_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/channel.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
  11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
  12 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  13 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  14 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
  15
  16 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
  19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
  20
  21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
  23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
  24
  25 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
  26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
  27 use ln::msgs;
  28 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
  29 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
  30 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
  31 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
  32 use ln::chan_utils;
  33 use chain::BestBlock;
  34 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
  35 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
  36 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
  37 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
  38 use util::transaction_utils;
  39 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
  40 use util::logger::Logger;
  41 use util::errors::APIError;
  42 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
  43 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
  44
  45 use io;
  46 use prelude::*;
  47 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
  48 use core::convert::TryFrom;
  49 use core::ops::Deref;
  50 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", debug_assertions))]
  51 use sync::Mutex;
  52 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
  53
  54 #[cfg(test)]
  55 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
  56         pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
  57         pub channel_value_msat: u64,
  58         pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
  59         pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  60         pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  61         pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
  62         pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
  63         pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
  64 }
  65
  66 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
  67         FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
  68         FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
  69         Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
  70 }
  71
  72 enum InboundHTLCState {
  73         /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
  74         /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
  75         RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
  76         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
  77         /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
  78         /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
  79         /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
  80         /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
  81         /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
  82         /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
  83         /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
  84         /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
  85         /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
  86         /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
  87         /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
  88         ///
  89         /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
  90         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc)   --> local
  91         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
  92         /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack               <-- local
  93         /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
  94         /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
  95         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc)   --> local
  96         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
  97         /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
  98         /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
  99         /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
 100         /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
 101         /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
 102         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 103         ///
 104         /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
 105         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
 106         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
 107         /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
 108         /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
 109         /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
 110         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 111         AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
 112         Committed,
 113         /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 114         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 115         /// we'll drop it.
 116         /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
 117         /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
 118         /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
 119         /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
 120         /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
 121         /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
 122         /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
 123         LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
 124 }
 125
 126 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
 127         htlc_id: u64,
 128         amount_msat: u64,
 129         cltv_expiry: u32,
 130         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 131         state: InboundHTLCState,
 132 }
 133
 134 enum OutboundHTLCState {
 135         /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 136         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 137         /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
 138         /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
 139         ///  * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
 140         ///    money back (though we won't), and,
 141         ///  * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
 142         ///    allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
 143         ///    doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
 144         ///    we'll never get out of sync).
 145         /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
 146         /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
 147         LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
 148         Committed,
 149         /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
 150         /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
 151         RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 152         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 153         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 154         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 155         /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
 156         /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
 157         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 158         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 159         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 160         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 161         /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
 162         /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
 163         AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 164 }
 165
 166 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
 167         htlc_id: u64,
 168         amount_msat: u64,
 169         cltv_expiry: u32,
 170         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 171         state: OutboundHTLCState,
 172         source: HTLCSource,
 173 }
 174
 175 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
 176 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
 177         AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
 178                 // always outbound
 179                 amount_msat: u64,
 180                 cltv_expiry: u32,
 181                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 182                 source: HTLCSource,
 183                 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
 184         },
 185         ClaimHTLC {
 186                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
 187                 htlc_id: u64,
 188         },
 189         FailHTLC {
 190                 htlc_id: u64,
 191                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
 192         },
 193 }
 194
 195 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
 196 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
 197 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
 198 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
 199 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
 200 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
 201 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
 202 enum ChannelState {
 203         /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
 204         OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
 205         /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
 206         TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
 207         /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
 208         /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
 209         /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
 210         FundingCreated = 4,
 211         /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
 212         /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
 213         /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
 214         FundingSent = 8,
 215         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
 216         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 217         TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
 218         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
 219         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 220         OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
 221         ChannelFunded = 64,
 222         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
 223         /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
 224         /// dance.
 225         PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
 226         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
 227         /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
 228         /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
 229         MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
 230         /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
 231         /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
 232         /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
 233         /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
 234         /// later.
 235         /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
 236         AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
 237         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
 238         /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
 239         /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
 240         RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
 241         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
 242         /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
 243         /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
 244         /// us their shutdown.
 245         LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
 246         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
 247         /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
 248         ShutdownComplete = 4096,
 249 }
 250 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
 251 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
 252
 253 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
 254
 255 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
 256 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
 257 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
 258 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
 259 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
 260 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
 261 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
 262         /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
 263         Enabled,
 264         /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
 265         DisabledStaged,
 266         /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
 267         EnabledStaged,
 268         /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
 269         Disabled,
 270 }
 271
 272 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
 273 enum HTLCInitiator {
 274         LocalOffered,
 275         RemoteOffered,
 276 }
 277
 278 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
 279 struct HTLCCandidate {
 280         amount_msat: u64,
 281         origin: HTLCInitiator,
 282 }
 283
 284 impl HTLCCandidate {
 285         fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
 286                 Self {
 287                         amount_msat,
 288                         origin,
 289                 }
 290         }
 291 }
 292
 293 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
 294 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
 295 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
 296         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
 297         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
 298         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
 299         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
 300         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
 301         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
 302         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
 303         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
 304 }
 305
 306 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
 307 /// description
 308 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
 309         NewClaim {
 310                 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
 311                 htlc_value_msat: u64,
 312                 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
 313         },
 314         DuplicateClaim {},
 315 }
 316
 317 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
 318 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
 319         /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
 320         /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
 321         /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
 322         NewClaim {
 323                 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
 324                 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
 325                 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
 326                 htlc_value_msat: u64,
 327                 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
 328                 /// in the holding cell).
 329                 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
 330         },
 331         /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
 332         /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
 333         DuplicateClaim {},
 334 }
 335
 336 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
 337 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
 338 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
 339 // inbound channel.
 340 //
 341 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
 342 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
 343 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
 344         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
 345         pub(crate) config: ChannelConfig,
 346         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
 347         config: ChannelConfig,
 348
 349         user_id: u64,
 350
 351         channel_id: [u8; 32],
 352         channel_state: u32,
 353         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
 354         channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 355
 356         latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
 357
 358         holder_signer: Signer,
 359         shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
 360         destination_script: Script,
 361
 362         // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
 363         // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
 364         // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
 365
 366         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 367         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 368         value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
 369         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
 370         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
 371         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
 372
 373         /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
 374         /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
 375         /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
 376         /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
 377         /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
 378         /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
 379         /// send it first.
 380         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
 381
 382         monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
 383         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
 384         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
 385         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
 386         monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
 387
 388         // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
 389         // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
 390         // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
 391         //
 392         // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
 393         // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
 394         // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
 395         // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
 396         // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
 397         // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
 398         // commitment_signed.
 399         pending_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 400         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
 401         // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
 402         // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
 403         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 404         holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 405         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
 406         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
 407         update_time_counter: u32,
 408         feerate_per_kw: u32,
 409
 410         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 411         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
 412         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 413         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 414         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
 415         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 416
 417         last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
 418
 419         /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
 420         funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
 421         funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
 422         short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
 423
 424         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 425         #[cfg(test)]
 426         pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 427         #[cfg(not(test))]
 428         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 429         #[cfg(test)]
 430         pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 431         #[cfg(not(test))]
 432         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 433         //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
 434         /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
 435         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
 436         // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
 437         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 438         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 439         #[cfg(test)]
 440         pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 441         #[cfg(not(test))]
 442         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 443         //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 444         minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
 445
 446         counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
 447
 448         pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
 449         funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
 450
 451         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 452         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 453         counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
 454
 455         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
 456
 457         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
 458
 459         channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
 460
 461         /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
 462         /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
 463         announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
 464
 465         // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
 466         // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
 467         // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
 468         // `build_commitment_transaction`.
 469         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 470         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
 471         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 472         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
 473
 474         /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
 475         /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
 476         /// funding_locked *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
 477         /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the funding_locked
 478         /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
 479         ///
 480         /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
 481         pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::FundingLocked>,
 482
 483         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 484         // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
 485         // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
 486         // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
 487         // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
 488         // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
 489         // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
 490         historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
 491 }
 492
 493 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 494 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
 495         fee: u64,
 496         total_pending_htlcs: usize,
 497         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
 498         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
 499         feerate: u32,
 500 }
 501
 502 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
 503
 504 #[cfg(not(test))]
 505 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 506 #[cfg(test)]
 507 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 508 #[cfg(not(test))]
 509 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 510 #[cfg(test)]
 511 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 512
 513 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
 514 /// it's 2^24.
 515 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
 516
 517 /// Maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed. 2 * standard dust threshold on p2wsh output
 518 /// Scales up on Bitcoin Core's proceeding policy with dust outputs. A typical p2wsh output is 43
 519 /// bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal spend of 67 bytes (even if
 520 /// a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee` is set to 3000sat/kb, thus
 521 /// 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs are p2wsh, a value of
 522 /// 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions. We give a bit
 523 /// of margin to our counterparty and pick up 660 satoshis as an accepted `dust_limit_satoshis`
 524 /// upper bound to avoid negotiation conflicts with other implementations.
 525 pub const MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 2 * 330;
 526
 527 /// A typical p2wsh output is 43 bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal
 528 /// spend of 67 bytes (even if a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee`
 529 /// is set to 3000sat/kb, thus 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs
 530 /// are p2wsh, a value of 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions.
 531 pub const MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 330;
 532
 533 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
 534 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
 535 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
 536 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
 537         Ignore(String),
 538         Close(String),
 539         CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
 540 }
 541
 542 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
 543         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
 544                 match self {
 545                         &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
 546                         &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
 547                         &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
 548                 }
 549         }
 550 }
 551
 552 macro_rules! secp_check {
 553         ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
 554                 match $res {
 555                         Ok(thing) => thing,
 556                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
 557                 }
 558         };
 559 }
 560
 561 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
 562         // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
 563         fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 564                 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
 565         }
 566
 567         /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
 568         /// required by us.
 569         ///
 570         /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
 571         pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 572                 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
 573                 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
 574         }
 575
 576         // Constructors:
 577         pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
 578         where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
 579               F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 580         {
 581                 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
 582                 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
 583                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
 584
 585                 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 586                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
 587                 }
 588                 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
 589                 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
 590                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
 591                 }
 592                 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 593                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
 594                 }
 595                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis);
 596                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
 597                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel  reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
 598                 }
 599
 600                 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
 601
 602                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 603                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
 604
 605                 Ok(Channel {
 606                         user_id,
 607                         config: config.channel_options.clone(),
 608
 609                         channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
 610                         channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
 611                         secp_ctx,
 612                         channel_value_satoshis,
 613
 614                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 615
 616                         holder_signer,
 617                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
 618                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 619
 620                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 621                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 622                         value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
 623
 624                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 625                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 626                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 627                         pending_update_fee: None,
 628                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 629                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 630                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 631                         update_time_counter: 1,
 632
 633                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 634
 635                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 636                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 637                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 638                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 639                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 640
 641                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 642                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 643                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 644                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 645
 646                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 647
 648                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 649                         funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
 650                         short_channel_id: None,
 651
 652                         feerate_per_kw: feerate,
 653                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
 654                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
 655                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
 656                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
 657                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
 658                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 659                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
 660                         minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
 661
 662                         counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
 663
 664                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
 665                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
 666                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 667                                 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
 668                                 counterparty_parameters: None,
 669                                 funding_outpoint: None
 670                         },
 671                         funding_transaction: None,
 672
 673                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
 674                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 675                         counterparty_node_id,
 676
 677                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
 678
 679                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 680
 681                         channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
 682
 683                         announcement_sigs: None,
 684
 685                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 686                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 687                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 688                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 689
 690                         workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
 691
 692                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 693                         historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
 694                 })
 695         }
 696
 697         fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
 698                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
 699         {
 700                 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 701                 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
 702                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
 703                 }
 704                 let upper_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64  * 2;
 705                 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
 706                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
 707                 }
 708                 Ok(())
 709         }
 710
 711         /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
 712         /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
 713         pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
 714                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
 715           F::Target: FeeEstimator
 716         {
 717                 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
 718                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
 719                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
 720                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
 721                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
 722                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
 723                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
 724                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
 725                 };
 726                 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
 727
 728                 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 729                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
 730                 }
 731
 732                 // Check sanity of message fields:
 733                 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 734                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 735                 }
 736                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 737                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 738                 }
 739                 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 740                 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
 741                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
 742                 }
 743                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 744                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 745                 }
 746                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
 747                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
 748                 }
 749                 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 750                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
 751                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
 752                 }
 753                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
 754
 755                 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
 756                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
 757                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
 758                 }
 759                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
 760                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
 761                 }
 762                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
 763                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
 764                 }
 765
 766                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
 767                 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
 768                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
 769                 }
 770                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
 771                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat,  config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
 772                 }
 773                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
 774                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
 775                 }
 776                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
 777                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 778                 }
 779                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
 780                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
 781                 }
 782                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
 783                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
 784                 }
 785                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis >  MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
 786                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
 787                 }
 788
 789                 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
 790
 791                 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
 792                 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
 793                         if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
 794                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
 795                         }
 796                 }
 797                 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
 798                 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
 799
 800                 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 801
 802                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
 803                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
 804                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
 805                 }
 806                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
 807                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
 808                 }
 809                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
 810                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 811                 }
 812
 813                 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
 814                 // for full fee payment
 815                 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
 816                 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 817                 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
 818                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
 819                 }
 820
 821                 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
 822                 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 823                 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
 824                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
 825                 }
 826
 827                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
 828                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
 829                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
 830                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
 831                                         if script.len() == 0 {
 832                                                 None
 833                                         } else {
 834                                                 match ShutdownScript::try_from((script.clone(), &their_features)) {
 835                                                         Ok(shutdown_script) => Some(shutdown_script.into_inner()),
 836                                                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex()))),
 837                                                 }
 838                                         }
 839                                 },
 840                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
 841                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
 842                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
 843                                 }
 844                         }
 845                 } else { None };
 846
 847                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 848                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
 849
 850                 let chan = Channel {
 851                         user_id,
 852                         config: local_config,
 853
 854                         channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
 855                         channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
 856                         secp_ctx,
 857
 858                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 859
 860                         holder_signer,
 861                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
 862                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 863
 864                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 865                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 866                         value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
 867
 868                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 869                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 870                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 871                         pending_update_fee: None,
 872                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 873                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 874                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 875                         update_time_counter: 1,
 876
 877                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 878
 879                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 880                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 881                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 882                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 883                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 884
 885                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 886                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 887                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 888                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 889
 890                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 891
 892                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 893                         funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
 894                         short_channel_id: None,
 895
 896                         feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
 897                         channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
 898                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
 899                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
 900                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
 901                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
 902                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
 903                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 904                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
 905                         minimum_depth: Some(config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth),
 906
 907                         counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
 908
 909                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
 910                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
 911                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 912                                 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
 913                                 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
 914                                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
 915                                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
 916                                 }),
 917                                 funding_outpoint: None
 918                         },
 919                         funding_transaction: None,
 920
 921                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
 922                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 923                         counterparty_node_id,
 924
 925                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
 926
 927                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 928
 929                         channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
 930
 931                         announcement_sigs: None,
 932
 933                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 934                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 935                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 936                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 937
 938                         workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
 939
 940                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 941                         historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
 942                 };
 943
 944                 Ok(chan)
 945         }
 946
 947         /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
 948         /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
 949         /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
 950         /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
 951         /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
 952         /// an HTLC to a).
 953         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
 954         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
 955         /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
 956         /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
 957         /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
 958         /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
 959         /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
 960         /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
 961         /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
 962         /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
 963         /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
 964         #[inline]
 965         fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
 966                 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
 967                 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
 968                 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
 969
 970                 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
 971                 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 972                 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 973                 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
 974
 975                 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
 976                         commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
 977                         get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
 978                         log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
 979
 980                 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
 981                         ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
 982                                 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 983                                         offered: $offered,
 984                                         amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
 985                                         cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
 986                                         payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
 987                                         transaction_output_index: None
 988                                 }
 989                         }
 990                 }
 991
 992                 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
 993                         ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
 994                                 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
 995                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
 996                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
 997                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 998                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 999                                         } else {
1000                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1001                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1002                                         }
1003                                 } else {
1004                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1005                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
1006                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1007                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1008                                         } else {
1009                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1010                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1011                                         }
1012                                 }
1013                         }
1014                 }
1015
1016                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1017                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1018                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1019                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1020                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1021                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1022                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1023                         };
1024
1025                         if include {
1026                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1027                                 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1028                         } else {
1029                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1030                                 match &htlc.state {
1031                                         &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1032                                                 if generated_by_local {
1033                                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1034                                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1035                                                         }
1036                                                 }
1037                                         },
1038                                         _ => {},
1039                                 }
1040                         }
1041                 }
1042
1043                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1044                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1045                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1046                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1047                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1048                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1049                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1050                         };
1051
1052                         if include {
1053                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1054                                 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1055                         } else {
1056                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1057                                 match htlc.state {
1058                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
1059                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1060                                         },
1061                                         OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
1062                                                 if !generated_by_local {
1063                                                         value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1064                                                 }
1065                                         },
1066                                         _ => {},
1067                                 }
1068                         }
1069                 }
1070
1071                 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1072                 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1073                 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1074                 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1075                 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1076                 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1077                 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1078                 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1079
1080                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1081                 {
1082                         // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1083                         // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1084                         let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1085                                 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1086                         } else {
1087                                 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1088                         };
1089                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1090                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1091                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
1092                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1093                 }
1094
1095                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1096                 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1097                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1098                 } else {
1099                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
1100                 };
1101
1102                 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1103                 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1104
1105                 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1106                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1107                 } else {
1108                         value_to_a = 0;
1109                 }
1110
1111                 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1112                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1113                 } else {
1114                         value_to_b = 0;
1115                 }
1116
1117                 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1118
1119                 let channel_parameters =
1120                         if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1121                         else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1122                 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1123                                                                              value_to_a as u64,
1124                                                                              value_to_b as u64,
1125                                                                              keys.clone(),
1126                                                                              feerate_per_kw,
1127                                                                              &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1128                                                                              &channel_parameters
1129                 );
1130                 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1131                 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1132                 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1133                 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1134
1135                 (tx, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1136         }
1137
1138         #[inline]
1139         fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1140                 let channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1141                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1142         }
1143
1144         #[inline]
1145         fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1146                 let mut ret =
1147                 (4 +                                           // version
1148                  1 +                                           // input count
1149                  36 +                                          // prevout
1150                  1 +                                           // script length (0)
1151                  4 +                                           // sequence
1152                  1 +                                           // output count
1153                  4                                             // lock time
1154                  )*4 +                                         // * 4 for non-witness parts
1155                 2 +                                            // witness marker and flag
1156                 1 +                                            // witness element count
1157                 4 +                                            // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1158                 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1159                 2*(1 + 71);                                    // two signatures + sighash type flags
1160                 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1161                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1162                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1163                 }
1164                 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1165                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1166                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1167                 }
1168                 ret
1169         }
1170
1171         #[inline]
1172         fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1173                 let txins = {
1174                         let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1175                         ins.push(TxIn {
1176                                 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1177                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1178                                 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1179                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1180                         });
1181                         ins
1182                 };
1183
1184                 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1185                 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1186                 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1187
1188                 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1189                 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1190                 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1191
1192                 if value_to_self < 0 {
1193                         assert!(self.is_outbound());
1194                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1195                 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1196                         assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1197                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1198                 }
1199
1200                 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1201                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1202                                 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1203                                 value: value_to_remote as u64
1204                         }, ()));
1205                 }
1206
1207                 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1208                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1209                                 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1210                                 value: value_to_self as u64
1211                         }, ()));
1212                 }
1213
1214                 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1215
1216                 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1217                 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1218                         outputs.push(out.0);
1219                 }
1220
1221                 (Transaction {
1222                         version: 2,
1223                         lock_time: 0,
1224                         input: txins,
1225                         output: outputs,
1226                 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1227         }
1228
1229         fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1230                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1231         }
1232
1233         #[inline]
1234         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1235         /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1236         /// our counterparty!)
1237         /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1238         /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1239         fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1240                 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1241                 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1242                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1243                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1244
1245                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1246         }
1247
1248         #[inline]
1249         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1250         /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1251         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1252         fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1253                 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1254                 //may see payments to it!
1255                 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1256                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1257                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1258
1259                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1260         }
1261
1262         /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1263         /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1264         /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1265         pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1266                 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1267         }
1268
1269         fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1270                 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1271                 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1272                 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1273                 // either.
1274                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1275                         panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1276                 }
1277                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1278
1279                 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1280
1281                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1282                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1283                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1284
1285                 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1286                 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1287                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1288                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1289                                 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1290                                 match htlc.state {
1291                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1292                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1293                                                 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1294                                                 } else {
1295                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1296                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1297                                                 }
1298                                                 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1299                                         },
1300                                         _ => {
1301                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1302                                                 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1303                                         }
1304                                 }
1305                                 pending_idx = idx;
1306                                 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1307                                 break;
1308                         }
1309                 }
1310                 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1311                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1312                         // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1313                         // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1314                         debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1315                         return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1316                 }
1317
1318                 // Now update local state:
1319                 //
1320                 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1321                 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1322                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1323                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1324                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1325                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1326                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1327                         }],
1328                 };
1329
1330                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1331                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1332                                 match pending_update {
1333                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1334                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1335                                                         // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1336                                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1337                                                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1338                                                         debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1339                                                         return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1340                                                 }
1341                                         },
1342                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1343                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1344                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1345                                                         // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1346                                                         // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1347                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1348                                                         return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1349                                                 }
1350                                         },
1351                                         _ => {}
1352                                 }
1353                         }
1354                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1355                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1356                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1357                         });
1358                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1359                         self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1360                         return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1361                 }
1362                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1363                 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1364
1365                 {
1366                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1367                         if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1368                         } else {
1369                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1370                                 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1371                         }
1372                         log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1373                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1374                 }
1375
1376                 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1377                         monitor_update,
1378                         htlc_value_msat,
1379                         msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1380                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1381                                 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1382                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1383                         }),
1384                 }
1385         }
1386
1387         pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1388                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1389                         UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1390                                 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1391                                         Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1392                                         Ok(res) => res
1393                                 };
1394                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1395                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1396                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1397                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1398                                 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1399                         },
1400                         UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1401                                 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1402                         UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1403                 }
1404         }
1405
1406         /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1407         /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1408         /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1409         /// before we fail backwards.
1410         /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1411         /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1412         pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1413                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1414                         panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1415                 }
1416                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1417
1418                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1419                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1420                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1421
1422                 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1423                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1424                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1425                                 match htlc.state {
1426                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1427                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1428                                                 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1429                                                 } else {
1430                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1431                                                 }
1432                                                 return Ok(None);
1433                                         },
1434                                         _ => {
1435                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1436                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1437                                         }
1438                                 }
1439                                 pending_idx = idx;
1440                         }
1441                 }
1442                 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1443                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1444                         // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1445                         // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1446                         debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1447                         return Ok(None);
1448                 }
1449
1450                 // Now update local state:
1451                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1452                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1453                                 match pending_update {
1454                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1455                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1456                                                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1457                                                         debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1458                                                         return Ok(None);
1459                                                 }
1460                                         },
1461                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1462                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1463                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1464                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1465                                                 }
1466                                         },
1467                                         _ => {}
1468                                 }
1469                         }
1470                         log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1471                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1472                                 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1473                                 err_packet,
1474                         });
1475                         return Ok(None);
1476                 }
1477
1478                 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1479                 {
1480                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1481                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1482                 }
1483
1484                 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1485                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1486                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1487                         reason: err_packet
1488                 }))
1489         }
1490
1491         // Message handlers:
1492
1493         pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1494                 // Check sanity of message fields:
1495                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1496                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1497                 }
1498                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1499                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1500                 }
1501                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1502                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1503                 }
1504                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1505                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1506                 }
1507                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1508                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1509                 }
1510                 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1511                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1512                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1513                 }
1514                 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1515                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1516                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1517                 }
1518                 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1519                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1520                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1521                 }
1522                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1523                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1524                 }
1525                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1526                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1527                 }
1528
1529                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1530                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1531                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1532                 }
1533                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1534                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1535                 }
1536                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1537                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1538                 }
1539                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1540                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1541                 }
1542                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1543                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1544                 }
1545                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1546                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1547                 }
1548                 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1549                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1550                 }
1551                 if msg.minimum_depth == 0 {
1552                         // Note that if this changes we should update the serialization minimum version to
1553                         // indicate to older clients that they don't understand some features of the current
1554                         // channel.
1555                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum confirmation depth must be at least 1".to_owned()));
1556                 }
1557
1558                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1559                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1560                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1561                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1562                                         if script.len() == 0 {
1563                                                 None
1564                                         } else {
1565                                                 match ShutdownScript::try_from((script.clone(), &their_features)) {
1566                                                         Ok(shutdown_script) => Some(shutdown_script.into_inner()),
1567                                                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex()))),
1568                                                 }
1569                                         }
1570                                 },
1571                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1572                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1573                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1574                                 }
1575                         }
1576                 } else { None };
1577
1578                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1579                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1580                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
1581                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1582                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1583                 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
1584
1585                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1586                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1587                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1588                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1589                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1590                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1591                 };
1592
1593                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1594                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1595                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1596                 });
1597
1598                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1599                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1600
1601                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1602
1603                 Ok(())
1604         }
1605
1606         fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1607                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1608
1609                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1610                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1611                 {
1612                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1613                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1614                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1615                         // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1616                         log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
1617                                 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
1618                                 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
1619                                 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1620                         secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1621                 }
1622
1623                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1624                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1625
1626                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1627                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1628                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1629                         log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1630
1631                 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1632                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1633
1634                 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1635                 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1636         }
1637
1638         fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1639                 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1640         }
1641
1642         pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1643                 if self.is_outbound() {
1644                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1645                 }
1646                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1647                         // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1648                         // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1649                         // channel.
1650                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1651                 }
1652                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1653                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1654                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1655                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1656                 }
1657
1658                 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1659                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1660                 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks.  In particular
1661                 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1662                 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1663
1664                 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1665                         Ok(res) => res,
1666                         Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1667                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1668                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1669                         },
1670                         Err(e) => {
1671                                 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1672                                 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1673                                 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1674                         }
1675                 };
1676
1677                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1678                         initial_commitment_tx,
1679                         msg.signature,
1680                         Vec::new(),
1681                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1682                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1683                 );
1684
1685                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1686
1687                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1688                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1689                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1690                 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1691                                                           &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1692                                                           &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1693                                                           &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1694                                                           funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1695                                                           obscure_factor,
1696                                                           holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1697
1698                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1699
1700                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1701                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1702                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1703                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1704
1705                 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1706
1707                 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1708                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
1709                         signature
1710                 }, channel_monitor))
1711         }
1712
1713         /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1714         /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1715         pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1716                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1717                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1718                 }
1719                 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1720                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1721                 }
1722                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1723                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1724                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1725                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1726                 }
1727
1728                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1729
1730                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1731                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1732                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1733                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1734
1735                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1736                         log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1737
1738                 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1739                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1740                 {
1741                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1742                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1743                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1744                         // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1745                         if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1746                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1747                         }
1748                 }
1749
1750                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1751                         initial_commitment_tx,
1752                         msg.signature,
1753                         Vec::new(),
1754                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1755                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1756                 );
1757
1758
1759                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1760                 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1761                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1762                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1763                 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1764                                                           &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1765                                                           &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1766                                                           &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1767                                                           funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1768                                                           obscure_factor,
1769                                                           holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1770
1771                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1772
1773                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1774                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1775                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1776                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1777
1778                 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1779
1780                 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap()))
1781         }
1782
1783         pub fn funding_locked<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1784                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1785                         self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
1786                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
1787                 }
1788
1789                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1790
1791                 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1792                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1793                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1794                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1795                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
1796                 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1797                                  // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1798                                  self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1799                                  self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1800                                 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1801                                 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1802                                                       (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1803                         if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1804                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1805                         }
1806                         // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1807                         return Ok(());
1808                 } else {
1809                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1810                 }
1811
1812                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1813                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1814
1815                 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_locked from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1816
1817                 Ok(())
1818         }
1819
1820         /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1821         fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1822                 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1823                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1824                         htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1825                 }
1826                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1827         }
1828
1829         /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1830         /// holding cell.
1831         fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1832                 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1833                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1834                         htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1835                 }
1836
1837                 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1838                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1839                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1840                                 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1841                                 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1842                         }
1843                 }
1844
1845                 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1846         }
1847
1848         /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1849         /// Doesn't bother handling the
1850         /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1851         /// corner case properly.
1852         pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1853                 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1854                 (
1855                         cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1856                                 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
1857                                 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64
1858                                 - Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64 * 1000,
1859                         0) as u64,
1860                         cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
1861                                 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64
1862                                 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
1863                         0) as u64
1864                 )
1865         }
1866
1867         pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1868                 (Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
1869                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1870         }
1871
1872         // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1873         // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1874         fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1875                 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1876                 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1877                 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1878         }
1879
1880         // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1881         // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
1882         // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
1883         // are excluded.
1884         fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1885                 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1886
1887                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1888                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1889
1890                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1891                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1892                 match htlc.origin {
1893                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1894                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1895                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1896                                 }
1897                         },
1898                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1899                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1900                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1901                                 }
1902                         }
1903                 }
1904
1905                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1906                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1907                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1908                                 continue
1909                         }
1910                         // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1911                         // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1912                         included_htlcs += 1;
1913                 }
1914
1915                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1916                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1917                                 continue
1918                         }
1919                         match htlc.state {
1920                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1921                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1922                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1923                                 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1924                                 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1925                                 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1926                                 _ => {},
1927                         }
1928                 }
1929
1930                 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1931                         match htlc {
1932                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1933                                         if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1934                                                 continue
1935                                         }
1936                                         included_htlcs += 1
1937                                 },
1938                                 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1939                                          // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1940                         }
1941                 }
1942
1943                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1944                 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1945                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1946                 {
1947                         let mut fee = res;
1948                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1949                                 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1950                         }
1951                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1952                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1953                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1954                                 fee,
1955                                 total_pending_htlcs,
1956                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1957                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1958                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1959                                 },
1960                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1961                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1962                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1963                                 },
1964                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1965                         };
1966                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1967                 }
1968                 res
1969         }
1970
1971         // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1972         // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
1973         // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
1974         // excluded.
1975         fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1976                 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1977
1978                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1979                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1980
1981                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1982                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1983                 match htlc.origin {
1984                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1985                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1986                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1987                                 }
1988                         },
1989                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1990                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1991                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1992                                 }
1993                         }
1994                 }
1995
1996                 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1997                 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1998                 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1999                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2000                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2001                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2002                                 continue
2003                         }
2004                         included_htlcs += 1;
2005                 }
2006
2007                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2008                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2009                                 continue
2010                         }
2011                         // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2012                         // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2013                         match htlc.state {
2014                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2015                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2016                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2017                                 _ => {},
2018                         }
2019                 }
2020
2021                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2022                 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
2023                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2024                 {
2025                         let mut fee = res;
2026                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2027                                 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
2028                         }
2029                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2030                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2031                                 fee,
2032                                 total_pending_htlcs,
2033                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2034                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2035                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2036                                 },
2037                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2038                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2039                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2040                                 },
2041                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2042                         };
2043                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2044                 }
2045                 res
2046         }
2047
2048         pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2049         where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2050                 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2051                 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2052                 if local_sent_shutdown {
2053                         pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
2054                 }
2055                 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2056                 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2057                 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2058                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2059                 }
2060                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2061                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2062                 }
2063                 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2064                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2065                 }
2066                 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2067                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2068                 }
2069                 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2070                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2071                 }
2072
2073                 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
2074                 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2075                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2076                 }
2077                 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2078                 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2079                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2080                 }
2081                 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2082                 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2083                 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2084                 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2085                 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2086                 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2087                 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2088                 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2089                 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2090                 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2091                 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2092                 // transaction).
2093                 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2094                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2095                         if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
2096                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2097                         } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
2098                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2099                         }
2100                 }
2101
2102                 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2103                         self.value_to_self_msat + htlc_inbound_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2104                 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2105                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2106                 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2107                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2108                 }
2109
2110                 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2111                 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2112                 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2113                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2114                         self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2115                 };
2116                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2117                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2118                 };
2119
2120                 let chan_reserve_msat =
2121                         Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
2122                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
2123                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2124                 }
2125
2126                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2127                         // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2128                         // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2129                         // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2130                         // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2131                         // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2132                         // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2133                         // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2134                         // sensitive to fee spikes.
2135                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2136                         let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2137                         if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2138                                 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2139                                 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2140                                 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2141                                 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2142                         }
2143                 } else {
2144                         // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2145                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2146                         let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2147                         if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2148                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2149                         }
2150                 }
2151                 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2152                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2153                 }
2154                 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2155                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2156                 }
2157
2158                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2159                         if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2160                                 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2161                         }
2162                 }
2163
2164                 // Now update local state:
2165                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2166                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2167                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2168                         amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2169                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2170                         cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2171                         state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2172                 });
2173                 Ok(())
2174         }
2175
2176         /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2177         #[inline]
2178         fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2179                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2180                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2181                                 match check_preimage {
2182                                         None => {},
2183                                         Some(payment_hash) =>
2184                                                 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2185                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2186                                                 }
2187                                 };
2188                                 match htlc.state {
2189                                         OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2190                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2191                                         OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2192                                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2193                                         },
2194                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2195                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2196                                 }
2197                                 return Ok(htlc);
2198                         }
2199                 }
2200                 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2201         }
2202
2203         pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2204                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2205                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2206                 }
2207                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2208                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2209                 }
2210
2211                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2212                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2213         }
2214
2215         pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2216                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2217                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2218                 }
2219                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2220                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2221                 }
2222
2223                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2224                 Ok(())
2225         }
2226
2227         pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2228                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2229                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2230                 }
2231                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2232                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2233                 }
2234
2235                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2236                 Ok(())
2237         }
2238
2239         pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2240         where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2241                                 L::Target: Logger
2242         {
2243                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2244                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2245                 }
2246                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2247                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2248                 }
2249                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2250                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2251                 }
2252
2253                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2254
2255                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2256
2257                 let mut update_fee = false;
2258                 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2259                         update_fee = true;
2260                         self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
2261                 } else {
2262                         self.feerate_per_kw
2263                 };
2264
2265                 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid) = {
2266                         let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
2267                         let commitment_txid = {
2268                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2269                                 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2270                                 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2271
2272                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2273                                         log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2274                                         log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2275                                         log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2276                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2277                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2278                                 }
2279                                 bitcoin_tx.txid
2280                         };
2281                         let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2282                         (commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid)
2283                 };
2284
2285                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2286                 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
2287                 if update_fee {
2288                         let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2289                         if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2290                                 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2291                         }
2292                 }
2293                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2294                 {
2295                         if self.is_outbound() {
2296                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2297                                 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2298                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2299                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2300                                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2301                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2302                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2303                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2304                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2305                                                         assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2306                                                 }
2307                                 }
2308                         }
2309                 }
2310
2311                 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2312                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2313                 }
2314
2315                 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2316                 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2317                 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2318                         if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2319                                 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw,
2320                                         self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc,
2321                                         &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2322
2323                                 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2324                                 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2325                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2326                                         log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2327                                         encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2328                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2329                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2330                                 }
2331                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2332                         } else {
2333                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2334                         }
2335                 }
2336
2337                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2338                         commitment_tx,
2339                         msg.signature,
2340                         msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2341                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2342                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2343                 );
2344
2345                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2346                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2347
2348                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2349                 let mut need_commitment = false;
2350                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2351                         if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
2352                                 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
2353                                 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
2354                                 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
2355                                 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
2356                                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
2357                                         need_commitment = true;
2358                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2359                                 }
2360                         }
2361                 }
2362
2363                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2364                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2365                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2366                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2367                                 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2368                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2369                         }]
2370                 };
2371
2372                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2373                         let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2374                                 Some(forward_info.clone())
2375                         } else { None };
2376                         if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2377                                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2378                                         log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2379                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2380                                 need_commitment = true;
2381                         }
2382                 }
2383                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2384                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2385                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
2386                         } else { None } {
2387                                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2388                                         log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2389                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2390                                 need_commitment = true;
2391                         }
2392                 }
2393
2394                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2395                 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2396                 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2397                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2398
2399                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2400                         // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2401                         // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2402                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2403                         if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2404                                 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2405                                 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2406                                 // includes the right HTLCs.
2407                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2408                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2409                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2410                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2411                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2412                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2413                         }
2414                         log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
2415                                 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2416                         // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2417                         // re-send the message on restoration)
2418                         return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2419                 }
2420
2421                 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2422                         // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2423                         // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2424                         // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2425                         let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2426                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2427                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2428                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2429                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2430                         (Some(msg), None)
2431                 } else if !need_commitment {
2432                         (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2433                 } else { (None, None) };
2434
2435                 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
2436                         log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
2437
2438                 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2439                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2440                         per_commitment_secret,
2441                         next_per_commitment_point,
2442                 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2443         }
2444
2445         /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
2446         /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
2447         /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
2448         pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2449                 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 &&
2450                    (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2451                         self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
2452                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
2453         }
2454
2455         /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2456         /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2457         fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2458                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2459                 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2460                         log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
2461                                 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2462
2463                         let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2464                                 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2465                                 updates: Vec::new(),
2466                         };
2467
2468                         let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2469                         mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2470                         let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2471                         let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2472                         let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2473                         let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2474                         for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2475                                 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2476                                 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2477                                 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2478                                 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2479                                 // to rebalance channels.
2480                                 match &htlc_update {
2481                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2482                                                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2483                                                         Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2484                                                         Err(e) => {
2485                                                                 match e {
2486                                                                         ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2487                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
2488                                                                                         log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2489                                                                                 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2490                                                                                 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2491                                                                                 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2492                                                                                 // into the holding cell without ever being
2493                                                                                 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2494                                                                                 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2495                                                                                 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2496                                                                         },
2497                                                                         _ => {
2498                                                                                 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2499                                                                         },
2500                                                                 }
2501                                                         }
2502                                                 }
2503                                         },
2504                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2505                                                 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
2506                                                 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
2507                                                 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
2508                                                 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
2509                                                 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
2510                                                 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
2511                                                         if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2512                                                                 (msg, monitor_update)
2513                                                         } else { unreachable!() };
2514                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2515                                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2516                                         },
2517                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2518                                                 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
2519                                                         Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
2520                                                                 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
2521                                                                 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
2522                                                                 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
2523                                                                 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
2524                                                                 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
2525                                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
2526                                                         },
2527                                                         Err(e) => {
2528                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2529                                                                 else {
2530                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2531                                                                 }
2532                                                         }
2533                                                 }
2534                                         },
2535                                 }
2536                         }
2537                         if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2538                                 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2539                         }
2540                         let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2541                                 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2542                                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2543                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2544                                         feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2545                                 })
2546                         } else {
2547                                 None
2548                         };
2549
2550                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2551                         // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2552                         // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2553                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2554                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2555
2556                         log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
2557                                 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
2558                                 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
2559
2560                         Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2561                                 update_add_htlcs,
2562                                 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2563                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2564                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2565                                 update_fee,
2566                                 commitment_signed,
2567                         }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2568                 } else {
2569                         Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2570                 }
2571         }
2572
2573         /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2574         /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2575         /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2576         /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2577         /// revoke_and_ack message.
2578         pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2579                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2580                                         L::Target: Logger,
2581         {
2582                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2583                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2584                 }
2585                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2586                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2587                 }
2588                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2589                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2590                 }
2591
2592                 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2593                         if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2594                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2595                         }
2596                 }
2597
2598                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2599                         // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2600                         // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2601                         // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2602                         // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2603                         // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2604                         // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2605                         // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2606                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2607                 }
2608
2609                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2610                 {
2611                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2612                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2613                 }
2614
2615                 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2616                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2617                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2618                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2619                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2620                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2621                                 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2622                                 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2623                         }],
2624                 };
2625
2626                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2627                 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2628                 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2629                 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2630                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2631                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2632                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2633                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2634
2635                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2636                 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2637                 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2638                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2639                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2640                 let mut require_commitment = false;
2641                 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2642
2643                 {
2644                         // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2645                         let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2646                         let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2647
2648                         // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2649                         pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2650                                 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2651                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2652                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2653                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2654                                         }
2655                                         false
2656                                 } else { true }
2657                         });
2658                         pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2659                                 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2660                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2661                                         if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2662                                                 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2663                                         } else {
2664                                                 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2665                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2666                                         }
2667                                         false
2668                                 } else { true }
2669                         });
2670                         for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2671                                 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2672                                         true
2673                                 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2674                                         true
2675                                 } else { false };
2676                                 if swap {
2677                                         let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2678                                         mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2679
2680                                         if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2681                                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2682                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2683                                                 require_commitment = true;
2684                                         } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2685                                                 match forward_info {
2686                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2687                                                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2688                                                                 require_commitment = true;
2689                                                                 match fail_msg {
2690                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2691                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2692                                                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2693                                                                         },
2694                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2695                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2696                                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2697                                                                         },
2698                                                                 }
2699                                                         },
2700                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2701                                                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2702                                                                 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2703                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2704                                                         }
2705                                                 }
2706                                         }
2707                                 }
2708                         }
2709                         for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2710                                 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2711                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2712                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2713                                 }
2714                                 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2715                                         Some(fail_reason.take())
2716                                 } else { None } {
2717                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2718                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2719                                         require_commitment = true;
2720                                 }
2721                         }
2722                 }
2723                 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2724
2725                 if self.is_outbound() {
2726                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2727                                 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2728                         }
2729                 } else {
2730                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2731                                 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2732                                 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2733                                 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2734                                 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2735                                 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2736                                 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2737                                         require_commitment = true;
2738                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2739                                 }
2740                         }
2741                 }
2742
2743                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2744                         // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2745                         // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2746                         if require_commitment {
2747                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2748                                 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2749                                 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2750                                 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2751                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2752                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2753                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2754                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2755                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2756                         }
2757                         self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2758                         self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2759                         log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2760                         return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2761                 }
2762
2763                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2764                         (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2765                                 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2766                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2767                                         commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2768                                 }
2769                                 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2770                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2771                                         commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2772                                 }
2773
2774                                 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2775                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2776                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2777                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2778
2779                                 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2780                         },
2781                         (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2782                                 if require_commitment {
2783                                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2784
2785                                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2786                                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2787                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2788                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2789
2790                                         log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
2791                                                 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2792                                         Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2793                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2794                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2795                                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2796                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2797                                                 update_fee: None,
2798                                                 commitment_signed
2799                                         }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2800                                 } else {
2801                                         log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2802                                         Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2803                                 }
2804                         }
2805                 }
2806
2807         }
2808
2809         /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2810         /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2811         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2812         fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2813                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2814                         panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2815                 }
2816                 if !self.is_usable() {
2817                         panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2818                 }
2819                 if !self.is_live() {
2820                         panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2821                 }
2822
2823                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2824                         self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2825                         return None;
2826                 }
2827
2828                 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2829                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2830
2831                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2832                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2833                         feerate_per_kw,
2834                 })
2835         }
2836
2837         pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2838                 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2839                         Some(update_fee) => {
2840                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2841                                 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2842                         },
2843                         None => Ok(None)
2844                 }
2845         }
2846
2847         /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
2848         /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
2849         /// resent.
2850         /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2851         /// completed.
2852         pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L)  where L::Target: Logger {
2853                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2854                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2855                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2856                         return;
2857                 }
2858                 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2859                 // will be retransmitted.
2860                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2861
2862                 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2863                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2864                         match htlc.state {
2865                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2866                                         // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2867                                         // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2868                                         // this HTLC accordingly
2869                                         inbound_drop_count += 1;
2870                                         false
2871                                 },
2872                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2873                                         // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2874                                         // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2875                                         // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2876                                         true
2877                                 },
2878                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2879                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2880                                         // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2881                                         // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2882                                         // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2883                                         // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2884                                         true
2885                                 },
2886                         }
2887                 });
2888                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2889
2890                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2891                         if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2892                                 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2893                                 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2894                                 // the update upon reconnection.
2895                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2896                         }
2897                 }
2898
2899                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2900                 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2901         }
2902
2903         /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2904         /// updates are partially paused.
2905         /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2906         /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2907         /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2908         /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2909         pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2910                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2911                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2912                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2913                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2914                 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2915                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2916                 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2917                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2918         }
2919
2920         /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2921         /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2922         /// to the remote side.
2923         pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<Transaction>, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
2924                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2925                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2926
2927                 let funding_broadcastable = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound() {
2928                         self.funding_transaction.take()
2929                 } else { None };
2930
2931                 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
2932                 // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
2933                 // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound
2934                 // channel which failed to persist the monitor on funding_created, and we got the funding
2935                 // transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted.
2936                 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2937                         assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
2938                         self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2939                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2940                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2941                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2942                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2943                         })
2944                 } else { None };
2945
2946                 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2947                 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2948                 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2949                 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2950
2951                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2952                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2953                         self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2954                         return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
2955                 }
2956
2957                 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2958                         Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2959                 } else { None };
2960                 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2961                         Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
2962                 } else { None };
2963
2964                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2965                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2966                 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2967                 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2968                         log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
2969                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2970                         match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2971                 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked)
2972         }
2973
2974         pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2975                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2976         {
2977                 if self.is_outbound() {
2978                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
2979                 }
2980                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2981                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2982                 }
2983                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2984                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw);
2985                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2986                 Ok(())
2987         }
2988
2989         fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2990                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2991                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2992                 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2993                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2994                         per_commitment_secret,
2995                         next_per_commitment_point,
2996                 }
2997         }
2998
2999         fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3000                 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3001                 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3002                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3003                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3004
3005                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3006                         if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3007                                 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3008                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3009                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3010                                         amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3011                                         payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3012                                         cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3013                                         onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3014                                 });
3015                         }
3016                 }
3017
3018                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3019                         if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3020                                 match reason {
3021                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3022                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3023                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3024                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3025                                                         reason: err_packet.clone()
3026                                                 });
3027                                         },
3028                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3029                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3030                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3031                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3032                                                         sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3033                                                         failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3034                                                 });
3035                                         },
3036                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3037                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3038                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3039                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3040                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3041                                                 });
3042                                         },
3043                                 }
3044                         }
3045                 }
3046
3047                 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3048                                 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3049                 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3050                         update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3051                         update_fee: None,
3052                         commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3053                 }
3054         }
3055
3056         /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3057         /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3058         pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3059                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3060                         // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3061                         // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3062                         // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3063                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3064                 }
3065
3066                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3067                         msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3068                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3069                 }
3070
3071                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3072                         match msg.data_loss_protect {
3073                                 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3074                                         let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3075                                         let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3076                                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3077                                         if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3078                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3079                                         }
3080                                         if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3081                                                 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
3082                                                         "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
3083                                                 ));
3084                                         }
3085                                 },
3086                                 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3087                         }
3088                 }
3089
3090                 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3091                 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3092                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3093
3094                 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3095                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3096                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3097                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3098                         })
3099                 } else { None };
3100
3101                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3102                         // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
3103                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
3104                                         self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3105                                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3106                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
3107                                 }
3108                                 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3109                                 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3110                         }
3111
3112                         // We have OurFundingLocked set!
3113                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3114                         return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3115                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3116                                 next_per_commitment_point,
3117                         }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3118                 }
3119
3120                 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3121                         // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3122                         // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
3123                         None
3124                 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3125                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3126                                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3127                                 None
3128                         } else {
3129                                 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3130                         }
3131                 } else {
3132                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3133                 };
3134
3135                 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3136                 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3137                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3138                 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3139                 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
3140
3141                 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3142                         // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
3143                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3144                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3145                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3146                                 next_per_commitment_point,
3147                         })
3148                 } else { None };
3149
3150                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3151                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
3152                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3153                         } else {
3154                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3155                         }
3156
3157                         if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3158                                 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3159                                 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3160                                 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3161                                 // now!
3162                                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3163                                         Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3164                                         Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3165                                         Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3166                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3167                                         },
3168                                         Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3169                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3170                                         },
3171                                 }
3172                         } else {
3173                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3174                         }
3175                 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3176                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
3177                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3178                         } else {
3179                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3180                         }
3181
3182                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3183                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3184                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3185                         }
3186
3187                         return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3188                 } else {
3189                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3190                 }
3191         }
3192
3193         fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
3194                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3195         {
3196                 if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
3197                                 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
3198                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3199                         return None;
3200                 }
3201
3202                 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3203                 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
3204                         proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
3205                 }
3206                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3207                 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3208
3209                 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
3210                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3211                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3212                         .ok();
3213                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3214                 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
3215
3216                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
3217                 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3218                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3219                         fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3220                         signature: sig.unwrap(),
3221                 })
3222         }
3223
3224         pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3225                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3226         {
3227                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3228                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3229                 }
3230                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3231                         // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3232                         // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3233                         // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3234                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3235                 }
3236                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3237                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3238                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3239                         }
3240                 }
3241                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3242
3243                 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match ShutdownScript::try_from((msg.scriptpubkey.clone(), their_features)) {
3244                         Ok(script) => script.into_inner(),
3245                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex()))),
3246                 };
3247
3248                 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3249                         if Some(&shutdown_scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3250                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", shutdown_scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3251                         }
3252                 } else {
3253                         self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3254                 }
3255
3256                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3257
3258                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3259                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3260
3261                 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3262                 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3263                 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3264                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3265                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3266                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3267                         match htlc_update {
3268                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3269                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3270                                         false
3271                                 },
3272                                 _ => true
3273                         }
3274                 });
3275                 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
3276                 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
3277                 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3278
3279                 let shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3280                         None
3281                 } else {
3282                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3283                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3284                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3285                         })
3286                 };
3287
3288                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3289                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3290
3291                 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3292         }
3293
3294         fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3295                 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3296                 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3297                 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3298
3299                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3300
3301                 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3302                 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3303                 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3304                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3305                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3306                 } else {
3307                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3308                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3309                 }
3310                 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3311                 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3312
3313                 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3314         }
3315
3316         pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3317                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3318         {
3319                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3320                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3321                 }
3322                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3323                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3324                 }
3325                 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3326                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3327                 }
3328                 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3329                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3330                 }
3331
3332                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3333                 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3334                 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3335                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3336                 }
3337                 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3338
3339                 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3340                         Ok(_) => {},
3341                         Err(_e) => {
3342                                 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3343                                 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3344                                 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3345                                 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3346                                 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3347                         },
3348                 };
3349
3350                 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3351                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3352                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3353                 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3354                         if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3355                                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3356                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3357                                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3358                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3359                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3360                                 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3361                         }
3362                 }
3363
3364                 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3365                         ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3366                                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3367                                 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3368                                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3369                                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3370                                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3371                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3372                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3373                                 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3374                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3375                                         fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3376                                         signature: sig,
3377                                 }), None))
3378                         }
3379                 }
3380
3381                 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3382                 if self.is_outbound() {
3383                         let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3384                         if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3385                                 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3386                                         if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3387                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3388                                         }
3389                                 }
3390                                 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3391                         }
3392                 } else {
3393                         min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3394                 }
3395                 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3396                         if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3397                                 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3398                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3399                                 }
3400                         }
3401                         propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3402                 }
3403
3404                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3405                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3406                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3407                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3408                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3409                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3410
3411                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3412                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3413
3414                 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3415                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3416                         fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3417                         signature: sig,
3418                 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3419         }
3420
3421         // Public utilities:
3422
3423         pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3424                 self.channel_id
3425         }
3426
3427         pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
3428                 self.minimum_depth
3429         }
3430
3431         /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3432         /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3433         pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3434                 self.user_id
3435         }
3436
3437         /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3438         /// is_usable() returns true).
3439         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3440         pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3441                 self.short_channel_id
3442         }
3443
3444         /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3445         /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3446         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3447                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3448         }
3449
3450         fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3451                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3452         }
3453
3454         fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3455                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3456         }
3457
3458         pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
3459                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
3460                         .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
3461         }
3462
3463         fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3464                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3465         }
3466
3467         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3468         pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3469                 self.counterparty_node_id
3470         }
3471
3472         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3473         #[cfg(test)]
3474         pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3475                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3476         }
3477
3478         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3479         pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3480                 return cmp::min(
3481                         // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3482                         // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3483                         // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3484                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
3485
3486                         Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3487                 );
3488         }
3489
3490         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3491         pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3492                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3493         }
3494
3495         pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3496                 self.channel_value_satoshis
3497         }
3498
3499         pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3500                 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3501         }
3502
3503         pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
3504                 cmp::max(self.config.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
3505         }
3506
3507         #[cfg(test)]
3508         pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3509                 self.feerate_per_kw
3510         }
3511
3512         pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3513                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3514         }
3515
3516         pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3517                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3518         }
3519
3520         pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3521                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3522         }
3523
3524         #[cfg(test)]
3525         pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3526                 &self.holder_signer
3527         }
3528
3529         #[cfg(test)]
3530         pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3531                 ChannelValueStat {
3532                         value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3533                         channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3534                         channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
3535                         pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3536                         pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3537                         holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3538                                 let mut res = 0;
3539                                 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3540                                         match h {
3541                                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3542                                                         res += amount_msat;
3543                                                 }
3544                                                 _ => {}
3545                                         }
3546                                 }
3547                                 res
3548                         },
3549                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3550                         counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3551                 }
3552         }
3553
3554         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3555         pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3556                 self.update_time_counter
3557         }
3558
3559         pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3560                 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3561         }
3562
3563         pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3564                 self.config.announced_channel
3565         }
3566
3567         pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3568                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3569         }
3570
3571         /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3572         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3573         pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
3574                 self.config.forwarding_fee_base_msat
3575         }
3576
3577         /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3578         pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3579                 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3580         }
3581
3582         /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3583         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3584         pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3585                 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3586                 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3587         }
3588
3589         /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3590         /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3591         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3592         pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3593                 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
3594         }
3595
3596         /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3597         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3598         pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3599                 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3600         }
3601
3602         /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3603         pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3604                 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3605         }
3606
3607         /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3608         /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3609         /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3610         pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3611                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32  {
3612                         assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3613                         true
3614                 } else { false }
3615         }
3616
3617         pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
3618                 self.channel_update_status
3619         }
3620
3621         pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
3622                 self.channel_update_status = status;
3623         }
3624
3625         fn check_get_funding_locked(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
3626                 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3627                         return None;
3628                 }
3629
3630                 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3631                 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
3632                         self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
3633                 }
3634
3635                 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
3636                         return None;
3637                 }
3638
3639                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3640                 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3641                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3642                         true
3643                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3644                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3645                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
3646                         true
3647                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3648                         // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3649                         false
3650                 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3651                         panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3652                 } else {
3653                         // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3654                         false
3655                 };
3656
3657                 if need_commitment_update {
3658                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3659                                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3660                                 return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3661                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3662                                         next_per_commitment_point,
3663                                 });
3664                         } else {
3665                                 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3666                         }
3667                 }
3668                 None
3669         }
3670
3671         /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
3672         /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
3673         /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
3674         pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData, logger: &L)
3675                         -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3676                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3677                 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3678                         if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3679                                 // If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring
3680                                 // whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one.
3681                                 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3682                                         if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
3683                                                 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
3684                                                 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3685                                                                 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3686                                                         if self.is_outbound() {
3687                                                                 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3688                                                                 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3689                                                                 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3690                                                                 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3691                                                                 // channel and move on.
3692                                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3693                                                                 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3694                                                         }
3695                                                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
3696                                                         return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3697                                                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3698                                                                 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index".to_owned()
3699                                                         });
3700                                                 } else {
3701                                                         if self.is_outbound() {
3702                                                                 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3703                                                                         if input.witness.is_empty() {
3704                                                                                 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3705                                                                                 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3706                                                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3707                                                                                 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3708                                                                         }
3709                                                                 }
3710                                                         }
3711                                                         self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
3712                                                         self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
3713                                                         self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
3714                                                                 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
3715                                                                 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
3716                                                         }
3717                                                 }
3718                                         }
3719                                         // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for funding_locked here and
3720                                         // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
3721                                         // may have already happened for this block).
3722                                         if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3723                                                 log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3724                                                 return Ok(Some(funding_locked));
3725                                         }
3726                                 }
3727                                 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3728                                         if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3729                                                 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3730                                                 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3731                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3732                                                         data: "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.".to_owned()
3733                                                 });
3734                                         }
3735                                 }
3736                         }
3737                 }
3738                 Ok(None)
3739         }
3740
3741         /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
3742         /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
3743         /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3744         /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3745         ///
3746         /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3747         /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3748         /// post-shutdown.
3749         ///
3750         /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3751         /// back.
3752         pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, logger: &L)
3753                         -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3754                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3755                 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
3756                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3757                         match htlc_update {
3758                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3759                                         if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
3760                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3761                                                 false
3762                                         } else { true }
3763                                 },
3764                                 _ => true
3765                         }
3766                 });
3767
3768                 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
3769
3770                 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3771                         log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3772                         return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs));
3773                 }
3774
3775                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3776                 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
3777                    (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 {
3778                         let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3779                         if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3780                                 // Note that check_get_funding_locked may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
3781                                 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
3782                                 // indicate we've already sent a funding_locked
3783                                 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
3784                         }
3785
3786                         // If we've sent funding_locked (or have both sent and received funding_locked), and
3787                         // the funding transaction's confirmation count has dipped below minimum_depth / 2,
3788                         // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
3789                         // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
3790                         if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap() as i64 / 2 {
3791                                 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3792                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3793                                         data: format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.", self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations),
3794                                 });
3795                         }
3796                 }
3797
3798                 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3799         }
3800
3801         /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
3802         /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
3803         /// before the channel has reached funding_locked and we can just wait for more blocks.
3804         pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3805                 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
3806                         // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
3807                         // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
3808                         let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
3809                         // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
3810                         // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
3811                         // time we saw and it will be ignored.
3812                         let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
3813                         match self.best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, logger) {
3814                                 Ok((funding_locked, timed_out_htlcs)) => {
3815                                         assert!(funding_locked.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
3816                                         assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
3817                                         Ok(())
3818                                 },
3819                                 Err(e) => Err(e)
3820                         }
3821                 } else {
3822                         // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
3823                         Ok(())
3824                 }
3825         }
3826
3827         // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3828         // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3829
3830         pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3831                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3832                         panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3833                 }
3834                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3835                         panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3836                 }
3837
3838                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3839                         panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3840                 }
3841
3842                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3843                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3844
3845                 msgs::OpenChannel {
3846                         chain_hash,
3847                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3848                         funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3849                         push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3850                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3851                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3852                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3853                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3854                         feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
3855                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3856                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3857                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3858                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3859                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3860                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3861                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3862                         first_per_commitment_point,
3863                         channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3864                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3865                 }
3866         }
3867
3868         pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3869                 if self.is_outbound() {
3870                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3871                 }
3872                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3873                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3874                 }
3875                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3876                         panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3877                 }
3878
3879                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3880                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3881
3882                 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3883                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3884                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3885                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3886                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3887                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3888                         minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
3889                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3890                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3891                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3892                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3893                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3894                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3895                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3896                         first_per_commitment_point,
3897                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3898                 }
3899         }
3900
3901         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3902         fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3903                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3904                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
3905                 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3906                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
3907         }
3908
3909         /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3910         /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3911         /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3912         /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3913         /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3914         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3915         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3916         pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3917                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3918                         panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3919                 }
3920                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3921                         panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3922                 }
3923                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3924                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3925                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3926                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3927                 }
3928
3929                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
3930                 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
3931
3932                 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
3933                         Ok(res) => res,
3934                         Err(e) => {
3935                                 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3936                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3937                                 return Err(e);
3938                         }
3939                 };
3940
3941                 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3942
3943                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3944
3945                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3946                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3947                 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
3948
3949                 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
3950                         temporary_channel_id,
3951                         funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3952                         funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3953                         signature
3954                 })
3955         }
3956
3957         /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3958         /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3959         /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3960         /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3961         /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3962         /// closing).
3963         /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3964         /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3965         ///
3966         /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
3967         pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3968                 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3969                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
3970                 }
3971                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3972                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
3973                 }
3974                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3975                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
3976                 }
3977
3978                 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
3979
3980                 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3981                         features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3982                         chain_hash,
3983                         short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3984                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
3985                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
3986                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3987                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
3988                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3989                 };
3990
3991                 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3992                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
3993
3994                 Ok((msg, sig))
3995         }
3996
3997         /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
3998         /// available.
3999         fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, msghash: secp256k1::Message, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, our_bitcoin_sig: Signature) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
4000                 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
4001                         let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
4002
4003                         let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, our_node_secret);
4004                         Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4005                                 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4006                                 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4007                                 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4008                                 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4009                                 contents: announcement,
4010                         })
4011                 } else {
4012                         Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4013                 }
4014         }
4015
4016         /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4017         /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4018         /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4019         pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
4020                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
4021
4022                 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4023
4024                 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4025                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4026                                 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4027                                  &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4028                 }
4029                 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4030                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4031                                 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4032                                 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4033                 }
4034
4035                 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4036
4037                 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig)
4038         }
4039
4040         /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4041         /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4042         pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
4043                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
4044                         Ok(res) => res,
4045                         Err(_) => return None,
4046                 };
4047                 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4048                 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) {
4049                         Ok(res) => Some(res),
4050                         Err(_) => None,
4051                 }
4052         }
4053
4054         /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4055         /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4056         pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4057                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4058                 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
4059                 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
4060                 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
4061                 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
4062                 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
4063                 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
4064                 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
4065                 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
4066                 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
4067                 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4068                         let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
4069                         log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4070                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4071                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
4072                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
4073                         })
4074                 } else {
4075                         log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4076                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4077                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
4078                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
4079                         })
4080                 };
4081                 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
4082                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4083                         // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
4084                         // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
4085                         // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
4086                         // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
4087                         // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
4088                         // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
4089
4090                         // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
4091                         // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
4092                         next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4093                         // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
4094                         // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
4095                         // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
4096                         // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
4097                         // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
4098                         // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
4099                         // overflow here.
4100                         next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
4101                         data_loss_protect,
4102                 }
4103         }
4104
4105
4106         // Send stuff to our remote peers:
4107
4108         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
4109         /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
4110         ///
4111         /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
4112         /// the wire:
4113         /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
4114         ///   wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
4115         ///   awaiting ACK.
4116         /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateFailed, we cannot commit to a new state as we
4117         ///   may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to regenerate
4118         ///   them.
4119         ///
4120         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
4121         ///
4122         /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
4123         pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
4124                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4125                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
4126                 }
4127                 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
4128                 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
4129                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
4130                 }
4131
4132                 if amount_msat == 0 {
4133                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4134                 }
4135
4136                 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
4137                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
4138                 }
4139
4140                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
4141                         // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
4142                         // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
4143                         // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
4144                         // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
4145                         // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
4146                         // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
4147                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
4148                 }
4149
4150                 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
4151                 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
4152                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4153                 }
4154                 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4155                 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4156                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4157                 }
4158
4159                 if !self.is_outbound() {
4160                         // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4161                         let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
4162                         let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
4163                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4164                         let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4165                         if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4166                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4167                         }
4168                 }
4169
4170                 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - htlc_outbound_value_msat;
4171                 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
4172                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
4173                 }
4174
4175                 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
4176                 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
4177                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4178                         2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
4179                 } else { 0 };
4180                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
4181                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
4182                 }
4183
4184                 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
4185                 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
4186                 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
4187                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
4188                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
4189                 }
4190
4191                 // Now update local state:
4192                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
4193                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4194                                 amount_msat,
4195                                 payment_hash,
4196                                 cltv_expiry,
4197                                 source,
4198                                 onion_routing_packet,
4199                         });
4200                         return Ok(None);
4201                 }
4202
4203                 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4204                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4205                         amount_msat,
4206                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4207                         cltv_expiry,
4208                         state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
4209                         source,
4210                 });
4211
4212                 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4213                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4214                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4215                         amount_msat,
4216                         payment_hash,
4217                         cltv_expiry,
4218                         onion_routing_packet,
4219                 };
4220                 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
4221
4222                 Ok(Some(res))
4223         }
4224
4225         /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
4226         /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
4227         /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
4228         /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
4229         pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4230                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4231                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
4232                 }
4233                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
4234                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
4235                 }
4236                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
4237                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4238                 }
4239                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
4240                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4241                 }
4242                 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
4243                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4244                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4245                                 have_updates = true;
4246                         }
4247                         if have_updates { break; }
4248                 }
4249                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4250                         if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4251                                 have_updates = true;
4252                         }
4253                         if have_updates { break; }
4254                 }
4255                 if !have_updates {
4256                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
4257                 }
4258                 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
4259         }
4260         /// Only fails in case of bad keys
4261         fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4262                 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4263                 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4264                 // is acceptable.
4265                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4266                         let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4267                                 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4268                         } else { None };
4269                         if let Some(state) = new_state {
4270                                 htlc.state = state;
4271                         }
4272                 }
4273                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4274                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4275                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
4276                         } else { None } {
4277                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4278                         }
4279                 }
4280                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4281
4282                 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4283                         Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4284                                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4285                                 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4286                                         htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4287                                 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4288                         },
4289                         Err(e) => return Err(e),
4290                 };
4291
4292                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4293                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4294                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4295                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4296                                 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4297                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4298                                 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4299                                 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4300                         }]
4301                 };
4302                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4303                 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4304         }
4305
4306         /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4307         /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4308         fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4309                 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4310                 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
4311                         if self.is_outbound() {
4312                                 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4313                         }
4314                 }
4315
4316                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4317                 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
4318                 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4319                 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4320
4321                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4322                 {
4323                         if !self.is_outbound() {
4324                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4325                                 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4326                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4327                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4328                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4329                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4330                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4331                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4332                                                         let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.1);
4333                                                         assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4334                                                 }
4335                                 }
4336                         }
4337                 }
4338
4339                 {
4340                         let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len());
4341                         for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
4342                                 htlcs.push(htlc);
4343                         }
4344
4345                         let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4346                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4347                         signature = res.0;
4348                         htlc_signatures = res.1;
4349
4350                         log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
4351                                 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4352                                 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4353                                 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4354
4355                         for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4356                                 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
4357                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4358                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4359                                         log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4360                                         log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4361                         }
4362                 }
4363
4364                 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4365                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4366                         signature,
4367                         htlc_signatures,
4368                 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
4369         }
4370
4371         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4372         /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4373         /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4374         /// more info.
4375         pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4376                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4377                         Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4378                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4379                                 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4380                         },
4381                         None => Ok(None)
4382                 }
4383         }
4384
4385         /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
4386         pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
4387                 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
4388         }
4389
4390         pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4391                 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4392                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
4393                 }
4394                 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4395                         fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
4396                         fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
4397                         cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
4398                 });
4399
4400                 Ok(())
4401         }
4402
4403         /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4404         /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4405         pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
4406                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4407                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4408                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4409                         }
4410                 }
4411                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4412                         if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4413                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4414                         }
4415                         else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4416                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4417                         }
4418                 }
4419                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4420                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4421                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4422                 }
4423
4424                 let closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
4425
4426                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4427                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4428                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4429                 } else {
4430                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4431                 }
4432                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4433
4434                 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4435                 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4436                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4437                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4438                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4439                         match htlc_update {
4440                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4441                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4442                                         false
4443                                 },
4444                                 _ => true
4445                         }
4446                 });
4447
4448                 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
4449                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4450                         scriptpubkey: closing_script,
4451                 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4452         }
4453
4454         /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4455         /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4456         /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4457         /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4458         /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4459         pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4460                 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
4461                 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
4462                 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
4463                 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4464                 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4465
4466                 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4467                 // return them to fail the payment.
4468                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4469                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4470                         match htlc_update {
4471                                 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4472                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4473                                 },
4474                                 _ => {}
4475                         }
4476                 }
4477                 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4478                         // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4479                         // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4480                         // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4481                         // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4482                         // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4483                         // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4484                         // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4485                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4486                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4487                                 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4488                                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4489                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4490                                 }))
4491                         } else { None }
4492                 } else { None };
4493
4494                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4495                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4496                 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4497         }
4498 }
4499
4500 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
4501 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4502
4503 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
4504         (0, FailRelay),
4505         (1, FailMalformed),
4506         (2, Fulfill),
4507 );
4508
4509 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4510         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4511                 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
4512                 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
4513                 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
4514                 match self {
4515                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4516                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4517                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4518                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4519                 }
4520                 Ok(())
4521         }
4522 }
4523
4524 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4525         fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4526                 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4527                         0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
4528                         1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
4529                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4530                 })
4531         }
4532 }
4533
4534 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4535         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4536                 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4537                 // called.
4538
4539                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4540
4541                 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4542
4543                 // Write out the old serialization for the config object. This is read by version-1
4544                 // deserializers, but we will read the version in the TLV at the end instead.
4545                 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4546                 self.config.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4547                 self.config.announced_channel.write(writer)?;
4548                 self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4549
4550                 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4551                 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4552                 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4553
4554                 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4555
4556                 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4557                 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
4558                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
4559                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
4560                 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4561                 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
4562
4563                 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4564                 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4565
4566                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4567                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4568                 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4569
4570                 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4571                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4572                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4573                                 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4574                         }
4575                 }
4576                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4577                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4578                         if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4579                                 continue; // Drop
4580                         }
4581                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4582                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4583                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4584                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4585                         match &htlc.state {
4586                                 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4587                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4588                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4589                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4590                                 },
4591                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4592                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4593                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4594                                 },
4595                                 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4596                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4597                                 },
4598                                 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4599                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4600                                         removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4601                                 },
4602                         }
4603                 }
4604
4605                 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4606                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4607                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4608                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4609                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4610                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4611                         htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4612                         match &htlc.state {
4613                                 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4614                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4615                                         onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4616                                 },
4617                                 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4618                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4619                                 },
4620                                 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
4621                                         // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
4622                                         // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
4623                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4624                                 },
4625                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4626                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4627                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4628                                 },
4629                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4630                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4631                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4632                                 },
4633                         }
4634                 }
4635
4636                 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4637                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4638                         match update {
4639                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4640                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4641                                         amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4642                                         cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4643                                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4644                                         source.write(writer)?;
4645                                         onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4646                                 },
4647                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4648                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4649                                         payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4650                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4651                                 },
4652                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4653                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4654                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4655                                         err_packet.write(writer)?;
4656                                 }
4657                         }
4658                 }
4659
4660                 match self.resend_order {
4661                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4662                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4663                 }
4664
4665                 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4666                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4667                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4668
4669                 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4670                 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4671                         pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4672                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4673                 }
4674
4675                 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4676                 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4677                         htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4678                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4679                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4680                 }
4681
4682                 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4683                 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4684
4685                 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4686                 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4687                 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4688                 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4689
4690                 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4691                         Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4692                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4693                                 feerate.write(writer)?;
4694                                 fee.write(writer)?;
4695                                 sig.write(writer)?;
4696                         },
4697                         None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4698                 }
4699
4700                 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4701                 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
4702                 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4703
4704                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4705                 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4706                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4707
4708                 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
4709                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
4710
4711                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4712                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4713                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4714
4715                 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
4716                 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
4717
4718                 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
4719                         Some(info) => {
4720                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4721                                 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
4722                                 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4723                                 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4724                         },
4725                         None => 0u8.write(writer)?
4726                 }
4727
4728                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
4729                 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
4730
4731                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4732                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4733                 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
4734
4735                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4736
4737                 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4738
4739                 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
4740
4741                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4742                 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4743                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4744                 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
4745                         htlc.write(writer)?;
4746                 }
4747
4748                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
4749                         (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
4750                         // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
4751                         // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
4752                         // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
4753                         // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
4754                         // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
4755                         // override that.
4756                         (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
4757                         (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
4758                         (5, self.config, required),
4759                 });
4760
4761                 Ok(())
4762         }
4763 }
4764
4765 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4766 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
4767                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4768         fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4769                 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4770
4771                 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4772
4773                 let mut config = Some(ChannelConfig::default());
4774                 if ver == 1 {
4775                         // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
4776                         config.as_mut().unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
4777                         config.as_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
4778                         config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
4779                         config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4780                 } else {
4781                         // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
4782                         let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4783                 }
4784
4785                 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4786                 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4787                 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4788
4789                 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4790
4791                 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4792                 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
4793                 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
4794                         // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
4795                         let mut data = [0; 1024];
4796                         let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
4797                         reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
4798                         keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
4799                 }
4800                 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
4801
4802                 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4803                 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4804
4805                 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4806                 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4807                 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4808
4809                 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4810                 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4811                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
4812                         pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4813                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4814                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4815                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4816                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4817                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4818                                         1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4819                                         2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4820                                         3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4821                                         4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4822                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4823                                 },
4824                         });
4825                 }
4826
4827                 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4828                 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4829                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4830                         pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4831                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4832                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4833                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4834                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4835                                 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4836                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4837                                         0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4838                                         1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4839                                         2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4840                                         3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4841                                         4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4842                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4843                                 },
4844                         });
4845                 }
4846
4847                 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4848                 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4849                 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4850                         holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4851                                 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4852                                         amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4853                                         cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4854                                         payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4855                                         source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4856                                         onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4857                                 },
4858                                 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4859                                         payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4860                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4861                                 },
4862                                 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4863                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4864                                         err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4865                                 },
4866                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4867                         });
4868                 }
4869
4870                 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4871                         0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4872                         1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4873                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4874                 };
4875
4876                 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4877                 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4878                 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4879
4880                 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4881                 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4882                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4883                         monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4884                 }
4885
4886                 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4887                 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4888                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4889                         monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4890                 }
4891
4892                 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4893                 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4894
4895                 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4896                 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4897                 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
4898                 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4899
4900                 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4901                         0 => None,
4902                         1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4903                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4904                 };
4905
4906                 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4907                 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
4908                 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4909
4910                 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4911                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4912                 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4913                 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
4914                 if ver == 1 {
4915                         // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
4916                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
4917                 } else {
4918                         // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
4919                         let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4920                 }
4921                 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4922                 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4923                 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
4924
4925                 let mut minimum_depth = None;
4926                 if ver == 1 {
4927                         // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
4928                         minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
4929                 } else {
4930                         // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
4931                         let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4932                 }
4933
4934                 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4935                         0 => None,
4936                         1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4937                                 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4938                                 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
4939                                 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
4940                         }),
4941                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4942                 };
4943
4944                 let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
4945                 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
4946
4947                 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4948
4949                 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4950                 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4951
4952                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4953                 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4954
4955                 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
4956
4957                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4958                 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
4959                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4960                 {
4961                         let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4962                         for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
4963                                 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
4964                         }
4965                 }
4966
4967                 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
4968                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
4969                         (0, announcement_sigs, option),
4970                         (1, minimum_depth, option),
4971                         (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
4972                         (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
4973                 });
4974
4975                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4976                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
4977
4978                 Ok(Channel {
4979                         user_id,
4980
4981                         config: config.unwrap(),
4982                         channel_id,
4983                         channel_state,
4984                         secp_ctx,
4985                         channel_value_satoshis,
4986
4987                         latest_monitor_update_id,
4988
4989                         holder_signer,
4990                         shutdown_pubkey,
4991                         destination_script,
4992
4993                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4994                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4995                         value_to_self_msat,
4996
4997                         pending_inbound_htlcs,
4998                         pending_outbound_htlcs,
4999                         holding_cell_htlc_updates,
5000
5001                         resend_order,
5002
5003                         monitor_pending_funding_locked,
5004                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
5005                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
5006                         monitor_pending_forwards,
5007                         monitor_pending_failures,
5008
5009                         pending_update_fee,
5010                         holding_cell_update_fee,
5011                         next_holder_htlc_id,
5012                         next_counterparty_htlc_id,
5013                         update_time_counter,
5014                         feerate_per_kw,
5015
5016                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5017                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
5018                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5019                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
5020
5021                         last_sent_closing_fee,
5022
5023                         funding_tx_confirmed_in,
5024                         funding_tx_confirmation_height,
5025                         short_channel_id,
5026
5027                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
5028                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5029                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5030                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5031                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
5032                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5033                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
5034                         minimum_depth,
5035
5036                         counterparty_forwarding_info,
5037
5038                         channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
5039                         funding_transaction,
5040
5041                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
5042                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
5043                         counterparty_node_id,
5044
5045                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5046
5047                         commitment_secrets,
5048
5049                         channel_update_status,
5050
5051                         announcement_sigs,
5052
5053                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5054                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5055                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5056                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5057
5058                         workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5059
5060                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5061                         historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
5062                 })
5063         }
5064 }
5065
5066 #[cfg(test)]
5067 mod tests {
5068         use bitcoin::util::bip143;
5069         use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
5070         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
5071         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
5072         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
5073         use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
5074         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5075         use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
5076         use hex;
5077         use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
5078         use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
5079         use ln::channel::{Channel,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
5080         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
5081         use ln::features::InitFeatures;
5082         use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
5083         use ln::chan_utils;
5084         use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
5085         use chain::BestBlock;
5086         use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
5087         use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
5088         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
5089         use util::config::UserConfig;
5090         use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
5091         use util::test_utils;
5092         use util::logger::Logger;
5093         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
5094         use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
5095         use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
5096         use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
5097         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5098         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5099         use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
5100         use sync::Arc;
5101         use prelude::*;
5102
5103         struct TestFeeEstimator {
5104                 fee_est: u32
5105         }
5106         impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
5107                 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
5108                         self.fee_est
5109                 }
5110         }
5111
5112         #[test]
5113         fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
5114                 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
5115                         "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
5116         }
5117
5118         struct Keys {
5119                 signer: InMemorySigner,
5120         }
5121         impl KeysInterface for Keys {
5122                 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
5123
5124                 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
5125                 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
5126                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5127                         let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5128                         let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
5129                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
5130                 }
5131
5132                 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
5133                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5134                         let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5135                         PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
5136                 }
5137
5138                 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
5139                         self.signer.clone()
5140                 }
5141                 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
5142                 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
5143                 fn sign_invoice(&self, _invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
5144         }
5145
5146         fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
5147                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
5148         }
5149
5150         // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
5151         // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
5152         #[test]
5153         fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
5154                 let original_fee = 253;
5155                 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
5156                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5157                 let seed = [42; 32];
5158                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5159                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5160
5161                 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5162                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5163                 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5164
5165                 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
5166                 // same as the old fee.
5167                 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
5168                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5169                 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
5170         }
5171
5172         #[test]
5173         fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
5174                 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
5175                 // dust limits are used.
5176                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5177                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5178                 let seed = [42; 32];
5179                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5180                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5181
5182                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
5183                 // they have different dust limits.
5184
5185                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5186                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5187                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5188                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5189
5190                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5191                 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
5192                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5193                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5194                 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5195
5196                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
5197                 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5198                 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5199                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5200                 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
5201
5202                 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
5203                 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
5204                 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
5205                         htlc_id: 0,
5206                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
5207                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
5208                         cltv_expiry: 300000000,
5209                         state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5210                 });
5211
5212                 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5213                         htlc_id: 1,
5214                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
5215                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
5216                         cltv_expiry: 200000000,
5217                         state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5218                         source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5219                                 path: Vec::new(),
5220                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5221                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
5222                         }
5223                 });
5224
5225                 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
5226                 // the dust limit check.
5227                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5228                 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5229                 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5230                 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
5231
5232                 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
5233                 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
5234                 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5235                 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
5236                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5237                 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5238                 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
5239         }
5240
5241         #[test]
5242         fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
5243                 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
5244                 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
5245                 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
5246                 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
5247                 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
5248                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5249                 let seed = [42; 32];
5250                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5251                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5252
5253                 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5254                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5255                 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5256
5257                 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5258                 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
5259
5260                 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
5261                 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5262                 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5263                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5264                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5265                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5266
5267                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5268                 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5269                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5270                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5271                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5272
5273                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5274
5275                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5276                 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5277                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5278                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5279                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5280
5281                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5282                 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5283                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5284                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5285                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5286         }
5287
5288         #[test]
5289         fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
5290                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5291                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5292                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5293                 let seed = [42; 32];
5294                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5295                 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
5296                 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
5297                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5298
5299                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
5300
5301                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5302                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5303                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5304                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5305
5306                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5307                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
5308                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5309                 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5310
5311                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
5312                 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5313                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5314
5315                 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
5316                 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5317                 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5318                         value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
5319                 }]};
5320                 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
5321                 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
5322                 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
5323
5324                 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
5325                 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
5326
5327                 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
5328                 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
5329                 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5330                 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5331                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5332                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5333                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5334                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5335                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5336                         },
5337                         _ => panic!()
5338                 }
5339
5340                 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
5341                 // is sane.
5342                 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5343                 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5344                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5345                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5346                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5347                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5348                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5349                         },
5350                         _ => panic!()
5351                 }
5352         }
5353
5354         #[test]
5355         fn channel_update() {
5356                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5357                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5358                 let seed = [42; 32];
5359                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5360                 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5361                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5362
5363                 // Create a channel.
5364                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5365                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5366                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5367                 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
5368                 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
5369                 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
5370
5371                 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
5372                 let update = ChannelUpdate {
5373                         contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
5374                                 chain_hash,
5375                                 short_channel_id: 0,
5376                                 timestamp: 0,
5377                                 flags: 0,
5378                                 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
5379                                 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
5380                                 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
5381                                 fee_base_msat: 110,
5382                                 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
5383                                 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5384                         },
5385                         signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
5386                 };
5387                 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
5388
5389                 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
5390                 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
5391                 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
5392                 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
5393                         Some(info) => {
5394                                 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
5395                                 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
5396                                 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
5397                         },
5398                         None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
5399                 }
5400         }
5401
5402         #[test]
5403         fn outbound_commitment_test() {
5404                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
5405                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5406                 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
5407                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5408
5409                 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
5410                         &secp_ctx,
5411                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5412                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5413                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5414                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5415                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5416
5417                         // These aren't set in the test vectors:
5418                         [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
5419                         10_000_000,
5420                         [0; 32]
5421                 );
5422
5423                 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5424                                 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
5425                 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
5426
5427                 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5428                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
5429                 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
5430                 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
5431                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5432                 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
5433
5434                 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
5435
5436                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5437                         funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5438                         revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5439                         payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
5440                         delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5441                         htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
5442                 };
5443                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5444                         CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5445                                 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5446                                 selected_contest_delay: 144
5447                         });
5448                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5449                 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5450
5451                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5452                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5453
5454                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5455                            hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5456
5457                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5458                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5459
5460                 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5461                 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5462                 // build_commitment_transaction.
5463                 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5464                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5465                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5466                 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5467                 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5468
5469                 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5470                         ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5471                                 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5472                         } ) => { {
5473                                 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
5474                                         let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
5475
5476                                         let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
5477                                                 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
5478                                                 .collect();
5479                                         (res.0, htlcs)
5480                                 };
5481                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
5482                                 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
5483                                 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5484                                 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5485                                 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
5486                                 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
5487
5488                                 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
5489                                 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5490                                 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
5491                                 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5492                                 $({
5493                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5494                                         per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
5495                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
5496                                 })*
5497                                 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
5498
5499                                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
5500                                         commitment_tx.clone(),
5501                                         counterparty_signature,
5502                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs,
5503                                         &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
5504                                         chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
5505                                 );
5506                                 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
5507                                 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
5508
5509                                 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5510                                 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
5511                                 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
5512
5513                                 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
5514                                 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
5515
5516                                 $({
5517                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5518
5519                                         let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
5520                                         let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
5521                                                 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
5522                                                 &htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
5523                                         let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
5524                                         let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
5525                                         secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
5526
5527                                         let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5528                                         if !htlc.offered {
5529                                                 for i in 0..5 {
5530                                                         let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
5531                                                         if out == htlc.payment_hash {
5532                                                                 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
5533                                                         }
5534                                                 }
5535
5536                                                 assert!(preimage.is_some());
5537                                         }
5538
5539                                         let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
5540                                         assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
5541
5542                                         let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5543                                         assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
5544                                         let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
5545                                         let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
5546                                         let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
5547                                         assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
5548                                                         hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
5549                                 })*
5550                                 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
5551                         } }
5552                 }
5553
5554                 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
5555                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
5556
5557                 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
5558                                                  "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
5559                                                  "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", {});
5560
5561                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5562                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5563                                 htlc_id: 0,
5564                                 amount_msat: 1000000,
5565                                 cltv_expiry: 500,
5566                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5567                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5568                         };
5569                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
5570                         out
5571                 });
5572                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5573                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5574                                 htlc_id: 1,
5575                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5576                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
5577                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5578                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5579                         };
5580                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5581                         out
5582                 });
5583                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5584                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5585                                 htlc_id: 2,
5586                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5587                                 cltv_expiry: 502,
5588                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5589                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5590                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5591                         };
5592                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
5593                         out
5594                 });
5595                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5596                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5597                                 htlc_id: 3,
5598                                 amount_msat: 3000000,
5599                                 cltv_expiry: 503,
5600                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5601                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5602                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5603                         };
5604                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
5605                         out
5606                 });
5607                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5608                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5609                                 htlc_id: 4,
5610                                 amount_msat: 4000000,
5611                                 cltv_expiry: 504,
5612                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5613                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5614                         };
5615                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
5616                         out
5617                 });
5618
5619                 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5620                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5621                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
5622
5623                 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
5624                                  "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
5625                                  "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", {
5626
5627                                   { 0,
5628                                   "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
5629                                   "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
5630                                   "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" },
5631
5632                                   { 1,
5633                                   "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
5634                                   "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
5635                                   "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
5636
5637                                   { 2,
5638                                   "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
5639                                   "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
5640                                   "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" },
5641
5642                                   { 3,
5643                                   "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
5644                                   "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
5645                                   "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" },
5646
5647                                   { 4,
5648                                   "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
5649                                   "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
5650                                   "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" }
5651                 } );
5652
5653                 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5654                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5655                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
5656
5657                 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
5658                                  "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
5659                                  "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", {
5660
5661                                   { 0,
5662                                   "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
5663                                   "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
5664                                   "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f014730440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
5665
5666                                   { 1,
5667                                   "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
5668                                   "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
5669                                   "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0100000000000000000124060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c014830450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
5670
5671                                   { 2,
5672                                   "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
5673                                   "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
5674                                   "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" },
5675
5676                                   { 3,
5677                                   "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
5678                                   "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
5679                                   "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" },
5680
5681                                   { 4,
5682                                   "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
5683                                   "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
5684                                   "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" }
5685                 } );
5686
5687                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5688                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5689                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
5690
5691                 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
5692                                  "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
5693                                  "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", {
5694
5695                                   { 0,
5696                                   "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
5697                                   "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
5698                                   "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" },
5699
5700                                   { 1,
5701                                   "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
5702                                   "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
5703                                   "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" },
5704
5705                                   { 2,
5706                                   "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
5707                                   "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
5708                                   "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" },
5709
5710                                   { 3,
5711                                   "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
5712                                   "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
5713                                   "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" }
5714                 } );
5715
5716                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5717                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5718                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
5719
5720                 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
5721                                  "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
5722                                  "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", {
5723
5724                                   { 0,
5725                                   "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
5726                                   "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
5727                                   "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" },
5728
5729                                   { 1,
5730                                   "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
5731                                   "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
5732                                   "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0100000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df01483045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
5733
5734                                   { 2,
5735                                   "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
5736                                   "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
5737                                   "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" },
5738
5739                                   { 3,
5740                                   "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
5741                                   "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
5742                                   "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" }
5743                 } );
5744
5745                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5746                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5747                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
5748
5749                 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
5750                                  "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
5751                                  "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", {
5752
5753                                   { 0,
5754                                   "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
5755                                   "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
5756                                   "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" },
5757
5758                                   { 1,
5759                                   "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
5760                                   "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
5761                                   "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" },
5762
5763                                   { 2,
5764                                   "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
5765                                   "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
5766                                   "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" }
5767                 } );
5768
5769                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5770                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5771                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
5772
5773                 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
5774                                  "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
5775                                  "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", {
5776
5777                                   { 0,
5778                                   "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
5779                                   "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
5780                                   "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" },
5781
5782                                   { 1,
5783                                   "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
5784                                   "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
5785                                   "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" },
5786
5787                                   { 2,
5788                                   "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
5789                                   "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
5790                                   "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" }
5791                 } );
5792
5793                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5794                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5795                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
5796
5797                 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
5798                                  "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
5799                                  "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", {
5800
5801                                   { 0,
5802                                   "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
5803                                   "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
5804                                   "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" },
5805
5806                                   { 1,
5807                                   "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
5808                                   "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
5809                                   "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" }
5810                 } );
5811
5812                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5813                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5814                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
5815
5816                 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
5817                                  "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
5818                                  "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", {
5819
5820                                   { 0,
5821                                   "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
5822                                   "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
5823                                   "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" },
5824
5825                                   { 1,
5826                                   "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
5827                                   "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
5828                                   "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" }
5829                 } );
5830
5831                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5832                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5833                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
5834
5835                 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
5836                                  "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
5837                                  "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", {
5838
5839                                   { 0,
5840                                   "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
5841                                   "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
5842                                   "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" }
5843                 } );
5844
5845                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5846                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5847                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
5848
5849                 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
5850                                  "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
5851                                  "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", {
5852
5853                                   { 0,
5854                                   "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
5855                                   "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
5856                                   "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" }
5857                 } );
5858
5859                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5860                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5861                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
5862
5863                 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
5864                                  "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
5865                                  "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", {});
5866
5867                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5868                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5869                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
5870
5871                 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
5872                                  "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
5873                                  "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", {});
5874
5875                 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5876                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5877                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
5878
5879                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5880                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5881                                  "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", {});
5882
5883                 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
5884                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5885                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
5886
5887                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5888                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5889                                  "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", {});
5890
5891                 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
5892                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
5893                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
5894                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
5895                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5896                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5897                                 htlc_id: 1,
5898                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5899                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
5900                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5901                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5902                         };
5903                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5904                         out
5905                 });
5906                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
5907                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5908                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5909                                 htlc_id: 6,
5910                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
5911                                 cltv_expiry: 506,
5912                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5913                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5914                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5915                         };
5916                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5917                         out
5918                 });
5919                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5920                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5921                                 htlc_id: 5,
5922                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
5923                                 cltv_expiry: 505,
5924                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5925                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5926                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5927                         };
5928                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5929                         out
5930                 });
5931
5932                 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
5933                                  "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
5934                                  "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", {
5935
5936                                   { 0,
5937                                   "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
5938                                   "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
5939                                   "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" },
5940                                   { 1,
5941                                   "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
5942                                   "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
5943                                   "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" },
5944                                   { 2,
5945                                   "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
5946                                   "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
5947                                   "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" }
5948                 } );
5949         }
5950
5951         #[test]
5952         fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
5953                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
5954
5955                 let mut seed = [0; 32];
5956                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
5957                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5958                            hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
5959
5960                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
5961                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5962                            hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
5963
5964                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
5965                            hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
5966
5967                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
5968                            hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
5969
5970                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
5971                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
5972                            hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
5973         }
5974
5975         #[test]
5976         fn test_key_derivation() {
5977                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
5978                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5979
5980                 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5981                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5982
5983                 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
5984                 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
5985
5986                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5987                 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
5988
5989                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5990                                 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
5991
5992                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5993                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5994
5995                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5996                                 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
5997
5998                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5999                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
6000         }
6001 }