 }
  87
  88 /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
  89 /// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
  90 ///
  91 /// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of counterarties in just 50*32 bytes
  92 /// or so.
  93 #[derive(Clone)]
  94 pub(crate) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
  95         old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
  96 }
  97
  98 impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
  99         fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
 100                 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
 101                         if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
 102                                 return false
 103                         }
 104                 }
 105                 true
 106         }
 107 }
 108
 109 impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
 110         pub(crate) fn new() -> Self {
 111                 Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
 112         }
 113
 114         #[inline]
 115         fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
 116                 for i in 0..48 {
 117                         if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
 118                                 return i
 119                         }
 120                 }
 121                 48
 122         }
 123
 124         pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
 125                 //TODO This can be optimized?
 126                 let mut min = 1 << 48;
 127                 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 128                         if idx < min {
 129                                 min = idx;
 130                         }
 131                 }
 132                 min
 133         }
 134
 135         #[inline]
 136         fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
 137                 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
 138                 for i in 0..bits {
 139                         let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
 140                         if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
 141                                 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
 142                                 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
 143                         }
 144                 }
 145                 res
 146         }
 147
 148         pub(crate) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
 149                 let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
 150                 for i in 0..pos {
 151                         let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
 152                         if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
 153                                 return Err(());
 154                         }
 155                 }
 156                 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
 157                         return Ok(());
 158                 }
 159                 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
 160                 Ok(())
 161         }
 162
 163         /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
 164         pub(crate) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
 165                 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
 166                         if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
 167                                 return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
 168                         }
 169                 }
 170                 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
 171                 None
 172         }
 173 }
 174
 175 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
 176         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 177                 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 178                         writer.write_all(secret)?;
 179                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
 180                 }
 181                 Ok(())
 182         }
 183 }
 184 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
 185         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 186                 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
 187                 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
 188                         *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
 189                         *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
 190                 }
 191
 192                 Ok(Self { old_secrets })
 193         }
 194 }
 195
 196 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
 197 /// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
 198 ///
 199 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 200 /// generated (ie our own).
 201 pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
 202         let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 203         sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 204         sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
 205         let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 206
 207         let mut key = base_secret.clone();
 208         key.add_assign(&res)?;
 209         Ok(key)
 210 }
 211
 212 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
 213 /// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
 214 /// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
 215 ///
 216 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 217 /// generated (ie our own).
 218 pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
 219         let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 220         sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 221         sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
 222         let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 223
 224         let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
 225         base_point.combine(&hashkey)
 226 }
 227
 228 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
 229 ///
 230 /// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
 231 /// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_secret always come from cheater
 232 /// and revocation_base_secret always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
 233 /// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
 234 ///
 235 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 236 /// generated (ie our own).
 237 pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
 238         let countersignatory_revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &countersignatory_revocation_base_secret);
 239         let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
 240
 241         let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
 242                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 243                 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
 244                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 245
 246                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 247         };
 248         let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
 249                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 250                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 251                 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
 252
 253                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 254         };
 255
 256         let mut countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_secret.clone();
 257         countersignatory_contrib.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
 258         let mut broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_secret.clone();
 259         broadcaster_contrib.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
 260         countersignatory_contrib.add_assign(&broadcaster_contrib[..])?;
 261         Ok(countersignatory_contrib)
 262 }
 263
 264 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
 265 /// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
 266 /// public key instead of private keys.
 267 ///
 268 /// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
 269 /// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_point always come from cheater
 270 /// and revocation_base_point always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
 271 /// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
 272 ///
 273 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 274 /// generated (ie our own).
 275 pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
 276         let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
 277                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 278                 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
 279                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 280
 281                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 282         };
 283         let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
 284                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 285                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 286                 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
 287
 288                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 289         };
 290
 291         let mut countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_point.clone();
 292         countersignatory_contrib.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
 293         let mut broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_point.clone();
 294         broadcaster_contrib.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
 295         countersignatory_contrib.combine(&broadcaster_contrib)
 296 }
 297
 298 /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
 299 /// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
 300 ///
 301 /// A broadcaster key is provided from potential broadcaster of the computed transaction.
 302 /// A countersignatory key is coming from a protocol participant unable to broadcast the
 303 /// transaction.
 304 ///
 305 /// These keys are assumed to be good, either because the code derived them from
 306 /// channel basepoints via the new function, or they were obtained via
 307 /// CommitmentTransaction.trust().keys() because we trusted the source of the
 308 /// pre-calculated keys.
 309 #[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
 310 pub struct TxCreationKeys {
 311         /// The broadcaster's per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
 312         pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
 313         /// The revocation key which is used to allow the broadcaster of the commitment
 314         /// transaction to provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast
 315         /// an old state.
 316         pub revocation_key: PublicKey,
 317         /// Broadcaster's HTLC Key
 318         pub broadcaster_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 319         /// Countersignatory's HTLC Key
 320         pub countersignatory_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 321         /// Broadcaster's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
 322         pub broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
 323 }
 324 impl_writeable!(TxCreationKeys, 33*6,
 325         { per_commitment_point, revocation_key, broadcaster_htlc_key, countersignatory_htlc_key, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key });
 326
 327 /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
 328 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 329 pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
 330         /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
 331         /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
 332         pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
 333         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
 334         /// revocation keys. This is combined with the per-commitment-secret generated by the
 335         /// counterparty to create a secret which the counterparty can reveal to revoke previous
 336         /// states.
 337         pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
 338         /// The public key on which the non-broadcaster (ie the countersignatory) receives an immediately
 339         /// spendable primary channel balance on the broadcaster's commitment transaction. This key is
 340         /// static across every commitment transaction.
 341         pub payment_point: PublicKey,
 342         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
 343         /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
 344         /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
 345         pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
 346         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
 347         /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
 348         pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
 349 }
 350
 351 impl_writeable!(ChannelPublicKeys, 33*5, {
 352         funding_pubkey,
 353         revocation_basepoint,
 354         payment_point,
 355         delayed_payment_basepoint,
 356         htlc_basepoint
 357 });
 358
 359
 360 impl TxCreationKeys {
 361         /// Create per-state keys from channel base points and the per-commitment point.
 362         /// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions.
 363         pub fn derive_new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, broadcaster_htlc_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
 364                 Ok(TxCreationKeys {
 365                         per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
 366                         revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_revocation_base)?,
 367                         broadcaster_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_htlc_base)?,
 368                         countersignatory_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_htlc_base)?,
 369                         broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_delayed_payment_base)?,
 370                 })
 371         }
 372
 373         /// Generate per-state keys from channel static keys.
 374         /// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions.
 375         pub fn from_channel_static_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
 376                 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(
 377                         &secp_ctx,
 378                         &per_commitment_point,
 379                         &broadcaster_keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
 380                         &broadcaster_keys.htlc_basepoint,
 381                         &countersignatory_keys.revocation_basepoint,
 382                         &countersignatory_keys.htlc_basepoint,
 383                 )
 384         }
 385 }
 386
 387 /// A script either spendable by the revocation
 388 /// key or the broadcaster_delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
 389 /// Encumbering a `to_holder` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
 390 pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, contest_delay: u16, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 391         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 392                       .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
 393                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 394                       .push_int(contest_delay as i64)
 395                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
 396                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 397                       .push_slice(&broadcaster_delayed_payment_key.serialize())
 398                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 399                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 400                       .into_script()
 401 }
 402
 403 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 404 /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
 405 pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 406         /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
 407         /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
 408         /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
 409         /// the counterparty or our own.
 410         pub offered: bool,
 411         /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
 412         /// this divided by 1000.
 413         pub amount_msat: u64,
 414         /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
 415         pub cltv_expiry: u32,
 416         /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
 417         pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 418         /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
 419         /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
 420         /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
 421         pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
 422 }
 423
 424 impl_writeable!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_OUTPUT_IN_COMMITMENT_SIZE, {
 425         offered,
 426         amount_msat,
 427         cltv_expiry,
 428         payment_hash,
 429         transaction_output_index
 430 });
 431
 432 #[inline]
 433 pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, broadcaster_htlc_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 434         let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
 435         if htlc.offered {
 436                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
 437                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 438                               .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
 439                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 440                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 441                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 442                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 443                               .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 444                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 445                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
 446                               .push_int(32)
 447                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 448                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
 449                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 450                               .push_int(2)
 451                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 452                               .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 453                               .push_int(2)
 454                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
 455                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 456                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 457                               .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
 458                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
 459                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 460                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 461                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 462                               .into_script()
 463         } else {
 464                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
 465                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 466                               .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
 467                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 468                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 469                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 470                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 471                               .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 472                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 473                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
 474                               .push_int(32)
 475                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 476                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 477                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 478                               .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
 479                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
 480                               .push_int(2)
 481                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 482                               .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 483                               .push_int(2)
 484                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
 485                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 486                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 487                               .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
 488                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
 489                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 490                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 491                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 492                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 493                               .into_script()
 494         }
 495 }
 496
 497 /// Gets the witness redeemscript for an HTLC output in a commitment transaction. Note that htlc
 498 /// does not need to have its previous_output_index filled.
 499 #[inline]
 500 pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
 501         get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
 502 }
 503
 504 /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
 505 /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
 506 pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(broadcaster: &PublicKey, countersignatory: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 507         let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster.serialize();
 508         let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory.serialize();
 509
 510         let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
 511         if broadcaster_funding_key[..] < countersignatory_funding_key[..] {
 512                 builder.push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
 513                         .push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
 514         } else {
 515                 builder.push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
 516                         .push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
 517         }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
 518 }
 519
 520 /// panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()!
 521 pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
 522         let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
 523         txins.push(TxIn {
 524                 previous_output: OutPoint {
 525                         txid: prev_hash.clone(),
 526                         vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
 527                 },
 528                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 529                 sequence: 0,
 530                 witness: Vec::new(),
 531         });
 532
 533         let total_fee = if htlc.offered {
 534                         feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
 535                 } else {
 536                         feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
 537                 };
 538
 539         let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
 540         txouts.push(TxOut {
 541                 script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, contest_delay, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
 542                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
 543         });
 544
 545         Transaction {
 546                 version: 2,
 547                 lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
 548                 input: txins,
 549                 output: txouts,
 550         }
 551 }
 552
 553 /// Per-channel data used to build transactions in conjunction with the per-commitment data (CommitmentTransaction).
 554 /// The fields are organized by holder/counterparty.
 555 ///
 556 /// Normally, this is converted to the broadcaster/countersignatory-organized DirectedChannelTransactionParameters
 557 /// before use, via the as_holder_broadcastable and as_counterparty_broadcastable functions.
 558 #[derive(Clone)]
 559 pub struct ChannelTransactionParameters {
 560         /// Holder public keys
 561         pub holder_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
 562         /// The contest delay selected by the holder, which applies to counterparty-broadcast transactions
 563         pub holder_selected_contest_delay: u16,
 564         /// Whether the holder is the initiator of this channel.
 565         /// This is an input to the commitment number obscure factor computation.
 566         pub is_outbound_from_holder: bool,
 567         /// The late-bound counterparty channel transaction parameters.
 568         /// These parameters are populated at the point in the protocol where the counterparty provides them.
 569         pub counterparty_parameters: Option<CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters>,
 570         /// The late-bound funding outpoint
 571         pub funding_outpoint: Option<chain::transaction::OutPoint>,
 572 }
 573
 574 /// Late-bound per-channel counterparty data used to build transactions.
 575 #[derive(Clone)]
 576 pub struct CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
 577         /// Counter-party public keys
 578         pub pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
 579         /// The contest delay selected by the counterparty, which applies to holder-broadcast transactions
 580         pub selected_contest_delay: u16,
 581 }
 582
 583 impl ChannelTransactionParameters {
 584         /// Whether the late bound parameters are populated.
 585         pub fn is_populated(&self) -> bool {
 586                 self.counterparty_parameters.is_some() && self.funding_outpoint.is_some()
 587         }
 588
 589         /// Convert the holder/counterparty parameters to broadcaster/countersignatory-organized parameters,
 590         /// given that the holder is the broadcaster.
 591         ///
 592         /// self.is_populated() must be true before calling this function.
 593         pub fn as_holder_broadcastable(&self) -> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
 594                 assert!(self.is_populated(), "self.late_parameters must be set before using as_holder_broadcastable");
 595                 DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
 596                         inner: self,
 597                         holder_is_broadcaster: true
 598                 }
 599         }
 600
 601         /// Convert the holder/counterparty parameters to broadcaster/countersignatory-organized parameters,
 602         /// given that the counterparty is the broadcaster.
 603         ///
 604         /// self.is_populated() must be true before calling this function.
 605         pub fn as_counterparty_broadcastable(&self) -> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
 606                 assert!(self.is_populated(), "self.late_parameters must be set before using as_counterparty_broadcastable");
 607                 DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
 608                         inner: self,
 609                         holder_is_broadcaster: false
 610                 }
 611         }
 612 }
 613
 614 impl_writeable!(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, 0, {
 615         pubkeys,
 616         selected_contest_delay
 617 });
 618
 619 impl_writeable!(ChannelTransactionParameters, 0, {
 620         holder_pubkeys,
 621         holder_selected_contest_delay,
 622         is_outbound_from_holder,
 623         counterparty_parameters,
 624         funding_outpoint
 625 });
 626
 627 /// Static channel fields used to build transactions given per-commitment fields, organized by
 628 /// broadcaster/countersignatory.
 629 ///
 630 /// This is derived from the holder/counterparty-organized ChannelTransactionParameters via the
 631 /// as_holder_broadcastable and as_counterparty_broadcastable functions.
 632 pub struct DirectedChannelTransactionParameters<'a> {
 633         /// The holder's channel static parameters
 634         inner: &'a ChannelTransactionParameters,
 635         /// Whether the holder is the broadcaster
 636         holder_is_broadcaster: bool,
 637 }
 638
 639 impl<'a> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters<'a> {
 640         /// Get the channel pubkeys for the broadcaster
 641         pub fn broadcaster_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
 642                 if self.holder_is_broadcaster {
 643                         &self.inner.holder_pubkeys
 644                 } else {
 645                         &self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
 646                 }
 647         }
 648
 649         /// Get the channel pubkeys for the countersignatory
 650         pub fn countersignatory_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
 651                 if self.holder_is_broadcaster {
 652                         &self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
 653                 } else {
 654                         &self.inner.holder_pubkeys
 655                 }
 656         }
 657
 658         /// Get the contest delay applicable to the transactions.
 659         /// Note that the contest delay was selected by the countersignatory.
 660         pub fn contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
 661                 let counterparty_parameters = self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
 662                 if self.holder_is_broadcaster { counterparty_parameters.selected_contest_delay } else { self.inner.holder_selected_contest_delay }
 663         }
 664
 665         /// Whether the channel is outbound from the broadcaster.
 666         ///
 667         /// The boolean representing the side that initiated the channel is
 668         /// an input to the commitment number obscure factor computation.
 669         pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
 670                 if self.holder_is_broadcaster { self.inner.is_outbound_from_holder } else { !self.inner.is_outbound_from_holder }
 671         }
 672
 673         /// The funding outpoint
 674         pub fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
 675                 self.inner.funding_outpoint.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint()
 676         }
 677 }
 678
 679 /// Information needed to build and sign a holder's commitment transaction.
 680 ///
 681 /// The transaction is only signed once we are ready to broadcast.
 682 #[derive(Clone)]
 683 pub struct HolderCommitmentTransaction {
 684         inner: CommitmentTransaction,
 685         /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction
 686         pub counterparty_sig: Signature,
 687         /// All non-dust counterparty HTLC signatures, in the order they appear in the transaction
 688         pub counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec<Signature>,
 689         // Which order the signatures should go in when constructing the final commitment tx witness.
 690         // The user should be able to reconstruct this themselves, so we don't bother to expose it.
 691         holder_sig_first: bool,
 692 }
 693
 694 impl Deref for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
 695         type Target = CommitmentTransaction;
 696
 697         fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { &self.inner }
 698 }
 699
 700 impl PartialEq for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
 701         // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
 702         fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
 703                 self.inner == o.inner
 704         }
 705 }
 706
 707 impl_writeable!(HolderCommitmentTransaction, 0, {
 708         inner, counterparty_sig, counterparty_htlc_sigs, holder_sig_first
 709 });
 710
 711 impl HolderCommitmentTransaction {
 712         #[cfg(test)]
 713         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
 714                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 715                 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
 716                 let dummy_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
 717
 718                 let keys = TxCreationKeys {
 719                         per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
 720                         revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 721                         broadcaster_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 722                         countersignatory_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 723                         broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 724                 };
 725                 let channel_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
 726                         funding_pubkey: dummy_key.clone(),
 727                         revocation_basepoint: dummy_key.clone(),
 728                         payment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
 729                         delayed_payment_basepoint: dummy_key.clone(),
 730                         htlc_basepoint: dummy_key.clone()
 731                 };
 732                 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
 733                         holder_pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(),
 734                         holder_selected_contest_delay: 0,
 735                         is_outbound_from_holder: false,
 736                         counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(), selected_contest_delay: 0 }),
 737                         funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Default::default(), index: 0 })
 738                 };
 739                 let mut htlcs_with_aux: Vec<(_, ())> = Vec::new();
 740                 let inner = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(0, 0, 0, keys, 0, &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable());
 741                 HolderCommitmentTransaction {
 742                         inner,
 743                         counterparty_sig: dummy_sig,
 744                         counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec::new(),
 745                         holder_sig_first: false
 746                 }
 747         }
 748
 749         /// Create a new holder transaction with the given counterparty signatures.
 750         /// The funding keys are used to figure out which signature should go first when building the transaction for broadcast.
 751         pub fn new(commitment_tx: CommitmentTransaction, counterparty_sig: Signature, counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec<Signature>, holder_funding_key: &PublicKey, counterparty_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Self {
 752                 Self {
 753                         inner: commitment_tx,
 754                         counterparty_sig,
 755                         counterparty_htlc_sigs,
 756                         holder_sig_first: holder_funding_key.serialize()[..] < counterparty_funding_key.serialize()[..],
 757                 }
 758         }
 759
 760         pub(crate) fn add_holder_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, holder_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
 761                 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
 762                 let mut tx = self.inner.built.transaction.clone();
 763                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 764
 765                 if self.holder_sig_first {
 766                         tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 767                         tx.input[0].witness.push(self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 768                 } else {
 769                         tx.input[0].witness.push(self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 770                         tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 771                 }
 772                 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 773                 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 774
 775                 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
 776                 tx
 777         }
 778 }
 779
 780 /// A pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction and its txid.
 781 #[derive(Clone)]
 782 pub struct BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
 783         /// The commitment transaction
 784         pub transaction: Transaction,
 785         /// The txid for the commitment transaction.
 786         ///
 787         /// This is provided as a performance optimization, instead of calling transaction.txid()
 788         /// multiple times.
 789         pub txid: Txid,
 790 }
 791
 792 impl_writeable!(BuiltCommitmentTransaction, 0, { transaction, txid });
 793
 794 impl BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
 795         /// Get the SIGHASH_ALL sighash value of the transaction.
 796         ///
 797         /// This can be used to verify a signature.
 798         pub fn get_sighash_all(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Message {
 799                 let sighash = &bip143::SigHashCache::new(&self.transaction).signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..];
 800                 hash_to_message!(sighash)
 801         }
 802
 803         /// Sign a transaction, either because we are counter-signing the counterparty's transaction or
 804         /// because we are about to broadcast a holder transaction.
 805         pub fn sign<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
 806                 let sighash = self.get_sighash_all(funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis);
 807                 secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key)
 808         }
 809 }
 810
 811 /// This class tracks the per-transaction information needed to build a commitment transaction and to
 812 /// actually build it and sign.  It is used for holder transactions that we sign only when needed
 813 /// and for transactions we sign for the counterparty.
 814 ///
 815 /// This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature given the relevant
 816 /// secret key.
 817 #[derive(Clone)]
 818 pub struct CommitmentTransaction {
 819         commitment_number: u64,
 820         to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64,
 821         to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64,
 822         feerate_per_kw: u32,
 823         htlcs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
 824         // A cache of the parties' pubkeys required to construct the transaction, see doc for trust()
 825         keys: TxCreationKeys,
 826         // For access to the pre-built transaction, see doc for trust()
 827         built: BuiltCommitmentTransaction,
 828 }
 829
 830 impl PartialEq for CommitmentTransaction {
 831         fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
 832                 let eq = self.commitment_number == o.commitment_number &&
 833                         self.to_broadcaster_value_sat == o.to_broadcaster_value_sat &&
 834                         self.to_countersignatory_value_sat == o.to_countersignatory_value_sat &&
 835                         self.feerate_per_kw == o.feerate_per_kw &&
 836                         self.htlcs == o.htlcs &&
 837                         self.keys == o.keys;
 838                 if eq {
 839                         debug_assert_eq!(self.built.transaction, o.built.transaction);
 840                         debug_assert_eq!(self.built.txid, o.built.txid);
 841                 }
 842                 eq
 843         }
 844 }
 845
 846 /// (C-not exported) as users never need to call this directly
 847 impl Writeable for Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
 848         #[inline]
 849         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 850                 (self.len() as u16).write(w)?;
 851                 for e in self.iter() {
 852                         e.write(w)?;
 853                 }
 854                 Ok(())
 855         }
 856 }
 857
 858 /// (C-not exported) as users never need to call this directly
 859 impl Readable for Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
 860         #[inline]
 861         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 862                 let len: u16 = Readable::read(r)?;
 863                 let byte_size = (len as usize)
 864                         .checked_mul(HTLC_OUTPUT_IN_COMMITMENT_SIZE)
 865                         .ok_or(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor)?;
 866                 if byte_size > MAX_BUF_SIZE {
 867                         return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor);
 868                 }
 869                 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(len as usize);
 870                 for _ in 0..len { ret.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment::read(r)?); }
 871                 Ok(ret)
 872         }
 873 }
 874
 875 impl_writeable!(CommitmentTransaction, 0, {
 876         commitment_number,
 877         to_broadcaster_value_sat,
 878         to_countersignatory_value_sat,
 879         feerate_per_kw,
 880         htlcs,
 881         keys,
 882         built
 883 });
 884
 885 impl CommitmentTransaction {
 886         /// Construct an object of the class while assigning transaction output indices to HTLCs.
 887         ///
 888         /// Populates HTLCOutputInCommitment.transaction_output_index in htlcs_with_aux.
 889         ///
 890         /// The generic T allows the caller to match the HTLC output index with auxiliary data.
 891         /// This auxiliary data is not stored in this object.
 892         ///
 893         /// Only include HTLCs that are above the dust limit for the channel.
 894         ///
 895         /// (C-not exported) due to the generic though we likely should expose a version without
 896         pub fn new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data<T>(commitment_number: u64, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> CommitmentTransaction {
 897                 // Sort outputs and populate output indices while keeping track of the auxiliary data
 898                 let (outputs, htlcs) = Self::internal_build_outputs(&keys, to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters).unwrap();
 899
 900                 let (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins) = Self::internal_build_inputs(commitment_number, channel_parameters);
 901                 let transaction = Self::make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins, outputs);
 902                 let txid = transaction.txid();
 903                 CommitmentTransaction {
 904                         commitment_number,
 905                         to_broadcaster_value_sat,
 906                         to_countersignatory_value_sat,
 907                         feerate_per_kw,
 908                         htlcs,
 909                         keys,
 910                         built: BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
 911                                 transaction,
 912                                 txid
 913                         },
 914                 }
 915         }
 916
 917         fn internal_rebuild_transaction(&self, keys: &TxCreationKeys, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> Result<BuiltCommitmentTransaction, ()> {
 918                 let (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins) = Self::internal_build_inputs(self.commitment_number, channel_parameters);
 919
 920                 let mut htlcs_with_aux = self.htlcs.iter().map(|h| (h.clone(), ())).collect();
 921                 let (outputs, _) = Self::internal_build_outputs(keys, self.to_broadcaster_value_sat, self.to_countersignatory_value_sat, &mut htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters)?;
 922
 923                 let transaction = Self::make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins, outputs);
 924                 let txid = transaction.txid();
 925                 let built_transaction = BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
 926                         transaction,
 927                         txid
 928                 };
 929                 Ok(built_transaction)
 930         }
 931
 932         fn make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number: u64, txins: Vec<TxIn>, outputs: Vec<TxOut>) -> Transaction {
 933                 Transaction {
 934                         version: 2,
 935                         lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8 * 3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
 936                         input: txins,
 937                         output: outputs,
 938                 }
 939         }
 940
 941         // This is used in two cases:
 942         // - initial sorting of outputs / HTLCs in the constructor, in which case T is auxiliary data the
 943         //   caller needs to have sorted together with the HTLCs so it can keep track of the output index
 944         // - building of a bitcoin transaction during a verify() call, in which case T is just ()
 945         fn internal_build_outputs<T>(keys: &TxCreationKeys, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> Result<(Vec<TxOut>, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>), ()> {
 946                 let countersignatory_pubkeys = channel_parameters.countersignatory_pubkeys();
 947                 let contest_delay = channel_parameters.contest_delay();
 948
 949                 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<&mut HTLCOutputInCommitment>)> = Vec::new();
 950
 951                 if to_countersignatory_value_sat > 0 {
 952                         let script = script_for_p2wpkh(&countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point);
 953                         txouts.push((
 954                                 TxOut {
 955                                         script_pubkey: script.clone(),
 956                                         value: to_countersignatory_value_sat,
 957                                 },
 958                                 None,
 959                         ))
 960                 }
 961
 962                 if to_broadcaster_value_sat > 0 {
 963                         let redeem_script = get_revokeable_redeemscript(
 964                                 &keys.revocation_key,
 965                                 contest_delay,
 966                                 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
 967                         );
 968                         txouts.push((
 969                                 TxOut {
 970                                         script_pubkey: redeem_script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
 971                                         value: to_broadcaster_value_sat,
 972                                 },
 973                                 None,
 974                         ));
 975                 }
 976
 977                 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_with_aux.len());
 978                 for (htlc, _) in htlcs_with_aux {
 979                         let script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
 980                         let txout = TxOut {
 981                                 script_pubkey: script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
 982                                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
 983                         };
 984                         txouts.push((txout, Some(htlc)));
 985                 }
 986
 987                 // Sort output in BIP-69 order (amount, scriptPubkey).  Tie-breaks based on HTLC
 988                 // CLTV expiration height.
 989                 sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
 990                         if let &Some(ref a_htlcout) = a {
 991                                 if let &Some(ref b_htlcout) = b {
 992                                         a_htlcout.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlcout.cltv_expiry)
 993                                                 // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
 994                                                 // here for fuzztarget mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
 995                                                 // may fail)!
 996                                                 .then(a_htlcout.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlcout.payment_hash.0))
 997                                 // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
 998                                 // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
 999                                 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1000                         } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1001                 });
1002
1003                 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
1004                 for (idx, out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
1005                         if let Some(htlc) = out.1 {
1006                                 htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
1007                                 htlcs.push(htlc.clone());
1008                         }
1009                         outputs.push(out.0);
1010                 }
1011                 Ok((outputs, htlcs))
1012         }
1013
1014         fn internal_build_inputs(commitment_number: u64, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> (u64, Vec<TxIn>) {
1015                 let broadcaster_pubkeys = channel_parameters.broadcaster_pubkeys();
1016                 let countersignatory_pubkeys = channel_parameters.countersignatory_pubkeys();
1017                 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(
1018                         &broadcaster_pubkeys.payment_point,
1019                         &countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point,
1020                         channel_parameters.is_outbound(),
1021                 );
1022
1023                 let obscured_commitment_transaction_number =
1024                         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
1025
1026                 let txins = {
1027                         let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1028                         ins.push(TxIn {
1029                                 previous_output: channel_parameters.funding_outpoint(),
1030                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1031                                 sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8 * 3)
1032                                         | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3 * 8) as u32),
1033                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1034                         });
1035                         ins
1036                 };
1037                 (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins)
1038         }
1039
1040         /// The backwards-counting commitment number
1041         pub fn commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1042                 self.commitment_number
1043         }
1044
1045         /// The value to be sent to the broadcaster
1046         pub fn to_broadcaster_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1047                 self.to_broadcaster_value_sat
1048         }
1049
1050         /// The value to be sent to the counterparty
1051         pub fn to_countersignatory_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1052                 self.to_countersignatory_value_sat
1053         }
1054
1055         /// The feerate paid per 1000-weight-unit in this commitment transaction.
1056         pub fn feerate_per_kw(&self) -> u32 {
1057                 self.feerate_per_kw
1058         }
1059
1060         /// The non-dust HTLCs (direction, amt, height expiration, hash, transaction output index)
1061         /// which were included in this commitment transaction in output order.
1062         /// The transaction index is always populated.
1063         ///
1064         /// (C-not exported) as we cannot currently convert Vec references to/from C, though we should
1065         /// expose a less effecient version which creates a Vec of references in the future.
1066         pub fn htlcs(&self) -> &Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
1067                 &self.htlcs
1068         }
1069
1070         /// Trust our pre-built transaction and derived transaction creation public keys.
1071         ///
1072         /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to these fields.
1073         ///
1074         /// This should only be used if you fully trust the builder of this object.  It should not
1075         ///     be used by an external signer - instead use the verify function.
1076         pub fn trust(&self) -> TrustedCommitmentTransaction {
1077                 TrustedCommitmentTransaction { inner: self }
1078         }
1079
1080         /// Verify our pre-built transaction and derived transaction creation public keys.
1081         ///
1082         /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to these fields.
1083         ///
1084         /// An external validating signer must call this method before signing
1085         /// or using the built transaction.
1086         pub fn verify<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<TrustedCommitmentTransaction, ()> {
1087                 // This is the only field of the key cache that we trust
1088                 let per_commitment_point = self.keys.per_commitment_point;
1089                 let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&per_commitment_point, broadcaster_keys, countersignatory_keys, secp_ctx).unwrap();
1090                 if keys != self.keys {
1091                         return Err(());
1092                 }
1093                 let tx = self.internal_rebuild_transaction(&keys, channel_parameters)?;
1094                 if self.built.transaction != tx.transaction || self.built.txid != tx.txid {
1095                         return Err(());
1096                 }
1097                 Ok(TrustedCommitmentTransaction { inner: self })
1098         }
1099 }
1100
1101 /// A wrapper on CommitmentTransaction indicating that the derived fields (the built bitcoin
1102 /// transaction and the transaction creation keys) are trusted.
1103 ///
1104 /// See trust() and verify() functions on CommitmentTransaction.
1105 ///
1106 /// This structure implements Deref.
1107 pub struct TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1108         inner: &'a CommitmentTransaction,
1109 }
1110
1111 impl<'a> Deref for TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1112         type Target = CommitmentTransaction;
1113
1114         fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { self.inner }
1115 }
1116
1117 impl<'a> TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1118         /// The transaction ID of the built Bitcoin transaction
1119         pub fn txid(&self) -> Txid {
1120                 self.inner.built.txid
1121         }
1122
1123         /// The pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction
1124         pub fn built_transaction(&self) -> &BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1125                 &self.inner.built
1126         }
1127
1128         /// The pre-calculated transaction creation public keys.
1129         pub fn keys(&self) -> &TxCreationKeys {
1130                 &self.inner.keys
1131         }
1132
1133         /// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
1134         /// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()).
1135         ///
1136         /// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order.
1137         pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()> {
1138                 let inner = self.inner;
1139                 let keys = &inner.keys;
1140                 let txid = inner.built.txid;
1141                 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(inner.htlcs.len());
1142                 let holder_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &inner.keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
1143
1144                 for this_htlc in inner.htlcs.iter() {
1145                         assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
1146                         let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1147
1148                         let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1149
1150                         let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
1151                         ret.push(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &holder_htlc_key));
1152                 }
1153                 Ok(ret)
1154         }
1155
1156         /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the holder HTLC transaction signature.
1157         pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, htlc_index: usize, counterparty_signature: &Signature, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Transaction {
1158                 let inner = self.inner;
1159                 let keys = &inner.keys;
1160                 let txid = inner.built.txid;
1161                 let this_htlc = &inner.htlcs[htlc_index];
1162                 assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
1163                 // if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction.
1164                 if !this_htlc.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); }
1165                 // Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
1166                 if  this_htlc.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
1167
1168                 let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1169
1170                 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1171
1172                 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
1173                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1174
1175                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
1176                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
1177                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1178                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1179
1180                 if this_htlc.offered {
1181                         // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
1182                         htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1183                 } else {
1184                         htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
1185                 }
1186
1187                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
1188                 htlc_tx
1189         }
1190 }
1191
1192 /// Get the transaction number obscure factor
1193 pub fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(
1194         broadcaster_payment_basepoint: &PublicKey,
1195         countersignatory_payment_basepoint: &PublicKey,
1196         outbound_from_broadcaster: bool,
1197 ) -> u64 {
1198         let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1199
1200         if outbound_from_broadcaster {
1201                 sha.input(&broadcaster_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1202                 sha.input(&countersignatory_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1203         } else {
1204                 sha.input(&countersignatory_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1205                 sha.input(&broadcaster_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1206         }
1207         let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
1208
1209         ((res[26] as u64) << 5 * 8)
1210                 | ((res[27] as u64) << 4 * 8)
1211                 | ((res[28] as u64) << 3 * 8)
1212                 | ((res[29] as u64) << 2 * 8)
1213                 | ((res[30] as u64) << 1 * 8)
1214                 | ((res[31] as u64) << 0 * 8)
1215 }
1216
1217 fn script_for_p2wpkh(key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
1218         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
1219                 .push_slice(&WPubkeyHash::hash(&key.serialize())[..])
1220                 .into_script()
1221 }
1222
1223 #[cfg(test)]
1224 mod tests {
1225         use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
1226         use hex;
1227
1228         #[test]
1229         fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1230                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1231                 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1232                 let mut monitor;
1233
1234                 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1235                         () => {
1236                                 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1237                                 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1238                                         assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1239                                         idx -= 1;
1240                                 }
1241                                 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1242                                 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
1243                         };
1244                 }
1245
1246                 {
1247                         // insert_secret correct sequence
1248                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1249                         secrets.clear();
1250
1251                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1252                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1253                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1254                         test_secrets!();
1255
1256                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1257                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1258                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1259                         test_secrets!();
1260
1261                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1262                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1263                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1264                         test_secrets!();
1265
1266                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1267                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1268                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1269                         test_secrets!();
1270
1271                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1272                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1273                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1274                         test_secrets!();
1275
1276                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1277                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1278                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1279                         test_secrets!();
1280
1281                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1282                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1283                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1284                         test_secrets!();
1285
1286                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1287                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1288                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1289                         test_secrets!();
1290                 }
1291
1292                 {
1293                         // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1294                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1295                         secrets.clear();
1296
1297                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1298                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1299                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1300                         test_secrets!();
1301
1302                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1303                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1304                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1305                 }
1306
1307                 {
1308                         // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1309                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1310                         secrets.clear();
1311
1312                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1313                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1314                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1315                         test_secrets!();
1316
1317                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1318                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1319                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1320                         test_secrets!();
1321
1322                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1323                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1324                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1325                         test_secrets!();
1326
1327                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1328                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1329                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1330                 }
1331
1332                 {
1333                         // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1334                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1335                         secrets.clear();
1336
1337                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1338                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1339                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1340                         test_secrets!();
1341
1342                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1343                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1344                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1345                         test_secrets!();
1346
1347                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1348                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1349                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1350                         test_secrets!();
1351
1352                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1353                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1354                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1355                 }
1356
1357                 {
1358                         // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1359                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1360                         secrets.clear();
1361
1362                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1363                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1364                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1365                         test_secrets!();
1366
1367                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1368                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1369                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1370                         test_secrets!();
1371
1372                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1373                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1374                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1375                         test_secrets!();
1376
1377                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1378                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1379                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1380                         test_secrets!();
1381
1382                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1383                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1384                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1385                         test_secrets!();
1386
1387                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1388                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1389                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1390                         test_secrets!();
1391
1392                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1393                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1394                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1395                         test_secrets!();
1396
1397                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1398                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1399                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1400                 }
1401
1402                 {
1403                         // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1404                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1405                         secrets.clear();
1406
1407                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1408                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1409                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1410                         test_secrets!();
1411
1412                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1413                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1414                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1415                         test_secrets!();
1416
1417                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1418                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1419                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1420                         test_secrets!();
1421
1422                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1423                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1424                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1425                         test_secrets!();
1426
1427                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1428                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1429                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1430                         test_secrets!();
1431
1432                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1433                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1434                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1435                 }
1436
1437                 {
1438                         // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1439                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1440                         secrets.clear();
1441
1442                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1443                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1444                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1445                         test_secrets!();
1446
1447                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1448                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1449                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1450                         test_secrets!();
1451
1452                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1453                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1454                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1455                         test_secrets!();
1456
1457                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1458                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1459                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1460                         test_secrets!();
1461
1462                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1463                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1464                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1465                         test_secrets!();
1466
1467                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1468                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1469                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1470                         test_secrets!();
1471
1472                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1473                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1474                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1475                         test_secrets!();
1476
1477                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1478                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1479                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1480                 }
1481
1482                 {
1483                         // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1484                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1485                         secrets.clear();
1486
1487                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1488                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1489                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1490                         test_secrets!();
1491
1492                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1493                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1494                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1495                         test_secrets!();
1496
1497                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1498                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1499                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1500                         test_secrets!();
1501
1502                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1503                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1504                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1505                         test_secrets!();
1506
1507                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1508                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1509                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1510                         test_secrets!();
1511
1512                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1513                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1514                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1515                         test_secrets!();
1516
1517                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1518                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1519                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1520                         test_secrets!();
1521
1522                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1523                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1524                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1525                 }
1526
1527                 {
1528                         // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1529                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1530                         secrets.clear();
1531
1532                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1533                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1534                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1535                         test_secrets!();
1536
1537                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1538                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1539                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1540                         test_secrets!();
1541
1542                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1543                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1544                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1545                         test_secrets!();
1546
1547                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1548                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1549                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1550                         test_secrets!();
1551
1552                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1553                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1554                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1555                         test_secrets!();
1556
1557                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1558                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1559                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1560                         test_secrets!();
1561
1562                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1563                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1564                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1565                         test_secrets!();
1566
1567                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1568                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1569                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1570                 }
1571         }
1572 }