_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/channel.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
  11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
  12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
  13 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  14 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
  16
  17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
  20
  21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
  23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
  24
  25 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
  26 use ln::msgs;
  27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
  28 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
  29 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
  30 use ln::chan_utils;
  31 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
  32 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
  33 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
  34 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
  35 use util::transaction_utils;
  36 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
  37 use util::logger::Logger;
  38 use util::errors::APIError;
  39 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
  40
  41 use std;
  42 use std::default::Default;
  43 use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
  44 use std::ops::Deref;
  45 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
  46 use std::sync::Mutex;
  47 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
  48
  49 #[cfg(test)]
  50 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
  51         pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
  52         pub channel_value_msat: u64,
  53         pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
  54         pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  55         pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  56         pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
  57         pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
  58         pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
  59 }
  60
  61 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
  62         FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
  63         FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
  64         Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
  65 }
  66
  67 enum InboundHTLCState {
  68         /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
  69         /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
  70         RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
  71         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
  72         /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
  73         /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
  74         /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
  75         /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
  76         /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
  77         /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
  78         /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
  79         /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
  80         /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
  81         /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
  82         /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
  83         ///
  84         /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
  85         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc)   --> local
  86         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
  87         /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack               <-- local
  88         /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
  89         /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
  90         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc)   --> local
  91         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
  92         /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
  93         /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
  94         /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
  95         /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
  96         /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
  97         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
  98         /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
  99         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
 100         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
 101         /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
 102         /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
 103         /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
 104         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 105         AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
 106         Committed,
 107         /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 108         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 109         /// we'll drop it.
 110         /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
 111         /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
 112         /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
 113         /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
 114         /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
 115         /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
 116         /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
 117         LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
 118 }
 119
 120 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
 121         htlc_id: u64,
 122         amount_msat: u64,
 123         cltv_expiry: u32,
 124         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 125         state: InboundHTLCState,
 126 }
 127
 128 enum OutboundHTLCState {
 129         /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 130         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 131         /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
 132         /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
 133         ///  * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
 134         ///    money back (though we won't), and,
 135         ///  * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
 136         ///    allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
 137         ///    doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
 138         ///    we'll never get out of sync).
 139         /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
 140         /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
 141         LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
 142         Committed,
 143         /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
 144         /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
 145         RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 146         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 147         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 148         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 149         /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
 150         /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
 151         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 152         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 153         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 154         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 155         /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
 156         /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
 157         AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 158 }
 159
 160 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
 161         htlc_id: u64,
 162         amount_msat: u64,
 163         cltv_expiry: u32,
 164         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 165         state: OutboundHTLCState,
 166         source: HTLCSource,
 167 }
 168
 169 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
 170 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
 171         AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
 172                 // always outbound
 173                 amount_msat: u64,
 174                 cltv_expiry: u32,
 175                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 176                 source: HTLCSource,
 177                 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
 178         },
 179         ClaimHTLC {
 180                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
 181                 htlc_id: u64,
 182         },
 183         FailHTLC {
 184                 htlc_id: u64,
 185                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
 186         },
 187 }
 188
 189 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
 190 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
 191 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
 192 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
 193 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
 194 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
 195 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
 196 enum ChannelState {
 197         /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
 198         OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
 199         /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
 200         TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
 201         /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
 202         /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
 203         /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
 204         FundingCreated = 4,
 205         /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
 206         /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
 207         /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
 208         FundingSent = 8,
 209         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
 210         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 211         TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
 212         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
 213         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 214         OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
 215         ChannelFunded = 64,
 216         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
 217         /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
 218         /// dance.
 219         PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
 220         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
 221         /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
 222         /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
 223         MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
 224         /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
 225         /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
 226         /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
 227         /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
 228         /// later.
 229         /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
 230         AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
 231         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
 232         /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
 233         /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
 234         RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
 235         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
 236         /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
 237         /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
 238         /// us their shutdown.
 239         LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
 240         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
 241         /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
 242         ShutdownComplete = 4096,
 243 }
 244 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
 245 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
 246
 247 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
 248
 249 /// Liveness is called to fluctuate given peer disconnecton/monitor failures/closing.
 250 /// If channel is public, network should have a liveness view announced by us on a
 251 /// best-effort, which means we may filter out some status transitions to avoid spam.
 252 /// See further timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
 253 #[derive(PartialEq)]
 254 enum UpdateStatus {
 255         /// Status has been gossiped.
 256         Fresh,
 257         /// Status has been changed.
 258         DisabledMarked,
 259         /// Status has been marked to be gossiped at next flush
 260         DisabledStaged,
 261 }
 262
 263 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
 264 enum HTLCInitiator {
 265         LocalOffered,
 266         RemoteOffered,
 267 }
 268
 269 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
 270 struct HTLCCandidate {
 271         amount_msat: u64,
 272         origin: HTLCInitiator,
 273 }
 274
 275 impl HTLCCandidate {
 276         fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
 277                 Self {
 278                         amount_msat,
 279                         origin,
 280                 }
 281         }
 282 }
 283
 284 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
 285 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
 286 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
 287 // inbound channel.
 288 //
 289 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
 290 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
 291 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
 292         config: ChannelConfig,
 293
 294         user_id: u64,
 295
 296         channel_id: [u8; 32],
 297         channel_state: u32,
 298         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
 299         channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 300
 301         latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
 302
 303         holder_signer: Signer,
 304         shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
 305         destination_script: Script,
 306
 307         // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
 308         // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
 309         // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
 310
 311         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 312         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 313         value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
 314         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
 315         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
 316         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
 317
 318         /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
 319         /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
 320         /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
 321         /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
 322         /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
 323         /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
 324         /// send it first.
 325         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
 326
 327         monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
 328         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
 329         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
 330         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
 331         monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
 332
 333         // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
 334         // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
 335         // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
 336         //
 337         // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
 338         // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
 339         // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
 340         // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
 341         // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
 342         // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
 343         // commitment_signed.
 344         pending_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 345         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
 346         // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
 347         // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
 348         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 349         holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 350         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
 351         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
 352         update_time_counter: u32,
 353         feerate_per_kw: u32,
 354
 355         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 356         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
 357         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 358         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 359         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
 360         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 361
 362         last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
 363
 364         /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
 365         /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
 366         /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
 367         /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
 368         funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
 369         short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
 370         /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
 371         /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
 372         pub(super) last_block_connected: BlockHash,
 373         funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
 374
 375         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 376         #[cfg(test)]
 377         pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 378         #[cfg(not(test))]
 379         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 380         #[cfg(test)]
 381         pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 382         #[cfg(not(test))]
 383         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 384         //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
 385         /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
 386         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
 387         // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
 388         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 389         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 390         #[cfg(test)]
 391         pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 392         #[cfg(not(test))]
 393         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 394         //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 395         minimum_depth: u32,
 396
 397         pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
 398
 399         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 400
 401         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 402         counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
 403
 404         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
 405
 406         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
 407
 408         network_sync: UpdateStatus,
 409
 410         // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
 411         // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
 412         // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
 413         // `build_commitment_transaction`.
 414         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 415         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
 416         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 417         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
 418 }
 419
 420 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 421 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
 422         fee: u64,
 423         total_pending_htlcs: usize,
 424         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
 425         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
 426         feerate: u32,
 427 }
 428
 429 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
 430 /// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
 431 /// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
 432 /// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
 433 const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
 434 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
 435 const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
 436
 437 #[cfg(not(test))]
 438 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 439 #[cfg(test)]
 440 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 441 #[cfg(not(test))]
 442 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 443 #[cfg(test)]
 444 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 445
 446 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
 447 /// it's 2^24.
 448 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
 449
 450 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
 451 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
 452 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
 453 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
 454         Ignore(String),
 455         Close(String),
 456         CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
 457 }
 458
 459 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
 460         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
 461                 match self {
 462                         &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
 463                         &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
 464                         &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
 465                 }
 466         }
 467 }
 468
 469 macro_rules! secp_check {
 470         ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
 471                 match $res {
 472                         Ok(thing) => thing,
 473                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
 474                 }
 475         };
 476 }
 477
 478 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
 479         // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
 480         fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 481                 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
 482         }
 483
 484         /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
 485         /// required by us.
 486         ///
 487         /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
 488         pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 489                 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
 490                 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
 491         }
 492
 493         fn derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u32) -> u64 {
 494                 cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate as u64 * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
 495         }
 496
 497         // Constructors:
 498         pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
 499         where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
 500               F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 501         {
 502                 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
 503                 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
 504                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
 505
 506                 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 507                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
 508                 }
 509                 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
 510                 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
 511                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
 512                 }
 513                 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 514                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
 515                 }
 516                 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 517                 if Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
 518                         return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
 519                 }
 520
 521                 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
 522
 523                 Ok(Channel {
 524                         user_id,
 525                         config: config.channel_options.clone(),
 526
 527                         channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
 528                         channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
 529                         secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
 530                         channel_value_satoshis,
 531
 532                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 533
 534                         holder_signer,
 535                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
 536                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 537
 538                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 539                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 540                         value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
 541
 542                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 543                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 544                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 545                         pending_update_fee: None,
 546                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 547                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 548                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 549                         update_time_counter: 1,
 550
 551                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 552
 553                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 554                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 555                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 556                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 557                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 558
 559                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 560                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 561                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 562                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 563
 564                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 565
 566                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 567                         short_channel_id: None,
 568                         last_block_connected: Default::default(),
 569                         funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
 570
 571                         feerate_per_kw: feerate,
 572                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
 573                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
 574                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
 575                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
 576                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
 577                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 578                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
 579                         minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
 580
 581                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
 582                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
 583                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 584                                 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
 585                                 counterparty_parameters: None,
 586                                 funding_outpoint: None
 587                         },
 588                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
 589
 590                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 591                         counterparty_node_id,
 592
 593                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
 594
 595                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 596
 597                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
 598
 599                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 600                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 601                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 602                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 603                 })
 604         }
 605
 606         fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
 607                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
 608         {
 609                 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 610                 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
 611                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
 612                 }
 613                 let upper_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64  * 2;
 614                 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
 615                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
 616                 }
 617                 Ok(())
 618         }
 619
 620         /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
 621         /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
 622         pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
 623                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
 624           F::Target: FeeEstimator
 625         {
 626                 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
 627                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
 628                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
 629                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
 630                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
 631                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
 632                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
 633                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
 634                 };
 635                 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
 636
 637                 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 638                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
 639                 }
 640
 641                 // Check sanity of message fields:
 642                 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 643                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 644                 }
 645                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 646                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 647                 }
 648                 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 649                 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
 650                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
 651                 }
 652                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 653                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 654                 }
 655                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
 656                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
 657                 }
 658                 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 659                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
 660                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
 661                 }
 662                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
 663
 664                 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
 665                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
 666                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
 667                 }
 668                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
 669                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
 670                 }
 671                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
 672                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
 673                 }
 674
 675                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
 676                 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
 677                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
 678                 }
 679                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
 680                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat,  config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
 681                 }
 682                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
 683                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
 684                 }
 685                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
 686                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 687                 }
 688                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
 689                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
 690                 }
 691                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
 692                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 693                 }
 694                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
 695                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 696                 }
 697
 698                 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
 699
 700                 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
 701                 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
 702                         if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
 703                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
 704                         }
 705                 }
 706                 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
 707                 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
 708
 709                 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 710
 711                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
 712                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
 713                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
 714                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 715                 }
 716                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
 717                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 718                 }
 719                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
 720                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 721                 }
 722
 723                 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
 724                 // for full fee payment
 725                 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
 726                 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 727                 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
 728                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
 729                 }
 730
 731                 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
 732                 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 733                 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
 734                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
 735                 }
 736
 737                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
 738                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
 739                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
 740                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
 741                                         if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
 742                                                 Some(script.clone())
 743                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
 744                                         } else if script.len() == 0 {
 745                                                 None
 746                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
 747                                         } else {
 748                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
 749                                         }
 750                                 },
 751                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
 752                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
 753                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
 754                                 }
 755                         }
 756                 } else { None };
 757
 758                 let chan = Channel {
 759                         user_id,
 760                         config: local_config,
 761
 762                         channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
 763                         channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
 764                         secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
 765
 766                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 767
 768                         holder_signer,
 769                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
 770                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 771
 772                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 773                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 774                         value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
 775
 776                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 777                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 778                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 779                         pending_update_fee: None,
 780                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 781                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 782                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 783                         update_time_counter: 1,
 784
 785                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 786
 787                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 788                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 789                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 790                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 791                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 792
 793                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 794                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 795                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 796                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 797
 798                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 799
 800                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 801                         short_channel_id: None,
 802                         last_block_connected: Default::default(),
 803                         funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
 804
 805                         feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
 806                         channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
 807                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
 808                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
 809                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
 810                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
 811                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
 812                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 813                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
 814                         minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
 815
 816                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
 817                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
 818                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 819                                 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
 820                                 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
 821                                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
 822                                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
 823                                 }),
 824                                 funding_outpoint: None
 825                         },
 826                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
 827
 828                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 829                         counterparty_node_id,
 830
 831                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
 832
 833                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 834
 835                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
 836
 837                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 838                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 839                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 840                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 841                 };
 842
 843                 Ok(chan)
 844         }
 845
 846         /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
 847         /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
 848         /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
 849         /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
 850         /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
 851         /// an HTLC to a).
 852         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
 853         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
 854         /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
 855         /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
 856         /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
 857         /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
 858         /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
 859         /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
 860         /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
 861         /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
 862         /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
 863         #[inline]
 864         fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
 865                 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
 866                 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
 867                 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
 868
 869                 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
 870                 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 871                 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 872                 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
 873
 874                 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
 875
 876                 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
 877                         ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
 878                                 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 879                                         offered: $offered,
 880                                         amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
 881                                         cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
 882                                         payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
 883                                         transaction_output_index: None
 884                                 }
 885                         }
 886                 }
 887
 888                 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
 889                         ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
 890                                 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
 891                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
 892                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
 893                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 894                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 895                                         } else {
 896                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 897                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 898                                         }
 899                                 } else {
 900                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
 901                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
 902                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 903                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 904                                         } else {
 905                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 906                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 907                                         }
 908                                 }
 909                         }
 910                 }
 911
 912                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
 913                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
 914                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
 915                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
 916                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
 917                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
 918                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
 919                         };
 920
 921                         if include {
 922                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
 923                                 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 924                         } else {
 925                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
 926                                 match &htlc.state {
 927                                         &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
 928                                                 if generated_by_local {
 929                                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
 930                                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 931                                                         }
 932                                                 }
 933                                         },
 934                                         _ => {},
 935                                 }
 936                         }
 937                 }
 938
 939                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
 940                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
 941                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
 942                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
 943                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
 944                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
 945                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
 946                         };
 947
 948                         if include {
 949                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
 950                                 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 951                         } else {
 952                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
 953                                 match htlc.state {
 954                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
 955                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 956                                         },
 957                                         OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
 958                                                 if !generated_by_local {
 959                                                         value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 960                                                 }
 961                                         },
 962                                         _ => {},
 963                                 }
 964                         }
 965                 }
 966
 967                 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
 968                 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
 969                 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
 970                 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
 971                 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
 972                 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
 973                 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
 974                 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
 975
 976                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 977                 {
 978                         // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
 979                         // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
 980                         let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
 981                                 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
 982                         } else {
 983                                 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
 984                         };
 985                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
 986                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
 987                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
 988                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
 989                 }
 990
 991                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 992                 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
 993                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
 994                 } else {
 995                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
 996                 };
 997
 998                 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
 999                 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1000
1001                 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1002                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1003                 } else {
1004                         value_to_a = 0;
1005                 }
1006
1007                 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1008                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1009                 } else {
1010                         value_to_b = 0;
1011                 }
1012
1013                 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1014
1015                 let channel_parameters =
1016                         if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1017                         else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1018                 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1019                                                                              value_to_a as u64,
1020                                                                              value_to_b as u64,
1021                                                                              keys.clone(),
1022                                                                              feerate_per_kw,
1023                                                                              &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1024                                                                              &channel_parameters
1025                 );
1026                 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1027                 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1028                 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1029                 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1030
1031                 (tx, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1032         }
1033
1034         #[inline]
1035         fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1036                 let channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1037                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1038         }
1039
1040         #[inline]
1041         fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1042                 let mut ret =
1043                 (4 +                                           // version
1044                  1 +                                           // input count
1045                  36 +                                          // prevout
1046                  1 +                                           // script length (0)
1047                  4 +                                           // sequence
1048                  1 +                                           // output count
1049                  4                                             // lock time
1050                  )*4 +                                         // * 4 for non-witness parts
1051                 2 +                                            // witness marker and flag
1052                 1 +                                            // witness element count
1053                 4 +                                            // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1054                 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1055                 2*(1 + 71);                                    // two signatures + sighash type flags
1056                 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1057                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1058                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1059                 }
1060                 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1061                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1062                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1063                 }
1064                 ret
1065         }
1066
1067         #[inline]
1068         fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1069                 let txins = {
1070                         let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1071                         ins.push(TxIn {
1072                                 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1073                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1074                                 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1075                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1076                         });
1077                         ins
1078                 };
1079
1080                 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1081                 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1082                 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1083
1084                 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1085                 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1086                 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1087
1088                 if value_to_self < 0 {
1089                         assert!(self.is_outbound());
1090                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1091                 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1092                         assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1093                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1094                 }
1095
1096                 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1097                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1098                                 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1099                                 value: value_to_remote as u64
1100                         }, ()));
1101                 }
1102
1103                 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1104                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1105                                 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1106                                 value: value_to_self as u64
1107                         }, ()));
1108                 }
1109
1110                 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1111
1112                 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1113                 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1114                         outputs.push(out.0);
1115                 }
1116
1117                 (Transaction {
1118                         version: 2,
1119                         lock_time: 0,
1120                         input: txins,
1121                         output: outputs,
1122                 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1123         }
1124
1125         fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1126                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1127         }
1128
1129         #[inline]
1130         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1131         /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1132         /// our counterparty!)
1133         /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1134         /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1135         fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1136                 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1137                 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1138                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1139                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1140
1141                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1142         }
1143
1144         #[inline]
1145         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1146         /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1147         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1148         fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1149                 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1150                 //may see payments to it!
1151                 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1152                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1153                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1154
1155                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1156         }
1157
1158         /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1159         /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1160         /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1161         pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1162                 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1163         }
1164
1165         /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1166         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1167         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1168         fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Transaction {
1169                 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay() } else { self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay() }, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1170         }
1171
1172         /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1173         /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1174         /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1175         ///
1176         /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1177         /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1178         fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1179                 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1180                 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1181                 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1182                 // either.
1183                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1184                         panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1185                 }
1186                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1187
1188                 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1189
1190                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1191                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1192                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1193
1194                 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1195                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1196                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1197                                 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1198                                 match htlc.state {
1199                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1200                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1201                                                 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1202                                                 } else {
1203                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1204                                                 }
1205                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1206                                                 return Ok((None, None));
1207                                         },
1208                                         _ => {
1209                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1210                                                 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1211                                         }
1212                                 }
1213                                 pending_idx = idx;
1214                                 break;
1215                         }
1216                 }
1217                 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1218                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1219                 }
1220
1221                 // Now update local state:
1222                 //
1223                 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1224                 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1225                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1226                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1227                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1228                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1229                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1230                         }],
1231                 };
1232
1233                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1234                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1235                                 match pending_update {
1236                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1237                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1238                                                         // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1239                                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1240                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1241                                                         return Ok((None, None));
1242                                                 }
1243                                         },
1244                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1245                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1246                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1247                                                         // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1248                                                         // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1249                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1250                                                         return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1251                                                 }
1252                                         },
1253                                         _ => {}
1254                                 }
1255                         }
1256                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1257                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1258                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1259                         });
1260                         return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1261                 }
1262
1263                 {
1264                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1265                         if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1266                         } else {
1267                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1268                                 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1269                         }
1270                         log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1271                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1272                 }
1273
1274                 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1275                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1276                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1277                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1278                 }), Some(monitor_update)))
1279         }
1280
1281         pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1282                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger)? {
1283                         (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), Some(mut monitor_update)) => {
1284                                 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1285                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1286                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1287                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1288                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1289                                 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1290                         },
1291                         (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), None) => {
1292                                 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1293                                 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1294                         },
1295                         (None, Some(monitor_update)) => Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))),
1296                         (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1297                 }
1298         }
1299
1300         /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1301         /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1302         /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1303         ///
1304         /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1305         /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1306         pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
1307                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1308                         panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1309                 }
1310                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1311
1312                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1313                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1314                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1315
1316                 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1317                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1318                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1319                                 match htlc.state {
1320                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1321                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1322                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1323                                                 return Ok(None);
1324                                         },
1325                                         _ => {
1326                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1327                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1328                                         }
1329                                 }
1330                                 pending_idx = idx;
1331                         }
1332                 }
1333                 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1334                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1335                 }
1336
1337                 // Now update local state:
1338                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1339                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1340                                 match pending_update {
1341                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1342                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1343                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1344                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1345                                                 }
1346                                         },
1347                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1348                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1349                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1350                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1351                                                 }
1352                                         },
1353                                         _ => {}
1354                                 }
1355                         }
1356                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1357                                 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1358                                 err_packet,
1359                         });
1360                         return Ok(None);
1361                 }
1362
1363                 {
1364                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1365                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1366                 }
1367
1368                 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1369                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1370                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1371                         reason: err_packet
1372                 }))
1373         }
1374
1375         // Message handlers:
1376
1377         pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1378                 // Check sanity of message fields:
1379                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1380                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1381                 }
1382                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1383                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1384                 }
1385                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1386                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1387                 }
1388                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1389                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1390                 }
1391                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1392                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve ({}) and dust_limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1393                 }
1394                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1395                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1396                 }
1397                 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1398                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1399                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1400                 }
1401                 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1402                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1403                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1404                 }
1405                 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1406                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1407                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1408                 }
1409                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1410                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1411                 }
1412                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1413                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1414                 }
1415
1416                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1417                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1418                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1419                 }
1420                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1421                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1422                 }
1423                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1424                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1425                 }
1426                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1427                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1428                 }
1429                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
1430                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1431                 }
1432                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
1433                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1434                 }
1435                 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1436                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1437                 }
1438
1439                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1440                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1441                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1442                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
1443                                         if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1444                                                 Some(script.clone())
1445                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1446                                         } else if script.len() == 0 {
1447                                                 None
1448                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1449                                         } else {
1450                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. scriptpubkey: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
1451                                         }
1452                                 },
1453                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1454                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1455                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1456                                 }
1457                         }
1458                 } else { None };
1459
1460                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1461                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1462                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1463                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1464                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1465                 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1466
1467                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1468                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1469                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1470                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1471                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1472                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1473                 };
1474
1475                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1476                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1477                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1478                 });
1479
1480                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1481                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1482
1483                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1484
1485                 Ok(())
1486         }
1487
1488         fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1489                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1490
1491                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1492                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1493                 {
1494                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1495                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1496                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1497                         // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1498                         log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1499                         secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1500                 }
1501
1502                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1503                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1504
1505                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1506                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1507                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1508
1509                 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1510                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1511
1512                 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1513                 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1514         }
1515
1516         fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1517                 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1518         }
1519
1520         pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1521                 if self.is_outbound() {
1522                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1523                 }
1524                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1525                         // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1526                         // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1527                         // channel.
1528                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1529                 }
1530                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1531                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1532                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1533                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1534                 }
1535
1536                 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1537                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1538                 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks.  In particular
1539                 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1540                 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1541
1542                 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1543                         Ok(res) => res,
1544                         Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1545                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1546                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1547                         },
1548                         Err(e) => {
1549                                 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1550                                 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1551                                 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1552                         }
1553                 };
1554
1555                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1556                         initial_commitment_tx,
1557                         msg.signature,
1558                         Vec::new(),
1559                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1560                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1561                 );
1562
1563                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1564
1565                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1566                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1567                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1568                 let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.holder_signer.clone(),
1569                                                               &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1570                                                               &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1571                                                               &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1572                                                               funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1573                                                               obscure_factor,
1574                                                               holder_commitment_tx);
1575
1576                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1577
1578                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1579                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1580                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1581                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1582
1583                 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1584                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
1585                         signature
1586                 }, channel_monitor))
1587         }
1588
1589         /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1590         /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1591         pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1592                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1593                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1594                 }
1595                 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1596                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1597                 }
1598                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1599                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1600                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1601                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1602                 }
1603
1604                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1605
1606                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1607                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1608                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1609                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1610
1611                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1612
1613                 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1614                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1615                 {
1616                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1617                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1618                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1619                         // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1620                         if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1621                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1622                         }
1623                 }
1624
1625                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1626                         initial_commitment_tx,
1627                         msg.signature,
1628                         Vec::new(),
1629                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1630                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1631                 );
1632
1633
1634                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1635                 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1636                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1637                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1638                 let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.holder_signer.clone(),
1639                                                               &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1640                                                               &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1641                                                               &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1642                                                               funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1643                                                               obscure_factor,
1644                                                               holder_commitment_tx);
1645
1646                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1647
1648                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1649                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1650                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1651                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1652
1653                 Ok(channel_monitor)
1654         }
1655
1656         pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1657                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1658                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1659                 }
1660
1661                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1662
1663                 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1664                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1665                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1666                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1667                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
1668                 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1669                                  // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1670                                  self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1671                                  self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1672                                 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1673                                 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1674                                                       (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1675                         if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1676                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1677                         }
1678                         // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1679                         return Ok(());
1680                 } else {
1681                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1682                 }
1683
1684                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1685                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1686                 Ok(())
1687         }
1688
1689         /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1690         fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1691                 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1692                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1693                         htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1694                 }
1695                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1696         }
1697
1698         /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1699         /// holding cell.
1700         fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1701                 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1702                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1703                         htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1704                 }
1705
1706                 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1707                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1708                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1709                                 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1710                                 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1711                         }
1712                 }
1713
1714                 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1715         }
1716
1717         /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1718         /// Doesn't bother handling the
1719         /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1720         /// corner case properly.
1721         pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1722                 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1723                 (cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1724                 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1725         }
1726
1727         // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1728         // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1729         fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1730                 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1731                 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1732                 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1733         }
1734
1735         // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1736         // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
1737         // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
1738         // are excluded.
1739         fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1740                 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1741
1742                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1743                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1744
1745                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1746                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1747                 match htlc.origin {
1748                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1749                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1750                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1751                                 }
1752                         },
1753                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1754                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1755                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1756                                 }
1757                         }
1758                 }
1759
1760                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1761                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1762                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1763                                 continue
1764                         }
1765                         // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1766                         // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1767                         included_htlcs += 1;
1768                 }
1769
1770                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1771                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1772                                 continue
1773                         }
1774                         match htlc.state {
1775                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1776                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1777                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1778                                 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1779                                 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1780                                 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1781                                 _ => {},
1782                         }
1783                 }
1784
1785                 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1786                         match htlc {
1787                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1788                                         if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1789                                                 continue
1790                                         }
1791                                         included_htlcs += 1
1792                                 },
1793                                 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1794                                          // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1795                         }
1796                 }
1797
1798                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1799                 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1800                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1801                 {
1802                         let mut fee = res;
1803                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1804                                 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1805                         }
1806                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1807                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1808                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1809                                 fee,
1810                                 total_pending_htlcs,
1811                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1812                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1813                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1814                                 },
1815                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1816                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1817                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1818                                 },
1819                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1820                         };
1821                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1822                 }
1823                 res
1824         }
1825
1826         // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1827         // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
1828         // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
1829         // excluded.
1830         fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1831                 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1832
1833                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1834                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1835
1836                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1837                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1838                 match htlc.origin {
1839                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1840                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1841                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1842                                 }
1843                         },
1844                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1845                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1846                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1847                                 }
1848                         }
1849                 }
1850
1851                 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1852                 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1853                 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1854                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1855                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1856                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1857                                 continue
1858                         }
1859                         included_htlcs += 1;
1860                 }
1861
1862                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1863                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1864                                 continue
1865                         }
1866                         // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1867                         // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1868                         match htlc.state {
1869                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1870                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1871                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1872                                 _ => {},
1873                         }
1874                 }
1875
1876                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1877                 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1878                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1879                 {
1880                         let mut fee = res;
1881                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1882                                 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1883                         }
1884                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1885                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1886                                 fee,
1887                                 total_pending_htlcs,
1888                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1889                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1890                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1891                                 },
1892                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1893                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1894                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1895                                 },
1896                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1897                         };
1898                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1899                 }
1900                 res
1901         }
1902
1903         pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1904         where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
1905                 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
1906                 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1907                 if local_sent_shutdown {
1908                         pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
1909                 }
1910                 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
1911                 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1912                 if remote_sent_shutdown {
1913                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1914                 }
1915                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1916                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1917                 }
1918                 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1919                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
1920                 }
1921                 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
1922                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
1923                 }
1924                 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
1925                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
1926                 }
1927
1928                 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1929                 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1930                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
1931                 }
1932                 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1933                 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1934                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1935                 }
1936                 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1937                 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1938                 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1939                 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1940                 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1941                 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1942                 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1943                 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1944                 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1945                 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1946                 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1947                 // transaction).
1948                 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
1949                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1950                         if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
1951                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1952                         } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
1953                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1954                         }
1955                 }
1956
1957                 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
1958                         self.value_to_self_msat + htlc_inbound_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
1959                 let pending_remote_value_msat =
1960                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
1961                 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
1962                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
1963                 }
1964
1965                 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
1966                 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
1967                 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
1968                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
1969                         self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
1970                 };
1971                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
1972                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
1973                 };
1974
1975                 let chan_reserve_msat =
1976                         Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
1977                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
1978                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
1979                 }
1980
1981                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1982                         // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
1983                         // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
1984                         // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
1985                         // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
1986                         // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
1987                         // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
1988                         // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
1989                         // sensitive to fee spikes.
1990                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
1991                         let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
1992                         if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
1993                                 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
1994                                 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
1995                                 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation");
1996                                 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
1997                         }
1998                 } else {
1999                         // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2000                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2001                         let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2002                         if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2003                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2004                         }
2005                 }
2006                 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2007                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2008                 }
2009                 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2010                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2011                 }
2012
2013                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2014                         if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2015                                 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2016                         }
2017                 }
2018
2019                 // Now update local state:
2020                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2021                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2022                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2023                         amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2024                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2025                         cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2026                         state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2027                 });
2028                 Ok(())
2029         }
2030
2031         /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2032         #[inline]
2033         fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2034                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2035                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2036                                 match check_preimage {
2037                                         None => {},
2038                                         Some(payment_hash) =>
2039                                                 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2040                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2041                                                 }
2042                                 };
2043                                 match htlc.state {
2044                                         OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2045                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2046                                         OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2047                                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2048                                         },
2049                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2050                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2051                                 }
2052                                 return Ok(&htlc.source);
2053                         }
2054                 }
2055                 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2056         }
2057
2058         pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2059                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2060                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2061                 }
2062                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2063                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2064                 }
2065
2066                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2067                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
2068         }
2069
2070         pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2071                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2072                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2073                 }
2074                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2075                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2076                 }
2077
2078                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2079                 Ok(())
2080         }
2081
2082         pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2083                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2084                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2085                 }
2086                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2087                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2088                 }
2089
2090                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2091                 Ok(())
2092         }
2093
2094         pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2095         where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2096                                 L::Target: Logger
2097         {
2098                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2099                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2100                 }
2101                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2102                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2103                 }
2104                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2105                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2106                 }
2107
2108                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2109
2110                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2111
2112                 let mut update_fee = false;
2113                 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2114                         update_fee = true;
2115                         self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
2116                 } else {
2117                         self.feerate_per_kw
2118                 };
2119
2120                 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid) = {
2121                         let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
2122                         let commitment_txid = {
2123                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2124                                 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2125                                 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2126
2127                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
2128                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2129                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2130                                 }
2131                                 bitcoin_tx.txid
2132                         };
2133                         let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2134                         (commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid)
2135                 };
2136
2137                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2138                 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
2139                 if update_fee {
2140                         let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2141                         if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2142                                 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2143                         }
2144                 }
2145                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2146                 {
2147                         if self.is_outbound() {
2148                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2149                                 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2150                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2151                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2152                                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2153                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2154                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2155                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2156                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2157                                                         assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2158                                                 }
2159                                 }
2160                         }
2161                 }
2162
2163                 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2164                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2165                 }
2166
2167                 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2168                 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2169                 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2170                         if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2171                                 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &keys, feerate_per_kw);
2172                                 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2173                                 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2174                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
2175                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2176                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2177                                 }
2178                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2179                         } else {
2180                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2181                         }
2182                 }
2183
2184                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2185                         commitment_tx,
2186                         msg.signature,
2187                         msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2188                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2189                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2190                 );
2191
2192                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2193                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2194
2195                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2196                 let mut need_commitment = false;
2197                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2198                         if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
2199                                 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
2200                                 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
2201                                 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
2202                                 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
2203                                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
2204                                         need_commitment = true;
2205                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2206                                 }
2207                         }
2208                 }
2209
2210                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2211                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2212                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2213                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2214                                 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2215                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2216                         }]
2217                 };
2218
2219                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2220                         let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2221                                 Some(forward_info.clone())
2222                         } else { None };
2223                         if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2224                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2225                                 need_commitment = true;
2226                         }
2227                 }
2228                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2229                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2230                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
2231                         } else { None } {
2232                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2233                                 need_commitment = true;
2234                         }
2235                 }
2236
2237                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2238                 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2239                 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2240                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2241
2242                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2243                         // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2244                         // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2245                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2246                         if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2247                                 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2248                                 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2249                                 // includes the right HTLCs.
2250                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2251                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2252                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2253                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2254                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2255                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2256                         }
2257                         // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2258                         // re-send the message on restoration)
2259                         return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2260                 }
2261
2262                 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2263                         // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2264                         // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2265                         // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2266                         let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2267                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2268                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2269                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2270                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2271                         (Some(msg), None)
2272                 } else if !need_commitment {
2273                         (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2274                 } else { (None, None) };
2275
2276                 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2277                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2278                         per_commitment_secret,
2279                         next_per_commitment_point,
2280                 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2281         }
2282
2283         /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2284         /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2285         fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2286                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2287                 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2288                         log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
2289
2290                         let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2291                                 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2292                                 updates: Vec::new(),
2293                         };
2294
2295                         let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2296                         mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2297                         let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2298                         let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2299                         let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2300                         let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2301                         for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2302                                 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2303                                 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2304                                 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2305                                 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2306                                 // to rebalance channels.
2307                                 match &htlc_update {
2308                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2309                                                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2310                                                         Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2311                                                         Err(e) => {
2312                                                                 match e {
2313                                                                         ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2314                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2315                                                                                 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2316                                                                                 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2317                                                                                 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2318                                                                                 // into the holding cell without ever being
2319                                                                                 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2320                                                                                 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2321                                                                                 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2322                                                                         },
2323                                                                         _ => {
2324                                                                                 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2325                                                                         },
2326                                                                 }
2327                                                         }
2328                                                 }
2329                                         },
2330                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2331                                                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2332                                                         Ok((update_fulfill_msg_option, additional_monitor_update_opt)) => {
2333                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2334                                                                 if let Some(mut additional_monitor_update) = additional_monitor_update_opt {
2335                                                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2336                                                                 }
2337                                                         },
2338                                                         Err(e) => {
2339                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2340                                                                 else {
2341                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
2342                                                                 }
2343                                                         }
2344                                                 }
2345                                         },
2346                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2347                                                 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
2348                                                         Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
2349                                                         Err(e) => {
2350                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2351                                                                 else {
2352                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2353                                                                 }
2354                                                         }
2355                                                 }
2356                                         },
2357                                 }
2358                         }
2359                         if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2360                                 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2361                         }
2362                         let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2363                                 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2364                                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2365                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2366                                         feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2367                                 })
2368                         } else {
2369                                 None
2370                         };
2371
2372                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2373                         // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2374                         // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2375                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2376                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2377
2378                         Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2379                                 update_add_htlcs,
2380                                 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2381                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2382                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2383                                 update_fee,
2384                                 commitment_signed,
2385                         }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2386                 } else {
2387                         Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2388                 }
2389         }
2390
2391         /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2392         /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2393         /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2394         /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2395         /// revoke_and_ack message.
2396         pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2397                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2398                                         L::Target: Logger,
2399         {
2400                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2401                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2402                 }
2403                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2404                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2405                 }
2406                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2407                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2408                 }
2409
2410                 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2411                         if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2412                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2413                         }
2414                 }
2415
2416                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2417                         // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2418                         // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2419                         // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2420                         // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2421                         // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2422                         // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2423                         // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2424                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2425                 }
2426
2427                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2428                 {
2429                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2430                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2431                 }
2432
2433                 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2434                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2435                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2436                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2437                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2438                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2439                                 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2440                                 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2441                         }],
2442                 };
2443
2444                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2445                 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2446                 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2447                 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2448                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2449                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2450                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2451                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2452
2453                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
2454                 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2455                 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2456                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2457                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2458                 let mut require_commitment = false;
2459                 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2460
2461                 {
2462                         // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2463                         let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2464                         let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2465
2466                         // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2467                         pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2468                                 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2469                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2470                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2471                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2472                                         }
2473                                         false
2474                                 } else { true }
2475                         });
2476                         pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2477                                 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2478                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2479                                         if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2480                                                 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2481                                         } else {
2482                                                 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2483                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2484                                         }
2485                                         false
2486                                 } else { true }
2487                         });
2488                         for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2489                                 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2490                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2491                                         true
2492                                 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2493                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2494                                         true
2495                                 } else { false };
2496                                 if swap {
2497                                         let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2498                                         mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2499
2500                                         if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2501                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2502                                                 require_commitment = true;
2503                                         } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2504                                                 match forward_info {
2505                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2506                                                                 require_commitment = true;
2507                                                                 match fail_msg {
2508                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2509                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2510                                                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2511                                                                         },
2512                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2513                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2514                                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2515                                                                         },
2516                                                                 }
2517                                                         },
2518                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2519                                                                 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2520                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2521                                                         }
2522                                                 }
2523                                         }
2524                                 }
2525                         }
2526                         for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2527                                 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2528                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2529                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2530                                 }
2531                                 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2532                                         Some(fail_reason.take())
2533                                 } else { None } {
2534                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2535                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2536                                         require_commitment = true;
2537                                 }
2538                         }
2539                 }
2540                 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2541
2542                 if self.is_outbound() {
2543                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2544                                 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2545                         }
2546                 } else {
2547                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2548                                 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2549                                 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2550                                 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2551                                 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2552                                 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2553                                 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2554                                         require_commitment = true;
2555                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2556                                 }
2557                         }
2558                 }
2559
2560                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2561                         // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2562                         // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2563                         if require_commitment {
2564                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2565                                 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2566                                 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2567                                 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2568                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2569                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2570                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2571                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2572                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2573                         }
2574                         self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2575                         self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2576                         return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2577                 }
2578
2579                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2580                         (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2581                                 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2582                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2583                                         commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2584                                 }
2585                                 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2586                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2587                                         commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2588                                 }
2589
2590                                 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2591                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2592                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2593                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2594
2595                                 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2596                         },
2597                         (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2598                                 if require_commitment {
2599                                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2600
2601                                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2602                                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2603                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2604                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2605
2606                                         Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2607                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2608                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2609                                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2610                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2611                                                 update_fee: None,
2612                                                 commitment_signed
2613                                         }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2614                                 } else {
2615                                         Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2616                                 }
2617                         }
2618                 }
2619
2620         }
2621
2622         /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2623         /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2624         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2625         fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2626                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2627                         panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2628                 }
2629                 if !self.is_usable() {
2630                         panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2631                 }
2632                 if !self.is_live() {
2633                         panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2634                 }
2635
2636                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2637                         self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2638                         return None;
2639                 }
2640
2641                 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2642                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2643
2644                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2645                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2646                         feerate_per_kw,
2647                 })
2648         }
2649
2650         pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2651                 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2652                         Some(update_fee) => {
2653                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2654                                 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2655                         },
2656                         None => Ok(None)
2657                 }
2658         }
2659
2660         /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2661         /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2662         /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2663         /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2664         /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2665         /// completed.
2666         pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> where L::Target: Logger {
2667                 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2668
2669                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2670                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2671                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2672                         return outbound_drops;
2673                 }
2674                 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2675                 // will be retransmitted.
2676                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2677
2678                 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2679                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2680                         match htlc.state {
2681                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2682                                         // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2683                                         // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2684                                         // this HTLC accordingly
2685                                         inbound_drop_count += 1;
2686                                         false
2687                                 },
2688                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2689                                         // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2690                                         // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2691                                         // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2692                                         true
2693                                 },
2694                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2695                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2696                                         // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2697                                         // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2698                                         // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2699                                         // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2700                                         true
2701                                 },
2702                         }
2703                 });
2704                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2705
2706                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2707                         if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2708                                 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2709                                 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2710                                 // the update upon reconnection.
2711                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2712                         }
2713                 }
2714
2715                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2716                         match htlc_update {
2717                                 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are
2718                                 // no holding cell HTLC update_adds, so if in the future we stop
2719                                 // dropping added HTLCs here and failing them backwards, then there will
2720                                 // need to be corresponding changes made in the Channel's re-establish
2721                                 // logic.
2722                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2723                                         outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2724                                         false
2725                                 },
2726                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2727                         }
2728                 });
2729                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2730                 log_debug!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2731                 outbound_drops
2732         }
2733
2734         /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2735         /// updates are partially paused.
2736         /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2737         /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2738         /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2739         /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2740         pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2741                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2742                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2743                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2744                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2745                 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2746                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2747                 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2748                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2749         }
2750
2751         /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2752         /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2753         /// to the remote side.
2754         pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
2755                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2756                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2757
2758                 let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound();
2759
2760                 // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
2761                 // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
2762                 // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
2763                 // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
2764                 // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
2765                 // monitor was persisted.
2766                 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2767                         assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
2768                         self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2769                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2770                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2771                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2772                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2773                         })
2774                 } else { None };
2775
2776                 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2777                 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2778                 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2779                 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2780
2781                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2782                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2783                         self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2784                         return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
2785                 }
2786
2787                 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2788                         Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2789                 } else { None };
2790                 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2791                         Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
2792                 } else { None };
2793
2794                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2795                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2796                 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2797                 log_trace!(logger, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2798                         if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
2799                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
2800                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2801                         match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2802                 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
2803         }
2804
2805         pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2806                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2807         {
2808                 if self.is_outbound() {
2809                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
2810                 }
2811                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2812                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2813                 }
2814                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2815                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw);
2816                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2817                 Ok(())
2818         }
2819
2820         fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2821                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2822                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2823                 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2824                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2825                         per_commitment_secret,
2826                         next_per_commitment_point,
2827                 }
2828         }
2829
2830         fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
2831                 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2832                 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2833                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2834                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2835
2836                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2837                         if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2838                                 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2839                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2840                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2841                                         amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2842                                         payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2843                                         cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2844                                         onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2845                                 });
2846                         }
2847                 }
2848
2849                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2850                         if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2851                                 match reason {
2852                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2853                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2854                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2855                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2856                                                         reason: err_packet.clone()
2857                                                 });
2858                                         },
2859                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2860                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2861                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2862                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2863                                                         sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2864                                                         failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2865                                                 });
2866                                         },
2867                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2868                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2869                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2870                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2871                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2872                                                 });
2873                                         },
2874                                 }
2875                         }
2876                 }
2877
2878                 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2879                                 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2880                 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2881                         update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2882                         update_fee: None,
2883                         commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2884                 }
2885         }
2886
2887         /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2888         /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2889         pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2890                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2891                         // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2892                         // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2893                         // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2894                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
2895                 }
2896
2897                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2898                         msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2899                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2900                 }
2901
2902                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
2903                         match msg.data_loss_protect {
2904                                 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
2905                                         let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2906                                         let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
2907                                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
2908                                         if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
2909                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
2910                                         }
2911                                         if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2912                                                 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
2913                                                         "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
2914                                                 ));
2915                                         }
2916                                 },
2917                                 OptionalField::Absent => {}
2918                         }
2919                 }
2920
2921                 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2922                 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2923                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2924
2925                 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2926                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2927                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2928                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2929                         })
2930                 } else { None };
2931
2932                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2933                         // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
2934                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
2935                                         self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2936                                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2937                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
2938                                 }
2939                                 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2940                                 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2941                         }
2942
2943                         // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2944                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2945                         return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2946                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2947                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2948                         }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2949                 }
2950
2951                 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2952                         // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2953                         // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2954                         None
2955                 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2956                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2957                                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2958                                 None
2959                         } else {
2960                                 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2961                         }
2962                 } else {
2963                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
2964                 };
2965
2966                 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2967                 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2968                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2969                 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2970                 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2971
2972                 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2973                         // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2974                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2975                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2976                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2977                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2978                         })
2979                 } else { None };
2980
2981                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
2982                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
2983                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2984                         } else {
2985                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2986                         }
2987
2988                         if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2989                                 // Note that if in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
2990                                 // disconnect, this logic will need to be updated.
2991                                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2992                                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } = htlc_update {
2993                                                 debug_assert!(false, "There shouldn't be any add-HTLCs in the holding cell now because they should have been dropped on peer disconnect. Panic here because said HTLCs won't be handled correctly.");
2994                                         }
2995                                 }
2996
2997                                 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
2998                                 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
2999                                 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3000                                 // now!
3001                                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3002                                         Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3003                                         Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3004                                         Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3005                                                 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3006                                                 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3007                                                 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
3008                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3009                                         },
3010                                         Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3011                                                 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3012                                                 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3013                                                 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
3014                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3015                                         },
3016                                 }
3017                         } else {
3018                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3019                         }
3020                 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3021                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
3022                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3023                         } else {
3024                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3025                         }
3026
3027                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3028                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3029                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3030                         }
3031
3032                         return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3033                 } else {
3034                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3035                 }
3036         }
3037
3038         fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
3039                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3040         {
3041                 if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
3042                                 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
3043                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3044                         return None;
3045                 }
3046
3047                 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3048                 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
3049                         proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
3050                 }
3051                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3052                 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3053
3054                 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
3055                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3056                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3057                         .ok();
3058                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3059                 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
3060
3061                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
3062                 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3063                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3064                         fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3065                         signature: sig.unwrap(),
3066                 })
3067         }
3068
3069         pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3070                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3071         {
3072                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3073                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3074                 }
3075                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3076                         // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3077                         // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3078                         // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3079                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3080                 }
3081                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3082                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3083                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3084                         }
3085                 }
3086                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3087
3088                 // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
3089                 // 34 bytes in length, so don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
3090                 if self.is_outbound() && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
3091                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got counterparty shutdown_scriptpubkey ({}) of absurd length from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3092                 }
3093
3094                 //Check counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must
3095                 if !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2pkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2sh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
3096                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3097                 }
3098
3099                 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3100                         if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3101                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3102                         }
3103                 } else {
3104                         self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
3105                 }
3106
3107                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3108
3109                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3110                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3111
3112                 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3113                 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3114                 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3115                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3116                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3117                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3118                         match htlc_update {
3119                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3120                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3121                                         false
3122                                 },
3123                                 _ => true
3124                         }
3125                 });
3126                 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
3127                 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
3128                 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3129
3130                 let shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3131                         None
3132                 } else {
3133                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3134                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3135                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3136                         })
3137                 };
3138
3139                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3140                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3141
3142                 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3143         }
3144
3145         fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3146                 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3147                 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3148                 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3149
3150                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3151
3152                 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3153                 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3154                 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3155                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3156                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3157                 } else {
3158                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3159                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3160                 }
3161                 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3162                 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3163
3164                 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3165         }
3166
3167         pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3168                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3169         {
3170                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3171                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3172                 }
3173                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3174                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3175                 }
3176                 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3177                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3178                 }
3179                 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3180                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3181                 }
3182
3183                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3184                 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3185                 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3186                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3187                 }
3188                 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3189
3190                 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3191                         Ok(_) => {},
3192                         Err(_e) => {
3193                                 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3194                                 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3195                                 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3196                                 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3197                                 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3198                         },
3199                 };
3200
3201                 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3202                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3203                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3204                 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3205                         if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3206                                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3207                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3208                                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3209                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3210                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3211                                 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3212                         }
3213                 }
3214
3215                 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3216                         ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3217                                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3218                                 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3219                                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3220                                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3221                                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3222                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3223                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3224                                 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3225                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3226                                         fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3227                                         signature: sig,
3228                                 }), None))
3229                         }
3230                 }
3231
3232                 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3233                 if self.is_outbound() {
3234                         let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3235                         if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3236                                 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3237                                         if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3238                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3239                                         }
3240                                 }
3241                                 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3242                         }
3243                 } else {
3244                         min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3245                 }
3246                 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3247                         if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3248                                 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3249                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3250                                 }
3251                         }
3252                         propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3253                 }
3254
3255                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3256                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3257                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3258                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3259                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3260                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3261
3262                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3263                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3264
3265                 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3266                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3267                         fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3268                         signature: sig,
3269                 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3270         }
3271
3272         // Public utilities:
3273
3274         pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3275                 self.channel_id
3276         }
3277
3278         /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3279         /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3280         pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3281                 self.user_id
3282         }
3283
3284         /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3285         /// is_usable() returns true).
3286         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3287         pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3288                 self.short_channel_id
3289         }
3290
3291         /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3292         /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3293         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3294                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3295         }
3296
3297         fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3298                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3299         }
3300
3301         fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3302                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3303         }
3304
3305         fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3306                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().selected_contest_delay
3307         }
3308
3309         fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3310                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3311         }
3312
3313         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3314         pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3315                 self.counterparty_node_id
3316         }
3317
3318         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3319         #[cfg(test)]
3320         pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3321                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3322         }
3323
3324         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3325         pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3326                 return cmp::min(
3327                         // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3328                         // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3329                         // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3330                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 9 / 10,
3331
3332                         Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3333                 );
3334         }
3335
3336         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3337         pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3338                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3339         }
3340
3341         pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3342                 self.channel_value_satoshis
3343         }
3344
3345         pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3346                 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
3347         }
3348
3349         #[cfg(test)]
3350         pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3351                 self.feerate_per_kw
3352         }
3353
3354         pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3355                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3356         }
3357
3358         pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3359                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3360         }
3361
3362         pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3363                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3364         }
3365
3366         #[cfg(test)]
3367         pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3368                 &self.holder_signer
3369         }
3370
3371         #[cfg(test)]
3372         pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3373                 ChannelValueStat {
3374                         value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3375                         channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3376                         channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
3377                         pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3378                         pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3379                         holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3380                                 let mut res = 0;
3381                                 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3382                                         match h {
3383                                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3384                                                         res += amount_msat;
3385                                                 }
3386                                                 _ => {}
3387                                         }
3388                                 }
3389                                 res
3390                         },
3391                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3392                         counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3393                 }
3394         }
3395
3396         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3397         pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3398                 self.update_time_counter
3399         }
3400
3401         pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3402                 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3403         }
3404
3405         pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3406                 self.config.announced_channel
3407         }
3408
3409         pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3410                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3411         }
3412
3413         /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3414         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3415         pub fn get_holder_fee_base_msat<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &F) -> u32
3416                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3417         {
3418                 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
3419                 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
3420
3421                 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
3422                 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
3423
3424                 if self.is_outbound() {
3425                         // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
3426                         res += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
3427                 }
3428
3429                 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
3430                 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) as u64 * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
3431
3432                 res as u32
3433         }
3434
3435         /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3436         pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3437                 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3438         }
3439
3440         /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3441         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3442         pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3443                 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3444                 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3445         }
3446
3447         /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3448         /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3449         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3450         pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3451                 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
3452         }
3453
3454         /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3455         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3456         pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3457                 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3458         }
3459
3460         /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3461         pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3462                 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3463         }
3464
3465         /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3466         /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3467         /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3468         pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3469                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32  {
3470                         assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3471                         true
3472                 } else { false }
3473         }
3474
3475         pub fn to_disabled_staged(&mut self) {
3476                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged;
3477         }
3478
3479         pub fn to_disabled_marked(&mut self) {
3480                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked;
3481         }
3482
3483         pub fn to_fresh(&mut self) {
3484                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::Fresh;
3485         }
3486
3487         pub fn is_disabled_staged(&self) -> bool {
3488                 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged
3489         }
3490
3491         pub fn is_disabled_marked(&self) -> bool {
3492                 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked
3493         }
3494
3495         /// When we receive a new block, we (a) check whether the block contains the funding
3496         /// transaction (which would start us counting blocks until we send the funding_signed), and
3497         /// (b) check the height of the block against outbound holding cell HTLCs in case we need to
3498         /// give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything else (e.g. commitment
3499         /// transaction broadcasts, channel closure detection, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3500         /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3501         ///
3502         /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3503         /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3504         /// post-shutdown.
3505         /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
3506         ///
3507         /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3508         /// back.
3509         pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3510                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3511                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3512                         match htlc_update {
3513                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3514                                         if *cltv_expiry <= height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3515                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3516                                                 false
3517                                         } else { true }
3518                                 },
3519                                 _ => true
3520                         }
3521                 });
3522                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3523                 if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3524                         if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3525                                 self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
3526                         }
3527                 }
3528                 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3529                         for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3530                                 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3531                                 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
3532                                         let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
3533                                         if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3534                                                         tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3535                                                 if self.is_outbound() {
3536                                                         // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3537                                                         // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3538                                                         // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3539                                                         // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3540                                                         // channel and move on.
3541                                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3542                                                         panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3543                                                 }
3544                                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3545                                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3546                                                 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3547                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3548                                                         data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
3549                                                 });
3550                                         } else {
3551                                                 if self.is_outbound() {
3552                                                         for input in tx.input.iter() {
3553                                                                 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3554                                                                         // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3555                                                                         // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3556                                                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3557                                                                         panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3558                                                                 }
3559                                                         }
3560                                                 }
3561                                                 if height > 0xff_ff_ff || (index_in_block) > 0xff_ff_ff {
3562                                                         panic!("Block was bogus - either height 16 million or had > 16 million transactions");
3563                                                 }
3564                                                 assert!(txo_idx <= 0xffff); // txo_idx is a (u16 as usize), so this is just listed here for completeness
3565                                                 self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
3566                                                 self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64)         << (5*8)) |
3567                                                                              ((index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
3568                                                                              ((txo_idx as u64)        << (0*8)));
3569                                         }
3570                                 }
3571                         }
3572                 }
3573                 if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3574                         self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
3575                         self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time);
3576                         if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3577                                 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
3578                                         let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3579                                                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3580                                                 true
3581                                         } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3582                                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3583                                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3584                                                 true
3585                                         } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3586                                                 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3587                                                 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3588                                                 false
3589                                         } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3590                                                 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3591                                         } else {
3592                                                 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3593                                                 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3594                                                 false
3595                                         };
3596                                         self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(self.last_block_connected);
3597
3598                                         //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
3599                                         //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
3600                                         //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
3601                                         //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
3602                                         if need_commitment_update {
3603                                                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3604                                                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3605                                                         return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3606                                                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3607                                                                 next_per_commitment_point,
3608                                                         }), timed_out_htlcs));
3609                                                 } else {
3610                                                         self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3611                                                         return Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs));
3612                                                 }
3613                                         }
3614                                 }
3615                         }
3616                 }
3617                 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3618         }
3619
3620         /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
3621         /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
3622         /// unconfirmation/reorg.
3623         pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
3624                 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3625                         self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
3626                         if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
3627                                 return true;
3628                         }
3629                 }
3630                 self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
3631                 if Some(self.last_block_connected) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
3632                         self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
3633                 }
3634                 false
3635         }
3636
3637         // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3638         // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3639
3640         pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3641                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3642                         panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3643                 }
3644                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3645                         panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3646                 }
3647
3648                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3649                         panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3650                 }
3651
3652                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3653                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3654
3655                 msgs::OpenChannel {
3656                         chain_hash,
3657                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3658                         funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3659                         push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3660                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3661                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3662                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3663                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3664                         feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
3665                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3666                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3667                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3668                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3669                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3670                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3671                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3672                         first_per_commitment_point,
3673                         channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3674                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3675                 }
3676         }
3677
3678         pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3679                 if self.is_outbound() {
3680                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3681                 }
3682                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3683                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3684                 }
3685                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3686                         panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3687                 }
3688
3689                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3690                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3691
3692                 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3693                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3694                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3695                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3696                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3697                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3698                         minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3699                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3700                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3701                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3702                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3703                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3704                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3705                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3706                         first_per_commitment_point,
3707                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3708                 }
3709         }
3710
3711         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3712         fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3713                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3714                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
3715                 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3716                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
3717         }
3718
3719         /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3720         /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3721         /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3722         /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3723         /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3724         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3725         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3726         pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3727                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3728                         panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3729                 }
3730                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3731                         panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3732                 }
3733                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3734                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3735                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3736                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3737                 }
3738
3739                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
3740                 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
3741
3742                 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
3743                         Ok(res) => res,
3744                         Err(e) => {
3745                                 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3746                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3747                                 return Err(e);
3748                         }
3749                 };
3750
3751                 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3752
3753                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3754
3755                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3756                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3757
3758                 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
3759                         temporary_channel_id,
3760                         funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3761                         funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3762                         signature
3763                 })
3764         }
3765
3766         /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3767         /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3768         /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3769         /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3770         /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3771         /// closing).
3772         /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3773         /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3774         pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3775                 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3776                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
3777                 }
3778                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3779                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
3780                 }
3781                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3782                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
3783                 }
3784
3785                 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
3786
3787                 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3788                         features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3789                         chain_hash,
3790                         short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3791                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
3792                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
3793                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3794                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
3795                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3796                 };
3797
3798                 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3799                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
3800
3801                 Ok((msg, sig))
3802         }
3803
3804         /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3805         /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3806         pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
3807                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3808                 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3809                 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
3810                 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
3811                 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
3812                 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
3813                 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
3814                 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
3815                 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
3816                 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
3817                 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3818                         let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
3819                         log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
3820                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3821                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
3822                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
3823                         })
3824                 } else {
3825                         log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret");
3826                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3827                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
3828                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
3829                         })
3830                 };
3831                 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3832                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3833                         // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3834                         // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3835                         // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3836                         // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3837                         // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3838                         // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3839
3840                         // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3841                         // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3842                         next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
3843                         // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3844                         // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3845                         // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3846                         // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3847                         // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3848                         // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3849                         // overflow here.
3850                         next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3851                         data_loss_protect,
3852                 }
3853         }
3854
3855
3856         // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3857
3858         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3859         /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3860         /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3861         /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3862         /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3863         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3864         /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
3865         pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
3866                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3867                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
3868                 }
3869                 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
3870                 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
3871                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
3872                 }
3873
3874                 if amount_msat == 0 {
3875                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3876                 }
3877
3878                 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
3879                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
3880                 }
3881
3882                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3883                         // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3884                         // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3885                         // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3886                         // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3887                         // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3888                         // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3889                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update".to_owned()));
3890                 }
3891
3892                 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3893                 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3894                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3895                 }
3896                 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3897                 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3898                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3899                 }
3900
3901                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3902                         // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3903                         let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
3904                         let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
3905                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3906                         let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3907                         if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3908                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3909                         }
3910                 }
3911
3912                 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - htlc_outbound_value_msat;
3913                 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
3914                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
3915                 }
3916
3917                 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
3918                 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
3919                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3920                         2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
3921                 } else { 0 };
3922                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
3923                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
3924                 }
3925
3926                 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
3927                 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
3928                 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3929                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
3930                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
3931                 }
3932
3933                 // Now update local state:
3934                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3935                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3936                                 amount_msat,
3937                                 payment_hash,
3938                                 cltv_expiry,
3939                                 source,
3940                                 onion_routing_packet,
3941                         });
3942                         return Ok(None);
3943                 }
3944
3945                 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3946                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3947                         amount_msat,
3948                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3949                         cltv_expiry,
3950                         state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
3951                         source,
3952                 });
3953
3954                 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3955                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3956                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3957                         amount_msat,
3958                         payment_hash,
3959                         cltv_expiry,
3960                         onion_routing_packet,
3961                 };
3962                 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
3963
3964                 Ok(Some(res))
3965         }
3966
3967         /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
3968         /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
3969         /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
3970         /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
3971         pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3972                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3973                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
3974                 }
3975                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3976                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
3977                 }
3978                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3979                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3980                 }
3981                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
3982                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3983                 }
3984                 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
3985                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3986                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3987                                 have_updates = true;
3988                         }
3989                         if have_updates { break; }
3990                 }
3991                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3992                         if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3993                                 have_updates = true;
3994                         }
3995                         if have_updates { break; }
3996                 }
3997                 if !have_updates {
3998                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
3999                 }
4000                 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
4001         }
4002         /// Only fails in case of bad keys
4003         fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4004                 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4005                 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4006                 // is acceptable.
4007                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4008                         let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4009                                 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4010                         } else { None };
4011                         if let Some(state) = new_state {
4012                                 htlc.state = state;
4013                         }
4014                 }
4015                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4016                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4017                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
4018                         } else { None } {
4019                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4020                         }
4021                 }
4022                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4023
4024                 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4025                         Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4026                                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4027                                 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4028                                         htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4029                                 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4030                         },
4031                         Err(e) => return Err(e),
4032                 };
4033
4034                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4035                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4036                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4037                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4038                                 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4039                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4040                                 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4041                                 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4042                         }]
4043                 };
4044                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4045                 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4046         }
4047
4048         /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4049         /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4050         fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4051                 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4052                 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
4053                         if self.is_outbound() {
4054                                 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4055                         }
4056                 }
4057
4058                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4059                 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
4060                 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4061                 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4062
4063                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4064                 {
4065                         if !self.is_outbound() {
4066                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4067                                 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4068                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4069                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4070                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4071                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4072                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4073                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4074                                                         let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.1);
4075                                                         assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4076                                                 }
4077                                 }
4078                         }
4079                 }
4080
4081                 {
4082                         let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len());
4083                         for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
4084                                 htlcs.push(htlc);
4085                         }
4086
4087                         let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4088                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4089                         signature = res.0;
4090                         htlc_signatures = res.1;
4091
4092                         log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} with redeemscript {} -> {}",
4093                                 &counterparty_commitment_txid,
4094                                 encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4095                                 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
4096
4097                         for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4098                                 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
4099                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4100                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4101                                         log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4102                                         log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
4103                         }
4104                 }
4105
4106                 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4107                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4108                         signature,
4109                         htlc_signatures,
4110                 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
4111         }
4112
4113         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4114         /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4115         /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4116         /// more info.
4117         pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4118                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4119                         Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4120                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4121                                 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4122                         },
4123                         None => Ok(None)
4124                 }
4125         }
4126
4127         /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4128         /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4129         pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
4130                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4131                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4132                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4133                         }
4134                 }
4135                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4136                         if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4137                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4138                         }
4139                         else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4140                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4141                         }
4142                 }
4143                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4144                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4145                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4146                 }
4147
4148                 let closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
4149
4150                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4151                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4152                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4153                 } else {
4154                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4155                 }
4156                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4157
4158                 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4159                 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4160                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4161                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4162                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4163                         match htlc_update {
4164                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4165                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4166                                         false
4167                                 },
4168                                 _ => true
4169                         }
4170                 });
4171
4172                 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
4173                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4174                         scriptpubkey: closing_script,
4175                 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4176         }
4177
4178         /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4179         /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4180         /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4181         /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4182         /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4183         pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4184                 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4185
4186                 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4187                 // return them to fail the payment.
4188                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4189                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4190                         match htlc_update {
4191                                 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4192                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4193                                 },
4194                                 _ => {}
4195                         }
4196                 }
4197                 let funding_txo = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4198                         // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4199                         // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4200                         // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4201                         // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4202                         // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4203                         // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4204                         // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4205                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4206                                 Some(funding_txo.clone())
4207                         } else { None }
4208                 } else { None };
4209
4210                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4211                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4212                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4213                 (funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4214                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4215                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4216                 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4217         }
4218 }
4219
4220 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4221 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4222
4223 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4224         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4225                 match self {
4226                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
4227                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
4228                                 error_packet.write(writer)?;
4229                         },
4230                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
4231                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4232                                 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
4233                                 err_code.write(writer)?;
4234                         },
4235                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4236                                 2u8.write(writer)?;
4237                                 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4238                         },
4239                 }
4240                 Ok(())
4241         }
4242 }
4243
4244 impl Readable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4245         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4246                 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4247                         0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
4248                         1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4249                         2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
4250                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4251                 })
4252         }
4253 }
4254
4255 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4256         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4257                 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4258                 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
4259
4260                 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4261                 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4262
4263                 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4264                 self.config.write(writer)?;
4265
4266                 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4267                 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4268                 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4269
4270                 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4271
4272                 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4273                 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
4274                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::usize::MAX);
4275                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::u32::MAX as usize);
4276                 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4277                 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
4278
4279                 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4280                 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4281
4282                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4283                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4284                 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4285
4286                 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4287                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4288                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4289                                 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4290                         }
4291                 }
4292                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4293                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4294                         if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4295                                 continue; // Drop
4296                         }
4297                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4298                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4299                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4300                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4301                         match &htlc.state {
4302                                 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4303                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4304                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4305                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4306                                 },
4307                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4308                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4309                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4310                                 },
4311                                 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4312                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4313                                 },
4314                                 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4315                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4316                                         removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4317                                 },
4318                         }
4319                 }
4320
4321                 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4322                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4323                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4324                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4325                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4326                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4327                         htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4328                         match &htlc.state {
4329                                 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4330                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4331                                         onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4332                                 },
4333                                 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4334                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4335                                 },
4336                                 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
4337                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4338                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4339                                 },
4340                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4341                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4342                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4343                                 },
4344                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4345                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4346                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4347                                 },
4348                         }
4349                 }
4350
4351                 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4352                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4353                         match update {
4354                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4355                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4356                                         amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4357                                         cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4358                                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4359                                         source.write(writer)?;
4360                                         onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4361                                 },
4362                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4363                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4364                                         payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4365                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4366                                 },
4367                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4368                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4369                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4370                                         err_packet.write(writer)?;
4371                                 }
4372                         }
4373                 }
4374
4375                 match self.resend_order {
4376                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4377                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4378                 }
4379
4380                 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4381                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4382                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4383
4384                 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4385                 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4386                         pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4387                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4388                 }
4389
4390                 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4391                 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4392                         htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4393                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4394                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4395                 }
4396
4397                 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4398                 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4399
4400                 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4401                 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4402                 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4403                 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4404
4405                 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4406                         Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4407                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4408                                 feerate.write(writer)?;
4409                                 fee.write(writer)?;
4410                                 sig.write(writer)?;
4411                         },
4412                         None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4413                 }
4414
4415                 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4416                 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4417
4418                 self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
4419                 self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
4420
4421                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4422                 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4423                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4424                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4425                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4426                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4427                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4428                 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
4429
4430                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
4431                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4432
4433                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4434                 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
4435
4436                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4437
4438                 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4439                 Ok(())
4440         }
4441 }
4442
4443 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4444 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
4445                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4446         fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4447                 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4448                 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4449                 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4450                         return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4451                 }
4452
4453                 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4454                 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
4455
4456                 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4457                 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4458                 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4459
4460                 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4461
4462                 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4463                 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
4464                 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
4465                         // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
4466                         let mut data = [0; 1024];
4467                         let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
4468                         reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
4469                         keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
4470                 }
4471                 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
4472
4473                 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4474                 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4475
4476                 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4477                 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4478                 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4479
4480                 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4481                 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4482                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
4483                         pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4484                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4485                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4486                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4487                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4488                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4489                                         1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4490                                         2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4491                                         3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4492                                         4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4493                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4494                                 },
4495                         });
4496                 }
4497
4498                 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4499                 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4500                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4501                         pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4502                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4503                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4504                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4505                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4506                                 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4507                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4508                                         0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4509                                         1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4510                                         2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4511                                         3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4512                                         4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4513                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4514                                 },
4515                         });
4516                 }
4517
4518                 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4519                 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4520                 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4521                         holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4522                                 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4523                                         amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4524                                         cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4525                                         payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4526                                         source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4527                                         onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4528                                 },
4529                                 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4530                                         payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4531                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4532                                 },
4533                                 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4534                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4535                                         err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4536                                 },
4537                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4538                         });
4539                 }
4540
4541                 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4542                         0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4543                         1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4544                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4545                 };
4546
4547                 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4548                 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4549                 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4550
4551                 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4552                 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4553                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4554                         monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4555                 }
4556
4557                 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4558                 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4559                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4560                         monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4561                 }
4562
4563                 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4564                 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4565
4566                 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4567                 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4568                 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
4569                 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4570
4571                 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4572                         0 => None,
4573                         1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4574                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4575                 };
4576
4577                 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4578                 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4579
4580                 let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
4581                 let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
4582
4583                 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4584                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4585                 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4586                 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4587                 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4588                 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4589                 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
4590                 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
4591
4592                 let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
4593                 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4594
4595                 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4596                 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4597
4598                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4599                 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4600
4601                 Ok(Channel {
4602                         user_id,
4603
4604                         config,
4605                         channel_id,
4606                         channel_state,
4607                         secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
4608                         channel_value_satoshis,
4609
4610                         latest_monitor_update_id,
4611
4612                         holder_signer,
4613                         shutdown_pubkey,
4614                         destination_script,
4615
4616                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4617                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4618                         value_to_self_msat,
4619
4620                         pending_inbound_htlcs,
4621                         pending_outbound_htlcs,
4622                         holding_cell_htlc_updates,
4623
4624                         resend_order,
4625
4626                         monitor_pending_funding_locked,
4627                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
4628                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
4629                         monitor_pending_forwards,
4630                         monitor_pending_failures,
4631
4632                         pending_update_fee,
4633                         holding_cell_update_fee,
4634                         next_holder_htlc_id,
4635                         next_counterparty_htlc_id,
4636                         update_time_counter,
4637                         feerate_per_kw,
4638
4639                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4640                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4641                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4642                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4643
4644                         last_sent_closing_fee,
4645
4646                         funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4647                         short_channel_id,
4648                         last_block_connected,
4649                         funding_tx_confirmations,
4650
4651                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
4652                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4653                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4654                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4655                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
4656                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4657                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
4658                         minimum_depth,
4659
4660                         channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
4661                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
4662
4663                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
4664                         counterparty_node_id,
4665
4666                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4667
4668                         commitment_secrets,
4669
4670                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
4671
4672                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4673                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4674                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4675                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4676                 })
4677         }
4678 }
4679
4680 #[cfg(test)]
4681 mod tests {
4682         use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4683         use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4684         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4685         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
4686         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4687         use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4688         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4689         use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4690         use hex;
4691         use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4692         use ln::channel::{Channel,Sign,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
4693         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4694         use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4695         use ln::msgs::{OptionalField, DataLossProtect, DecodeError};
4696         use ln::chan_utils;
4697         use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
4698         use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4699         use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface};
4700         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4701         use util::config::UserConfig;
4702         use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
4703         use util::test_utils;
4704         use util::logger::Logger;
4705         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
4706         use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4707         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4708         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4709         use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
4710         use std::sync::Arc;
4711
4712         struct TestFeeEstimator {
4713                 fee_est: u32
4714         }
4715         impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4716                 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
4717                         self.fee_est
4718                 }
4719         }
4720
4721         #[test]
4722         fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4723                 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4724                         "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4725         }
4726
4727         struct Keys {
4728                 signer: InMemorySigner,
4729         }
4730         impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4731                 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
4732
4733                 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4734                 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4735                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4736                         let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4737                         let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4738                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4739                 }
4740
4741                 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4742                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4743                         let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4744                         PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4745                 }
4746
4747                 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
4748                         self.signer.clone()
4749                 }
4750                 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4751                 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
4752         }
4753
4754         fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
4755                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
4756         }
4757
4758         // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
4759         // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
4760         #[test]
4761         fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
4762                 let original_fee = 253;
4763                 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
4764                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4765                 let seed = [42; 32];
4766                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4767                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4768
4769                 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4770                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4771                 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4772
4773                 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
4774                 // same as the old fee.
4775                 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
4776                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4777                 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
4778         }
4779
4780         #[test]
4781         fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
4782                 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
4783                 // dust limits are used.
4784                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4785                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4786                 let seed = [42; 32];
4787                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4788                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4789
4790                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
4791                 // they have different dust limits.
4792
4793                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
4794                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4795                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4796                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4797
4798                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4799                 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
4800                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4801                 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis, 1560);
4802                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4803                 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
4804
4805                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
4806                 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4807                 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
4808                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
4809
4810                 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
4811                 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
4812                 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4813                         htlc_id: 0,
4814                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
4815                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
4816                         cltv_expiry: 300000000,
4817                         state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4818                 });
4819
4820                 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4821                         htlc_id: 1,
4822                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
4823                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
4824                         cltv_expiry: 200000000,
4825                         state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4826                         source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4827                                 path: Vec::new(),
4828                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4829                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
4830                         }
4831                 });
4832
4833                 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
4834                 // the dust limit check.
4835                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4836                 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4837                 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
4838                 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
4839
4840                 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
4841                 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
4842                 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
4843                 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
4844                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4845                 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4846                 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
4847         }
4848
4849         #[test]
4850         fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
4851                 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
4852                 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
4853                 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
4854                 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
4855                 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
4856                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4857                 let seed = [42; 32];
4858                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4859                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4860
4861                 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4862                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4863                 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4864
4865                 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
4866                 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
4867
4868                 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
4869                 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
4870                 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
4871                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4872                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4873                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
4874
4875                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
4876                 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
4877                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4878                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4879                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
4880
4881                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
4882
4883                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
4884                 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
4885                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4886                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4887                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
4888
4889                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
4890                 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
4891                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4892                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4893                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
4894         }
4895
4896         #[test]
4897         fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
4898                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4899                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4900                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4901                 let seed = [42; 32];
4902                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4903                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4904
4905                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
4906
4907                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
4908                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4909                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4910                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4911
4912                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4913                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4914                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4915                 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
4916
4917                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
4918                 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4919                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
4920
4921                 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
4922                 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4923                 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4924                         value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
4925                 }]};
4926                 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
4927                 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
4928                 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, &&logger).unwrap();
4929
4930                 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
4931                 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, &&logger);
4932
4933                 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
4934                 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
4935                 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
4936                 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
4937                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
4938                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
4939                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4940                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
4941                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
4942                         },
4943                         _ => panic!()
4944                 }
4945
4946                 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
4947                 // is sane.
4948                 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
4949                 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
4950                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
4951                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
4952                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4953                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
4954                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
4955                         },
4956                         _ => panic!()
4957                 }
4958         }
4959
4960         #[test]
4961         fn outbound_commitment_test() {
4962                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
4963                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4964                 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4965                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4966
4967                 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
4968                         &secp_ctx,
4969                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4970                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4971                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4972                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4973                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4974
4975                         // These aren't set in the test vectors:
4976                         [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
4977                         10_000_000,
4978                         [0; 32]
4979                 );
4980
4981                 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
4982                                 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
4983                 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
4984
4985                 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4986                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
4987                 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
4988                 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
4989                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
4990
4991                 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
4992
4993                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
4994                         funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
4995                         revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4996                         payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
4997                         delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
4998                         htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
4999                 };
5000                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5001                         CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5002                                 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5003                                 selected_contest_delay: 144
5004                         });
5005                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5006                 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5007
5008                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5009                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5010
5011                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5012                            hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5013
5014                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5015                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5016
5017                 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5018                 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5019                 // build_commitment_transaction.
5020                 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5021                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5022                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5023                 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5024                 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5025
5026                 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5027                         ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5028                                 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5029                         } ) => { {
5030                                 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
5031                                         let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
5032
5033                                         let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
5034                                                 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
5035                                                 .collect();
5036                                         (res.0, htlcs)
5037                                 };
5038                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
5039                                 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
5040                                 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5041                                 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5042                                 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
5043                                 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
5044
5045                                 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
5046                                 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5047                                 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
5048                                 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5049                                 $({
5050                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5051                                         per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
5052                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
5053                                 })*
5054                                 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
5055
5056                                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
5057                                         commitment_tx.clone(),
5058                                         counterparty_signature,
5059                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs,
5060                                         &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
5061                                         chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
5062                                 );
5063                                 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
5064                                 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
5065
5066                                 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5067                                 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
5068                                 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
5069
5070                                 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
5071                                 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
5072
5073                                 $({
5074                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5075
5076                                         let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
5077                                         let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
5078                                         let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
5079                                         let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
5080                                         secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
5081
5082                                         let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5083                                         if !htlc.offered {
5084                                                 for i in 0..5 {
5085                                                         let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
5086                                                         if out == htlc.payment_hash {
5087                                                                 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
5088                                                         }
5089                                                 }
5090
5091                                                 assert!(preimage.is_some());
5092                                         }
5093
5094                                         let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
5095                                         assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
5096
5097                                         let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5098                                         assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
5099                                         let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
5100                                         let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
5101                                         let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
5102                                         assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
5103                                                         hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
5104                                 })*
5105                                 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
5106                         } }
5107                 }
5108
5109                 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
5110                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
5111
5112                 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
5113                                                  "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
5114                                                  "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", {});
5115
5116                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5117                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5118                                 htlc_id: 0,
5119                                 amount_msat: 1000000,
5120                                 cltv_expiry: 500,
5121                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5122                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5123                         };
5124                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
5125                         out
5126                 });
5127                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5128                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5129                                 htlc_id: 1,
5130                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5131                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
5132                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5133                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5134                         };
5135                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5136                         out
5137                 });
5138                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5139                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5140                                 htlc_id: 2,
5141                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5142                                 cltv_expiry: 502,
5143                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5144                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5145                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5146                         };
5147                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
5148                         out
5149                 });
5150                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5151                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5152                                 htlc_id: 3,
5153                                 amount_msat: 3000000,
5154                                 cltv_expiry: 503,
5155                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5156                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5157                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5158                         };
5159                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
5160                         out
5161                 });
5162                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5163                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5164                                 htlc_id: 4,
5165                                 amount_msat: 4000000,
5166                                 cltv_expiry: 504,
5167                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5168                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5169                         };
5170                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
5171                         out
5172                 });
5173
5174                 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5175                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5176                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
5177
5178                 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
5179                                  "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
5180                                  "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", {
5181
5182                                   { 0,
5183                                   "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
5184                                   "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
5185                                   "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" },
5186
5187                                   { 1,
5188                                   "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
5189                                   "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
5190                                   "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
5191
5192                                   { 2,
5193                                   "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
5194                                   "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
5195                                   "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" },
5196
5197                                   { 3,
5198                                   "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
5199                                   "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
5200                                   "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" },
5201
5202                                   { 4,
5203                                   "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
5204                                   "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
5205                                   "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b04000000000000000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b8701483045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5206                 } );
5207
5208                 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5209                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5210                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
5211
5212                 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
5213                                  "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
5214                                  "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", {
5215
5216                                   { 0,
5217                                   "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
5218                                   "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
5219                                   "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" },
5220
5221                                   { 1,
5222                                   "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
5223                                   "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
5224                                   "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" },
5225
5226                                   { 2,
5227                                   "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
5228                                   "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
5229                                   "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" },
5230
5231                                   { 3,
5232                                   "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
5233                                   "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
5234                                   "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" },
5235
5236                                   { 4,
5237                                   "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
5238                                   "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
5239                                   "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe04000000000000000001da0d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca01473044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5240                 } );
5241
5242                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5243                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5244                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
5245
5246                 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
5247                                  "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
5248                                  "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", {
5249
5250                                   { 0,
5251                                   "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
5252                                   "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
5253                                   "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" },
5254
5255                                   { 1,
5256                                   "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
5257                                   "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
5258                                   "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" },
5259
5260                                   { 2,
5261                                   "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
5262                                   "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
5263                                   "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" },
5264
5265                                   { 3,
5266                                   "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
5267                                   "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
5268                                   "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" }
5269                 } );
5270
5271                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5272                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5273                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
5274
5275                 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
5276                                  "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
5277                                  "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", {
5278
5279                                   { 0,
5280                                   "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
5281                                   "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
5282                                   "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" },
5283
5284                                   { 1,
5285                                   "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
5286                                   "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
5287                                   "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" },
5288
5289                                   { 2,
5290                                   "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
5291                                   "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
5292                                   "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" },
5293
5294                                   { 3,
5295                                   "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
5296                                   "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
5297                                   "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" }
5298                 } );
5299
5300                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5301                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5302                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
5303
5304                 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
5305                                  "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
5306                                  "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", {
5307
5308                                   { 0,
5309                                   "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
5310                                   "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
5311                                   "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" },
5312
5313                                   { 1,
5314                                   "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
5315                                   "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
5316                                   "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" },
5317
5318                                   { 2,
5319                                   "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
5320                                   "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
5321                                   "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" }
5322                 } );
5323
5324                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5325                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5326                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
5327
5328                 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
5329                                  "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
5330                                  "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", {
5331
5332                                   { 0,
5333                                   "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
5334                                   "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
5335                                   "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" },
5336
5337                                   { 1,
5338                                   "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
5339                                   "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
5340                                   "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" },
5341
5342                                   { 2,
5343                                   "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
5344                                   "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
5345                                   "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" }
5346                 } );
5347
5348                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5349                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5350                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
5351
5352                 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
5353                                  "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
5354                                  "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", {
5355
5356                                   { 0,
5357                                   "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
5358                                   "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
5359                                   "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e01483045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d7601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
5360
5361                                   { 1,
5362                                   "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
5363                                   "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
5364                                   "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" }
5365                 } );
5366
5367                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5368                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5369                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
5370
5371                 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
5372                                  "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
5373                                  "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", {
5374
5375                                   { 0,
5376                                   "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
5377                                   "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
5378                                   "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" },
5379
5380                                   { 1,
5381                                   "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
5382                                   "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
5383                                   "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" }
5384                 } );
5385
5386                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5387                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5388                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
5389
5390                 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
5391                                  "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
5392                                  "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", {
5393
5394                                   { 0,
5395                                   "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
5396                                   "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
5397                                   "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" }
5398                 } );
5399
5400                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5401                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5402                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
5403
5404                 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
5405                                  "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
5406                                  "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", {
5407
5408                                   { 0,
5409                                   "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
5410                                   "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
5411                                   "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" }
5412                 } );
5413
5414                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5415                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5416                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
5417
5418                 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
5419                                  "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
5420                                  "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", {});
5421
5422                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5423                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5424                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
5425
5426                 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
5427                                  "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
5428                                  "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", {});
5429
5430                 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5431                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5432                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
5433
5434                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5435                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5436                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
5437
5438                 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
5439                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5440                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
5441
5442                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5443                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5444                                  "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", {});
5445
5446                 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
5447                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
5448                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
5449                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
5450                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5451                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5452                                 htlc_id: 1,
5453                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5454                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
5455                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5456                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5457                         };
5458                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5459                         out
5460                 });
5461                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
5462                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5463                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5464                                 htlc_id: 6,
5465                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
5466                                 cltv_expiry: 506,
5467                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5468                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5469                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5470                         };
5471                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5472                         out
5473                 });
5474                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5475                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5476                                 htlc_id: 5,
5477                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
5478                                 cltv_expiry: 505,
5479                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5480                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5481                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5482                         };
5483                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5484                         out
5485                 });
5486
5487                 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
5488                                  "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
5489                                  "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", {
5490
5491                                   { 0,
5492                                   "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
5493                                   "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
5494                                   "0200000000010189a326e23addc28323dbadcb4e71c2c17088b6e8fa184103e552f44075dddc34000000000000000000011f070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050048304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c60148304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
5495                                   { 1,
5496                                   "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
5497                                   "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
5498                                   "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" },
5499                                   { 2,
5500                                   "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
5501                                   "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
5502                                   "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" }
5503                 } );
5504         }
5505
5506         #[test]
5507         fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
5508                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
5509
5510                 let mut seed = [0; 32];
5511                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
5512                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5513                            hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
5514
5515                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
5516                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5517                            hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
5518
5519                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
5520                            hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
5521
5522                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
5523                            hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
5524
5525                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
5526                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
5527                            hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
5528         }
5529
5530         #[test]
5531         fn test_key_derivation() {
5532                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
5533                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5534
5535                 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5536                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5537
5538                 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
5539                 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
5540
5541                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5542                 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
5543
5544                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5545                                 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
5546
5547                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5548                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5549
5550                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5551                                 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
5552
5553                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5554                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5555         }
5556 }