_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/channel.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
  11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
  12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
  13 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  14 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
  16
  17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
  20
  21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
  23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
  24
  25 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
  26 use ln::msgs;
  27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
  28 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
  29 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
  30 use ln::chan_utils;
  31 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
  32 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
  33 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
  34 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
  35 use util::transaction_utils;
  36 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
  37 use util::logger::Logger;
  38 use util::errors::APIError;
  39 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
  40
  41 use std;
  42 use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
  43 use std::ops::Deref;
  44 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
  45 use std::sync::Mutex;
  46 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
  47 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0;
  48
  49 #[cfg(test)]
  50 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
  51         pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
  52         pub channel_value_msat: u64,
  53         pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
  54         pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  55         pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  56         pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
  57         pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
  58         pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
  59 }
  60
  61 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
  62         FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
  63         FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
  64         Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
  65 }
  66
  67 enum InboundHTLCState {
  68         /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
  69         /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
  70         RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
  71         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
  72         /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
  73         /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
  74         /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
  75         /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
  76         /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
  77         /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
  78         /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
  79         /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
  80         /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
  81         /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
  82         /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
  83         ///
  84         /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
  85         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc)   --> local
  86         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
  87         /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack               <-- local
  88         /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
  89         /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
  90         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc)   --> local
  91         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
  92         /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
  93         /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
  94         /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
  95         /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
  96         /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
  97         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
  98         /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
  99         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
 100         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
 101         /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
 102         /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
 103         /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
 104         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 105         AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
 106         Committed,
 107         /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 108         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 109         /// we'll drop it.
 110         /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
 111         /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
 112         /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
 113         /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
 114         /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
 115         /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
 116         /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
 117         LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
 118 }
 119
 120 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
 121         htlc_id: u64,
 122         amount_msat: u64,
 123         cltv_expiry: u32,
 124         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 125         state: InboundHTLCState,
 126 }
 127
 128 enum OutboundHTLCState {
 129         /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 130         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 131         /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
 132         /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
 133         ///  * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
 134         ///    money back (though we won't), and,
 135         ///  * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
 136         ///    allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
 137         ///    doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
 138         ///    we'll never get out of sync).
 139         /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
 140         /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
 141         LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
 142         Committed,
 143         /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
 144         /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
 145         RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 146         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 147         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 148         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 149         /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
 150         /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
 151         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 152         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 153         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 154         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 155         /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
 156         /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
 157         AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 158 }
 159
 160 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
 161         htlc_id: u64,
 162         amount_msat: u64,
 163         cltv_expiry: u32,
 164         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 165         state: OutboundHTLCState,
 166         source: HTLCSource,
 167 }
 168
 169 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
 170 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
 171         AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
 172                 // always outbound
 173                 amount_msat: u64,
 174                 cltv_expiry: u32,
 175                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 176                 source: HTLCSource,
 177                 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
 178         },
 179         ClaimHTLC {
 180                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
 181                 htlc_id: u64,
 182         },
 183         FailHTLC {
 184                 htlc_id: u64,
 185                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
 186         },
 187 }
 188
 189 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
 190 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
 191 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
 192 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
 193 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
 194 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
 195 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
 196 enum ChannelState {
 197         /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
 198         OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
 199         /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
 200         TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
 201         /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
 202         /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
 203         /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
 204         FundingCreated = 4,
 205         /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
 206         /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
 207         /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
 208         FundingSent = 8,
 209         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
 210         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 211         TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
 212         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
 213         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 214         OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
 215         ChannelFunded = 64,
 216         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
 217         /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
 218         /// dance.
 219         PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
 220         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
 221         /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
 222         /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
 223         MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
 224         /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
 225         /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
 226         /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
 227         /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
 228         /// later.
 229         /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
 230         AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
 231         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
 232         /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
 233         /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
 234         RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
 235         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
 236         /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
 237         /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
 238         /// us their shutdown.
 239         LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
 240         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
 241         /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
 242         ShutdownComplete = 4096,
 243 }
 244 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
 245 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
 246
 247 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
 248
 249 /// Liveness is called to fluctuate given peer disconnecton/monitor failures/closing.
 250 /// If channel is public, network should have a liveness view announced by us on a
 251 /// best-effort, which means we may filter out some status transitions to avoid spam.
 252 /// See further timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
 253 #[derive(PartialEq)]
 254 enum UpdateStatus {
 255         /// Status has been gossiped.
 256         Fresh,
 257         /// Status has been changed.
 258         DisabledMarked,
 259         /// Status has been marked to be gossiped at next flush
 260         DisabledStaged,
 261 }
 262
 263 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
 264 enum HTLCInitiator {
 265         LocalOffered,
 266         RemoteOffered,
 267 }
 268
 269 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
 270 struct HTLCCandidate {
 271         amount_msat: u64,
 272         origin: HTLCInitiator,
 273 }
 274
 275 impl HTLCCandidate {
 276         fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
 277                 Self {
 278                         amount_msat,
 279                         origin,
 280                 }
 281         }
 282 }
 283
 284 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
 285 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
 286 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
 287 // inbound channel.
 288 //
 289 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
 290 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
 291 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
 292         config: ChannelConfig,
 293
 294         user_id: u64,
 295
 296         channel_id: [u8; 32],
 297         channel_state: u32,
 298         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
 299         channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 300
 301         latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
 302
 303         holder_signer: Signer,
 304         shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
 305         destination_script: Script,
 306
 307         // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
 308         // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
 309         // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
 310
 311         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 312         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 313         value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
 314         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
 315         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
 316         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
 317
 318         /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
 319         /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
 320         /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
 321         /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
 322         /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
 323         /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
 324         /// send it first.
 325         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
 326
 327         monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
 328         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
 329         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
 330         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
 331         monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
 332
 333         // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
 334         // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
 335         // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
 336         //
 337         // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
 338         // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
 339         // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
 340         // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
 341         // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
 342         // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
 343         // commitment_signed.
 344         pending_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 345         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
 346         // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
 347         // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
 348         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 349         holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 350         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
 351         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
 352         update_time_counter: u32,
 353         feerate_per_kw: u32,
 354
 355         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 356         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
 357         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 358         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 359         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
 360         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 361
 362         last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
 363
 364         /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
 365         /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
 366         /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
 367         /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
 368         funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
 369         short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
 370         funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
 371
 372         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 373         #[cfg(test)]
 374         pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 375         #[cfg(not(test))]
 376         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 377         #[cfg(test)]
 378         pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 379         #[cfg(not(test))]
 380         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 381         //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
 382         /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
 383         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
 384         // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
 385         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 386         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 387         #[cfg(test)]
 388         pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 389         #[cfg(not(test))]
 390         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 391         //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 392         minimum_depth: u32,
 393
 394         pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
 395
 396         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 397
 398         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 399         counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
 400
 401         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
 402
 403         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
 404
 405         network_sync: UpdateStatus,
 406
 407         // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
 408         // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
 409         // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
 410         // `build_commitment_transaction`.
 411         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 412         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
 413         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 414         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
 415 }
 416
 417 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 418 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
 419         fee: u64,
 420         total_pending_htlcs: usize,
 421         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
 422         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
 423         feerate: u32,
 424 }
 425
 426 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
 427 /// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
 428 /// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
 429 /// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
 430 const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
 431 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
 432 const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
 433
 434 #[cfg(not(test))]
 435 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 436 #[cfg(test)]
 437 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 438 #[cfg(not(test))]
 439 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 440 #[cfg(test)]
 441 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 442
 443 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
 444 /// it's 2^24.
 445 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
 446
 447 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
 448 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
 449 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
 450 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
 451         Ignore(String),
 452         Close(String),
 453         CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
 454 }
 455
 456 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
 457         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
 458                 match self {
 459                         &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
 460                         &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
 461                         &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
 462                 }
 463         }
 464 }
 465
 466 macro_rules! secp_check {
 467         ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
 468                 match $res {
 469                         Ok(thing) => thing,
 470                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
 471                 }
 472         };
 473 }
 474
 475 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
 476         // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
 477         fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 478                 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
 479         }
 480
 481         /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
 482         /// required by us.
 483         ///
 484         /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
 485         pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 486                 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
 487                 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
 488         }
 489
 490         fn derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u32) -> u64 {
 491                 cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate as u64 * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
 492         }
 493
 494         // Constructors:
 495         pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
 496         where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
 497               F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 498         {
 499                 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
 500                 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
 501                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
 502
 503                 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 504                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
 505                 }
 506                 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
 507                 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
 508                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
 509                 }
 510                 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 511                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
 512                 }
 513                 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 514                 if Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
 515                         return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
 516                 }
 517
 518                 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
 519
 520                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 521                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
 522
 523                 Ok(Channel {
 524                         user_id,
 525                         config: config.channel_options.clone(),
 526
 527                         channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
 528                         channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
 529                         secp_ctx,
 530                         channel_value_satoshis,
 531
 532                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 533
 534                         holder_signer,
 535                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
 536                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 537
 538                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 539                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 540                         value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
 541
 542                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 543                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 544                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 545                         pending_update_fee: None,
 546                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 547                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 548                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 549                         update_time_counter: 1,
 550
 551                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 552
 553                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 554                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 555                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 556                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 557                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 558
 559                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 560                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 561                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 562                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 563
 564                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 565
 566                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 567                         short_channel_id: None,
 568                         funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
 569
 570                         feerate_per_kw: feerate,
 571                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
 572                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
 573                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
 574                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
 575                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
 576                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 577                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
 578                         minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
 579
 580                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
 581                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
 582                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 583                                 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
 584                                 counterparty_parameters: None,
 585                                 funding_outpoint: None
 586                         },
 587                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
 588
 589                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 590                         counterparty_node_id,
 591
 592                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
 593
 594                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 595
 596                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
 597
 598                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 599                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 600                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 601                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 602                 })
 603         }
 604
 605         fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
 606                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
 607         {
 608                 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 609                 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
 610                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
 611                 }
 612                 let upper_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64  * 2;
 613                 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
 614                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
 615                 }
 616                 Ok(())
 617         }
 618
 619         /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
 620         /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
 621         pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
 622                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
 623           F::Target: FeeEstimator
 624         {
 625                 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
 626                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
 627                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
 628                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
 629                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
 630                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
 631                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
 632                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
 633                 };
 634                 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
 635
 636                 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 637                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
 638                 }
 639
 640                 // Check sanity of message fields:
 641                 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 642                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 643                 }
 644                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 645                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 646                 }
 647                 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 648                 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
 649                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
 650                 }
 651                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 652                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 653                 }
 654                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
 655                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
 656                 }
 657                 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 658                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
 659                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
 660                 }
 661                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
 662
 663                 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
 664                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
 665                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
 666                 }
 667                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
 668                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
 669                 }
 670                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
 671                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
 672                 }
 673
 674                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
 675                 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
 676                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
 677                 }
 678                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
 679                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat,  config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
 680                 }
 681                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
 682                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
 683                 }
 684                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
 685                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 686                 }
 687                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
 688                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
 689                 }
 690                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
 691                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 692                 }
 693                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
 694                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 695                 }
 696
 697                 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
 698
 699                 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
 700                 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
 701                         if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
 702                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
 703                         }
 704                 }
 705                 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
 706                 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
 707
 708                 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 709
 710                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
 711                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
 712                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
 713                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 714                 }
 715                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
 716                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 717                 }
 718                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
 719                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 720                 }
 721
 722                 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
 723                 // for full fee payment
 724                 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
 725                 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 726                 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
 727                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
 728                 }
 729
 730                 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
 731                 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 732                 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
 733                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
 734                 }
 735
 736                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
 737                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
 738                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
 739                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
 740                                         if script.len() == 0 {
 741                                                 None
 742                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
 743                                         } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
 744                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
 745                                         } else {
 746                                                 Some(script.clone())
 747                                         }
 748                                 },
 749                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
 750                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
 751                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
 752                                 }
 753                         }
 754                 } else { None };
 755
 756                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 757                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
 758
 759                 let chan = Channel {
 760                         user_id,
 761                         config: local_config,
 762
 763                         channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
 764                         channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
 765                         secp_ctx,
 766
 767                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 768
 769                         holder_signer,
 770                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
 771                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 772
 773                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 774                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 775                         value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
 776
 777                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 778                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 779                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 780                         pending_update_fee: None,
 781                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 782                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 783                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 784                         update_time_counter: 1,
 785
 786                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 787
 788                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 789                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 790                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 791                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 792                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 793
 794                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 795                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 796                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 797                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 798
 799                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 800
 801                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 802                         short_channel_id: None,
 803                         funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
 804
 805                         feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
 806                         channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
 807                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
 808                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
 809                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
 810                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
 811                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
 812                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 813                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
 814                         minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
 815
 816                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
 817                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
 818                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 819                                 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
 820                                 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
 821                                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
 822                                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
 823                                 }),
 824                                 funding_outpoint: None
 825                         },
 826                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
 827
 828                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 829                         counterparty_node_id,
 830
 831                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
 832
 833                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 834
 835                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
 836
 837                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 838                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 839                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 840                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 841                 };
 842
 843                 Ok(chan)
 844         }
 845
 846         /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
 847         /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
 848         /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
 849         /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
 850         /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
 851         /// an HTLC to a).
 852         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
 853         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
 854         /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
 855         /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
 856         /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
 857         /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
 858         /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
 859         /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
 860         /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
 861         /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
 862         /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
 863         #[inline]
 864         fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
 865                 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
 866                 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
 867                 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
 868
 869                 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
 870                 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 871                 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 872                 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
 873
 874                 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
 875
 876                 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
 877                         ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
 878                                 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 879                                         offered: $offered,
 880                                         amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
 881                                         cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
 882                                         payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
 883                                         transaction_output_index: None
 884                                 }
 885                         }
 886                 }
 887
 888                 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
 889                         ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
 890                                 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
 891                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
 892                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
 893                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 894                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 895                                         } else {
 896                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 897                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 898                                         }
 899                                 } else {
 900                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
 901                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
 902                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 903                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 904                                         } else {
 905                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 906                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 907                                         }
 908                                 }
 909                         }
 910                 }
 911
 912                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
 913                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
 914                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
 915                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
 916                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
 917                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
 918                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
 919                         };
 920
 921                         if include {
 922                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
 923                                 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 924                         } else {
 925                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
 926                                 match &htlc.state {
 927                                         &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
 928                                                 if generated_by_local {
 929                                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
 930                                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 931                                                         }
 932                                                 }
 933                                         },
 934                                         _ => {},
 935                                 }
 936                         }
 937                 }
 938
 939                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
 940                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
 941                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
 942                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
 943                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
 944                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
 945                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
 946                         };
 947
 948                         if include {
 949                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
 950                                 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 951                         } else {
 952                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
 953                                 match htlc.state {
 954                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
 955                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 956                                         },
 957                                         OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
 958                                                 if !generated_by_local {
 959                                                         value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 960                                                 }
 961                                         },
 962                                         _ => {},
 963                                 }
 964                         }
 965                 }
 966
 967                 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
 968                 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
 969                 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
 970                 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
 971                 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
 972                 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
 973                 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
 974                 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
 975
 976                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 977                 {
 978                         // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
 979                         // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
 980                         let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
 981                                 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
 982                         } else {
 983                                 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
 984                         };
 985                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
 986                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
 987                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
 988                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
 989                 }
 990
 991                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 992                 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
 993                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
 994                 } else {
 995                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
 996                 };
 997
 998                 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
 999                 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1000
1001                 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1002                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1003                 } else {
1004                         value_to_a = 0;
1005                 }
1006
1007                 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1008                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1009                 } else {
1010                         value_to_b = 0;
1011                 }
1012
1013                 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1014
1015                 let channel_parameters =
1016                         if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1017                         else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1018                 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1019                                                                              value_to_a as u64,
1020                                                                              value_to_b as u64,
1021                                                                              keys.clone(),
1022                                                                              feerate_per_kw,
1023                                                                              &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1024                                                                              &channel_parameters
1025                 );
1026                 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1027                 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1028                 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1029                 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1030
1031                 (tx, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1032         }
1033
1034         #[inline]
1035         fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1036                 let channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1037                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1038         }
1039
1040         #[inline]
1041         fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1042                 let mut ret =
1043                 (4 +                                           // version
1044                  1 +                                           // input count
1045                  36 +                                          // prevout
1046                  1 +                                           // script length (0)
1047                  4 +                                           // sequence
1048                  1 +                                           // output count
1049                  4                                             // lock time
1050                  )*4 +                                         // * 4 for non-witness parts
1051                 2 +                                            // witness marker and flag
1052                 1 +                                            // witness element count
1053                 4 +                                            // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1054                 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1055                 2*(1 + 71);                                    // two signatures + sighash type flags
1056                 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1057                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1058                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1059                 }
1060                 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1061                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1062                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1063                 }
1064                 ret
1065         }
1066
1067         #[inline]
1068         fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1069                 let txins = {
1070                         let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1071                         ins.push(TxIn {
1072                                 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1073                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1074                                 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1075                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1076                         });
1077                         ins
1078                 };
1079
1080                 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1081                 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1082                 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1083
1084                 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1085                 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1086                 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1087
1088                 if value_to_self < 0 {
1089                         assert!(self.is_outbound());
1090                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1091                 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1092                         assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1093                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1094                 }
1095
1096                 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1097                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1098                                 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1099                                 value: value_to_remote as u64
1100                         }, ()));
1101                 }
1102
1103                 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1104                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1105                                 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1106                                 value: value_to_self as u64
1107                         }, ()));
1108                 }
1109
1110                 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1111
1112                 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1113                 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1114                         outputs.push(out.0);
1115                 }
1116
1117                 (Transaction {
1118                         version: 2,
1119                         lock_time: 0,
1120                         input: txins,
1121                         output: outputs,
1122                 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1123         }
1124
1125         fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1126                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1127         }
1128
1129         #[inline]
1130         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1131         /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1132         /// our counterparty!)
1133         /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1134         /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1135         fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1136                 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1137                 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1138                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1139                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1140
1141                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1142         }
1143
1144         #[inline]
1145         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1146         /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1147         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1148         fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1149                 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1150                 //may see payments to it!
1151                 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1152                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1153                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1154
1155                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1156         }
1157
1158         /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1159         /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1160         /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1161         pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1162                 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1163         }
1164
1165         /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1166         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1167         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1168         fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Transaction {
1169                 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay() } else { self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay() }, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1170         }
1171
1172         /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1173         /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1174         /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1175         ///
1176         /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1177         /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1178         fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1179                 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1180                 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1181                 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1182                 // either.
1183                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1184                         panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1185                 }
1186                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1187
1188                 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1189
1190                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1191                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1192                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1193
1194                 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1195                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1196                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1197                                 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1198                                 match htlc.state {
1199                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1200                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1201                                                 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1202                                                 } else {
1203                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1204                                                 }
1205                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1206                                                 return Ok((None, None));
1207                                         },
1208                                         _ => {
1209                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1210                                                 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1211                                         }
1212                                 }
1213                                 pending_idx = idx;
1214                                 break;
1215                         }
1216                 }
1217                 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1218                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1219                 }
1220
1221                 // Now update local state:
1222                 //
1223                 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1224                 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1225                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1226                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1227                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1228                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1229                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1230                         }],
1231                 };
1232
1233                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1234                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1235                                 match pending_update {
1236                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1237                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1238                                                         // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1239                                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1240                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1241                                                         return Ok((None, None));
1242                                                 }
1243                                         },
1244                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1245                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1246                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1247                                                         // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1248                                                         // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1249                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1250                                                         return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1251                                                 }
1252                                         },
1253                                         _ => {}
1254                                 }
1255                         }
1256                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1257                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1258                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1259                         });
1260                         return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1261                 }
1262
1263                 {
1264                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1265                         if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1266                         } else {
1267                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1268                                 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1269                         }
1270                         log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1271                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1272                 }
1273
1274                 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1275                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1276                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1277                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1278                 }), Some(monitor_update)))
1279         }
1280
1281         pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1282                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger)? {
1283                         (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), Some(mut monitor_update)) => {
1284                                 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1285                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1286                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1287                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1288                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1289                                 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1290                         },
1291                         (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), None) => {
1292                                 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1293                                 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1294                         },
1295                         (None, Some(monitor_update)) => Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))),
1296                         (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1297                 }
1298         }
1299
1300         /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1301         /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1302         /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1303         ///
1304         /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1305         /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1306         pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
1307                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1308                         panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1309                 }
1310                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1311
1312                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1313                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1314                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1315
1316                 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1317                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1318                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1319                                 match htlc.state {
1320                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1321                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1322                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1323                                                 return Ok(None);
1324                                         },
1325                                         _ => {
1326                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1327                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1328                                         }
1329                                 }
1330                                 pending_idx = idx;
1331                         }
1332                 }
1333                 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1334                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1335                 }
1336
1337                 // Now update local state:
1338                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1339                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1340                                 match pending_update {
1341                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1342                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1343                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1344                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1345                                                 }
1346                                         },
1347                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1348                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1349                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1350                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1351                                                 }
1352                                         },
1353                                         _ => {}
1354                                 }
1355                         }
1356                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1357                                 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1358                                 err_packet,
1359                         });
1360                         return Ok(None);
1361                 }
1362
1363                 {
1364                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1365                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1366                 }
1367
1368                 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1369                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1370                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1371                         reason: err_packet
1372                 }))
1373         }
1374
1375         // Message handlers:
1376
1377         pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1378                 // Check sanity of message fields:
1379                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1380                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1381                 }
1382                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1383                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1384                 }
1385                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1386                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1387                 }
1388                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1389                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1390                 }
1391                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1392                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve ({}) and dust_limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1393                 }
1394                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1395                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1396                 }
1397                 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1398                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1399                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1400                 }
1401                 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1402                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1403                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1404                 }
1405                 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1406                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1407                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1408                 }
1409                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1410                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1411                 }
1412                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1413                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1414                 }
1415
1416                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1417                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1418                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1419                 }
1420                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1421                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1422                 }
1423                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1424                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1425                 }
1426                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1427                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1428                 }
1429                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
1430                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1431                 }
1432                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
1433                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1434                 }
1435                 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1436                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1437                 }
1438
1439                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1440                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1441                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1442                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1443                                         if script.len() == 0 {
1444                                                 None
1445                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1446                                         } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
1447                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
1448                                         } else {
1449                                                 Some(script.clone())
1450                                         }
1451                                 },
1452                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1453                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1454                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1455                                 }
1456                         }
1457                 } else { None };
1458
1459                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1460                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1461                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1462                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1463                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1464                 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1465
1466                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1467                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1468                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1469                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1470                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1471                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1472                 };
1473
1474                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1475                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1476                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1477                 });
1478
1479                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1480                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1481
1482                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1483
1484                 Ok(())
1485         }
1486
1487         fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1488                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1489
1490                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1491                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1492                 {
1493                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1494                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1495                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1496                         // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1497                         log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1498                         secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1499                 }
1500
1501                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1502                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1503
1504                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1505                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1506                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1507
1508                 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1509                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1510
1511                 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1512                 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1513         }
1514
1515         fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1516                 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1517         }
1518
1519         pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1520                 if self.is_outbound() {
1521                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1522                 }
1523                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1524                         // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1525                         // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1526                         // channel.
1527                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1528                 }
1529                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1530                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1531                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1532                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1533                 }
1534
1535                 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1536                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1537                 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks.  In particular
1538                 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1539                 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1540
1541                 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1542                         Ok(res) => res,
1543                         Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1544                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1545                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1546                         },
1547                         Err(e) => {
1548                                 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1549                                 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1550                                 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1551                         }
1552                 };
1553
1554                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1555                         initial_commitment_tx,
1556                         msg.signature,
1557                         Vec::new(),
1558                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1559                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1560                 );
1561
1562                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1563
1564                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1565                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1566                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1567                 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1568                                                           &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1569                                                           &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1570                                                           &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1571                                                           funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1572                                                           obscure_factor,
1573                                                           holder_commitment_tx);
1574
1575                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1576
1577                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1578                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1579                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1580                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1581
1582                 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1583                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
1584                         signature
1585                 }, channel_monitor))
1586         }
1587
1588         /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1589         /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1590         pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1591                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1592                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1593                 }
1594                 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1595                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1596                 }
1597                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1598                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1599                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1600                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1601                 }
1602
1603                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1604
1605                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1606                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1607                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1608                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1609
1610                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1611
1612                 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1613                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1614                 {
1615                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1616                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1617                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1618                         // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1619                         if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1620                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1621                         }
1622                 }
1623
1624                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1625                         initial_commitment_tx,
1626                         msg.signature,
1627                         Vec::new(),
1628                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1629                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1630                 );
1631
1632
1633                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1634                 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1635                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1636                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1637                 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1638                                                           &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1639                                                           &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1640                                                           &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1641                                                           funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1642                                                           obscure_factor,
1643                                                           holder_commitment_tx);
1644
1645                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1646
1647                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1648                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1649                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1650                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1651
1652                 Ok(channel_monitor)
1653         }
1654
1655         pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1656                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1657                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1658                 }
1659
1660                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1661
1662                 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1663                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1664                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1665                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1666                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
1667                 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1668                                  // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1669                                  self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1670                                  self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1671                                 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1672                                 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1673                                                       (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1674                         if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1675                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1676                         }
1677                         // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1678                         return Ok(());
1679                 } else {
1680                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1681                 }
1682
1683                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1684                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1685                 Ok(())
1686         }
1687
1688         /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1689         fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1690                 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1691                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1692                         htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1693                 }
1694                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1695         }
1696
1697         /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1698         /// holding cell.
1699         fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1700                 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1701                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1702                         htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1703                 }
1704
1705                 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1706                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1707                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1708                                 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1709                                 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1710                         }
1711                 }
1712
1713                 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1714         }
1715
1716         /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1717         /// Doesn't bother handling the
1718         /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1719         /// corner case properly.
1720         pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1721                 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1722                 (cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1723                 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1724         }
1725
1726         // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1727         // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1728         fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1729                 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1730                 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1731                 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1732         }
1733
1734         // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1735         // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
1736         // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
1737         // are excluded.
1738         fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1739                 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1740
1741                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1742                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1743
1744                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1745                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1746                 match htlc.origin {
1747                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1748                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1749                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1750                                 }
1751                         },
1752                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1753                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1754                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1755                                 }
1756                         }
1757                 }
1758
1759                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1760                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1761                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1762                                 continue
1763                         }
1764                         // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1765                         // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1766                         included_htlcs += 1;
1767                 }
1768
1769                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1770                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1771                                 continue
1772                         }
1773                         match htlc.state {
1774                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1775                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1776                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1777                                 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1778                                 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1779                                 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1780                                 _ => {},
1781                         }
1782                 }
1783
1784                 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1785                         match htlc {
1786                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1787                                         if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1788                                                 continue
1789                                         }
1790                                         included_htlcs += 1
1791                                 },
1792                                 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1793                                          // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1794                         }
1795                 }
1796
1797                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1798                 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1799                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1800                 {
1801                         let mut fee = res;
1802                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1803                                 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1804                         }
1805                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1806                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1807                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1808                                 fee,
1809                                 total_pending_htlcs,
1810                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1811                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1812                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1813                                 },
1814                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1815                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1816                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1817                                 },
1818                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1819                         };
1820                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1821                 }
1822                 res
1823         }
1824
1825         // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1826         // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
1827         // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
1828         // excluded.
1829         fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1830                 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1831
1832                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1833                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1834
1835                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1836                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1837                 match htlc.origin {
1838                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1839                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1840                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1841                                 }
1842                         },
1843                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1844                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1845                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1846                                 }
1847                         }
1848                 }
1849
1850                 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1851                 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1852                 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1853                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1854                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1855                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1856                                 continue
1857                         }
1858                         included_htlcs += 1;
1859                 }
1860
1861                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1862                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1863                                 continue
1864                         }
1865                         // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1866                         // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1867                         match htlc.state {
1868                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1869                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1870                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1871                                 _ => {},
1872                         }
1873                 }
1874
1875                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1876                 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1877                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1878                 {
1879                         let mut fee = res;
1880                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1881                                 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1882                         }
1883                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1884                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1885                                 fee,
1886                                 total_pending_htlcs,
1887                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1888                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1889                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1890                                 },
1891                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1892                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1893                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1894                                 },
1895                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1896                         };
1897                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1898                 }
1899                 res
1900         }
1901
1902         pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1903         where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
1904                 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
1905                 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1906                 if local_sent_shutdown {
1907                         pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
1908                 }
1909                 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
1910                 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1911                 if remote_sent_shutdown {
1912                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1913                 }
1914                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1915                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1916                 }
1917                 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1918                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
1919                 }
1920                 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
1921                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
1922                 }
1923                 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
1924                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
1925                 }
1926
1927                 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1928                 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1929                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
1930                 }
1931                 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1932                 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1933                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1934                 }
1935                 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1936                 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1937                 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1938                 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1939                 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1940                 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1941                 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1942                 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1943                 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1944                 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1945                 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1946                 // transaction).
1947                 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
1948                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1949                         if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
1950                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1951                         } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
1952                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1953                         }
1954                 }
1955
1956                 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
1957                         self.value_to_self_msat + htlc_inbound_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
1958                 let pending_remote_value_msat =
1959                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
1960                 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
1961                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
1962                 }
1963
1964                 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
1965                 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
1966                 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
1967                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
1968                         self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
1969                 };
1970                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
1971                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
1972                 };
1973
1974                 let chan_reserve_msat =
1975                         Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
1976                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
1977                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
1978                 }
1979
1980                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1981                         // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
1982                         // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
1983                         // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
1984                         // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
1985                         // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
1986                         // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
1987                         // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
1988                         // sensitive to fee spikes.
1989                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
1990                         let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
1991                         if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
1992                                 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
1993                                 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
1994                                 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation");
1995                                 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
1996                         }
1997                 } else {
1998                         // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
1999                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2000                         let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2001                         if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2002                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2003                         }
2004                 }
2005                 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2006                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2007                 }
2008                 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2009                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2010                 }
2011
2012                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2013                         if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2014                                 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2015                         }
2016                 }
2017
2018                 // Now update local state:
2019                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2020                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2021                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2022                         amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2023                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2024                         cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2025                         state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2026                 });
2027                 Ok(())
2028         }
2029
2030         /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2031         #[inline]
2032         fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2033                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2034                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2035                                 match check_preimage {
2036                                         None => {},
2037                                         Some(payment_hash) =>
2038                                                 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2039                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2040                                                 }
2041                                 };
2042                                 match htlc.state {
2043                                         OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2044                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2045                                         OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2046                                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2047                                         },
2048                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2049                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2050                                 }
2051                                 return Ok(&htlc.source);
2052                         }
2053                 }
2054                 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2055         }
2056
2057         pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2058                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2059                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2060                 }
2061                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2062                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2063                 }
2064
2065                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2066                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
2067         }
2068
2069         pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2070                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2071                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2072                 }
2073                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2074                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2075                 }
2076
2077                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2078                 Ok(())
2079         }
2080
2081         pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2082                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2083                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2084                 }
2085                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2086                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2087                 }
2088
2089                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2090                 Ok(())
2091         }
2092
2093         pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2094         where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2095                                 L::Target: Logger
2096         {
2097                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2098                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2099                 }
2100                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2101                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2102                 }
2103                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2104                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2105                 }
2106
2107                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2108
2109                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2110
2111                 let mut update_fee = false;
2112                 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2113                         update_fee = true;
2114                         self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
2115                 } else {
2116                         self.feerate_per_kw
2117                 };
2118
2119                 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid) = {
2120                         let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
2121                         let commitment_txid = {
2122                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2123                                 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2124                                 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2125
2126                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
2127                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2128                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2129                                 }
2130                                 bitcoin_tx.txid
2131                         };
2132                         let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2133                         (commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid)
2134                 };
2135
2136                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2137                 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
2138                 if update_fee {
2139                         let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2140                         if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2141                                 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2142                         }
2143                 }
2144                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2145                 {
2146                         if self.is_outbound() {
2147                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2148                                 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2149                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2150                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2151                                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2152                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2153                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2154                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2155                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2156                                                         assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2157                                                 }
2158                                 }
2159                         }
2160                 }
2161
2162                 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2163                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2164                 }
2165
2166                 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2167                 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2168                 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2169                         if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2170                                 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &keys, feerate_per_kw);
2171                                 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2172                                 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2173                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
2174                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2175                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2176                                 }
2177                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2178                         } else {
2179                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2180                         }
2181                 }
2182
2183                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2184                         commitment_tx,
2185                         msg.signature,
2186                         msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2187                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2188                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2189                 );
2190
2191                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2192                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2193
2194                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2195                 let mut need_commitment = false;
2196                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2197                         if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
2198                                 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
2199                                 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
2200                                 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
2201                                 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
2202                                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
2203                                         need_commitment = true;
2204                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2205                                 }
2206                         }
2207                 }
2208
2209                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2210                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2211                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2212                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2213                                 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2214                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2215                         }]
2216                 };
2217
2218                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2219                         let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2220                                 Some(forward_info.clone())
2221                         } else { None };
2222                         if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2223                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2224                                 need_commitment = true;
2225                         }
2226                 }
2227                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2228                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2229                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
2230                         } else { None } {
2231                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2232                                 need_commitment = true;
2233                         }
2234                 }
2235
2236                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2237                 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2238                 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2239                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2240
2241                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2242                         // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2243                         // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2244                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2245                         if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2246                                 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2247                                 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2248                                 // includes the right HTLCs.
2249                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2250                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2251                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2252                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2253                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2254                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2255                         }
2256                         // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2257                         // re-send the message on restoration)
2258                         return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2259                 }
2260
2261                 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2262                         // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2263                         // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2264                         // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2265                         let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2266                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2267                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2268                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2269                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2270                         (Some(msg), None)
2271                 } else if !need_commitment {
2272                         (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2273                 } else { (None, None) };
2274
2275                 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2276                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2277                         per_commitment_secret,
2278                         next_per_commitment_point,
2279                 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2280         }
2281
2282         /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2283         /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2284         fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2285                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2286                 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2287                         log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
2288
2289                         let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2290                                 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2291                                 updates: Vec::new(),
2292                         };
2293
2294                         let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2295                         mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2296                         let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2297                         let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2298                         let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2299                         let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2300                         for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2301                                 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2302                                 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2303                                 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2304                                 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2305                                 // to rebalance channels.
2306                                 match &htlc_update {
2307                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2308                                                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2309                                                         Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2310                                                         Err(e) => {
2311                                                                 match e {
2312                                                                         ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2313                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2314                                                                                 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2315                                                                                 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2316                                                                                 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2317                                                                                 // into the holding cell without ever being
2318                                                                                 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2319                                                                                 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2320                                                                                 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2321                                                                         },
2322                                                                         _ => {
2323                                                                                 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2324                                                                         },
2325                                                                 }
2326                                                         }
2327                                                 }
2328                                         },
2329                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2330                                                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2331                                                         Ok((update_fulfill_msg_option, additional_monitor_update_opt)) => {
2332                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2333                                                                 if let Some(mut additional_monitor_update) = additional_monitor_update_opt {
2334                                                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2335                                                                 }
2336                                                         },
2337                                                         Err(e) => {
2338                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2339                                                                 else {
2340                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
2341                                                                 }
2342                                                         }
2343                                                 }
2344                                         },
2345                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2346                                                 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
2347                                                         Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
2348                                                         Err(e) => {
2349                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2350                                                                 else {
2351                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2352                                                                 }
2353                                                         }
2354                                                 }
2355                                         },
2356                                 }
2357                         }
2358                         if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2359                                 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2360                         }
2361                         let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2362                                 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2363                                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2364                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2365                                         feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2366                                 })
2367                         } else {
2368                                 None
2369                         };
2370
2371                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2372                         // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2373                         // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2374                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2375                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2376
2377                         Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2378                                 update_add_htlcs,
2379                                 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2380                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2381                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2382                                 update_fee,
2383                                 commitment_signed,
2384                         }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2385                 } else {
2386                         Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2387                 }
2388         }
2389
2390         /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2391         /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2392         /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2393         /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2394         /// revoke_and_ack message.
2395         pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2396                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2397                                         L::Target: Logger,
2398         {
2399                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2400                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2401                 }
2402                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2403                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2404                 }
2405                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2406                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2407                 }
2408
2409                 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2410                         if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2411                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2412                         }
2413                 }
2414
2415                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2416                         // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2417                         // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2418                         // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2419                         // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2420                         // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2421                         // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2422                         // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2423                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2424                 }
2425
2426                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2427                 {
2428                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2429                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2430                 }
2431
2432                 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2433                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2434                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2435                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2436                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2437                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2438                                 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2439                                 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2440                         }],
2441                 };
2442
2443                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2444                 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2445                 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2446                 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2447                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2448                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2449                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2450                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2451
2452                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
2453                 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2454                 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2455                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2456                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2457                 let mut require_commitment = false;
2458                 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2459
2460                 {
2461                         // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2462                         let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2463                         let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2464
2465                         // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2466                         pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2467                                 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2468                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2469                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2470                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2471                                         }
2472                                         false
2473                                 } else { true }
2474                         });
2475                         pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2476                                 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2477                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2478                                         if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2479                                                 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2480                                         } else {
2481                                                 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2482                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2483                                         }
2484                                         false
2485                                 } else { true }
2486                         });
2487                         for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2488                                 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2489                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2490                                         true
2491                                 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2492                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2493                                         true
2494                                 } else { false };
2495                                 if swap {
2496                                         let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2497                                         mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2498
2499                                         if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2500                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2501                                                 require_commitment = true;
2502                                         } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2503                                                 match forward_info {
2504                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2505                                                                 require_commitment = true;
2506                                                                 match fail_msg {
2507                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2508                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2509                                                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2510                                                                         },
2511                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2512                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2513                                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2514                                                                         },
2515                                                                 }
2516                                                         },
2517                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2518                                                                 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2519                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2520                                                         }
2521                                                 }
2522                                         }
2523                                 }
2524                         }
2525                         for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2526                                 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2527                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2528                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2529                                 }
2530                                 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2531                                         Some(fail_reason.take())
2532                                 } else { None } {
2533                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2534                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2535                                         require_commitment = true;
2536                                 }
2537                         }
2538                 }
2539                 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2540
2541                 if self.is_outbound() {
2542                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2543                                 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2544                         }
2545                 } else {
2546                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2547                                 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2548                                 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2549                                 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2550                                 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2551                                 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2552                                 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2553                                         require_commitment = true;
2554                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2555                                 }
2556                         }
2557                 }
2558
2559                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2560                         // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2561                         // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2562                         if require_commitment {
2563                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2564                                 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2565                                 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2566                                 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2567                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2568                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2569                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2570                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2571                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2572                         }
2573                         self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2574                         self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2575                         return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2576                 }
2577
2578                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2579                         (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2580                                 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2581                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2582                                         commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2583                                 }
2584                                 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2585                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2586                                         commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2587                                 }
2588
2589                                 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2590                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2591                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2592                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2593
2594                                 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2595                         },
2596                         (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2597                                 if require_commitment {
2598                                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2599
2600                                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2601                                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2602                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2603                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2604
2605                                         Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2606                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2607                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2608                                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2609                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2610                                                 update_fee: None,
2611                                                 commitment_signed
2612                                         }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2613                                 } else {
2614                                         Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2615                                 }
2616                         }
2617                 }
2618
2619         }
2620
2621         /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2622         /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2623         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2624         fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2625                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2626                         panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2627                 }
2628                 if !self.is_usable() {
2629                         panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2630                 }
2631                 if !self.is_live() {
2632                         panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2633                 }
2634
2635                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2636                         self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2637                         return None;
2638                 }
2639
2640                 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2641                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2642
2643                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2644                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2645                         feerate_per_kw,
2646                 })
2647         }
2648
2649         pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2650                 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2651                         Some(update_fee) => {
2652                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2653                                 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2654                         },
2655                         None => Ok(None)
2656                 }
2657         }
2658
2659         /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2660         /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2661         /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2662         /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2663         /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2664         /// completed.
2665         pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> where L::Target: Logger {
2666                 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2667
2668                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2669                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2670                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2671                         return outbound_drops;
2672                 }
2673                 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2674                 // will be retransmitted.
2675                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2676
2677                 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2678                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2679                         match htlc.state {
2680                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2681                                         // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2682                                         // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2683                                         // this HTLC accordingly
2684                                         inbound_drop_count += 1;
2685                                         false
2686                                 },
2687                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2688                                         // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2689                                         // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2690                                         // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2691                                         true
2692                                 },
2693                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2694                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2695                                         // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2696                                         // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2697                                         // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2698                                         // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2699                                         true
2700                                 },
2701                         }
2702                 });
2703                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2704
2705                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2706                         if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2707                                 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2708                                 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2709                                 // the update upon reconnection.
2710                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2711                         }
2712                 }
2713
2714                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2715                         match htlc_update {
2716                                 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are
2717                                 // no holding cell HTLC update_adds, so if in the future we stop
2718                                 // dropping added HTLCs here and failing them backwards, then there will
2719                                 // need to be corresponding changes made in the Channel's re-establish
2720                                 // logic.
2721                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2722                                         outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2723                                         false
2724                                 },
2725                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2726                         }
2727                 });
2728                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2729                 log_debug!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2730                 outbound_drops
2731         }
2732
2733         /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2734         /// updates are partially paused.
2735         /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2736         /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2737         /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2738         /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2739         pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2740                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2741                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2742                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2743                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2744                 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2745                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2746                 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2747                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2748         }
2749
2750         /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2751         /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2752         /// to the remote side.
2753         pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
2754                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2755                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2756
2757                 let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound();
2758
2759                 // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
2760                 // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
2761                 // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
2762                 // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
2763                 // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
2764                 // monitor was persisted.
2765                 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2766                         assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
2767                         self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2768                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2769                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2770                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2771                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2772                         })
2773                 } else { None };
2774
2775                 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2776                 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2777                 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2778                 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2779
2780                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2781                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2782                         self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2783                         return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
2784                 }
2785
2786                 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2787                         Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2788                 } else { None };
2789                 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2790                         Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
2791                 } else { None };
2792
2793                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2794                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2795                 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2796                 log_trace!(logger, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2797                         if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
2798                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
2799                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2800                         match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2801                 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
2802         }
2803
2804         pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2805                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2806         {
2807                 if self.is_outbound() {
2808                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
2809                 }
2810                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2811                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2812                 }
2813                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2814                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw);
2815                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2816                 Ok(())
2817         }
2818
2819         fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2820                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2821                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2822                 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2823                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2824                         per_commitment_secret,
2825                         next_per_commitment_point,
2826                 }
2827         }
2828
2829         fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
2830                 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2831                 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2832                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2833                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2834
2835                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2836                         if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2837                                 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2838                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2839                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2840                                         amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2841                                         payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2842                                         cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2843                                         onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2844                                 });
2845                         }
2846                 }
2847
2848                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2849                         if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2850                                 match reason {
2851                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2852                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2853                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2854                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2855                                                         reason: err_packet.clone()
2856                                                 });
2857                                         },
2858                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2859                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2860                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2861                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2862                                                         sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2863                                                         failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2864                                                 });
2865                                         },
2866                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2867                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2868                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2869                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2870                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2871                                                 });
2872                                         },
2873                                 }
2874                         }
2875                 }
2876
2877                 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2878                                 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2879                 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2880                         update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2881                         update_fee: None,
2882                         commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2883                 }
2884         }
2885
2886         /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2887         /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2888         pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2889                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2890                         // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2891                         // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2892                         // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2893                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
2894                 }
2895
2896                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2897                         msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2898                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2899                 }
2900
2901                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
2902                         match msg.data_loss_protect {
2903                                 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
2904                                         let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2905                                         let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
2906                                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
2907                                         if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
2908                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
2909                                         }
2910                                         if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2911                                                 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
2912                                                         "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
2913                                                 ));
2914                                         }
2915                                 },
2916                                 OptionalField::Absent => {}
2917                         }
2918                 }
2919
2920                 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2921                 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2922                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2923
2924                 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2925                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2926                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2927                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2928                         })
2929                 } else { None };
2930
2931                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2932                         // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
2933                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
2934                                         self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2935                                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2936                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
2937                                 }
2938                                 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2939                                 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2940                         }
2941
2942                         // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2943                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2944                         return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2945                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2946                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2947                         }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2948                 }
2949
2950                 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2951                         // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2952                         // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2953                         None
2954                 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2955                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2956                                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2957                                 None
2958                         } else {
2959                                 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2960                         }
2961                 } else {
2962                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
2963                 };
2964
2965                 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2966                 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2967                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2968                 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2969                 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2970
2971                 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2972                         // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2973                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2974                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2975                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2976                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2977                         })
2978                 } else { None };
2979
2980                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
2981                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
2982                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2983                         } else {
2984                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2985                         }
2986
2987                         if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2988                                 // Note that if in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
2989                                 // disconnect, this logic will need to be updated.
2990                                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2991                                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } = htlc_update {
2992                                                 debug_assert!(false, "There shouldn't be any add-HTLCs in the holding cell now because they should have been dropped on peer disconnect. Panic here because said HTLCs won't be handled correctly.");
2993                                         }
2994                                 }
2995
2996                                 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
2997                                 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
2998                                 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
2999                                 // now!
3000                                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3001                                         Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3002                                         Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3003                                         Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3004                                                 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3005                                                 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3006                                                 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
3007                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3008                                         },
3009                                         Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3010                                                 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3011                                                 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3012                                                 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
3013                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3014                                         },
3015                                 }
3016                         } else {
3017                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3018                         }
3019                 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3020                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
3021                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3022                         } else {
3023                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3024                         }
3025
3026                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3027                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3028                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3029                         }
3030
3031                         return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3032                 } else {
3033                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3034                 }
3035         }
3036
3037         fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
3038                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3039         {
3040                 if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
3041                                 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
3042                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3043                         return None;
3044                 }
3045
3046                 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3047                 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
3048                         proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
3049                 }
3050                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3051                 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3052
3053                 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
3054                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3055                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3056                         .ok();
3057                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3058                 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
3059
3060                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
3061                 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3062                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3063                         fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3064                         signature: sig.unwrap(),
3065                 })
3066         }
3067
3068         pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3069                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3070         {
3071                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3072                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3073                 }
3074                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3075                         // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3076                         // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3077                         // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3078                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3079                 }
3080                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3081                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3082                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3083                         }
3084                 }
3085                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3086
3087                 if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, &msg.scriptpubkey) {
3088                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3089                 }
3090
3091                 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3092                         if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3093                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3094                         }
3095                 } else {
3096                         self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
3097                 }
3098
3099                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3100
3101                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3102                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3103
3104                 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3105                 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3106                 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3107                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3108                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3109                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3110                         match htlc_update {
3111                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3112                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3113                                         false
3114                                 },
3115                                 _ => true
3116                         }
3117                 });
3118                 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
3119                 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
3120                 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3121
3122                 let shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3123                         None
3124                 } else {
3125                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3126                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3127                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3128                         })
3129                 };
3130
3131                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3132                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3133
3134                 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3135         }
3136
3137         fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3138                 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3139                 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3140                 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3141
3142                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3143
3144                 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3145                 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3146                 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3147                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3148                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3149                 } else {
3150                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3151                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3152                 }
3153                 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3154                 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3155
3156                 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3157         }
3158
3159         pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3160                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3161         {
3162                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3163                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3164                 }
3165                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3166                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3167                 }
3168                 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3169                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3170                 }
3171                 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3172                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3173                 }
3174
3175                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3176                 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3177                 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3178                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3179                 }
3180                 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3181
3182                 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3183                         Ok(_) => {},
3184                         Err(_e) => {
3185                                 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3186                                 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3187                                 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3188                                 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3189                                 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3190                         },
3191                 };
3192
3193                 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3194                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3195                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3196                 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3197                         if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3198                                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3199                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3200                                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3201                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3202                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3203                                 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3204                         }
3205                 }
3206
3207                 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3208                         ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3209                                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3210                                 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3211                                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3212                                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3213                                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3214                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3215                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3216                                 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3217                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3218                                         fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3219                                         signature: sig,
3220                                 }), None))
3221                         }
3222                 }
3223
3224                 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3225                 if self.is_outbound() {
3226                         let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3227                         if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3228                                 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3229                                         if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3230                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3231                                         }
3232                                 }
3233                                 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3234                         }
3235                 } else {
3236                         min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3237                 }
3238                 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3239                         if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3240                                 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3241                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3242                                 }
3243                         }
3244                         propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3245                 }
3246
3247                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3248                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3249                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3250                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3251                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3252                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3253
3254                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3255                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3256
3257                 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3258                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3259                         fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3260                         signature: sig,
3261                 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3262         }
3263
3264         // Public utilities:
3265
3266         pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3267                 self.channel_id
3268         }
3269
3270         /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3271         /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3272         pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3273                 self.user_id
3274         }
3275
3276         /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3277         /// is_usable() returns true).
3278         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3279         pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3280                 self.short_channel_id
3281         }
3282
3283         /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3284         /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3285         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3286                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3287         }
3288
3289         fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3290                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3291         }
3292
3293         fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3294                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3295         }
3296
3297         fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3298                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().selected_contest_delay
3299         }
3300
3301         fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3302                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3303         }
3304
3305         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3306         pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3307                 self.counterparty_node_id
3308         }
3309
3310         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3311         #[cfg(test)]
3312         pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3313                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3314         }
3315
3316         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3317         pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3318                 return cmp::min(
3319                         // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3320                         // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3321                         // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3322                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
3323
3324                         Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3325                 );
3326         }
3327
3328         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3329         pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3330                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3331         }
3332
3333         pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3334                 self.channel_value_satoshis
3335         }
3336
3337         pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3338                 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
3339         }
3340
3341         #[cfg(test)]
3342         pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3343                 self.feerate_per_kw
3344         }
3345
3346         pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3347                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3348         }
3349
3350         pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3351                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3352         }
3353
3354         pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3355                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3356         }
3357
3358         #[cfg(test)]
3359         pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3360                 &self.holder_signer
3361         }
3362
3363         #[cfg(test)]
3364         pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3365                 ChannelValueStat {
3366                         value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3367                         channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3368                         channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
3369                         pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3370                         pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3371                         holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3372                                 let mut res = 0;
3373                                 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3374                                         match h {
3375                                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3376                                                         res += amount_msat;
3377                                                 }
3378                                                 _ => {}
3379                                         }
3380                                 }
3381                                 res
3382                         },
3383                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3384                         counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3385                 }
3386         }
3387
3388         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3389         pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3390                 self.update_time_counter
3391         }
3392
3393         pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3394                 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3395         }
3396
3397         pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3398                 self.config.announced_channel
3399         }
3400
3401         pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3402                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3403         }
3404
3405         /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3406         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3407         pub fn get_holder_fee_base_msat<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &F) -> u32
3408                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3409         {
3410                 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
3411                 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
3412
3413                 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
3414                 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
3415
3416                 if self.is_outbound() {
3417                         // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
3418                         res += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
3419                 }
3420
3421                 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
3422                 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) as u64 * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
3423
3424                 res as u32
3425         }
3426
3427         /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3428         pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3429                 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3430         }
3431
3432         /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3433         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3434         pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3435                 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3436                 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3437         }
3438
3439         /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3440         /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3441         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3442         pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3443                 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
3444         }
3445
3446         /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3447         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3448         pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3449                 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3450         }
3451
3452         /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3453         pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3454                 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3455         }
3456
3457         /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3458         /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3459         /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3460         pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3461                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32  {
3462                         assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3463                         true
3464                 } else { false }
3465         }
3466
3467         pub fn to_disabled_staged(&mut self) {
3468                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged;
3469         }
3470
3471         pub fn to_disabled_marked(&mut self) {
3472                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked;
3473         }
3474
3475         pub fn to_fresh(&mut self) {
3476                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::Fresh;
3477         }
3478
3479         pub fn is_disabled_staged(&self) -> bool {
3480                 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged
3481         }
3482
3483         pub fn is_disabled_marked(&self) -> bool {
3484                 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked
3485         }
3486
3487         /// When we receive a new block, we (a) check whether the block contains the funding
3488         /// transaction (which would start us counting blocks until we send the funding_signed), and
3489         /// (b) check the height of the block against outbound holding cell HTLCs in case we need to
3490         /// give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything else (e.g. commitment
3491         /// transaction broadcasts, channel closure detection, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3492         /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3493         ///
3494         /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3495         /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3496         /// post-shutdown.
3497         /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
3498         ///
3499         /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3500         /// back.
3501         pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3502                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3503                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3504                         match htlc_update {
3505                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3506                                         if *cltv_expiry <= height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3507                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3508                                                 false
3509                                         } else { true }
3510                                 },
3511                                 _ => true
3512                         }
3513                 });
3514
3515                 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3516                         self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
3517                 }
3518
3519                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3520                 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3521                         for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3522                                 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3523                                 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
3524                                         let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
3525                                         if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3526                                                         tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3527                                                 if self.is_outbound() {
3528                                                         // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3529                                                         // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3530                                                         // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3531                                                         // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3532                                                         // channel and move on.
3533                                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3534                                                         panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3535                                                 }
3536                                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3537                                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3538                                                 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3539                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3540                                                         data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
3541                                                 });
3542                                         } else {
3543                                                 if self.is_outbound() {
3544                                                         for input in tx.input.iter() {
3545                                                                 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3546                                                                         // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3547                                                                         // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3548                                                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3549                                                                         panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3550                                                                 }
3551                                                         }
3552                                                 }
3553                                                 if height > 0xff_ff_ff || (index_in_block) > 0xff_ff_ff {
3554                                                         panic!("Block was bogus - either height 16 million or had > 16 million transactions");
3555                                                 }
3556                                                 assert!(txo_idx <= 0xffff); // txo_idx is a (u16 as usize), so this is just listed here for completeness
3557                                                 self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
3558                                                 self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64)         << (5*8)) |
3559                                                                              ((index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
3560                                                                              ((txo_idx as u64)        << (0*8)));
3561                                         }
3562                                 }
3563                         }
3564                 }
3565
3566                 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time);
3567                 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3568                         if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
3569                                 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3570                                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3571                                         true
3572                                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3573                                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3574                                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
3575                                         true
3576                                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3577                                         // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3578                                         // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3579                                         false
3580                                 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3581                                         panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3582                                 } else {
3583                                         // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3584                                         // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3585                                         false
3586                                 };
3587                                 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.block_hash());
3588
3589                                 //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
3590                                 //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
3591                                 //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
3592                                 //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
3593                                 if need_commitment_update {
3594                                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3595                                                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3596                                                 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3597                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3598                                                         next_per_commitment_point,
3599                                                 }), timed_out_htlcs));
3600                                         } else {
3601                                                 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3602                                                 return Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs));
3603                                         }
3604                                 }
3605                         }
3606                 }
3607                 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3608         }
3609
3610         /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
3611         /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
3612         /// unconfirmation/reorg.
3613         pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
3614                 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3615                         self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
3616                         if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
3617                                 return true;
3618                         }
3619                 }
3620                 if Some(header.block_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
3621                         self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
3622                 }
3623                 false
3624         }
3625
3626         // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3627         // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3628
3629         pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3630                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3631                         panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3632                 }
3633                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3634                         panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3635                 }
3636
3637                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3638                         panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3639                 }
3640
3641                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3642                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3643
3644                 msgs::OpenChannel {
3645                         chain_hash,
3646                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3647                         funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3648                         push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3649                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3650                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3651                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3652                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3653                         feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
3654                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3655                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3656                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3657                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3658                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3659                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3660                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3661                         first_per_commitment_point,
3662                         channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3663                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3664                 }
3665         }
3666
3667         pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3668                 if self.is_outbound() {
3669                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3670                 }
3671                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3672                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3673                 }
3674                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3675                         panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3676                 }
3677
3678                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3679                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3680
3681                 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3682                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3683                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3684                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3685                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3686                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3687                         minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3688                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3689                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3690                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3691                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3692                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3693                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3694                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3695                         first_per_commitment_point,
3696                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3697                 }
3698         }
3699
3700         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3701         fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3702                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3703                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
3704                 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3705                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
3706         }
3707
3708         /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3709         /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3710         /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3711         /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3712         /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3713         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3714         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3715         pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3716                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3717                         panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3718                 }
3719                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3720                         panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3721                 }
3722                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3723                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3724                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3725                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3726                 }
3727
3728                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
3729                 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
3730
3731                 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
3732                         Ok(res) => res,
3733                         Err(e) => {
3734                                 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3735                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3736                                 return Err(e);
3737                         }
3738                 };
3739
3740                 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3741
3742                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3743
3744                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3745                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3746
3747                 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
3748                         temporary_channel_id,
3749                         funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3750                         funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3751                         signature
3752                 })
3753         }
3754
3755         /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3756         /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3757         /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3758         /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3759         /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3760         /// closing).
3761         /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3762         /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3763         pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3764                 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3765                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
3766                 }
3767                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3768                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
3769                 }
3770                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3771                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
3772                 }
3773
3774                 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
3775
3776                 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3777                         features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3778                         chain_hash,
3779                         short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3780                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
3781                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
3782                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3783                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
3784                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3785                 };
3786
3787                 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3788                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
3789
3790                 Ok((msg, sig))
3791         }
3792
3793         /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3794         /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3795         pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
3796                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3797                 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3798                 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
3799                 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
3800                 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
3801                 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
3802                 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
3803                 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
3804                 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
3805                 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
3806                 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3807                         let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
3808                         log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
3809                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3810                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
3811                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
3812                         })
3813                 } else {
3814                         log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret");
3815                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3816                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
3817                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
3818                         })
3819                 };
3820                 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3821                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3822                         // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3823                         // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3824                         // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3825                         // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3826                         // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3827                         // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3828
3829                         // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3830                         // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3831                         next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
3832                         // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3833                         // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3834                         // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3835                         // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3836                         // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3837                         // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3838                         // overflow here.
3839                         next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3840                         data_loss_protect,
3841                 }
3842         }
3843
3844
3845         // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3846
3847         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3848         /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3849         /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3850         /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3851         /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3852         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3853         /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
3854         pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
3855                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3856                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
3857                 }
3858                 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
3859                 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
3860                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
3861                 }
3862
3863                 if amount_msat == 0 {
3864                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3865                 }
3866
3867                 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
3868                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
3869                 }
3870
3871                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3872                         // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3873                         // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3874                         // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3875                         // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3876                         // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3877                         // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3878                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update".to_owned()));
3879                 }
3880
3881                 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3882                 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3883                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3884                 }
3885                 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3886                 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3887                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3888                 }
3889
3890                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3891                         // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3892                         let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
3893                         let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
3894                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3895                         let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3896                         if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3897                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3898                         }
3899                 }
3900
3901                 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - htlc_outbound_value_msat;
3902                 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
3903                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
3904                 }
3905
3906                 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
3907                 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
3908                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3909                         2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
3910                 } else { 0 };
3911                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
3912                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
3913                 }
3914
3915                 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
3916                 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
3917                 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3918                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
3919                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
3920                 }
3921
3922                 // Now update local state:
3923                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3924                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3925                                 amount_msat,
3926                                 payment_hash,
3927                                 cltv_expiry,
3928                                 source,
3929                                 onion_routing_packet,
3930                         });
3931                         return Ok(None);
3932                 }
3933
3934                 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3935                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3936                         amount_msat,
3937                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3938                         cltv_expiry,
3939                         state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
3940                         source,
3941                 });
3942
3943                 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3944                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3945                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3946                         amount_msat,
3947                         payment_hash,
3948                         cltv_expiry,
3949                         onion_routing_packet,
3950                 };
3951                 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
3952
3953                 Ok(Some(res))
3954         }
3955
3956         /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
3957         /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
3958         /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
3959         /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
3960         pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3961                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3962                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
3963                 }
3964                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3965                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
3966                 }
3967                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3968                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3969                 }
3970                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
3971                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3972                 }
3973                 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
3974                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3975                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3976                                 have_updates = true;
3977                         }
3978                         if have_updates { break; }
3979                 }
3980                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3981                         if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3982                                 have_updates = true;
3983                         }
3984                         if have_updates { break; }
3985                 }
3986                 if !have_updates {
3987                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
3988                 }
3989                 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
3990         }
3991         /// Only fails in case of bad keys
3992         fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3993                 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
3994                 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
3995                 // is acceptable.
3996                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3997                         let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3998                                 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
3999                         } else { None };
4000                         if let Some(state) = new_state {
4001                                 htlc.state = state;
4002                         }
4003                 }
4004                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4005                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4006                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
4007                         } else { None } {
4008                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4009                         }
4010                 }
4011                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4012
4013                 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4014                         Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4015                                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4016                                 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4017                                         htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4018                                 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4019                         },
4020                         Err(e) => return Err(e),
4021                 };
4022
4023                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4024                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4025                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4026                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4027                                 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4028                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4029                                 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4030                                 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4031                         }]
4032                 };
4033                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4034                 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4035         }
4036
4037         /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4038         /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4039         fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4040                 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4041                 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
4042                         if self.is_outbound() {
4043                                 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4044                         }
4045                 }
4046
4047                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4048                 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
4049                 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4050                 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4051
4052                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4053                 {
4054                         if !self.is_outbound() {
4055                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4056                                 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4057                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4058                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4059                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4060                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4061                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4062                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4063                                                         let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.1);
4064                                                         assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4065                                                 }
4066                                 }
4067                         }
4068                 }
4069
4070                 {
4071                         let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len());
4072                         for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
4073                                 htlcs.push(htlc);
4074                         }
4075
4076                         let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4077                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4078                         signature = res.0;
4079                         htlc_signatures = res.1;
4080
4081                         log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {}",
4082                                 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4083                                 &counterparty_commitment_txid,
4084                                 encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4085                                 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
4086
4087                         for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4088                                 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
4089                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4090                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4091                                         log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4092                                         log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
4093                         }
4094                 }
4095
4096                 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4097                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4098                         signature,
4099                         htlc_signatures,
4100                 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
4101         }
4102
4103         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4104         /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4105         /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4106         /// more info.
4107         pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4108                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4109                         Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4110                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4111                                 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4112                         },
4113                         None => Ok(None)
4114                 }
4115         }
4116
4117         /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4118         /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4119         pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
4120                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4121                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4122                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4123                         }
4124                 }
4125                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4126                         if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4127                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4128                         }
4129                         else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4130                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4131                         }
4132                 }
4133                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4134                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4135                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4136                 }
4137
4138                 let closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
4139
4140                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4141                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4142                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4143                 } else {
4144                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4145                 }
4146                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4147
4148                 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4149                 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4150                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4151                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4152                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4153                         match htlc_update {
4154                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4155                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4156                                         false
4157                                 },
4158                                 _ => true
4159                         }
4160                 });
4161
4162                 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
4163                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4164                         scriptpubkey: closing_script,
4165                 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4166         }
4167
4168         /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4169         /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4170         /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4171         /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4172         /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4173         pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4174                 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
4175                 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
4176                 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
4177                 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4178                 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4179
4180                 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4181                 // return them to fail the payment.
4182                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4183                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4184                         match htlc_update {
4185                                 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4186                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4187                                 },
4188                                 _ => {}
4189                         }
4190                 }
4191                 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4192                         // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4193                         // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4194                         // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4195                         // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4196                         // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4197                         // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4198                         // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4199                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4200                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4201                                 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4202                                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4203                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4204                                 }))
4205                         } else { None }
4206                 } else { None };
4207
4208                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4209                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4210                 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4211         }
4212 }
4213
4214 fn is_unsupported_shutdown_script(their_features: &InitFeatures, script: &Script) -> bool {
4215         // We restrain shutdown scripts to standards forms to avoid transactions not propagating on the p2p tx-relay network
4216
4217         // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms,
4218         // which for a a BIP-141-compliant witness program is at max 42 bytes in length.
4219         // So don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
4220         let is_script_too_long = script.len() > 42;
4221         if is_script_too_long {
4222                 return true;
4223         }
4224
4225         if their_features.supports_shutdown_anysegwit() && script.is_witness_program() && script.as_bytes()[0] != OP_PUSHBYTES_0.into_u8() {
4226                 return false;
4227         }
4228
4229         return !script.is_p2pkh() && !script.is_p2sh() && !script.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !script.is_v0_p2wsh()
4230 }
4231
4232 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4233 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4234
4235 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4236         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4237                 match self {
4238                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
4239                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
4240                                 error_packet.write(writer)?;
4241                         },
4242                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
4243                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4244                                 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
4245                                 err_code.write(writer)?;
4246                         },
4247                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4248                                 2u8.write(writer)?;
4249                                 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4250                         },
4251                 }
4252                 Ok(())
4253         }
4254 }
4255
4256 impl Readable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4257         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4258                 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4259                         0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
4260                         1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4261                         2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
4262                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4263                 })
4264         }
4265 }
4266
4267 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4268         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4269                 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4270                 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
4271
4272                 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4273                 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4274
4275                 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4276                 self.config.write(writer)?;
4277
4278                 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4279                 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4280                 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4281
4282                 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4283
4284                 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4285                 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
4286                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::usize::MAX);
4287                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::u32::MAX as usize);
4288                 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4289                 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
4290
4291                 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4292                 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4293
4294                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4295                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4296                 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4297
4298                 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4299                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4300                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4301                                 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4302                         }
4303                 }
4304                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4305                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4306                         if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4307                                 continue; // Drop
4308                         }
4309                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4310                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4311                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4312                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4313                         match &htlc.state {
4314                                 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4315                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4316                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4317                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4318                                 },
4319                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4320                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4321                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4322                                 },
4323                                 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4324                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4325                                 },
4326                                 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4327                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4328                                         removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4329                                 },
4330                         }
4331                 }
4332
4333                 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4334                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4335                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4336                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4337                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4338                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4339                         htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4340                         match &htlc.state {
4341                                 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4342                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4343                                         onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4344                                 },
4345                                 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4346                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4347                                 },
4348                                 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
4349                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4350                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4351                                 },
4352                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4353                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4354                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4355                                 },
4356                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4357                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4358                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4359                                 },
4360                         }
4361                 }
4362
4363                 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4364                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4365                         match update {
4366                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4367                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4368                                         amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4369                                         cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4370                                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4371                                         source.write(writer)?;
4372                                         onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4373                                 },
4374                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4375                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4376                                         payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4377                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4378                                 },
4379                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4380                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4381                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4382                                         err_packet.write(writer)?;
4383                                 }
4384                         }
4385                 }
4386
4387                 match self.resend_order {
4388                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4389                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4390                 }
4391
4392                 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4393                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4394                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4395
4396                 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4397                 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4398                         pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4399                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4400                 }
4401
4402                 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4403                 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4404                         htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4405                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4406                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4407                 }
4408
4409                 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4410                 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4411
4412                 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4413                 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4414                 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4415                 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4416
4417                 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4418                         Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4419                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4420                                 feerate.write(writer)?;
4421                                 fee.write(writer)?;
4422                                 sig.write(writer)?;
4423                         },
4424                         None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4425                 }
4426
4427                 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4428                 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4429                 self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
4430
4431                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4432                 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4433                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4434                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4435                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4436                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4437                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4438                 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
4439
4440                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
4441                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4442
4443                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4444                 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
4445
4446                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4447
4448                 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4449                 Ok(())
4450         }
4451 }
4452
4453 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4454 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
4455                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4456         fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4457                 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4458                 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4459                 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4460                         return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4461                 }
4462
4463                 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4464                 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
4465
4466                 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4467                 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4468                 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4469
4470                 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4471
4472                 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4473                 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
4474                 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
4475                         // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
4476                         let mut data = [0; 1024];
4477                         let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
4478                         reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
4479                         keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
4480                 }
4481                 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
4482
4483                 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4484                 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4485
4486                 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4487                 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4488                 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4489
4490                 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4491                 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4492                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
4493                         pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4494                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4495                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4496                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4497                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4498                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4499                                         1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4500                                         2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4501                                         3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4502                                         4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4503                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4504                                 },
4505                         });
4506                 }
4507
4508                 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4509                 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4510                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4511                         pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4512                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4513                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4514                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4515                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4516                                 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4517                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4518                                         0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4519                                         1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4520                                         2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4521                                         3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4522                                         4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4523                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4524                                 },
4525                         });
4526                 }
4527
4528                 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4529                 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4530                 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4531                         holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4532                                 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4533                                         amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4534                                         cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4535                                         payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4536                                         source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4537                                         onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4538                                 },
4539                                 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4540                                         payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4541                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4542                                 },
4543                                 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4544                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4545                                         err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4546                                 },
4547                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4548                         });
4549                 }
4550
4551                 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4552                         0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4553                         1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4554                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4555                 };
4556
4557                 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4558                 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4559                 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4560
4561                 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4562                 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4563                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4564                         monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4565                 }
4566
4567                 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4568                 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4569                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4570                         monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4571                 }
4572
4573                 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4574                 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4575
4576                 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4577                 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4578                 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
4579                 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4580
4581                 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4582                         0 => None,
4583                         1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4584                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4585                 };
4586
4587                 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4588                 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4589                 let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
4590
4591                 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4592                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4593                 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4594                 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4595                 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4596                 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4597                 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
4598                 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
4599
4600                 let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
4601                 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4602
4603                 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4604                 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4605
4606                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4607                 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4608
4609                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4610                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
4611
4612                 Ok(Channel {
4613                         user_id,
4614
4615                         config,
4616                         channel_id,
4617                         channel_state,
4618                         secp_ctx,
4619                         channel_value_satoshis,
4620
4621                         latest_monitor_update_id,
4622
4623                         holder_signer,
4624                         shutdown_pubkey,
4625                         destination_script,
4626
4627                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4628                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4629                         value_to_self_msat,
4630
4631                         pending_inbound_htlcs,
4632                         pending_outbound_htlcs,
4633                         holding_cell_htlc_updates,
4634
4635                         resend_order,
4636
4637                         monitor_pending_funding_locked,
4638                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
4639                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
4640                         monitor_pending_forwards,
4641                         monitor_pending_failures,
4642
4643                         pending_update_fee,
4644                         holding_cell_update_fee,
4645                         next_holder_htlc_id,
4646                         next_counterparty_htlc_id,
4647                         update_time_counter,
4648                         feerate_per_kw,
4649
4650                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4651                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4652                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4653                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4654
4655                         last_sent_closing_fee,
4656
4657                         funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4658                         short_channel_id,
4659                         funding_tx_confirmations,
4660
4661                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
4662                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4663                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4664                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4665                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
4666                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4667                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
4668                         minimum_depth,
4669
4670                         channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
4671                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
4672
4673                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
4674                         counterparty_node_id,
4675
4676                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4677
4678                         commitment_secrets,
4679
4680                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
4681
4682                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4683                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4684                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4685                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4686                 })
4687         }
4688 }
4689
4690 #[cfg(test)]
4691 mod tests {
4692         use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4693         use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4694         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4695         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
4696         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4697         use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4698         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4699         use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4700         use hex;
4701         use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4702         use ln::channel::{Channel,Sign,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
4703         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4704         use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4705         use ln::msgs::{OptionalField, DataLossProtect, DecodeError};
4706         use ln::chan_utils;
4707         use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
4708         use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4709         use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface};
4710         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4711         use util::config::UserConfig;
4712         use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
4713         use util::test_utils;
4714         use util::logger::Logger;
4715         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
4716         use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4717         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4718         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4719         use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
4720         use std::sync::Arc;
4721
4722         struct TestFeeEstimator {
4723                 fee_est: u32
4724         }
4725         impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4726                 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
4727                         self.fee_est
4728                 }
4729         }
4730
4731         #[test]
4732         fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4733                 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4734                         "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4735         }
4736
4737         struct Keys {
4738                 signer: InMemorySigner,
4739         }
4740         impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4741                 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
4742
4743                 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4744                 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4745                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4746                         let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4747                         let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4748                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4749                 }
4750
4751                 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4752                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4753                         let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4754                         PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4755                 }
4756
4757                 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
4758                         self.signer.clone()
4759                 }
4760                 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4761                 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
4762         }
4763
4764         fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
4765                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
4766         }
4767
4768         // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
4769         // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
4770         #[test]
4771         fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
4772                 let original_fee = 253;
4773                 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
4774                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4775                 let seed = [42; 32];
4776                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4777                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4778
4779                 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4780                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4781                 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4782
4783                 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
4784                 // same as the old fee.
4785                 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
4786                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4787                 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
4788         }
4789
4790         #[test]
4791         fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
4792                 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
4793                 // dust limits are used.
4794                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4795                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4796                 let seed = [42; 32];
4797                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4798                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4799
4800                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
4801                 // they have different dust limits.
4802
4803                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
4804                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4805                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4806                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4807
4808                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4809                 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
4810                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4811                 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis, 1560);
4812                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4813                 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
4814
4815                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
4816                 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4817                 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
4818                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
4819
4820                 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
4821                 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
4822                 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4823                         htlc_id: 0,
4824                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
4825                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
4826                         cltv_expiry: 300000000,
4827                         state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4828                 });
4829
4830                 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4831                         htlc_id: 1,
4832                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
4833                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
4834                         cltv_expiry: 200000000,
4835                         state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4836                         source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4837                                 path: Vec::new(),
4838                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4839                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
4840                         }
4841                 });
4842
4843                 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
4844                 // the dust limit check.
4845                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4846                 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4847                 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
4848                 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
4849
4850                 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
4851                 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
4852                 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
4853                 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
4854                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4855                 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4856                 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
4857         }
4858
4859         #[test]
4860         fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
4861                 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
4862                 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
4863                 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
4864                 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
4865                 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
4866                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4867                 let seed = [42; 32];
4868                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4869                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4870
4871                 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4872                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4873                 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4874
4875                 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
4876                 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
4877
4878                 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
4879                 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
4880                 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
4881                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4882                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4883                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
4884
4885                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
4886                 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
4887                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4888                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4889                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
4890
4891                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
4892
4893                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
4894                 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
4895                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4896                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4897                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
4898
4899                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
4900                 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
4901                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4902                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4903                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
4904         }
4905
4906         #[test]
4907         fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
4908                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4909                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4910                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4911                 let seed = [42; 32];
4912                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4913                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4914
4915                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
4916
4917                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
4918                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4919                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4920                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4921
4922                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4923                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4924                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4925                 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
4926
4927                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
4928                 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4929                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
4930
4931                 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
4932                 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4933                 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4934                         value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
4935                 }]};
4936                 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
4937                 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
4938                 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, &&logger).unwrap();
4939
4940                 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
4941                 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, &&logger);
4942
4943                 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
4944                 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
4945                 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
4946                 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
4947                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
4948                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
4949                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4950                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
4951                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
4952                         },
4953                         _ => panic!()
4954                 }
4955
4956                 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
4957                 // is sane.
4958                 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
4959                 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
4960                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
4961                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
4962                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4963                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
4964                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
4965                         },
4966                         _ => panic!()
4967                 }
4968         }
4969
4970         #[test]
4971         fn outbound_commitment_test() {
4972                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
4973                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4974                 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4975                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4976
4977                 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
4978                         &secp_ctx,
4979                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4980                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4981                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4982                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4983                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4984
4985                         // These aren't set in the test vectors:
4986                         [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
4987                         10_000_000,
4988                         [0; 32]
4989                 );
4990
4991                 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
4992                                 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
4993                 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
4994
4995                 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4996                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
4997                 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
4998                 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
4999                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5000
5001                 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
5002
5003                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5004                         funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5005                         revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5006                         payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
5007                         delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5008                         htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
5009                 };
5010                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5011                         CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5012                                 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5013                                 selected_contest_delay: 144
5014                         });
5015                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5016                 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5017
5018                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5019                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5020
5021                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5022                            hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5023
5024                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5025                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5026
5027                 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5028                 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5029                 // build_commitment_transaction.
5030                 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5031                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5032                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5033                 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5034                 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5035
5036                 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5037                         ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5038                                 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5039                         } ) => { {
5040                                 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
5041                                         let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
5042
5043                                         let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
5044                                                 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
5045                                                 .collect();
5046                                         (res.0, htlcs)
5047                                 };
5048                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
5049                                 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
5050                                 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5051                                 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5052                                 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
5053                                 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
5054
5055                                 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
5056                                 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5057                                 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
5058                                 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5059                                 $({
5060                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5061                                         per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
5062                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
5063                                 })*
5064                                 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
5065
5066                                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
5067                                         commitment_tx.clone(),
5068                                         counterparty_signature,
5069                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs,
5070                                         &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
5071                                         chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
5072                                 );
5073                                 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
5074                                 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
5075
5076                                 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5077                                 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
5078                                 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
5079
5080                                 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
5081                                 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
5082
5083                                 $({
5084                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5085
5086                                         let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
5087                                         let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
5088                                         let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
5089                                         let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
5090                                         secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
5091
5092                                         let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5093                                         if !htlc.offered {
5094                                                 for i in 0..5 {
5095                                                         let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
5096                                                         if out == htlc.payment_hash {
5097                                                                 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
5098                                                         }
5099                                                 }
5100
5101                                                 assert!(preimage.is_some());
5102                                         }
5103
5104                                         let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
5105                                         assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
5106
5107                                         let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5108                                         assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
5109                                         let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
5110                                         let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
5111                                         let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
5112                                         assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
5113                                                         hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
5114                                 })*
5115                                 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
5116                         } }
5117                 }
5118
5119                 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
5120                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
5121
5122                 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
5123                                                  "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
5124                                                  "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", {});
5125
5126                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5127                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5128                                 htlc_id: 0,
5129                                 amount_msat: 1000000,
5130                                 cltv_expiry: 500,
5131                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5132                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5133                         };
5134                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
5135                         out
5136                 });
5137                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5138                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5139                                 htlc_id: 1,
5140                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5141                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
5142                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5143                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5144                         };
5145                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5146                         out
5147                 });
5148                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5149                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5150                                 htlc_id: 2,
5151                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5152                                 cltv_expiry: 502,
5153                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5154                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5155                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5156                         };
5157                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
5158                         out
5159                 });
5160                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5161                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5162                                 htlc_id: 3,
5163                                 amount_msat: 3000000,
5164                                 cltv_expiry: 503,
5165                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5166                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5167                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5168                         };
5169                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
5170                         out
5171                 });
5172                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5173                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5174                                 htlc_id: 4,
5175                                 amount_msat: 4000000,
5176                                 cltv_expiry: 504,
5177                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5178                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5179                         };
5180                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
5181                         out
5182                 });
5183
5184                 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5185                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5186                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
5187
5188                 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
5189                                  "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
5190                                  "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", {
5191
5192                                   { 0,
5193                                   "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
5194                                   "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
5195                                   "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" },
5196
5197                                   { 1,
5198                                   "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
5199                                   "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
5200                                   "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" },
5201
5202                                   { 2,
5203                                   "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
5204                                   "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
5205                                   "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" },
5206
5207                                   { 3,
5208                                   "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
5209                                   "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
5210                                   "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" },
5211
5212                                   { 4,
5213                                   "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
5214                                   "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
5215                                   "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b04000000000000000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b8701483045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5216                 } );
5217
5218                 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5219                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5220                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
5221
5222                 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
5223                                  "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
5224                                  "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", {
5225
5226                                   { 0,
5227                                   "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
5228                                   "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
5229                                   "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" },
5230
5231                                   { 1,
5232                                   "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
5233                                   "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
5234                                   "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" },
5235
5236                                   { 2,
5237                                   "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
5238                                   "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
5239                                   "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" },
5240
5241                                   { 3,
5242                                   "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
5243                                   "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
5244                                   "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" },
5245
5246                                   { 4,
5247                                   "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
5248                                   "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
5249                                   "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" }
5250                 } );
5251
5252                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5253                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5254                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
5255
5256                 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
5257                                  "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
5258                                  "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", {
5259
5260                                   { 0,
5261                                   "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
5262                                   "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
5263                                   "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" },
5264
5265                                   { 1,
5266                                   "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
5267                                   "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
5268                                   "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" },
5269
5270                                   { 2,
5271                                   "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
5272                                   "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
5273                                   "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf1020000000000000000010b0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc62553298901483045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e226079601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
5274
5275                                   { 3,
5276                                   "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
5277                                   "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
5278                                   "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" }
5279                 } );
5280
5281                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5282                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5283                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
5284
5285                 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
5286                                  "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
5287                                  "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", {
5288
5289                                   { 0,
5290                                   "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
5291                                   "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
5292                                   "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" },
5293
5294                                   { 1,
5295                                   "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
5296                                   "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
5297                                   "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" },
5298
5299                                   { 2,
5300                                   "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
5301                                   "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
5302                                   "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" },
5303
5304                                   { 3,
5305                                   "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
5306                                   "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
5307                                   "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" }
5308                 } );
5309
5310                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5311                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5312                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
5313
5314                 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
5315                                  "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
5316                                  "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", {
5317
5318                                   { 0,
5319                                   "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
5320                                   "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
5321                                   "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" },
5322
5323                                   { 1,
5324                                   "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
5325                                   "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
5326                                   "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" },
5327
5328                                   { 2,
5329                                   "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
5330                                   "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
5331                                   "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" }
5332                 } );
5333
5334                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5335                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5336                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
5337
5338                 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
5339                                  "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
5340                                  "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", {
5341
5342                                   { 0,
5343                                   "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
5344                                   "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
5345                                   "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" },
5346
5347                                   { 1,
5348                                   "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
5349                                   "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
5350                                   "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd010000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a001483045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b7701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
5351
5352                                   { 2,
5353                                   "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
5354                                   "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
5355                                   "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" }
5356                 } );
5357
5358                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5359                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5360                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
5361
5362                 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
5363                                  "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
5364                                  "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", {
5365
5366                                   { 0,
5367                                   "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
5368                                   "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
5369                                   "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e01483045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d7601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
5370
5371                                   { 1,
5372                                   "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
5373                                   "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
5374                                   "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900100000000000000000199090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a01473044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5375                 } );
5376
5377                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5378                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5379                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
5380
5381                 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
5382                                  "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
5383                                  "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", {
5384
5385                                   { 0,
5386                                   "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
5387                                   "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
5388                                   "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" },
5389
5390                                   { 1,
5391                                   "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
5392                                   "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
5393                                   "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" }
5394                 } );
5395
5396                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5397                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5398                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
5399
5400                 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
5401                                  "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
5402                                  "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", {
5403
5404                                   { 0,
5405                                   "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
5406                                   "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
5407                                   "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" }
5408                 } );
5409
5410                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5411                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5412                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
5413
5414                 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
5415                                  "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
5416                                  "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", {
5417
5418                                   { 0,
5419                                   "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
5420                                   "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
5421                                   "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" }
5422                 } );
5423
5424                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5425                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5426                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
5427
5428                 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
5429                                  "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
5430                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
5431
5432                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5433                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5434                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
5435
5436                 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
5437                                  "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
5438                                  "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", {});
5439
5440                 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5441                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5442                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
5443
5444                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5445                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5446                                  "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", {});
5447
5448                 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
5449                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5450                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
5451
5452                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5453                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5454                                  "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", {});
5455
5456                 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
5457                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
5458                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
5459                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
5460                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5461                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5462                                 htlc_id: 1,
5463                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5464                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
5465                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5466                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5467                         };
5468                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5469                         out
5470                 });
5471                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
5472                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5473                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5474                                 htlc_id: 6,
5475                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
5476                                 cltv_expiry: 506,
5477                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5478                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5479                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5480                         };
5481                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5482                         out
5483                 });
5484                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5485                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5486                                 htlc_id: 5,
5487                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
5488                                 cltv_expiry: 505,
5489                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5490                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5491                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5492                         };
5493                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5494                         out
5495                 });
5496
5497                 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
5498                                  "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
5499                                  "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", {
5500
5501                                   { 0,
5502                                   "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
5503                                   "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
5504                                   "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" },
5505                                   { 1,
5506                                   "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
5507                                   "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
5508                                   "0200000000010189a326e23addc28323dbadcb4e71c2c17088b6e8fa184103e552f44075dddc3401000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5014830450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d3901008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868f9010000" },
5509                                   { 2,
5510                                   "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
5511                                   "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
5512                                   "0200000000010189a326e23addc28323dbadcb4e71c2c17088b6e8fa184103e552f44075dddc3402000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f014730440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e51101008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868fa010000" }
5513                 } );
5514         }
5515
5516         #[test]
5517         fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
5518                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
5519
5520                 let mut seed = [0; 32];
5521                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
5522                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5523                            hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
5524
5525                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
5526                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5527                            hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
5528
5529                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
5530                            hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
5531
5532                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
5533                            hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
5534
5535                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
5536                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
5537                            hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
5538         }
5539
5540         #[test]
5541         fn test_key_derivation() {
5542                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
5543                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5544
5545                 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5546                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5547
5548                 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
5549                 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
5550
5551                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5552                 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
5553
5554                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5555                                 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
5556
5557                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5558                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5559
5560                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5561                                 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
5562
5563                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5564                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5565         }
5566 }