_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/channel.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
  11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
  12 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
  14
  15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
  18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
  19
  20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
  21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
  23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
  24
  25 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
  26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
  27 use ln::msgs;
  28 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
  29 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
  30 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
  31 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
  32 use ln::chan_utils;
  33 use chain::BestBlock;
  34 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
  35 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
  36 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
  37 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
  38 use util::transaction_utils;
  39 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
  40 use util::logger::Logger;
  41 use util::errors::APIError;
  42 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
  43 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
  44
  45 use io;
  46 use prelude::*;
  47 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
  48 use core::convert::TryFrom;
  49 use core::ops::Deref;
  50 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", debug_assertions))]
  51 use sync::Mutex;
  52 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
  53
  54 #[cfg(test)]
  55 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
  56         pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
  57         pub channel_value_msat: u64,
  58         pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
  59         pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  60         pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  61         pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
  62         pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
  63         pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
  64 }
  65
  66 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
  67 enum FeeUpdateState {
  68         // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
  69         RemoteAnnounced,
  70         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
  71         // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
  72         // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
  73         // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
  74         // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
  75         // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
  76
  77         // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
  78         Outbound,
  79 }
  80
  81 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
  82         FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
  83         FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
  84         Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
  85 }
  86
  87 enum InboundHTLCState {
  88         /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
  89         /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
  90         RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
  91         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
  92         /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
  93         /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
  94         /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
  95         /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
  96         /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
  97         /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
  98         /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
  99         /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
 100         /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
 101         /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
 102         /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
 103         ///
 104         /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
 105         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc)   --> local
 106         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
 107         /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack               <-- local
 108         /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
 109         /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
 110         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc)   --> local
 111         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
 112         /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
 113         /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
 114         /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
 115         /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
 116         /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
 117         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 118         ///
 119         /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
 120         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
 121         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
 122         /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
 123         /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
 124         /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
 125         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 126         AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
 127         Committed,
 128         /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 129         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 130         /// we'll drop it.
 131         /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
 132         /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
 133         /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
 134         /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
 135         /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
 136         /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
 137         /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
 138         LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
 139 }
 140
 141 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
 142         htlc_id: u64,
 143         amount_msat: u64,
 144         cltv_expiry: u32,
 145         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 146         state: InboundHTLCState,
 147 }
 148
 149 enum OutboundHTLCState {
 150         /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 151         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 152         /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
 153         /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
 154         ///  * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
 155         ///    money back (though we won't), and,
 156         ///  * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
 157         ///    allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
 158         ///    doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
 159         ///    we'll never get out of sync).
 160         /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
 161         /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
 162         LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
 163         Committed,
 164         /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
 165         /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
 166         RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 167         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 168         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 169         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 170         /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
 171         /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
 172         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 173         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 174         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 175         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 176         /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
 177         /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
 178         AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 179 }
 180
 181 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
 182         htlc_id: u64,
 183         amount_msat: u64,
 184         cltv_expiry: u32,
 185         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 186         state: OutboundHTLCState,
 187         source: HTLCSource,
 188 }
 189
 190 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
 191 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
 192         AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
 193                 // always outbound
 194                 amount_msat: u64,
 195                 cltv_expiry: u32,
 196                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 197                 source: HTLCSource,
 198                 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
 199         },
 200         ClaimHTLC {
 201                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
 202                 htlc_id: u64,
 203         },
 204         FailHTLC {
 205                 htlc_id: u64,
 206                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
 207         },
 208 }
 209
 210 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
 211 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
 212 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
 213 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
 214 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
 215 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
 216 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
 217 enum ChannelState {
 218         /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
 219         OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
 220         /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
 221         TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
 222         /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
 223         /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
 224         /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
 225         FundingCreated = 4,
 226         /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
 227         /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
 228         /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
 229         FundingSent = 8,
 230         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
 231         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 232         TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
 233         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
 234         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 235         OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
 236         ChannelFunded = 64,
 237         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
 238         /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
 239         /// dance.
 240         PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
 241         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
 242         /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
 243         /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
 244         MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
 245         /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
 246         /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
 247         /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
 248         /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
 249         /// later.
 250         /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
 251         AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
 252         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
 253         /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
 254         /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
 255         RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
 256         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
 257         /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
 258         LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
 259         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
 260         /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
 261         ShutdownComplete = 4096,
 262 }
 263 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
 264 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
 265
 266 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
 267
 268 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
 269 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
 270 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
 271 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
 272 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
 273 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
 274 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
 275         /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
 276         Enabled,
 277         /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
 278         DisabledStaged,
 279         /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
 280         EnabledStaged,
 281         /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
 282         Disabled,
 283 }
 284
 285 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
 286 enum HTLCInitiator {
 287         LocalOffered,
 288         RemoteOffered,
 289 }
 290
 291 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
 292 struct HTLCStats {
 293         pending_htlcs: u32,
 294         pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
 295         on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
 296         on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
 297 }
 298
 299 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
 300 struct HTLCCandidate {
 301         amount_msat: u64,
 302         origin: HTLCInitiator,
 303 }
 304
 305 impl HTLCCandidate {
 306         fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
 307                 Self {
 308                         amount_msat,
 309                         origin,
 310                 }
 311         }
 312 }
 313
 314 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
 315 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
 316 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
 317         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
 318         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
 319         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
 320         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
 321         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
 322         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
 323         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
 324         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
 325 }
 326
 327 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
 328 /// description
 329 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
 330         NewClaim {
 331                 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
 332                 htlc_value_msat: u64,
 333                 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
 334         },
 335         DuplicateClaim {},
 336 }
 337
 338 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
 339 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
 340         /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
 341         /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
 342         /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
 343         NewClaim {
 344                 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
 345                 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
 346                 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
 347                 htlc_value_msat: u64,
 348                 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
 349                 /// in the holding cell).
 350                 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
 351         },
 352         /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
 353         /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
 354         DuplicateClaim {},
 355 }
 356
 357 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
 358 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
 359 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
 360 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
 361 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
 362 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
 363 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
 364 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
 365 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
 366 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
 367 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
 368 #[cfg(fuzzing)]
 369 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
 370 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
 371 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
 372
 373 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
 374 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
 375 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
 376 // inbound channel.
 377 //
 378 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
 379 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
 380 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
 381         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
 382         pub(crate) config: ChannelConfig,
 383         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
 384         config: ChannelConfig,
 385
 386         user_id: u64,
 387
 388         channel_id: [u8; 32],
 389         channel_state: u32,
 390         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
 391         channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 392
 393         latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
 394
 395         holder_signer: Signer,
 396         shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
 397         destination_script: Script,
 398
 399         // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
 400         // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
 401         // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
 402
 403         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 404         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 405         value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
 406         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
 407         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
 408         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
 409
 410         /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
 411         /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
 412         /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
 413         /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
 414         /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
 415         /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
 416         /// send it first.
 417         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
 418
 419         monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
 420         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
 421         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
 422         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
 423         monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
 424
 425         // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
 426         // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
 427         // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
 428         //
 429         // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
 430         // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
 431         // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
 432         // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
 433         // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
 434         // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
 435         // commitment_signed.
 436         pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
 437         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
 438         // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
 439         // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
 440         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 441         holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 442         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
 443         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
 444         update_time_counter: u32,
 445         feerate_per_kw: u32,
 446
 447         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 448         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
 449         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 450         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 451         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
 452         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 453
 454         last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
 455         closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
 456         target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
 457
 458         /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
 459         /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
 460         /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
 461         pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
 462
 463         /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
 464         funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
 465         funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
 466         short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
 467
 468         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 469         #[cfg(test)]
 470         pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 471         #[cfg(not(test))]
 472         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 473         #[cfg(test)]
 474         pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 475         #[cfg(not(test))]
 476         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 477         //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
 478         /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
 479         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
 480         // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
 481         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 482         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 483         #[cfg(test)]
 484         pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 485         #[cfg(not(test))]
 486         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 487         //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 488         minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
 489
 490         counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
 491
 492         pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
 493         funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
 494
 495         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 496         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 497         counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
 498
 499         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
 500
 501         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
 502
 503         channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
 504         /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
 505         /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
 506         /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
 507         /// to DoS us.
 508         /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
 509         /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
 510         closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
 511
 512         /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
 513         /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
 514         announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
 515
 516         // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
 517         // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
 518         // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
 519         // `build_commitment_transaction`.
 520         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 521         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
 522         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 523         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
 524
 525         /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
 526         /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
 527         /// funding_locked *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
 528         /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the funding_locked
 529         /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
 530         ///
 531         /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
 532         pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::FundingLocked>,
 533
 534         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 535         // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
 536         // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
 537         // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
 538         // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
 539         // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
 540         // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
 541         historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
 542 }
 543
 544 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 545 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
 546         fee: u64,
 547         total_pending_htlcs: usize,
 548         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
 549         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
 550         feerate: u32,
 551 }
 552
 553 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
 554
 555 #[cfg(not(test))]
 556 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 557 #[cfg(test)]
 558 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 559 #[cfg(not(test))]
 560 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 561 #[cfg(test)]
 562 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 563
 564 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
 565 /// it's 2^24.
 566 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
 567
 568 /// Maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed. 2 * standard dust threshold on p2wsh output
 569 /// Scales up on Bitcoin Core's proceeding policy with dust outputs. A typical p2wsh output is 43
 570 /// bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal spend of 67 bytes (even if
 571 /// a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee` is set to 3000sat/kb, thus
 572 /// 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs are p2wsh, a value of
 573 /// 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions. We give a bit
 574 /// of margin to our counterparty and pick up 660 satoshis as an accepted `dust_limit_satoshis`
 575 /// upper bound to avoid negotiation conflicts with other implementations.
 576 pub const MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 2 * 330;
 577
 578 /// A typical p2wsh output is 43 bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal
 579 /// spend of 67 bytes (even if a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee`
 580 /// is set to 3000sat/kb, thus 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs
 581 /// are p2wsh, a value of 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions.
 582 pub const MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 330;
 583
 584 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
 585 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
 586 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
 587 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
 588         Ignore(String),
 589         Warn(String),
 590         Close(String),
 591         CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
 592 }
 593
 594 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
 595         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
 596                 match self {
 597                         &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
 598                         &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
 599                         &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
 600                         &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
 601                 }
 602         }
 603 }
 604
 605 macro_rules! secp_check {
 606         ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
 607                 match $res {
 608                         Ok(thing) => thing,
 609                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
 610                 }
 611         };
 612 }
 613
 614 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
 615         // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
 616         fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 617                 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
 618         }
 619
 620         /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
 621         /// required by us.
 622         ///
 623         /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
 624         pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 625                 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
 626                 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
 627         }
 628
 629         // Constructors:
 630         pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
 631         where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
 632               F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 633         {
 634                 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
 635                 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
 636                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
 637
 638                 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 639                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
 640                 }
 641                 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
 642                 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
 643                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
 644                 }
 645                 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 646                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
 647                 }
 648                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis);
 649                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
 650                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel  reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
 651                 }
 652
 653                 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
 654
 655                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 656                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
 657
 658                 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_options.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
 659                         Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
 660                 } else { None };
 661
 662                 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
 663                         if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
 664                                 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
 665                         }
 666                 }
 667
 668                 Ok(Channel {
 669                         user_id,
 670                         config: config.channel_options.clone(),
 671
 672                         channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
 673                         channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
 674                         secp_ctx,
 675                         channel_value_satoshis,
 676
 677                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 678
 679                         holder_signer,
 680                         shutdown_scriptpubkey,
 681                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 682
 683                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 684                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 685                         value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
 686
 687                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 688                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 689                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 690                         pending_update_fee: None,
 691                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 692                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 693                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 694                         update_time_counter: 1,
 695
 696                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 697
 698                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 699                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 700                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 701                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 702                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 703
 704                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 705                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 706                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 707                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 708
 709                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 710                         pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
 711                         closing_fee_limits: None,
 712                         target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
 713
 714                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 715                         funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
 716                         short_channel_id: None,
 717
 718                         feerate_per_kw: feerate,
 719                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
 720                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
 721                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
 722                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
 723                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
 724                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 725                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
 726                         minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
 727
 728                         counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
 729
 730                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
 731                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
 732                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 733                                 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
 734                                 counterparty_parameters: None,
 735                                 funding_outpoint: None
 736                         },
 737                         funding_transaction: None,
 738
 739                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
 740                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 741                         counterparty_node_id,
 742
 743                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
 744
 745                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 746
 747                         channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
 748                         closing_signed_in_flight: false,
 749
 750                         announcement_sigs: None,
 751
 752                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 753                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 754                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 755                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 756
 757                         workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
 758
 759                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 760                         historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
 761                 })
 762         }
 763
 764         fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
 765                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
 766         {
 767                 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 768                 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
 769                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
 770                 }
 771                 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
 772                 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
 773                 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
 774                 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
 775                 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
 776                         fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
 777                 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
 778                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
 779                 }
 780                 Ok(())
 781         }
 782
 783         /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
 784         /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
 785         pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
 786                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
 787           F::Target: FeeEstimator
 788         {
 789                 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
 790                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
 791                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
 792                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
 793                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
 794                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
 795                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
 796                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
 797                 };
 798                 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
 799
 800                 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 801                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
 802                 }
 803
 804                 // Check sanity of message fields:
 805                 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 806                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 807                 }
 808                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 809                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 810                 }
 811                 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 812                 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
 813                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
 814                 }
 815                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 816                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 817                 }
 818                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
 819                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
 820                 }
 821                 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 822                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
 823                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
 824                 }
 825                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
 826
 827                 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
 828                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
 829                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
 830                 }
 831                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
 832                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
 833                 }
 834                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
 835                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
 836                 }
 837
 838                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
 839                 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
 840                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
 841                 }
 842                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
 843                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat,  config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
 844                 }
 845                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
 846                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
 847                 }
 848                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
 849                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 850                 }
 851                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
 852                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
 853                 }
 854                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
 855                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
 856                 }
 857                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis >  MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
 858                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
 859                 }
 860
 861                 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
 862
 863                 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
 864                 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
 865                         if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
 866                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
 867                         }
 868                 }
 869                 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
 870                 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
 871
 872                 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 873
 874                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
 875                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
 876                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
 877                 }
 878                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
 879                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
 880                 }
 881                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
 882                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 883                 }
 884
 885                 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
 886                 // for full fee payment
 887                 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
 888                 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 889                 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
 890                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
 891                 }
 892
 893                 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
 894                 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 895                 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
 896                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
 897                 }
 898
 899                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
 900                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
 901                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
 902                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
 903                                         if script.len() == 0 {
 904                                                 None
 905                                         } else {
 906                                                 match ShutdownScript::try_from((script.clone(), their_features)) {
 907                                                         Ok(shutdown_script) => Some(shutdown_script.into_inner()),
 908                                                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script))),
 909                                                 }
 910                                         }
 911                                 },
 912                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
 913                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
 914                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
 915                                 }
 916                         }
 917                 } else { None };
 918
 919                 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_options.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
 920                         Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
 921                 } else { None };
 922
 923                 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
 924                         if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
 925                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
 926                         }
 927                 }
 928
 929                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 930                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
 931
 932                 let chan = Channel {
 933                         user_id,
 934                         config: local_config,
 935
 936                         channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
 937                         channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
 938                         secp_ctx,
 939
 940                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 941
 942                         holder_signer,
 943                         shutdown_scriptpubkey,
 944                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 945
 946                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 947                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 948                         value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
 949
 950                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 951                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 952                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 953                         pending_update_fee: None,
 954                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 955                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 956                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 957                         update_time_counter: 1,
 958
 959                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 960
 961                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 962                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 963                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 964                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 965                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 966
 967                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 968                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 969                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 970                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 971
 972                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 973                         pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
 974                         closing_fee_limits: None,
 975                         target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
 976
 977                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 978                         funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
 979                         short_channel_id: None,
 980
 981                         feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
 982                         channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
 983                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
 984                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
 985                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
 986                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
 987                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
 988                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 989                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
 990                         minimum_depth: Some(config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth),
 991
 992                         counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
 993
 994                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
 995                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
 996                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 997                                 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
 998                                 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
 999                                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1000                                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1001                                 }),
1002                                 funding_outpoint: None
1003                         },
1004                         funding_transaction: None,
1005
1006                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1007                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1008                         counterparty_node_id,
1009
1010                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1011
1012                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1013
1014                         channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1015                         closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1016
1017                         announcement_sigs: None,
1018
1019                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1020                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1021                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1022                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1023
1024                         workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1025
1026                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1027                         historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1028                 };
1029
1030                 Ok(chan)
1031         }
1032
1033         /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1034         /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1035         /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1036         /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1037         /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1038         /// an HTLC to a).
1039         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1040         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1041         /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1042         /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1043         /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1044         /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1045         /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1046         /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
1047         /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
1048         /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the fourth return value, but not the third, and
1049         /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the fourth return value.
1050         #[inline]
1051         fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, u32, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
1052                 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1053                 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1054                 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1055
1056                 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1057                 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1058                 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1059                 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1060
1061                 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1062                 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1063                         if match update_state {
1064                                 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1065                                 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1066                                 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1067                                 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1068                                 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound());  generated_by_local },
1069                         } {
1070                                 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1071                         }
1072                 }
1073
1074                 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1075                         commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1076                         get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1077                         log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1078
1079                 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1080                         ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1081                                 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1082                                         offered: $offered,
1083                                         amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1084                                         cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1085                                         payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1086                                         transaction_output_index: None
1087                                 }
1088                         }
1089                 }
1090
1091                 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1092                         ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1093                                 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1094                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1095                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
1096                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1097                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1098                                         } else {
1099                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1100                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1101                                         }
1102                                 } else {
1103                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1104                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
1105                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1106                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1107                                         } else {
1108                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1109                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1110                                         }
1111                                 }
1112                         }
1113                 }
1114
1115                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1116                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1117                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1118                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1119                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1120                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1121                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1122                         };
1123
1124                         if include {
1125                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1126                                 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1127                         } else {
1128                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1129                                 match &htlc.state {
1130                                         &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1131                                                 if generated_by_local {
1132                                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1133                                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1134                                                         }
1135                                                 }
1136                                         },
1137                                         _ => {},
1138                                 }
1139                         }
1140                 }
1141
1142                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1143                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1144                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1145                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1146                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1147                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1148                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1149                         };
1150
1151                         if include {
1152                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1153                                 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1154                         } else {
1155                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1156                                 match htlc.state {
1157                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
1158                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1159                                         },
1160                                         OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
1161                                                 if !generated_by_local {
1162                                                         value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1163                                                 }
1164                                         },
1165                                         _ => {},
1166                                 }
1167                         }
1168                 }
1169
1170                 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1171                 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1172                 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1173                 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1174                 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1175                 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1176                 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1177                 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1178
1179                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1180                 {
1181                         // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1182                         // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1183                         let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1184                                 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1185                         } else {
1186                                 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1187                         };
1188                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1189                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1190                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
1191                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1192                 }
1193
1194                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1195                 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1196                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1197                 } else {
1198                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
1199                 };
1200
1201                 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1202                 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1203
1204                 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1205                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1206                 } else {
1207                         value_to_a = 0;
1208                 }
1209
1210                 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1211                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1212                 } else {
1213                         value_to_b = 0;
1214                 }
1215
1216                 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1217
1218                 let channel_parameters =
1219                         if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1220                         else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1221                 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1222                                                                              value_to_a as u64,
1223                                                                              value_to_b as u64,
1224                                                                              keys.clone(),
1225                                                                              feerate_per_kw,
1226                                                                              &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1227                                                                              &channel_parameters
1228                 );
1229                 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1230                 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1231                 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1232                 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1233
1234                 (tx, feerate_per_kw, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1235         }
1236
1237         #[inline]
1238         fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1239                 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1240                 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1241                 // outside of those situations will fail.
1242                 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1243         }
1244
1245         #[inline]
1246         fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1247                 let mut ret =
1248                 (4 +                                           // version
1249                  1 +                                           // input count
1250                  36 +                                          // prevout
1251                  1 +                                           // script length (0)
1252                  4 +                                           // sequence
1253                  1 +                                           // output count
1254                  4                                             // lock time
1255                  )*4 +                                         // * 4 for non-witness parts
1256                 2 +                                            // witness marker and flag
1257                 1 +                                            // witness element count
1258                 4 +                                            // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1259                 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1260                 2*(1 + 71);                                    // two signatures + sighash type flags
1261                 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1262                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1263                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1264                 }
1265                 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1266                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1267                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1268                 }
1269                 ret
1270         }
1271
1272         #[inline]
1273         fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1274                 let txins = {
1275                         let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1276                         ins.push(TxIn {
1277                                 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1278                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1279                                 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1280                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1281                         });
1282                         ins
1283                 };
1284
1285                 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1286                 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1287                 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1288                 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1289
1290                 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1291                 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1292                 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1293
1294                 if value_to_self < 0 {
1295                         assert!(self.is_outbound());
1296                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1297                 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1298                         assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1299                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1300                 }
1301
1302                 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1303                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1304                                 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1305                                 value: value_to_remote as u64
1306                         }, ()));
1307                 }
1308
1309                 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1310                 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1311                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1312                                 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1313                                 value: value_to_self as u64
1314                         }, ()));
1315                 }
1316
1317                 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1318
1319                 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1320                 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1321                         outputs.push(out.0);
1322                 }
1323
1324                 (Transaction {
1325                         version: 2,
1326                         lock_time: 0,
1327                         input: txins,
1328                         output: outputs,
1329                 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1330         }
1331
1332         fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1333                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1334         }
1335
1336         #[inline]
1337         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1338         /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1339         /// our counterparty!)
1340         /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1341         /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1342         fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1343                 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1344                 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1345                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1346                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1347
1348                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1349         }
1350
1351         #[inline]
1352         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1353         /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1354         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1355         fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1356                 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1357                 //may see payments to it!
1358                 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1359                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1360                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1361
1362                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1363         }
1364
1365         /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1366         /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1367         /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1368         pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1369                 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1370         }
1371
1372         fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1373                 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1374                 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1375                 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1376                 // either.
1377                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1378                         panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1379                 }
1380                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1381
1382                 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1383
1384                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1385                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1386                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1387
1388                 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1389                 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1390                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1391                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1392                                 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1393                                 match htlc.state {
1394                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1395                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1396                                                 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1397                                                 } else {
1398                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1399                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1400                                                 }
1401                                                 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1402                                         },
1403                                         _ => {
1404                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1405                                                 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1406                                         }
1407                                 }
1408                                 pending_idx = idx;
1409                                 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1410                                 break;
1411                         }
1412                 }
1413                 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1414                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1415                         // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1416                         // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1417                         debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1418                         return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1419                 }
1420
1421                 // Now update local state:
1422                 //
1423                 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1424                 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1425                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1426                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1427                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1428                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1429                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1430                         }],
1431                 };
1432
1433                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1434                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1435                                 match pending_update {
1436                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1437                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1438                                                         // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1439                                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1440                                                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1441                                                         debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1442                                                         return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1443                                                 }
1444                                         },
1445                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1446                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1447                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1448                                                         // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1449                                                         // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1450                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1451                                                         return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1452                                                 }
1453                                         },
1454                                         _ => {}
1455                                 }
1456                         }
1457                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1458                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1459                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1460                         });
1461                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1462                         self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1463                         return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1464                 }
1465                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1466                 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1467
1468                 {
1469                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1470                         if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1471                         } else {
1472                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1473                                 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1474                         }
1475                         log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1476                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1477                 }
1478
1479                 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1480                         monitor_update,
1481                         htlc_value_msat,
1482                         msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1483                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1484                                 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1485                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1486                         }),
1487                 }
1488         }
1489
1490         pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1491                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1492                         UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1493                                 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1494                                         Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1495                                         Ok(res) => res
1496                                 };
1497                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1498                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1499                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1500                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1501                                 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1502                         },
1503                         UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1504                                 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1505                         UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1506                 }
1507         }
1508
1509         /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1510         /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1511         /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1512         /// before we fail backwards.
1513         /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1514         /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1515         pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1516                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1517                         panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1518                 }
1519                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1520
1521                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1522                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1523                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1524
1525                 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1526                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1527                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1528                                 match htlc.state {
1529                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1530                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1531                                                 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1532                                                 } else {
1533                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1534                                                 }
1535                                                 return Ok(None);
1536                                         },
1537                                         _ => {
1538                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1539                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1540                                         }
1541                                 }
1542                                 pending_idx = idx;
1543                         }
1544                 }
1545                 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1546                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1547                         // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1548                         // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1549                         debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1550                         return Ok(None);
1551                 }
1552
1553                 // Now update local state:
1554                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1555                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1556                                 match pending_update {
1557                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1558                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1559                                                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1560                                                         debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1561                                                         return Ok(None);
1562                                                 }
1563                                         },
1564                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1565                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1566                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1567                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1568                                                 }
1569                                         },
1570                                         _ => {}
1571                                 }
1572                         }
1573                         log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1574                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1575                                 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1576                                 err_packet,
1577                         });
1578                         return Ok(None);
1579                 }
1580
1581                 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1582                 {
1583                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1584                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1585                 }
1586
1587                 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1588                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1589                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1590                         reason: err_packet
1591                 }))
1592         }
1593
1594         // Message handlers:
1595
1596         pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1597                 // Check sanity of message fields:
1598                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1599                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1600                 }
1601                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1602                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1603                 }
1604                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1605                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1606                 }
1607                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1608                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1609                 }
1610                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1611                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1612                 }
1613                 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1614                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1615                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1616                 }
1617                 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1618                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1619                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1620                 }
1621                 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1622                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1623                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1624                 }
1625                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1626                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1627                 }
1628                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1629                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1630                 }
1631
1632                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1633                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1634                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1635                 }
1636                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1637                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1638                 }
1639                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1640                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1641                 }
1642                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1643                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1644                 }
1645                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1646                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1647                 }
1648                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1649                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1650                 }
1651                 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1652                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1653                 }
1654                 if msg.minimum_depth == 0 {
1655                         // Note that if this changes we should update the serialization minimum version to
1656                         // indicate to older clients that they don't understand some features of the current
1657                         // channel.
1658                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum confirmation depth must be at least 1".to_owned()));
1659                 }
1660
1661                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1662                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1663                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1664                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1665                                         if script.len() == 0 {
1666                                                 None
1667                                         } else {
1668                                                 match ShutdownScript::try_from((script.clone(), their_features)) {
1669                                                         Ok(shutdown_script) => Some(shutdown_script.into_inner()),
1670                                                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script))),
1671                                                 }
1672                                         }
1673                                 },
1674                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1675                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1676                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1677                                 }
1678                         }
1679                 } else { None };
1680
1681                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1682                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1683                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
1684                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1685                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1686                 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
1687
1688                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1689                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1690                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1691                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1692                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1693                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1694                 };
1695
1696                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1697                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1698                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1699                 });
1700
1701                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1702                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1703
1704                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1705
1706                 Ok(())
1707         }
1708
1709         fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1710                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1711
1712                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1713                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).0;
1714                 {
1715                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1716                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1717                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1718                         // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1719                         log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
1720                                 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
1721                                 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
1722                                 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1723                         secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1724                 }
1725
1726                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1727                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).0;
1728
1729                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1730                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1731                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1732                         log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1733
1734                 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1735                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1736
1737                 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1738                 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1739         }
1740
1741         fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1742                 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1743         }
1744
1745         pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1746                 if self.is_outbound() {
1747                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1748                 }
1749                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1750                         // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1751                         // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1752                         // channel.
1753                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1754                 }
1755                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1756                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1757                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1758                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1759                 }
1760
1761                 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1762                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1763                 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks.  In particular
1764                 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1765                 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1766
1767                 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1768                         Ok(res) => res,
1769                         Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1770                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1771                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1772                         },
1773                         Err(e) => {
1774                                 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1775                                 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1776                                 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1777                         }
1778                 };
1779
1780                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1781                         initial_commitment_tx,
1782                         msg.signature,
1783                         Vec::new(),
1784                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1785                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1786                 );
1787
1788                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1789
1790                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1791                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1792                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1793                 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
1794                 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1795                                                           shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1796                                                           &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1797                                                           &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1798                                                           funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1799                                                           obscure_factor,
1800                                                           holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1801
1802                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1803
1804                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1805                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1806                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1807                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1808
1809                 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1810
1811                 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1812                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
1813                         signature
1814                 }, channel_monitor))
1815         }
1816
1817         /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1818         /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1819         pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1820                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1821                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1822                 }
1823                 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1824                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1825                 }
1826                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1827                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1828                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1829                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1830                 }
1831
1832                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1833
1834                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1835                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).0;
1836                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1837                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1838
1839                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1840                         log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1841
1842                 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1843                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).0;
1844                 {
1845                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1846                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1847                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1848                         // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1849                         if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1850                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1851                         }
1852                 }
1853
1854                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1855                         initial_commitment_tx,
1856                         msg.signature,
1857                         Vec::new(),
1858                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1859                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1860                 );
1861
1862
1863                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1864                 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1865                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1866                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1867                 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
1868                 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1869                                                           shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1870                                                           &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1871                                                           &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1872                                                           funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1873                                                           obscure_factor,
1874                                                           holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1875
1876                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1877
1878                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1879                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1880                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1881                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1882
1883                 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1884
1885                 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap()))
1886         }
1887
1888         pub fn funding_locked<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1889                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1890                         self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
1891                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
1892                 }
1893
1894                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1895
1896                 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1897                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1898                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1899                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1900                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
1901                 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1902                                  // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1903                                  self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1904                                  self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1905                                 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1906                                 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1907                                                       (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1908                         if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1909                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1910                         }
1911                         // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1912                         return Ok(());
1913                 } else {
1914                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1915                 }
1916
1917                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1918                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1919
1920                 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_locked from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1921
1922                 Ok(())
1923         }
1924
1925         /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1926         fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> HTLCStats {
1927                 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1928                         pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1929                         pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1930                         on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1931                         on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1932                 };
1933
1934                 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1935                 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1936                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1937                         stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1938                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1939                                 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1940                         }
1941                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1942                                 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1943                         }
1944                 }
1945                 stats
1946         }
1947
1948         /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1949         fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> HTLCStats {
1950                 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1951                         pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1952                         pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1953                         on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1954                         on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1955                 };
1956
1957                 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1958                 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1959                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1960                         stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1961                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1962                                 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1963                         }
1964                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1965                                 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1966                         }
1967                 }
1968
1969                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1970                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1971                                 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1972                                 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1973                                 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1974                                         stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1975                                 }
1976                                 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1977                                         stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1978                                 }
1979                         }
1980                 }
1981                 stats
1982         }
1983
1984         /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1985         /// Doesn't bother handling the
1986         /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1987         /// corner case properly.
1988         pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1989                 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1990                 (
1991                         cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1992                                 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
1993                                 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1994                                 - Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64 * 1000,
1995                         0) as u64,
1996                         cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
1997                                 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1998                                 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
1999                         0) as u64
2000                 )
2001         }
2002
2003         pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2004                 (Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
2005                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2006         }
2007
2008         // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2009         // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2010         fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
2011                 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2012                 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2013                 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2014         }
2015
2016         // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2017         // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2018         // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2019         // are excluded.
2020         fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2021                 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2022
2023                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2024                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2025
2026                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2027                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2028                 match htlc.origin {
2029                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2030                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2031                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
2032                                 }
2033                         },
2034                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2035                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2036                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
2037                                 }
2038                         }
2039                 }
2040
2041                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2042                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2043                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2044                                 continue
2045                         }
2046                         // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2047                         // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2048                         included_htlcs += 1;
2049                 }
2050
2051                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2052                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2053                                 continue
2054                         }
2055                         match htlc.state {
2056                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2057                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2058                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2059                                 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2060                                 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2061                                 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2062                                 _ => {},
2063                         }
2064                 }
2065
2066                 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2067                         match htlc {
2068                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2069                                         if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2070                                                 continue
2071                                         }
2072                                         included_htlcs += 1
2073                                 },
2074                                 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2075                                          // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2076                         }
2077                 }
2078
2079                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2080                 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
2081                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2082                 {
2083                         let mut fee = res;
2084                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2085                                 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
2086                         }
2087                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2088                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2089                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2090                                 fee,
2091                                 total_pending_htlcs,
2092                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2093                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2094                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2095                                 },
2096                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2097                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2098                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2099                                 },
2100                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2101                         };
2102                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2103                 }
2104                 res
2105         }
2106
2107         // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2108         // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2109         // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2110         // excluded.
2111         fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2112                 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2113
2114                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2115                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2116
2117                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2118                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2119                 match htlc.origin {
2120                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2121                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2122                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
2123                                 }
2124                         },
2125                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2126                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2127                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
2128                                 }
2129                         }
2130                 }
2131
2132                 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2133                 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2134                 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2135                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2136                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2137                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2138                                 continue
2139                         }
2140                         included_htlcs += 1;
2141                 }
2142
2143                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2144                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2145                                 continue
2146                         }
2147                         // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2148                         // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2149                         match htlc.state {
2150                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2151                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2152                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2153                                 _ => {},
2154                         }
2155                 }
2156
2157                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2158                 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
2159                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2160                 {
2161                         let mut fee = res;
2162                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2163                                 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
2164                         }
2165                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2166                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2167                                 fee,
2168                                 total_pending_htlcs,
2169                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2170                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2171                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2172                                 },
2173                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2174                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2175                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2176                                 },
2177                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2178                         };
2179                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2180                 }
2181                 res
2182         }
2183
2184         pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2185         where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2186                 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2187                 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2188                 if local_sent_shutdown {
2189                         pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
2190                 }
2191                 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2192                 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2193                 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2194                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2195                 }
2196                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2197                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2198                 }
2199                 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2200                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2201                 }
2202                 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2203                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2204                 }
2205                 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2206                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2207                 }
2208
2209                 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
2210                 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
2211                 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2212                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2213                 }
2214                 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2215                 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2216                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2217                 }
2218                 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2219                 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2220                 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2221                 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2222                 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2223                 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2224                 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2225                 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2226                 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2227                 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2228                 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2229                 // transaction).
2230                 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2231                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2232                         if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
2233                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2234                         } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
2235                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2236                         }
2237                 }
2238
2239                 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2240                 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2241                         let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2242                         if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2243                                 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2244                                         on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2245                                 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2246                         }
2247                 }
2248
2249                 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2250                 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2251                         let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2252                         if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2253                                 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2254                                         on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2255                                 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2256                         }
2257                 }
2258
2259                 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2260                         self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2261                 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2262                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2263                 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2264                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2265                 }
2266
2267                 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2268                 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2269                 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2270                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2271                         self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2272                 };
2273                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2274                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2275                 };
2276
2277                 let chan_reserve_msat =
2278                         Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
2279                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
2280                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2281                 }
2282
2283                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2284                         // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2285                         // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2286                         // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2287                         // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2288                         // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2289                         // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2290                         // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2291                         // sensitive to fee spikes.
2292                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2293                         let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2294                         if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2295                                 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2296                                 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2297                                 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2298                                 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2299                         }
2300                 } else {
2301                         // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2302                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2303                         let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2304                         if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2305                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2306                         }
2307                 }
2308                 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2309                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2310                 }
2311                 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2312                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2313                 }
2314
2315                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2316                         if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2317                                 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2318                         }
2319                 }
2320
2321                 // Now update local state:
2322                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2323                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2324                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2325                         amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2326                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2327                         cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2328                         state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2329                 });
2330                 Ok(())
2331         }
2332
2333         /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2334         #[inline]
2335         fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2336                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2337                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2338                                 match check_preimage {
2339                                         None => {},
2340                                         Some(payment_hash) =>
2341                                                 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2342                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2343                                                 }
2344                                 };
2345                                 match htlc.state {
2346                                         OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2347                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2348                                         OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2349                                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2350                                         },
2351                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2352                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2353                                 }
2354                                 return Ok(htlc);
2355                         }
2356                 }
2357                 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2358         }
2359
2360         pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2361                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2362                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2363                 }
2364                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2365                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2366                 }
2367
2368                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2369                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2370         }
2371
2372         pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2373                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2374                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2375                 }
2376                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2377                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2378                 }
2379
2380                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2381                 Ok(())
2382         }
2383
2384         pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2385                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2386                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2387                 }
2388                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2389                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2390                 }
2391
2392                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2393                 Ok(())
2394         }
2395
2396         pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2397                 where L::Target: Logger
2398         {
2399                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2400                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2401                 }
2402                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2403                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2404                 }
2405                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2406                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2407                 }
2408
2409                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2410
2411                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2412
2413                 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw) = {
2414                         let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2415                         let commitment_txid = {
2416                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2417                                 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2418                                 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2419
2420                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2421                                         log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2422                                         log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2423                                         log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2424                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2425                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2426                                 }
2427                                 bitcoin_tx.txid
2428                         };
2429                         let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.3.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2430                         (commitment_tx.2, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid, commitment_tx.1)
2431                 };
2432
2433                 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2434                 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2435                 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2436                         update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2437                 } else { false };
2438                 if update_fee { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); }
2439                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2440                 if update_fee {
2441                         let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2442                         if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2443                                 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2444                         }
2445                 }
2446                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2447                 {
2448                         if self.is_outbound() {
2449                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2450                                 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2451                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2452                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2453                                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2454                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2455                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2456                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2457                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2458                                                         assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2459                                                 }
2460                                 }
2461                         }
2462                 }
2463
2464                 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2465                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2466                 }
2467
2468                 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2469                 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2470                 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2471                         if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2472                                 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw,
2473                                         self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc,
2474                                         &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2475
2476                                 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2477                                 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2478                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2479                                         log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2480                                         encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2481                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2482                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2483                                 }
2484                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2485                         } else {
2486                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2487                         }
2488                 }
2489
2490                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2491                         commitment_tx,
2492                         msg.signature,
2493                         msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2494                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2495                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2496                 );
2497
2498                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2499                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2500
2501                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2502                 let mut need_commitment = false;
2503                 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
2504                         if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2505                                 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2506                                 need_commitment = true;
2507                         }
2508                 }
2509
2510                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2511                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2512                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2513                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2514                                 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2515                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2516                         }]
2517                 };
2518
2519                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2520                         let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2521                                 Some(forward_info.clone())
2522                         } else { None };
2523                         if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2524                                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2525                                         log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2526                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2527                                 need_commitment = true;
2528                         }
2529                 }
2530                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2531                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2532                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
2533                         } else { None } {
2534                                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2535                                         log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2536                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2537                                 need_commitment = true;
2538                         }
2539                 }
2540
2541                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2542                 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2543                 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2544                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2545
2546                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2547                         // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2548                         // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2549                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2550                         if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2551                                 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2552                                 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2553                                 // includes the right HTLCs.
2554                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2555                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2556                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2557                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2558                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2559                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2560                         }
2561                         log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
2562                                 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2563                         return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2564                 }
2565
2566                 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2567                         // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2568                         // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2569                         // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2570                         let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2571                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2572                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2573                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2574                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2575                         Some(msg)
2576                 } else { None };
2577
2578                 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
2579                         log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
2580
2581                 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2582                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2583                         per_commitment_secret,
2584                         next_per_commitment_point,
2585                 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
2586         }
2587
2588         /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
2589         /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
2590         /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
2591         pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2592                 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 &&
2593                    (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2594                         self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
2595                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
2596         }
2597
2598         /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2599         /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2600         fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2601                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2602                 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2603                         log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
2604                                 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2605
2606                         let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2607                                 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2608                                 updates: Vec::new(),
2609                         };
2610
2611                         let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2612                         mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2613                         let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2614                         let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2615                         let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2616                         let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2617                         for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2618                                 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2619                                 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2620                                 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2621                                 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2622                                 // to rebalance channels.
2623                                 match &htlc_update {
2624                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2625                                                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2626                                                         Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2627                                                         Err(e) => {
2628                                                                 match e {
2629                                                                         ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2630                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
2631                                                                                         log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2632                                                                                 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2633                                                                                 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2634                                                                                 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2635                                                                                 // into the holding cell without ever being
2636                                                                                 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2637                                                                                 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2638                                                                                 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2639                                                                         },
2640                                                                         _ => {
2641                                                                                 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2642                                                                         },
2643                                                                 }
2644                                                         }
2645                                                 }
2646                                         },
2647                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2648                                                 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
2649                                                 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
2650                                                 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
2651                                                 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
2652                                                 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
2653                                                 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
2654                                                         if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2655                                                                 (msg, monitor_update)
2656                                                         } else { unreachable!() };
2657                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2658                                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2659                                         },
2660                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2661                                                 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
2662                                                         Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
2663                                                                 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
2664                                                                 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
2665                                                                 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
2666                                                                 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
2667                                                                 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
2668                                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
2669                                                         },
2670                                                         Err(e) => {
2671                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2672                                                                 else {
2673                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2674                                                                 }
2675                                                         }
2676                                                 }
2677                                         },
2678                                 }
2679                         }
2680                         if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2681                                 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2682                         }
2683                         let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
2684                                 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2685                                 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
2686                                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2687                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2688                                         feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2689                                 })
2690                         } else {
2691                                 None
2692                         };
2693
2694                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2695                         // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2696                         // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2697                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2698                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2699
2700                         log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
2701                                 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
2702                                 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
2703
2704                         Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2705                                 update_add_htlcs,
2706                                 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2707                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2708                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2709                                 update_fee,
2710                                 commitment_signed,
2711                         }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2712                 } else {
2713                         Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2714                 }
2715         }
2716
2717         /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2718         /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2719         /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2720         /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2721         /// revoke_and_ack message.
2722         pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2723                 where L::Target: Logger,
2724         {
2725                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2726                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2727                 }
2728                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2729                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2730                 }
2731                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2732                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2733                 }
2734
2735                 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2736                         if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2737                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2738                         }
2739                 }
2740
2741                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2742                         // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2743                         // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2744                         // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2745                         // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2746                         // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2747                         // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2748                         // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2749                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2750                 }
2751
2752                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2753                 {
2754                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2755                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2756                 }
2757
2758                 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2759                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2760                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2761                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2762                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2763                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2764                                 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2765                                 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2766                         }],
2767                 };
2768
2769                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2770                 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2771                 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2772                 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2773                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2774                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2775                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2776                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2777
2778                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2779                 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2780                 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2781                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2782                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2783                 let mut require_commitment = false;
2784                 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2785
2786                 {
2787                         // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2788                         let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2789                         let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2790
2791                         // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2792                         pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2793                                 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2794                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2795                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2796                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2797                                         }
2798                                         false
2799                                 } else { true }
2800                         });
2801                         pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2802                                 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2803                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2804                                         if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2805                                                 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2806                                         } else {
2807                                                 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2808                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2809                                         }
2810                                         false
2811                                 } else { true }
2812                         });
2813                         for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2814                                 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2815                                         true
2816                                 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2817                                         true
2818                                 } else { false };
2819                                 if swap {
2820                                         let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2821                                         mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2822
2823                                         if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2824                                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2825                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2826                                                 require_commitment = true;
2827                                         } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2828                                                 match forward_info {
2829                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2830                                                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2831                                                                 require_commitment = true;
2832                                                                 match fail_msg {
2833                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2834                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2835                                                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2836                                                                         },
2837                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2838                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2839                                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2840                                                                         },
2841                                                                 }
2842                                                         },
2843                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2844                                                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2845                                                                 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2846                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2847                                                         }
2848                                                 }
2849                                         }
2850                                 }
2851                         }
2852                         for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2853                                 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2854                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2855                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2856                                 }
2857                                 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2858                                         Some(fail_reason.take())
2859                                 } else { None } {
2860                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2861                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2862                                         require_commitment = true;
2863                                 }
2864                         }
2865                 }
2866                 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2867
2868                 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2869                         match update_state {
2870                                 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
2871                                         debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
2872                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
2873                                         self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2874                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2875                                 },
2876                                 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
2877                                 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
2878                                         debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2879                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
2880                                         require_commitment = true;
2881                                         self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2882                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2883                                 },
2884                         }
2885                 }
2886
2887                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2888                         // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2889                         // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2890                         if require_commitment {
2891                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2892                                 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2893                                 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2894                                 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2895                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2896                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2897                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2898                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2899                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2900                         }
2901                         self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2902                         self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2903                         log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2904                         return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2905                 }
2906
2907                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2908                         (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2909                                 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2910                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2911                                         commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2912                                 }
2913                                 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2914                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2915                                         commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2916                                 }
2917
2918                                 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2919                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2920                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2921                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2922
2923                                 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2924                         },
2925                         (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2926                                 if require_commitment {
2927                                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2928
2929                                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2930                                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2931                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2932                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2933
2934                                         log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
2935                                                 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2936                                         Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2937                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2938                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2939                                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2940                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2941                                                 update_fee: None,
2942                                                 commitment_signed
2943                                         }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2944                                 } else {
2945                                         log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2946                                         Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2947                                 }
2948                         }
2949                 }
2950         }
2951
2952         /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2953         /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2954         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2955         fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2956                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2957                         panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2958                 }
2959                 if !self.is_usable() {
2960                         panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2961                 }
2962                 if !self.is_live() {
2963                         panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2964                 }
2965
2966                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
2967                         self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2968                         return None;
2969                 }
2970
2971                 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2972                 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
2973
2974                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2975                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2976                         feerate_per_kw,
2977                 })
2978         }
2979
2980         pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2981                 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2982                         Some(update_fee) => {
2983                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2984                                 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2985                         },
2986                         None => Ok(None)
2987                 }
2988         }
2989
2990         /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
2991         /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
2992         /// resent.
2993         /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2994         /// completed.
2995         pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L)  where L::Target: Logger {
2996                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2997                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2998                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2999                         return;
3000                 }
3001                 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3002                 // will be retransmitted.
3003                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3004                 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3005                 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3006
3007                 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3008                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3009                         match htlc.state {
3010                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3011                                         // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3012                                         // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3013                                         // this HTLC accordingly
3014                                         inbound_drop_count += 1;
3015                                         false
3016                                 },
3017                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3018                                         // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3019                                         // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3020                                         // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3021                                         true
3022                                 },
3023                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3024                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3025                                         // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3026                                         // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3027                                         // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3028                                         // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3029                                         true
3030                                 },
3031                         }
3032                 });
3033                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3034
3035                 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3036                         if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3037                                 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3038                                 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3039                         }
3040                 }
3041
3042                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3043                         if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3044                                 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3045                                 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3046                                 // the update upon reconnection.
3047                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3048                         }
3049                 }
3050
3051                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3052                 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3053         }
3054
3055         /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
3056         /// updates are partially paused.
3057         /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
3058         /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
3059         /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
3060         /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
3061         pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
3062                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
3063                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
3064                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
3065                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
3066                 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3067                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
3068                 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3069                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
3070         }
3071
3072         /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3073         /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3074         /// to the remote side.
3075         pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<Transaction>, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
3076                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3077                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3078
3079                 let funding_broadcastable = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound() {
3080                         self.funding_transaction.take()
3081                 } else { None };
3082
3083                 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
3084                 // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
3085                 // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound
3086                 // channel which failed to persist the monitor on funding_created, and we got the funding
3087                 // transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted.
3088                 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
3089                         assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3090                         self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
3091                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3092                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3093                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3094                                 next_per_commitment_point,
3095                         })
3096                 } else { None };
3097
3098                 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
3099                 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3100                 let mut failures = Vec::new();
3101                 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3102
3103                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3104                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3105                         self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3106                         return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
3107                 }
3108
3109                 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3110                         Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3111                 } else { None };
3112                 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3113                         Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3114                 } else { None };
3115
3116                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3117                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3118                 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3119                 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3120                         log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3121                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3122                         match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3123                 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked)
3124         }
3125
3126         pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3127                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3128         {
3129                 if self.is_outbound() {
3130                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3131                 }
3132                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3133                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3134                 }
3135                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
3136                 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate();
3137
3138                 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3139                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3140                 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3141                 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3142                 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3143                 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3144                         let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3145                         let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3146                         let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3147                         let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3148                         if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3149                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3150                                         msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3151                         }
3152                         if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3153                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3154                                         msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3155                         }
3156                 }
3157                 Ok(())
3158         }
3159
3160         fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3161                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3162                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3163                 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3164                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3165                         per_commitment_secret,
3166                         next_per_commitment_point,
3167                 }
3168         }
3169
3170         fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3171                 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3172                 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3173                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3174                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3175
3176                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3177                         if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3178                                 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3179                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3180                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3181                                         amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3182                                         payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3183                                         cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3184                                         onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3185                                 });
3186                         }
3187                 }
3188
3189                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3190                         if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3191                                 match reason {
3192                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3193                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3194                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3195                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3196                                                         reason: err_packet.clone()
3197                                                 });
3198                                         },
3199                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3200                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3201                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3202                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3203                                                         sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3204                                                         failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3205                                                 });
3206                                         },
3207                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3208                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3209                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3210                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3211                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3212                                                 });
3213                                         },
3214                                 }
3215                         }
3216                 }
3217
3218                 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3219                         Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3220                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3221                                 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3222                         })
3223                 } else { None };
3224
3225                 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3226                                 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3227                                 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3228                 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3229                         update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3230                         commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3231                 }
3232         }
3233
3234         /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3235         /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3236         pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3237                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3238                         // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3239                         // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3240                         // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3241                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3242                 }
3243
3244                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3245                         msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3246                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3247                 }
3248
3249                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3250                         match msg.data_loss_protect {
3251                                 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3252                                         let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3253                                         let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3254                                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3255                                         if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3256                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3257                                         }
3258                                         if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3259                                                 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
3260                                                         "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
3261                                                 ));
3262                                         }
3263                                 },
3264                                 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3265                         }
3266                 }
3267
3268                 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3269                 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3270                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3271
3272                 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3273                         assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3274                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3275                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3276                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3277                         })
3278                 } else { None };
3279
3280                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3281                         // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
3282                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
3283                                         self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3284                                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3285                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
3286                                 }
3287                                 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3288                                 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3289                         }
3290
3291                         // We have OurFundingLocked set!
3292                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3293                         return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3294                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3295                                 next_per_commitment_point,
3296                         }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3297                 }
3298
3299                 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3300                         // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3301                         // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
3302                         None
3303                 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3304                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3305                                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3306                                 None
3307                         } else {
3308                                 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3309                         }
3310                 } else {
3311                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3312                 };
3313
3314                 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3315                 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3316                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3317                 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3318                 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
3319
3320                 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3321                         // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
3322                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3323                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3324                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3325                                 next_per_commitment_point,
3326                         })
3327                 } else { None };
3328
3329                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3330                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
3331                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3332                         } else {
3333                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3334                         }
3335
3336                         if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3337                                 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3338                                 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3339                                 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3340                                 // now!
3341                                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3342                                         Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3343                                         Err(ChannelError::Warn(_)) | Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) =>
3344                                                 panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3345                                         Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3346                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3347                                         },
3348                                         Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3349                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3350                                         },
3351                                 }
3352                         } else {
3353                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3354                         }
3355                 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3356                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
3357                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3358                         } else {
3359                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3360                         }
3361
3362                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3363                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3364                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3365                         }
3366
3367                         return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3368                 } else {
3369                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3370                 }
3371         }
3372
3373         /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
3374         /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
3375         /// at which point they will be recalculated.
3376         fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> (u64, u64)
3377                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3378         {
3379                 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
3380
3381                 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
3382                 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
3383                 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
3384                 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3385                 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3386                 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
3387
3388                 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
3389                 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
3390                 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
3391                 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
3392                 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
3393
3394                 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
3395                         let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
3396                         proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
3397                         proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
3398                 }
3399
3400                 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
3401                 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
3402                 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
3403                 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
3404                 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
3405                 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
3406                 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
3407                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3408                 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3409                 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
3410                                 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
3411                                 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
3412                                 // target feerate-calculated fee.
3413                                 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
3414                                         proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
3415                         } else {
3416                                 u64::max_value()
3417                         };
3418
3419                 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
3420                 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
3421         }
3422
3423         /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
3424         /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
3425         /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
3426         /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
3427         fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
3428                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
3429                         self.channel_state &
3430                                 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
3431                                  ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)
3432                                 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
3433                         self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
3434         }
3435
3436         /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
3437         /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
3438         /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
3439         pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3440                 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
3441                         if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
3442                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
3443                         } else {
3444                                 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
3445                         }
3446                 }
3447                 Ok(())
3448         }
3449
3450         pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
3451                 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3452                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3453         {
3454                 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
3455                         return Ok((None, None));
3456                 }
3457
3458                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3459                         if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
3460                                 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
3461                         }
3462                         return Ok((None, None));
3463                 }
3464
3465                 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
3466
3467                 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3468                 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
3469                 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
3470                         our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
3471
3472                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3473                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3474                         .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
3475
3476                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
3477                 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3478                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3479                         fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3480                         signature: sig,
3481                         fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
3482                                 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
3483                                 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
3484                         }),
3485                 }), None))
3486         }
3487
3488         pub fn shutdown<K: Deref>(
3489                 &mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
3490         ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3491         where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
3492         {
3493                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3494                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3495                 }
3496                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3497                         // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3498                         // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3499                         // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3500                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3501                 }
3502                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3503                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3504                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3505                         }
3506                 }
3507                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3508
3509                 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match ShutdownScript::try_from((msg.scriptpubkey.clone(), their_features)) {
3510                         Ok(script) => script.into_inner(),
3511                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex()))),
3512                 };
3513
3514                 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3515                         if Some(&shutdown_scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3516                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", shutdown_scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3517                         }
3518                 } else {
3519                         self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3520                 }
3521
3522                 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
3523                 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
3524                 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3525                 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3526
3527                 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
3528                         Some(_) => false,
3529                         None => {
3530                                 assert!(send_shutdown);
3531                                 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
3532                                 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
3533                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
3534                                 }
3535                                 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3536                                 true
3537                         },
3538                 };
3539
3540                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3541
3542                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3543                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3544
3545                 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
3546                         self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3547                         Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3548                                 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3549                                 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
3550                                         scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3551                                 }],
3552                         })
3553                 } else { None };
3554                 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
3555                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3556                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3557                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3558                         })
3559                 } else { None };
3560
3561                 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3562                 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3563                 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3564                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3565                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3566                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3567                         match htlc_update {
3568                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3569                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3570                                         false
3571                                 },
3572                                 _ => true
3573                         }
3574                 });
3575
3576                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3577                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3578
3579                 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3580         }
3581
3582         fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3583                 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3584                 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3585                 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3586
3587                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3588
3589                 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3590                 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3591                 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3592                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3593                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3594                 } else {
3595                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3596                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3597                 }
3598                 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3599                 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3600
3601                 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3602         }
3603
3604         pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3605                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3606         {
3607                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3608                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3609                 }
3610                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3611                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3612                 }
3613                 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3614                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3615                 }
3616                 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3617                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3618                 }
3619
3620                 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
3621                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
3622                 }
3623
3624                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 != 0 {
3625                         self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
3626                         return Ok((None, None));
3627                 }
3628
3629                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3630                 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3631                 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3632                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3633                 }
3634                 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3635
3636                 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3637                         Ok(_) => {},
3638                         Err(_e) => {
3639                                 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3640                                 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3641                                 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3642                                 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3643                                 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3644                         },
3645                 };
3646
3647                 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3648                 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3649                         if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3650                                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3651                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3652                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3653                                 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3654                         }
3655                 }
3656
3657                 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
3658
3659                 macro_rules! propose_fee {
3660                         ($new_fee: expr) => {
3661                                 let (mut tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3662                                         (closing_tx, $new_fee)
3663                                 } else {
3664                                         self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
3665                                 };
3666
3667                                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3668                                         .sign_closing_transaction(&tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3669                                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3670
3671                                 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3672                                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3673                                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
3674                                         self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3675                                         Some(tx)
3676                                 } else { None };
3677
3678                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
3679                                 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3680                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3681                                         fee_satoshis: used_fee,
3682                                         signature: sig,
3683                                         fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
3684                                                 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
3685                                                 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
3686                                         }),
3687                                 }), signed_tx))
3688                         }
3689                 }
3690
3691                 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
3692                         if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
3693                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
3694                         }
3695                         if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
3696                                 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
3697                         }
3698                         if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
3699                                 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
3700                         }
3701
3702                         if !self.is_outbound() {
3703                                 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
3704                                 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, u64::max_value()); // We should never set an upper bound
3705                                 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
3706                         } else {
3707                                 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
3708                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
3709                                                 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
3710                                 }
3711                                 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
3712                                 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
3713                         }
3714                 } else {
3715                         // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
3716                         // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
3717                         if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3718                                 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
3719                                         if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
3720                                                 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
3721                                         } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
3722                                                 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
3723                                         } else {
3724                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
3725                                         }
3726                                 } else {
3727                                         if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
3728                                                 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
3729                                         } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
3730                                                 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
3731                                         } else {
3732                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
3733                                         }
3734                                 }
3735                         } else {
3736                                 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
3737                                         propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
3738                                 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
3739                                         propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
3740                                 } else {
3741                                         propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
3742                                 }
3743                         }
3744                 }
3745         }
3746
3747         // Public utilities:
3748
3749         pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3750                 self.channel_id
3751         }
3752
3753         pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
3754                 self.minimum_depth
3755         }
3756
3757         /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3758         /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3759         pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3760                 self.user_id
3761         }
3762
3763         /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3764         /// is_usable() returns true).
3765         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3766         pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3767                 self.short_channel_id
3768         }
3769
3770         /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3771         /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3772         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3773                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3774         }
3775
3776         fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3777                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3778         }
3779
3780         fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3781                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3782         }
3783
3784         pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
3785                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
3786                         .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
3787         }
3788
3789         fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3790                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3791         }
3792
3793         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3794         pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3795                 self.counterparty_node_id
3796         }
3797
3798         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3799         #[cfg(test)]
3800         pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3801                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3802         }
3803
3804         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3805         pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3806                 return cmp::min(
3807                         // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3808                         // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3809                         // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3810                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
3811
3812                         Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3813                 );
3814         }
3815
3816         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3817         pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3818                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3819         }
3820
3821         pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3822                 self.channel_value_satoshis
3823         }
3824
3825         pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3826                 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3827         }
3828
3829         pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
3830                 cmp::max(self.config.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
3831         }
3832
3833         pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3834                 self.config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
3835         }
3836
3837         pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3838                 self.feerate_per_kw
3839         }
3840
3841         pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3842                 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
3843                 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
3844                 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
3845                 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
3846                 // which are near the dust limit.
3847                 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
3848                 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3849                         feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
3850                 }
3851                 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
3852         }
3853
3854         pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3855                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3856         }
3857
3858         pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3859                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3860         }
3861
3862         pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3863                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3864         }
3865
3866         #[cfg(test)]
3867         pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3868                 &self.holder_signer
3869         }
3870
3871         #[cfg(test)]
3872         pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3873                 ChannelValueStat {
3874                         value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3875                         channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3876                         channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
3877                         pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3878                         pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3879                         holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3880                                 let mut res = 0;
3881                                 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3882                                         match h {
3883                                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3884                                                         res += amount_msat;
3885                                                 }
3886                                                 _ => {}
3887                                         }
3888                                 }
3889                                 res
3890                         },
3891                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3892                         counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3893                 }
3894         }
3895
3896         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3897         pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3898                 self.update_time_counter
3899         }
3900
3901         pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3902                 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3903         }
3904
3905         pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3906                 self.config.announced_channel
3907         }
3908
3909         pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3910                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3911         }
3912
3913         /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3914         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3915         pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
3916                 self.config.forwarding_fee_base_msat
3917         }
3918
3919         /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3920         pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3921                 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3922         }
3923
3924         /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3925         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3926         pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3927                 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3928                 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3929         }
3930
3931         /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3932         /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3933         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3934         pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3935                 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
3936         }
3937
3938         /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3939         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3940         pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3941                 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3942         }
3943
3944         /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3945         pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3946                 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3947         }
3948
3949         /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
3950         pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3951                 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
3952         }
3953
3954         /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
3955         pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3956                 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
3957         }
3958
3959         /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3960         /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3961         /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3962         pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3963                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32  {
3964                         assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3965                         true
3966                 } else { false }
3967         }
3968
3969         pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
3970                 self.channel_update_status
3971         }
3972
3973         pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
3974                 self.channel_update_status = status;
3975         }
3976
3977         fn check_get_funding_locked(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
3978                 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3979                         return None;
3980                 }
3981
3982                 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3983                 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
3984                         self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
3985                 }
3986
3987                 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
3988                         return None;
3989                 }
3990
3991                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3992                 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3993                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3994                         true
3995                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3996                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3997                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
3998                         true
3999                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
4000                         // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4001                         false
4002                 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
4003                         panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
4004                 } else {
4005                         // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4006                         false
4007                 };
4008
4009                 if need_commitment_update {
4010                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
4011                                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4012                                 return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
4013                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4014                                         next_per_commitment_point,
4015                                 });
4016                         } else {
4017                                 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
4018                         }
4019                 }
4020                 None
4021         }
4022
4023         /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4024         /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4025         /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4026         pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData, logger: &L)
4027                         -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
4028                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4029                 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4030                         if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4031                                 // If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring
4032                                 // whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one.
4033                                 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4034                                         if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4035                                                 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4036                                                 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4037                                                                 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
4038                                                         if self.is_outbound() {
4039                                                                 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4040                                                                 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4041                                                                 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4042                                                                 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4043                                                                 // channel and move on.
4044                                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4045                                                                 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4046                                                         }
4047                                                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
4048                                                         return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
4049                                                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4050                                                                 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index".to_owned()
4051                                                         });
4052                                                 } else {
4053                                                         if self.is_outbound() {
4054                                                                 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4055                                                                         if input.witness.is_empty() {
4056                                                                                 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4057                                                                                 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4058                                                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4059                                                                                 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4060                                                                         }
4061                                                                 }
4062                                                         }
4063                                                         self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4064                                                         self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4065                                                         self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4066                                                                 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4067                                                                 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4068                                                         }
4069                                                 }
4070                                         }
4071                                         // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for funding_locked here and
4072                                         // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4073                                         // may have already happened for this block).
4074                                         if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
4075                                                 log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4076                                                 return Ok(Some(funding_locked));
4077                                         }
4078                                 }
4079                                 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4080                                         if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4081                                                 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4082                                                 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
4083                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4084                                                         data: "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.".to_owned()
4085                                                 });
4086                                         }
4087                                 }
4088                         }
4089                 }
4090                 Ok(None)
4091         }
4092
4093         /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4094         /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4095         /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4096         /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4097         ///
4098         /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4099         /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4100         /// post-shutdown.
4101         ///
4102         /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4103         /// back.
4104         pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, logger: &L)
4105                         -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
4106                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4107                 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
4108                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4109                         match htlc_update {
4110                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4111                                         if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4112                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4113                                                 false
4114                                         } else { true }
4115                                 },
4116                                 _ => true
4117                         }
4118                 });
4119
4120                 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4121
4122                 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
4123                         log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4124                         return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs));
4125                 }
4126
4127                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4128                 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
4129                    (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 {
4130                         let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4131                         if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4132                                 // Note that check_get_funding_locked may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4133                                 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4134                                 // indicate we've already sent a funding_locked
4135                                 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4136                         }
4137
4138                         // If we've sent funding_locked (or have both sent and received funding_locked), and
4139                         // the funding transaction's confirmation count has dipped below minimum_depth / 2,
4140                         // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4141                         // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4142                         if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap() as i64 / 2 {
4143                                 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
4144                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4145                                         data: format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.", self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations),
4146                                 });
4147                         }
4148                 }
4149
4150                 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
4151         }
4152
4153         /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4154         /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4155         /// before the channel has reached funding_locked and we can just wait for more blocks.
4156         pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
4157                 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4158                         // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4159                         // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4160                         let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4161                         // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4162                         // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4163                         // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4164                         let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
4165                         match self.best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, logger) {
4166                                 Ok((funding_locked, timed_out_htlcs)) => {
4167                                         assert!(funding_locked.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4168                                         assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4169                                         Ok(())
4170                                 },
4171                                 Err(e) => Err(e)
4172                         }
4173                 } else {
4174                         // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4175                         Ok(())
4176                 }
4177         }
4178
4179         // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4180         // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4181
4182         pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
4183                 if !self.is_outbound() {
4184                         panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
4185                 }
4186                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
4187                         panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
4188                 }
4189
4190                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4191                         panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
4192                 }
4193
4194                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4195                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
4196
4197                 msgs::OpenChannel {
4198                         chain_hash,
4199                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
4200                         funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
4201                         push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
4202                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4203                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4204                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4205                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4206                         feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
4207                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
4208                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
4209                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
4210                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
4211                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
4212                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
4213                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
4214                         first_per_commitment_point,
4215                         channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
4216                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4217                                 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
4218                                 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
4219                         }),
4220                 }
4221         }
4222
4223         pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
4224                 if self.is_outbound() {
4225                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
4226                 }
4227                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
4228                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
4229                 }
4230                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4231                         panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
4232                 }
4233
4234                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4235                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
4236
4237                 msgs::AcceptChannel {
4238                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
4239                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4240                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4241                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4242                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4243                         minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
4244                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
4245                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
4246                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
4247                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
4248                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
4249                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
4250                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
4251                         first_per_commitment_point,
4252                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4253                                 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
4254                                 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
4255                         }),
4256                 }
4257         }
4258
4259         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
4260         fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4261                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4262                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).0;
4263                 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4264                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
4265         }
4266
4267         /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
4268         /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
4269         /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
4270         /// or if called on an inbound channel.
4271         /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
4272         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
4273         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
4274         pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4275                 if !self.is_outbound() {
4276                         panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
4277                 }
4278                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
4279                         panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
4280                 }
4281                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
4282                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4283                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4284                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
4285                 }
4286
4287                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
4288                 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
4289
4290                 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
4291                         Ok(res) => res,
4292                         Err(e) => {
4293                                 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
4294                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
4295                                 return Err(e);
4296                         }
4297                 };
4298
4299                 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
4300
4301                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
4302
4303                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
4304                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
4305                 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
4306
4307                 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
4308                         temporary_channel_id,
4309                         funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
4310                         funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
4311                         signature
4312                 })
4313         }
4314
4315         /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
4316         /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
4317         /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
4318         /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4319         /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4320         /// closing).
4321         /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
4322         /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
4323         ///
4324         /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4325         pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
4326                 if !self.config.announced_channel {
4327                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4328                 }
4329                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
4330                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
4331                 }
4332                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
4333                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
4334                 }
4335
4336                 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
4337
4338                 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4339                         features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
4340                         chain_hash,
4341                         short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4342                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
4343                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
4344                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
4345                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
4346                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
4347                 };
4348
4349                 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
4350                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4351
4352                 Ok((msg, sig))
4353         }
4354
4355         /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4356         /// available.
4357         fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, msghash: secp256k1::Message, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, our_bitcoin_sig: Signature) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
4358                 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
4359                         let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
4360
4361                         let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, our_node_secret);
4362                         Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4363                                 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4364                                 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4365                                 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4366                                 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4367                                 contents: announcement,
4368                         })
4369                 } else {
4370                         Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4371                 }
4372         }
4373
4374         /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4375         /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4376         /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4377         pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
4378                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
4379
4380                 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4381
4382                 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4383                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4384                                 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4385                                  &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4386                 }
4387                 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4388                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4389                                 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4390                                 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4391                 }
4392
4393                 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4394
4395                 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig)
4396         }
4397
4398         /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4399         /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4400         pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
4401                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
4402                         Ok(res) => res,
4403                         Err(_) => return None,
4404                 };
4405                 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4406                 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) {
4407                         Ok(res) => Some(res),
4408                         Err(_) => None,
4409                 }
4410         }
4411
4412         /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4413         /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4414         pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4415                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4416                 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
4417                 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
4418                 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
4419                 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
4420                 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
4421                 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
4422                 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
4423                 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
4424                 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
4425                 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4426                         let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
4427                         log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4428                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4429                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
4430                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
4431                         })
4432                 } else {
4433                         log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4434                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4435                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
4436                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
4437                         })
4438                 };
4439                 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
4440                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4441                         // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
4442                         // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
4443                         // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
4444                         // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
4445                         // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
4446                         // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
4447
4448                         // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
4449                         // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
4450                         next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4451                         // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
4452                         // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
4453                         // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
4454                         // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
4455                         // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
4456                         // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
4457                         // overflow here.
4458                         next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
4459                         data_loss_protect,
4460                 }
4461         }
4462
4463
4464         // Send stuff to our remote peers:
4465
4466         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
4467         /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
4468         ///
4469         /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
4470         /// the wire:
4471         /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
4472         ///   wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
4473         ///   awaiting ACK.
4474         /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateFailed, we cannot commit to a new state as we
4475         ///   may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to regenerate
4476         ///   them.
4477         ///
4478         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
4479         ///
4480         /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
4481         pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
4482                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4483                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
4484                 }
4485                 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
4486                 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
4487                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
4488                 }
4489
4490                 if amount_msat == 0 {
4491                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4492                 }
4493
4494                 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
4495                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
4496                 }
4497
4498                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
4499                         // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
4500                         // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
4501                         // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
4502                         // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
4503                         // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
4504                         // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
4505                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
4506                 }
4507
4508                 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
4509                 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
4510                 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
4511                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4512                 }
4513                 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4514                 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4515                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4516                 }
4517
4518                 if !self.is_outbound() {
4519                         // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4520                         let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
4521                         let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
4522                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4523                         let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4524                         if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4525                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4526                         }
4527                 }
4528
4529                 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
4530                 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
4531                         let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
4532                         if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4533                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
4534                                         on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
4535                         }
4536                 }
4537
4538                 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4539                 if amount_msat / 1000 <  exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
4540                         let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
4541                         if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4542                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
4543                                         on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
4544                         }
4545                 }
4546
4547                 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
4548                 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
4549                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
4550                 }
4551
4552                 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
4553                 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
4554                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4555                         FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
4556                 } else { 0 };
4557                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
4558                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
4559                 }
4560
4561                 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
4562                 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
4563                 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
4564                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
4565                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
4566                 }
4567
4568                 // Now update local state:
4569                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
4570                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4571                                 amount_msat,
4572                                 payment_hash,
4573                                 cltv_expiry,
4574                                 source,
4575                                 onion_routing_packet,
4576                         });
4577                         return Ok(None);
4578                 }
4579
4580                 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4581                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4582                         amount_msat,
4583                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4584                         cltv_expiry,
4585                         state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
4586                         source,
4587                 });
4588
4589                 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4590                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4591                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4592                         amount_msat,
4593                         payment_hash,
4594                         cltv_expiry,
4595                         onion_routing_packet,
4596                 };
4597                 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
4598
4599                 Ok(Some(res))
4600         }
4601
4602         /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
4603         /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
4604         /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
4605         /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
4606         pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4607                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4608                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
4609                 }
4610                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
4611                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
4612                 }
4613                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
4614                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4615                 }
4616                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
4617                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4618                 }
4619                 let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
4620                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4621                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4622                                 have_updates = true;
4623                         }
4624                         if have_updates { break; }
4625                 }
4626                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4627                         if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4628                                 have_updates = true;
4629                         }
4630                         if have_updates { break; }
4631                 }
4632                 if !have_updates {
4633                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
4634                 }
4635                 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
4636         }
4637         /// Only fails in case of bad keys
4638         fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4639                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
4640                 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4641                 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4642                 // is acceptable.
4643                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4644                         let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4645                                 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4646                         } else { None };
4647                         if let Some(state) = new_state {
4648                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4649                                 htlc.state = state;
4650                         }
4651                 }
4652                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4653                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4654                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
4655                         } else { None } {
4656                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4657                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4658                         }
4659                 }
4660                 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4661                         if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
4662                                 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
4663                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4664                                 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4665                                 self.pending_update_fee = None;
4666                         }
4667                 }
4668                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4669
4670                 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4671                         Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4672                                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4673                                 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4674                                         htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4675                                 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4676                         },
4677                         Err(e) => return Err(e),
4678                 };
4679
4680                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4681                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4682                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4683                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4684                                 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4685                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4686                                 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4687                                 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4688                         }]
4689                 };
4690                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4691                 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4692         }
4693
4694         /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4695         /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4696         fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4697                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4698                 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
4699                 let feerate_per_kw = counterparty_commitment_tx.1;
4700                 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4701                 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4702
4703                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4704                 {
4705                         if !self.is_outbound() {
4706                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4707                                 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4708                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4709                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4710                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4711                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4712                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4713                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4714                                                         let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.2);
4715                                                         assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4716                                                 }
4717                                 }
4718                         }
4719                 }
4720
4721                 {
4722                         let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.3.len());
4723                         for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.3.iter() {
4724                                 htlcs.push(htlc);
4725                         }
4726
4727                         let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4728                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4729                         signature = res.0;
4730                         htlc_signatures = res.1;
4731
4732                         log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
4733                                 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4734                                 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4735                                 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4736
4737                         for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4738                                 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
4739                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4740                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4741                                         log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4742                                         log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4743                         }
4744                 }
4745
4746                 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4747                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4748                         signature,
4749                         htlc_signatures,
4750                 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.3)))
4751         }
4752
4753         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4754         /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4755         /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4756         /// more info.
4757         pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4758                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4759                         Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4760                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4761                                 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4762                         },
4763                         None => Ok(None)
4764                 }
4765         }
4766
4767         /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
4768         pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
4769                 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
4770         }
4771
4772         pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4773                 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4774                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
4775                 }
4776                 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4777                         fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
4778                         fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
4779                         cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
4780                 });
4781
4782                 Ok(())
4783         }
4784
4785         /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4786         /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4787         pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
4788         -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
4789         where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4790                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4791                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4792                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4793                         }
4794                 }
4795                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4796                         if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4797                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4798                         }
4799                         else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4800                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4801                         }
4802                 }
4803                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4804                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4805                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4806                 }
4807
4808                 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4809                         Some(_) => false,
4810                         None => {
4811                                 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4812                                 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4813                                         return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
4814                                 }
4815                                 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4816                                 true
4817                         },
4818                 };
4819
4820                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4821                 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
4822                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4823                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4824                 } else {
4825                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4826                 }
4827                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4828
4829                 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4830                         self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4831                         Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4832                                 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4833                                 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4834                                         scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4835                                 }],
4836                         })
4837                 } else { None };
4838                 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
4839                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4840                         scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4841                 };
4842
4843                 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4844                 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4845                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4846                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4847                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4848                         match htlc_update {
4849                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4850                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4851                                         false
4852                                 },
4853                                 _ => true
4854                         }
4855                 });
4856
4857                 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4858         }
4859
4860         /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4861         /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4862         /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4863         /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4864         /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4865         pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4866                 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
4867                 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
4868                 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
4869                 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4870                 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4871
4872                 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4873                 // return them to fail the payment.
4874                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4875                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4876                         match htlc_update {
4877                                 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4878                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4879                                 },
4880                                 _ => {}
4881                         }
4882                 }
4883                 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4884                         // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4885                         // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4886                         // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4887                         // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4888                         // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4889                         // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4890                         // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4891                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4892                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4893                                 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4894                                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4895                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4896                                 }))
4897                         } else { None }
4898                 } else { None };
4899
4900                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4901                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4902                 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4903         }
4904 }
4905
4906 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
4907 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4908
4909 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
4910         (0, FailRelay),
4911         (1, FailMalformed),
4912         (2, Fulfill),
4913 );
4914
4915 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4916         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4917                 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
4918                 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
4919                 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
4920                 match self {
4921                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4922                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4923                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4924                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4925                 }
4926                 Ok(())
4927         }
4928 }
4929
4930 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4931         fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4932                 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4933                         0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
4934                         1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
4935                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4936                 })
4937         }
4938 }
4939
4940 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4941         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4942                 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4943                 // called.
4944
4945                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4946
4947                 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4948
4949                 // Write out the old serialization for the config object. This is read by version-1
4950                 // deserializers, but we will read the version in the TLV at the end instead.
4951                 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4952                 self.config.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4953                 self.config.announced_channel.write(writer)?;
4954                 self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4955
4956                 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4957                 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4958                 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4959
4960                 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4961
4962                 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4963                 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
4964                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
4965                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
4966                 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4967                 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
4968
4969                 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
4970                 // deserialized from that format.
4971                 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
4972                         Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
4973                         None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
4974                 }
4975                 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4976
4977                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4978                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4979                 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4980
4981                 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4982                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4983                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4984                                 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4985                         }
4986                 }
4987                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4988                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4989                         if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4990                                 continue; // Drop
4991                         }
4992                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4993                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4994                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4995                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4996                         match &htlc.state {
4997                                 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4998                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4999                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
5000                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
5001                                 },
5002                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
5003                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
5004                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
5005                                 },
5006                                 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
5007                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
5008                                 },
5009                                 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
5010                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
5011                                         removal_reason.write(writer)?;
5012                                 },
5013                         }
5014                 }
5015
5016                 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5017                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5018                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5019                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
5020                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
5021                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5022                         htlc.source.write(writer)?;
5023                         match &htlc.state {
5024                                 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
5025                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
5026                                         onion_packet.write(writer)?;
5027                                 },
5028                                 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
5029                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
5030                                 },
5031                                 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
5032                                         // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
5033                                         // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
5034                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
5035                                 },
5036                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
5037                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
5038                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
5039                                 },
5040                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
5041                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
5042                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
5043                                 },
5044                         }
5045                 }
5046
5047                 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5048                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5049                         match update {
5050                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
5051                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
5052                                         amount_msat.write(writer)?;
5053                                         cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
5054                                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5055                                         source.write(writer)?;
5056                                         onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
5057                                 },
5058                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
5059                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
5060                                         payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
5061                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5062                                 },
5063                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
5064                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
5065                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5066                                         err_packet.write(writer)?;
5067                                 }
5068                         }
5069                 }
5070
5071                 match self.resend_order {
5072                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5073                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5074                 }
5075
5076                 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
5077                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
5078                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
5079
5080                 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5081                 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
5082                         pending_forward.write(writer)?;
5083                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5084                 }
5085
5086                 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5087                 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
5088                         htlc_source.write(writer)?;
5089                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5090                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
5091                 }
5092
5093                 if self.is_outbound() {
5094                         self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
5095                 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5096                         // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed, drop it.
5097                         Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
5098                 } else {
5099                         None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
5100                 }
5101                 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
5102
5103                 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5104                 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
5105                 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
5106                 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
5107
5108                 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
5109                 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
5110                 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
5111                 // consider the stale state on reload.
5112                 0u8.write(writer)?;
5113
5114                 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
5115                 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
5116                 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5117
5118                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
5119                 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
5120                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
5121
5122                 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
5123                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
5124
5125                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
5126                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
5127                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
5128
5129                 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
5130                 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
5131
5132                 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
5133                         Some(info) => {
5134                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
5135                                 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
5136                                 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
5137                                 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
5138                         },
5139                         None => 0u8.write(writer)?
5140                 }
5141
5142                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
5143                 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
5144
5145                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
5146                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
5147                 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
5148
5149                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
5150
5151                 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
5152
5153                 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
5154
5155                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5156                 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5157                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5158                 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
5159                         htlc.write(writer)?;
5160                 }
5161
5162                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5163                         (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
5164                         // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
5165                         // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
5166                         // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
5167                         // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
5168                         // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
5169                         // override that.
5170                         (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
5171                         (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
5172                         (5, self.config, required),
5173                         (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
5174                         (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
5175                 });
5176
5177                 Ok(())
5178         }
5179 }
5180
5181 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
5182 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
5183                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
5184         fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5185                 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5186
5187                 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5188
5189                 let mut config = Some(ChannelConfig::default());
5190                 if ver == 1 {
5191                         // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
5192                         config.as_mut().unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
5193                         config.as_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
5194                         config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
5195                         config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5196                 } else {
5197                         // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
5198                         let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5199                 }
5200
5201                 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5202                 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
5203                 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5204
5205                 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5206
5207                 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5208                 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
5209                 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
5210                         // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
5211                         let mut data = [0; 1024];
5212                         let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
5213                         reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
5214                         keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
5215                 }
5216                 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
5217
5218                 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
5219                 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
5220                         Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
5221                         Err(_) => None,
5222                 };
5223                 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
5224
5225                 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
5226                 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
5227                 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5228
5229                 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5230                 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5231                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
5232                         pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
5233                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5234                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5235                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5236                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5237                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5238                                         1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
5239                                         2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
5240                                         3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5241                                         4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
5242                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5243                                 },
5244                         });
5245                 }
5246
5247                 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5248                 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5249                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
5250                         pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5251                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5252                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5253                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5254                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5255                                 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
5256                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5257                                         0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5258                                         1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5259                                         2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
5260                                         3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
5261                                         4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
5262                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5263                                 },
5264                         });
5265                 }
5266
5267                 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5268                 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
5269                 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
5270                         holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5271                                 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5272                                         amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5273                                         cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5274                                         payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5275                                         source: Readable::read(reader)?,
5276                                         onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
5277                                 },
5278                                 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
5279                                         payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
5280                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5281                                 },
5282                                 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
5283                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5284                                         err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
5285                                 },
5286                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5287                         });
5288                 }
5289
5290                 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5291                         0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5292                         1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5293                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5294                 };
5295
5296                 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
5297                 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
5298                 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
5299
5300                 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5301                 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5302                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
5303                         monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
5304                 }
5305
5306                 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5307                 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5308                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
5309                         monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
5310                 }
5311
5312                 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
5313
5314                 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
5315
5316                 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5317                 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5318                 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
5319                 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
5320
5321                 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
5322                 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
5323                 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
5324                 // consider the stale state on reload.
5325                 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5326                         0 => {},
5327                         1 => {
5328                                 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5329                                 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5330                                 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
5331                         },
5332                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5333                 }
5334
5335                 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
5336                 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
5337                 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5338
5339                 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5340                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5341                 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5342                 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
5343                 if ver == 1 {
5344                         // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
5345                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
5346                 } else {
5347                         // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
5348                         let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5349                 }
5350                 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5351                 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5352                 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
5353
5354                 let mut minimum_depth = None;
5355                 if ver == 1 {
5356                         // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
5357                         minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
5358                 } else {
5359                         // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
5360                         let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5361                 }
5362
5363                 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5364                         0 => None,
5365                         1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5366                                 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5367                                 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
5368                                 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
5369                         }),
5370                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5371                 };
5372
5373                 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
5374                 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
5375
5376                 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
5377
5378                 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
5379                 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5380
5381                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5382                 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
5383
5384                 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
5385
5386                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5387                 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
5388                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5389                 {
5390                         let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5391                         for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
5392                                 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
5393                         }
5394                 }
5395
5396                 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
5397                         Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
5398                                 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
5399                         } else {
5400                                 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
5401                         }))
5402                 } else {
5403                         None
5404                 };
5405
5406                 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
5407                 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
5408                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5409                         (0, announcement_sigs, option),
5410                         (1, minimum_depth, option),
5411                         (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
5412                         (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
5413                         (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
5414                         (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
5415                 });
5416
5417                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5418                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5419
5420                 Ok(Channel {
5421                         user_id,
5422
5423                         config: config.unwrap(),
5424                         channel_id,
5425                         channel_state,
5426                         secp_ctx,
5427                         channel_value_satoshis,
5428
5429                         latest_monitor_update_id,
5430
5431                         holder_signer,
5432                         shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5433                         destination_script,
5434
5435                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5436                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5437                         value_to_self_msat,
5438
5439                         pending_inbound_htlcs,
5440                         pending_outbound_htlcs,
5441                         holding_cell_htlc_updates,
5442
5443                         resend_order,
5444
5445                         monitor_pending_funding_locked,
5446                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
5447                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
5448                         monitor_pending_forwards,
5449                         monitor_pending_failures,
5450
5451                         pending_update_fee,
5452                         holding_cell_update_fee,
5453                         next_holder_htlc_id,
5454                         next_counterparty_htlc_id,
5455                         update_time_counter,
5456                         feerate_per_kw,
5457
5458                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5459                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
5460                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5461                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
5462
5463                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5464                         pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5465                         closing_fee_limits: None,
5466                         target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
5467
5468                         funding_tx_confirmed_in,
5469                         funding_tx_confirmation_height,
5470                         short_channel_id,
5471
5472                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
5473                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5474                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5475                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5476                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
5477                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5478                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
5479                         minimum_depth,
5480
5481                         counterparty_forwarding_info,
5482
5483                         channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
5484                         funding_transaction,
5485
5486                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
5487                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
5488                         counterparty_node_id,
5489
5490                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5491
5492                         commitment_secrets,
5493
5494                         channel_update_status,
5495                         closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5496
5497                         announcement_sigs,
5498
5499                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5500                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5501                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5502                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5503
5504                         workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5505
5506                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5507                         historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
5508                 })
5509         }
5510 }
5511
5512 #[cfg(test)]
5513 mod tests {
5514         use bitcoin::util::bip143;
5515         use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
5516         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
5517         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
5518         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
5519         use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
5520         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5521         use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
5522         use hex;
5523         use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
5524         use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
5525         use ln::channel::{Channel,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
5526         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
5527         use ln::features::InitFeatures;
5528         use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
5529         use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
5530         use ln::chan_utils;
5531         use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
5532         use chain::BestBlock;
5533         use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
5534         use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
5535         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
5536         use util::config::UserConfig;
5537         use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
5538         use util::errors::APIError;
5539         use util::test_utils;
5540         use util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
5541         use util::logger::Logger;
5542         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
5543         use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
5544         use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
5545         use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
5546         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5547         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5548         use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
5549         use core::num::NonZeroU8;
5550         use sync::Arc;
5551         use prelude::*;
5552
5553         struct TestFeeEstimator {
5554                 fee_est: u32
5555         }
5556         impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
5557                 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
5558                         self.fee_est
5559                 }
5560         }
5561
5562         #[test]
5563         fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
5564                 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
5565                         "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
5566         }
5567
5568         struct Keys {
5569                 signer: InMemorySigner,
5570         }
5571         impl KeysInterface for Keys {
5572                 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
5573
5574                 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
5575                 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
5576                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5577                         let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5578                         let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
5579                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
5580                 }
5581
5582                 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
5583                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5584                         let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5585                         ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
5586                 }
5587
5588                 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
5589                         self.signer.clone()
5590                 }
5591                 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
5592                 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
5593                 fn sign_invoice(&self, _invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
5594         }
5595
5596         fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
5597                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
5598         }
5599
5600         #[test]
5601         fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
5602                 let features = InitFeatures::known().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
5603                 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
5604                         ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(NonZeroU8::new(16).unwrap(), &[0, 40]).unwrap();
5605
5606                 let seed = [42; 32];
5607                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5608                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5609                 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
5610                         returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
5611                 });
5612
5613                 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 };
5614                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5615                 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5616                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5617                 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config) {
5618                         Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
5619                                 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
5620                         },
5621                         Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
5622                         Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
5623                 }
5624         }
5625
5626         // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
5627         // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
5628         #[test]
5629         fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
5630                 let original_fee = 253;
5631                 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
5632                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5633                 let seed = [42; 32];
5634                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5635                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5636
5637                 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5638                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5639                 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5640
5641                 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
5642                 // same as the old fee.
5643                 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
5644                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5645                 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
5646         }
5647
5648         #[test]
5649         fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
5650                 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
5651                 // dust limits are used.
5652                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5653                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5654                 let seed = [42; 32];
5655                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5656                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5657
5658                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
5659                 // they have different dust limits.
5660
5661                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5662                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5663                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5664                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5665
5666                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5667                 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
5668                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5669                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5670                 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5671
5672                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
5673                 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5674                 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5675                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5676                 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
5677
5678                 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
5679                 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
5680                 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
5681                         htlc_id: 0,
5682                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
5683                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
5684                         cltv_expiry: 300000000,
5685                         state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5686                 });
5687
5688                 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5689                         htlc_id: 1,
5690                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
5691                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
5692                         cltv_expiry: 200000000,
5693                         state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5694                         source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5695                                 path: Vec::new(),
5696                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5697                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
5698                         }
5699                 });
5700
5701                 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
5702                 // the dust limit check.
5703                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5704                 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5705                 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5706                 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
5707
5708                 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
5709                 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
5710                 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5711                 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
5712                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5713                 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5714                 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
5715         }
5716
5717         #[test]
5718         fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
5719                 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
5720                 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
5721                 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
5722                 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
5723                 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
5724                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5725                 let seed = [42; 32];
5726                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5727                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5728
5729                 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5730                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5731                 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5732
5733                 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5734                 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
5735
5736                 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
5737                 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5738                 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5739                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5740                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5741                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5742
5743                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5744                 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5745                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5746                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5747                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5748
5749                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5750
5751                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5752                 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5753                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5754                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5755                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5756
5757                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5758                 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5759                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5760                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5761                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5762         }
5763
5764         #[test]
5765         fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
5766                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5767                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5768                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5769                 let seed = [42; 32];
5770                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5771                 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
5772                 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
5773                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5774
5775                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
5776
5777                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5778                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5779                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5780                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5781
5782                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5783                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
5784                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5785                 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5786
5787                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
5788                 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5789                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5790
5791                 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
5792                 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5793                 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5794                         value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
5795                 }]};
5796                 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
5797                 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
5798                 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
5799
5800                 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
5801                 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
5802
5803                 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
5804                 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
5805                 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5806                 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5807                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5808                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5809                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5810                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5811                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5812                         },
5813                         _ => panic!()
5814                 }
5815
5816                 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
5817                 // is sane.
5818                 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5819                 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5820                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5821                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5822                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5823                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5824                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5825                         },
5826                         _ => panic!()
5827                 }
5828         }
5829
5830         #[test]
5831         fn channel_update() {
5832                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5833                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5834                 let seed = [42; 32];
5835                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5836                 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5837                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5838
5839                 // Create a channel.
5840                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5841                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5842                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5843                 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
5844                 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
5845                 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
5846
5847                 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
5848                 let update = ChannelUpdate {
5849                         contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
5850                                 chain_hash,
5851                                 short_channel_id: 0,
5852                                 timestamp: 0,
5853                                 flags: 0,
5854                                 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
5855                                 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
5856                                 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
5857                                 fee_base_msat: 110,
5858                                 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
5859                                 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5860                         },
5861                         signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
5862                 };
5863                 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
5864
5865                 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
5866                 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
5867                 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
5868                 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
5869                         Some(info) => {
5870                                 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
5871                                 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
5872                                 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
5873                         },
5874                         None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
5875                 }
5876         }
5877
5878         #[test]
5879         fn outbound_commitment_test() {
5880                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
5881                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5882                 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
5883                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5884
5885                 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
5886                         &secp_ctx,
5887                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5888                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5889                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5890                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5891                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5892
5893                         // These aren't set in the test vectors:
5894                         [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
5895                         10_000_000,
5896                         [0; 32]
5897                 );
5898
5899                 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5900                                 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
5901                 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
5902
5903                 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5904                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
5905                 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
5906                 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
5907                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5908                 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
5909
5910                 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
5911
5912                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5913                         funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5914                         revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5915                         payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
5916                         delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5917                         htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
5918                 };
5919                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5920                         CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5921                                 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5922                                 selected_contest_delay: 144
5923                         });
5924                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5925                 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5926
5927                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5928                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5929
5930                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5931                            hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5932
5933                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5934                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5935
5936                 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5937                 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5938                 // build_commitment_transaction.
5939                 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5940                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5941                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5942                 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5943                 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5944
5945                 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5946                         ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5947                                 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5948                         } ) => { {
5949                                 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
5950                                         let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
5951
5952                                         let htlcs = res.3.drain(..)
5953                                                 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
5954                                                 .collect();
5955                                         (res.0, htlcs)
5956                                 };
5957                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
5958                                 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
5959                                 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5960                                 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5961                                 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
5962                                 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
5963
5964                                 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
5965                                 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5966                                 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
5967                                 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5968                                 $({
5969                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5970                                         per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
5971                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
5972                                 })*
5973                                 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
5974
5975                                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
5976                                         commitment_tx.clone(),
5977                                         counterparty_signature,
5978                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs,
5979                                         &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
5980                                         chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
5981                                 );
5982                                 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
5983                                 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
5984
5985                                 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5986                                 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
5987                                 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
5988
5989                                 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
5990                                 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
5991
5992                                 $({
5993                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5994
5995                                         let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
5996                                         let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
5997                                                 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
5998                                                 &htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
5999                                         let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
6000                                         let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
6001                                         secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
6002
6003                                         let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6004                                         if !htlc.offered {
6005                                                 for i in 0..5 {
6006                                                         let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
6007                                                         if out == htlc.payment_hash {
6008                                                                 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
6009                                                         }
6010                                                 }
6011
6012                                                 assert!(preimage.is_some());
6013                                         }
6014
6015                                         let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
6016                                         assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
6017
6018                                         let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6019                                         assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
6020                                         let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
6021                                         let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
6022                                         let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
6023                                         assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
6024                                                         hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
6025                                 })*
6026                                 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
6027                         } }
6028                 }
6029
6030                 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
6031                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
6032
6033                 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
6034                                                  "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
6035                                                  "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", {});
6036
6037                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6038                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6039                                 htlc_id: 0,
6040                                 amount_msat: 1000000,
6041                                 cltv_expiry: 500,
6042                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6043                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6044                         };
6045                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
6046                         out
6047                 });
6048                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6049                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6050                                 htlc_id: 1,
6051                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
6052                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
6053                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6054                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6055                         };
6056                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
6057                         out
6058                 });
6059                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6060                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6061                                 htlc_id: 2,
6062                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
6063                                 cltv_expiry: 502,
6064                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6065                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6066                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6067                         };
6068                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
6069                         out
6070                 });
6071                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6072                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6073                                 htlc_id: 3,
6074                                 amount_msat: 3000000,
6075                                 cltv_expiry: 503,
6076                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6077                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6078                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6079                         };
6080                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
6081                         out
6082                 });
6083                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6084                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6085                                 htlc_id: 4,
6086                                 amount_msat: 4000000,
6087                                 cltv_expiry: 504,
6088                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6089                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6090                         };
6091                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
6092                         out
6093                 });
6094
6095                 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6096                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6097                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
6098
6099                 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
6100                                  "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
6101                                  "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", {
6102
6103                                   { 0,
6104                                   "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
6105                                   "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
6106                                   "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" },
6107
6108                                   { 1,
6109                                   "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
6110                                   "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
6111                                   "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" },
6112
6113                                   { 2,
6114                                   "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
6115                                   "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
6116                                   "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" },
6117
6118                                   { 3,
6119                                   "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
6120                                   "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
6121                                   "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" },
6122
6123                                   { 4,
6124                                   "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
6125                                   "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
6126                                   "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" }
6127                 } );
6128
6129                 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6130                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6131                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
6132
6133                 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
6134                                  "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
6135                                  "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", {
6136
6137                                   { 0,
6138                                   "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
6139                                   "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
6140                                   "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" },
6141
6142                                   { 1,
6143                                   "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
6144                                   "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
6145                                   "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" },
6146
6147                                   { 2,
6148                                   "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
6149                                   "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
6150                                   "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" },
6151
6152                                   { 3,
6153                                   "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
6154                                   "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
6155                                   "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" },
6156
6157                                   { 4,
6158                                   "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
6159                                   "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
6160                                   "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" }
6161                 } );
6162
6163                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6164                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6165                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
6166
6167                 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
6168                                  "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
6169                                  "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", {
6170
6171                                   { 0,
6172                                   "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
6173                                   "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
6174                                   "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" },
6175
6176                                   { 1,
6177                                   "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
6178                                   "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
6179                                   "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" },
6180
6181                                   { 2,
6182                                   "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
6183                                   "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
6184                                   "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" },
6185
6186                                   { 3,
6187                                   "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
6188                                   "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
6189                                   "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" }
6190                 } );
6191
6192                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6193                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6194                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
6195
6196                 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
6197                                  "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
6198                                  "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", {
6199
6200                                   { 0,
6201                                   "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
6202                                   "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
6203                                   "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" },
6204
6205                                   { 1,
6206                                   "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
6207                                   "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
6208                                   "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" },
6209
6210                                   { 2,
6211                                   "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
6212                                   "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
6213                                   "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" },
6214
6215                                   { 3,
6216                                   "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
6217                                   "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
6218                                   "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" }
6219                 } );
6220
6221                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6222                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6223                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
6224
6225                 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
6226                                  "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
6227                                  "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", {
6228
6229                                   { 0,
6230                                   "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
6231                                   "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
6232                                   "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" },
6233
6234                                   { 1,
6235                                   "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
6236                                   "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
6237                                   "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" },
6238
6239                                   { 2,
6240                                   "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
6241                                   "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
6242                                   "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" }
6243                 } );
6244
6245                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6246                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6247                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
6248
6249                 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
6250                                  "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
6251                                  "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", {
6252
6253                                   { 0,
6254                                   "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
6255                                   "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
6256                                   "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" },
6257
6258                                   { 1,
6259                                   "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
6260                                   "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
6261                                   "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" },
6262
6263                                   { 2,
6264                                   "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
6265                                   "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
6266                                   "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" }
6267                 } );
6268
6269                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6270                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6271                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
6272
6273                 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
6274                                  "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
6275                                  "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", {
6276
6277                                   { 0,
6278                                   "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
6279                                   "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
6280                                   "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" },
6281
6282                                   { 1,
6283                                   "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
6284                                   "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
6285                                   "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" }
6286                 } );
6287
6288                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6289                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6290                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
6291
6292                 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
6293                                  "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
6294                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4846f916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf750148304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee4016901475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
6295
6296                                   { 0,
6297                                   "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
6298                                   "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
6299                                   "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" },
6300
6301                                   { 1,
6302                                   "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
6303                                   "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
6304                                   "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" }
6305                 } );
6306
6307                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6308                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6309                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
6310
6311                 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
6312                                  "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
6313                                  "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", {
6314
6315                                   { 0,
6316                                   "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
6317                                   "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
6318                                   "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" }
6319                 } );
6320
6321                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6322                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6323                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
6324
6325                 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
6326                                  "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
6327                                  "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", {
6328
6329                                   { 0,
6330                                   "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
6331                                   "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
6332                                   "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" }
6333                 } );
6334
6335                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6336                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6337                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
6338
6339                 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
6340                                  "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
6341                                  "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", {});
6342
6343                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6344                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6345                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
6346
6347                 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
6348                                  "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
6349                                  "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", {});
6350
6351                 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6352                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6353                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
6354
6355                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
6356                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
6357                                  "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", {});
6358
6359                 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
6360                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6361                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
6362
6363                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
6364                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
6365                                  "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", {});
6366
6367                 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
6368                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
6369                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
6370                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
6371                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6372                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6373                                 htlc_id: 1,
6374                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
6375                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
6376                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6377                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6378                         };
6379                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
6380                         out
6381                 });
6382                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
6383                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6384                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6385                                 htlc_id: 6,
6386                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
6387                                 cltv_expiry: 506,
6388                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6389                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6390                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6391                         };
6392                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
6393                         out
6394                 });
6395                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6396                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6397                                 htlc_id: 5,
6398                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
6399                                 cltv_expiry: 505,
6400                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6401                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6402                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6403                         };
6404                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
6405                         out
6406                 });
6407
6408                 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
6409                                  "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
6410                                  "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", {
6411
6412                                   { 0,
6413                                   "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
6414                                   "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
6415                                   "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" },
6416                                   { 1,
6417                                   "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
6418                                   "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
6419                                   "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" },
6420                                   { 2,
6421                                   "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
6422                                   "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
6423                                   "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" }
6424                 } );
6425         }
6426
6427         #[test]
6428         fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
6429                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
6430
6431                 let mut seed = [0; 32];
6432                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
6433                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
6434                            hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
6435
6436                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
6437                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
6438                            hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
6439
6440                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
6441                            hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
6442
6443                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
6444                            hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
6445
6446                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
6447                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
6448                            hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
6449         }
6450
6451         #[test]
6452         fn test_key_derivation() {
6453                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
6454                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6455
6456                 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6457                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6458
6459                 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
6460                 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
6461
6462                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
6463                 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
6464
6465                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
6466                                 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
6467
6468                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
6469                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
6470
6471                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
6472                                 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
6473
6474                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
6475                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
6476         }
6477 }