1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
30 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
34 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
35 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
36 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
38 use util::transaction_utils;
39 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::errors::APIError;
42 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
43 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
47 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
48 use core::convert::TryFrom;
50 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", debug_assertions))]
52 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
56 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
63 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
66 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
67 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
68 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
69 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
72 enum InboundHTLCState {
73 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
74 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
75 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
76 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
77 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
78 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
79 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
80 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
81 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
82 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
83 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
84 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
85 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
86 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
87 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
89 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
90 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
91 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
92 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
93 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
94 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
95 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
96 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
97 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
98 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
99 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
100 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
101 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
102 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
104 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
105 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
106 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
107 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
108 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
109 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
110 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
111 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
113 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
114 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
116 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
117 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
118 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
119 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
120 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
121 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
122 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
123 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
126 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
130 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
131 state: InboundHTLCState,
134 enum OutboundHTLCState {
135 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
136 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
137 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
138 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
139 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
140 /// money back (though we won't), and,
141 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
142 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
143 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
144 /// we'll never get out of sync).
145 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
146 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
147 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
149 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
150 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
151 RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
152 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
153 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
154 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
155 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
156 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
157 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
158 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
159 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
160 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
161 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
162 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
163 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
166 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
170 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
171 state: OutboundHTLCState,
175 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
176 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
177 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
181 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
183 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
186 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
191 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
195 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
196 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
197 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
198 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
199 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
200 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
201 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
203 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
204 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
205 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
206 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
207 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
208 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
209 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
211 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
212 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
213 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
215 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
216 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
217 TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
218 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
219 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
220 OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
222 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
223 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
225 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
226 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
227 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
228 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
229 MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
230 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
231 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
232 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
233 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
235 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
236 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
237 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
238 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
239 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
240 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
241 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
242 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
243 /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
244 /// us their shutdown.
245 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
246 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
247 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
248 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
250 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
251 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
253 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
255 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
256 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
257 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
258 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
259 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
260 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
261 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
262 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
264 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
266 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
268 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
272 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
278 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
281 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
282 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
283 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
286 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
287 struct HTLCCandidate {
289 origin: HTLCInitiator,
293 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
301 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
302 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
303 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
304 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
305 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
306 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
307 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
308 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
309 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
310 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
311 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
314 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
316 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
318 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
319 htlc_value_msat: u64,
320 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
325 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
326 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
327 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
328 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
329 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
331 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
332 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
333 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
334 htlc_value_msat: u64,
335 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
336 /// in the holding cell).
337 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
339 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
340 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
344 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
345 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
346 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
347 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
348 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
349 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
350 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
351 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
352 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
353 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
354 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
356 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
358 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
360 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
361 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
362 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
365 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
366 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
367 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
368 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
369 pub(crate) config: ChannelConfig,
370 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
371 config: ChannelConfig,
375 channel_id: [u8; 32],
377 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
378 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
380 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
382 holder_signer: Signer,
383 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
384 destination_script: Script,
386 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
387 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
388 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
390 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
391 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
392 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
393 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
394 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
395 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
397 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
398 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
399 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
400 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
401 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
402 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
404 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
406 monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
407 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
408 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
409 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
410 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
412 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
413 // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
414 // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
416 // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
417 // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
418 // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
419 // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
420 // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
421 // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
422 // commitment_signed.
423 pending_update_fee: Option<u32>,
424 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
425 // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
426 // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
427 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
428 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
429 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
430 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
431 update_time_counter: u32,
434 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
435 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
436 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
437 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
438 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
439 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
441 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
443 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
444 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
445 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
446 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
448 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
450 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
452 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
454 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
456 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
457 //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
458 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
459 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
460 // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
461 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
462 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
464 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
466 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
467 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
468 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
470 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
472 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
473 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
475 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
476 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
477 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
479 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
481 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
483 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
485 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
486 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
487 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
489 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
490 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
491 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
492 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
493 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
494 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
495 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
496 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
498 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
499 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
500 /// funding_locked *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
501 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the funding_locked
502 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
504 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
505 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::FundingLocked>,
507 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
508 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
509 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
510 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
511 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
512 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
513 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
514 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
517 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
518 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
520 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
521 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
522 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
526 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
529 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
531 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
533 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
535 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
537 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
539 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
541 /// Maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed. 2 * standard dust threshold on p2wsh output
542 /// Scales up on Bitcoin Core's proceeding policy with dust outputs. A typical p2wsh output is 43
543 /// bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal spend of 67 bytes (even if
544 /// a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee` is set to 3000sat/kb, thus
545 /// 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs are p2wsh, a value of
546 /// 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions. We give a bit
547 /// of margin to our counterparty and pick up 660 satoshis as an accepted `dust_limit_satoshis`
548 /// upper bound to avoid negotiation conflicts with other implementations.
549 pub const MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 2 * 330;
551 /// A typical p2wsh output is 43 bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal
552 /// spend of 67 bytes (even if a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee`
553 /// is set to 3000sat/kb, thus 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs
554 /// are p2wsh, a value of 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions.
555 pub const MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 330;
557 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
558 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
559 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
560 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
563 CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
566 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
567 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
569 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
570 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
571 &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
576 macro_rules! secp_check {
577 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
580 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
585 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
586 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
587 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
588 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
591 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
594 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
595 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
596 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
597 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
601 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
602 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
603 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
605 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
606 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
607 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
609 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
610 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
612 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
613 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
614 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
616 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
617 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
619 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis);
620 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
621 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
624 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
626 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
627 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
629 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_options.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
630 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
633 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
634 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
635 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
641 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
643 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
644 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
646 channel_value_satoshis,
648 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
651 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
652 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
654 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
655 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
656 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
658 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
659 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
660 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
661 pending_update_fee: None,
662 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
663 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
664 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
665 update_time_counter: 1,
667 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
669 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
670 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
671 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
672 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
673 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
675 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
676 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
677 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
678 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
680 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
682 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
683 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
684 short_channel_id: None,
686 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
687 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
688 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
689 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
690 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
691 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
692 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
693 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
694 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
696 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
698 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
699 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
700 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
701 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
702 counterparty_parameters: None,
703 funding_outpoint: None
705 funding_transaction: None,
707 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
708 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
709 counterparty_node_id,
711 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
713 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
715 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
717 announcement_sigs: None,
719 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
720 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
721 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
722 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
724 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
726 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
727 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
731 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
732 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
734 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
735 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
736 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
738 let upper_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 2;
739 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
740 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
745 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
746 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
747 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
748 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
749 F::Target: FeeEstimator
751 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
752 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
753 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
754 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
755 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
756 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
757 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
758 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
760 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
762 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
763 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
766 // Check sanity of message fields:
767 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
768 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
770 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
771 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
773 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
774 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
775 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
777 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
778 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
780 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
781 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
783 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
784 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
785 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
787 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
789 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
790 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
791 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
793 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
794 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
796 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
797 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
800 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
801 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
802 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
804 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
805 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
807 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
808 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
810 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
811 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
813 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
814 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
816 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
817 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
819 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
820 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
823 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
825 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
826 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
827 if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
828 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
831 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
832 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
834 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
836 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
837 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
838 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
840 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
841 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
843 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
844 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
847 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
848 // for full fee payment
849 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
850 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
851 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
852 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
855 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
856 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
857 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
858 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
861 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
862 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
863 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
864 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
865 if script.len() == 0 {
868 match ShutdownScript::try_from((script.clone(), their_features)) {
869 Ok(shutdown_script) => Some(shutdown_script.into_inner()),
870 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script))),
874 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
875 &OptionalField::Absent => {
876 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
881 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_options.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
882 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
885 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
886 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
887 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
891 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
892 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
896 config: local_config,
898 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
899 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
902 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
905 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
906 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
908 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
909 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
910 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
912 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
913 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
914 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
915 pending_update_fee: None,
916 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
917 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
918 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
919 update_time_counter: 1,
921 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
923 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
924 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
925 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
926 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
927 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
929 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
930 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
931 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
932 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
934 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
936 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
937 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
938 short_channel_id: None,
940 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
941 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
942 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
943 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
944 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
945 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
946 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
947 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
948 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
949 minimum_depth: Some(config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth),
951 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
953 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
954 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
955 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
956 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
957 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
958 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
959 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
961 funding_outpoint: None
963 funding_transaction: None,
965 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
966 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
967 counterparty_node_id,
969 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
971 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
973 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
975 announcement_sigs: None,
977 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
978 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
979 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
980 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
982 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
984 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
985 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
991 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
992 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
993 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
994 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
995 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
997 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
998 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
999 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1000 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1001 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1002 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1003 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1004 /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
1005 /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
1006 /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
1007 /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
1009 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
1010 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1011 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1012 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1014 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1015 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1016 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1017 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1019 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1020 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1021 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1022 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1024 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1025 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1026 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1028 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1029 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1030 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1031 transaction_output_index: None
1036 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1037 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1038 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1039 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1040 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
1041 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1042 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1044 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1045 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1048 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1049 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
1050 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1051 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1053 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1054 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1060 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1061 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1062 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1063 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1064 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1065 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1066 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1070 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1071 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1073 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1075 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1076 if generated_by_local {
1077 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1078 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1087 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1088 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1089 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1090 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1091 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1092 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1093 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1097 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1098 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1100 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1102 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
1103 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1105 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
1106 if !generated_by_local {
1107 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1115 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1116 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1117 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1118 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1119 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1120 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1121 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1122 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1124 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1126 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1127 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1128 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1129 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1131 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1133 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1134 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1135 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
1136 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1139 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1140 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1141 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1143 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
1146 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1147 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1149 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1150 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1155 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1156 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1161 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1163 let channel_parameters =
1164 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1165 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1166 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1171 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1174 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1175 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1176 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1177 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1179 (tx, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1183 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1184 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1185 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1186 // outside of those situations will fail.
1187 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1191 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1196 1 + // script length (0)
1200 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1201 2 + // witness marker and flag
1202 1 + // witness element count
1203 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1204 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1205 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1206 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1207 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1208 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1210 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1211 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1212 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1218 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1220 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1222 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1223 script_sig: Script::new(),
1224 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1225 witness: Vec::new(),
1230 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1231 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1232 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1234 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1235 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1236 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1238 if value_to_self < 0 {
1239 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1240 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1241 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1242 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1243 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1246 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1247 txouts.push((TxOut {
1248 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1249 value: value_to_remote as u64
1253 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1254 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1255 txouts.push((TxOut {
1256 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1257 value: value_to_self as u64
1261 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1263 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1264 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1265 outputs.push(out.0);
1273 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1276 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1277 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1281 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1282 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1283 /// our counterparty!)
1284 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1285 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1286 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1287 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1288 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1289 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1290 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1292 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1296 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1297 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1298 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1299 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1300 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1301 //may see payments to it!
1302 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1303 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1304 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1306 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1309 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1310 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1311 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1312 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1313 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1316 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1317 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1318 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1319 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1321 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1322 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1324 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1326 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1328 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1329 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1330 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1332 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1333 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1334 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1335 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1336 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1338 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1339 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1340 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1342 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1343 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1345 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1348 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1349 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1353 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1357 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1358 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1359 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1360 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1361 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1362 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1365 // Now update local state:
1367 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1368 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1369 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1370 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1371 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1372 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1373 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1377 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1378 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1379 match pending_update {
1380 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1381 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1382 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1383 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1384 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1385 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1386 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1389 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1390 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1391 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1392 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1393 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1394 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1395 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1401 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1402 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1403 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1405 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1406 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1407 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1409 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1410 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1413 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1414 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1416 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1417 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1419 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1420 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1423 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1426 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1427 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1428 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1429 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1434 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1435 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1436 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1437 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1438 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1441 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1442 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1443 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1444 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1445 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1447 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1448 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1449 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1453 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1454 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1455 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1456 /// before we fail backwards.
1457 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1458 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1459 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1460 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1461 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1463 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1465 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1466 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1467 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1469 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1470 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1471 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1473 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1474 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1475 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1477 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1482 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1483 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1489 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1490 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1491 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1492 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1493 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1497 // Now update local state:
1498 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1499 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1500 match pending_update {
1501 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1502 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1503 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1504 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1508 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1509 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1510 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1511 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1517 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1518 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1519 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1525 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1527 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1528 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1531 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1532 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1533 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1538 // Message handlers:
1540 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1541 // Check sanity of message fields:
1542 if !self.is_outbound() {
1543 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1545 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1546 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1548 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1549 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1551 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1552 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1554 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1555 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1557 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1558 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1559 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1561 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1562 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1563 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1565 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1566 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1567 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1569 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1570 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1572 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1573 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1576 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1577 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1578 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1580 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1581 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1583 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1584 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1586 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1587 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1589 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1590 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1592 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1593 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1595 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1596 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1598 if msg.minimum_depth == 0 {
1599 // Note that if this changes we should update the serialization minimum version to
1600 // indicate to older clients that they don't understand some features of the current
1602 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum confirmation depth must be at least 1".to_owned()));
1605 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1606 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1607 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1608 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1609 if script.len() == 0 {
1612 match ShutdownScript::try_from((script.clone(), their_features)) {
1613 Ok(shutdown_script) => Some(shutdown_script.into_inner()),
1614 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script))),
1618 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1619 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1620 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1625 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1626 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1627 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
1628 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1629 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1630 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
1632 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1633 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1634 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1635 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1636 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1637 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1640 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1641 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1642 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1645 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1646 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1648 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1653 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1654 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1656 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1657 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1659 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1660 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1661 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1662 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1663 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
1664 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
1665 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
1666 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1667 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1670 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1671 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1673 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1674 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1675 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1676 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1678 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1679 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1681 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1682 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1685 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1686 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1689 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1690 if self.is_outbound() {
1691 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1693 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1694 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1695 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1697 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1699 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1700 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1701 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1702 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1705 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1706 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1707 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
1708 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1709 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1711 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1713 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1714 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1715 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1718 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1719 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1720 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1724 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1725 initial_commitment_tx,
1728 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1729 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1732 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1734 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1735 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1736 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1737 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
1738 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1739 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1740 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1741 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1742 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1744 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1746 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1748 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1749 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1750 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1751 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1753 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1755 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1756 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1758 }, channel_monitor))
1761 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1762 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1763 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1764 if !self.is_outbound() {
1765 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1767 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1768 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1770 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1771 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1772 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1773 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1776 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1778 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1779 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1780 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1781 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1783 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1784 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1786 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1787 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1789 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1790 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1791 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1792 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1793 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1794 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1798 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1799 initial_commitment_tx,
1802 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1803 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1807 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1808 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1809 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1810 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1811 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
1812 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1813 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1814 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1815 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1816 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1818 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1820 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1822 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1823 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1824 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1825 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1827 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1829 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap()))
1832 pub fn funding_locked<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1833 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1834 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
1835 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
1838 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1840 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1841 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1842 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1843 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1844 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1845 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1846 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1847 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1848 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1849 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1850 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1851 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1852 if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1853 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1855 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1858 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1861 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1862 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1864 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_locked from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1869 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1870 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> HTLCStats {
1871 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1872 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1873 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1874 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1875 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1878 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1879 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1880 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1881 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1882 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1883 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1885 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1886 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1892 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1893 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> HTLCStats {
1894 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1895 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1896 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1897 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1898 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1901 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1902 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1903 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1904 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1905 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1906 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1908 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1909 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1913 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1914 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1915 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1916 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1917 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1918 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1920 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1921 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1928 /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1929 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1930 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1931 /// corner case properly.
1932 pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1933 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1935 cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1936 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
1937 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1938 - Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64 * 1000,
1940 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
1941 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1942 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
1947 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1948 (Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
1949 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1952 // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1953 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1954 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1955 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1956 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1957 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1960 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1961 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
1962 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
1964 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1965 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1967 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1968 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1970 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1971 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1973 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1974 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1978 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1979 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1985 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1986 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1987 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1990 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1991 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1992 included_htlcs += 1;
1995 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1996 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2000 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2001 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2002 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2003 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2004 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2005 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2010 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2012 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2013 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2018 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2019 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2023 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2024 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
2025 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2028 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2029 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
2031 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2032 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2033 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2035 total_pending_htlcs,
2036 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2037 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2038 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2040 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2041 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2042 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2044 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2046 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2051 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2052 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2053 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2055 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2056 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2058 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2059 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2061 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2062 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2064 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2065 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2069 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2070 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2076 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2077 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2078 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2079 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2080 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2081 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2084 included_htlcs += 1;
2087 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2088 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2091 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2092 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2094 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2095 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2096 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2101 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2102 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
2103 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2106 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2107 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
2109 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2110 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2112 total_pending_htlcs,
2113 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2114 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2115 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2117 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2118 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2119 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2121 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2123 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2128 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2129 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2130 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2131 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2132 if local_sent_shutdown {
2133 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
2135 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2136 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2137 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2138 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2140 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2141 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2143 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2144 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2146 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2147 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2149 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2150 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2153 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
2154 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
2155 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2156 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2158 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2159 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2160 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2162 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2163 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2164 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2165 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2166 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2167 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2168 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2169 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2170 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2171 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2172 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2174 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2175 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2176 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
2177 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2178 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
2179 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2183 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2184 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2185 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2186 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2187 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2188 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2189 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2193 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2194 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2195 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2196 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2197 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2198 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2199 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2203 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2204 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2205 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2206 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2207 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2208 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2211 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2212 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2213 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2214 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2215 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2217 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2218 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2221 let chan_reserve_msat =
2222 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
2223 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
2224 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2227 if !self.is_outbound() {
2228 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2229 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2230 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2231 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2232 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2233 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2234 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2235 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2236 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2237 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2238 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2239 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2240 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2241 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2242 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2245 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2246 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2247 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2248 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2249 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2252 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2253 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2255 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2256 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2259 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2260 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2261 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2265 // Now update local state:
2266 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2267 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2268 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2269 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2270 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2271 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2272 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2277 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2279 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2280 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2281 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2282 match check_preimage {
2284 Some(payment_hash) =>
2285 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2286 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2290 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2291 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2292 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2293 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2295 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2296 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2301 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2304 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2305 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2306 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2308 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2309 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2312 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2313 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2316 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2317 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2318 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2320 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2321 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2324 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2328 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2329 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2330 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2332 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2333 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2336 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2340 pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2341 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2344 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2345 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2347 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2348 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2350 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2351 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2354 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2356 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2358 let mut update_fee = false;
2359 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2361 self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
2366 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid) = {
2367 let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
2368 let commitment_txid = {
2369 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2370 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2371 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2373 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2374 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2375 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2376 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2377 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2378 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2382 let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2383 (commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid)
2386 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2387 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
2389 let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2390 if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2391 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2394 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2396 if self.is_outbound() {
2397 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2398 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2399 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2400 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2401 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2402 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2403 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2404 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2405 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2406 assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2412 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2413 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2416 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2417 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2418 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2419 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2420 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw,
2421 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc,
2422 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2424 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2425 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2426 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2427 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2428 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2429 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2430 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2432 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2434 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2438 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2441 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2442 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2443 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2446 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2447 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2449 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2450 let mut need_commitment = false;
2451 if !self.is_outbound() {
2452 if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
2453 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
2454 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
2455 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
2456 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
2457 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
2458 need_commitment = true;
2459 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2464 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2465 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2466 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2467 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2468 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2469 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2473 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2474 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2475 Some(forward_info.clone())
2477 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2478 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2479 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2480 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2481 need_commitment = true;
2484 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2485 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2486 Some(fail_reason.take())
2488 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2489 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2490 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2491 need_commitment = true;
2495 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2496 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2497 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2498 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2500 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2501 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2502 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2503 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2504 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2505 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2506 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2507 // includes the right HTLCs.
2508 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2509 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2510 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2511 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2512 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2513 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2515 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
2516 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2517 // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2518 // re-send the message on restoration)
2519 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2522 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2523 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2524 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2525 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2526 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2527 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2528 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2529 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2530 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2532 } else if !need_commitment {
2533 (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2534 } else { (None, None) };
2536 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
2537 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
2539 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2540 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2541 per_commitment_secret,
2542 next_per_commitment_point,
2543 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2546 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
2547 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
2548 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
2549 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2550 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 &&
2551 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2552 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
2553 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
2556 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2557 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2558 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2559 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2560 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2561 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
2562 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2564 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2565 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2566 updates: Vec::new(),
2569 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2570 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2571 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2572 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2573 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2574 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2575 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2576 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2577 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2578 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2579 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2580 // to rebalance channels.
2581 match &htlc_update {
2582 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2583 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2584 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2587 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2588 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
2589 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2590 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2591 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2592 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2593 // into the holding cell without ever being
2594 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2595 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2596 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2599 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2605 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2606 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
2607 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
2608 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
2609 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
2610 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
2611 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
2612 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2613 (msg, monitor_update)
2614 } else { unreachable!() };
2615 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2616 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2618 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2619 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
2620 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
2621 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
2622 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
2623 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
2624 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
2625 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
2626 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
2629 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2631 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2638 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2639 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2641 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2642 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2643 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2644 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2645 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2651 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2652 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2653 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2654 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2655 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2657 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
2658 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
2659 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
2661 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2663 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2665 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2668 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2670 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2674 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2675 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2676 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2677 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2678 /// revoke_and_ack message.
2679 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2680 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2683 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2684 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2686 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2687 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2689 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2690 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2693 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2694 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2695 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2699 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2700 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2701 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2702 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2703 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2704 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2705 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2706 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2707 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2710 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2712 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2713 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2716 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2717 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2718 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2719 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2720 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2721 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2722 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2723 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2727 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2728 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2729 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2730 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2731 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2732 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2733 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2734 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2736 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2737 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2738 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2739 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2740 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2741 let mut require_commitment = false;
2742 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2745 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2746 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2747 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2749 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2750 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2751 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2752 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2753 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2754 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2759 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2760 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2761 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2762 if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2763 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2765 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2766 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2771 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2772 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2774 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2778 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2779 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2781 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2782 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2783 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2784 require_commitment = true;
2785 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2786 match forward_info {
2787 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2788 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2789 require_commitment = true;
2791 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2792 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2793 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2795 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2796 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2797 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2801 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2802 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2803 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2804 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2810 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2811 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2812 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2813 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2815 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2816 Some(fail_reason.take())
2818 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2819 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2820 require_commitment = true;
2824 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2826 if self.is_outbound() {
2827 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2828 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2831 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2832 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2833 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2834 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2835 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2836 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2837 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2838 require_commitment = true;
2839 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2844 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2845 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2846 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2847 if require_commitment {
2848 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2849 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2850 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2851 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2852 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2853 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2854 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2855 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2856 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2858 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2859 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2860 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2861 return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2864 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2865 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2866 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2867 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2868 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2870 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2871 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2872 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2875 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2876 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2877 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2878 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2880 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2882 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2883 if require_commitment {
2884 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2886 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2887 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2888 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2889 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2891 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
2892 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2893 Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2894 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2895 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2897 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2900 }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2902 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2903 Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2910 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2911 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2912 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2913 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2914 if !self.is_outbound() {
2915 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2917 if !self.is_usable() {
2918 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2920 if !self.is_live() {
2921 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2924 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
2925 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2929 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2930 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2932 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2933 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2938 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2939 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2940 Some(update_fee) => {
2941 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2942 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2948 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
2949 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
2951 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2953 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2954 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2955 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2956 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2959 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2960 // will be retransmitted.
2961 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2963 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2964 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2966 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2967 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2968 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2969 // this HTLC accordingly
2970 inbound_drop_count += 1;
2973 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2974 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2975 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2976 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2979 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2980 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2981 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2982 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2983 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2984 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2989 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2991 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2992 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2993 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2994 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2995 // the update upon reconnection.
2996 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3000 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3001 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3004 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
3005 /// updates are partially paused.
3006 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
3007 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
3008 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
3009 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
3010 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
3011 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
3012 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
3013 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
3014 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
3015 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3016 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
3017 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3018 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
3021 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3022 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3023 /// to the remote side.
3024 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<Transaction>, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
3025 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3026 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3028 let funding_broadcastable = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound() {
3029 self.funding_transaction.take()
3032 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
3033 // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
3034 // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound
3035 // channel which failed to persist the monitor on funding_created, and we got the funding
3036 // transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted.
3037 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
3038 assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3039 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
3040 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3041 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3042 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3043 next_per_commitment_point,
3047 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
3048 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3049 let mut failures = Vec::new();
3050 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3052 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3053 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3054 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3055 return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
3058 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3059 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3061 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3062 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3065 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3066 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3067 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3068 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3069 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3070 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3071 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3072 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked)
3075 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3076 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3078 if self.is_outbound() {
3079 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3081 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3082 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3084 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
3085 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw);
3086 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3090 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3091 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3092 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3093 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3094 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3095 per_commitment_secret,
3096 next_per_commitment_point,
3100 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3101 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3102 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3103 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3104 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3106 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3107 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3108 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3109 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3110 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3111 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3112 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3113 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3114 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3119 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3120 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3122 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3123 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3124 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3125 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3126 reason: err_packet.clone()
3129 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3130 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3131 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3132 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3133 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3134 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3137 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3138 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3139 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3140 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3141 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3148 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3149 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3150 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3151 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3153 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3157 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3158 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3159 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3160 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3161 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3162 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3163 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3164 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3167 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3168 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3169 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3172 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3173 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3174 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3175 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3176 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3177 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3178 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3179 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3181 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3182 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
3183 "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
3187 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3191 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3192 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3193 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3195 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3196 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3197 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3198 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3199 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3203 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3204 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
3205 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
3206 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3207 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3208 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
3210 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3211 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3214 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
3215 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3216 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3217 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3218 next_per_commitment_point,
3219 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3222 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3223 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3224 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
3226 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3227 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3228 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3231 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3234 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3237 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3238 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3239 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3240 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3241 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
3243 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3244 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
3245 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3246 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3247 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3248 next_per_commitment_point,
3252 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3253 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3254 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3256 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3259 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3260 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3261 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3262 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3264 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3265 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3266 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3267 Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3268 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3270 Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3271 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3275 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3277 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3278 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3279 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3281 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3284 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3285 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3286 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3289 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3291 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3295 fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
3296 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3298 if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
3299 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
3300 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3304 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3305 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
3306 proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
3308 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3309 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3310 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3312 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
3313 let sig = self.holder_signer
3314 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3316 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3317 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
3319 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
3320 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3321 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3322 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3323 signature: sig.unwrap(),
3327 pub fn shutdown<F: Deref, K: Deref>(
3328 &mut self, fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
3329 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3331 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3332 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
3334 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3335 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3337 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3338 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3339 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3340 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3341 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3343 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3344 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3345 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3348 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3350 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match ShutdownScript::try_from((msg.scriptpubkey.clone(), their_features)) {
3351 Ok(script) => script.into_inner(),
3352 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex()))),
3355 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3356 if Some(&shutdown_scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3357 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", shutdown_scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3360 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3363 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
3364 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
3365 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3366 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3368 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
3371 assert!(send_shutdown);
3372 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
3373 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
3374 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
3376 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3381 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3383 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3384 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3386 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
3387 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3388 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3389 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3390 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
3391 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3395 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
3396 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3397 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3398 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3402 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3403 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3404 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3405 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3406 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3407 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3409 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3410 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3417 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3418 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3420 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3423 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3424 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3425 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3426 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3428 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3430 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3431 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3432 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3433 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3434 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3436 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3437 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3439 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3440 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3442 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3445 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3446 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3448 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3449 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3451 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3452 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3454 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3455 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3457 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3458 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3461 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3462 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3463 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3464 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3466 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3468 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3471 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3472 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3473 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3474 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3475 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3479 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3480 if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3481 if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3482 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3483 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3484 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3485 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3486 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3487 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3488 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3489 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3493 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3494 ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3495 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3496 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3497 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3498 let sig = self.holder_signer
3499 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3500 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3501 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3502 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3503 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3504 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3505 fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3511 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3512 if self.is_outbound() {
3513 let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3514 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3515 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3516 if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3517 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3520 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3523 min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3525 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3526 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3527 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3528 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3531 propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3534 let sig = self.holder_signer
3535 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3536 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3537 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3538 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3539 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3541 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3542 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3544 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3545 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3546 fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3548 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3551 // Public utilities:
3553 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3557 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
3561 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3562 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3563 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3567 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3568 /// is_usable() returns true).
3569 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3570 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3571 self.short_channel_id
3574 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3575 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3576 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3577 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3580 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3581 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3584 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3585 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3588 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
3589 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
3590 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
3593 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3594 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3597 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3598 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3599 self.counterparty_node_id
3602 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3604 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3605 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3608 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3609 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3611 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3612 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3613 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3614 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
3616 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3620 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3621 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3622 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3625 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3626 self.channel_value_satoshis
3629 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3630 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3633 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
3634 cmp::max(self.config.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
3637 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3638 self.config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
3641 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3645 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3646 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
3647 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
3648 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
3649 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
3650 // which are near the dust limit.
3651 cmp::max(2530, self.feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
3654 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3655 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3658 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3659 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3662 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3663 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3667 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3672 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3674 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3675 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3676 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
3677 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3678 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3679 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3681 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3683 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3691 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3692 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3696 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3697 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3698 self.update_time_counter
3701 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3702 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3705 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3706 self.config.announced_channel
3709 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3710 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3713 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3714 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3715 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
3716 self.config.forwarding_fee_base_msat
3719 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3720 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3721 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3724 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3725 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3726 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3727 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3728 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3731 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3732 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3733 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3734 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3735 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
3738 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3739 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3740 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3741 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3744 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3745 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3746 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3749 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3750 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3751 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3752 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3753 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
3754 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3759 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
3760 self.channel_update_status
3763 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
3764 self.channel_update_status = status;
3767 fn check_get_funding_locked(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
3768 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3772 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3773 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
3774 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
3777 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
3781 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3782 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3783 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3785 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3786 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3787 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3789 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3790 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3792 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3793 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3795 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3799 if need_commitment_update {
3800 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3801 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3802 return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3803 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3804 next_per_commitment_point,
3807 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3813 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
3814 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
3815 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
3816 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData, logger: &L)
3817 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3818 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3819 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3820 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3821 // If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring
3822 // whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one.
3823 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3824 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
3825 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
3826 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3827 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3828 if self.is_outbound() {
3829 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3830 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3831 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3832 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3833 // channel and move on.
3834 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3835 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3837 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3838 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3839 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3840 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index".to_owned()
3843 if self.is_outbound() {
3844 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3845 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3846 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3847 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3848 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3849 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3853 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
3854 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
3855 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
3856 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
3857 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
3861 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for funding_locked here and
3862 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
3863 // may have already happened for this block).
3864 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3865 log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3866 return Ok(Some(funding_locked));
3869 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3870 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3871 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3872 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3873 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3874 data: "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.".to_owned()
3883 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
3884 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
3885 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3886 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3888 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3889 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3892 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3894 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, logger: &L)
3895 -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3896 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3897 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
3898 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3900 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3901 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
3902 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3910 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
3912 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3913 log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3914 return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs));
3917 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3918 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
3919 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 {
3920 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3921 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3922 // Note that check_get_funding_locked may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
3923 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
3924 // indicate we've already sent a funding_locked
3925 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
3928 // If we've sent funding_locked (or have both sent and received funding_locked), and
3929 // the funding transaction's confirmation count has dipped below minimum_depth / 2,
3930 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
3931 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
3932 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap() as i64 / 2 {
3933 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3934 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3935 data: format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.", self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations),
3940 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3943 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
3944 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
3945 /// before the channel has reached funding_locked and we can just wait for more blocks.
3946 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3947 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
3948 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
3949 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
3950 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
3951 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
3952 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
3953 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
3954 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
3955 match self.best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, logger) {
3956 Ok((funding_locked, timed_out_htlcs)) => {
3957 assert!(funding_locked.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
3958 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
3964 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
3969 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3970 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3972 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3973 if !self.is_outbound() {
3974 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3976 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3977 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3980 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3981 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3984 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3985 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3989 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3990 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3991 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3992 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3993 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3994 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3995 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3996 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
3997 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3998 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3999 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
4000 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
4001 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
4002 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
4003 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
4004 first_per_commitment_point,
4005 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
4006 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4007 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
4008 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
4013 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
4014 if self.is_outbound() {
4015 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
4017 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
4018 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
4020 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4021 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
4024 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4025 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
4027 msgs::AcceptChannel {
4028 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
4029 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4030 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4031 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4032 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4033 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
4034 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
4035 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
4036 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
4037 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
4038 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
4039 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
4040 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
4041 first_per_commitment_point,
4042 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4043 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
4044 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
4049 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
4050 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4051 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4052 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
4053 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4054 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
4057 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
4058 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
4059 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
4060 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
4061 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
4062 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
4063 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
4064 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4065 if !self.is_outbound() {
4066 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
4068 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
4069 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
4071 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
4072 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4073 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4074 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
4077 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
4078 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
4080 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
4083 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
4084 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
4089 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
4091 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
4093 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
4094 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
4095 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
4097 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
4098 temporary_channel_id,
4099 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
4100 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
4105 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
4106 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
4107 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
4108 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4109 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4111 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
4112 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
4114 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4115 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
4116 if !self.config.announced_channel {
4117 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4119 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
4120 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
4122 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
4123 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
4126 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
4128 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4129 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
4131 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4132 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
4133 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
4134 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
4135 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
4136 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4139 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
4140 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4145 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4147 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, msghash: secp256k1::Message, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, our_bitcoin_sig: Signature) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
4148 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
4149 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
4151 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, our_node_secret);
4152 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4153 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4154 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4155 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4156 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4157 contents: announcement,
4160 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4164 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4165 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4166 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4167 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
4168 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
4170 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4172 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4173 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4174 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4175 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4177 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4178 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4179 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4180 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4183 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4185 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig)
4188 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4189 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4190 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
4191 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
4193 Err(_) => return None,
4195 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4196 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) {
4197 Ok(res) => Some(res),
4202 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4203 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4204 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4205 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4206 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
4207 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
4208 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
4209 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
4210 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
4211 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
4212 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
4213 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
4214 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
4215 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4216 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
4217 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4218 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4219 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
4220 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
4223 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4224 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4225 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
4226 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
4229 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
4230 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4231 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
4232 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
4233 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
4234 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
4235 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
4236 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
4238 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
4239 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
4240 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4241 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
4242 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
4243 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
4244 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
4245 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
4246 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
4248 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
4254 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
4256 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
4257 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
4259 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
4261 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
4262 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
4264 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateFailed, we cannot commit to a new state as we
4265 /// may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to regenerate
4268 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
4270 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
4271 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
4272 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4273 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
4275 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
4276 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
4277 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
4280 if amount_msat == 0 {
4281 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4284 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
4285 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
4288 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
4289 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
4290 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
4291 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
4292 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
4293 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
4294 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
4295 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
4298 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
4299 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
4300 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
4301 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4303 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4304 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4305 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4308 if !self.is_outbound() {
4309 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4310 let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
4311 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
4312 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4313 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4314 if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4315 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4319 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
4320 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
4321 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
4322 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4323 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
4324 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
4328 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4329 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
4330 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
4331 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4332 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
4333 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
4337 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
4338 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
4339 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
4342 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
4343 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
4344 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4345 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
4347 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
4348 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
4351 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
4352 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
4353 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
4354 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
4355 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
4358 // Now update local state:
4359 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
4360 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4365 onion_routing_packet,
4370 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4371 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4373 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4375 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
4379 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4380 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4381 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4385 onion_routing_packet,
4387 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
4392 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
4393 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
4394 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
4395 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
4396 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4397 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4398 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
4400 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
4401 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
4403 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
4404 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4406 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
4407 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4409 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
4410 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4411 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4412 have_updates = true;
4414 if have_updates { break; }
4416 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4417 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4418 have_updates = true;
4420 if have_updates { break; }
4423 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
4425 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
4427 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
4428 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4429 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4430 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4432 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4433 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4434 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4436 if let Some(state) = new_state {
4440 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4441 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4442 Some(fail_reason.take())
4444 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4447 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4449 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4450 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4451 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4452 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4453 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4454 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4456 Err(e) => return Err(e),
4459 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4460 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4461 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4462 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4463 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4464 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4465 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4466 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4469 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4470 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4473 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4474 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4475 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4476 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4477 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
4478 if self.is_outbound() {
4479 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4483 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4484 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
4485 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4486 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4488 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4490 if !self.is_outbound() {
4491 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4492 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4493 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4494 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4495 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4496 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4497 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4498 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4499 let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.1);
4500 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4507 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len());
4508 for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
4512 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4513 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4515 htlc_signatures = res.1;
4517 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
4518 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4519 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4520 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4522 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4523 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
4524 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4525 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4526 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4527 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4531 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4532 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4535 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
4538 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4539 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4540 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4542 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4543 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4544 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4545 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4546 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4552 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
4553 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
4554 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
4557 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4558 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4559 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
4561 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4562 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
4563 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
4564 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
4570 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4571 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4572 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
4573 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4574 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4575 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4576 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4579 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4580 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4581 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4583 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4584 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4587 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4588 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4589 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4592 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4595 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4596 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4597 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
4599 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4604 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4605 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4606 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4608 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4610 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4612 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4613 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4614 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4615 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4616 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4617 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4621 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
4622 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4623 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4626 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4627 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4628 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4629 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4630 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4632 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4633 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4640 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4643 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4644 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4645 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4646 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4647 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4648 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4649 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
4650 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
4651 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
4652 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4653 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4655 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4656 // return them to fail the payment.
4657 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4658 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4660 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4661 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4666 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4667 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4668 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4669 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4670 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4671 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4672 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4673 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4674 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4675 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4676 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4677 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4678 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4683 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4684 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4685 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4689 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
4690 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4692 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
4698 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4699 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4700 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
4701 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
4702 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
4704 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4705 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4706 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4707 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4713 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4714 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4715 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4716 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
4717 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
4718 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4723 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4724 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4725 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4728 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4730 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4732 // Write out the old serialization for the config object. This is read by version-1
4733 // deserializers, but we will read the version in the TLV at the end instead.
4734 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4735 self.config.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4736 self.config.announced_channel.write(writer)?;
4737 self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4739 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4740 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4741 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4743 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4745 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4746 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
4747 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
4748 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
4749 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4750 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
4752 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
4753 // deserialized from that format.
4754 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
4755 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
4756 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
4758 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4760 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4761 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4762 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4764 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4765 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4766 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4767 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4770 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4771 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4772 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4775 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4776 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4777 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4778 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4780 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4781 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4783 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4785 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4787 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4789 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4792 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4794 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4799 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4800 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4801 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4802 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4803 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4804 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4805 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4807 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4809 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4811 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4814 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
4815 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
4816 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
4819 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4821 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4823 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4825 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4830 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4831 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4833 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4835 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4836 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4837 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4838 source.write(writer)?;
4839 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4841 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4843 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4844 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4846 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4848 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4849 err_packet.write(writer)?;
4854 match self.resend_order {
4855 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4856 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4859 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4860 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4861 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4863 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4864 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4865 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4866 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4869 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4870 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4871 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4872 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4873 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4876 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4877 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4879 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4880 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4881 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4882 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4884 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4885 Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4887 feerate.write(writer)?;
4891 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4894 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4895 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
4896 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4898 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4899 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4900 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4902 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
4903 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
4905 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4906 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4907 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4909 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
4910 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
4912 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
4915 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
4916 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4917 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4919 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
4922 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
4923 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
4925 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4926 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4927 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
4929 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4931 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4933 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
4935 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4936 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4937 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4938 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
4939 htlc.write(writer)?;
4942 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
4943 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
4944 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
4945 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
4946 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
4947 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
4948 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
4950 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
4951 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
4952 (5, self.config, required),
4953 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
4960 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4961 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
4962 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4963 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4964 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4966 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4968 let mut config = Some(ChannelConfig::default());
4970 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
4971 config.as_mut().unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
4972 config.as_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
4973 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
4974 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4976 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
4977 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4980 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4981 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4982 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4984 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4986 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4987 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
4988 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
4989 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
4990 let mut data = [0; 1024];
4991 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
4992 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
4993 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
4995 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
4997 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
4998 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
4999 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
5002 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
5004 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
5005 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
5006 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5008 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5009 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5010 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
5011 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
5012 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5013 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5014 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5015 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5016 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5017 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
5018 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
5019 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5020 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
5021 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5026 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5027 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5028 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
5029 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5030 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5031 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5032 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5033 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5034 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
5035 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5036 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5037 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5038 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
5039 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
5040 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
5041 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5046 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5047 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
5048 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
5049 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5050 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5051 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5052 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5053 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5054 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
5055 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
5057 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
5058 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
5059 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5061 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
5062 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5063 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
5065 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5069 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5070 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5071 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5072 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5075 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
5076 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
5077 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
5079 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5080 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5081 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
5082 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
5085 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5086 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5087 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
5088 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
5091 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
5092 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
5094 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5095 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5096 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
5097 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
5099 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5101 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
5102 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5105 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
5106 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
5107 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5109 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5110 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5111 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5112 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
5114 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
5115 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
5117 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
5118 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5120 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5121 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5122 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
5124 let mut minimum_depth = None;
5126 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
5127 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
5129 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
5130 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5133 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5135 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5136 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5137 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
5138 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
5140 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5143 let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
5144 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
5146 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
5148 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
5149 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5151 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5152 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
5154 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
5156 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5157 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
5158 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5160 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5161 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
5162 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
5166 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
5167 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5168 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
5169 (1, minimum_depth, option),
5170 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
5171 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
5172 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
5175 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5176 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5181 config: config.unwrap(),
5185 channel_value_satoshis,
5187 latest_monitor_update_id,
5190 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5193 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5194 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5197 pending_inbound_htlcs,
5198 pending_outbound_htlcs,
5199 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
5203 monitor_pending_funding_locked,
5204 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
5205 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
5206 monitor_pending_forwards,
5207 monitor_pending_failures,
5210 holding_cell_update_fee,
5211 next_holder_htlc_id,
5212 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
5213 update_time_counter,
5216 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5217 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
5218 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5219 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
5221 last_sent_closing_fee,
5223 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
5224 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
5227 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
5228 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5229 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5230 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5231 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
5232 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5233 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
5236 counterparty_forwarding_info,
5238 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
5239 funding_transaction,
5241 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
5242 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
5243 counterparty_node_id,
5245 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5249 channel_update_status,
5253 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5254 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5255 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5256 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5258 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5260 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5261 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
5268 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
5269 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
5270 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
5271 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
5272 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
5273 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
5274 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5275 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
5277 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
5278 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
5279 use ln::channel::{Channel,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
5280 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
5281 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
5282 use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
5283 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
5285 use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
5286 use chain::BestBlock;
5287 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
5288 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
5289 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
5290 use util::config::UserConfig;
5291 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
5292 use util::errors::APIError;
5293 use util::test_utils;
5294 use util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
5295 use util::logger::Logger;
5296 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
5297 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
5298 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
5299 use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
5300 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5301 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5302 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
5303 use core::num::NonZeroU8;
5307 struct TestFeeEstimator {
5310 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
5311 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
5317 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
5318 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
5319 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
5323 signer: InMemorySigner,
5325 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
5326 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
5328 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
5329 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
5330 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5331 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5332 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
5333 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
5336 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
5337 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5338 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5339 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
5342 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
5345 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
5346 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
5347 fn sign_invoice(&self, _invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
5350 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
5351 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
5355 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
5356 let features = InitFeatures::known().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
5357 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
5358 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(NonZeroU8::new(16).unwrap(), &[0, 40]).unwrap();
5360 let seed = [42; 32];
5361 let network = Network::Testnet;
5362 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5363 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
5364 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
5367 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 };
5368 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5369 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5370 let config = UserConfig::default();
5371 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config) {
5372 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
5373 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
5375 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
5376 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
5380 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
5381 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
5383 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
5384 let original_fee = 253;
5385 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
5386 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5387 let seed = [42; 32];
5388 let network = Network::Testnet;
5389 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5391 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5392 let config = UserConfig::default();
5393 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5395 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
5396 // same as the old fee.
5397 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
5398 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5399 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
5403 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
5404 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
5405 // dust limits are used.
5406 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5407 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5408 let seed = [42; 32];
5409 let network = Network::Testnet;
5410 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5412 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
5413 // they have different dust limits.
5415 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5416 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5417 let config = UserConfig::default();
5418 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5420 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5421 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
5422 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5423 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5424 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5426 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
5427 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5428 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5429 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5430 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
5432 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
5433 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
5434 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
5436 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
5437 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
5438 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
5439 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5442 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5444 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
5445 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
5446 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
5447 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5448 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5450 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5451 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
5455 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
5456 // the dust limit check.
5457 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5458 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5459 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5460 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
5462 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
5463 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
5464 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5465 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
5466 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5467 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5468 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
5472 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
5473 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
5474 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
5475 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
5476 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
5477 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
5478 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5479 let seed = [42; 32];
5480 let network = Network::Testnet;
5481 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5483 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5484 let config = UserConfig::default();
5485 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5487 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5488 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
5490 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
5491 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5492 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5493 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5494 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5495 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5497 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5498 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5499 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5500 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5501 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5503 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5505 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5506 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5507 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5508 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5509 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5511 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5512 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5513 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5514 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5515 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5519 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
5520 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5521 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5522 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5523 let seed = [42; 32];
5524 let network = Network::Testnet;
5525 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
5526 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
5527 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5529 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
5531 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5532 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5533 let config = UserConfig::default();
5534 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5536 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5537 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
5538 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5539 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5541 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
5542 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5543 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5545 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
5546 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5547 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5548 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
5550 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
5551 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
5552 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
5554 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
5555 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
5557 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
5558 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
5559 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5560 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5561 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5562 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5563 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5564 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5565 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5570 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
5572 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5573 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5574 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5575 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5576 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5577 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5578 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5585 fn channel_update() {
5586 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5587 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5588 let seed = [42; 32];
5589 let network = Network::Testnet;
5590 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5591 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5593 // Create a channel.
5594 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5595 let config = UserConfig::default();
5596 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5597 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
5598 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
5599 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
5601 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
5602 let update = ChannelUpdate {
5603 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
5605 short_channel_id: 0,
5608 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
5609 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
5610 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
5612 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
5613 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5615 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
5617 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
5619 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
5620 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
5621 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
5622 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
5624 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
5625 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
5626 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
5628 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
5633 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
5634 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
5635 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5636 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
5637 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5639 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
5641 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5642 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5643 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5644 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5645 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5647 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
5648 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
5653 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5654 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
5655 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
5657 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5658 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
5659 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
5660 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
5661 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5662 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
5664 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
5666 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5667 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5668 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5669 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
5670 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5671 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
5673 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5674 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5675 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5676 selected_contest_delay: 144
5678 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5679 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5681 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5682 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5684 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5685 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5687 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5688 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5690 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5691 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5692 // build_commitment_transaction.
5693 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5694 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5695 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5696 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5697 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5699 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5700 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5701 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5703 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
5704 let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
5706 let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
5707 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
5711 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
5712 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
5713 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5714 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5715 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
5716 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
5718 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
5719 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5720 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
5721 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5723 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5724 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
5725 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
5727 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
5729 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
5730 commitment_tx.clone(),
5731 counterparty_signature,
5732 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
5733 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
5734 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
5736 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
5737 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
5739 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5740 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
5741 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
5743 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
5744 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
5747 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5749 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
5750 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
5751 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
5752 &htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
5753 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
5754 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
5755 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
5757 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5760 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
5761 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
5762 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
5766 assert!(preimage.is_some());
5769 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
5770 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
5772 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5773 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
5774 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
5775 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
5776 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
5777 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
5778 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
5780 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
5784 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
5785 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
5787 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
5788 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
5789 "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", {});
5791 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5792 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5794 amount_msat: 1000000,
5796 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5797 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5799 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
5802 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5803 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5805 amount_msat: 2000000,
5807 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5808 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5810 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5813 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5814 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5816 amount_msat: 2000000,
5818 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5819 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5820 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5822 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
5825 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5826 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5828 amount_msat: 3000000,
5830 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5831 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5832 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5834 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
5837 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5838 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5840 amount_msat: 4000000,
5842 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5843 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5845 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
5849 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5850 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5851 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
5853 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
5854 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
5855 "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", {
5858 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
5859 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
5860 "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" },
5863 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
5864 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
5865 "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" },
5868 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
5869 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
5870 "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" },
5873 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
5874 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
5875 "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" },
5878 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
5879 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
5880 "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" }
5883 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5884 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5885 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
5887 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
5888 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
5889 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e09c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb701483045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
5892 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
5893 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
5894 "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" },
5897 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
5898 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
5899 "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" },
5902 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
5903 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
5904 "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" },
5907 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
5908 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
5909 "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" },
5912 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
5913 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
5914 "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" }
5917 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5918 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5919 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
5921 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
5922 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
5923 "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", {
5926 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
5927 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
5928 "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" },
5931 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
5932 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
5933 "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" },
5936 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
5937 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
5938 "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" },
5941 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
5942 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
5943 "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" }
5946 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5947 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5948 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
5950 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
5951 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
5952 "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", {
5955 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
5956 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
5957 "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" },
5960 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
5961 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
5962 "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" },
5965 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
5966 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
5967 "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" },
5970 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
5971 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
5972 "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" }
5975 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5976 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5977 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
5979 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
5980 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
5981 "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", {
5984 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
5985 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
5986 "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" },
5989 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
5990 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
5991 "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" },
5994 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
5995 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
5996 "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" }
5999 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6000 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6001 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
6003 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
6004 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
6005 "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", {
6008 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
6009 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
6010 "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" },
6013 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
6014 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
6015 "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" },
6018 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
6019 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
6020 "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" }
6023 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6024 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6025 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
6027 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
6028 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
6029 "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", {
6032 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
6033 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
6034 "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" },
6037 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
6038 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
6039 "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" }
6042 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6043 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6044 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
6046 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
6047 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
6048 "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", {
6051 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
6052 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
6053 "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" },
6056 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
6057 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
6058 "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" }
6061 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6062 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6063 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
6065 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
6066 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
6067 "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", {
6070 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
6071 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
6072 "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" }
6075 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6076 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6077 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
6079 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
6080 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
6081 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8003a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484ae8f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c1901483045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c9524401475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
6084 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
6085 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
6086 "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" }
6089 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6090 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6091 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
6093 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
6094 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
6095 "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", {});
6097 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6098 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6099 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
6101 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
6102 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
6103 "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", {});
6105 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6106 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6107 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
6109 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
6110 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
6111 "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", {});
6113 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
6114 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6115 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
6117 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
6118 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
6119 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
6121 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
6122 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
6123 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
6124 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
6125 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6126 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6128 amount_msat: 2000000,
6130 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6131 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6133 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
6136 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
6137 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6138 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6140 amount_msat: 5000000,
6142 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6143 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6144 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6146 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
6149 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6150 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6152 amount_msat: 5000000,
6154 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6155 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6156 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6158 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
6162 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
6163 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
6164 "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", {
6167 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
6168 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
6169 "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" },
6171 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
6172 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
6173 "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" },
6175 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
6176 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
6177 "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" }
6182 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
6183 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
6185 let mut seed = [0; 32];
6186 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
6187 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
6188 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
6190 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
6191 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
6192 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
6194 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
6195 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
6197 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
6198 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
6200 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
6201 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
6202 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
6206 fn test_key_derivation() {
6207 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
6208 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6210 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6211 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6213 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
6214 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
6216 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
6217 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
6219 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
6220 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
6222 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
6223 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
6225 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
6226 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
6228 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
6229 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());