_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/channel.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
  11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
  12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
  13 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  14 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
  16
  17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
  20
  21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
  23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
  24
  25 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
  26 use ln::msgs;
  27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
  28 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
  29 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
  30 use ln::chan_utils;
  31 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
  32 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
  33 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
  34 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
  35 use util::transaction_utils;
  36 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
  37 use util::logger::Logger;
  38 use util::errors::APIError;
  39 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
  40
  41 use std;
  42 use std::default::Default;
  43 use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
  44 use std::ops::Deref;
  45 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
  46 use std::sync::Mutex;
  47 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
  48 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0;
  49
  50 #[cfg(test)]
  51 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
  52         pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
  53         pub channel_value_msat: u64,
  54         pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
  55         pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  56         pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  57         pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
  58         pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
  59         pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
  60 }
  61
  62 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
  63         FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
  64         FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
  65         Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
  66 }
  67
  68 enum InboundHTLCState {
  69         /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
  70         /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
  71         RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
  72         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
  73         /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
  74         /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
  75         /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
  76         /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
  77         /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
  78         /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
  79         /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
  80         /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
  81         /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
  82         /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
  83         /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
  84         ///
  85         /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
  86         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc)   --> local
  87         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
  88         /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack               <-- local
  89         /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
  90         /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
  91         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc)   --> local
  92         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
  93         /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
  94         /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
  95         /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
  96         /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
  97         /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
  98         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
  99         /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
 100         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
 101         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
 102         /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
 103         /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
 104         /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
 105         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 106         AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
 107         Committed,
 108         /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 109         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 110         /// we'll drop it.
 111         /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
 112         /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
 113         /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
 114         /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
 115         /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
 116         /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
 117         /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
 118         LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
 119 }
 120
 121 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
 122         htlc_id: u64,
 123         amount_msat: u64,
 124         cltv_expiry: u32,
 125         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 126         state: InboundHTLCState,
 127 }
 128
 129 enum OutboundHTLCState {
 130         /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 131         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 132         /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
 133         /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
 134         ///  * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
 135         ///    money back (though we won't), and,
 136         ///  * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
 137         ///    allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
 138         ///    doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
 139         ///    we'll never get out of sync).
 140         /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
 141         /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
 142         LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
 143         Committed,
 144         /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
 145         /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
 146         RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 147         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 148         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 149         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 150         /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
 151         /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
 152         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 153         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 154         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 155         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 156         /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
 157         /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
 158         AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 159 }
 160
 161 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
 162         htlc_id: u64,
 163         amount_msat: u64,
 164         cltv_expiry: u32,
 165         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 166         state: OutboundHTLCState,
 167         source: HTLCSource,
 168 }
 169
 170 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
 171 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
 172         AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
 173                 // always outbound
 174                 amount_msat: u64,
 175                 cltv_expiry: u32,
 176                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 177                 source: HTLCSource,
 178                 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
 179         },
 180         ClaimHTLC {
 181                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
 182                 htlc_id: u64,
 183         },
 184         FailHTLC {
 185                 htlc_id: u64,
 186                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
 187         },
 188 }
 189
 190 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
 191 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
 192 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
 193 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
 194 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
 195 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
 196 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
 197 enum ChannelState {
 198         /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
 199         OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
 200         /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
 201         TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
 202         /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
 203         /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
 204         /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
 205         FundingCreated = 4,
 206         /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
 207         /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
 208         /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
 209         FundingSent = 8,
 210         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
 211         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 212         TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
 213         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
 214         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 215         OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
 216         ChannelFunded = 64,
 217         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
 218         /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
 219         /// dance.
 220         PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
 221         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
 222         /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
 223         /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
 224         MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
 225         /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
 226         /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
 227         /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
 228         /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
 229         /// later.
 230         /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
 231         AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
 232         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
 233         /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
 234         /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
 235         RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
 236         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
 237         /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
 238         /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
 239         /// us their shutdown.
 240         LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
 241         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
 242         /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
 243         ShutdownComplete = 4096,
 244 }
 245 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
 246 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
 247
 248 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
 249
 250 /// Liveness is called to fluctuate given peer disconnecton/monitor failures/closing.
 251 /// If channel is public, network should have a liveness view announced by us on a
 252 /// best-effort, which means we may filter out some status transitions to avoid spam.
 253 /// See further timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
 254 #[derive(PartialEq)]
 255 enum UpdateStatus {
 256         /// Status has been gossiped.
 257         Fresh,
 258         /// Status has been changed.
 259         DisabledMarked,
 260         /// Status has been marked to be gossiped at next flush
 261         DisabledStaged,
 262 }
 263
 264 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
 265 enum HTLCInitiator {
 266         LocalOffered,
 267         RemoteOffered,
 268 }
 269
 270 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
 271 struct HTLCCandidate {
 272         amount_msat: u64,
 273         origin: HTLCInitiator,
 274 }
 275
 276 impl HTLCCandidate {
 277         fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
 278                 Self {
 279                         amount_msat,
 280                         origin,
 281                 }
 282         }
 283 }
 284
 285 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
 286 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
 287 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
 288 // inbound channel.
 289 //
 290 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
 291 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
 292 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
 293         config: ChannelConfig,
 294
 295         user_id: u64,
 296
 297         channel_id: [u8; 32],
 298         channel_state: u32,
 299         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
 300         channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 301
 302         latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
 303
 304         holder_signer: Signer,
 305         shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
 306         destination_script: Script,
 307
 308         // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
 309         // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
 310         // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
 311
 312         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 313         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 314         value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
 315         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
 316         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
 317         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
 318
 319         /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
 320         /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
 321         /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
 322         /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
 323         /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
 324         /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
 325         /// send it first.
 326         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
 327
 328         monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
 329         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
 330         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
 331         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
 332         monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
 333
 334         // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
 335         // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
 336         // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
 337         //
 338         // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
 339         // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
 340         // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
 341         // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
 342         // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
 343         // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
 344         // commitment_signed.
 345         pending_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 346         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
 347         // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
 348         // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
 349         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 350         holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 351         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
 352         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
 353         update_time_counter: u32,
 354         feerate_per_kw: u32,
 355
 356         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 357         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
 358         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 359         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 360         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
 361         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 362
 363         last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
 364
 365         /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
 366         /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
 367         /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
 368         /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
 369         funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
 370         short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
 371         /// Used to verify consistency during ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super)).
 372         pub(super) last_block_connected: BlockHash,
 373         funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
 374
 375         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 376         #[cfg(test)]
 377         pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 378         #[cfg(not(test))]
 379         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 380         #[cfg(test)]
 381         pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 382         #[cfg(not(test))]
 383         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 384         //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
 385         /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
 386         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
 387         // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
 388         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 389         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 390         #[cfg(test)]
 391         pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 392         #[cfg(not(test))]
 393         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 394         //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 395         minimum_depth: u32,
 396
 397         pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
 398
 399         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 400
 401         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 402         counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
 403
 404         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
 405
 406         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
 407
 408         network_sync: UpdateStatus,
 409
 410         // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
 411         // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
 412         // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
 413         // `build_commitment_transaction`.
 414         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 415         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
 416         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 417         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
 418 }
 419
 420 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 421 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
 422         fee: u64,
 423         total_pending_htlcs: usize,
 424         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
 425         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
 426         feerate: u32,
 427 }
 428
 429 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
 430 /// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
 431 /// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
 432 /// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
 433 const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
 434 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
 435 const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
 436
 437 #[cfg(not(test))]
 438 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 439 #[cfg(test)]
 440 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 441 #[cfg(not(test))]
 442 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 443 #[cfg(test)]
 444 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 445
 446 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
 447 /// it's 2^24.
 448 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
 449
 450 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
 451 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
 452 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
 453 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
 454         Ignore(String),
 455         Close(String),
 456         CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
 457 }
 458
 459 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
 460         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
 461                 match self {
 462                         &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
 463                         &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
 464                         &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
 465                 }
 466         }
 467 }
 468
 469 macro_rules! secp_check {
 470         ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
 471                 match $res {
 472                         Ok(thing) => thing,
 473                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
 474                 }
 475         };
 476 }
 477
 478 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
 479         // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
 480         fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 481                 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
 482         }
 483
 484         /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
 485         /// required by us.
 486         ///
 487         /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
 488         pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 489                 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
 490                 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
 491         }
 492
 493         fn derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u32) -> u64 {
 494                 cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate as u64 * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
 495         }
 496
 497         // Constructors:
 498         pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
 499         where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
 500               F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 501         {
 502                 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
 503                 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
 504                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
 505
 506                 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 507                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
 508                 }
 509                 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
 510                 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
 511                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
 512                 }
 513                 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 514                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
 515                 }
 516                 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 517                 if Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
 518                         return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
 519                 }
 520
 521                 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
 522
 523                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 524                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
 525
 526                 Ok(Channel {
 527                         user_id,
 528                         config: config.channel_options.clone(),
 529
 530                         channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
 531                         channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
 532                         secp_ctx,
 533                         channel_value_satoshis,
 534
 535                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 536
 537                         holder_signer,
 538                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
 539                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 540
 541                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 542                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 543                         value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
 544
 545                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 546                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 547                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 548                         pending_update_fee: None,
 549                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 550                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 551                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 552                         update_time_counter: 1,
 553
 554                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 555
 556                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 557                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 558                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 559                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 560                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 561
 562                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 563                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 564                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 565                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 566
 567                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 568
 569                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 570                         short_channel_id: None,
 571                         last_block_connected: Default::default(),
 572                         funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
 573
 574                         feerate_per_kw: feerate,
 575                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
 576                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
 577                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
 578                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
 579                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
 580                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 581                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
 582                         minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
 583
 584                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
 585                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
 586                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 587                                 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
 588                                 counterparty_parameters: None,
 589                                 funding_outpoint: None
 590                         },
 591                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
 592
 593                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 594                         counterparty_node_id,
 595
 596                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
 597
 598                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 599
 600                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
 601
 602                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 603                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 604                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 605                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 606                 })
 607         }
 608
 609         fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
 610                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
 611         {
 612                 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 613                 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
 614                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
 615                 }
 616                 let upper_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64  * 2;
 617                 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
 618                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
 619                 }
 620                 Ok(())
 621         }
 622
 623         /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
 624         /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
 625         pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
 626                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
 627           F::Target: FeeEstimator
 628         {
 629                 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
 630                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
 631                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
 632                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
 633                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
 634                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
 635                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
 636                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
 637                 };
 638                 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
 639
 640                 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 641                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
 642                 }
 643
 644                 // Check sanity of message fields:
 645                 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 646                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 647                 }
 648                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 649                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 650                 }
 651                 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 652                 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
 653                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
 654                 }
 655                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 656                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 657                 }
 658                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
 659                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
 660                 }
 661                 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 662                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
 663                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
 664                 }
 665                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
 666
 667                 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
 668                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
 669                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
 670                 }
 671                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
 672                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
 673                 }
 674                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
 675                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
 676                 }
 677
 678                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
 679                 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
 680                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
 681                 }
 682                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
 683                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat,  config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
 684                 }
 685                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
 686                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
 687                 }
 688                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
 689                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 690                 }
 691                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
 692                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
 693                 }
 694                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
 695                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 696                 }
 697                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
 698                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 699                 }
 700
 701                 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
 702
 703                 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
 704                 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
 705                         if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
 706                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
 707                         }
 708                 }
 709                 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
 710                 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
 711
 712                 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 713
 714                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
 715                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
 716                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
 717                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 718                 }
 719                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
 720                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 721                 }
 722                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
 723                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 724                 }
 725
 726                 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
 727                 // for full fee payment
 728                 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
 729                 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 730                 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
 731                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
 732                 }
 733
 734                 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
 735                 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 736                 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
 737                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
 738                 }
 739
 740                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
 741                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
 742                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
 743                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
 744                                         if script.len() == 0 {
 745                                                 None
 746                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
 747                                         } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
 748                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
 749                                         } else {
 750                                                 Some(script.clone())
 751                                         }
 752                                 },
 753                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
 754                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
 755                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
 756                                 }
 757                         }
 758                 } else { None };
 759
 760                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 761                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
 762
 763                 let chan = Channel {
 764                         user_id,
 765                         config: local_config,
 766
 767                         channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
 768                         channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
 769                         secp_ctx,
 770
 771                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 772
 773                         holder_signer,
 774                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
 775                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 776
 777                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 778                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 779                         value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
 780
 781                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 782                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 783                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 784                         pending_update_fee: None,
 785                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 786                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 787                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 788                         update_time_counter: 1,
 789
 790                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 791
 792                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 793                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 794                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 795                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 796                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 797
 798                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 799                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 800                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 801                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 802
 803                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 804
 805                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 806                         short_channel_id: None,
 807                         last_block_connected: Default::default(),
 808                         funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
 809
 810                         feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
 811                         channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
 812                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
 813                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
 814                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
 815                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
 816                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
 817                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 818                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
 819                         minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
 820
 821                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
 822                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
 823                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 824                                 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
 825                                 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
 826                                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
 827                                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
 828                                 }),
 829                                 funding_outpoint: None
 830                         },
 831                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
 832
 833                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 834                         counterparty_node_id,
 835
 836                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
 837
 838                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 839
 840                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
 841
 842                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 843                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 844                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 845                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 846                 };
 847
 848                 Ok(chan)
 849         }
 850
 851         /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
 852         /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
 853         /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
 854         /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
 855         /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
 856         /// an HTLC to a).
 857         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
 858         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
 859         /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
 860         /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
 861         /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
 862         /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
 863         /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
 864         /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
 865         /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
 866         /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
 867         /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
 868         #[inline]
 869         fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
 870                 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
 871                 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
 872                 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
 873
 874                 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
 875                 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 876                 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 877                 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
 878
 879                 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
 880
 881                 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
 882                         ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
 883                                 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 884                                         offered: $offered,
 885                                         amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
 886                                         cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
 887                                         payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
 888                                         transaction_output_index: None
 889                                 }
 890                         }
 891                 }
 892
 893                 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
 894                         ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
 895                                 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
 896                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
 897                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
 898                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 899                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 900                                         } else {
 901                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 902                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 903                                         }
 904                                 } else {
 905                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
 906                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
 907                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 908                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 909                                         } else {
 910                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 911                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 912                                         }
 913                                 }
 914                         }
 915                 }
 916
 917                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
 918                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
 919                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
 920                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
 921                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
 922                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
 923                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
 924                         };
 925
 926                         if include {
 927                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
 928                                 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 929                         } else {
 930                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
 931                                 match &htlc.state {
 932                                         &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
 933                                                 if generated_by_local {
 934                                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
 935                                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 936                                                         }
 937                                                 }
 938                                         },
 939                                         _ => {},
 940                                 }
 941                         }
 942                 }
 943
 944                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
 945                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
 946                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
 947                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
 948                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
 949                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
 950                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
 951                         };
 952
 953                         if include {
 954                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
 955                                 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 956                         } else {
 957                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
 958                                 match htlc.state {
 959                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
 960                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 961                                         },
 962                                         OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
 963                                                 if !generated_by_local {
 964                                                         value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 965                                                 }
 966                                         },
 967                                         _ => {},
 968                                 }
 969                         }
 970                 }
 971
 972                 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
 973                 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
 974                 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
 975                 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
 976                 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
 977                 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
 978                 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
 979                 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
 980
 981                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 982                 {
 983                         // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
 984                         // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
 985                         let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
 986                                 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
 987                         } else {
 988                                 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
 989                         };
 990                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
 991                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
 992                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
 993                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
 994                 }
 995
 996                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 997                 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
 998                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
 999                 } else {
1000                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
1001                 };
1002
1003                 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1004                 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1005
1006                 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1007                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1008                 } else {
1009                         value_to_a = 0;
1010                 }
1011
1012                 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1013                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1014                 } else {
1015                         value_to_b = 0;
1016                 }
1017
1018                 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1019
1020                 let channel_parameters =
1021                         if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1022                         else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1023                 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1024                                                                              value_to_a as u64,
1025                                                                              value_to_b as u64,
1026                                                                              keys.clone(),
1027                                                                              feerate_per_kw,
1028                                                                              &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1029                                                                              &channel_parameters
1030                 );
1031                 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1032                 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1033                 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1034                 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1035
1036                 (tx, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1037         }
1038
1039         #[inline]
1040         fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1041                 let channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1042                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1043         }
1044
1045         #[inline]
1046         fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1047                 let mut ret =
1048                 (4 +                                           // version
1049                  1 +                                           // input count
1050                  36 +                                          // prevout
1051                  1 +                                           // script length (0)
1052                  4 +                                           // sequence
1053                  1 +                                           // output count
1054                  4                                             // lock time
1055                  )*4 +                                         // * 4 for non-witness parts
1056                 2 +                                            // witness marker and flag
1057                 1 +                                            // witness element count
1058                 4 +                                            // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1059                 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1060                 2*(1 + 71);                                    // two signatures + sighash type flags
1061                 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1062                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1063                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1064                 }
1065                 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1066                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1067                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1068                 }
1069                 ret
1070         }
1071
1072         #[inline]
1073         fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1074                 let txins = {
1075                         let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1076                         ins.push(TxIn {
1077                                 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1078                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1079                                 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1080                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1081                         });
1082                         ins
1083                 };
1084
1085                 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1086                 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1087                 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1088
1089                 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1090                 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1091                 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1092
1093                 if value_to_self < 0 {
1094                         assert!(self.is_outbound());
1095                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1096                 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1097                         assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1098                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1099                 }
1100
1101                 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1102                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1103                                 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1104                                 value: value_to_remote as u64
1105                         }, ()));
1106                 }
1107
1108                 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1109                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1110                                 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1111                                 value: value_to_self as u64
1112                         }, ()));
1113                 }
1114
1115                 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1116
1117                 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1118                 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1119                         outputs.push(out.0);
1120                 }
1121
1122                 (Transaction {
1123                         version: 2,
1124                         lock_time: 0,
1125                         input: txins,
1126                         output: outputs,
1127                 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1128         }
1129
1130         fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1131                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1132         }
1133
1134         #[inline]
1135         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1136         /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1137         /// our counterparty!)
1138         /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1139         /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1140         fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1141                 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1142                 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1143                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1144                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1145
1146                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1147         }
1148
1149         #[inline]
1150         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1151         /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1152         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1153         fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1154                 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1155                 //may see payments to it!
1156                 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1157                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1158                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1159
1160                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1161         }
1162
1163         /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1164         /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1165         /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1166         pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1167                 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1168         }
1169
1170         /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1171         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1172         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1173         fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Transaction {
1174                 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay() } else { self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay() }, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1175         }
1176
1177         /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1178         /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1179         /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1180         ///
1181         /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1182         /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1183         fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1184                 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1185                 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1186                 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1187                 // either.
1188                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1189                         panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1190                 }
1191                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1192
1193                 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1194
1195                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1196                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1197                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1198
1199                 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1200                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1201                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1202                                 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1203                                 match htlc.state {
1204                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1205                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1206                                                 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1207                                                 } else {
1208                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1209                                                 }
1210                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1211                                                 return Ok((None, None));
1212                                         },
1213                                         _ => {
1214                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1215                                                 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1216                                         }
1217                                 }
1218                                 pending_idx = idx;
1219                                 break;
1220                         }
1221                 }
1222                 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1223                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1224                 }
1225
1226                 // Now update local state:
1227                 //
1228                 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1229                 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1230                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1231                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1232                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1233                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1234                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1235                         }],
1236                 };
1237
1238                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1239                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1240                                 match pending_update {
1241                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1242                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1243                                                         // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1244                                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1245                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1246                                                         return Ok((None, None));
1247                                                 }
1248                                         },
1249                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1250                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1251                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1252                                                         // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1253                                                         // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1254                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1255                                                         return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1256                                                 }
1257                                         },
1258                                         _ => {}
1259                                 }
1260                         }
1261                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1262                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1263                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1264                         });
1265                         return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1266                 }
1267
1268                 {
1269                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1270                         if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1271                         } else {
1272                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1273                                 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1274                         }
1275                         log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1276                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1277                 }
1278
1279                 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1280                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1281                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1282                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1283                 }), Some(monitor_update)))
1284         }
1285
1286         pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1287                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger)? {
1288                         (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), Some(mut monitor_update)) => {
1289                                 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1290                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1291                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1292                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1293                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1294                                 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1295                         },
1296                         (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), None) => {
1297                                 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1298                                 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1299                         },
1300                         (None, Some(monitor_update)) => Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))),
1301                         (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1302                 }
1303         }
1304
1305         /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1306         /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1307         /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1308         ///
1309         /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1310         /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1311         pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
1312                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1313                         panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1314                 }
1315                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1316
1317                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1318                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1319                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1320
1321                 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1322                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1323                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1324                                 match htlc.state {
1325                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1326                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1327                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1328                                                 return Ok(None);
1329                                         },
1330                                         _ => {
1331                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1332                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1333                                         }
1334                                 }
1335                                 pending_idx = idx;
1336                         }
1337                 }
1338                 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1339                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1340                 }
1341
1342                 // Now update local state:
1343                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1344                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1345                                 match pending_update {
1346                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1347                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1348                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1349                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1350                                                 }
1351                                         },
1352                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1353                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1354                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1355                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1356                                                 }
1357                                         },
1358                                         _ => {}
1359                                 }
1360                         }
1361                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1362                                 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1363                                 err_packet,
1364                         });
1365                         return Ok(None);
1366                 }
1367
1368                 {
1369                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1370                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1371                 }
1372
1373                 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1374                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1375                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1376                         reason: err_packet
1377                 }))
1378         }
1379
1380         // Message handlers:
1381
1382         pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1383                 // Check sanity of message fields:
1384                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1385                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1386                 }
1387                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1388                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1389                 }
1390                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1391                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1392                 }
1393                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1394                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1395                 }
1396                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1397                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve ({}) and dust_limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1398                 }
1399                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1400                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1401                 }
1402                 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1403                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1404                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1405                 }
1406                 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1407                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1408                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1409                 }
1410                 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1411                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1412                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1413                 }
1414                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1415                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1416                 }
1417                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1418                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1419                 }
1420
1421                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1422                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1423                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1424                 }
1425                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1426                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1427                 }
1428                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1429                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1430                 }
1431                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1432                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1433                 }
1434                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
1435                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1436                 }
1437                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
1438                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1439                 }
1440                 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1441                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1442                 }
1443
1444                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1445                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1446                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1447                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1448                                         if script.len() == 0 {
1449                                                 None
1450                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1451                                         } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
1452                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
1453                                         } else {
1454                                                 Some(script.clone())
1455                                         }
1456                                 },
1457                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1458                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1459                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1460                                 }
1461                         }
1462                 } else { None };
1463
1464                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1465                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1466                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1467                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1468                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1469                 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1470
1471                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1472                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1473                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1474                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1475                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1476                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1477                 };
1478
1479                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1480                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1481                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1482                 });
1483
1484                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1485                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1486
1487                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1488
1489                 Ok(())
1490         }
1491
1492         fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1493                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1494
1495                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1496                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1497                 {
1498                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1499                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1500                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1501                         // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1502                         log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1503                         secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1504                 }
1505
1506                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1507                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1508
1509                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1510                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1511                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1512
1513                 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1514                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1515
1516                 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1517                 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1518         }
1519
1520         fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1521                 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1522         }
1523
1524         pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1525                 if self.is_outbound() {
1526                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1527                 }
1528                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1529                         // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1530                         // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1531                         // channel.
1532                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1533                 }
1534                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1535                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1536                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1537                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1538                 }
1539
1540                 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1541                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1542                 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks.  In particular
1543                 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1544                 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1545
1546                 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1547                         Ok(res) => res,
1548                         Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1549                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1550                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1551                         },
1552                         Err(e) => {
1553                                 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1554                                 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1555                                 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1556                         }
1557                 };
1558
1559                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1560                         initial_commitment_tx,
1561                         msg.signature,
1562                         Vec::new(),
1563                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1564                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1565                 );
1566
1567                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1568
1569                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1570                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1571                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1572                 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1573                                                           &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1574                                                           &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1575                                                           &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1576                                                           funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1577                                                           obscure_factor,
1578                                                           holder_commitment_tx);
1579
1580                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1581
1582                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1583                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1584                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1585                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1586
1587                 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1588                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
1589                         signature
1590                 }, channel_monitor))
1591         }
1592
1593         /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1594         /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1595         pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1596                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1597                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1598                 }
1599                 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1600                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1601                 }
1602                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1603                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1604                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1605                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1606                 }
1607
1608                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1609
1610                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1611                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1612                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1613                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1614
1615                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1616
1617                 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1618                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1619                 {
1620                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1621                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1622                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1623                         // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1624                         if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1625                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1626                         }
1627                 }
1628
1629                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1630                         initial_commitment_tx,
1631                         msg.signature,
1632                         Vec::new(),
1633                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1634                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1635                 );
1636
1637
1638                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1639                 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1640                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1641                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1642                 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1643                                                           &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1644                                                           &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1645                                                           &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1646                                                           funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1647                                                           obscure_factor,
1648                                                           holder_commitment_tx);
1649
1650                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1651
1652                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1653                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1654                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1655                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1656
1657                 Ok(channel_monitor)
1658         }
1659
1660         pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1661                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1662                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1663                 }
1664
1665                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1666
1667                 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1668                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1669                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1670                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1671                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
1672                 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1673                                  // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1674                                  self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1675                                  self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1676                                 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1677                                 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1678                                                       (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1679                         if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1680                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1681                         }
1682                         // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1683                         return Ok(());
1684                 } else {
1685                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1686                 }
1687
1688                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1689                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1690                 Ok(())
1691         }
1692
1693         /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1694         fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1695                 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1696                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1697                         htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1698                 }
1699                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1700         }
1701
1702         /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1703         /// holding cell.
1704         fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1705                 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1706                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1707                         htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1708                 }
1709
1710                 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1711                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1712                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1713                                 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1714                                 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1715                         }
1716                 }
1717
1718                 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1719         }
1720
1721         /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1722         /// Doesn't bother handling the
1723         /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1724         /// corner case properly.
1725         pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1726                 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1727                 (cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1728                 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1729         }
1730
1731         // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1732         // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1733         fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1734                 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1735                 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1736                 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1737         }
1738
1739         // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1740         // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
1741         // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
1742         // are excluded.
1743         fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1744                 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1745
1746                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1747                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1748
1749                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1750                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1751                 match htlc.origin {
1752                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1753                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1754                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1755                                 }
1756                         },
1757                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1758                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1759                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1760                                 }
1761                         }
1762                 }
1763
1764                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1765                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1766                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1767                                 continue
1768                         }
1769                         // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1770                         // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1771                         included_htlcs += 1;
1772                 }
1773
1774                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1775                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1776                                 continue
1777                         }
1778                         match htlc.state {
1779                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1780                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1781                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1782                                 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1783                                 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1784                                 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1785                                 _ => {},
1786                         }
1787                 }
1788
1789                 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1790                         match htlc {
1791                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1792                                         if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1793                                                 continue
1794                                         }
1795                                         included_htlcs += 1
1796                                 },
1797                                 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1798                                          // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1799                         }
1800                 }
1801
1802                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1803                 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1804                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1805                 {
1806                         let mut fee = res;
1807                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1808                                 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1809                         }
1810                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1811                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1812                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1813                                 fee,
1814                                 total_pending_htlcs,
1815                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1816                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1817                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1818                                 },
1819                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1820                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1821                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1822                                 },
1823                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1824                         };
1825                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1826                 }
1827                 res
1828         }
1829
1830         // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1831         // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
1832         // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
1833         // excluded.
1834         fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1835                 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1836
1837                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1838                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1839
1840                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1841                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1842                 match htlc.origin {
1843                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1844                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1845                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1846                                 }
1847                         },
1848                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1849                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1850                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1851                                 }
1852                         }
1853                 }
1854
1855                 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1856                 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1857                 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1858                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1859                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1860                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1861                                 continue
1862                         }
1863                         included_htlcs += 1;
1864                 }
1865
1866                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1867                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1868                                 continue
1869                         }
1870                         // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1871                         // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1872                         match htlc.state {
1873                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1874                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1875                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1876                                 _ => {},
1877                         }
1878                 }
1879
1880                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1881                 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1882                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1883                 {
1884                         let mut fee = res;
1885                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1886                                 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1887                         }
1888                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1889                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1890                                 fee,
1891                                 total_pending_htlcs,
1892                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1893                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1894                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1895                                 },
1896                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1897                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1898                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1899                                 },
1900                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1901                         };
1902                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1903                 }
1904                 res
1905         }
1906
1907         pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1908         where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
1909                 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
1910                 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1911                 if local_sent_shutdown {
1912                         pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
1913                 }
1914                 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
1915                 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1916                 if remote_sent_shutdown {
1917                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1918                 }
1919                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1920                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1921                 }
1922                 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1923                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
1924                 }
1925                 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
1926                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
1927                 }
1928                 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
1929                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
1930                 }
1931
1932                 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1933                 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1934                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
1935                 }
1936                 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1937                 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1938                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1939                 }
1940                 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1941                 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1942                 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1943                 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1944                 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1945                 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1946                 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1947                 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1948                 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1949                 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1950                 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1951                 // transaction).
1952                 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
1953                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1954                         if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
1955                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1956                         } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
1957                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1958                         }
1959                 }
1960
1961                 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
1962                         self.value_to_self_msat + htlc_inbound_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
1963                 let pending_remote_value_msat =
1964                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
1965                 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
1966                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
1967                 }
1968
1969                 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
1970                 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
1971                 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
1972                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
1973                         self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
1974                 };
1975                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
1976                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
1977                 };
1978
1979                 let chan_reserve_msat =
1980                         Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
1981                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
1982                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
1983                 }
1984
1985                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1986                         // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
1987                         // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
1988                         // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
1989                         // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
1990                         // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
1991                         // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
1992                         // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
1993                         // sensitive to fee spikes.
1994                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
1995                         let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
1996                         if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
1997                                 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
1998                                 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
1999                                 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation");
2000                                 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2001                         }
2002                 } else {
2003                         // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2004                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2005                         let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2006                         if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2007                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2008                         }
2009                 }
2010                 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2011                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2012                 }
2013                 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2014                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2015                 }
2016
2017                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2018                         if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2019                                 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2020                         }
2021                 }
2022
2023                 // Now update local state:
2024                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2025                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2026                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2027                         amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2028                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2029                         cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2030                         state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2031                 });
2032                 Ok(())
2033         }
2034
2035         /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2036         #[inline]
2037         fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2038                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2039                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2040                                 match check_preimage {
2041                                         None => {},
2042                                         Some(payment_hash) =>
2043                                                 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2044                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2045                                                 }
2046                                 };
2047                                 match htlc.state {
2048                                         OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2049                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2050                                         OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2051                                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2052                                         },
2053                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2054                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2055                                 }
2056                                 return Ok(&htlc.source);
2057                         }
2058                 }
2059                 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2060         }
2061
2062         pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2063                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2064                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2065                 }
2066                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2067                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2068                 }
2069
2070                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2071                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
2072         }
2073
2074         pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2075                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2076                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2077                 }
2078                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2079                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2080                 }
2081
2082                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2083                 Ok(())
2084         }
2085
2086         pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2087                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2088                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2089                 }
2090                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2091                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2092                 }
2093
2094                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2095                 Ok(())
2096         }
2097
2098         pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2099         where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2100                                 L::Target: Logger
2101         {
2102                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2103                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2104                 }
2105                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2106                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2107                 }
2108                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2109                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2110                 }
2111
2112                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2113
2114                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2115
2116                 let mut update_fee = false;
2117                 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2118                         update_fee = true;
2119                         self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
2120                 } else {
2121                         self.feerate_per_kw
2122                 };
2123
2124                 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid) = {
2125                         let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
2126                         let commitment_txid = {
2127                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2128                                 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2129                                 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2130
2131                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
2132                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2133                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2134                                 }
2135                                 bitcoin_tx.txid
2136                         };
2137                         let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2138                         (commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid)
2139                 };
2140
2141                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2142                 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
2143                 if update_fee {
2144                         let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2145                         if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2146                                 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2147                         }
2148                 }
2149                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2150                 {
2151                         if self.is_outbound() {
2152                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2153                                 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2154                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2155                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2156                                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2157                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2158                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2159                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2160                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2161                                                         assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2162                                                 }
2163                                 }
2164                         }
2165                 }
2166
2167                 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2168                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2169                 }
2170
2171                 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2172                 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2173                 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2174                         if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2175                                 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &keys, feerate_per_kw);
2176                                 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2177                                 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2178                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
2179                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2180                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2181                                 }
2182                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2183                         } else {
2184                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2185                         }
2186                 }
2187
2188                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2189                         commitment_tx,
2190                         msg.signature,
2191                         msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2192                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2193                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2194                 );
2195
2196                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2197                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2198
2199                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2200                 let mut need_commitment = false;
2201                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2202                         if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
2203                                 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
2204                                 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
2205                                 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
2206                                 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
2207                                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
2208                                         need_commitment = true;
2209                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2210                                 }
2211                         }
2212                 }
2213
2214                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2215                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2216                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2217                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2218                                 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2219                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2220                         }]
2221                 };
2222
2223                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2224                         let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2225                                 Some(forward_info.clone())
2226                         } else { None };
2227                         if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2228                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2229                                 need_commitment = true;
2230                         }
2231                 }
2232                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2233                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2234                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
2235                         } else { None } {
2236                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2237                                 need_commitment = true;
2238                         }
2239                 }
2240
2241                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2242                 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2243                 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2244                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2245
2246                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2247                         // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2248                         // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2249                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2250                         if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2251                                 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2252                                 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2253                                 // includes the right HTLCs.
2254                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2255                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2256                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2257                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2258                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2259                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2260                         }
2261                         // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2262                         // re-send the message on restoration)
2263                         return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2264                 }
2265
2266                 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2267                         // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2268                         // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2269                         // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2270                         let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2271                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2272                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2273                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2274                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2275                         (Some(msg), None)
2276                 } else if !need_commitment {
2277                         (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2278                 } else { (None, None) };
2279
2280                 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2281                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2282                         per_commitment_secret,
2283                         next_per_commitment_point,
2284                 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2285         }
2286
2287         /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2288         /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2289         fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2290                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2291                 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2292                         log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
2293
2294                         let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2295                                 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2296                                 updates: Vec::new(),
2297                         };
2298
2299                         let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2300                         mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2301                         let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2302                         let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2303                         let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2304                         let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2305                         for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2306                                 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2307                                 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2308                                 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2309                                 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2310                                 // to rebalance channels.
2311                                 match &htlc_update {
2312                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2313                                                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2314                                                         Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2315                                                         Err(e) => {
2316                                                                 match e {
2317                                                                         ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2318                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2319                                                                                 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2320                                                                                 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2321                                                                                 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2322                                                                                 // into the holding cell without ever being
2323                                                                                 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2324                                                                                 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2325                                                                                 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2326                                                                         },
2327                                                                         _ => {
2328                                                                                 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2329                                                                         },
2330                                                                 }
2331                                                         }
2332                                                 }
2333                                         },
2334                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2335                                                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2336                                                         Ok((update_fulfill_msg_option, additional_monitor_update_opt)) => {
2337                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2338                                                                 if let Some(mut additional_monitor_update) = additional_monitor_update_opt {
2339                                                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2340                                                                 }
2341                                                         },
2342                                                         Err(e) => {
2343                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2344                                                                 else {
2345                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
2346                                                                 }
2347                                                         }
2348                                                 }
2349                                         },
2350                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2351                                                 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
2352                                                         Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
2353                                                         Err(e) => {
2354                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2355                                                                 else {
2356                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2357                                                                 }
2358                                                         }
2359                                                 }
2360                                         },
2361                                 }
2362                         }
2363                         if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2364                                 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2365                         }
2366                         let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2367                                 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2368                                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2369                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2370                                         feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2371                                 })
2372                         } else {
2373                                 None
2374                         };
2375
2376                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2377                         // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2378                         // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2379                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2380                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2381
2382                         Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2383                                 update_add_htlcs,
2384                                 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2385                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2386                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2387                                 update_fee,
2388                                 commitment_signed,
2389                         }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2390                 } else {
2391                         Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2392                 }
2393         }
2394
2395         /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2396         /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2397         /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2398         /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2399         /// revoke_and_ack message.
2400         pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2401                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2402                                         L::Target: Logger,
2403         {
2404                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2405                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2406                 }
2407                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2408                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2409                 }
2410                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2411                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2412                 }
2413
2414                 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2415                         if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2416                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2417                         }
2418                 }
2419
2420                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2421                         // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2422                         // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2423                         // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2424                         // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2425                         // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2426                         // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2427                         // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2428                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2429                 }
2430
2431                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2432                 {
2433                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2434                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2435                 }
2436
2437                 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2438                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2439                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2440                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2441                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2442                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2443                                 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2444                                 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2445                         }],
2446                 };
2447
2448                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2449                 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2450                 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2451                 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2452                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2453                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2454                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2455                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2456
2457                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
2458                 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2459                 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2460                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2461                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2462                 let mut require_commitment = false;
2463                 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2464
2465                 {
2466                         // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2467                         let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2468                         let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2469
2470                         // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2471                         pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2472                                 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2473                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2474                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2475                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2476                                         }
2477                                         false
2478                                 } else { true }
2479                         });
2480                         pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2481                                 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2482                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2483                                         if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2484                                                 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2485                                         } else {
2486                                                 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2487                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2488                                         }
2489                                         false
2490                                 } else { true }
2491                         });
2492                         for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2493                                 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2494                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2495                                         true
2496                                 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2497                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2498                                         true
2499                                 } else { false };
2500                                 if swap {
2501                                         let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2502                                         mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2503
2504                                         if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2505                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2506                                                 require_commitment = true;
2507                                         } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2508                                                 match forward_info {
2509                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2510                                                                 require_commitment = true;
2511                                                                 match fail_msg {
2512                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2513                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2514                                                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2515                                                                         },
2516                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2517                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2518                                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2519                                                                         },
2520                                                                 }
2521                                                         },
2522                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2523                                                                 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2524                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2525                                                         }
2526                                                 }
2527                                         }
2528                                 }
2529                         }
2530                         for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2531                                 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2532                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2533                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2534                                 }
2535                                 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2536                                         Some(fail_reason.take())
2537                                 } else { None } {
2538                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2539                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2540                                         require_commitment = true;
2541                                 }
2542                         }
2543                 }
2544                 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2545
2546                 if self.is_outbound() {
2547                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2548                                 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2549                         }
2550                 } else {
2551                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2552                                 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2553                                 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2554                                 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2555                                 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2556                                 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2557                                 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2558                                         require_commitment = true;
2559                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2560                                 }
2561                         }
2562                 }
2563
2564                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2565                         // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2566                         // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2567                         if require_commitment {
2568                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2569                                 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2570                                 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2571                                 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2572                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2573                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2574                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2575                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2576                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2577                         }
2578                         self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2579                         self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2580                         return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2581                 }
2582
2583                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2584                         (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2585                                 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2586                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2587                                         commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2588                                 }
2589                                 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2590                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2591                                         commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2592                                 }
2593
2594                                 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2595                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2596                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2597                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2598
2599                                 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2600                         },
2601                         (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2602                                 if require_commitment {
2603                                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2604
2605                                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2606                                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2607                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2608                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2609
2610                                         Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2611                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2612                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2613                                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2614                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2615                                                 update_fee: None,
2616                                                 commitment_signed
2617                                         }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2618                                 } else {
2619                                         Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2620                                 }
2621                         }
2622                 }
2623
2624         }
2625
2626         /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2627         /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2628         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2629         fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2630                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2631                         panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2632                 }
2633                 if !self.is_usable() {
2634                         panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2635                 }
2636                 if !self.is_live() {
2637                         panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2638                 }
2639
2640                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2641                         self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2642                         return None;
2643                 }
2644
2645                 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2646                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2647
2648                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2649                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2650                         feerate_per_kw,
2651                 })
2652         }
2653
2654         pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2655                 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2656                         Some(update_fee) => {
2657                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2658                                 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2659                         },
2660                         None => Ok(None)
2661                 }
2662         }
2663
2664         /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2665         /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2666         /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2667         /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2668         /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2669         /// completed.
2670         pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> where L::Target: Logger {
2671                 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2672
2673                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2674                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2675                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2676                         return outbound_drops;
2677                 }
2678                 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2679                 // will be retransmitted.
2680                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2681
2682                 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2683                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2684                         match htlc.state {
2685                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2686                                         // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2687                                         // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2688                                         // this HTLC accordingly
2689                                         inbound_drop_count += 1;
2690                                         false
2691                                 },
2692                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2693                                         // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2694                                         // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2695                                         // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2696                                         true
2697                                 },
2698                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2699                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2700                                         // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2701                                         // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2702                                         // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2703                                         // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2704                                         true
2705                                 },
2706                         }
2707                 });
2708                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2709
2710                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2711                         if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2712                                 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2713                                 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2714                                 // the update upon reconnection.
2715                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2716                         }
2717                 }
2718
2719                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2720                         match htlc_update {
2721                                 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are
2722                                 // no holding cell HTLC update_adds, so if in the future we stop
2723                                 // dropping added HTLCs here and failing them backwards, then there will
2724                                 // need to be corresponding changes made in the Channel's re-establish
2725                                 // logic.
2726                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2727                                         outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2728                                         false
2729                                 },
2730                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2731                         }
2732                 });
2733                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2734                 log_debug!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2735                 outbound_drops
2736         }
2737
2738         /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2739         /// updates are partially paused.
2740         /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2741         /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2742         /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2743         /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2744         pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2745                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2746                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2747                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2748                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2749                 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2750                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2751                 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2752                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2753         }
2754
2755         /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2756         /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2757         /// to the remote side.
2758         pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
2759                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2760                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2761
2762                 let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound();
2763
2764                 // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
2765                 // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
2766                 // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
2767                 // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
2768                 // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
2769                 // monitor was persisted.
2770                 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2771                         assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
2772                         self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2773                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2774                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2775                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2776                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2777                         })
2778                 } else { None };
2779
2780                 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2781                 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2782                 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2783                 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2784
2785                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2786                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2787                         self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2788                         return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
2789                 }
2790
2791                 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2792                         Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2793                 } else { None };
2794                 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2795                         Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
2796                 } else { None };
2797
2798                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2799                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2800                 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2801                 log_trace!(logger, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2802                         if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
2803                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
2804                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2805                         match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2806                 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
2807         }
2808
2809         pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2810                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2811         {
2812                 if self.is_outbound() {
2813                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
2814                 }
2815                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2816                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2817                 }
2818                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2819                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw);
2820                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2821                 Ok(())
2822         }
2823
2824         fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2825                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2826                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2827                 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2828                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2829                         per_commitment_secret,
2830                         next_per_commitment_point,
2831                 }
2832         }
2833
2834         fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
2835                 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2836                 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2837                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2838                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2839
2840                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2841                         if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2842                                 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2843                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2844                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2845                                         amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2846                                         payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2847                                         cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2848                                         onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2849                                 });
2850                         }
2851                 }
2852
2853                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2854                         if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2855                                 match reason {
2856                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2857                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2858                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2859                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2860                                                         reason: err_packet.clone()
2861                                                 });
2862                                         },
2863                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2864                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2865                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2866                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2867                                                         sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2868                                                         failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2869                                                 });
2870                                         },
2871                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2872                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2873                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2874                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2875                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2876                                                 });
2877                                         },
2878                                 }
2879                         }
2880                 }
2881
2882                 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2883                                 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2884                 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2885                         update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2886                         update_fee: None,
2887                         commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2888                 }
2889         }
2890
2891         /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2892         /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2893         pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2894                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2895                         // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2896                         // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2897                         // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2898                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
2899                 }
2900
2901                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2902                         msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2903                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2904                 }
2905
2906                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
2907                         match msg.data_loss_protect {
2908                                 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
2909                                         let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2910                                         let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
2911                                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
2912                                         if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
2913                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
2914                                         }
2915                                         if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2916                                                 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
2917                                                         "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
2918                                                 ));
2919                                         }
2920                                 },
2921                                 OptionalField::Absent => {}
2922                         }
2923                 }
2924
2925                 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2926                 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2927                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2928
2929                 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2930                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2931                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2932                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2933                         })
2934                 } else { None };
2935
2936                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2937                         // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
2938                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
2939                                         self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2940                                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2941                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
2942                                 }
2943                                 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2944                                 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2945                         }
2946
2947                         // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2948                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2949                         return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2950                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2951                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2952                         }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2953                 }
2954
2955                 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2956                         // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2957                         // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2958                         None
2959                 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2960                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2961                                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2962                                 None
2963                         } else {
2964                                 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2965                         }
2966                 } else {
2967                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
2968                 };
2969
2970                 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2971                 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2972                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2973                 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2974                 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2975
2976                 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2977                         // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2978                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2979                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2980                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2981                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2982                         })
2983                 } else { None };
2984
2985                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
2986                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
2987                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2988                         } else {
2989                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2990                         }
2991
2992                         if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2993                                 // Note that if in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
2994                                 // disconnect, this logic will need to be updated.
2995                                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2996                                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } = htlc_update {
2997                                                 debug_assert!(false, "There shouldn't be any add-HTLCs in the holding cell now because they should have been dropped on peer disconnect. Panic here because said HTLCs won't be handled correctly.");
2998                                         }
2999                                 }
3000
3001                                 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3002                                 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3003                                 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3004                                 // now!
3005                                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3006                                         Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3007                                         Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3008                                         Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3009                                                 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3010                                                 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3011                                                 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
3012                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3013                                         },
3014                                         Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3015                                                 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3016                                                 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3017                                                 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
3018                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3019                                         },
3020                                 }
3021                         } else {
3022                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3023                         }
3024                 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3025                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
3026                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3027                         } else {
3028                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3029                         }
3030
3031                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3032                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3033                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3034                         }
3035
3036                         return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3037                 } else {
3038                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3039                 }
3040         }
3041
3042         fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
3043                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3044         {
3045                 if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
3046                                 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
3047                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3048                         return None;
3049                 }
3050
3051                 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3052                 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
3053                         proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
3054                 }
3055                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3056                 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3057
3058                 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
3059                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3060                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3061                         .ok();
3062                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3063                 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
3064
3065                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
3066                 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3067                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3068                         fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3069                         signature: sig.unwrap(),
3070                 })
3071         }
3072
3073         pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3074                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3075         {
3076                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3077                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3078                 }
3079                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3080                         // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3081                         // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3082                         // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3083                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3084                 }
3085                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3086                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3087                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3088                         }
3089                 }
3090                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3091
3092                 if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, &msg.scriptpubkey) {
3093                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3094                 }
3095
3096                 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3097                         if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3098                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3099                         }
3100                 } else {
3101                         self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
3102                 }
3103
3104                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3105
3106                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3107                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3108
3109                 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3110                 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3111                 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3112                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3113                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3114                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3115                         match htlc_update {
3116                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3117                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3118                                         false
3119                                 },
3120                                 _ => true
3121                         }
3122                 });
3123                 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
3124                 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
3125                 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3126
3127                 let shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3128                         None
3129                 } else {
3130                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3131                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3132                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3133                         })
3134                 };
3135
3136                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3137                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3138
3139                 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3140         }
3141
3142         fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3143                 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3144                 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3145                 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3146
3147                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3148
3149                 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3150                 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3151                 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3152                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3153                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3154                 } else {
3155                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3156                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3157                 }
3158                 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3159                 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3160
3161                 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3162         }
3163
3164         pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3165                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3166         {
3167                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3168                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3169                 }
3170                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3171                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3172                 }
3173                 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3174                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3175                 }
3176                 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3177                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3178                 }
3179
3180                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3181                 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3182                 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3183                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3184                 }
3185                 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3186
3187                 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3188                         Ok(_) => {},
3189                         Err(_e) => {
3190                                 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3191                                 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3192                                 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3193                                 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3194                                 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3195                         },
3196                 };
3197
3198                 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3199                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3200                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3201                 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3202                         if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3203                                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3204                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3205                                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3206                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3207                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3208                                 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3209                         }
3210                 }
3211
3212                 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3213                         ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3214                                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3215                                 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3216                                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3217                                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3218                                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3219                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3220                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3221                                 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3222                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3223                                         fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3224                                         signature: sig,
3225                                 }), None))
3226                         }
3227                 }
3228
3229                 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3230                 if self.is_outbound() {
3231                         let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3232                         if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3233                                 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3234                                         if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3235                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3236                                         }
3237                                 }
3238                                 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3239                         }
3240                 } else {
3241                         min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3242                 }
3243                 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3244                         if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3245                                 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3246                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3247                                 }
3248                         }
3249                         propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3250                 }
3251
3252                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3253                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3254                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3255                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3256                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3257                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3258
3259                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3260                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3261
3262                 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3263                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3264                         fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3265                         signature: sig,
3266                 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3267         }
3268
3269         // Public utilities:
3270
3271         pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3272                 self.channel_id
3273         }
3274
3275         /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3276         /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3277         pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3278                 self.user_id
3279         }
3280
3281         /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3282         /// is_usable() returns true).
3283         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3284         pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3285                 self.short_channel_id
3286         }
3287
3288         /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3289         /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3290         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3291                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3292         }
3293
3294         fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3295                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3296         }
3297
3298         fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3299                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3300         }
3301
3302         fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3303                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().selected_contest_delay
3304         }
3305
3306         fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3307                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3308         }
3309
3310         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3311         pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3312                 self.counterparty_node_id
3313         }
3314
3315         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3316         #[cfg(test)]
3317         pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3318                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3319         }
3320
3321         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3322         pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3323                 return cmp::min(
3324                         // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3325                         // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3326                         // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3327                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
3328
3329                         Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3330                 );
3331         }
3332
3333         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3334         pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3335                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3336         }
3337
3338         pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3339                 self.channel_value_satoshis
3340         }
3341
3342         pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3343                 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
3344         }
3345
3346         #[cfg(test)]
3347         pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3348                 self.feerate_per_kw
3349         }
3350
3351         pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3352                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3353         }
3354
3355         pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3356                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3357         }
3358
3359         pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3360                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3361         }
3362
3363         #[cfg(test)]
3364         pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3365                 &self.holder_signer
3366         }
3367
3368         #[cfg(test)]
3369         pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3370                 ChannelValueStat {
3371                         value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3372                         channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3373                         channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
3374                         pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3375                         pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3376                         holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3377                                 let mut res = 0;
3378                                 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3379                                         match h {
3380                                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3381                                                         res += amount_msat;
3382                                                 }
3383                                                 _ => {}
3384                                         }
3385                                 }
3386                                 res
3387                         },
3388                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3389                         counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3390                 }
3391         }
3392
3393         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3394         pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3395                 self.update_time_counter
3396         }
3397
3398         pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3399                 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3400         }
3401
3402         pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3403                 self.config.announced_channel
3404         }
3405
3406         pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3407                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3408         }
3409
3410         /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3411         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3412         pub fn get_holder_fee_base_msat<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &F) -> u32
3413                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3414         {
3415                 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
3416                 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
3417
3418                 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
3419                 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
3420
3421                 if self.is_outbound() {
3422                         // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
3423                         res += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
3424                 }
3425
3426                 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
3427                 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) as u64 * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
3428
3429                 res as u32
3430         }
3431
3432         /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3433         pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3434                 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3435         }
3436
3437         /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3438         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3439         pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3440                 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3441                 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3442         }
3443
3444         /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3445         /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3446         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3447         pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3448                 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
3449         }
3450
3451         /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3452         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3453         pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3454                 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3455         }
3456
3457         /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3458         pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3459                 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3460         }
3461
3462         /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3463         /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3464         /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3465         pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3466                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32  {
3467                         assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3468                         true
3469                 } else { false }
3470         }
3471
3472         pub fn to_disabled_staged(&mut self) {
3473                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged;
3474         }
3475
3476         pub fn to_disabled_marked(&mut self) {
3477                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked;
3478         }
3479
3480         pub fn to_fresh(&mut self) {
3481                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::Fresh;
3482         }
3483
3484         pub fn is_disabled_staged(&self) -> bool {
3485                 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged
3486         }
3487
3488         pub fn is_disabled_marked(&self) -> bool {
3489                 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked
3490         }
3491
3492         /// When we receive a new block, we (a) check whether the block contains the funding
3493         /// transaction (which would start us counting blocks until we send the funding_signed), and
3494         /// (b) check the height of the block against outbound holding cell HTLCs in case we need to
3495         /// give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything else (e.g. commitment
3496         /// transaction broadcasts, channel closure detection, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3497         /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3498         ///
3499         /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3500         /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3501         /// post-shutdown.
3502         /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
3503         ///
3504         /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3505         /// back.
3506         pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3507                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3508                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3509                         match htlc_update {
3510                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3511                                         if *cltv_expiry <= height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3512                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3513                                                 false
3514                                         } else { true }
3515                                 },
3516                                 _ => true
3517                         }
3518                 });
3519
3520                 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3521                         self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
3522                 }
3523
3524                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3525                 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3526                         for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3527                                 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3528                                 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
3529                                         let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
3530                                         if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3531                                                         tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3532                                                 if self.is_outbound() {
3533                                                         // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3534                                                         // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3535                                                         // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3536                                                         // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3537                                                         // channel and move on.
3538                                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3539                                                         panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3540                                                 }
3541                                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3542                                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3543                                                 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3544                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3545                                                         data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
3546                                                 });
3547                                         } else {
3548                                                 if self.is_outbound() {
3549                                                         for input in tx.input.iter() {
3550                                                                 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3551                                                                         // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3552                                                                         // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3553                                                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3554                                                                         panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3555                                                                 }
3556                                                         }
3557                                                 }
3558                                                 if height > 0xff_ff_ff || (index_in_block) > 0xff_ff_ff {
3559                                                         panic!("Block was bogus - either height 16 million or had > 16 million transactions");
3560                                                 }
3561                                                 assert!(txo_idx <= 0xffff); // txo_idx is a (u16 as usize), so this is just listed here for completeness
3562                                                 self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
3563                                                 self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64)         << (5*8)) |
3564                                                                              ((index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
3565                                                                              ((txo_idx as u64)        << (0*8)));
3566                                         }
3567                                 }
3568                         }
3569                 }
3570
3571                 self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
3572                 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time);
3573                 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3574                         if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
3575                                 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3576                                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3577                                         true
3578                                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3579                                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3580                                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
3581                                         true
3582                                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3583                                         // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3584                                         // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3585                                         false
3586                                 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3587                                         panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3588                                 } else {
3589                                         // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3590                                         // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3591                                         false
3592                                 };
3593                                 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(self.last_block_connected);
3594
3595                                 //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
3596                                 //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
3597                                 //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
3598                                 //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
3599                                 if need_commitment_update {
3600                                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3601                                                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3602                                                 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3603                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3604                                                         next_per_commitment_point,
3605                                                 }), timed_out_htlcs));
3606                                         } else {
3607                                                 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3608                                                 return Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs));
3609                                         }
3610                                 }
3611                         }
3612                 }
3613                 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3614         }
3615
3616         /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
3617         /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
3618         /// unconfirmation/reorg.
3619         pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
3620                 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3621                         self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
3622                         if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
3623                                 return true;
3624                         }
3625                 }
3626                 self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
3627                 if Some(self.last_block_connected) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
3628                         self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
3629                 }
3630                 false
3631         }
3632
3633         // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3634         // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3635
3636         pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3637                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3638                         panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3639                 }
3640                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3641                         panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3642                 }
3643
3644                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3645                         panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3646                 }
3647
3648                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3649                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3650
3651                 msgs::OpenChannel {
3652                         chain_hash,
3653                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3654                         funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3655                         push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3656                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3657                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3658                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3659                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3660                         feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
3661                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3662                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3663                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3664                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3665                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3666                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3667                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3668                         first_per_commitment_point,
3669                         channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3670                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3671                 }
3672         }
3673
3674         pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3675                 if self.is_outbound() {
3676                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3677                 }
3678                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3679                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3680                 }
3681                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3682                         panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3683                 }
3684
3685                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3686                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3687
3688                 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3689                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3690                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3691                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3692                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3693                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3694                         minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3695                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3696                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3697                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3698                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3699                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3700                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3701                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3702                         first_per_commitment_point,
3703                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3704                 }
3705         }
3706
3707         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3708         fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3709                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3710                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
3711                 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3712                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
3713         }
3714
3715         /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3716         /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3717         /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3718         /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3719         /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3720         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3721         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3722         pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3723                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3724                         panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3725                 }
3726                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3727                         panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3728                 }
3729                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3730                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3731                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3732                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3733                 }
3734
3735                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
3736                 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
3737
3738                 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
3739                         Ok(res) => res,
3740                         Err(e) => {
3741                                 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3742                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3743                                 return Err(e);
3744                         }
3745                 };
3746
3747                 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3748
3749                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3750
3751                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3752                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3753
3754                 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
3755                         temporary_channel_id,
3756                         funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3757                         funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3758                         signature
3759                 })
3760         }
3761
3762         /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3763         /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3764         /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3765         /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3766         /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3767         /// closing).
3768         /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3769         /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3770         pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3771                 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3772                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
3773                 }
3774                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3775                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
3776                 }
3777                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3778                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
3779                 }
3780
3781                 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
3782
3783                 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3784                         features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3785                         chain_hash,
3786                         short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3787                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
3788                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
3789                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3790                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
3791                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3792                 };
3793
3794                 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3795                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
3796
3797                 Ok((msg, sig))
3798         }
3799
3800         /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3801         /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3802         pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
3803                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3804                 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3805                 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
3806                 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
3807                 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
3808                 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
3809                 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
3810                 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
3811                 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
3812                 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
3813                 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3814                         let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
3815                         log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
3816                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3817                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
3818                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
3819                         })
3820                 } else {
3821                         log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret");
3822                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3823                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
3824                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
3825                         })
3826                 };
3827                 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3828                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3829                         // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3830                         // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3831                         // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3832                         // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3833                         // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3834                         // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3835
3836                         // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3837                         // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3838                         next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
3839                         // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3840                         // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3841                         // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3842                         // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3843                         // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3844                         // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3845                         // overflow here.
3846                         next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3847                         data_loss_protect,
3848                 }
3849         }
3850
3851
3852         // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3853
3854         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3855         /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3856         /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3857         /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3858         /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3859         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3860         /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
3861         pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
3862                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3863                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
3864                 }
3865                 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
3866                 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
3867                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
3868                 }
3869
3870                 if amount_msat == 0 {
3871                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3872                 }
3873
3874                 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
3875                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
3876                 }
3877
3878                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3879                         // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3880                         // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3881                         // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3882                         // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3883                         // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3884                         // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3885                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update".to_owned()));
3886                 }
3887
3888                 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3889                 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3890                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3891                 }
3892                 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3893                 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3894                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3895                 }
3896
3897                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3898                         // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3899                         let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
3900                         let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
3901                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3902                         let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3903                         if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3904                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3905                         }
3906                 }
3907
3908                 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - htlc_outbound_value_msat;
3909                 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
3910                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
3911                 }
3912
3913                 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
3914                 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
3915                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3916                         2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
3917                 } else { 0 };
3918                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
3919                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
3920                 }
3921
3922                 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
3923                 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
3924                 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3925                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
3926                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
3927                 }
3928
3929                 // Now update local state:
3930                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3931                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3932                                 amount_msat,
3933                                 payment_hash,
3934                                 cltv_expiry,
3935                                 source,
3936                                 onion_routing_packet,
3937                         });
3938                         return Ok(None);
3939                 }
3940
3941                 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3942                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3943                         amount_msat,
3944                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3945                         cltv_expiry,
3946                         state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
3947                         source,
3948                 });
3949
3950                 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3951                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3952                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3953                         amount_msat,
3954                         payment_hash,
3955                         cltv_expiry,
3956                         onion_routing_packet,
3957                 };
3958                 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
3959
3960                 Ok(Some(res))
3961         }
3962
3963         /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
3964         /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
3965         /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
3966         /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
3967         pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3968                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3969                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
3970                 }
3971                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3972                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
3973                 }
3974                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3975                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3976                 }
3977                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
3978                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3979                 }
3980                 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
3981                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3982                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3983                                 have_updates = true;
3984                         }
3985                         if have_updates { break; }
3986                 }
3987                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3988                         if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3989                                 have_updates = true;
3990                         }
3991                         if have_updates { break; }
3992                 }
3993                 if !have_updates {
3994                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
3995                 }
3996                 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
3997         }
3998         /// Only fails in case of bad keys
3999         fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4000                 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4001                 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4002                 // is acceptable.
4003                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4004                         let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4005                                 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4006                         } else { None };
4007                         if let Some(state) = new_state {
4008                                 htlc.state = state;
4009                         }
4010                 }
4011                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4012                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4013                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
4014                         } else { None } {
4015                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4016                         }
4017                 }
4018                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4019
4020                 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4021                         Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4022                                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4023                                 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4024                                         htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4025                                 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4026                         },
4027                         Err(e) => return Err(e),
4028                 };
4029
4030                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4031                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4032                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4033                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4034                                 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4035                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4036                                 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4037                                 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4038                         }]
4039                 };
4040                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4041                 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4042         }
4043
4044         /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4045         /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4046         fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4047                 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4048                 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
4049                         if self.is_outbound() {
4050                                 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4051                         }
4052                 }
4053
4054                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4055                 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
4056                 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4057                 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4058
4059                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4060                 {
4061                         if !self.is_outbound() {
4062                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4063                                 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4064                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4065                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4066                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4067                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4068                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4069                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4070                                                         let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.1);
4071                                                         assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4072                                                 }
4073                                 }
4074                         }
4075                 }
4076
4077                 {
4078                         let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len());
4079                         for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
4080                                 htlcs.push(htlc);
4081                         }
4082
4083                         let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4084                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4085                         signature = res.0;
4086                         htlc_signatures = res.1;
4087
4088                         log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {}",
4089                                 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4090                                 &counterparty_commitment_txid,
4091                                 encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4092                                 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
4093
4094                         for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4095                                 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
4096                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4097                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4098                                         log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4099                                         log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
4100                         }
4101                 }
4102
4103                 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4104                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4105                         signature,
4106                         htlc_signatures,
4107                 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
4108         }
4109
4110         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4111         /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4112         /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4113         /// more info.
4114         pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4115                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4116                         Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4117                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4118                                 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4119                         },
4120                         None => Ok(None)
4121                 }
4122         }
4123
4124         /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4125         /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4126         pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
4127                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4128                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4129                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4130                         }
4131                 }
4132                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4133                         if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4134                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4135                         }
4136                         else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4137                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4138                         }
4139                 }
4140                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4141                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4142                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4143                 }
4144
4145                 let closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
4146
4147                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4148                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4149                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4150                 } else {
4151                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4152                 }
4153                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4154
4155                 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4156                 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4157                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4158                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4159                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4160                         match htlc_update {
4161                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4162                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4163                                         false
4164                                 },
4165                                 _ => true
4166                         }
4167                 });
4168
4169                 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
4170                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4171                         scriptpubkey: closing_script,
4172                 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4173         }
4174
4175         /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4176         /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4177         /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4178         /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4179         /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4180         pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4181                 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
4182                 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
4183                 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
4184                 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4185                 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4186
4187                 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4188                 // return them to fail the payment.
4189                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4190                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4191                         match htlc_update {
4192                                 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4193                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4194                                 },
4195                                 _ => {}
4196                         }
4197                 }
4198                 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4199                         // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4200                         // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4201                         // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4202                         // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4203                         // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4204                         // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4205                         // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4206                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4207                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4208                                 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4209                                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4210                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4211                                 }))
4212                         } else { None }
4213                 } else { None };
4214
4215                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4216                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4217                 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4218         }
4219 }
4220
4221 fn is_unsupported_shutdown_script(their_features: &InitFeatures, script: &Script) -> bool {
4222         // We restrain shutdown scripts to standards forms to avoid transactions not propagating on the p2p tx-relay network
4223
4224         // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms,
4225         // which for a a BIP-141-compliant witness program is at max 42 bytes in length.
4226         // So don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
4227         let is_script_too_long = script.len() > 42;
4228         if is_script_too_long {
4229                 return true;
4230         }
4231
4232         if their_features.supports_shutdown_anysegwit() && script.is_witness_program() && script.as_bytes()[0] != OP_PUSHBYTES_0.into_u8() {
4233                 return false;
4234         }
4235
4236         return !script.is_p2pkh() && !script.is_p2sh() && !script.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !script.is_v0_p2wsh()
4237 }
4238
4239 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4240 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4241
4242 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4243         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4244                 match self {
4245                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
4246                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
4247                                 error_packet.write(writer)?;
4248                         },
4249                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
4250                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4251                                 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
4252                                 err_code.write(writer)?;
4253                         },
4254                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4255                                 2u8.write(writer)?;
4256                                 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4257                         },
4258                 }
4259                 Ok(())
4260         }
4261 }
4262
4263 impl Readable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4264         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4265                 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4266                         0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
4267                         1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4268                         2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
4269                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4270                 })
4271         }
4272 }
4273
4274 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4275         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4276                 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4277                 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
4278
4279                 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4280                 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4281
4282                 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4283                 self.config.write(writer)?;
4284
4285                 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4286                 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4287                 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4288
4289                 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4290
4291                 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4292                 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
4293                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::usize::MAX);
4294                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::u32::MAX as usize);
4295                 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4296                 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
4297
4298                 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4299                 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4300
4301                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4302                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4303                 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4304
4305                 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4306                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4307                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4308                                 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4309                         }
4310                 }
4311                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4312                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4313                         if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4314                                 continue; // Drop
4315                         }
4316                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4317                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4318                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4319                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4320                         match &htlc.state {
4321                                 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4322                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4323                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4324                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4325                                 },
4326                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4327                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4328                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4329                                 },
4330                                 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4331                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4332                                 },
4333                                 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4334                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4335                                         removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4336                                 },
4337                         }
4338                 }
4339
4340                 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4341                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4342                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4343                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4344                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4345                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4346                         htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4347                         match &htlc.state {
4348                                 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4349                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4350                                         onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4351                                 },
4352                                 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4353                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4354                                 },
4355                                 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
4356                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4357                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4358                                 },
4359                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4360                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4361                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4362                                 },
4363                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4364                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4365                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4366                                 },
4367                         }
4368                 }
4369
4370                 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4371                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4372                         match update {
4373                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4374                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4375                                         amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4376                                         cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4377                                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4378                                         source.write(writer)?;
4379                                         onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4380                                 },
4381                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4382                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4383                                         payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4384                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4385                                 },
4386                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4387                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4388                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4389                                         err_packet.write(writer)?;
4390                                 }
4391                         }
4392                 }
4393
4394                 match self.resend_order {
4395                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4396                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4397                 }
4398
4399                 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4400                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4401                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4402
4403                 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4404                 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4405                         pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4406                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4407                 }
4408
4409                 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4410                 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4411                         htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4412                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4413                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4414                 }
4415
4416                 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4417                 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4418
4419                 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4420                 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4421                 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4422                 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4423
4424                 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4425                         Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4426                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4427                                 feerate.write(writer)?;
4428                                 fee.write(writer)?;
4429                                 sig.write(writer)?;
4430                         },
4431                         None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4432                 }
4433
4434                 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4435                 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4436
4437                 self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
4438                 self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
4439
4440                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4441                 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4442                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4443                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4444                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4445                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4446                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4447                 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
4448
4449                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
4450                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4451
4452                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4453                 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
4454
4455                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4456
4457                 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4458                 Ok(())
4459         }
4460 }
4461
4462 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4463 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
4464                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4465         fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4466                 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4467                 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4468                 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4469                         return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4470                 }
4471
4472                 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4473                 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
4474
4475                 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4476                 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4477                 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4478
4479                 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4480
4481                 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4482                 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
4483                 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
4484                         // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
4485                         let mut data = [0; 1024];
4486                         let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
4487                         reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
4488                         keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
4489                 }
4490                 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
4491
4492                 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4493                 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4494
4495                 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4496                 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4497                 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4498
4499                 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4500                 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4501                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
4502                         pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4503                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4504                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4505                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4506                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4507                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4508                                         1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4509                                         2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4510                                         3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4511                                         4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4512                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4513                                 },
4514                         });
4515                 }
4516
4517                 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4518                 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4519                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4520                         pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4521                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4522                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4523                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4524                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4525                                 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4526                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4527                                         0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4528                                         1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4529                                         2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4530                                         3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4531                                         4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4532                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4533                                 },
4534                         });
4535                 }
4536
4537                 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4538                 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4539                 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4540                         holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4541                                 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4542                                         amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4543                                         cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4544                                         payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4545                                         source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4546                                         onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4547                                 },
4548                                 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4549                                         payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4550                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4551                                 },
4552                                 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4553                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4554                                         err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4555                                 },
4556                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4557                         });
4558                 }
4559
4560                 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4561                         0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4562                         1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4563                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4564                 };
4565
4566                 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4567                 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4568                 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4569
4570                 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4571                 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4572                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4573                         monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4574                 }
4575
4576                 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4577                 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4578                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4579                         monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4580                 }
4581
4582                 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4583                 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4584
4585                 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4586                 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4587                 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
4588                 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4589
4590                 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4591                         0 => None,
4592                         1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4593                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4594                 };
4595
4596                 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4597                 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4598
4599                 let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
4600                 let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
4601
4602                 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4603                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4604                 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4605                 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4606                 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4607                 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4608                 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
4609                 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
4610
4611                 let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
4612                 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4613
4614                 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4615                 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4616
4617                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4618                 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4619
4620                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4621                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
4622
4623                 Ok(Channel {
4624                         user_id,
4625
4626                         config,
4627                         channel_id,
4628                         channel_state,
4629                         secp_ctx,
4630                         channel_value_satoshis,
4631
4632                         latest_monitor_update_id,
4633
4634                         holder_signer,
4635                         shutdown_pubkey,
4636                         destination_script,
4637
4638                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4639                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4640                         value_to_self_msat,
4641
4642                         pending_inbound_htlcs,
4643                         pending_outbound_htlcs,
4644                         holding_cell_htlc_updates,
4645
4646                         resend_order,
4647
4648                         monitor_pending_funding_locked,
4649                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
4650                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
4651                         monitor_pending_forwards,
4652                         monitor_pending_failures,
4653
4654                         pending_update_fee,
4655                         holding_cell_update_fee,
4656                         next_holder_htlc_id,
4657                         next_counterparty_htlc_id,
4658                         update_time_counter,
4659                         feerate_per_kw,
4660
4661                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4662                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4663                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4664                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4665
4666                         last_sent_closing_fee,
4667
4668                         funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4669                         short_channel_id,
4670                         last_block_connected,
4671                         funding_tx_confirmations,
4672
4673                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
4674                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4675                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4676                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4677                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
4678                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4679                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
4680                         minimum_depth,
4681
4682                         channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
4683                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
4684
4685                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
4686                         counterparty_node_id,
4687
4688                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4689
4690                         commitment_secrets,
4691
4692                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
4693
4694                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4695                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4696                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4697                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4698                 })
4699         }
4700 }
4701
4702 #[cfg(test)]
4703 mod tests {
4704         use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4705         use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4706         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4707         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
4708         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4709         use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4710         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4711         use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4712         use hex;
4713         use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4714         use ln::channel::{Channel,Sign,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
4715         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4716         use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4717         use ln::msgs::{OptionalField, DataLossProtect, DecodeError};
4718         use ln::chan_utils;
4719         use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
4720         use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4721         use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface};
4722         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4723         use util::config::UserConfig;
4724         use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
4725         use util::test_utils;
4726         use util::logger::Logger;
4727         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
4728         use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4729         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4730         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4731         use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
4732         use std::sync::Arc;
4733
4734         struct TestFeeEstimator {
4735                 fee_est: u32
4736         }
4737         impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4738                 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
4739                         self.fee_est
4740                 }
4741         }
4742
4743         #[test]
4744         fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4745                 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4746                         "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4747         }
4748
4749         struct Keys {
4750                 signer: InMemorySigner,
4751         }
4752         impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4753                 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
4754
4755                 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4756                 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4757                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4758                         let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4759                         let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4760                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4761                 }
4762
4763                 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4764                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4765                         let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4766                         PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4767                 }
4768
4769                 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
4770                         self.signer.clone()
4771                 }
4772                 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4773                 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
4774         }
4775
4776         fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
4777                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
4778         }
4779
4780         // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
4781         // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
4782         #[test]
4783         fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
4784                 let original_fee = 253;
4785                 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
4786                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4787                 let seed = [42; 32];
4788                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4789                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4790
4791                 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4792                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4793                 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4794
4795                 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
4796                 // same as the old fee.
4797                 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
4798                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4799                 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
4800         }
4801
4802         #[test]
4803         fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
4804                 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
4805                 // dust limits are used.
4806                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4807                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4808                 let seed = [42; 32];
4809                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4810                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4811
4812                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
4813                 // they have different dust limits.
4814
4815                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
4816                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4817                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4818                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4819
4820                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4821                 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
4822                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4823                 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis, 1560);
4824                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4825                 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
4826
4827                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
4828                 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4829                 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
4830                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
4831
4832                 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
4833                 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
4834                 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4835                         htlc_id: 0,
4836                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
4837                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
4838                         cltv_expiry: 300000000,
4839                         state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4840                 });
4841
4842                 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4843                         htlc_id: 1,
4844                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
4845                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
4846                         cltv_expiry: 200000000,
4847                         state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4848                         source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4849                                 path: Vec::new(),
4850                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4851                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
4852                         }
4853                 });
4854
4855                 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
4856                 // the dust limit check.
4857                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4858                 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4859                 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
4860                 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
4861
4862                 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
4863                 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
4864                 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
4865                 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
4866                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4867                 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4868                 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
4869         }
4870
4871         #[test]
4872         fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
4873                 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
4874                 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
4875                 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
4876                 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
4877                 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
4878                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4879                 let seed = [42; 32];
4880                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4881                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4882
4883                 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4884                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4885                 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4886
4887                 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
4888                 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
4889
4890                 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
4891                 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
4892                 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
4893                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4894                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4895                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
4896
4897                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
4898                 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
4899                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4900                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4901                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
4902
4903                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
4904
4905                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
4906                 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
4907                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4908                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4909                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
4910
4911                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
4912                 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
4913                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4914                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4915                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
4916         }
4917
4918         #[test]
4919         fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
4920                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4921                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4922                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4923                 let seed = [42; 32];
4924                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4925                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4926
4927                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
4928
4929                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
4930                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4931                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4932                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4933
4934                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4935                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4936                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4937                 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
4938
4939                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
4940                 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4941                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
4942
4943                 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
4944                 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4945                 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4946                         value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
4947                 }]};
4948                 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
4949                 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
4950                 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, &&logger).unwrap();
4951
4952                 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
4953                 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, &&logger);
4954
4955                 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
4956                 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
4957                 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
4958                 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
4959                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
4960                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
4961                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4962                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
4963                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
4964                         },
4965                         _ => panic!()
4966                 }
4967
4968                 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
4969                 // is sane.
4970                 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
4971                 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
4972                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
4973                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
4974                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4975                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
4976                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
4977                         },
4978                         _ => panic!()
4979                 }
4980         }
4981
4982         #[test]
4983         fn outbound_commitment_test() {
4984                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
4985                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4986                 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4987                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4988
4989                 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
4990                         &secp_ctx,
4991                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4992                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4993                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4994                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4995                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4996
4997                         // These aren't set in the test vectors:
4998                         [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
4999                         10_000_000,
5000                         [0; 32]
5001                 );
5002
5003                 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5004                                 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
5005                 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
5006
5007                 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5008                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
5009                 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
5010                 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
5011                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5012
5013                 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
5014
5015                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5016                         funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5017                         revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5018                         payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
5019                         delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5020                         htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
5021                 };
5022                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5023                         CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5024                                 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5025                                 selected_contest_delay: 144
5026                         });
5027                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5028                 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5029
5030                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5031                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5032
5033                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5034                            hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5035
5036                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5037                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5038
5039                 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5040                 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5041                 // build_commitment_transaction.
5042                 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5043                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5044                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5045                 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5046                 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5047
5048                 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5049                         ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5050                                 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5051                         } ) => { {
5052                                 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
5053                                         let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
5054
5055                                         let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
5056                                                 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
5057                                                 .collect();
5058                                         (res.0, htlcs)
5059                                 };
5060                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
5061                                 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
5062                                 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5063                                 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5064                                 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
5065                                 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
5066
5067                                 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
5068                                 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5069                                 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
5070                                 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5071                                 $({
5072                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5073                                         per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
5074                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
5075                                 })*
5076                                 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
5077
5078                                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
5079                                         commitment_tx.clone(),
5080                                         counterparty_signature,
5081                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs,
5082                                         &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
5083                                         chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
5084                                 );
5085                                 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
5086                                 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
5087
5088                                 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5089                                 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
5090                                 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
5091
5092                                 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
5093                                 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
5094
5095                                 $({
5096                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5097
5098                                         let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
5099                                         let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
5100                                         let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
5101                                         let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
5102                                         secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
5103
5104                                         let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5105                                         if !htlc.offered {
5106                                                 for i in 0..5 {
5107                                                         let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
5108                                                         if out == htlc.payment_hash {
5109                                                                 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
5110                                                         }
5111                                                 }
5112
5113                                                 assert!(preimage.is_some());
5114                                         }
5115
5116                                         let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
5117                                         assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
5118
5119                                         let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5120                                         assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
5121                                         let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
5122                                         let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
5123                                         let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
5124                                         assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
5125                                                         hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
5126                                 })*
5127                                 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
5128                         } }
5129                 }
5130
5131                 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
5132                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
5133
5134                 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
5135                                                  "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
5136                                                  "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", {});
5137
5138                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5139                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5140                                 htlc_id: 0,
5141                                 amount_msat: 1000000,
5142                                 cltv_expiry: 500,
5143                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5144                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5145                         };
5146                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
5147                         out
5148                 });
5149                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5150                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5151                                 htlc_id: 1,
5152                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5153                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
5154                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5155                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5156                         };
5157                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5158                         out
5159                 });
5160                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5161                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5162                                 htlc_id: 2,
5163                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5164                                 cltv_expiry: 502,
5165                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5166                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5167                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5168                         };
5169                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
5170                         out
5171                 });
5172                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5173                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5174                                 htlc_id: 3,
5175                                 amount_msat: 3000000,
5176                                 cltv_expiry: 503,
5177                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5178                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5179                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5180                         };
5181                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
5182                         out
5183                 });
5184                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5185                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5186                                 htlc_id: 4,
5187                                 amount_msat: 4000000,
5188                                 cltv_expiry: 504,
5189                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5190                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5191                         };
5192                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
5193                         out
5194                 });
5195
5196                 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5197                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5198                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
5199
5200                 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
5201                                  "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
5202                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e0a06a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea01473044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
5203
5204                                   { 0,
5205                                   "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
5206                                   "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
5207                                   "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" },
5208
5209                                   { 1,
5210                                   "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
5211                                   "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
5212                                   "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" },
5213
5214                                   { 2,
5215                                   "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
5216                                   "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
5217                                   "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b02000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d4335201483045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
5218
5219                                   { 3,
5220                                   "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
5221                                   "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
5222                                   "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" },
5223
5224                                   { 4,
5225                                   "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
5226                                   "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
5227                                   "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" }
5228                 } );
5229
5230                 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5231                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5232                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
5233
5234                 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
5235                                  "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
5236                                  "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", {
5237
5238                                   { 0,
5239                                   "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
5240                                   "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
5241                                   "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" },
5242
5243                                   { 1,
5244                                   "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
5245                                   "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
5246                                   "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" },
5247
5248                                   { 2,
5249                                   "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
5250                                   "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
5251                                   "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" },
5252
5253                                   { 3,
5254                                   "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
5255                                   "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
5256                                   "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" },
5257
5258                                   { 4,
5259                                   "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
5260                                   "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
5261                                   "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" }
5262                 } );
5263
5264                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5265                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5266                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
5267
5268                 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
5269                                  "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
5270                                  "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", {
5271
5272                                   { 0,
5273                                   "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
5274                                   "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
5275                                   "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" },
5276
5277                                   { 1,
5278                                   "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
5279                                   "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
5280                                   "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" },
5281
5282                                   { 2,
5283                                   "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
5284                                   "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
5285                                   "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" },
5286
5287                                   { 3,
5288                                   "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
5289                                   "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
5290                                   "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf103000000000000000001d90d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be01483045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5291                 } );
5292
5293                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5294                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5295                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
5296
5297                 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
5298                                  "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
5299                                  "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", {
5300
5301                                   { 0,
5302                                   "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
5303                                   "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
5304                                   "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" },
5305
5306                                   { 1,
5307                                   "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
5308                                   "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
5309                                   "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" },
5310
5311                                   { 2,
5312                                   "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
5313                                   "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
5314                                   "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" },
5315
5316                                   { 3,
5317                                   "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
5318                                   "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
5319                                   "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" }
5320                 } );
5321
5322                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5323                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5324                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
5325
5326                 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
5327                                  "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
5328                                  "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", {
5329
5330                                   { 0,
5331                                   "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
5332                                   "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
5333                                   "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" },
5334
5335                                   { 1,
5336                                   "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
5337                                   "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
5338                                   "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" },
5339
5340                                   { 2,
5341                                   "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
5342                                   "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
5343                                   "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" }
5344                 } );
5345
5346                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5347                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5348                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
5349
5350                 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
5351                                  "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
5352                                  "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", {
5353
5354                                   { 0,
5355                                   "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
5356                                   "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
5357                                   "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" },
5358
5359                                   { 1,
5360                                   "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
5361                                   "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
5362                                   "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" },
5363
5364                                   { 2,
5365                                   "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
5366                                   "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
5367                                   "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" }
5368                 } );
5369
5370                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5371                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5372                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
5373
5374                 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
5375                                  "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
5376                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484b8976a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d17670147304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce40301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
5377
5378                                   { 0,
5379                                   "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
5380                                   "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
5381                                   "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" },
5382
5383                                   { 1,
5384                                   "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
5385                                   "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
5386                                   "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" }
5387                 } );
5388
5389                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5390                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5391                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
5392
5393                 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
5394                                  "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
5395                                  "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", {
5396
5397                                   { 0,
5398                                   "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
5399                                   "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
5400                                   "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" },
5401
5402                                   { 1,
5403                                   "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
5404                                   "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
5405                                   "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" }
5406                 } );
5407
5408                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5409                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5410                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
5411
5412                 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
5413                                  "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
5414                                  "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", {
5415
5416                                   { 0,
5417                                   "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
5418                                   "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
5419                                   "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" }
5420                 } );
5421
5422                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5423                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5424                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
5425
5426                 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
5427                                  "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
5428                                  "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", {
5429
5430                                   { 0,
5431                                   "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
5432                                   "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
5433                                   "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" }
5434                 } );
5435
5436                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5437                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5438                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
5439
5440                 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
5441                                  "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
5442                                  "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", {});
5443
5444                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5445                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5446                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
5447
5448                 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
5449                                  "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
5450                                  "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", {});
5451
5452                 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5453                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5454                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
5455
5456                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5457                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5458                                  "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", {});
5459
5460                 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
5461                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5462                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
5463
5464                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5465                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5466                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
5467
5468                 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
5469                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
5470                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
5471                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
5472                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5473                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5474                                 htlc_id: 1,
5475                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5476                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
5477                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5478                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5479                         };
5480                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5481                         out
5482                 });
5483                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
5484                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5485                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5486                                 htlc_id: 6,
5487                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
5488                                 cltv_expiry: 506,
5489                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5490                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5491                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5492                         };
5493                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5494                         out
5495                 });
5496                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5497                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5498                                 htlc_id: 5,
5499                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
5500                                 cltv_expiry: 505,
5501                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5502                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5503                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5504                         };
5505                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5506                         out
5507                 });
5508
5509                 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
5510                                  "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
5511                                  "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", {
5512
5513                                   { 0,
5514                                   "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
5515                                   "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
5516                                   "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" },
5517                                   { 1,
5518                                   "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
5519                                   "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
5520                                   "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" },
5521                                   { 2,
5522                                   "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
5523                                   "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
5524                                   "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" }
5525                 } );
5526         }
5527
5528         #[test]
5529         fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
5530                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
5531
5532                 let mut seed = [0; 32];
5533                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
5534                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5535                            hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
5536
5537                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
5538                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5539                            hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
5540
5541                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
5542                            hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
5543
5544                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
5545                            hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
5546
5547                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
5548                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
5549                            hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
5550         }
5551
5552         #[test]
5553         fn test_key_derivation() {
5554                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
5555                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5556
5557                 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5558                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5559
5560                 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
5561                 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
5562
5563                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5564                 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
5565
5566                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5567                                 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
5568
5569                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5570                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5571
5572                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5573                                 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
5574
5575                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5576                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5577         }
5578 }