_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/channel.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
  11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
  12 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  13 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  14 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
  15
  16 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
  19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
  20
  21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
  23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
  24
  25 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
  26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
  27 use ln::msgs;
  28 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
  29 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
  30 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
  31 use ln::chan_utils;
  32 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
  33 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
  34 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
  35 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
  36 use util::transaction_utils;
  37 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
  38 use util::logger::Logger;
  39 use util::errors::APIError;
  40 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
  41 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
  42
  43 use prelude::*;
  44 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
  45 use core::ops::Deref;
  46 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
  47 use std::sync::Mutex;
  48 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
  49 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0;
  50
  51 #[cfg(test)]
  52 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
  53         pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
  54         pub channel_value_msat: u64,
  55         pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
  56         pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  57         pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  58         pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
  59         pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
  60         pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
  61 }
  62
  63 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
  64         FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
  65         FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
  66         Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
  67 }
  68
  69 enum InboundHTLCState {
  70         /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
  71         /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
  72         RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
  73         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
  74         /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
  75         /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
  76         /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
  77         /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
  78         /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
  79         /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
  80         /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
  81         /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
  82         /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
  83         /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
  84         /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
  85         ///
  86         /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
  87         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc)   --> local
  88         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
  89         /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack               <-- local
  90         /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
  91         /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
  92         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc)   --> local
  93         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
  94         /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
  95         /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
  96         /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
  97         /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
  98         /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
  99         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 100         ///
 101         /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
 102         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
 103         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
 104         /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
 105         /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
 106         /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
 107         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 108         AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
 109         Committed,
 110         /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 111         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 112         /// we'll drop it.
 113         /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
 114         /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
 115         /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
 116         /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
 117         /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
 118         /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
 119         /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
 120         LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
 121 }
 122
 123 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
 124         htlc_id: u64,
 125         amount_msat: u64,
 126         cltv_expiry: u32,
 127         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 128         state: InboundHTLCState,
 129 }
 130
 131 enum OutboundHTLCState {
 132         /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 133         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 134         /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
 135         /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
 136         ///  * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
 137         ///    money back (though we won't), and,
 138         ///  * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
 139         ///    allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
 140         ///    doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
 141         ///    we'll never get out of sync).
 142         /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
 143         /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
 144         LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
 145         Committed,
 146         /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
 147         /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
 148         RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 149         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 150         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 151         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 152         /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
 153         /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
 154         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 155         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 156         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 157         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 158         /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
 159         /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
 160         AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 161 }
 162
 163 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
 164         htlc_id: u64,
 165         amount_msat: u64,
 166         cltv_expiry: u32,
 167         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 168         state: OutboundHTLCState,
 169         source: HTLCSource,
 170 }
 171
 172 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
 173 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
 174         AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
 175                 // always outbound
 176                 amount_msat: u64,
 177                 cltv_expiry: u32,
 178                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 179                 source: HTLCSource,
 180                 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
 181         },
 182         ClaimHTLC {
 183                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
 184                 htlc_id: u64,
 185         },
 186         FailHTLC {
 187                 htlc_id: u64,
 188                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
 189         },
 190 }
 191
 192 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
 193 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
 194 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
 195 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
 196 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
 197 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
 198 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
 199 enum ChannelState {
 200         /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
 201         OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
 202         /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
 203         TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
 204         /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
 205         /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
 206         /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
 207         FundingCreated = 4,
 208         /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
 209         /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
 210         /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
 211         FundingSent = 8,
 212         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
 213         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 214         TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
 215         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
 216         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 217         OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
 218         ChannelFunded = 64,
 219         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
 220         /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
 221         /// dance.
 222         PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
 223         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
 224         /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
 225         /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
 226         MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
 227         /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
 228         /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
 229         /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
 230         /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
 231         /// later.
 232         /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
 233         AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
 234         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
 235         /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
 236         /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
 237         RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
 238         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
 239         /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
 240         /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
 241         /// us their shutdown.
 242         LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
 243         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
 244         /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
 245         ShutdownComplete = 4096,
 246 }
 247 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
 248 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
 249
 250 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
 251
 252 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
 253 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
 254 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
 255 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
 256 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
 257 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
 258 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
 259         /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
 260         Enabled,
 261         /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
 262         DisabledStaged,
 263         /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
 264         EnabledStaged,
 265         /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
 266         Disabled,
 267 }
 268
 269 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
 270 enum HTLCInitiator {
 271         LocalOffered,
 272         RemoteOffered,
 273 }
 274
 275 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
 276 struct HTLCCandidate {
 277         amount_msat: u64,
 278         origin: HTLCInitiator,
 279 }
 280
 281 impl HTLCCandidate {
 282         fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
 283                 Self {
 284                         amount_msat,
 285                         origin,
 286                 }
 287         }
 288 }
 289
 290 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
 291 #[derive(Clone)]
 292 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
 293         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
 294         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
 295         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
 296         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
 297         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
 298         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
 299         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
 300         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
 301 }
 302
 303 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
 304 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
 305 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
 306 // inbound channel.
 307 //
 308 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
 309 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
 310 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
 311         config: ChannelConfig,
 312
 313         user_id: u64,
 314
 315         channel_id: [u8; 32],
 316         channel_state: u32,
 317         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
 318         channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 319
 320         latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
 321
 322         holder_signer: Signer,
 323         shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
 324         destination_script: Script,
 325
 326         // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
 327         // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
 328         // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
 329
 330         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 331         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 332         value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
 333         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
 334         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
 335         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
 336
 337         /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
 338         /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
 339         /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
 340         /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
 341         /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
 342         /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
 343         /// send it first.
 344         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
 345
 346         monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
 347         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
 348         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
 349         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
 350         monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
 351
 352         // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
 353         // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
 354         // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
 355         //
 356         // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
 357         // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
 358         // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
 359         // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
 360         // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
 361         // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
 362         // commitment_signed.
 363         pending_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 364         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
 365         // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
 366         // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
 367         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 368         holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 369         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
 370         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
 371         update_time_counter: u32,
 372         feerate_per_kw: u32,
 373
 374         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 375         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
 376         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 377         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 378         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
 379         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 380
 381         last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
 382
 383         /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
 384         funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
 385         funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
 386         short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
 387
 388         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 389         #[cfg(test)]
 390         pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 391         #[cfg(not(test))]
 392         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 393         #[cfg(test)]
 394         pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 395         #[cfg(not(test))]
 396         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 397         //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
 398         /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
 399         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
 400         // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
 401         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 402         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 403         #[cfg(test)]
 404         pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 405         #[cfg(not(test))]
 406         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 407         //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 408         minimum_depth: u32,
 409
 410         counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
 411
 412         pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
 413         funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
 414
 415         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 416         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 417         counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
 418
 419         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
 420
 421         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
 422
 423         channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
 424
 425         /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
 426         /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
 427         announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
 428
 429         // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
 430         // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
 431         // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
 432         // `build_commitment_transaction`.
 433         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 434         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
 435         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 436         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
 437 }
 438
 439 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 440 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
 441         fee: u64,
 442         total_pending_htlcs: usize,
 443         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
 444         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
 445         feerate: u32,
 446 }
 447
 448 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
 449 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
 450
 451 #[cfg(not(test))]
 452 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 453 #[cfg(test)]
 454 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 455 #[cfg(not(test))]
 456 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 457 #[cfg(test)]
 458 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 459
 460 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
 461 /// it's 2^24.
 462 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
 463
 464 /// Maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed. 2 * standard dust threshold on p2wsh output
 465 /// Scales up on Bitcoin Core's proceeding policy with dust outputs. A typical p2wsh output is 43
 466 /// bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal spend of 67 bytes (even if
 467 /// a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee` is set to 3000sat/kb, thus
 468 /// 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs are p2wsh, a value of
 469 /// 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions. We give a bit
 470 /// of margin to our counterparty and pick up 660 satoshis as an accepted `dust_limit_satoshis`
 471 /// upper bound to avoid negotiation conflicts with other implementations.
 472 pub const MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 2 * 330;
 473
 474 /// A typical p2wsh output is 43 bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal
 475 /// spend of 67 bytes (even if a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee`
 476 /// is set to 3000sat/kb, thus 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs
 477 /// are p2wsh, a value of 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions.
 478 pub const MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 330;
 479
 480 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
 481 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
 482 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
 483 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
 484         Ignore(String),
 485         Close(String),
 486         CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
 487 }
 488
 489 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
 490         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
 491                 match self {
 492                         &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
 493                         &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
 494                         &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
 495                 }
 496         }
 497 }
 498
 499 macro_rules! secp_check {
 500         ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
 501                 match $res {
 502                         Ok(thing) => thing,
 503                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
 504                 }
 505         };
 506 }
 507
 508 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
 509         // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
 510         fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 511                 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
 512         }
 513
 514         /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
 515         /// required by us.
 516         ///
 517         /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
 518         pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 519                 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
 520                 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
 521         }
 522
 523         // Constructors:
 524         pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
 525         where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
 526               F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 527         {
 528                 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
 529                 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
 530                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
 531
 532                 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 533                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
 534                 }
 535                 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
 536                 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
 537                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
 538                 }
 539                 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 540                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
 541                 }
 542                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis);
 543                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
 544                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel  reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
 545                 }
 546
 547                 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
 548
 549                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 550                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
 551
 552                 Ok(Channel {
 553                         user_id,
 554                         config: config.channel_options.clone(),
 555
 556                         channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
 557                         channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
 558                         secp_ctx,
 559                         channel_value_satoshis,
 560
 561                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 562
 563                         holder_signer,
 564                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
 565                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 566
 567                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 568                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 569                         value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
 570
 571                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 572                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 573                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 574                         pending_update_fee: None,
 575                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 576                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 577                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 578                         update_time_counter: 1,
 579
 580                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 581
 582                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 583                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 584                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 585                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 586                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 587
 588                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 589                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 590                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 591                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 592
 593                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 594
 595                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 596                         funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
 597                         short_channel_id: None,
 598
 599                         feerate_per_kw: feerate,
 600                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
 601                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
 602                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
 603                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
 604                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
 605                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 606                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
 607                         minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
 608
 609                         counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
 610
 611                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
 612                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
 613                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 614                                 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
 615                                 counterparty_parameters: None,
 616                                 funding_outpoint: None
 617                         },
 618                         funding_transaction: None,
 619
 620                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
 621                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 622                         counterparty_node_id,
 623
 624                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
 625
 626                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 627
 628                         channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
 629
 630                         announcement_sigs: None,
 631
 632                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 633                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 634                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 635                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 636                 })
 637         }
 638
 639         fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
 640                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
 641         {
 642                 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 643                 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
 644                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
 645                 }
 646                 let upper_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64  * 2;
 647                 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
 648                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
 649                 }
 650                 Ok(())
 651         }
 652
 653         /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
 654         /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
 655         pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
 656                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
 657           F::Target: FeeEstimator
 658         {
 659                 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
 660                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
 661                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
 662                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
 663                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
 664                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
 665                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
 666                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
 667                 };
 668                 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
 669
 670                 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 671                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
 672                 }
 673
 674                 // Check sanity of message fields:
 675                 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 676                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 677                 }
 678                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 679                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 680                 }
 681                 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 682                 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
 683                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
 684                 }
 685                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 686                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 687                 }
 688                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
 689                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
 690                 }
 691                 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 692                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
 693                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
 694                 }
 695                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
 696
 697                 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
 698                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
 699                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
 700                 }
 701                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
 702                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
 703                 }
 704                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
 705                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
 706                 }
 707
 708                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
 709                 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
 710                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
 711                 }
 712                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
 713                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat,  config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
 714                 }
 715                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
 716                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
 717                 }
 718                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
 719                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 720                 }
 721                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
 722                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
 723                 }
 724                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
 725                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
 726                 }
 727                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis >  MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
 728                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
 729                 }
 730
 731                 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
 732
 733                 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
 734                 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
 735                         if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
 736                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
 737                         }
 738                 }
 739                 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
 740                 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
 741
 742                 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 743
 744                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
 745                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
 746                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
 747                 }
 748                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
 749                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
 750                 }
 751                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
 752                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 753                 }
 754
 755                 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
 756                 // for full fee payment
 757                 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
 758                 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 759                 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
 760                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
 761                 }
 762
 763                 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
 764                 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 765                 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
 766                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
 767                 }
 768
 769                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
 770                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
 771                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
 772                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
 773                                         if script.len() == 0 {
 774                                                 None
 775                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
 776                                         } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
 777                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
 778                                         } else {
 779                                                 Some(script.clone())
 780                                         }
 781                                 },
 782                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
 783                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
 784                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
 785                                 }
 786                         }
 787                 } else { None };
 788
 789                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 790                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
 791
 792                 let chan = Channel {
 793                         user_id,
 794                         config: local_config,
 795
 796                         channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
 797                         channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
 798                         secp_ctx,
 799
 800                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 801
 802                         holder_signer,
 803                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
 804                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 805
 806                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 807                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 808                         value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
 809
 810                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 811                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 812                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 813                         pending_update_fee: None,
 814                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 815                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 816                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 817                         update_time_counter: 1,
 818
 819                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 820
 821                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 822                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 823                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 824                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 825                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 826
 827                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 828                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 829                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 830                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 831
 832                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 833
 834                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 835                         funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
 836                         short_channel_id: None,
 837
 838                         feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
 839                         channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
 840                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
 841                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
 842                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
 843                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
 844                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
 845                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 846                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
 847                         minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
 848
 849                         counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
 850
 851                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
 852                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
 853                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 854                                 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
 855                                 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
 856                                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
 857                                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
 858                                 }),
 859                                 funding_outpoint: None
 860                         },
 861                         funding_transaction: None,
 862
 863                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
 864                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 865                         counterparty_node_id,
 866
 867                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
 868
 869                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 870
 871                         channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
 872
 873                         announcement_sigs: None,
 874
 875                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 876                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 877                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 878                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 879                 };
 880
 881                 Ok(chan)
 882         }
 883
 884         /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
 885         /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
 886         /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
 887         /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
 888         /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
 889         /// an HTLC to a).
 890         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
 891         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
 892         /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
 893         /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
 894         /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
 895         /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
 896         /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
 897         /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
 898         /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
 899         /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
 900         /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
 901         #[inline]
 902         fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
 903                 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
 904                 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
 905                 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
 906
 907                 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
 908                 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 909                 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 910                 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
 911
 912                 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
 913                         commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
 914                         get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
 915                         log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
 916
 917                 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
 918                         ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
 919                                 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 920                                         offered: $offered,
 921                                         amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
 922                                         cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
 923                                         payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
 924                                         transaction_output_index: None
 925                                 }
 926                         }
 927                 }
 928
 929                 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
 930                         ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
 931                                 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
 932                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
 933                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
 934                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 935                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 936                                         } else {
 937                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 938                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 939                                         }
 940                                 } else {
 941                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
 942                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
 943                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 944                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 945                                         } else {
 946                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 947                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 948                                         }
 949                                 }
 950                         }
 951                 }
 952
 953                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
 954                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
 955                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
 956                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
 957                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
 958                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
 959                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
 960                         };
 961
 962                         if include {
 963                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
 964                                 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 965                         } else {
 966                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
 967                                 match &htlc.state {
 968                                         &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
 969                                                 if generated_by_local {
 970                                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
 971                                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 972                                                         }
 973                                                 }
 974                                         },
 975                                         _ => {},
 976                                 }
 977                         }
 978                 }
 979
 980                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
 981                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
 982                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
 983                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
 984                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
 985                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
 986                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
 987                         };
 988
 989                         if include {
 990                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
 991                                 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 992                         } else {
 993                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
 994                                 match htlc.state {
 995                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
 996                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 997                                         },
 998                                         OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
 999                                                 if !generated_by_local {
1000                                                         value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1001                                                 }
1002                                         },
1003                                         _ => {},
1004                                 }
1005                         }
1006                 }
1007
1008                 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1009                 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1010                 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1011                 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1012                 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1013                 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1014                 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1015                 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1016
1017                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1018                 {
1019                         // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1020                         // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1021                         let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1022                                 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1023                         } else {
1024                                 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1025                         };
1026                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1027                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1028                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
1029                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1030                 }
1031
1032                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1033                 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1034                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1035                 } else {
1036                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
1037                 };
1038
1039                 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1040                 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1041
1042                 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1043                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1044                 } else {
1045                         value_to_a = 0;
1046                 }
1047
1048                 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1049                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1050                 } else {
1051                         value_to_b = 0;
1052                 }
1053
1054                 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1055
1056                 let channel_parameters =
1057                         if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1058                         else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1059                 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1060                                                                              value_to_a as u64,
1061                                                                              value_to_b as u64,
1062                                                                              keys.clone(),
1063                                                                              feerate_per_kw,
1064                                                                              &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1065                                                                              &channel_parameters
1066                 );
1067                 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1068                 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1069                 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1070                 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1071
1072                 (tx, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1073         }
1074
1075         #[inline]
1076         fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1077                 let channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1078                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1079         }
1080
1081         #[inline]
1082         fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1083                 let mut ret =
1084                 (4 +                                           // version
1085                  1 +                                           // input count
1086                  36 +                                          // prevout
1087                  1 +                                           // script length (0)
1088                  4 +                                           // sequence
1089                  1 +                                           // output count
1090                  4                                             // lock time
1091                  )*4 +                                         // * 4 for non-witness parts
1092                 2 +                                            // witness marker and flag
1093                 1 +                                            // witness element count
1094                 4 +                                            // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1095                 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1096                 2*(1 + 71);                                    // two signatures + sighash type flags
1097                 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1098                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1099                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1100                 }
1101                 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1102                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1103                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1104                 }
1105                 ret
1106         }
1107
1108         #[inline]
1109         fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1110                 let txins = {
1111                         let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1112                         ins.push(TxIn {
1113                                 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1114                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1115                                 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1116                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1117                         });
1118                         ins
1119                 };
1120
1121                 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1122                 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1123                 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1124
1125                 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1126                 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1127                 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1128
1129                 if value_to_self < 0 {
1130                         assert!(self.is_outbound());
1131                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1132                 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1133                         assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1134                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1135                 }
1136
1137                 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1138                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1139                                 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1140                                 value: value_to_remote as u64
1141                         }, ()));
1142                 }
1143
1144                 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1145                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1146                                 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1147                                 value: value_to_self as u64
1148                         }, ()));
1149                 }
1150
1151                 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1152
1153                 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1154                 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1155                         outputs.push(out.0);
1156                 }
1157
1158                 (Transaction {
1159                         version: 2,
1160                         lock_time: 0,
1161                         input: txins,
1162                         output: outputs,
1163                 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1164         }
1165
1166         fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1167                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1168         }
1169
1170         #[inline]
1171         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1172         /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1173         /// our counterparty!)
1174         /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1175         /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1176         fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1177                 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1178                 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1179                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1180                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1181
1182                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1183         }
1184
1185         #[inline]
1186         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1187         /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1188         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1189         fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1190                 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1191                 //may see payments to it!
1192                 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1193                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1194                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1195
1196                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1197         }
1198
1199         /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1200         /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1201         /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1202         pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1203                 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1204         }
1205
1206         /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1207         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1208         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1209         fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Transaction {
1210                 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay() } else { self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay() }, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1211         }
1212
1213         /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1214         /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1215         /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1216         ///
1217         /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1218         /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1219         fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1220                 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1221                 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1222                 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1223                 // either.
1224                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1225                         panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1226                 }
1227                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1228
1229                 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1230
1231                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1232                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1233                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1234
1235                 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1236                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1237                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1238                                 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1239                                 match htlc.state {
1240                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1241                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1242                                                 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1243                                                 } else {
1244                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1245                                                 }
1246                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1247                                                 return Ok((None, None));
1248                                         },
1249                                         _ => {
1250                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1251                                                 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1252                                         }
1253                                 }
1254                                 pending_idx = idx;
1255                                 break;
1256                         }
1257                 }
1258                 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1259                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1260                 }
1261
1262                 // Now update local state:
1263                 //
1264                 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1265                 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1266                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1267                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1268                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1269                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1270                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1271                         }],
1272                 };
1273
1274                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1275                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1276                                 match pending_update {
1277                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1278                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1279                                                         // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1280                                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1281                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1282                                                         return Ok((None, None));
1283                                                 }
1284                                         },
1285                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1286                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1287                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1288                                                         // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1289                                                         // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1290                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1291                                                         return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1292                                                 }
1293                                         },
1294                                         _ => {}
1295                                 }
1296                         }
1297                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1298                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1299                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1300                         });
1301                         return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1302                 }
1303
1304                 {
1305                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1306                         if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1307                         } else {
1308                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1309                                 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1310                         }
1311                         log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1312                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1313                 }
1314
1315                 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1316                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1317                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1318                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1319                 }), Some(monitor_update)))
1320         }
1321
1322         pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1323                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger)? {
1324                         (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), Some(mut monitor_update)) => {
1325                                 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1326                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1327                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1328                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1329                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1330                                 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1331                         },
1332                         (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), None) => {
1333                                 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1334                                 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1335                         },
1336                         (None, Some(monitor_update)) => Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))),
1337                         (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1338                 }
1339         }
1340
1341         /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1342         /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1343         /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1344         ///
1345         /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1346         /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1347         pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1348                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1349                         panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1350                 }
1351                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1352
1353                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1354                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1355                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1356
1357                 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1358                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1359                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1360                                 match htlc.state {
1361                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1362                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1363                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1364                                                 return Ok(None);
1365                                         },
1366                                         _ => {
1367                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1368                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1369                                         }
1370                                 }
1371                                 pending_idx = idx;
1372                         }
1373                 }
1374                 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1375                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1376                 }
1377
1378                 // Now update local state:
1379                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1380                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1381                                 match pending_update {
1382                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1383                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1384                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1385                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1386                                                 }
1387                                         },
1388                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1389                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1390                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1391                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1392                                                 }
1393                                         },
1394                                         _ => {}
1395                                 }
1396                         }
1397                         log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1398                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1399                                 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1400                                 err_packet,
1401                         });
1402                         return Ok(None);
1403                 }
1404
1405                 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1406                 {
1407                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1408                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1409                 }
1410
1411                 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1412                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1413                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1414                         reason: err_packet
1415                 }))
1416         }
1417
1418         // Message handlers:
1419
1420         pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1421                 // Check sanity of message fields:
1422                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1423                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1424                 }
1425                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1426                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1427                 }
1428                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1429                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1430                 }
1431                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1432                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1433                 }
1434                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1435                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1436                 }
1437                 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1438                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1439                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1440                 }
1441                 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1442                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1443                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1444                 }
1445                 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1446                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1447                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1448                 }
1449                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1450                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1451                 }
1452                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1453                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1454                 }
1455
1456                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1457                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1458                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1459                 }
1460                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1461                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1462                 }
1463                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1464                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1465                 }
1466                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1467                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1468                 }
1469                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1470                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1471                 }
1472                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1473                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1474                 }
1475                 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1476                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1477                 }
1478
1479                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1480                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1481                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1482                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1483                                         if script.len() == 0 {
1484                                                 None
1485                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1486                                         } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
1487                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
1488                                         } else {
1489                                                 Some(script.clone())
1490                                         }
1491                                 },
1492                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1493                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1494                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1495                                 }
1496                         }
1497                 } else { None };
1498
1499                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1500                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1501                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1502                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1503                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1504                 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1505
1506                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1507                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1508                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1509                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1510                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1511                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1512                 };
1513
1514                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1515                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1516                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1517                 });
1518
1519                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1520                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1521
1522                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1523
1524                 Ok(())
1525         }
1526
1527         fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1528                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1529
1530                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1531                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1532                 {
1533                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1534                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1535                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1536                         // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1537                         log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
1538                                 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
1539                                 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
1540                                 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1541                         secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1542                 }
1543
1544                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1545                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1546
1547                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1548                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1549                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1550                         log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1551
1552                 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1553                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1554
1555                 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1556                 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1557         }
1558
1559         fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1560                 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1561         }
1562
1563         pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1564                 if self.is_outbound() {
1565                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1566                 }
1567                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1568                         // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1569                         // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1570                         // channel.
1571                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1572                 }
1573                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1574                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1575                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1576                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1577                 }
1578
1579                 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1580                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1581                 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks.  In particular
1582                 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1583                 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1584
1585                 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1586                         Ok(res) => res,
1587                         Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1588                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1589                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1590                         },
1591                         Err(e) => {
1592                                 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1593                                 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1594                                 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1595                         }
1596                 };
1597
1598                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1599                         initial_commitment_tx,
1600                         msg.signature,
1601                         Vec::new(),
1602                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1603                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1604                 );
1605
1606                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1607
1608                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1609                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1610                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1611                 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1612                                                           &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1613                                                           &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1614                                                           &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1615                                                           funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1616                                                           obscure_factor,
1617                                                           holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1618
1619                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1620
1621                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1622                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1623                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1624                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1625
1626                 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1627
1628                 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1629                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
1630                         signature
1631                 }, channel_monitor))
1632         }
1633
1634         /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1635         /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1636         pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1637                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1638                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1639                 }
1640                 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1641                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1642                 }
1643                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1644                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1645                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1646                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1647                 }
1648
1649                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1650
1651                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1652                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1653                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1654                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1655
1656                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1657                         log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1658
1659                 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1660                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1661                 {
1662                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1663                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1664                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1665                         // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1666                         if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1667                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1668                         }
1669                 }
1670
1671                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1672                         initial_commitment_tx,
1673                         msg.signature,
1674                         Vec::new(),
1675                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1676                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1677                 );
1678
1679
1680                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1681                 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1682                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1683                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1684                 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1685                                                           &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1686                                                           &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1687                                                           &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1688                                                           funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1689                                                           obscure_factor,
1690                                                           holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1691
1692                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1693
1694                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1695                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1696                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1697                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1698
1699                 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1700
1701                 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap()))
1702         }
1703
1704         pub fn funding_locked<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1705                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1706                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1707                 }
1708
1709                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1710
1711                 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1712                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1713                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1714                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1715                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
1716                 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1717                                  // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1718                                  self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1719                                  self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1720                                 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1721                                 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1722                                                       (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1723                         if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1724                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1725                         }
1726                         // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1727                         return Ok(());
1728                 } else {
1729                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1730                 }
1731
1732                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1733                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1734
1735                 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_locked from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1736
1737                 Ok(())
1738         }
1739
1740         /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1741         fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1742                 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1743                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1744                         htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1745                 }
1746                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1747         }
1748
1749         /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1750         /// holding cell.
1751         fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1752                 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1753                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1754                         htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1755                 }
1756
1757                 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1758                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1759                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1760                                 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1761                                 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1762                         }
1763                 }
1764
1765                 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1766         }
1767
1768         /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1769         /// Doesn't bother handling the
1770         /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1771         /// corner case properly.
1772         pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1773                 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1774                 (cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1775                 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1776         }
1777
1778         // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1779         // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1780         fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1781                 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1782                 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1783                 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1784         }
1785
1786         // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1787         // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
1788         // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
1789         // are excluded.
1790         fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1791                 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1792
1793                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1794                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1795
1796                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1797                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1798                 match htlc.origin {
1799                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1800                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1801                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1802                                 }
1803                         },
1804                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1805                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1806                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1807                                 }
1808                         }
1809                 }
1810
1811                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1812                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1813                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1814                                 continue
1815                         }
1816                         // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1817                         // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1818                         included_htlcs += 1;
1819                 }
1820
1821                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1822                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1823                                 continue
1824                         }
1825                         match htlc.state {
1826                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1827                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1828                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1829                                 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1830                                 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1831                                 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1832                                 _ => {},
1833                         }
1834                 }
1835
1836                 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1837                         match htlc {
1838                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1839                                         if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1840                                                 continue
1841                                         }
1842                                         included_htlcs += 1
1843                                 },
1844                                 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1845                                          // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1846                         }
1847                 }
1848
1849                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1850                 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1851                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1852                 {
1853                         let mut fee = res;
1854                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1855                                 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1856                         }
1857                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1858                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1859                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1860                                 fee,
1861                                 total_pending_htlcs,
1862                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1863                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1864                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1865                                 },
1866                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1867                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1868                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1869                                 },
1870                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1871                         };
1872                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1873                 }
1874                 res
1875         }
1876
1877         // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1878         // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
1879         // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
1880         // excluded.
1881         fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1882                 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1883
1884                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1885                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1886
1887                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1888                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1889                 match htlc.origin {
1890                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1891                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1892                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1893                                 }
1894                         },
1895                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1896                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1897                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1898                                 }
1899                         }
1900                 }
1901
1902                 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1903                 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1904                 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1905                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1906                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1907                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1908                                 continue
1909                         }
1910                         included_htlcs += 1;
1911                 }
1912
1913                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1914                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1915                                 continue
1916                         }
1917                         // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1918                         // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1919                         match htlc.state {
1920                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1921                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1922                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1923                                 _ => {},
1924                         }
1925                 }
1926
1927                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1928                 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1929                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1930                 {
1931                         let mut fee = res;
1932                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1933                                 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1934                         }
1935                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1936                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1937                                 fee,
1938                                 total_pending_htlcs,
1939                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1940                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1941                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1942                                 },
1943                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1944                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1945                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1946                                 },
1947                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1948                         };
1949                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1950                 }
1951                 res
1952         }
1953
1954         pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1955         where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
1956                 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
1957                 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1958                 if local_sent_shutdown {
1959                         pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
1960                 }
1961                 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
1962                 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1963                 if remote_sent_shutdown {
1964                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1965                 }
1966                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1967                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1968                 }
1969                 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1970                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
1971                 }
1972                 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
1973                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
1974                 }
1975                 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
1976                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
1977                 }
1978
1979                 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1980                 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1981                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
1982                 }
1983                 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1984                 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1985                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1986                 }
1987                 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1988                 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1989                 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1990                 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1991                 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1992                 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1993                 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1994                 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1995                 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1996                 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1997                 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1998                 // transaction).
1999                 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2000                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2001                         if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
2002                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2003                         } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
2004                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2005                         }
2006                 }
2007
2008                 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2009                         self.value_to_self_msat + htlc_inbound_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2010                 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2011                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2012                 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2013                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2014                 }
2015
2016                 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2017                 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2018                 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2019                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2020                         self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2021                 };
2022                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2023                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2024                 };
2025
2026                 let chan_reserve_msat =
2027                         Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
2028                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
2029                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2030                 }
2031
2032                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2033                         // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2034                         // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2035                         // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2036                         // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2037                         // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2038                         // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2039                         // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2040                         // sensitive to fee spikes.
2041                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2042                         let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2043                         if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2044                                 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2045                                 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2046                                 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2047                                 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2048                         }
2049                 } else {
2050                         // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2051                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2052                         let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2053                         if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2054                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2055                         }
2056                 }
2057                 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2058                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2059                 }
2060                 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2061                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2062                 }
2063
2064                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2065                         if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2066                                 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2067                         }
2068                 }
2069
2070                 // Now update local state:
2071                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2072                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2073                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2074                         amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2075                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2076                         cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2077                         state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2078                 });
2079                 Ok(())
2080         }
2081
2082         /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2083         #[inline]
2084         fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2085                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2086                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2087                                 match check_preimage {
2088                                         None => {},
2089                                         Some(payment_hash) =>
2090                                                 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2091                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2092                                                 }
2093                                 };
2094                                 match htlc.state {
2095                                         OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2096                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2097                                         OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2098                                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2099                                         },
2100                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2101                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2102                                 }
2103                                 return Ok(&htlc.source);
2104                         }
2105                 }
2106                 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2107         }
2108
2109         pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2110                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2111                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2112                 }
2113                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2114                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2115                 }
2116
2117                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2118                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
2119         }
2120
2121         pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2122                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2123                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2124                 }
2125                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2126                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2127                 }
2128
2129                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2130                 Ok(())
2131         }
2132
2133         pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2134                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2135                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2136                 }
2137                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2138                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2139                 }
2140
2141                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2142                 Ok(())
2143         }
2144
2145         pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2146         where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2147                                 L::Target: Logger
2148         {
2149                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2150                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2151                 }
2152                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2153                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2154                 }
2155                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2156                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2157                 }
2158
2159                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2160
2161                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2162
2163                 let mut update_fee = false;
2164                 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2165                         update_fee = true;
2166                         self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
2167                 } else {
2168                         self.feerate_per_kw
2169                 };
2170
2171                 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid) = {
2172                         let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
2173                         let commitment_txid = {
2174                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2175                                 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2176                                 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2177
2178                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2179                                         log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2180                                         log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2181                                         log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2182                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2183                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2184                                 }
2185                                 bitcoin_tx.txid
2186                         };
2187                         let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2188                         (commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid)
2189                 };
2190
2191                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2192                 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
2193                 if update_fee {
2194                         let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2195                         if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2196                                 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2197                         }
2198                 }
2199                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2200                 {
2201                         if self.is_outbound() {
2202                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2203                                 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2204                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2205                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2206                                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2207                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2208                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2209                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2210                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2211                                                         assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2212                                                 }
2213                                 }
2214                         }
2215                 }
2216
2217                 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2218                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2219                 }
2220
2221                 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2222                 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2223                 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2224                         if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2225                                 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &keys, feerate_per_kw);
2226                                 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2227                                 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2228                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2229                                         log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2230                                         encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2231                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2232                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2233                                 }
2234                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2235                         } else {
2236                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2237                         }
2238                 }
2239
2240                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2241                         commitment_tx,
2242                         msg.signature,
2243                         msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2244                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2245                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2246                 );
2247
2248                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2249                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2250
2251                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2252                 let mut need_commitment = false;
2253                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2254                         if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
2255                                 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
2256                                 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
2257                                 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
2258                                 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
2259                                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
2260                                         need_commitment = true;
2261                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2262                                 }
2263                         }
2264                 }
2265
2266                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2267                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2268                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2269                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2270                                 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2271                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2272                         }]
2273                 };
2274
2275                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2276                         let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2277                                 Some(forward_info.clone())
2278                         } else { None };
2279                         if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2280                                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2281                                         log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2282                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2283                                 need_commitment = true;
2284                         }
2285                 }
2286                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2287                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2288                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
2289                         } else { None } {
2290                                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2291                                         log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2292                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2293                                 need_commitment = true;
2294                         }
2295                 }
2296
2297                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2298                 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2299                 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2300                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2301
2302                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2303                         // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2304                         // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2305                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2306                         if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2307                                 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2308                                 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2309                                 // includes the right HTLCs.
2310                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2311                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2312                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2313                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2314                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2315                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2316                         }
2317                         log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
2318                                 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2319                         // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2320                         // re-send the message on restoration)
2321                         return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2322                 }
2323
2324                 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2325                         // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2326                         // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2327                         // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2328                         let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2329                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2330                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2331                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2332                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2333                         (Some(msg), None)
2334                 } else if !need_commitment {
2335                         (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2336                 } else { (None, None) };
2337
2338                 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
2339                         log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
2340
2341                 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2342                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2343                         per_commitment_secret,
2344                         next_per_commitment_point,
2345                 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2346         }
2347
2348         /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
2349         /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
2350         /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
2351         pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2352                 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 &&
2353                    (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2354                         self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
2355                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
2356         }
2357
2358         /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2359         /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2360         fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2361                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2362                 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2363                         log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
2364                                 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2365
2366                         let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2367                                 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2368                                 updates: Vec::new(),
2369                         };
2370
2371                         let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2372                         mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2373                         let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2374                         let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2375                         let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2376                         let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2377                         for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2378                                 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2379                                 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2380                                 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2381                                 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2382                                 // to rebalance channels.
2383                                 match &htlc_update {
2384                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2385                                                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2386                                                         Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2387                                                         Err(e) => {
2388                                                                 match e {
2389                                                                         ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2390                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
2391                                                                                         log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2392                                                                                 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2393                                                                                 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2394                                                                                 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2395                                                                                 // into the holding cell without ever being
2396                                                                                 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2397                                                                                 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2398                                                                                 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2399                                                                         },
2400                                                                         _ => {
2401                                                                                 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2402                                                                         },
2403                                                                 }
2404                                                         }
2405                                                 }
2406                                         },
2407                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2408                                                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2409                                                         Ok((update_fulfill_msg_option, additional_monitor_update_opt)) => {
2410                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2411                                                                 if let Some(mut additional_monitor_update) = additional_monitor_update_opt {
2412                                                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2413                                                                 }
2414                                                         },
2415                                                         Err(e) => {
2416                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2417                                                                 else {
2418                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
2419                                                                 }
2420                                                         }
2421                                                 }
2422                                         },
2423                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2424                                                 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
2425                                                         Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
2426                                                         Err(e) => {
2427                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2428                                                                 else {
2429                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2430                                                                 }
2431                                                         }
2432                                                 }
2433                                         },
2434                                 }
2435                         }
2436                         if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2437                                 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2438                         }
2439                         let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2440                                 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2441                                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2442                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2443                                         feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2444                                 })
2445                         } else {
2446                                 None
2447                         };
2448
2449                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2450                         // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2451                         // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2452                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2453                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2454
2455                         log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
2456                                 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
2457                                 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
2458
2459                         Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2460                                 update_add_htlcs,
2461                                 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2462                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2463                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2464                                 update_fee,
2465                                 commitment_signed,
2466                         }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2467                 } else {
2468                         Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2469                 }
2470         }
2471
2472         /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2473         /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2474         /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2475         /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2476         /// revoke_and_ack message.
2477         pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2478                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2479                                         L::Target: Logger,
2480         {
2481                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2482                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2483                 }
2484                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2485                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2486                 }
2487                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2488                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2489                 }
2490
2491                 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2492                         if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2493                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2494                         }
2495                 }
2496
2497                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2498                         // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2499                         // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2500                         // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2501                         // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2502                         // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2503                         // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2504                         // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2505                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2506                 }
2507
2508                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2509                 {
2510                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2511                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2512                 }
2513
2514                 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2515                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2516                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2517                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2518                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2519                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2520                                 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2521                                 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2522                         }],
2523                 };
2524
2525                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2526                 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2527                 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2528                 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2529                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2530                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2531                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2532                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2533
2534                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2535                 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2536                 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2537                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2538                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2539                 let mut require_commitment = false;
2540                 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2541
2542                 {
2543                         // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2544                         let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2545                         let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2546
2547                         // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2548                         pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2549                                 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2550                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2551                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2552                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2553                                         }
2554                                         false
2555                                 } else { true }
2556                         });
2557                         pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2558                                 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2559                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2560                                         if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2561                                                 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2562                                         } else {
2563                                                 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2564                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2565                                         }
2566                                         false
2567                                 } else { true }
2568                         });
2569                         for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2570                                 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2571                                         true
2572                                 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2573                                         true
2574                                 } else { false };
2575                                 if swap {
2576                                         let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2577                                         mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2578
2579                                         if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2580                                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2581                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2582                                                 require_commitment = true;
2583                                         } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2584                                                 match forward_info {
2585                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2586                                                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2587                                                                 require_commitment = true;
2588                                                                 match fail_msg {
2589                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2590                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2591                                                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2592                                                                         },
2593                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2594                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2595                                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2596                                                                         },
2597                                                                 }
2598                                                         },
2599                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2600                                                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2601                                                                 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2602                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2603                                                         }
2604                                                 }
2605                                         }
2606                                 }
2607                         }
2608                         for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2609                                 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2610                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2611                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2612                                 }
2613                                 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2614                                         Some(fail_reason.take())
2615                                 } else { None } {
2616                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2617                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2618                                         require_commitment = true;
2619                                 }
2620                         }
2621                 }
2622                 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2623
2624                 if self.is_outbound() {
2625                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2626                                 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2627                         }
2628                 } else {
2629                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2630                                 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2631                                 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2632                                 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2633                                 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2634                                 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2635                                 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2636                                         require_commitment = true;
2637                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2638                                 }
2639                         }
2640                 }
2641
2642                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2643                         // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2644                         // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2645                         if require_commitment {
2646                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2647                                 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2648                                 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2649                                 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2650                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2651                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2652                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2653                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2654                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2655                         }
2656                         self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2657                         self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2658                         log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2659                         return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2660                 }
2661
2662                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2663                         (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2664                                 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2665                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2666                                         commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2667                                 }
2668                                 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2669                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2670                                         commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2671                                 }
2672
2673                                 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2674                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2675                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2676                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2677
2678                                 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2679                         },
2680                         (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2681                                 if require_commitment {
2682                                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2683
2684                                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2685                                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2686                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2687                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2688
2689                                         log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
2690                                                 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2691                                         Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2692                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2693                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2694                                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2695                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2696                                                 update_fee: None,
2697                                                 commitment_signed
2698                                         }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2699                                 } else {
2700                                         log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2701                                         Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2702                                 }
2703                         }
2704                 }
2705
2706         }
2707
2708         /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2709         /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2710         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2711         fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2712                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2713                         panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2714                 }
2715                 if !self.is_usable() {
2716                         panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2717                 }
2718                 if !self.is_live() {
2719                         panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2720                 }
2721
2722                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2723                         self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2724                         return None;
2725                 }
2726
2727                 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2728                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2729
2730                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2731                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2732                         feerate_per_kw,
2733                 })
2734         }
2735
2736         pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2737                 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2738                         Some(update_fee) => {
2739                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2740                                 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2741                         },
2742                         None => Ok(None)
2743                 }
2744         }
2745
2746         /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
2747         /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
2748         /// resent.
2749         /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2750         /// completed.
2751         pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L)  where L::Target: Logger {
2752                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2753                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2754                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2755                         return;
2756                 }
2757                 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2758                 // will be retransmitted.
2759                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2760
2761                 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2762                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2763                         match htlc.state {
2764                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2765                                         // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2766                                         // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2767                                         // this HTLC accordingly
2768                                         inbound_drop_count += 1;
2769                                         false
2770                                 },
2771                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2772                                         // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2773                                         // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2774                                         // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2775                                         true
2776                                 },
2777                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2778                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2779                                         // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2780                                         // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2781                                         // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2782                                         // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2783                                         true
2784                                 },
2785                         }
2786                 });
2787                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2788
2789                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2790                         if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2791                                 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2792                                 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2793                                 // the update upon reconnection.
2794                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2795                         }
2796                 }
2797
2798                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2799                 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2800         }
2801
2802         /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2803         /// updates are partially paused.
2804         /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2805         /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2806         /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2807         /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2808         pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2809                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2810                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2811                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2812                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2813                 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2814                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2815                 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2816                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2817         }
2818
2819         /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2820         /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2821         /// to the remote side.
2822         pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<Transaction>, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
2823                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2824                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2825
2826                 let funding_broadcastable = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound() {
2827                         self.funding_transaction.take()
2828                 } else { None };
2829
2830                 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
2831                 // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
2832                 // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound
2833                 // channel which failed to persist the monitor on funding_created, and we got the funding
2834                 // transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted.
2835                 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2836                         assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
2837                         self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2838                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2839                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2840                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2841                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2842                         })
2843                 } else { None };
2844
2845                 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2846                 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2847                 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2848                 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2849
2850                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2851                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2852                         self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2853                         return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
2854                 }
2855
2856                 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2857                         Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2858                 } else { None };
2859                 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2860                         Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
2861                 } else { None };
2862
2863                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2864                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2865                 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2866                 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2867                         log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
2868                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2869                         match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2870                 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked)
2871         }
2872
2873         pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2874                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2875         {
2876                 if self.is_outbound() {
2877                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
2878                 }
2879                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2880                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2881                 }
2882                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2883                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw);
2884                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2885                 Ok(())
2886         }
2887
2888         fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2889                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2890                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2891                 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2892                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2893                         per_commitment_secret,
2894                         next_per_commitment_point,
2895                 }
2896         }
2897
2898         fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
2899                 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2900                 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2901                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2902                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2903
2904                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2905                         if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2906                                 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2907                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2908                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2909                                         amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2910                                         payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2911                                         cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2912                                         onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2913                                 });
2914                         }
2915                 }
2916
2917                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2918                         if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2919                                 match reason {
2920                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2921                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2922                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2923                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2924                                                         reason: err_packet.clone()
2925                                                 });
2926                                         },
2927                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2928                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2929                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2930                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2931                                                         sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2932                                                         failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2933                                                 });
2934                                         },
2935                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2936                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2937                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2938                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2939                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2940                                                 });
2941                                         },
2942                                 }
2943                         }
2944                 }
2945
2946                 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2947                                 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2948                 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2949                         update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2950                         update_fee: None,
2951                         commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2952                 }
2953         }
2954
2955         /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2956         /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2957         pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2958                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2959                         // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2960                         // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2961                         // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2962                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
2963                 }
2964
2965                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2966                         msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2967                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2968                 }
2969
2970                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
2971                         match msg.data_loss_protect {
2972                                 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
2973                                         let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2974                                         let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
2975                                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
2976                                         if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
2977                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
2978                                         }
2979                                         if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2980                                                 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
2981                                                         "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
2982                                                 ));
2983                                         }
2984                                 },
2985                                 OptionalField::Absent => {}
2986                         }
2987                 }
2988
2989                 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2990                 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2991                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2992
2993                 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2994                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2995                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2996                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2997                         })
2998                 } else { None };
2999
3000                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3001                         // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
3002                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
3003                                         self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3004                                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3005                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
3006                                 }
3007                                 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3008                                 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3009                         }
3010
3011                         // We have OurFundingLocked set!
3012                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3013                         return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3014                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3015                                 next_per_commitment_point,
3016                         }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3017                 }
3018
3019                 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3020                         // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3021                         // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
3022                         None
3023                 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3024                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3025                                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3026                                 None
3027                         } else {
3028                                 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3029                         }
3030                 } else {
3031                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3032                 };
3033
3034                 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3035                 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3036                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3037                 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3038                 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
3039
3040                 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3041                         // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
3042                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3043                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3044                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3045                                 next_per_commitment_point,
3046                         })
3047                 } else { None };
3048
3049                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3050                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
3051                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3052                         } else {
3053                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3054                         }
3055
3056                         if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3057                                 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3058                                 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3059                                 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3060                                 // now!
3061                                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3062                                         Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3063                                         Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3064                                         Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3065                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3066                                         },
3067                                         Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3068                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3069                                         },
3070                                 }
3071                         } else {
3072                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3073                         }
3074                 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3075                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
3076                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3077                         } else {
3078                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3079                         }
3080
3081                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3082                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3083                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3084                         }
3085
3086                         return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3087                 } else {
3088                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3089                 }
3090         }
3091
3092         fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
3093                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3094         {
3095                 if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
3096                                 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
3097                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3098                         return None;
3099                 }
3100
3101                 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3102                 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
3103                         proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
3104                 }
3105                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3106                 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3107
3108                 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
3109                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3110                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3111                         .ok();
3112                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3113                 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
3114
3115                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
3116                 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3117                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3118                         fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3119                         signature: sig.unwrap(),
3120                 })
3121         }
3122
3123         pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3124                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3125         {
3126                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3127                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3128                 }
3129                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3130                         // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3131                         // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3132                         // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3133                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3134                 }
3135                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3136                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3137                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3138                         }
3139                 }
3140                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3141
3142                 if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, &msg.scriptpubkey) {
3143                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3144                 }
3145
3146                 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3147                         if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3148                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3149                         }
3150                 } else {
3151                         self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
3152                 }
3153
3154                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3155
3156                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3157                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3158
3159                 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3160                 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3161                 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3162                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3163                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3164                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3165                         match htlc_update {
3166                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3167                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3168                                         false
3169                                 },
3170                                 _ => true
3171                         }
3172                 });
3173                 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
3174                 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
3175                 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3176
3177                 let shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3178                         None
3179                 } else {
3180                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3181                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3182                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3183                         })
3184                 };
3185
3186                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3187                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3188
3189                 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3190         }
3191
3192         fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3193                 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3194                 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3195                 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3196
3197                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3198
3199                 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3200                 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3201                 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3202                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3203                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3204                 } else {
3205                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3206                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3207                 }
3208                 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3209                 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3210
3211                 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3212         }
3213
3214         pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3215                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3216         {
3217                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3218                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3219                 }
3220                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3221                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3222                 }
3223                 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3224                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3225                 }
3226                 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3227                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3228                 }
3229
3230                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3231                 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3232                 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3233                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3234                 }
3235                 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3236
3237                 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3238                         Ok(_) => {},
3239                         Err(_e) => {
3240                                 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3241                                 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3242                                 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3243                                 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3244                                 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3245                         },
3246                 };
3247
3248                 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3249                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3250                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3251                 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3252                         if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3253                                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3254                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3255                                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3256                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3257                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3258                                 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3259                         }
3260                 }
3261
3262                 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3263                         ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3264                                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3265                                 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3266                                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3267                                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3268                                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3269                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3270                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3271                                 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3272                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3273                                         fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3274                                         signature: sig,
3275                                 }), None))
3276                         }
3277                 }
3278
3279                 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3280                 if self.is_outbound() {
3281                         let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3282                         if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3283                                 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3284                                         if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3285                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3286                                         }
3287                                 }
3288                                 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3289                         }
3290                 } else {
3291                         min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3292                 }
3293                 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3294                         if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3295                                 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3296                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3297                                 }
3298                         }
3299                         propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3300                 }
3301
3302                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3303                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3304                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3305                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3306                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3307                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3308
3309                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3310                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3311
3312                 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3313                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3314                         fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3315                         signature: sig,
3316                 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3317         }
3318
3319         // Public utilities:
3320
3321         pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3322                 self.channel_id
3323         }
3324
3325         /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3326         /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3327         pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3328                 self.user_id
3329         }
3330
3331         /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3332         /// is_usable() returns true).
3333         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3334         pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3335                 self.short_channel_id
3336         }
3337
3338         /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3339         /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3340         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3341                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3342         }
3343
3344         fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3345                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3346         }
3347
3348         fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3349                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3350         }
3351
3352         fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3353                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().selected_contest_delay
3354         }
3355
3356         fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3357                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3358         }
3359
3360         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3361         pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3362                 self.counterparty_node_id
3363         }
3364
3365         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3366         #[cfg(test)]
3367         pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3368                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3369         }
3370
3371         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3372         pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3373                 return cmp::min(
3374                         // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3375                         // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3376                         // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3377                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
3378
3379                         Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3380                 );
3381         }
3382
3383         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3384         pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3385                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3386         }
3387
3388         pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3389                 self.channel_value_satoshis
3390         }
3391
3392         pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3393                 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
3394         }
3395
3396         pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
3397                 cmp::max(self.config.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
3398         }
3399
3400         #[cfg(test)]
3401         pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3402                 self.feerate_per_kw
3403         }
3404
3405         pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3406                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3407         }
3408
3409         pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3410                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3411         }
3412
3413         pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3414                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3415         }
3416
3417         #[cfg(test)]
3418         pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3419                 &self.holder_signer
3420         }
3421
3422         #[cfg(test)]
3423         pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3424                 ChannelValueStat {
3425                         value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3426                         channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3427                         channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
3428                         pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3429                         pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3430                         holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3431                                 let mut res = 0;
3432                                 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3433                                         match h {
3434                                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3435                                                         res += amount_msat;
3436                                                 }
3437                                                 _ => {}
3438                                         }
3439                                 }
3440                                 res
3441                         },
3442                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3443                         counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3444                 }
3445         }
3446
3447         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3448         pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3449                 self.update_time_counter
3450         }
3451
3452         pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3453                 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3454         }
3455
3456         pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3457                 self.config.announced_channel
3458         }
3459
3460         pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3461                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3462         }
3463
3464         /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3465         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3466         pub fn get_holder_fee_base_msat<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &F) -> u32
3467                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3468         {
3469                 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
3470                 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
3471
3472                 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
3473                 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
3474
3475                 if self.is_outbound() {
3476                         // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
3477                         res += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
3478                 }
3479
3480                 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
3481                 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) as u64 * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
3482
3483                 res as u32
3484         }
3485
3486         /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3487         pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3488                 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3489         }
3490
3491         /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3492         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3493         pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3494                 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3495                 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3496         }
3497
3498         /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3499         /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3500         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3501         pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3502                 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
3503         }
3504
3505         /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3506         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3507         pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3508                 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3509         }
3510
3511         /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3512         pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3513                 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3514         }
3515
3516         /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3517         /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3518         /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3519         pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3520                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32  {
3521                         assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3522                         true
3523                 } else { false }
3524         }
3525
3526         pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
3527                 self.channel_update_status
3528         }
3529
3530         pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
3531                 self.channel_update_status = status;
3532         }
3533
3534         fn check_get_funding_locked(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
3535                 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3536                         return None;
3537                 }
3538
3539                 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3540                 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
3541                         self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
3542                 }
3543
3544                 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth as i64 {
3545                         return None;
3546                 }
3547
3548                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3549                 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3550                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3551                         true
3552                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3553                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3554                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
3555                         true
3556                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3557                         // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3558                         false
3559                 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3560                         panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3561                 } else {
3562                         // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3563                         false
3564                 };
3565
3566                 if need_commitment_update {
3567                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3568                                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3569                                 return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3570                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3571                                         next_per_commitment_point,
3572                                 });
3573                         } else {
3574                                 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3575                         }
3576                 }
3577                 None
3578         }
3579
3580         /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
3581         /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
3582         /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
3583         pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData, logger: &L)
3584                         -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3585                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3586                 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3587                         if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3588                                 // If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring
3589                                 // whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one.
3590                                 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3591                                         if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
3592                                                 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
3593                                                 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3594                                                                 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3595                                                         if self.is_outbound() {
3596                                                                 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3597                                                                 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3598                                                                 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3599                                                                 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3600                                                                 // channel and move on.
3601                                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3602                                                                 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3603                                                         }
3604                                                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
3605                                                         return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3606                                                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3607                                                                 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index".to_owned()
3608                                                         });
3609                                                 } else {
3610                                                         if self.is_outbound() {
3611                                                                 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3612                                                                         if input.witness.is_empty() {
3613                                                                                 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3614                                                                                 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3615                                                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3616                                                                                 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3617                                                                         }
3618                                                                 }
3619                                                         }
3620                                                         self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
3621                                                         self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
3622                                                         self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
3623                                                                 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
3624                                                                 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
3625                                                         }
3626                                                 }
3627                                         }
3628                                         // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for funding_locked here and
3629                                         // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
3630                                         // may have already happened for this block).
3631                                         if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3632                                                 log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3633                                                 return Ok(Some(funding_locked));
3634                                         }
3635                                 }
3636                                 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3637                                         if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3638                                                 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3639                                                 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3640                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3641                                                         data: "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.".to_owned()
3642                                                 });
3643                                         }
3644                                 }
3645                         }
3646                 }
3647                 Ok(None)
3648         }
3649
3650         /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
3651         /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
3652         /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3653         /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3654         ///
3655         /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3656         /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3657         /// post-shutdown.
3658         ///
3659         /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3660         /// back.
3661         pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, logger: &L)
3662                         -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3663                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3664                 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
3665                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3666                         match htlc_update {
3667                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3668                                         if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
3669                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3670                                                 false
3671                                         } else { true }
3672                                 },
3673                                 _ => true
3674                         }
3675                 });
3676
3677                 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
3678
3679                 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3680                         log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3681                         return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs));
3682                 }
3683
3684                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3685                 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
3686                    (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 {
3687                         let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3688                         if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3689                                 // Note that check_get_funding_locked may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
3690                                 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
3691                                 // indicate we've already sent a funding_locked
3692                                 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
3693                         }
3694
3695                         // If we've sent funding_locked (or have both sent and received funding_locked), and
3696                         // the funding transaction's confirmation count has dipped below minimum_depth / 2,
3697                         // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
3698                         // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
3699                         if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth as i64 / 2 {
3700                                 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3701                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3702                                         data: format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.", self.minimum_depth, funding_tx_confirmations),
3703                                 });
3704                         }
3705                 }
3706
3707                 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3708         }
3709
3710         /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
3711         /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
3712         /// before the channel has reached funding_locked and we can just wait for more blocks.
3713         pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3714                 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
3715                         // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
3716                         // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
3717                         let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
3718                         // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
3719                         // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
3720                         // time we saw and it will be ignored.
3721                         let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
3722                         match self.best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, logger) {
3723                                 Ok((funding_locked, timed_out_htlcs)) => {
3724                                         assert!(funding_locked.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
3725                                         assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
3726                                         Ok(())
3727                                 },
3728                                 Err(e) => Err(e)
3729                         }
3730                 } else {
3731                         // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
3732                         Ok(())
3733                 }
3734         }
3735
3736         // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3737         // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3738
3739         pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3740                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3741                         panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3742                 }
3743                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3744                         panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3745                 }
3746
3747                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3748                         panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3749                 }
3750
3751                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3752                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3753
3754                 msgs::OpenChannel {
3755                         chain_hash,
3756                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3757                         funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3758                         push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3759                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3760                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3761                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3762                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3763                         feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
3764                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3765                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3766                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3767                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3768                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3769                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3770                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3771                         first_per_commitment_point,
3772                         channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3773                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3774                 }
3775         }
3776
3777         pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3778                 if self.is_outbound() {
3779                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3780                 }
3781                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3782                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3783                 }
3784                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3785                         panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3786                 }
3787
3788                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3789                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3790
3791                 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3792                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3793                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3794                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3795                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3796                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3797                         minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3798                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3799                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3800                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3801                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3802                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3803                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3804                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3805                         first_per_commitment_point,
3806                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3807                 }
3808         }
3809
3810         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3811         fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3812                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3813                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
3814                 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3815                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
3816         }
3817
3818         /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3819         /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3820         /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3821         /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3822         /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3823         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3824         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3825         pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3826                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3827                         panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3828                 }
3829                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3830                         panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3831                 }
3832                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3833                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3834                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3835                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3836                 }
3837
3838                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
3839                 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
3840
3841                 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
3842                         Ok(res) => res,
3843                         Err(e) => {
3844                                 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3845                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3846                                 return Err(e);
3847                         }
3848                 };
3849
3850                 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3851
3852                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3853
3854                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3855                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3856                 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
3857
3858                 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
3859                         temporary_channel_id,
3860                         funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3861                         funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3862                         signature
3863                 })
3864         }
3865
3866         /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3867         /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3868         /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3869         /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3870         /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3871         /// closing).
3872         /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3873         /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3874         ///
3875         /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
3876         pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3877                 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3878                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
3879                 }
3880                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3881                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
3882                 }
3883                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3884                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
3885                 }
3886
3887                 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
3888
3889                 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3890                         features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3891                         chain_hash,
3892                         short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3893                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
3894                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
3895                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3896                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
3897                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3898                 };
3899
3900                 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3901                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
3902
3903                 Ok((msg, sig))
3904         }
3905
3906         /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
3907         /// available.
3908         fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, msghash: secp256k1::Message, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, our_bitcoin_sig: Signature) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
3909                 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
3910                         let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
3911
3912                         let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, our_node_secret);
3913                         Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3914                                 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
3915                                 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
3916                                 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
3917                                 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
3918                                 contents: announcement,
3919                         })
3920                 } else {
3921                         Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
3922                 }
3923         }
3924
3925         /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
3926         /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
3927         /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
3928         pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
3929                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
3930
3931                 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
3932
3933                 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
3934                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
3935                                 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
3936                                  &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
3937                 }
3938                 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
3939                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
3940                                 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
3941                                 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
3942                 }
3943
3944                 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
3945
3946                 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig)
3947         }
3948
3949         /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
3950         /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
3951         pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
3952                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
3953                         Ok(res) => res,
3954                         Err(_) => return None,
3955                 };
3956                 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
3957                 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) {
3958                         Ok(res) => Some(res),
3959                         Err(_) => None,
3960                 }
3961         }
3962
3963         /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3964         /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3965         pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
3966                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3967                 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3968                 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
3969                 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
3970                 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
3971                 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
3972                 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
3973                 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
3974                 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
3975                 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
3976                 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3977                         let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
3978                         log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3979                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3980                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
3981                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
3982                         })
3983                 } else {
3984                         log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3985                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3986                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
3987                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
3988                         })
3989                 };
3990                 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3991                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3992                         // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3993                         // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3994                         // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3995                         // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3996                         // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3997                         // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3998
3999                         // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
4000                         // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
4001                         next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4002                         // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
4003                         // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
4004                         // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
4005                         // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
4006                         // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
4007                         // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
4008                         // overflow here.
4009                         next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
4010                         data_loss_protect,
4011                 }
4012         }
4013
4014
4015         // Send stuff to our remote peers:
4016
4017         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
4018         /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
4019         /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
4020         /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
4021         /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
4022         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
4023         /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
4024         pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
4025                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4026                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
4027                 }
4028                 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
4029                 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
4030                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
4031                 }
4032
4033                 if amount_msat == 0 {
4034                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4035                 }
4036
4037                 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
4038                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
4039                 }
4040
4041                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
4042                         // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
4043                         // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
4044                         // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
4045                         // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
4046                         // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
4047                         // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
4048                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update".to_owned()));
4049                 }
4050
4051                 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
4052                 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
4053                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4054                 }
4055                 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4056                 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4057                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4058                 }
4059
4060                 if !self.is_outbound() {
4061                         // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4062                         let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
4063                         let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
4064                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4065                         let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4066                         if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4067                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4068                         }
4069                 }
4070
4071                 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - htlc_outbound_value_msat;
4072                 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
4073                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
4074                 }
4075
4076                 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
4077                 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
4078                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4079                         2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
4080                 } else { 0 };
4081                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
4082                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
4083                 }
4084
4085                 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
4086                 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
4087                 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
4088                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
4089                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
4090                 }
4091
4092                 // Now update local state:
4093                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
4094                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4095                                 amount_msat,
4096                                 payment_hash,
4097                                 cltv_expiry,
4098                                 source,
4099                                 onion_routing_packet,
4100                         });
4101                         return Ok(None);
4102                 }
4103
4104                 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4105                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4106                         amount_msat,
4107                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4108                         cltv_expiry,
4109                         state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
4110                         source,
4111                 });
4112
4113                 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4114                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4115                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4116                         amount_msat,
4117                         payment_hash,
4118                         cltv_expiry,
4119                         onion_routing_packet,
4120                 };
4121                 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
4122
4123                 Ok(Some(res))
4124         }
4125
4126         /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
4127         /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
4128         /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
4129         /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
4130         pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4131                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4132                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
4133                 }
4134                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
4135                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
4136                 }
4137                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
4138                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4139                 }
4140                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
4141                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4142                 }
4143                 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
4144                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4145                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4146                                 have_updates = true;
4147                         }
4148                         if have_updates { break; }
4149                 }
4150                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4151                         if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4152                                 have_updates = true;
4153                         }
4154                         if have_updates { break; }
4155                 }
4156                 if !have_updates {
4157                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
4158                 }
4159                 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
4160         }
4161         /// Only fails in case of bad keys
4162         fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4163                 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4164                 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4165                 // is acceptable.
4166                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4167                         let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4168                                 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4169                         } else { None };
4170                         if let Some(state) = new_state {
4171                                 htlc.state = state;
4172                         }
4173                 }
4174                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4175                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4176                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
4177                         } else { None } {
4178                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4179                         }
4180                 }
4181                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4182
4183                 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4184                         Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4185                                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4186                                 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4187                                         htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4188                                 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4189                         },
4190                         Err(e) => return Err(e),
4191                 };
4192
4193                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4194                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4195                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4196                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4197                                 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4198                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4199                                 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4200                                 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4201                         }]
4202                 };
4203                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4204                 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4205         }
4206
4207         /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4208         /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4209         fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4210                 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4211                 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
4212                         if self.is_outbound() {
4213                                 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4214                         }
4215                 }
4216
4217                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4218                 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
4219                 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4220                 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4221
4222                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4223                 {
4224                         if !self.is_outbound() {
4225                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4226                                 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4227                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4228                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4229                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4230                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4231                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4232                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4233                                                         let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.1);
4234                                                         assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4235                                                 }
4236                                 }
4237                         }
4238                 }
4239
4240                 {
4241                         let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len());
4242                         for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
4243                                 htlcs.push(htlc);
4244                         }
4245
4246                         let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4247                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4248                         signature = res.0;
4249                         htlc_signatures = res.1;
4250
4251                         log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
4252                                 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4253                                 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4254                                 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4255
4256                         for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4257                                 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
4258                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4259                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4260                                         log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4261                                         log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4262                         }
4263                 }
4264
4265                 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4266                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4267                         signature,
4268                         htlc_signatures,
4269                 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
4270         }
4271
4272         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4273         /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4274         /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4275         /// more info.
4276         pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4277                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4278                         Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4279                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4280                                 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4281                         },
4282                         None => Ok(None)
4283                 }
4284         }
4285
4286         /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
4287         pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
4288                 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
4289         }
4290
4291         pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4292                 let usable_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
4293                 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= usable_channel_value_msat {
4294                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
4295                 }
4296                 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4297                         fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
4298                         fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
4299                         cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
4300                 });
4301
4302                 Ok(())
4303         }
4304
4305         /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4306         /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4307         pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
4308                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4309                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4310                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4311                         }
4312                 }
4313                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4314                         if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4315                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4316                         }
4317                         else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4318                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4319                         }
4320                 }
4321                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4322                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4323                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4324                 }
4325
4326                 let closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
4327
4328                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4329                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4330                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4331                 } else {
4332                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4333                 }
4334                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4335
4336                 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4337                 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4338                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4339                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4340                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4341                         match htlc_update {
4342                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4343                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4344                                         false
4345                                 },
4346                                 _ => true
4347                         }
4348                 });
4349
4350                 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
4351                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4352                         scriptpubkey: closing_script,
4353                 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4354         }
4355
4356         /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4357         /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4358         /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4359         /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4360         /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4361         pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4362                 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
4363                 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
4364                 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
4365                 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4366                 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4367
4368                 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4369                 // return them to fail the payment.
4370                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4371                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4372                         match htlc_update {
4373                                 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4374                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4375                                 },
4376                                 _ => {}
4377                         }
4378                 }
4379                 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4380                         // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4381                         // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4382                         // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4383                         // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4384                         // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4385                         // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4386                         // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4387                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4388                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4389                                 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4390                                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4391                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4392                                 }))
4393                         } else { None }
4394                 } else { None };
4395
4396                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4397                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4398                 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4399         }
4400 }
4401
4402 fn is_unsupported_shutdown_script(their_features: &InitFeatures, script: &Script) -> bool {
4403         // We restrain shutdown scripts to standards forms to avoid transactions not propagating on the p2p tx-relay network
4404
4405         // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms,
4406         // which for a a BIP-141-compliant witness program is at max 42 bytes in length.
4407         // So don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
4408         let is_script_too_long = script.len() > 42;
4409         if is_script_too_long {
4410                 return true;
4411         }
4412
4413         if their_features.supports_shutdown_anysegwit() && script.is_witness_program() && script.as_bytes()[0] != OP_PUSHBYTES_0.into_u8() {
4414                 return false;
4415         }
4416
4417         return !script.is_p2pkh() && !script.is_p2sh() && !script.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !script.is_v0_p2wsh()
4418 }
4419
4420 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4421 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4422
4423 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
4424         (0, FailRelay),
4425         (1, FailMalformed),
4426         (2, Fulfill),
4427 );
4428
4429 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4430         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4431                 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
4432                 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
4433                 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
4434                 match self {
4435                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4436                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4437                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4438                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4439                 }
4440                 Ok(())
4441         }
4442 }
4443
4444 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4445         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4446                 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4447                         0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
4448                         1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
4449                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4450                 })
4451         }
4452 }
4453
4454 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4455         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4456                 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4457                 // called.
4458
4459                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4460
4461                 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4462                 self.config.write(writer)?;
4463
4464                 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4465                 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4466                 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4467
4468                 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4469
4470                 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4471                 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
4472                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
4473                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
4474                 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4475                 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
4476
4477                 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4478                 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4479
4480                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4481                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4482                 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4483
4484                 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4485                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4486                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4487                                 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4488                         }
4489                 }
4490                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4491                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4492                         if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4493                                 continue; // Drop
4494                         }
4495                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4496                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4497                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4498                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4499                         match &htlc.state {
4500                                 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4501                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4502                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4503                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4504                                 },
4505                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4506                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4507                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4508                                 },
4509                                 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4510                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4511                                 },
4512                                 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4513                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4514                                         removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4515                                 },
4516                         }
4517                 }
4518
4519                 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4520                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4521                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4522                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4523                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4524                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4525                         htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4526                         match &htlc.state {
4527                                 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4528                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4529                                         onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4530                                 },
4531                                 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4532                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4533                                 },
4534                                 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
4535                                         // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
4536                                         // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
4537                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4538                                 },
4539                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4540                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4541                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4542                                 },
4543                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4544                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4545                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4546                                 },
4547                         }
4548                 }
4549
4550                 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4551                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4552                         match update {
4553                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4554                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4555                                         amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4556                                         cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4557                                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4558                                         source.write(writer)?;
4559                                         onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4560                                 },
4561                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4562                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4563                                         payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4564                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4565                                 },
4566                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4567                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4568                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4569                                         err_packet.write(writer)?;
4570                                 }
4571                         }
4572                 }
4573
4574                 match self.resend_order {
4575                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4576                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4577                 }
4578
4579                 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4580                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4581                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4582
4583                 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4584                 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4585                         pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4586                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4587                 }
4588
4589                 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4590                 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4591                         htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4592                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4593                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4594                 }
4595
4596                 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4597                 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4598
4599                 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4600                 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4601                 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4602                 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4603
4604                 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4605                         Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4606                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4607                                 feerate.write(writer)?;
4608                                 fee.write(writer)?;
4609                                 sig.write(writer)?;
4610                         },
4611                         None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4612                 }
4613
4614                 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4615                 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
4616                 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4617
4618                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4619                 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4620                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4621                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4622                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4623                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4624                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4625                 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
4626
4627                 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
4628                         Some(info) => {
4629                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4630                                 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
4631                                 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4632                                 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4633                         },
4634                         None => 0u8.write(writer)?
4635                 }
4636
4637                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
4638                 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
4639
4640                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4641                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4642                 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
4643
4644                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4645
4646                 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4647
4648                 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
4649
4650                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {}, {(0, self.announcement_sigs)});
4651
4652                 Ok(())
4653         }
4654 }
4655
4656 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4657 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
4658                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4659         fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4660                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4661
4662                 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4663                 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
4664
4665                 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4666                 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4667                 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4668
4669                 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4670
4671                 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4672                 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
4673                 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
4674                         // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
4675                         let mut data = [0; 1024];
4676                         let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
4677                         reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
4678                         keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
4679                 }
4680                 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
4681
4682                 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4683                 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4684
4685                 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4686                 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4687                 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4688
4689                 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4690                 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4691                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
4692                         pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4693                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4694                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4695                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4696                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4697                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4698                                         1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4699                                         2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4700                                         3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4701                                         4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4702                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4703                                 },
4704                         });
4705                 }
4706
4707                 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4708                 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4709                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4710                         pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4711                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4712                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4713                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4714                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4715                                 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4716                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4717                                         0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4718                                         1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4719                                         2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4720                                         3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4721                                         4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4722                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4723                                 },
4724                         });
4725                 }
4726
4727                 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4728                 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4729                 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4730                         holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4731                                 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4732                                         amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4733                                         cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4734                                         payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4735                                         source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4736                                         onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4737                                 },
4738                                 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4739                                         payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4740                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4741                                 },
4742                                 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4743                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4744                                         err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4745                                 },
4746                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4747                         });
4748                 }
4749
4750                 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4751                         0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4752                         1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4753                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4754                 };
4755
4756                 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4757                 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4758                 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4759
4760                 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4761                 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4762                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4763                         monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4764                 }
4765
4766                 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4767                 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4768                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4769                         monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4770                 }
4771
4772                 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4773                 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4774
4775                 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4776                 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4777                 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
4778                 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4779
4780                 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4781                         0 => None,
4782                         1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4783                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4784                 };
4785
4786                 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4787                 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
4788                 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4789
4790                 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4791                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4792                 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4793                 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4794                 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4795                 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4796                 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
4797                 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
4798
4799                 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4800                         0 => None,
4801                         1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4802                                 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4803                                 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
4804                                 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
4805                         }),
4806                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4807                 };
4808
4809                 let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
4810                 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
4811
4812                 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4813
4814                 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4815                 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4816
4817                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4818                 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4819
4820                 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
4821
4822                 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
4823                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {}, {(0, announcement_sigs)});
4824
4825                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4826                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
4827
4828                 Ok(Channel {
4829                         user_id,
4830
4831                         config,
4832                         channel_id,
4833                         channel_state,
4834                         secp_ctx,
4835                         channel_value_satoshis,
4836
4837                         latest_monitor_update_id,
4838
4839                         holder_signer,
4840                         shutdown_pubkey,
4841                         destination_script,
4842
4843                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4844                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4845                         value_to_self_msat,
4846
4847                         pending_inbound_htlcs,
4848                         pending_outbound_htlcs,
4849                         holding_cell_htlc_updates,
4850
4851                         resend_order,
4852
4853                         monitor_pending_funding_locked,
4854                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
4855                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
4856                         monitor_pending_forwards,
4857                         monitor_pending_failures,
4858
4859                         pending_update_fee,
4860                         holding_cell_update_fee,
4861                         next_holder_htlc_id,
4862                         next_counterparty_htlc_id,
4863                         update_time_counter,
4864                         feerate_per_kw,
4865
4866                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4867                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4868                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4869                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4870
4871                         last_sent_closing_fee,
4872
4873                         funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4874                         funding_tx_confirmation_height,
4875                         short_channel_id,
4876
4877                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
4878                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4879                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4880                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4881                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
4882                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4883                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
4884                         minimum_depth,
4885
4886                         counterparty_forwarding_info,
4887
4888                         channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
4889                         funding_transaction,
4890
4891                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
4892                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
4893                         counterparty_node_id,
4894
4895                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4896
4897                         commitment_secrets,
4898
4899                         channel_update_status,
4900
4901                         announcement_sigs,
4902
4903                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4904                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4905                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4906                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4907                 })
4908         }
4909 }
4910
4911 #[cfg(test)]
4912 mod tests {
4913         use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4914         use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4915         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4916         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
4917         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4918         use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4919         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4920         use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4921         use hex;
4922         use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4923         use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, HTLCSource};
4924         use ln::channel::{Channel,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
4925         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4926         use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4927         use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
4928         use ln::chan_utils;
4929         use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
4930         use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4931         use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
4932         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4933         use util::config::UserConfig;
4934         use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
4935         use util::test_utils;
4936         use util::logger::Logger;
4937         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
4938         use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
4939         use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4940         use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
4941         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4942         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4943         use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
4944         use std::sync::Arc;
4945         use prelude::*;
4946
4947         struct TestFeeEstimator {
4948                 fee_est: u32
4949         }
4950         impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4951                 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
4952                         self.fee_est
4953                 }
4954         }
4955
4956         #[test]
4957         fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4958                 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4959                         "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4960         }
4961
4962         struct Keys {
4963                 signer: InMemorySigner,
4964         }
4965         impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4966                 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
4967
4968                 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4969                 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4970                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4971                         let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4972                         let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4973                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4974                 }
4975
4976                 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4977                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4978                         let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4979                         PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4980                 }
4981
4982                 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
4983                         self.signer.clone()
4984                 }
4985                 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4986                 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
4987                 fn sign_invoice(&self, _invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
4988         }
4989
4990         fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
4991                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
4992         }
4993
4994         // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
4995         // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
4996         #[test]
4997         fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
4998                 let original_fee = 253;
4999                 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
5000                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5001                 let seed = [42; 32];
5002                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5003                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5004
5005                 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5006                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5007                 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5008
5009                 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
5010                 // same as the old fee.
5011                 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
5012                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5013                 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
5014         }
5015
5016         #[test]
5017         fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
5018                 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
5019                 // dust limits are used.
5020                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5021                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5022                 let seed = [42; 32];
5023                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5024                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5025
5026                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
5027                 // they have different dust limits.
5028
5029                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5030                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5031                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5032                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5033
5034                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5035                 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
5036                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5037                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5038                 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5039
5040                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
5041                 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5042                 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5043                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5044                 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
5045
5046                 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
5047                 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
5048                 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
5049                         htlc_id: 0,
5050                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
5051                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
5052                         cltv_expiry: 300000000,
5053                         state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5054                 });
5055
5056                 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5057                         htlc_id: 1,
5058                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
5059                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
5060                         cltv_expiry: 200000000,
5061                         state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5062                         source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5063                                 path: Vec::new(),
5064                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5065                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
5066                         }
5067                 });
5068
5069                 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
5070                 // the dust limit check.
5071                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5072                 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5073                 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5074                 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
5075
5076                 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
5077                 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
5078                 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5079                 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
5080                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5081                 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5082                 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
5083         }
5084
5085         #[test]
5086         fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
5087                 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
5088                 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
5089                 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
5090                 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
5091                 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
5092                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5093                 let seed = [42; 32];
5094                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5095                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5096
5097                 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5098                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5099                 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5100
5101                 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5102                 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
5103
5104                 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
5105                 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5106                 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5107                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5108                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5109                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5110
5111                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5112                 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5113                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5114                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5115                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5116
5117                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5118
5119                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5120                 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5121                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5122                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5123                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5124
5125                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5126                 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5127                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5128                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5129                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5130         }
5131
5132         #[test]
5133         fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
5134                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5135                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5136                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5137                 let seed = [42; 32];
5138                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5139                 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
5140                 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
5141                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5142
5143                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
5144
5145                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5146                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5147                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5148                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5149
5150                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5151                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
5152                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5153                 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5154
5155                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
5156                 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5157                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5158
5159                 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
5160                 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5161                 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5162                         value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
5163                 }]};
5164                 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
5165                 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
5166                 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
5167
5168                 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
5169                 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
5170
5171                 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
5172                 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
5173                 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5174                 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5175                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5176                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5177                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5178                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5179                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5180                         },
5181                         _ => panic!()
5182                 }
5183
5184                 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
5185                 // is sane.
5186                 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5187                 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5188                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5189                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5190                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5191                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5192                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5193                         },
5194                         _ => panic!()
5195                 }
5196         }
5197
5198         #[test]
5199         fn channel_update() {
5200                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5201                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5202                 let seed = [42; 32];
5203                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5204                 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5205                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5206
5207                 // Create a channel.
5208                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5209                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5210                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5211                 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
5212                 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
5213                 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
5214
5215                 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
5216                 let update = ChannelUpdate {
5217                         contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
5218                                 chain_hash,
5219                                 short_channel_id: 0,
5220                                 timestamp: 0,
5221                                 flags: 0,
5222                                 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
5223                                 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
5224                                 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
5225                                 fee_base_msat: 110,
5226                                 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
5227                                 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5228                         },
5229                         signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
5230                 };
5231                 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
5232
5233                 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
5234                 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
5235                 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
5236                 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
5237                         Some(info) => {
5238                                 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
5239                                 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
5240                                 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
5241                         },
5242                         None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
5243                 }
5244         }
5245
5246         #[test]
5247         fn outbound_commitment_test() {
5248                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
5249                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5250                 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
5251                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5252
5253                 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
5254                         &secp_ctx,
5255                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5256                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5257                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5258                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5259                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5260
5261                         // These aren't set in the test vectors:
5262                         [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
5263                         10_000_000,
5264                         [0; 32]
5265                 );
5266
5267                 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5268                                 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
5269                 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
5270
5271                 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5272                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
5273                 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
5274                 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
5275                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5276
5277                 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
5278
5279                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5280                         funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5281                         revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5282                         payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
5283                         delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5284                         htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
5285                 };
5286                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5287                         CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5288                                 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5289                                 selected_contest_delay: 144
5290                         });
5291                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5292                 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5293
5294                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5295                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5296
5297                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5298                            hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5299
5300                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5301                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5302
5303                 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5304                 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5305                 // build_commitment_transaction.
5306                 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5307                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5308                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5309                 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5310                 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5311
5312                 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5313                         ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5314                                 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5315                         } ) => { {
5316                                 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
5317                                         let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
5318
5319                                         let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
5320                                                 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
5321                                                 .collect();
5322                                         (res.0, htlcs)
5323                                 };
5324                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
5325                                 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
5326                                 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5327                                 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5328                                 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
5329                                 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
5330
5331                                 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
5332                                 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5333                                 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
5334                                 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5335                                 $({
5336                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5337                                         per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
5338                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
5339                                 })*
5340                                 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
5341
5342                                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
5343                                         commitment_tx.clone(),
5344                                         counterparty_signature,
5345                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs,
5346                                         &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
5347                                         chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
5348                                 );
5349                                 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
5350                                 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
5351
5352                                 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5353                                 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
5354                                 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
5355
5356                                 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
5357                                 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
5358
5359                                 $({
5360                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5361
5362                                         let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
5363                                         let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
5364                                         let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
5365                                         let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
5366                                         secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
5367
5368                                         let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5369                                         if !htlc.offered {
5370                                                 for i in 0..5 {
5371                                                         let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
5372                                                         if out == htlc.payment_hash {
5373                                                                 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
5374                                                         }
5375                                                 }
5376
5377                                                 assert!(preimage.is_some());
5378                                         }
5379
5380                                         let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
5381                                         assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
5382
5383                                         let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5384                                         assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
5385                                         let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
5386                                         let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
5387                                         let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
5388                                         assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
5389                                                         hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
5390                                 })*
5391                                 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
5392                         } }
5393                 }
5394
5395                 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
5396                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
5397
5398                 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
5399                                                  "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
5400                                                  "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", {});
5401
5402                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5403                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5404                                 htlc_id: 0,
5405                                 amount_msat: 1000000,
5406                                 cltv_expiry: 500,
5407                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5408                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5409                         };
5410                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
5411                         out
5412                 });
5413                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5414                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5415                                 htlc_id: 1,
5416                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5417                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
5418                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5419                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5420                         };
5421                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5422                         out
5423                 });
5424                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5425                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5426                                 htlc_id: 2,
5427                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5428                                 cltv_expiry: 502,
5429                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5430                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5431                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5432                         };
5433                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
5434                         out
5435                 });
5436                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5437                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5438                                 htlc_id: 3,
5439                                 amount_msat: 3000000,
5440                                 cltv_expiry: 503,
5441                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5442                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5443                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5444                         };
5445                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
5446                         out
5447                 });
5448                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5449                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5450                                 htlc_id: 4,
5451                                 amount_msat: 4000000,
5452                                 cltv_expiry: 504,
5453                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5454                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5455                         };
5456                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
5457                         out
5458                 });
5459
5460                 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5461                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5462                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
5463
5464                 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
5465                                  "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
5466                                  "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", {
5467
5468                                   { 0,
5469                                   "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
5470                                   "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
5471                                   "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" },
5472
5473                                   { 1,
5474                                   "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
5475                                   "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
5476                                   "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" },
5477
5478                                   { 2,
5479                                   "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
5480                                   "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
5481                                   "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" },
5482
5483                                   { 3,
5484                                   "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
5485                                   "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
5486                                   "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" },
5487
5488                                   { 4,
5489                                   "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
5490                                   "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
5491                                   "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b04000000000000000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b8701483045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5492                 } );
5493
5494                 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5495                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5496                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
5497
5498                 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
5499                                  "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
5500                                  "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", {
5501
5502                                   { 0,
5503                                   "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
5504                                   "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
5505                                   "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" },
5506
5507                                   { 1,
5508                                   "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
5509                                   "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
5510                                   "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" },
5511
5512                                   { 2,
5513                                   "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
5514                                   "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
5515                                   "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" },
5516
5517                                   { 3,
5518                                   "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
5519                                   "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
5520                                   "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" },
5521
5522                                   { 4,
5523                                   "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
5524                                   "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
5525                                   "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" }
5526                 } );
5527
5528                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5529                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5530                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
5531
5532                 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
5533                                  "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
5534                                  "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", {
5535
5536                                   { 0,
5537                                   "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
5538                                   "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
5539                                   "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" },
5540
5541                                   { 1,
5542                                   "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
5543                                   "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
5544                                   "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" },
5545
5546                                   { 2,
5547                                   "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
5548                                   "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
5549                                   "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" },
5550
5551                                   { 3,
5552                                   "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
5553                                   "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
5554                                   "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" }
5555                 } );
5556
5557                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5558                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5559                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
5560
5561                 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
5562                                  "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
5563                                  "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", {
5564
5565                                   { 0,
5566                                   "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
5567                                   "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
5568                                   "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" },
5569
5570                                   { 1,
5571                                   "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
5572                                   "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
5573                                   "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" },
5574
5575                                   { 2,
5576                                   "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
5577                                   "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
5578                                   "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" },
5579
5580                                   { 3,
5581                                   "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
5582                                   "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
5583                                   "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" }
5584                 } );
5585
5586                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5587                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5588                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
5589
5590                 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
5591                                  "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
5592                                  "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", {
5593
5594                                   { 0,
5595                                   "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
5596                                   "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
5597                                   "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" },
5598
5599                                   { 1,
5600                                   "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
5601                                   "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
5602                                   "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" },
5603
5604                                   { 2,
5605                                   "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
5606                                   "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
5607                                   "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" }
5608                 } );
5609
5610                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5611                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5612                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
5613
5614                 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
5615                                  "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
5616                                  "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", {
5617
5618                                   { 0,
5619                                   "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
5620                                   "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
5621                                   "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" },
5622
5623                                   { 1,
5624                                   "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
5625                                   "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
5626                                   "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" },
5627
5628                                   { 2,
5629                                   "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
5630                                   "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
5631                                   "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" }
5632                 } );
5633
5634                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5635                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5636                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
5637
5638                 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
5639                                  "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
5640                                  "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", {
5641
5642                                   { 0,
5643                                   "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
5644                                   "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
5645                                   "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" },
5646
5647                                   { 1,
5648                                   "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
5649                                   "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
5650                                   "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" }
5651                 } );
5652
5653                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5654                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5655                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
5656
5657                 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
5658                                  "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
5659                                  "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", {
5660
5661                                   { 0,
5662                                   "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
5663                                   "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
5664                                   "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" },
5665
5666                                   { 1,
5667                                   "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
5668                                   "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
5669                                   "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" }
5670                 } );
5671
5672                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5673                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5674                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
5675
5676                 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
5677                                  "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
5678                                  "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", {
5679
5680                                   { 0,
5681                                   "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
5682                                   "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
5683                                   "0200000000010120060e4a29579d429f0f27c17ee5f1ee282f20d706d6f90b63d35946d8f3029a0000000000000000000175050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a01483045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5684                 } );
5685
5686                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5687                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5688                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
5689
5690                 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
5691                                  "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
5692                                  "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", {
5693
5694                                   { 0,
5695                                   "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
5696                                   "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
5697                                   "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" }
5698                 } );
5699
5700                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5701                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5702                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
5703
5704                 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
5705                                  "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
5706                                  "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", {});
5707
5708                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5709                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5710                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
5711
5712                 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
5713                                  "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
5714                                  "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", {});
5715
5716                 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5717                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5718                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
5719
5720                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5721                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5722                                  "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", {});
5723
5724                 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
5725                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5726                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
5727
5728                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5729                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5730                                  "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", {});
5731
5732                 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
5733                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
5734                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
5735                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
5736                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5737                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5738                                 htlc_id: 1,
5739                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5740                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
5741                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5742                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5743                         };
5744                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5745                         out
5746                 });
5747                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
5748                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5749                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5750                                 htlc_id: 6,
5751                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
5752                                 cltv_expiry: 506,
5753                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5754                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5755                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5756                         };
5757                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5758                         out
5759                 });
5760                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5761                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5762                                 htlc_id: 5,
5763                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
5764                                 cltv_expiry: 505,
5765                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5766                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5767                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5768                         };
5769                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5770                         out
5771                 });
5772
5773                 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
5774                                  "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
5775                                  "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", {
5776
5777                                   { 0,
5778                                   "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
5779                                   "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
5780                                   "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" },
5781                                   { 1,
5782                                   "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
5783                                   "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
5784                                   "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" },
5785                                   { 2,
5786                                   "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
5787                                   "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
5788                                   "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" }
5789                 } );
5790         }
5791
5792         #[test]
5793         fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
5794                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
5795
5796                 let mut seed = [0; 32];
5797                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
5798                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5799                            hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
5800
5801                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
5802                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5803                            hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
5804
5805                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
5806                            hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
5807
5808                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
5809                            hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
5810
5811                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
5812                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
5813                            hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
5814         }
5815
5816         #[test]
5817         fn test_key_derivation() {
5818                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
5819                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5820
5821                 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5822                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5823
5824                 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
5825                 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
5826
5827                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5828                 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
5829
5830                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5831                                 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
5832
5833                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5834                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5835
5836                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5837                                 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
5838
5839                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5840                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5841         }
5842 }