_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/channel.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
  11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
  12 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  13 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  14 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
  15
  16 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
  19
  20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
  22 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
  23
  24 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
  25 use ln::msgs;
  26 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
  27 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
  28 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
  29 use ln::chan_utils;
  30 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
  31 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
  32 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
  33 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
  34 use util::transaction_utils;
  35 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
  36 use util::logger::Logger;
  37 use util::errors::APIError;
  38 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
  39 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
  40
  41 use std;
  42 use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
  43 use std::ops::Deref;
  44 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
  45 use std::sync::Mutex;
  46 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
  47 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0;
  48
  49 #[cfg(test)]
  50 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
  51         pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
  52         pub channel_value_msat: u64,
  53         pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
  54         pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  55         pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  56         pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
  57         pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
  58         pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
  59 }
  60
  61 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
  62         FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
  63         FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
  64         Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
  65 }
  66
  67 enum InboundHTLCState {
  68         /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
  69         /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
  70         RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
  71         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
  72         /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
  73         /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
  74         /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
  75         /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
  76         /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
  77         /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
  78         /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
  79         /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
  80         /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
  81         /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
  82         /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
  83         ///
  84         /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
  85         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc)   --> local
  86         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
  87         /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack               <-- local
  88         /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
  89         /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
  90         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc)   --> local
  91         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
  92         /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
  93         /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
  94         /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
  95         /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
  96         /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
  97         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
  98         ///
  99         /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
 100         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
 101         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
 102         /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
 103         /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
 104         /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
 105         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 106         AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
 107         Committed,
 108         /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 109         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 110         /// we'll drop it.
 111         /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
 112         /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
 113         /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
 114         /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
 115         /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
 116         /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
 117         /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
 118         LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
 119 }
 120
 121 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
 122         htlc_id: u64,
 123         amount_msat: u64,
 124         cltv_expiry: u32,
 125         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 126         state: InboundHTLCState,
 127 }
 128
 129 enum OutboundHTLCState {
 130         /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 131         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 132         /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
 133         /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
 134         ///  * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
 135         ///    money back (though we won't), and,
 136         ///  * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
 137         ///    allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
 138         ///    doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
 139         ///    we'll never get out of sync).
 140         /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
 141         /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
 142         LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
 143         Committed,
 144         /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
 145         /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
 146         RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 147         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 148         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 149         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 150         /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
 151         /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
 152         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 153         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 154         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 155         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 156         /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
 157         /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
 158         AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 159 }
 160
 161 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
 162         htlc_id: u64,
 163         amount_msat: u64,
 164         cltv_expiry: u32,
 165         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 166         state: OutboundHTLCState,
 167         source: HTLCSource,
 168 }
 169
 170 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
 171 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
 172         AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
 173                 // always outbound
 174                 amount_msat: u64,
 175                 cltv_expiry: u32,
 176                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 177                 source: HTLCSource,
 178                 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
 179         },
 180         ClaimHTLC {
 181                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
 182                 htlc_id: u64,
 183         },
 184         FailHTLC {
 185                 htlc_id: u64,
 186                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
 187         },
 188 }
 189
 190 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
 191 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
 192 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
 193 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
 194 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
 195 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
 196 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
 197 enum ChannelState {
 198         /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
 199         OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
 200         /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
 201         TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
 202         /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
 203         /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
 204         /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
 205         FundingCreated = 4,
 206         /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
 207         /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
 208         /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
 209         FundingSent = 8,
 210         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
 211         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 212         TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
 213         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
 214         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 215         OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
 216         ChannelFunded = 64,
 217         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
 218         /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
 219         /// dance.
 220         PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
 221         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
 222         /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
 223         /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
 224         MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
 225         /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
 226         /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
 227         /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
 228         /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
 229         /// later.
 230         /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
 231         AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
 232         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
 233         /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
 234         /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
 235         RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
 236         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
 237         /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
 238         /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
 239         /// us their shutdown.
 240         LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
 241         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
 242         /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
 243         ShutdownComplete = 4096,
 244 }
 245 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
 246 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
 247
 248 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
 249
 250 /// Liveness is called to fluctuate given peer disconnecton/monitor failures/closing.
 251 /// If channel is public, network should have a liveness view announced by us on a
 252 /// best-effort, which means we may filter out some status transitions to avoid spam.
 253 /// See further timer_tick_occurred.
 254 #[derive(PartialEq)]
 255 enum UpdateStatus {
 256         /// Status has been gossiped.
 257         Fresh,
 258         /// Status has been changed.
 259         DisabledMarked,
 260         /// Status has been marked to be gossiped at next flush
 261         DisabledStaged,
 262 }
 263
 264 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
 265 enum HTLCInitiator {
 266         LocalOffered,
 267         RemoteOffered,
 268 }
 269
 270 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
 271 struct HTLCCandidate {
 272         amount_msat: u64,
 273         origin: HTLCInitiator,
 274 }
 275
 276 impl HTLCCandidate {
 277         fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
 278                 Self {
 279                         amount_msat,
 280                         origin,
 281                 }
 282         }
 283 }
 284
 285 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
 286 #[derive(Clone)]
 287 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
 288         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
 289         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
 290         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
 291         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
 292         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
 293         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
 294         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
 295         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
 296 }
 297
 298 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
 299 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
 300 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
 301 // inbound channel.
 302 //
 303 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
 304 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
 305 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
 306         config: ChannelConfig,
 307
 308         user_id: u64,
 309
 310         channel_id: [u8; 32],
 311         channel_state: u32,
 312         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
 313         channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 314
 315         latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
 316
 317         holder_signer: Signer,
 318         shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
 319         destination_script: Script,
 320
 321         // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
 322         // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
 323         // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
 324
 325         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 326         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 327         value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
 328         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
 329         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
 330         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
 331
 332         /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
 333         /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
 334         /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
 335         /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
 336         /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
 337         /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
 338         /// send it first.
 339         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
 340
 341         monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
 342         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
 343         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
 344         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
 345         monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
 346
 347         // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
 348         // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
 349         // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
 350         //
 351         // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
 352         // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
 353         // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
 354         // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
 355         // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
 356         // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
 357         // commitment_signed.
 358         pending_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 359         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
 360         // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
 361         // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
 362         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 363         holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 364         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
 365         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
 366         update_time_counter: u32,
 367         feerate_per_kw: u32,
 368
 369         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 370         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
 371         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 372         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 373         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
 374         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 375
 376         last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
 377
 378         /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
 379         funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
 380         funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
 381         short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
 382
 383         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 384         #[cfg(test)]
 385         pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 386         #[cfg(not(test))]
 387         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 388         #[cfg(test)]
 389         pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 390         #[cfg(not(test))]
 391         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 392         //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
 393         /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
 394         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
 395         // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
 396         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 397         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 398         #[cfg(test)]
 399         pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 400         #[cfg(not(test))]
 401         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 402         //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 403         minimum_depth: u32,
 404
 405         counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
 406
 407         pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
 408         funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
 409
 410         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 411         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 412         counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
 413
 414         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
 415
 416         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
 417
 418         network_sync: UpdateStatus,
 419
 420         // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
 421         // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
 422         // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
 423         // `build_commitment_transaction`.
 424         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 425         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
 426         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 427         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
 428 }
 429
 430 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 431 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
 432         fee: u64,
 433         total_pending_htlcs: usize,
 434         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
 435         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
 436         feerate: u32,
 437 }
 438
 439 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
 440 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
 441
 442 #[cfg(not(test))]
 443 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 444 #[cfg(test)]
 445 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 446 #[cfg(not(test))]
 447 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 448 #[cfg(test)]
 449 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 450
 451 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
 452 /// it's 2^24.
 453 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
 454
 455 /// Maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed. 2 * standard dust threshold on p2wsh output
 456 /// Scales up on Bitcoin Core's proceeding policy with dust outputs. A typical p2wsh output is 43
 457 /// bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal spend of 67 bytes (even if
 458 /// a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee` is set to 3000sat/kb, thus
 459 /// 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs are p2wsh, a value of
 460 /// 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions. We give a bit
 461 /// of margin to our counterparty and pick up 660 satoshis as an accepted `dust_limit_satoshis`
 462 /// upper bound to avoid negotiation conflicts with other implementations.
 463 pub const MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 2 * 330;
 464
 465 /// A typical p2wsh output is 43 bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal
 466 /// spend of 67 bytes (even if a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee`
 467 /// is set to 3000sat/kb, thus 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs
 468 /// are p2wsh, a value of 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions.
 469 pub const MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 330;
 470
 471 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
 472 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
 473 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
 474 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
 475         Ignore(String),
 476         Close(String),
 477         CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
 478 }
 479
 480 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
 481         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
 482                 match self {
 483                         &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
 484                         &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
 485                         &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
 486                 }
 487         }
 488 }
 489
 490 macro_rules! secp_check {
 491         ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
 492                 match $res {
 493                         Ok(thing) => thing,
 494                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
 495                 }
 496         };
 497 }
 498
 499 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
 500         // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
 501         fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 502                 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
 503         }
 504
 505         /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
 506         /// required by us.
 507         ///
 508         /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
 509         pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 510                 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
 511                 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
 512         }
 513
 514         // Constructors:
 515         pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
 516         where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
 517               F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 518         {
 519                 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
 520                 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
 521                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
 522
 523                 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 524                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
 525                 }
 526                 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
 527                 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
 528                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
 529                 }
 530                 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 531                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
 532                 }
 533                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis);
 534                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
 535                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel  reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
 536                 }
 537
 538                 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
 539
 540                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 541                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
 542
 543                 Ok(Channel {
 544                         user_id,
 545                         config: config.channel_options.clone(),
 546
 547                         channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
 548                         channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
 549                         secp_ctx,
 550                         channel_value_satoshis,
 551
 552                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 553
 554                         holder_signer,
 555                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
 556                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 557
 558                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 559                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 560                         value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
 561
 562                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 563                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 564                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 565                         pending_update_fee: None,
 566                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 567                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 568                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 569                         update_time_counter: 1,
 570
 571                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 572
 573                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 574                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 575                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 576                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 577                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 578
 579                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 580                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 581                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 582                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 583
 584                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 585
 586                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 587                         funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
 588                         short_channel_id: None,
 589
 590                         feerate_per_kw: feerate,
 591                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
 592                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
 593                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
 594                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
 595                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
 596                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 597                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
 598                         minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
 599
 600                         counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
 601
 602                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
 603                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
 604                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 605                                 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
 606                                 counterparty_parameters: None,
 607                                 funding_outpoint: None
 608                         },
 609                         funding_transaction: None,
 610
 611                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
 612                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 613                         counterparty_node_id,
 614
 615                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
 616
 617                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 618
 619                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
 620
 621                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 622                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 623                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 624                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 625                 })
 626         }
 627
 628         fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
 629                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
 630         {
 631                 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 632                 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
 633                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
 634                 }
 635                 let upper_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64  * 2;
 636                 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
 637                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
 638                 }
 639                 Ok(())
 640         }
 641
 642         /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
 643         /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
 644         pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
 645                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
 646           F::Target: FeeEstimator
 647         {
 648                 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
 649                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
 650                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
 651                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
 652                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
 653                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
 654                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
 655                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
 656                 };
 657                 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
 658
 659                 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 660                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
 661                 }
 662
 663                 // Check sanity of message fields:
 664                 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 665                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 666                 }
 667                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 668                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 669                 }
 670                 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 671                 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
 672                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
 673                 }
 674                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 675                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 676                 }
 677                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
 678                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
 679                 }
 680                 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 681                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
 682                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
 683                 }
 684                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
 685
 686                 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
 687                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
 688                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
 689                 }
 690                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
 691                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
 692                 }
 693                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
 694                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
 695                 }
 696
 697                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
 698                 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
 699                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
 700                 }
 701                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
 702                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat,  config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
 703                 }
 704                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
 705                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
 706                 }
 707                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
 708                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 709                 }
 710                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
 711                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
 712                 }
 713                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
 714                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
 715                 }
 716                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis >  MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
 717                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
 718                 }
 719
 720                 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
 721
 722                 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
 723                 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
 724                         if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
 725                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
 726                         }
 727                 }
 728                 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
 729                 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
 730
 731                 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 732
 733                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
 734                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
 735                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
 736                 }
 737                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
 738                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
 739                 }
 740                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
 741                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 742                 }
 743
 744                 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
 745                 // for full fee payment
 746                 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
 747                 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 748                 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
 749                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
 750                 }
 751
 752                 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
 753                 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 754                 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
 755                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
 756                 }
 757
 758                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
 759                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
 760                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
 761                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
 762                                         if script.len() == 0 {
 763                                                 None
 764                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
 765                                         } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
 766                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
 767                                         } else {
 768                                                 Some(script.clone())
 769                                         }
 770                                 },
 771                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
 772                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
 773                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
 774                                 }
 775                         }
 776                 } else { None };
 777
 778                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 779                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
 780
 781                 let chan = Channel {
 782                         user_id,
 783                         config: local_config,
 784
 785                         channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
 786                         channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
 787                         secp_ctx,
 788
 789                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 790
 791                         holder_signer,
 792                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
 793                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 794
 795                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 796                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 797                         value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
 798
 799                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 800                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 801                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 802                         pending_update_fee: None,
 803                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 804                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 805                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 806                         update_time_counter: 1,
 807
 808                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 809
 810                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 811                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 812                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 813                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 814                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 815
 816                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 817                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 818                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 819                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 820
 821                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 822
 823                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 824                         funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
 825                         short_channel_id: None,
 826
 827                         feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
 828                         channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
 829                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
 830                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
 831                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
 832                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
 833                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
 834                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 835                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
 836                         minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
 837
 838                         counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
 839
 840                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
 841                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
 842                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 843                                 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
 844                                 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
 845                                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
 846                                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
 847                                 }),
 848                                 funding_outpoint: None
 849                         },
 850                         funding_transaction: None,
 851
 852                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
 853                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 854                         counterparty_node_id,
 855
 856                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
 857
 858                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 859
 860                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
 861
 862                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 863                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 864                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 865                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 866                 };
 867
 868                 Ok(chan)
 869         }
 870
 871         /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
 872         /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
 873         /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
 874         /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
 875         /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
 876         /// an HTLC to a).
 877         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
 878         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
 879         /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
 880         /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
 881         /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
 882         /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
 883         /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
 884         /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
 885         /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
 886         /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
 887         /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
 888         #[inline]
 889         fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
 890                 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
 891                 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
 892                 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
 893
 894                 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
 895                 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 896                 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 897                 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
 898
 899                 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
 900
 901                 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
 902                         ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
 903                                 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 904                                         offered: $offered,
 905                                         amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
 906                                         cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
 907                                         payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
 908                                         transaction_output_index: None
 909                                 }
 910                         }
 911                 }
 912
 913                 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
 914                         ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
 915                                 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
 916                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
 917                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
 918                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 919                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 920                                         } else {
 921                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 922                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 923                                         }
 924                                 } else {
 925                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
 926                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
 927                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 928                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 929                                         } else {
 930                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 931                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 932                                         }
 933                                 }
 934                         }
 935                 }
 936
 937                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
 938                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
 939                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
 940                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
 941                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
 942                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
 943                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
 944                         };
 945
 946                         if include {
 947                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
 948                                 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 949                         } else {
 950                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
 951                                 match &htlc.state {
 952                                         &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
 953                                                 if generated_by_local {
 954                                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
 955                                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 956                                                         }
 957                                                 }
 958                                         },
 959                                         _ => {},
 960                                 }
 961                         }
 962                 }
 963
 964                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
 965                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
 966                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
 967                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
 968                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
 969                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
 970                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
 971                         };
 972
 973                         if include {
 974                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
 975                                 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 976                         } else {
 977                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
 978                                 match htlc.state {
 979                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
 980                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 981                                         },
 982                                         OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
 983                                                 if !generated_by_local {
 984                                                         value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 985                                                 }
 986                                         },
 987                                         _ => {},
 988                                 }
 989                         }
 990                 }
 991
 992                 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
 993                 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
 994                 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
 995                 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
 996                 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
 997                 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
 998                 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
 999                 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1000
1001                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1002                 {
1003                         // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1004                         // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1005                         let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1006                                 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1007                         } else {
1008                                 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1009                         };
1010                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1011                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1012                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
1013                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1014                 }
1015
1016                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1017                 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1018                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1019                 } else {
1020                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
1021                 };
1022
1023                 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1024                 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1025
1026                 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1027                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1028                 } else {
1029                         value_to_a = 0;
1030                 }
1031
1032                 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1033                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1034                 } else {
1035                         value_to_b = 0;
1036                 }
1037
1038                 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1039
1040                 let channel_parameters =
1041                         if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1042                         else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1043                 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1044                                                                              value_to_a as u64,
1045                                                                              value_to_b as u64,
1046                                                                              keys.clone(),
1047                                                                              feerate_per_kw,
1048                                                                              &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1049                                                                              &channel_parameters
1050                 );
1051                 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1052                 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1053                 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1054                 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1055
1056                 (tx, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1057         }
1058
1059         #[inline]
1060         fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1061                 let channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1062                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1063         }
1064
1065         #[inline]
1066         fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1067                 let mut ret =
1068                 (4 +                                           // version
1069                  1 +                                           // input count
1070                  36 +                                          // prevout
1071                  1 +                                           // script length (0)
1072                  4 +                                           // sequence
1073                  1 +                                           // output count
1074                  4                                             // lock time
1075                  )*4 +                                         // * 4 for non-witness parts
1076                 2 +                                            // witness marker and flag
1077                 1 +                                            // witness element count
1078                 4 +                                            // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1079                 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1080                 2*(1 + 71);                                    // two signatures + sighash type flags
1081                 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1082                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1083                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1084                 }
1085                 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1086                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1087                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1088                 }
1089                 ret
1090         }
1091
1092         #[inline]
1093         fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1094                 let txins = {
1095                         let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1096                         ins.push(TxIn {
1097                                 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1098                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1099                                 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1100                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1101                         });
1102                         ins
1103                 };
1104
1105                 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1106                 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1107                 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1108
1109                 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1110                 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1111                 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1112
1113                 if value_to_self < 0 {
1114                         assert!(self.is_outbound());
1115                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1116                 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1117                         assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1118                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1119                 }
1120
1121                 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1122                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1123                                 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1124                                 value: value_to_remote as u64
1125                         }, ()));
1126                 }
1127
1128                 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1129                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1130                                 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1131                                 value: value_to_self as u64
1132                         }, ()));
1133                 }
1134
1135                 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1136
1137                 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1138                 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1139                         outputs.push(out.0);
1140                 }
1141
1142                 (Transaction {
1143                         version: 2,
1144                         lock_time: 0,
1145                         input: txins,
1146                         output: outputs,
1147                 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1148         }
1149
1150         fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1151                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1152         }
1153
1154         #[inline]
1155         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1156         /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1157         /// our counterparty!)
1158         /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1159         /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1160         fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1161                 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1162                 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1163                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1164                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1165
1166                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1167         }
1168
1169         #[inline]
1170         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1171         /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1172         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1173         fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1174                 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1175                 //may see payments to it!
1176                 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1177                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1178                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1179
1180                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1181         }
1182
1183         /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1184         /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1185         /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1186         pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1187                 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1188         }
1189
1190         /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1191         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1192         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1193         fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Transaction {
1194                 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay() } else { self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay() }, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1195         }
1196
1197         /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1198         /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1199         /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1200         ///
1201         /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1202         /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1203         fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1204                 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1205                 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1206                 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1207                 // either.
1208                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1209                         panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1210                 }
1211                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1212
1213                 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1214
1215                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1216                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1217                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1218
1219                 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1220                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1221                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1222                                 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1223                                 match htlc.state {
1224                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1225                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1226                                                 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1227                                                 } else {
1228                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1229                                                 }
1230                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1231                                                 return Ok((None, None));
1232                                         },
1233                                         _ => {
1234                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1235                                                 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1236                                         }
1237                                 }
1238                                 pending_idx = idx;
1239                                 break;
1240                         }
1241                 }
1242                 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1243                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1244                 }
1245
1246                 // Now update local state:
1247                 //
1248                 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1249                 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1250                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1251                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1252                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1253                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1254                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1255                         }],
1256                 };
1257
1258                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1259                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1260                                 match pending_update {
1261                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1262                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1263                                                         // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1264                                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1265                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1266                                                         return Ok((None, None));
1267                                                 }
1268                                         },
1269                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1270                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1271                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1272                                                         // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1273                                                         // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1274                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1275                                                         return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1276                                                 }
1277                                         },
1278                                         _ => {}
1279                                 }
1280                         }
1281                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1282                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1283                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1284                         });
1285                         return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1286                 }
1287
1288                 {
1289                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1290                         if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1291                         } else {
1292                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1293                                 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1294                         }
1295                         log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1296                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1297                 }
1298
1299                 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1300                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1301                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1302                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1303                 }), Some(monitor_update)))
1304         }
1305
1306         pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1307                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger)? {
1308                         (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), Some(mut monitor_update)) => {
1309                                 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1310                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1311                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1312                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1313                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1314                                 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1315                         },
1316                         (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), None) => {
1317                                 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1318                                 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1319                         },
1320                         (None, Some(monitor_update)) => Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))),
1321                         (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1322                 }
1323         }
1324
1325         /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1326         /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1327         /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1328         ///
1329         /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1330         /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1331         pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
1332                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1333                         panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1334                 }
1335                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1336
1337                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1338                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1339                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1340
1341                 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1342                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1343                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1344                                 match htlc.state {
1345                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1346                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1347                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1348                                                 return Ok(None);
1349                                         },
1350                                         _ => {
1351                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1352                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1353                                         }
1354                                 }
1355                                 pending_idx = idx;
1356                         }
1357                 }
1358                 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1359                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1360                 }
1361
1362                 // Now update local state:
1363                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1364                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1365                                 match pending_update {
1366                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1367                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1368                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1369                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1370                                                 }
1371                                         },
1372                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1373                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1374                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1375                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1376                                                 }
1377                                         },
1378                                         _ => {}
1379                                 }
1380                         }
1381                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1382                                 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1383                                 err_packet,
1384                         });
1385                         return Ok(None);
1386                 }
1387
1388                 {
1389                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1390                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1391                 }
1392
1393                 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1394                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1395                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1396                         reason: err_packet
1397                 }))
1398         }
1399
1400         // Message handlers:
1401
1402         pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1403                 // Check sanity of message fields:
1404                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1405                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1406                 }
1407                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1408                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1409                 }
1410                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1411                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1412                 }
1413                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1414                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1415                 }
1416                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1417                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve ({}) and dust_limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1418                 }
1419                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1420                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1421                 }
1422                 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1423                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1424                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1425                 }
1426                 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1427                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1428                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1429                 }
1430                 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1431                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1432                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1433                 }
1434                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1435                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1436                 }
1437                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1438                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1439                 }
1440
1441                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1442                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1443                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1444                 }
1445                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1446                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1447                 }
1448                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1449                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1450                 }
1451                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1452                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1453                 }
1454                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1455                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1456                 }
1457                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1458                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1459                 }
1460                 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1461                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1462                 }
1463
1464                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1465                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1466                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1467                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1468                                         if script.len() == 0 {
1469                                                 None
1470                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1471                                         } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
1472                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
1473                                         } else {
1474                                                 Some(script.clone())
1475                                         }
1476                                 },
1477                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1478                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1479                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1480                                 }
1481                         }
1482                 } else { None };
1483
1484                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1485                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1486                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1487                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1488                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1489                 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1490
1491                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1492                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1493                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1494                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1495                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1496                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1497                 };
1498
1499                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1500                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1501                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1502                 });
1503
1504                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1505                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1506
1507                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1508
1509                 Ok(())
1510         }
1511
1512         fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1513                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1514
1515                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1516                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1517                 {
1518                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1519                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1520                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1521                         // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1522                         log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1523                         secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1524                 }
1525
1526                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1527                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1528
1529                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1530                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1531                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1532
1533                 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1534                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1535
1536                 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1537                 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1538         }
1539
1540         fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1541                 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1542         }
1543
1544         pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1545                 if self.is_outbound() {
1546                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1547                 }
1548                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1549                         // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1550                         // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1551                         // channel.
1552                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1553                 }
1554                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1555                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1556                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1557                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1558                 }
1559
1560                 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1561                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1562                 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks.  In particular
1563                 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1564                 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1565
1566                 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1567                         Ok(res) => res,
1568                         Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1569                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1570                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1571                         },
1572                         Err(e) => {
1573                                 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1574                                 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1575                                 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1576                         }
1577                 };
1578
1579                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1580                         initial_commitment_tx,
1581                         msg.signature,
1582                         Vec::new(),
1583                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1584                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1585                 );
1586
1587                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1588
1589                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1590                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1591                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1592                 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1593                                                           &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1594                                                           &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1595                                                           &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1596                                                           funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1597                                                           obscure_factor,
1598                                                           holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1599
1600                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1601
1602                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1603                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1604                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1605                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1606
1607                 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1608                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
1609                         signature
1610                 }, channel_monitor))
1611         }
1612
1613         /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1614         /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1615         pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1616                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1617                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1618                 }
1619                 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1620                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1621                 }
1622                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1623                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1624                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1625                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1626                 }
1627
1628                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1629
1630                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1631                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1632                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1633                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1634
1635                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1636
1637                 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1638                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1639                 {
1640                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1641                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1642                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1643                         // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1644                         if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1645                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1646                         }
1647                 }
1648
1649                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1650                         initial_commitment_tx,
1651                         msg.signature,
1652                         Vec::new(),
1653                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1654                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1655                 );
1656
1657
1658                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1659                 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1660                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1661                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1662                 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1663                                                           &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1664                                                           &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1665                                                           &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1666                                                           funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1667                                                           obscure_factor,
1668                                                           holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1669
1670                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1671
1672                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1673                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1674                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1675                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1676
1677                 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap()))
1678         }
1679
1680         pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1681                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1682                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1683                 }
1684
1685                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1686
1687                 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1688                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1689                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1690                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1691                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
1692                 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1693                                  // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1694                                  self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1695                                  self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1696                                 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1697                                 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1698                                                       (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1699                         if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1700                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1701                         }
1702                         // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1703                         return Ok(());
1704                 } else {
1705                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1706                 }
1707
1708                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1709                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1710                 Ok(())
1711         }
1712
1713         /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1714         fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1715                 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1716                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1717                         htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1718                 }
1719                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1720         }
1721
1722         /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1723         /// holding cell.
1724         fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1725                 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1726                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1727                         htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1728                 }
1729
1730                 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1731                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1732                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1733                                 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1734                                 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1735                         }
1736                 }
1737
1738                 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1739         }
1740
1741         /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1742         /// Doesn't bother handling the
1743         /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1744         /// corner case properly.
1745         pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1746                 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1747                 (cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1748                 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1749         }
1750
1751         // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1752         // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1753         fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1754                 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1755                 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1756                 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1757         }
1758
1759         // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1760         // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
1761         // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
1762         // are excluded.
1763         fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1764                 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1765
1766                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1767                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1768
1769                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1770                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1771                 match htlc.origin {
1772                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1773                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1774                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1775                                 }
1776                         },
1777                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1778                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1779                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1780                                 }
1781                         }
1782                 }
1783
1784                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1785                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1786                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1787                                 continue
1788                         }
1789                         // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1790                         // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1791                         included_htlcs += 1;
1792                 }
1793
1794                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1795                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1796                                 continue
1797                         }
1798                         match htlc.state {
1799                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1800                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1801                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1802                                 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1803                                 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1804                                 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1805                                 _ => {},
1806                         }
1807                 }
1808
1809                 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1810                         match htlc {
1811                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1812                                         if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1813                                                 continue
1814                                         }
1815                                         included_htlcs += 1
1816                                 },
1817                                 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1818                                          // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1819                         }
1820                 }
1821
1822                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1823                 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1824                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1825                 {
1826                         let mut fee = res;
1827                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1828                                 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1829                         }
1830                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1831                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1832                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1833                                 fee,
1834                                 total_pending_htlcs,
1835                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1836                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1837                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1838                                 },
1839                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1840                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1841                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1842                                 },
1843                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1844                         };
1845                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1846                 }
1847                 res
1848         }
1849
1850         // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1851         // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
1852         // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
1853         // excluded.
1854         fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1855                 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1856
1857                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1858                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1859
1860                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1861                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1862                 match htlc.origin {
1863                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1864                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1865                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1866                                 }
1867                         },
1868                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1869                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1870                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1871                                 }
1872                         }
1873                 }
1874
1875                 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1876                 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1877                 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1878                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1879                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1880                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1881                                 continue
1882                         }
1883                         included_htlcs += 1;
1884                 }
1885
1886                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1887                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1888                                 continue
1889                         }
1890                         // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1891                         // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1892                         match htlc.state {
1893                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1894                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1895                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1896                                 _ => {},
1897                         }
1898                 }
1899
1900                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1901                 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1902                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1903                 {
1904                         let mut fee = res;
1905                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1906                                 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1907                         }
1908                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1909                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1910                                 fee,
1911                                 total_pending_htlcs,
1912                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1913                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1914                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1915                                 },
1916                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1917                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1918                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1919                                 },
1920                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1921                         };
1922                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1923                 }
1924                 res
1925         }
1926
1927         pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1928         where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
1929                 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
1930                 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1931                 if local_sent_shutdown {
1932                         pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
1933                 }
1934                 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
1935                 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1936                 if remote_sent_shutdown {
1937                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1938                 }
1939                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1940                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1941                 }
1942                 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1943                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
1944                 }
1945                 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
1946                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
1947                 }
1948                 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
1949                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
1950                 }
1951
1952                 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1953                 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1954                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
1955                 }
1956                 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1957                 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1958                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1959                 }
1960                 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1961                 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1962                 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1963                 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1964                 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1965                 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1966                 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1967                 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1968                 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1969                 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1970                 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1971                 // transaction).
1972                 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
1973                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1974                         if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
1975                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1976                         } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
1977                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1978                         }
1979                 }
1980
1981                 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
1982                         self.value_to_self_msat + htlc_inbound_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
1983                 let pending_remote_value_msat =
1984                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
1985                 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
1986                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
1987                 }
1988
1989                 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
1990                 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
1991                 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
1992                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
1993                         self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
1994                 };
1995                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
1996                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
1997                 };
1998
1999                 let chan_reserve_msat =
2000                         Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
2001                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
2002                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2003                 }
2004
2005                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2006                         // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2007                         // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2008                         // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2009                         // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2010                         // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2011                         // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2012                         // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2013                         // sensitive to fee spikes.
2014                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2015                         let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2016                         if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2017                                 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2018                                 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2019                                 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation");
2020                                 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2021                         }
2022                 } else {
2023                         // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2024                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2025                         let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2026                         if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2027                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2028                         }
2029                 }
2030                 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2031                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2032                 }
2033                 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2034                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2035                 }
2036
2037                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2038                         if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2039                                 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2040                         }
2041                 }
2042
2043                 // Now update local state:
2044                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2045                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2046                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2047                         amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2048                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2049                         cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2050                         state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2051                 });
2052                 Ok(())
2053         }
2054
2055         /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2056         #[inline]
2057         fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2058                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2059                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2060                                 match check_preimage {
2061                                         None => {},
2062                                         Some(payment_hash) =>
2063                                                 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2064                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2065                                                 }
2066                                 };
2067                                 match htlc.state {
2068                                         OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2069                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2070                                         OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2071                                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2072                                         },
2073                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2074                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2075                                 }
2076                                 return Ok(&htlc.source);
2077                         }
2078                 }
2079                 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2080         }
2081
2082         pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2083                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2084                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2085                 }
2086                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2087                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2088                 }
2089
2090                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2091                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
2092         }
2093
2094         pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2095                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2096                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2097                 }
2098                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2099                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2100                 }
2101
2102                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2103                 Ok(())
2104         }
2105
2106         pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2107                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2108                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2109                 }
2110                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2111                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2112                 }
2113
2114                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2115                 Ok(())
2116         }
2117
2118         pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2119         where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2120                                 L::Target: Logger
2121         {
2122                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2123                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2124                 }
2125                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2126                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2127                 }
2128                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2129                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2130                 }
2131
2132                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2133
2134                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2135
2136                 let mut update_fee = false;
2137                 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2138                         update_fee = true;
2139                         self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
2140                 } else {
2141                         self.feerate_per_kw
2142                 };
2143
2144                 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid) = {
2145                         let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
2146                         let commitment_txid = {
2147                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2148                                 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2149                                 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2150
2151                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
2152                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2153                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2154                                 }
2155                                 bitcoin_tx.txid
2156                         };
2157                         let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2158                         (commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid)
2159                 };
2160
2161                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2162                 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
2163                 if update_fee {
2164                         let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2165                         if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2166                                 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2167                         }
2168                 }
2169                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2170                 {
2171                         if self.is_outbound() {
2172                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2173                                 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2174                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2175                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2176                                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2177                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2178                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2179                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2180                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2181                                                         assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2182                                                 }
2183                                 }
2184                         }
2185                 }
2186
2187                 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2188                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2189                 }
2190
2191                 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2192                 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2193                 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2194                         if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2195                                 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &keys, feerate_per_kw);
2196                                 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2197                                 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2198                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
2199                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2200                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2201                                 }
2202                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2203                         } else {
2204                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2205                         }
2206                 }
2207
2208                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2209                         commitment_tx,
2210                         msg.signature,
2211                         msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2212                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2213                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2214                 );
2215
2216                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2217                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2218
2219                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2220                 let mut need_commitment = false;
2221                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2222                         if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
2223                                 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
2224                                 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
2225                                 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
2226                                 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
2227                                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
2228                                         need_commitment = true;
2229                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2230                                 }
2231                         }
2232                 }
2233
2234                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2235                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2236                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2237                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2238                                 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2239                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2240                         }]
2241                 };
2242
2243                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2244                         let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2245                                 Some(forward_info.clone())
2246                         } else { None };
2247                         if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2248                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2249                                 need_commitment = true;
2250                         }
2251                 }
2252                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2253                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2254                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
2255                         } else { None } {
2256                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2257                                 need_commitment = true;
2258                         }
2259                 }
2260
2261                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2262                 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2263                 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2264                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2265
2266                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2267                         // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2268                         // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2269                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2270                         if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2271                                 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2272                                 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2273                                 // includes the right HTLCs.
2274                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2275                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2276                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2277                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2278                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2279                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2280                         }
2281                         // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2282                         // re-send the message on restoration)
2283                         return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2284                 }
2285
2286                 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2287                         // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2288                         // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2289                         // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2290                         let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2291                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2292                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2293                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2294                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2295                         (Some(msg), None)
2296                 } else if !need_commitment {
2297                         (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2298                 } else { (None, None) };
2299
2300                 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2301                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2302                         per_commitment_secret,
2303                         next_per_commitment_point,
2304                 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2305         }
2306
2307         /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2308         /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2309         fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2310                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2311                 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2312                         log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
2313
2314                         let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2315                                 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2316                                 updates: Vec::new(),
2317                         };
2318
2319                         let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2320                         mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2321                         let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2322                         let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2323                         let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2324                         let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2325                         for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2326                                 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2327                                 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2328                                 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2329                                 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2330                                 // to rebalance channels.
2331                                 match &htlc_update {
2332                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2333                                                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2334                                                         Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2335                                                         Err(e) => {
2336                                                                 match e {
2337                                                                         ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2338                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2339                                                                                 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2340                                                                                 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2341                                                                                 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2342                                                                                 // into the holding cell without ever being
2343                                                                                 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2344                                                                                 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2345                                                                                 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2346                                                                         },
2347                                                                         _ => {
2348                                                                                 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2349                                                                         },
2350                                                                 }
2351                                                         }
2352                                                 }
2353                                         },
2354                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2355                                                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2356                                                         Ok((update_fulfill_msg_option, additional_monitor_update_opt)) => {
2357                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2358                                                                 if let Some(mut additional_monitor_update) = additional_monitor_update_opt {
2359                                                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2360                                                                 }
2361                                                         },
2362                                                         Err(e) => {
2363                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2364                                                                 else {
2365                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
2366                                                                 }
2367                                                         }
2368                                                 }
2369                                         },
2370                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2371                                                 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
2372                                                         Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
2373                                                         Err(e) => {
2374                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2375                                                                 else {
2376                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2377                                                                 }
2378                                                         }
2379                                                 }
2380                                         },
2381                                 }
2382                         }
2383                         if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2384                                 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2385                         }
2386                         let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2387                                 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2388                                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2389                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2390                                         feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2391                                 })
2392                         } else {
2393                                 None
2394                         };
2395
2396                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2397                         // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2398                         // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2399                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2400                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2401
2402                         Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2403                                 update_add_htlcs,
2404                                 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2405                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2406                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2407                                 update_fee,
2408                                 commitment_signed,
2409                         }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2410                 } else {
2411                         Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2412                 }
2413         }
2414
2415         /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2416         /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2417         /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2418         /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2419         /// revoke_and_ack message.
2420         pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2421                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2422                                         L::Target: Logger,
2423         {
2424                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2425                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2426                 }
2427                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2428                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2429                 }
2430                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2431                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2432                 }
2433
2434                 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2435                         if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2436                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2437                         }
2438                 }
2439
2440                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2441                         // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2442                         // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2443                         // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2444                         // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2445                         // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2446                         // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2447                         // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2448                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2449                 }
2450
2451                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2452                 {
2453                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2454                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2455                 }
2456
2457                 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2458                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2459                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2460                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2461                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2462                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2463                                 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2464                                 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2465                         }],
2466                 };
2467
2468                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2469                 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2470                 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2471                 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2472                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2473                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2474                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2475                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2476
2477                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
2478                 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2479                 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2480                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2481                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2482                 let mut require_commitment = false;
2483                 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2484
2485                 {
2486                         // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2487                         let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2488                         let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2489
2490                         // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2491                         pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2492                                 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2493                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2494                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2495                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2496                                         }
2497                                         false
2498                                 } else { true }
2499                         });
2500                         pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2501                                 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2502                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2503                                         if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2504                                                 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2505                                         } else {
2506                                                 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2507                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2508                                         }
2509                                         false
2510                                 } else { true }
2511                         });
2512                         for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2513                                 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2514                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2515                                         true
2516                                 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2517                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2518                                         true
2519                                 } else { false };
2520                                 if swap {
2521                                         let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2522                                         mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2523
2524                                         if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2525                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2526                                                 require_commitment = true;
2527                                         } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2528                                                 match forward_info {
2529                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2530                                                                 require_commitment = true;
2531                                                                 match fail_msg {
2532                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2533                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2534                                                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2535                                                                         },
2536                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2537                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2538                                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2539                                                                         },
2540                                                                 }
2541                                                         },
2542                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2543                                                                 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2544                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2545                                                         }
2546                                                 }
2547                                         }
2548                                 }
2549                         }
2550                         for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2551                                 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2552                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2553                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2554                                 }
2555                                 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2556                                         Some(fail_reason.take())
2557                                 } else { None } {
2558                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2559                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2560                                         require_commitment = true;
2561                                 }
2562                         }
2563                 }
2564                 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2565
2566                 if self.is_outbound() {
2567                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2568                                 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2569                         }
2570                 } else {
2571                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2572                                 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2573                                 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2574                                 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2575                                 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2576                                 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2577                                 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2578                                         require_commitment = true;
2579                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2580                                 }
2581                         }
2582                 }
2583
2584                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2585                         // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2586                         // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2587                         if require_commitment {
2588                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2589                                 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2590                                 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2591                                 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2592                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2593                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2594                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2595                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2596                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2597                         }
2598                         self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2599                         self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2600                         return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2601                 }
2602
2603                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2604                         (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2605                                 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2606                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2607                                         commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2608                                 }
2609                                 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2610                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2611                                         commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2612                                 }
2613
2614                                 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2615                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2616                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2617                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2618
2619                                 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2620                         },
2621                         (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2622                                 if require_commitment {
2623                                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2624
2625                                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2626                                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2627                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2628                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2629
2630                                         Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2631                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2632                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2633                                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2634                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2635                                                 update_fee: None,
2636                                                 commitment_signed
2637                                         }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2638                                 } else {
2639                                         Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2640                                 }
2641                         }
2642                 }
2643
2644         }
2645
2646         /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2647         /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2648         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2649         fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2650                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2651                         panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2652                 }
2653                 if !self.is_usable() {
2654                         panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2655                 }
2656                 if !self.is_live() {
2657                         panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2658                 }
2659
2660                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2661                         self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2662                         return None;
2663                 }
2664
2665                 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2666                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2667
2668                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2669                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2670                         feerate_per_kw,
2671                 })
2672         }
2673
2674         pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2675                 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2676                         Some(update_fee) => {
2677                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2678                                 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2679                         },
2680                         None => Ok(None)
2681                 }
2682         }
2683
2684         /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2685         /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2686         /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2687         /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2688         /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2689         /// completed.
2690         pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> where L::Target: Logger {
2691                 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2692
2693                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2694                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2695                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2696                         return outbound_drops;
2697                 }
2698                 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2699                 // will be retransmitted.
2700                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2701
2702                 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2703                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2704                         match htlc.state {
2705                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2706                                         // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2707                                         // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2708                                         // this HTLC accordingly
2709                                         inbound_drop_count += 1;
2710                                         false
2711                                 },
2712                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2713                                         // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2714                                         // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2715                                         // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2716                                         true
2717                                 },
2718                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2719                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2720                                         // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2721                                         // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2722                                         // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2723                                         // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2724                                         true
2725                                 },
2726                         }
2727                 });
2728                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2729
2730                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2731                         if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2732                                 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2733                                 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2734                                 // the update upon reconnection.
2735                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2736                         }
2737                 }
2738
2739                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2740                         match htlc_update {
2741                                 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are
2742                                 // no holding cell HTLC update_adds, so if in the future we stop
2743                                 // dropping added HTLCs here and failing them backwards, then there will
2744                                 // need to be corresponding changes made in the Channel's re-establish
2745                                 // logic.
2746                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2747                                         outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2748                                         false
2749                                 },
2750                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2751                         }
2752                 });
2753                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2754                 log_debug!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2755                 outbound_drops
2756         }
2757
2758         /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2759         /// updates are partially paused.
2760         /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2761         /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2762         /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2763         /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2764         pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2765                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2766                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2767                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2768                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2769                 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2770                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2771                 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2772                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2773         }
2774
2775         /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2776         /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2777         /// to the remote side.
2778         pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<Transaction>, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
2779                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2780                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2781
2782                 let funding_broadcastable = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound() {
2783                         self.funding_transaction.take()
2784                 } else { None };
2785
2786                 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
2787                 // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
2788                 // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound
2789                 // channel which failed to persist the monitor on funding_created, and we got the funding
2790                 // transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted.
2791                 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2792                         assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
2793                         self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2794                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2795                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2796                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2797                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2798                         })
2799                 } else { None };
2800
2801                 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2802                 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2803                 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2804                 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2805
2806                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2807                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2808                         self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2809                         return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
2810                 }
2811
2812                 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2813                         Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2814                 } else { None };
2815                 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2816                         Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
2817                 } else { None };
2818
2819                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2820                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2821                 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2822                 log_trace!(logger, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2823                         if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
2824                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
2825                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2826                         match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2827                 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked)
2828         }
2829
2830         pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2831                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2832         {
2833                 if self.is_outbound() {
2834                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
2835                 }
2836                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2837                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2838                 }
2839                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2840                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw);
2841                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2842                 Ok(())
2843         }
2844
2845         fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2846                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2847                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2848                 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2849                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2850                         per_commitment_secret,
2851                         next_per_commitment_point,
2852                 }
2853         }
2854
2855         fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
2856                 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2857                 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2858                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2859                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2860
2861                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2862                         if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2863                                 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2864                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2865                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2866                                         amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2867                                         payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2868                                         cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2869                                         onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2870                                 });
2871                         }
2872                 }
2873
2874                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2875                         if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2876                                 match reason {
2877                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2878                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2879                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2880                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2881                                                         reason: err_packet.clone()
2882                                                 });
2883                                         },
2884                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2885                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2886                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2887                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2888                                                         sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2889                                                         failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2890                                                 });
2891                                         },
2892                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2893                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2894                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2895                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2896                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2897                                                 });
2898                                         },
2899                                 }
2900                         }
2901                 }
2902
2903                 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2904                                 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2905                 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2906                         update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2907                         update_fee: None,
2908                         commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2909                 }
2910         }
2911
2912         /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2913         /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2914         pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2915                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2916                         // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2917                         // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2918                         // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2919                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
2920                 }
2921
2922                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2923                         msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2924                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2925                 }
2926
2927                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
2928                         match msg.data_loss_protect {
2929                                 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
2930                                         let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2931                                         let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
2932                                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
2933                                         if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
2934                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
2935                                         }
2936                                         if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2937                                                 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
2938                                                         "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
2939                                                 ));
2940                                         }
2941                                 },
2942                                 OptionalField::Absent => {}
2943                         }
2944                 }
2945
2946                 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2947                 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2948                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2949
2950                 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2951                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2952                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2953                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2954                         })
2955                 } else { None };
2956
2957                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2958                         // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
2959                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
2960                                         self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2961                                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2962                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
2963                                 }
2964                                 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2965                                 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2966                         }
2967
2968                         // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2969                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2970                         return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2971                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2972                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2973                         }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2974                 }
2975
2976                 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2977                         // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2978                         // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2979                         None
2980                 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2981                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2982                                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2983                                 None
2984                         } else {
2985                                 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2986                         }
2987                 } else {
2988                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
2989                 };
2990
2991                 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2992                 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2993                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2994                 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2995                 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2996
2997                 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2998                         // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2999                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3000                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3001                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3002                                 next_per_commitment_point,
3003                         })
3004                 } else { None };
3005
3006                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3007                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
3008                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3009                         } else {
3010                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3011                         }
3012
3013                         if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3014                                 // Note that if in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3015                                 // disconnect, this logic will need to be updated.
3016                                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3017                                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } = htlc_update {
3018                                                 debug_assert!(false, "There shouldn't be any add-HTLCs in the holding cell now because they should have been dropped on peer disconnect. Panic here because said HTLCs won't be handled correctly.");
3019                                         }
3020                                 }
3021
3022                                 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3023                                 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3024                                 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3025                                 // now!
3026                                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3027                                         Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3028                                         Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3029                                         Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3030                                                 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3031                                                 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3032                                                 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
3033                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3034                                         },
3035                                         Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3036                                                 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3037                                                 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3038                                                 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
3039                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3040                                         },
3041                                 }
3042                         } else {
3043                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3044                         }
3045                 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3046                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
3047                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3048                         } else {
3049                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3050                         }
3051
3052                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3053                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3054                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3055                         }
3056
3057                         return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3058                 } else {
3059                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3060                 }
3061         }
3062
3063         fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
3064                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3065         {
3066                 if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
3067                                 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
3068                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3069                         return None;
3070                 }
3071
3072                 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3073                 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
3074                         proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
3075                 }
3076                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3077                 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3078
3079                 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
3080                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3081                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3082                         .ok();
3083                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3084                 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
3085
3086                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
3087                 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3088                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3089                         fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3090                         signature: sig.unwrap(),
3091                 })
3092         }
3093
3094         pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3095                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3096         {
3097                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3098                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3099                 }
3100                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3101                         // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3102                         // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3103                         // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3104                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3105                 }
3106                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3107                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3108                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3109                         }
3110                 }
3111                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3112
3113                 if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, &msg.scriptpubkey) {
3114                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3115                 }
3116
3117                 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3118                         if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3119                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3120                         }
3121                 } else {
3122                         self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
3123                 }
3124
3125                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3126
3127                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3128                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3129
3130                 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3131                 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3132                 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3133                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3134                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3135                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3136                         match htlc_update {
3137                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3138                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3139                                         false
3140                                 },
3141                                 _ => true
3142                         }
3143                 });
3144                 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
3145                 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
3146                 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3147
3148                 let shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3149                         None
3150                 } else {
3151                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3152                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3153                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3154                         })
3155                 };
3156
3157                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3158                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3159
3160                 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3161         }
3162
3163         fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3164                 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3165                 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3166                 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3167
3168                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3169
3170                 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3171                 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3172                 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3173                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3174                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3175                 } else {
3176                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3177                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3178                 }
3179                 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3180                 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3181
3182                 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3183         }
3184
3185         pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3186                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3187         {
3188                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3189                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3190                 }
3191                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3192                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3193                 }
3194                 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3195                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3196                 }
3197                 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3198                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3199                 }
3200
3201                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3202                 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3203                 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3204                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3205                 }
3206                 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3207
3208                 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3209                         Ok(_) => {},
3210                         Err(_e) => {
3211                                 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3212                                 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3213                                 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3214                                 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3215                                 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3216                         },
3217                 };
3218
3219                 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3220                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3221                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3222                 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3223                         if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3224                                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3225                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3226                                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3227                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3228                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3229                                 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3230                         }
3231                 }
3232
3233                 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3234                         ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3235                                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3236                                 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3237                                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3238                                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3239                                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3240                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3241                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3242                                 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3243                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3244                                         fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3245                                         signature: sig,
3246                                 }), None))
3247                         }
3248                 }
3249
3250                 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3251                 if self.is_outbound() {
3252                         let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3253                         if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3254                                 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3255                                         if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3256                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3257                                         }
3258                                 }
3259                                 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3260                         }
3261                 } else {
3262                         min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3263                 }
3264                 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3265                         if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3266                                 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3267                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3268                                 }
3269                         }
3270                         propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3271                 }
3272
3273                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3274                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3275                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3276                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3277                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3278                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3279
3280                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3281                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3282
3283                 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3284                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3285                         fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3286                         signature: sig,
3287                 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3288         }
3289
3290         // Public utilities:
3291
3292         pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3293                 self.channel_id
3294         }
3295
3296         /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3297         /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3298         pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3299                 self.user_id
3300         }
3301
3302         /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3303         /// is_usable() returns true).
3304         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3305         pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3306                 self.short_channel_id
3307         }
3308
3309         /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3310         /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3311         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3312                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3313         }
3314
3315         fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3316                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3317         }
3318
3319         fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3320                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3321         }
3322
3323         fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3324                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().selected_contest_delay
3325         }
3326
3327         fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3328                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3329         }
3330
3331         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3332         pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3333                 self.counterparty_node_id
3334         }
3335
3336         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3337         #[cfg(test)]
3338         pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3339                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3340         }
3341
3342         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3343         pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3344                 return cmp::min(
3345                         // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3346                         // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3347                         // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3348                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
3349
3350                         Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3351                 );
3352         }
3353
3354         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3355         pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3356                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3357         }
3358
3359         pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3360                 self.channel_value_satoshis
3361         }
3362
3363         pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3364                 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
3365         }
3366
3367         pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
3368                 cmp::max(self.config.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
3369         }
3370
3371         #[cfg(test)]
3372         pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3373                 self.feerate_per_kw
3374         }
3375
3376         pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3377                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3378         }
3379
3380         pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3381                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3382         }
3383
3384         pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3385                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3386         }
3387
3388         #[cfg(test)]
3389         pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3390                 &self.holder_signer
3391         }
3392
3393         #[cfg(test)]
3394         pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3395                 ChannelValueStat {
3396                         value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3397                         channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3398                         channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
3399                         pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3400                         pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3401                         holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3402                                 let mut res = 0;
3403                                 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3404                                         match h {
3405                                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3406                                                         res += amount_msat;
3407                                                 }
3408                                                 _ => {}
3409                                         }
3410                                 }
3411                                 res
3412                         },
3413                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3414                         counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3415                 }
3416         }
3417
3418         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3419         pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3420                 self.update_time_counter
3421         }
3422
3423         pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3424                 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3425         }
3426
3427         pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3428                 self.config.announced_channel
3429         }
3430
3431         pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3432                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3433         }
3434
3435         /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3436         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3437         pub fn get_holder_fee_base_msat<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &F) -> u32
3438                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3439         {
3440                 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
3441                 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
3442
3443                 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
3444                 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
3445
3446                 if self.is_outbound() {
3447                         // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
3448                         res += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
3449                 }
3450
3451                 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
3452                 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) as u64 * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
3453
3454                 res as u32
3455         }
3456
3457         /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3458         pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3459                 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3460         }
3461
3462         /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3463         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3464         pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3465                 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3466                 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3467         }
3468
3469         /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3470         /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3471         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3472         pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3473                 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
3474         }
3475
3476         /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3477         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3478         pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3479                 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3480         }
3481
3482         /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3483         pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3484                 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3485         }
3486
3487         /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3488         /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3489         /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3490         pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3491                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32  {
3492                         assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3493                         true
3494                 } else { false }
3495         }
3496
3497         pub fn to_disabled_staged(&mut self) {
3498                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged;
3499         }
3500
3501         pub fn to_disabled_marked(&mut self) {
3502                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked;
3503         }
3504
3505         pub fn to_fresh(&mut self) {
3506                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::Fresh;
3507         }
3508
3509         pub fn is_disabled_staged(&self) -> bool {
3510                 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged
3511         }
3512
3513         pub fn is_disabled_marked(&self) -> bool {
3514                 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked
3515         }
3516
3517         fn check_get_funding_locked(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
3518                 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3519                         return None;
3520                 }
3521
3522                 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3523                 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
3524                         self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
3525                 }
3526
3527                 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth as i64 {
3528                         return None;
3529                 }
3530
3531                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3532                 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3533                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3534                         true
3535                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3536                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3537                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
3538                         true
3539                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3540                         // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3541                         false
3542                 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3543                         panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3544                 } else {
3545                         // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3546                         false
3547                 };
3548
3549                 if need_commitment_update {
3550                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3551                                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3552                                 return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3553                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3554                                         next_per_commitment_point,
3555                                 });
3556                         } else {
3557                                 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3558                         }
3559                 }
3560                 None
3561         }
3562
3563         /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
3564         /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
3565         /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
3566         pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData, logger: &L)
3567                         -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3568                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3569                 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3570                         if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3571                                 // If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring
3572                                 // whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one.
3573                                 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3574                                         if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
3575                                                 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
3576                                                 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3577                                                                 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3578                                                         if self.is_outbound() {
3579                                                                 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3580                                                                 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3581                                                                 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3582                                                                 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3583                                                                 // channel and move on.
3584                                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3585                                                                 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3586                                                         }
3587                                                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
3588                                                         return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3589                                                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3590                                                                 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index".to_owned()
3591                                                         });
3592                                                 } else {
3593                                                         if self.is_outbound() {
3594                                                                 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3595                                                                         if input.witness.is_empty() {
3596                                                                                 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3597                                                                                 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3598                                                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3599                                                                                 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3600                                                                         }
3601                                                                 }
3602                                                         }
3603                                                         self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
3604                                                         self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
3605                                                         self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
3606                                                                 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
3607                                                                 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
3608                                                         }
3609                                                 }
3610                                         }
3611                                         // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for funding_locked here and
3612                                         // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
3613                                         // may have already happened for this block).
3614                                         if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3615                                                 return Ok(Some(funding_locked));
3616                                         }
3617                                 }
3618                                 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3619                                         if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3620                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3621                                                 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3622                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3623                                                         data: "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.".to_owned()
3624                                                 });
3625                                         }
3626                                 }
3627                         }
3628                 }
3629                 Ok(None)
3630         }
3631
3632         /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
3633         /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
3634         /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3635         /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3636         ///
3637         /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3638         /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3639         /// post-shutdown.
3640         ///
3641         /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3642         /// back.
3643         pub fn best_block_updated(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3644                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3645                 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
3646                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3647                         match htlc_update {
3648                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3649                                         if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
3650                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3651                                                 false
3652                                         } else { true }
3653                                 },
3654                                 _ => true
3655                         }
3656                 });
3657
3658                 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
3659
3660                 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3661                         return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs));
3662                 }
3663
3664                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3665                 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
3666                    (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 {
3667                         let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3668                         if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3669                                 // Note that check_get_funding_locked may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
3670                                 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
3671                                 // indicate we've already sent a funding_locked
3672                                 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
3673                         }
3674
3675                         // If we've sent funding_locked (or have both sent and received funding_locked), and
3676                         // the funding transaction's confirmation count has dipped below minimum_depth / 2,
3677                         // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
3678                         // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
3679                         if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth as i64 / 2 {
3680                                 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3681                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3682                                         data: format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.", self.minimum_depth, funding_tx_confirmations),
3683                                 });
3684                         }
3685                 }
3686
3687                 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3688         }
3689
3690         /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
3691         /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
3692         /// before the channel has reached funding_locked and we can just wait for more blocks.
3693         pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&mut self) -> Result<(), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3694                 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
3695                         // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
3696                         // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
3697                         let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
3698                         // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
3699                         // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
3700                         // time we saw and it will be ignored.
3701                         let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
3702                         match self.best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time) {
3703                                 Ok((funding_locked, timed_out_htlcs)) => {
3704                                         assert!(funding_locked.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
3705                                         assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
3706                                         Ok(())
3707                                 },
3708                                 Err(e) => Err(e)
3709                         }
3710                 } else {
3711                         // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
3712                         Ok(())
3713                 }
3714         }
3715
3716         // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3717         // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3718
3719         pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3720                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3721                         panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3722                 }
3723                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3724                         panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3725                 }
3726
3727                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3728                         panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3729                 }
3730
3731                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3732                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3733
3734                 msgs::OpenChannel {
3735                         chain_hash,
3736                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3737                         funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3738                         push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3739                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3740                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3741                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3742                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3743                         feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
3744                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3745                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3746                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3747                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3748                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3749                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3750                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3751                         first_per_commitment_point,
3752                         channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3753                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3754                 }
3755         }
3756
3757         pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3758                 if self.is_outbound() {
3759                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3760                 }
3761                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3762                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3763                 }
3764                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3765                         panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3766                 }
3767
3768                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3769                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3770
3771                 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3772                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3773                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3774                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3775                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3776                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3777                         minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3778                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3779                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3780                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3781                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3782                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3783                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3784                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3785                         first_per_commitment_point,
3786                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3787                 }
3788         }
3789
3790         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3791         fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3792                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3793                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
3794                 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3795                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
3796         }
3797
3798         /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3799         /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3800         /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3801         /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3802         /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3803         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3804         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3805         pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3806                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3807                         panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3808                 }
3809                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3810                         panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3811                 }
3812                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3813                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3814                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3815                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3816                 }
3817
3818                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
3819                 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
3820
3821                 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
3822                         Ok(res) => res,
3823                         Err(e) => {
3824                                 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3825                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3826                                 return Err(e);
3827                         }
3828                 };
3829
3830                 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3831
3832                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3833
3834                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3835                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3836                 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
3837
3838                 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
3839                         temporary_channel_id,
3840                         funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3841                         funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3842                         signature
3843                 })
3844         }
3845
3846         /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3847         /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3848         /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3849         /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3850         /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3851         /// closing).
3852         /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3853         /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3854         pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3855                 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3856                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
3857                 }
3858                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3859                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
3860                 }
3861                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3862                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
3863                 }
3864
3865                 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
3866
3867                 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3868                         features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3869                         chain_hash,
3870                         short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3871                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
3872                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
3873                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3874                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
3875                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3876                 };
3877
3878                 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3879                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
3880
3881                 Ok((msg, sig))
3882         }
3883
3884         /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3885         /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3886         pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
3887                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3888                 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3889                 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
3890                 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
3891                 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
3892                 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
3893                 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
3894                 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
3895                 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
3896                 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
3897                 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3898                         let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
3899                         log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
3900                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3901                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
3902                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
3903                         })
3904                 } else {
3905                         log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret");
3906                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3907                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
3908                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
3909                         })
3910                 };
3911                 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3912                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3913                         // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3914                         // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3915                         // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3916                         // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3917                         // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3918                         // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3919
3920                         // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3921                         // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3922                         next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
3923                         // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3924                         // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3925                         // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3926                         // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3927                         // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3928                         // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3929                         // overflow here.
3930                         next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3931                         data_loss_protect,
3932                 }
3933         }
3934
3935
3936         // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3937
3938         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3939         /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3940         /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3941         /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3942         /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3943         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3944         /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
3945         pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
3946                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3947                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
3948                 }
3949                 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
3950                 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
3951                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
3952                 }
3953
3954                 if amount_msat == 0 {
3955                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3956                 }
3957
3958                 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
3959                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
3960                 }
3961
3962                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3963                         // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3964                         // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3965                         // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3966                         // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3967                         // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3968                         // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3969                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update".to_owned()));
3970                 }
3971
3972                 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3973                 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3974                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3975                 }
3976                 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3977                 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3978                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3979                 }
3980
3981                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3982                         // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3983                         let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
3984                         let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
3985                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3986                         let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3987                         if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3988                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3989                         }
3990                 }
3991
3992                 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - htlc_outbound_value_msat;
3993                 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
3994                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
3995                 }
3996
3997                 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
3998                 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
3999                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4000                         2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
4001                 } else { 0 };
4002                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
4003                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
4004                 }
4005
4006                 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
4007                 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
4008                 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
4009                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
4010                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
4011                 }
4012
4013                 // Now update local state:
4014                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
4015                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4016                                 amount_msat,
4017                                 payment_hash,
4018                                 cltv_expiry,
4019                                 source,
4020                                 onion_routing_packet,
4021                         });
4022                         return Ok(None);
4023                 }
4024
4025                 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4026                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4027                         amount_msat,
4028                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4029                         cltv_expiry,
4030                         state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
4031                         source,
4032                 });
4033
4034                 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4035                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4036                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4037                         amount_msat,
4038                         payment_hash,
4039                         cltv_expiry,
4040                         onion_routing_packet,
4041                 };
4042                 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
4043
4044                 Ok(Some(res))
4045         }
4046
4047         /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
4048         /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
4049         /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
4050         /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
4051         pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4052                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4053                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
4054                 }
4055                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
4056                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
4057                 }
4058                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
4059                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4060                 }
4061                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
4062                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4063                 }
4064                 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
4065                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4066                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4067                                 have_updates = true;
4068                         }
4069                         if have_updates { break; }
4070                 }
4071                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4072                         if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4073                                 have_updates = true;
4074                         }
4075                         if have_updates { break; }
4076                 }
4077                 if !have_updates {
4078                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
4079                 }
4080                 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
4081         }
4082         /// Only fails in case of bad keys
4083         fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4084                 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4085                 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4086                 // is acceptable.
4087                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4088                         let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4089                                 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4090                         } else { None };
4091                         if let Some(state) = new_state {
4092                                 htlc.state = state;
4093                         }
4094                 }
4095                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4096                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4097                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
4098                         } else { None } {
4099                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4100                         }
4101                 }
4102                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4103
4104                 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4105                         Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4106                                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4107                                 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4108                                         htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4109                                 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4110                         },
4111                         Err(e) => return Err(e),
4112                 };
4113
4114                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4115                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4116                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4117                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4118                                 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4119                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4120                                 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4121                                 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4122                         }]
4123                 };
4124                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4125                 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4126         }
4127
4128         /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4129         /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4130         fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4131                 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4132                 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
4133                         if self.is_outbound() {
4134                                 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4135                         }
4136                 }
4137
4138                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4139                 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
4140                 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4141                 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4142
4143                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4144                 {
4145                         if !self.is_outbound() {
4146                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4147                                 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4148                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4149                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4150                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4151                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4152                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4153                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4154                                                         let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.1);
4155                                                         assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4156                                                 }
4157                                 }
4158                         }
4159                 }
4160
4161                 {
4162                         let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len());
4163                         for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
4164                                 htlcs.push(htlc);
4165                         }
4166
4167                         let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4168                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4169                         signature = res.0;
4170                         htlc_signatures = res.1;
4171
4172                         log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {}",
4173                                 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4174                                 &counterparty_commitment_txid,
4175                                 encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4176                                 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
4177
4178                         for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4179                                 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
4180                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4181                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4182                                         log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4183                                         log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
4184                         }
4185                 }
4186
4187                 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4188                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4189                         signature,
4190                         htlc_signatures,
4191                 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
4192         }
4193
4194         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4195         /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4196         /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4197         /// more info.
4198         pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4199                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4200                         Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4201                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4202                                 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4203                         },
4204                         None => Ok(None)
4205                 }
4206         }
4207
4208         /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
4209         pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
4210                 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
4211         }
4212
4213         pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4214                 let usable_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
4215                 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= usable_channel_value_msat {
4216                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
4217                 }
4218                 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4219                         fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
4220                         fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
4221                         cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
4222                 });
4223
4224                 Ok(())
4225         }
4226
4227         /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4228         /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4229         pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
4230                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4231                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4232                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4233                         }
4234                 }
4235                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4236                         if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4237                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4238                         }
4239                         else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4240                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4241                         }
4242                 }
4243                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4244                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4245                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4246                 }
4247
4248                 let closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
4249
4250                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4251                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4252                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4253                 } else {
4254                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4255                 }
4256                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4257
4258                 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4259                 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4260                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4261                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4262                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4263                         match htlc_update {
4264                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4265                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4266                                         false
4267                                 },
4268                                 _ => true
4269                         }
4270                 });
4271
4272                 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
4273                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4274                         scriptpubkey: closing_script,
4275                 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4276         }
4277
4278         /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4279         /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4280         /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4281         /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4282         /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4283         pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4284                 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
4285                 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
4286                 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
4287                 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4288                 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4289
4290                 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4291                 // return them to fail the payment.
4292                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4293                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4294                         match htlc_update {
4295                                 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4296                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4297                                 },
4298                                 _ => {}
4299                         }
4300                 }
4301                 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4302                         // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4303                         // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4304                         // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4305                         // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4306                         // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4307                         // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4308                         // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4309                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4310                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4311                                 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4312                                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4313                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4314                                 }))
4315                         } else { None }
4316                 } else { None };
4317
4318                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4319                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4320                 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4321         }
4322 }
4323
4324 fn is_unsupported_shutdown_script(their_features: &InitFeatures, script: &Script) -> bool {
4325         // We restrain shutdown scripts to standards forms to avoid transactions not propagating on the p2p tx-relay network
4326
4327         // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms,
4328         // which for a a BIP-141-compliant witness program is at max 42 bytes in length.
4329         // So don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
4330         let is_script_too_long = script.len() > 42;
4331         if is_script_too_long {
4332                 return true;
4333         }
4334
4335         if their_features.supports_shutdown_anysegwit() && script.is_witness_program() && script.as_bytes()[0] != OP_PUSHBYTES_0.into_u8() {
4336                 return false;
4337         }
4338
4339         return !script.is_p2pkh() && !script.is_p2sh() && !script.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !script.is_v0_p2wsh()
4340 }
4341
4342 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4343 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4344
4345 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4346         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4347                 match self {
4348                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
4349                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
4350                                 error_packet.write(writer)?;
4351                         },
4352                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
4353                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4354                                 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
4355                                 err_code.write(writer)?;
4356                         },
4357                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4358                                 2u8.write(writer)?;
4359                                 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4360                         },
4361                 }
4362                 Ok(())
4363         }
4364 }
4365
4366 impl Readable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4367         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4368                 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4369                         0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
4370                         1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4371                         2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
4372                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4373                 })
4374         }
4375 }
4376
4377 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4378         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4379                 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4380                 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
4381
4382                 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4383                 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4384
4385                 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4386                 self.config.write(writer)?;
4387
4388                 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4389                 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4390                 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4391
4392                 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4393
4394                 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4395                 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
4396                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::usize::MAX);
4397                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::u32::MAX as usize);
4398                 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4399                 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
4400
4401                 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4402                 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4403
4404                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4405                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4406                 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4407
4408                 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4409                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4410                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4411                                 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4412                         }
4413                 }
4414                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4415                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4416                         if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4417                                 continue; // Drop
4418                         }
4419                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4420                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4421                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4422                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4423                         match &htlc.state {
4424                                 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4425                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4426                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4427                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4428                                 },
4429                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4430                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4431                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4432                                 },
4433                                 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4434                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4435                                 },
4436                                 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4437                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4438                                         removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4439                                 },
4440                         }
4441                 }
4442
4443                 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4444                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4445                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4446                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4447                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4448                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4449                         htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4450                         match &htlc.state {
4451                                 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4452                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4453                                         onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4454                                 },
4455                                 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4456                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4457                                 },
4458                                 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
4459                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4460                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4461                                 },
4462                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4463                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4464                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4465                                 },
4466                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4467                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4468                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4469                                 },
4470                         }
4471                 }
4472
4473                 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4474                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4475                         match update {
4476                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4477                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4478                                         amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4479                                         cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4480                                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4481                                         source.write(writer)?;
4482                                         onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4483                                 },
4484                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4485                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4486                                         payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4487                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4488                                 },
4489                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4490                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4491                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4492                                         err_packet.write(writer)?;
4493                                 }
4494                         }
4495                 }
4496
4497                 match self.resend_order {
4498                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4499                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4500                 }
4501
4502                 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4503                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4504                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4505
4506                 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4507                 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4508                         pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4509                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4510                 }
4511
4512                 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4513                 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4514                         htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4515                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4516                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4517                 }
4518
4519                 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4520                 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4521
4522                 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4523                 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4524                 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4525                 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4526
4527                 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4528                         Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4529                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4530                                 feerate.write(writer)?;
4531                                 fee.write(writer)?;
4532                                 sig.write(writer)?;
4533                         },
4534                         None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4535                 }
4536
4537                 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4538                 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
4539                 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4540
4541                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4542                 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4543                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4544                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4545                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4546                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4547                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4548                 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
4549
4550                 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
4551                         Some(info) => {
4552                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4553                                 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
4554                                 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4555                                 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4556                         },
4557                         None => 0u8.write(writer)?
4558                 }
4559
4560                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
4561                 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
4562
4563                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4564                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4565                 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
4566
4567                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4568
4569                 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4570                 Ok(())
4571         }
4572 }
4573
4574 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4575 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
4576                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4577         fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4578                 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4579                 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4580                 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4581                         return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4582                 }
4583
4584                 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4585                 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
4586
4587                 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4588                 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4589                 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4590
4591                 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4592
4593                 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4594                 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
4595                 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
4596                         // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
4597                         let mut data = [0; 1024];
4598                         let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
4599                         reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
4600                         keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
4601                 }
4602                 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
4603
4604                 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4605                 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4606
4607                 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4608                 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4609                 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4610
4611                 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4612                 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4613                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
4614                         pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4615                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4616                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4617                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4618                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4619                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4620                                         1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4621                                         2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4622                                         3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4623                                         4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4624                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4625                                 },
4626                         });
4627                 }
4628
4629                 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4630                 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4631                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4632                         pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4633                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4634                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4635                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4636                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4637                                 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4638                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4639                                         0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4640                                         1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4641                                         2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4642                                         3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4643                                         4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4644                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4645                                 },
4646                         });
4647                 }
4648
4649                 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4650                 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4651                 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4652                         holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4653                                 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4654                                         amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4655                                         cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4656                                         payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4657                                         source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4658                                         onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4659                                 },
4660                                 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4661                                         payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4662                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4663                                 },
4664                                 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4665                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4666                                         err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4667                                 },
4668                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4669                         });
4670                 }
4671
4672                 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4673                         0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4674                         1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4675                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4676                 };
4677
4678                 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4679                 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4680                 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4681
4682                 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4683                 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4684                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4685                         monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4686                 }
4687
4688                 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4689                 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4690                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4691                         monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4692                 }
4693
4694                 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4695                 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4696
4697                 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4698                 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4699                 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
4700                 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4701
4702                 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4703                         0 => None,
4704                         1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4705                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4706                 };
4707
4708                 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4709                 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
4710                 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4711
4712                 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4713                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4714                 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4715                 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4716                 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4717                 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4718                 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
4719                 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
4720
4721                 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4722                         0 => None,
4723                         1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4724                                 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4725                                 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
4726                                 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
4727                         }),
4728                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4729                 };
4730
4731                 let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
4732                 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
4733
4734                 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4735
4736                 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4737                 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4738
4739                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4740                 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4741
4742                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4743                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
4744
4745                 Ok(Channel {
4746                         user_id,
4747
4748                         config,
4749                         channel_id,
4750                         channel_state,
4751                         secp_ctx,
4752                         channel_value_satoshis,
4753
4754                         latest_monitor_update_id,
4755
4756                         holder_signer,
4757                         shutdown_pubkey,
4758                         destination_script,
4759
4760                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4761                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4762                         value_to_self_msat,
4763
4764                         pending_inbound_htlcs,
4765                         pending_outbound_htlcs,
4766                         holding_cell_htlc_updates,
4767
4768                         resend_order,
4769
4770                         monitor_pending_funding_locked,
4771                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
4772                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
4773                         monitor_pending_forwards,
4774                         monitor_pending_failures,
4775
4776                         pending_update_fee,
4777                         holding_cell_update_fee,
4778                         next_holder_htlc_id,
4779                         next_counterparty_htlc_id,
4780                         update_time_counter,
4781                         feerate_per_kw,
4782
4783                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4784                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4785                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4786                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4787
4788                         last_sent_closing_fee,
4789
4790                         funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4791                         funding_tx_confirmation_height,
4792                         short_channel_id,
4793
4794                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
4795                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4796                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4797                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4798                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
4799                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4800                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
4801                         minimum_depth,
4802
4803                         counterparty_forwarding_info,
4804
4805                         channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
4806                         funding_transaction,
4807
4808                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
4809                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
4810                         counterparty_node_id,
4811
4812                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4813
4814                         commitment_secrets,
4815
4816                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
4817
4818                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4819                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4820                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4821                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4822                 })
4823         }
4824 }
4825
4826 #[cfg(test)]
4827 mod tests {
4828         use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4829         use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4830         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4831         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
4832         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4833         use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4834         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4835         use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4836         use hex;
4837         use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4838         use ln::channel::{Channel,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
4839         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4840         use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4841         use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
4842         use ln::chan_utils;
4843         use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
4844         use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4845         use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
4846         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4847         use util::config::UserConfig;
4848         use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
4849         use util::test_utils;
4850         use util::logger::Logger;
4851         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
4852         use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
4853         use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4854         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4855         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4856         use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
4857         use std::sync::Arc;
4858
4859         struct TestFeeEstimator {
4860                 fee_est: u32
4861         }
4862         impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4863                 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
4864                         self.fee_est
4865                 }
4866         }
4867
4868         #[test]
4869         fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4870                 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4871                         "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4872         }
4873
4874         struct Keys {
4875                 signer: InMemorySigner,
4876         }
4877         impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4878                 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
4879
4880                 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4881                 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4882                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4883                         let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4884                         let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4885                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4886                 }
4887
4888                 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4889                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4890                         let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4891                         PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4892                 }
4893
4894                 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
4895                         self.signer.clone()
4896                 }
4897                 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4898                 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
4899         }
4900
4901         fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
4902                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
4903         }
4904
4905         // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
4906         // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
4907         #[test]
4908         fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
4909                 let original_fee = 253;
4910                 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
4911                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4912                 let seed = [42; 32];
4913                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4914                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4915
4916                 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4917                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4918                 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4919
4920                 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
4921                 // same as the old fee.
4922                 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
4923                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4924                 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
4925         }
4926
4927         #[test]
4928         fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
4929                 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
4930                 // dust limits are used.
4931                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4932                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4933                 let seed = [42; 32];
4934                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4935                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4936
4937                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
4938                 // they have different dust limits.
4939
4940                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
4941                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4942                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4943                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4944
4945                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4946                 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
4947                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4948                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4949                 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
4950
4951                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
4952                 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4953                 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
4954                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
4955                 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
4956
4957                 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
4958                 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
4959                 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4960                         htlc_id: 0,
4961                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
4962                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
4963                         cltv_expiry: 300000000,
4964                         state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4965                 });
4966
4967                 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4968                         htlc_id: 1,
4969                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
4970                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
4971                         cltv_expiry: 200000000,
4972                         state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4973                         source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4974                                 path: Vec::new(),
4975                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4976                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
4977                         }
4978                 });
4979
4980                 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
4981                 // the dust limit check.
4982                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4983                 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4984                 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
4985                 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
4986
4987                 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
4988                 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
4989                 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
4990                 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
4991                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4992                 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4993                 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
4994         }
4995
4996         #[test]
4997         fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
4998                 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
4999                 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
5000                 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
5001                 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
5002                 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
5003                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5004                 let seed = [42; 32];
5005                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5006                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5007
5008                 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5009                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5010                 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5011
5012                 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5013                 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
5014
5015                 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
5016                 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5017                 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5018                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5019                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5020                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5021
5022                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5023                 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5024                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5025                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5026                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5027
5028                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5029
5030                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5031                 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5032                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5033                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5034                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5035
5036                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5037                 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5038                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5039                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5040                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5041         }
5042
5043         #[test]
5044         fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
5045                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5046                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5047                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5048                 let seed = [42; 32];
5049                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5050                 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
5051                 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
5052                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5053
5054                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
5055
5056                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5057                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5058                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5059                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5060
5061                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5062                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
5063                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5064                 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5065
5066                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
5067                 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5068                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5069
5070                 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
5071                 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5072                 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5073                         value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
5074                 }]};
5075                 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
5076                 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
5077                 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
5078
5079                 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
5080                 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
5081
5082                 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
5083                 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
5084                 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5085                 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5086                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5087                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5088                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5089                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5090                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5091                         },
5092                         _ => panic!()
5093                 }
5094
5095                 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
5096                 // is sane.
5097                 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5098                 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5099                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5100                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5101                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5102                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5103                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5104                         },
5105                         _ => panic!()
5106                 }
5107         }
5108
5109         #[test]
5110         fn channel_update() {
5111                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5112                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5113                 let seed = [42; 32];
5114                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5115                 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5116                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5117
5118                 // Create a channel.
5119                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5120                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5121                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5122                 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
5123                 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
5124                 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
5125
5126                 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
5127                 let update = ChannelUpdate {
5128                         contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
5129                                 chain_hash,
5130                                 short_channel_id: 0,
5131                                 timestamp: 0,
5132                                 flags: 0,
5133                                 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
5134                                 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
5135                                 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
5136                                 fee_base_msat: 110,
5137                                 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
5138                                 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5139                         },
5140                         signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
5141                 };
5142                 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
5143
5144                 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
5145                 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
5146                 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
5147                 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
5148                         Some(info) => {
5149                                 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
5150                                 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
5151                                 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
5152                         },
5153                         None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
5154                 }
5155         }
5156
5157         #[test]
5158         fn outbound_commitment_test() {
5159                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
5160                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5161                 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
5162                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5163
5164                 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
5165                         &secp_ctx,
5166                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5167                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5168                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5169                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5170                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5171
5172                         // These aren't set in the test vectors:
5173                         [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
5174                         10_000_000,
5175                         [0; 32]
5176                 );
5177
5178                 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5179                                 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
5180                 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
5181
5182                 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5183                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
5184                 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
5185                 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
5186                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5187
5188                 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
5189
5190                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5191                         funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5192                         revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5193                         payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
5194                         delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5195                         htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
5196                 };
5197                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5198                         CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5199                                 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5200                                 selected_contest_delay: 144
5201                         });
5202                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5203                 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5204
5205                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5206                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5207
5208                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5209                            hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5210
5211                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5212                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5213
5214                 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5215                 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5216                 // build_commitment_transaction.
5217                 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5218                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5219                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5220                 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5221                 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5222
5223                 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5224                         ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5225                                 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5226                         } ) => { {
5227                                 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
5228                                         let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
5229
5230                                         let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
5231                                                 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
5232                                                 .collect();
5233                                         (res.0, htlcs)
5234                                 };
5235                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
5236                                 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
5237                                 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5238                                 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5239                                 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
5240                                 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
5241
5242                                 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
5243                                 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5244                                 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
5245                                 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5246                                 $({
5247                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5248                                         per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
5249                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
5250                                 })*
5251                                 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
5252
5253                                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
5254                                         commitment_tx.clone(),
5255                                         counterparty_signature,
5256                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs,
5257                                         &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
5258                                         chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
5259                                 );
5260                                 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
5261                                 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
5262
5263                                 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5264                                 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
5265                                 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
5266
5267                                 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
5268                                 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
5269
5270                                 $({
5271                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5272
5273                                         let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
5274                                         let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
5275                                         let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
5276                                         let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
5277                                         secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
5278
5279                                         let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5280                                         if !htlc.offered {
5281                                                 for i in 0..5 {
5282                                                         let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
5283                                                         if out == htlc.payment_hash {
5284                                                                 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
5285                                                         }
5286                                                 }
5287
5288                                                 assert!(preimage.is_some());
5289                                         }
5290
5291                                         let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
5292                                         assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
5293
5294                                         let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5295                                         assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
5296                                         let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
5297                                         let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
5298                                         let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
5299                                         assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
5300                                                         hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
5301                                 })*
5302                                 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
5303                         } }
5304                 }
5305
5306                 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
5307                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
5308
5309                 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
5310                                                  "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
5311                                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48454a56a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004730440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae05564714201483045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
5312
5313                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5314                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5315                                 htlc_id: 0,
5316                                 amount_msat: 1000000,
5317                                 cltv_expiry: 500,
5318                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5319                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5320                         };
5321                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
5322                         out
5323                 });
5324                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5325                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5326                                 htlc_id: 1,
5327                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5328                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
5329                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5330                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5331                         };
5332                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5333                         out
5334                 });
5335                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5336                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5337                                 htlc_id: 2,
5338                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5339                                 cltv_expiry: 502,
5340                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5341                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5342                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5343                         };
5344                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
5345                         out
5346                 });
5347                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5348                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5349                                 htlc_id: 3,
5350                                 amount_msat: 3000000,
5351                                 cltv_expiry: 503,
5352                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5353                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5354                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5355                         };
5356                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
5357                         out
5358                 });
5359                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5360                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5361                                 htlc_id: 4,
5362                                 amount_msat: 4000000,
5363                                 cltv_expiry: 504,
5364                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5365                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5366                         };
5367                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
5368                         out
5369                 });
5370
5371                 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5372                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5373                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
5374
5375                 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
5376                                  "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
5377                                  "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", {
5378
5379                                   { 0,
5380                                   "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
5381                                   "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
5382                                   "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" },
5383
5384                                   { 1,
5385                                   "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
5386                                   "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
5387                                   "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" },
5388
5389                                   { 2,
5390                                   "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
5391                                   "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
5392                                   "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" },
5393
5394                                   { 3,
5395                                   "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
5396                                   "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
5397                                   "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b03000000000000000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c13630147304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac748701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
5398
5399                                   { 4,
5400                                   "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
5401                                   "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
5402                                   "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" }
5403                 } );
5404
5405                 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5406                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5407                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
5408
5409                 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
5410                                  "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
5411                                  "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", {
5412
5413                                   { 0,
5414                                   "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
5415                                   "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
5416                                   "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" },
5417
5418                                   { 1,
5419                                   "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
5420                                   "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
5421                                   "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" },
5422
5423                                   { 2,
5424                                   "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
5425                                   "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
5426                                   "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" },
5427
5428                                   { 3,
5429                                   "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
5430                                   "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
5431                                   "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe030000000000000000010c0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c6401483045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
5432
5433                                   { 4,
5434                                   "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
5435                                   "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
5436                                   "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe04000000000000000001da0d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca01473044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5437                 } );
5438
5439                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5440                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5441                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
5442
5443                 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
5444                                  "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
5445                                  "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", {
5446
5447                                   { 0,
5448                                   "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
5449                                   "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
5450                                   "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" },
5451
5452                                   { 1,
5453                                   "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
5454                                   "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
5455                                   "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" },
5456
5457                                   { 2,
5458                                   "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
5459                                   "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
5460                                   "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" },
5461
5462                                   { 3,
5463                                   "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
5464                                   "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
5465                                   "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" }
5466                 } );
5467
5468                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5469                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5470                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
5471
5472                 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
5473                                  "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
5474                                  "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", {
5475
5476                                   { 0,
5477                                   "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
5478                                   "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
5479                                   "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
5480
5481                                   { 1,
5482                                   "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
5483                                   "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
5484                                   "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" },
5485
5486                                   { 2,
5487                                   "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
5488                                   "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
5489                                   "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" },
5490
5491                                   { 3,
5492                                   "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
5493                                   "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
5494                                   "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" }
5495                 } );
5496
5497                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5498                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5499                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
5500
5501                 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
5502                                  "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
5503                                  "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", {
5504
5505                                   { 0,
5506                                   "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
5507                                   "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
5508                                   "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff0000000000000000000174020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b014730440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e501008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
5509
5510                                   { 1,
5511                                   "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
5512                                   "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
5513                                   "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff010000000000000000015c060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546014830450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
5514
5515                                   { 2,
5516                                   "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
5517                                   "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
5518                                   "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" }
5519                 } );
5520
5521                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5522                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5523                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
5524
5525                 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
5526                                  "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
5527                                  "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", {
5528
5529                                   { 0,
5530                                   "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
5531                                   "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
5532                                   "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" },
5533
5534                                   { 1,
5535                                   "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
5536                                   "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
5537                                   "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" },
5538
5539                                   { 2,
5540                                   "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
5541                                   "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
5542                                   "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd020000000000000000019a090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b014830450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5543                 } );
5544
5545                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5546                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5547                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
5548
5549                 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
5550                                  "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
5551                                  "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", {
5552
5553                                   { 0,
5554                                   "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
5555                                   "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
5556                                   "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e01483045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d7601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
5557
5558                                   { 1,
5559                                   "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
5560                                   "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
5561                                   "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" }
5562                 } );
5563
5564                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5565                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5566                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
5567
5568                 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
5569                                  "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
5570                                  "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", {
5571
5572                                   { 0,
5573                                   "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
5574                                   "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
5575                                   "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" },
5576
5577                                   { 1,
5578                                   "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
5579                                   "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
5580                                   "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" }
5581                 } );
5582
5583                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5584                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5585                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
5586
5587                 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
5588                                  "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
5589                                  "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", {
5590
5591                                   { 0,
5592                                   "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
5593                                   "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
5594                                   "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" }
5595                 } );
5596
5597                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5598                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5599                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
5600
5601                 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
5602                                  "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
5603                                  "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", {
5604
5605                                   { 0,
5606                                   "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
5607                                   "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
5608                                   "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" }
5609                 } );
5610
5611                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5612                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5613                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
5614
5615                 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
5616                                  "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
5617                                  "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", {});
5618
5619                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5620                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5621                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
5622
5623                 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
5624                                  "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
5625                                  "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", {});
5626
5627                 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5628                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5629                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
5630
5631                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5632                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5633                                  "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", {});
5634
5635                 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
5636                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5637                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
5638
5639                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5640                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5641                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
5642
5643                 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
5644                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
5645                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
5646                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
5647                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5648                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5649                                 htlc_id: 1,
5650                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5651                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
5652                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5653                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5654                         };
5655                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5656                         out
5657                 });
5658                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
5659                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5660                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5661                                 htlc_id: 6,
5662                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
5663                                 cltv_expiry: 506,
5664                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5665                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5666                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5667                         };
5668                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5669                         out
5670                 });
5671                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5672                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5673                                 htlc_id: 5,
5674                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
5675                                 cltv_expiry: 505,
5676                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5677                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5678                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5679                         };
5680                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5681                         out
5682                 });
5683
5684                 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
5685                                  "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
5686                                  "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", {
5687
5688                                   { 0,
5689                                   "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
5690                                   "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
5691                                   "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" },
5692                                   { 1,
5693                                   "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
5694                                   "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
5695                                   "0200000000010189a326e23addc28323dbadcb4e71c2c17088b6e8fa184103e552f44075dddc3401000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5014830450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d3901008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868f9010000" },
5696                                   { 2,
5697                                   "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
5698                                   "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
5699                                   "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" }
5700                 } );
5701         }
5702
5703         #[test]
5704         fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
5705                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
5706
5707                 let mut seed = [0; 32];
5708                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
5709                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5710                            hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
5711
5712                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
5713                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5714                            hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
5715
5716                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
5717                            hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
5718
5719                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
5720                            hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
5721
5722                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
5723                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
5724                            hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
5725         }
5726
5727         #[test]
5728         fn test_key_derivation() {
5729                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
5730                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5731
5732                 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5733                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5734
5735                 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
5736                 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
5737
5738                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5739                 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
5740
5741                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5742                                 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
5743
5744                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5745                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5746
5747                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5748                                 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
5749
5750                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5751                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5752         }
5753 }