_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/channel.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
  11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
  12 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  13 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  14 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
  15
  16 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
  19
  20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
  22 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
  23
  24 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
  25 use ln::msgs;
  26 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
  27 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
  28 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
  29 use ln::chan_utils;
  30 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
  31 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
  32 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
  33 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
  34 use util::transaction_utils;
  35 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
  36 use util::logger::Logger;
  37 use util::errors::APIError;
  38 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
  39 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
  40
  41 use std;
  42 use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
  43 use std::ops::Deref;
  44 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
  45 use std::sync::Mutex;
  46 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
  47 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0;
  48
  49 #[cfg(test)]
  50 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
  51         pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
  52         pub channel_value_msat: u64,
  53         pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
  54         pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  55         pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  56         pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
  57         pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
  58         pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
  59 }
  60
  61 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
  62         FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
  63         FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
  64         Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
  65 }
  66
  67 enum InboundHTLCState {
  68         /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
  69         /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
  70         RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
  71         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
  72         /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
  73         /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
  74         /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
  75         /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
  76         /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
  77         /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
  78         /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
  79         /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
  80         /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
  81         /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
  82         /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
  83         ///
  84         /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
  85         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc)   --> local
  86         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
  87         /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack               <-- local
  88         /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
  89         /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
  90         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc)   --> local
  91         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
  92         /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
  93         /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
  94         /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
  95         /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
  96         /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
  97         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
  98         ///
  99         /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
 100         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
 101         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
 102         /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
 103         /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
 104         /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
 105         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 106         AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
 107         Committed,
 108         /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 109         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 110         /// we'll drop it.
 111         /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
 112         /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
 113         /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
 114         /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
 115         /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
 116         /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
 117         /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
 118         LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
 119 }
 120
 121 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
 122         htlc_id: u64,
 123         amount_msat: u64,
 124         cltv_expiry: u32,
 125         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 126         state: InboundHTLCState,
 127 }
 128
 129 enum OutboundHTLCState {
 130         /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 131         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 132         /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
 133         /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
 134         ///  * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
 135         ///    money back (though we won't), and,
 136         ///  * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
 137         ///    allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
 138         ///    doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
 139         ///    we'll never get out of sync).
 140         /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
 141         /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
 142         LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
 143         Committed,
 144         /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
 145         /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
 146         RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 147         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 148         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 149         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 150         /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
 151         /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
 152         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 153         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 154         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 155         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 156         /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
 157         /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
 158         AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 159 }
 160
 161 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
 162         htlc_id: u64,
 163         amount_msat: u64,
 164         cltv_expiry: u32,
 165         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 166         state: OutboundHTLCState,
 167         source: HTLCSource,
 168 }
 169
 170 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
 171 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
 172         AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
 173                 // always outbound
 174                 amount_msat: u64,
 175                 cltv_expiry: u32,
 176                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 177                 source: HTLCSource,
 178                 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
 179         },
 180         ClaimHTLC {
 181                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
 182                 htlc_id: u64,
 183         },
 184         FailHTLC {
 185                 htlc_id: u64,
 186                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
 187         },
 188 }
 189
 190 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
 191 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
 192 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
 193 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
 194 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
 195 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
 196 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
 197 enum ChannelState {
 198         /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
 199         OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
 200         /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
 201         TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
 202         /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
 203         /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
 204         /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
 205         FundingCreated = 4,
 206         /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
 207         /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
 208         /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
 209         FundingSent = 8,
 210         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
 211         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 212         TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
 213         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
 214         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 215         OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
 216         ChannelFunded = 64,
 217         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
 218         /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
 219         /// dance.
 220         PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
 221         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
 222         /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
 223         /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
 224         MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
 225         /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
 226         /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
 227         /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
 228         /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
 229         /// later.
 230         /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
 231         AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
 232         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
 233         /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
 234         /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
 235         RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
 236         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
 237         /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
 238         /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
 239         /// us their shutdown.
 240         LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
 241         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
 242         /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
 243         ShutdownComplete = 4096,
 244 }
 245 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
 246 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
 247
 248 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
 249
 250 /// Liveness is called to fluctuate given peer disconnecton/monitor failures/closing.
 251 /// If channel is public, network should have a liveness view announced by us on a
 252 /// best-effort, which means we may filter out some status transitions to avoid spam.
 253 /// See further timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
 254 #[derive(PartialEq)]
 255 enum UpdateStatus {
 256         /// Status has been gossiped.
 257         Fresh,
 258         /// Status has been changed.
 259         DisabledMarked,
 260         /// Status has been marked to be gossiped at next flush
 261         DisabledStaged,
 262 }
 263
 264 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
 265 enum HTLCInitiator {
 266         LocalOffered,
 267         RemoteOffered,
 268 }
 269
 270 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
 271 struct HTLCCandidate {
 272         amount_msat: u64,
 273         origin: HTLCInitiator,
 274 }
 275
 276 impl HTLCCandidate {
 277         fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
 278                 Self {
 279                         amount_msat,
 280                         origin,
 281                 }
 282         }
 283 }
 284
 285 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
 286 #[derive(Clone)]
 287 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
 288         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
 289         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
 290         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
 291         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
 292         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
 293         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
 294         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
 295         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
 296 }
 297
 298 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
 299 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
 300 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
 301 // inbound channel.
 302 //
 303 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
 304 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
 305 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
 306         config: ChannelConfig,
 307
 308         user_id: u64,
 309
 310         channel_id: [u8; 32],
 311         channel_state: u32,
 312         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
 313         channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 314
 315         latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
 316
 317         holder_signer: Signer,
 318         shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
 319         destination_script: Script,
 320
 321         // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
 322         // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
 323         // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
 324
 325         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 326         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 327         value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
 328         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
 329         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
 330         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
 331
 332         /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
 333         /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
 334         /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
 335         /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
 336         /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
 337         /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
 338         /// send it first.
 339         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
 340
 341         monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
 342         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
 343         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
 344         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
 345         monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
 346
 347         // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
 348         // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
 349         // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
 350         //
 351         // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
 352         // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
 353         // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
 354         // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
 355         // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
 356         // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
 357         // commitment_signed.
 358         pending_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 359         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
 360         // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
 361         // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
 362         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 363         holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 364         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
 365         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
 366         update_time_counter: u32,
 367         feerate_per_kw: u32,
 368
 369         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 370         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
 371         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 372         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 373         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
 374         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 375
 376         last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
 377
 378         /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
 379         funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
 380         funding_tx_confirmation_height: u64,
 381         short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
 382
 383         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 384         #[cfg(test)]
 385         pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 386         #[cfg(not(test))]
 387         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 388         #[cfg(test)]
 389         pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 390         #[cfg(not(test))]
 391         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 392         //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
 393         /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
 394         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
 395         // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
 396         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 397         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 398         #[cfg(test)]
 399         pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 400         #[cfg(not(test))]
 401         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 402         //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 403         minimum_depth: u32,
 404
 405         counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
 406
 407         pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
 408
 409         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 410
 411         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 412         counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
 413
 414         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
 415
 416         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
 417
 418         network_sync: UpdateStatus,
 419
 420         // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
 421         // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
 422         // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
 423         // `build_commitment_transaction`.
 424         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 425         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
 426         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 427         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
 428 }
 429
 430 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 431 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
 432         fee: u64,
 433         total_pending_htlcs: usize,
 434         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
 435         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
 436         feerate: u32,
 437 }
 438
 439 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
 440 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
 441 const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
 442
 443 #[cfg(not(test))]
 444 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 445 #[cfg(test)]
 446 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 447 #[cfg(not(test))]
 448 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 449 #[cfg(test)]
 450 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 451
 452 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
 453 /// it's 2^24.
 454 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
 455
 456 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
 457 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
 458 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
 459 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
 460         Ignore(String),
 461         Close(String),
 462         CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
 463 }
 464
 465 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
 466         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
 467                 match self {
 468                         &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
 469                         &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
 470                         &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
 471                 }
 472         }
 473 }
 474
 475 macro_rules! secp_check {
 476         ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
 477                 match $res {
 478                         Ok(thing) => thing,
 479                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
 480                 }
 481         };
 482 }
 483
 484 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
 485         // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
 486         fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 487                 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
 488         }
 489
 490         /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
 491         /// required by us.
 492         ///
 493         /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
 494         pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 495                 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
 496                 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
 497         }
 498
 499         fn derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u32) -> u64 {
 500                 cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate as u64 * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
 501         }
 502
 503         // Constructors:
 504         pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
 505         where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
 506               F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 507         {
 508                 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
 509                 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
 510                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
 511
 512                 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 513                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
 514                 }
 515                 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
 516                 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
 517                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
 518                 }
 519                 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 520                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
 521                 }
 522                 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 523                 if Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
 524                         return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
 525                 }
 526
 527                 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
 528
 529                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 530                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
 531
 532                 Ok(Channel {
 533                         user_id,
 534                         config: config.channel_options.clone(),
 535
 536                         channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
 537                         channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
 538                         secp_ctx,
 539                         channel_value_satoshis,
 540
 541                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 542
 543                         holder_signer,
 544                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
 545                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 546
 547                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 548                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 549                         value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
 550
 551                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 552                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 553                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 554                         pending_update_fee: None,
 555                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 556                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 557                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 558                         update_time_counter: 1,
 559
 560                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 561
 562                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 563                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 564                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 565                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 566                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 567
 568                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 569                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 570                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 571                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 572
 573                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 574
 575                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 576                         funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
 577                         short_channel_id: None,
 578
 579                         feerate_per_kw: feerate,
 580                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
 581                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
 582                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
 583                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
 584                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
 585                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 586                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
 587                         minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
 588
 589                         counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
 590
 591                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
 592                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
 593                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 594                                 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
 595                                 counterparty_parameters: None,
 596                                 funding_outpoint: None
 597                         },
 598                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
 599
 600                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 601                         counterparty_node_id,
 602
 603                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
 604
 605                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 606
 607                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
 608
 609                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 610                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 611                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 612                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 613                 })
 614         }
 615
 616         fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
 617                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
 618         {
 619                 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 620                 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
 621                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
 622                 }
 623                 let upper_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64  * 2;
 624                 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
 625                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
 626                 }
 627                 Ok(())
 628         }
 629
 630         /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
 631         /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
 632         pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
 633                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
 634           F::Target: FeeEstimator
 635         {
 636                 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
 637                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
 638                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
 639                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
 640                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
 641                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
 642                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
 643                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
 644                 };
 645                 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
 646
 647                 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 648                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
 649                 }
 650
 651                 // Check sanity of message fields:
 652                 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 653                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 654                 }
 655                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 656                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 657                 }
 658                 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 659                 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
 660                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
 661                 }
 662                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 663                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 664                 }
 665                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
 666                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
 667                 }
 668                 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 669                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
 670                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
 671                 }
 672                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
 673
 674                 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
 675                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
 676                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
 677                 }
 678                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
 679                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
 680                 }
 681                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
 682                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
 683                 }
 684
 685                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
 686                 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
 687                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
 688                 }
 689                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
 690                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat,  config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
 691                 }
 692                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
 693                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
 694                 }
 695                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
 696                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 697                 }
 698                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
 699                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
 700                 }
 701                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
 702                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 703                 }
 704                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
 705                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 706                 }
 707
 708                 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
 709
 710                 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
 711                 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
 712                         if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
 713                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
 714                         }
 715                 }
 716                 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
 717                 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
 718
 719                 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 720
 721                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
 722                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
 723                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
 724                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 725                 }
 726                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
 727                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 728                 }
 729                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
 730                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 731                 }
 732
 733                 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
 734                 // for full fee payment
 735                 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
 736                 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 737                 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
 738                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
 739                 }
 740
 741                 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
 742                 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 743                 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
 744                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
 745                 }
 746
 747                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
 748                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
 749                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
 750                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
 751                                         if script.len() == 0 {
 752                                                 None
 753                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
 754                                         } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
 755                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
 756                                         } else {
 757                                                 Some(script.clone())
 758                                         }
 759                                 },
 760                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
 761                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
 762                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
 763                                 }
 764                         }
 765                 } else { None };
 766
 767                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 768                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
 769
 770                 let chan = Channel {
 771                         user_id,
 772                         config: local_config,
 773
 774                         channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
 775                         channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
 776                         secp_ctx,
 777
 778                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 779
 780                         holder_signer,
 781                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
 782                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 783
 784                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 785                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 786                         value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
 787
 788                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 789                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 790                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 791                         pending_update_fee: None,
 792                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 793                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 794                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 795                         update_time_counter: 1,
 796
 797                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 798
 799                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 800                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 801                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 802                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 803                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 804
 805                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 806                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 807                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 808                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 809
 810                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 811
 812                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 813                         funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
 814                         short_channel_id: None,
 815
 816                         feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
 817                         channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
 818                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
 819                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
 820                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
 821                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
 822                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
 823                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 824                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
 825                         minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
 826
 827                         counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
 828
 829                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
 830                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
 831                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 832                                 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
 833                                 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
 834                                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
 835                                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
 836                                 }),
 837                                 funding_outpoint: None
 838                         },
 839                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
 840
 841                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 842                         counterparty_node_id,
 843
 844                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
 845
 846                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 847
 848                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
 849
 850                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 851                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 852                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 853                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 854                 };
 855
 856                 Ok(chan)
 857         }
 858
 859         /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
 860         /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
 861         /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
 862         /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
 863         /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
 864         /// an HTLC to a).
 865         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
 866         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
 867         /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
 868         /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
 869         /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
 870         /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
 871         /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
 872         /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
 873         /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
 874         /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
 875         /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
 876         #[inline]
 877         fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
 878                 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
 879                 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
 880                 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
 881
 882                 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
 883                 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 884                 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 885                 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
 886
 887                 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
 888
 889                 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
 890                         ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
 891                                 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 892                                         offered: $offered,
 893                                         amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
 894                                         cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
 895                                         payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
 896                                         transaction_output_index: None
 897                                 }
 898                         }
 899                 }
 900
 901                 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
 902                         ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
 903                                 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
 904                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
 905                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
 906                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 907                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 908                                         } else {
 909                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 910                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 911                                         }
 912                                 } else {
 913                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
 914                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
 915                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 916                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 917                                         } else {
 918                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 919                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 920                                         }
 921                                 }
 922                         }
 923                 }
 924
 925                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
 926                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
 927                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
 928                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
 929                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
 930                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
 931                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
 932                         };
 933
 934                         if include {
 935                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
 936                                 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 937                         } else {
 938                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
 939                                 match &htlc.state {
 940                                         &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
 941                                                 if generated_by_local {
 942                                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
 943                                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 944                                                         }
 945                                                 }
 946                                         },
 947                                         _ => {},
 948                                 }
 949                         }
 950                 }
 951
 952                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
 953                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
 954                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
 955                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
 956                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
 957                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
 958                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
 959                         };
 960
 961                         if include {
 962                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
 963                                 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 964                         } else {
 965                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
 966                                 match htlc.state {
 967                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
 968                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 969                                         },
 970                                         OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
 971                                                 if !generated_by_local {
 972                                                         value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 973                                                 }
 974                                         },
 975                                         _ => {},
 976                                 }
 977                         }
 978                 }
 979
 980                 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
 981                 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
 982                 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
 983                 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
 984                 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
 985                 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
 986                 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
 987                 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
 988
 989                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 990                 {
 991                         // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
 992                         // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
 993                         let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
 994                                 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
 995                         } else {
 996                                 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
 997                         };
 998                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
 999                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1000                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
1001                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1002                 }
1003
1004                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1005                 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1006                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1007                 } else {
1008                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
1009                 };
1010
1011                 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1012                 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1013
1014                 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1015                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1016                 } else {
1017                         value_to_a = 0;
1018                 }
1019
1020                 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1021                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1022                 } else {
1023                         value_to_b = 0;
1024                 }
1025
1026                 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1027
1028                 let channel_parameters =
1029                         if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1030                         else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1031                 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1032                                                                              value_to_a as u64,
1033                                                                              value_to_b as u64,
1034                                                                              keys.clone(),
1035                                                                              feerate_per_kw,
1036                                                                              &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1037                                                                              &channel_parameters
1038                 );
1039                 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1040                 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1041                 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1042                 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1043
1044                 (tx, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1045         }
1046
1047         #[inline]
1048         fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1049                 let channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1050                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1051         }
1052
1053         #[inline]
1054         fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1055                 let mut ret =
1056                 (4 +                                           // version
1057                  1 +                                           // input count
1058                  36 +                                          // prevout
1059                  1 +                                           // script length (0)
1060                  4 +                                           // sequence
1061                  1 +                                           // output count
1062                  4                                             // lock time
1063                  )*4 +                                         // * 4 for non-witness parts
1064                 2 +                                            // witness marker and flag
1065                 1 +                                            // witness element count
1066                 4 +                                            // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1067                 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1068                 2*(1 + 71);                                    // two signatures + sighash type flags
1069                 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1070                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1071                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1072                 }
1073                 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1074                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1075                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1076                 }
1077                 ret
1078         }
1079
1080         #[inline]
1081         fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1082                 let txins = {
1083                         let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1084                         ins.push(TxIn {
1085                                 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1086                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1087                                 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1088                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1089                         });
1090                         ins
1091                 };
1092
1093                 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1094                 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1095                 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1096
1097                 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1098                 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1099                 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1100
1101                 if value_to_self < 0 {
1102                         assert!(self.is_outbound());
1103                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1104                 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1105                         assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1106                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1107                 }
1108
1109                 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1110                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1111                                 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1112                                 value: value_to_remote as u64
1113                         }, ()));
1114                 }
1115
1116                 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1117                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1118                                 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1119                                 value: value_to_self as u64
1120                         }, ()));
1121                 }
1122
1123                 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1124
1125                 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1126                 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1127                         outputs.push(out.0);
1128                 }
1129
1130                 (Transaction {
1131                         version: 2,
1132                         lock_time: 0,
1133                         input: txins,
1134                         output: outputs,
1135                 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1136         }
1137
1138         fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1139                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1140         }
1141
1142         #[inline]
1143         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1144         /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1145         /// our counterparty!)
1146         /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1147         /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1148         fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1149                 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1150                 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1151                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1152                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1153
1154                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1155         }
1156
1157         #[inline]
1158         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1159         /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1160         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1161         fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1162                 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1163                 //may see payments to it!
1164                 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1165                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1166                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1167
1168                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1169         }
1170
1171         /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1172         /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1173         /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1174         pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1175                 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1176         }
1177
1178         /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1179         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1180         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1181         fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Transaction {
1182                 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay() } else { self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay() }, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1183         }
1184
1185         /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1186         /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1187         /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1188         ///
1189         /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1190         /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1191         fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1192                 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1193                 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1194                 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1195                 // either.
1196                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1197                         panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1198                 }
1199                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1200
1201                 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1202
1203                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1204                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1205                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1206
1207                 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1208                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1209                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1210                                 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1211                                 match htlc.state {
1212                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1213                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1214                                                 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1215                                                 } else {
1216                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1217                                                 }
1218                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1219                                                 return Ok((None, None));
1220                                         },
1221                                         _ => {
1222                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1223                                                 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1224                                         }
1225                                 }
1226                                 pending_idx = idx;
1227                                 break;
1228                         }
1229                 }
1230                 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1231                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1232                 }
1233
1234                 // Now update local state:
1235                 //
1236                 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1237                 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1238                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1239                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1240                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1241                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1242                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1243                         }],
1244                 };
1245
1246                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1247                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1248                                 match pending_update {
1249                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1250                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1251                                                         // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1252                                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1253                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1254                                                         return Ok((None, None));
1255                                                 }
1256                                         },
1257                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1258                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1259                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1260                                                         // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1261                                                         // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1262                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1263                                                         return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1264                                                 }
1265                                         },
1266                                         _ => {}
1267                                 }
1268                         }
1269                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1270                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1271                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1272                         });
1273                         return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1274                 }
1275
1276                 {
1277                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1278                         if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1279                         } else {
1280                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1281                                 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1282                         }
1283                         log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1284                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1285                 }
1286
1287                 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1288                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1289                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1290                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1291                 }), Some(monitor_update)))
1292         }
1293
1294         pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1295                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger)? {
1296                         (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), Some(mut monitor_update)) => {
1297                                 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1298                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1299                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1300                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1301                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1302                                 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1303                         },
1304                         (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), None) => {
1305                                 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1306                                 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1307                         },
1308                         (None, Some(monitor_update)) => Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))),
1309                         (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1310                 }
1311         }
1312
1313         /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1314         /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1315         /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1316         ///
1317         /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1318         /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1319         pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
1320                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1321                         panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1322                 }
1323                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1324
1325                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1326                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1327                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1328
1329                 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1330                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1331                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1332                                 match htlc.state {
1333                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1334                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1335                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1336                                                 return Ok(None);
1337                                         },
1338                                         _ => {
1339                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1340                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1341                                         }
1342                                 }
1343                                 pending_idx = idx;
1344                         }
1345                 }
1346                 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1347                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1348                 }
1349
1350                 // Now update local state:
1351                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1352                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1353                                 match pending_update {
1354                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1355                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1356                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1357                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1358                                                 }
1359                                         },
1360                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1361                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1362                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1363                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1364                                                 }
1365                                         },
1366                                         _ => {}
1367                                 }
1368                         }
1369                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1370                                 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1371                                 err_packet,
1372                         });
1373                         return Ok(None);
1374                 }
1375
1376                 {
1377                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1378                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1379                 }
1380
1381                 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1382                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1383                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1384                         reason: err_packet
1385                 }))
1386         }
1387
1388         // Message handlers:
1389
1390         pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1391                 // Check sanity of message fields:
1392                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1393                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1394                 }
1395                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1396                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1397                 }
1398                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1399                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1400                 }
1401                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1402                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1403                 }
1404                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1405                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve ({}) and dust_limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1406                 }
1407                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1408                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1409                 }
1410                 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1411                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1412                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1413                 }
1414                 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1415                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1416                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1417                 }
1418                 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1419                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1420                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1421                 }
1422                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1423                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1424                 }
1425                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1426                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1427                 }
1428
1429                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1430                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1431                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1432                 }
1433                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1434                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1435                 }
1436                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1437                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1438                 }
1439                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1440                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1441                 }
1442                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
1443                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1444                 }
1445                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
1446                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1447                 }
1448                 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1449                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1450                 }
1451
1452                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1453                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1454                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1455                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1456                                         if script.len() == 0 {
1457                                                 None
1458                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1459                                         } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
1460                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
1461                                         } else {
1462                                                 Some(script.clone())
1463                                         }
1464                                 },
1465                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1466                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1467                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1468                                 }
1469                         }
1470                 } else { None };
1471
1472                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1473                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1474                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1475                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1476                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1477                 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1478
1479                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1480                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1481                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1482                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1483                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1484                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1485                 };
1486
1487                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1488                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1489                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1490                 });
1491
1492                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1493                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1494
1495                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1496
1497                 Ok(())
1498         }
1499
1500         fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1501                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1502
1503                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1504                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1505                 {
1506                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1507                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1508                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1509                         // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1510                         log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1511                         secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1512                 }
1513
1514                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1515                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1516
1517                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1518                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1519                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1520
1521                 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1522                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1523
1524                 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1525                 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1526         }
1527
1528         fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1529                 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1530         }
1531
1532         pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, last_block_hash: BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1533                 if self.is_outbound() {
1534                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1535                 }
1536                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1537                         // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1538                         // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1539                         // channel.
1540                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1541                 }
1542                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1543                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1544                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1545                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1546                 }
1547
1548                 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1549                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1550                 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks.  In particular
1551                 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1552                 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1553
1554                 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1555                         Ok(res) => res,
1556                         Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1557                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1558                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1559                         },
1560                         Err(e) => {
1561                                 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1562                                 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1563                                 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1564                         }
1565                 };
1566
1567                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1568                         initial_commitment_tx,
1569                         msg.signature,
1570                         Vec::new(),
1571                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1572                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1573                 );
1574
1575                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1576
1577                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1578                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1579                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1580                 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1581                                                           &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1582                                                           &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1583                                                           &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1584                                                           funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1585                                                           obscure_factor,
1586                                                           holder_commitment_tx, last_block_hash);
1587
1588                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1589
1590                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1591                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1592                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1593                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1594
1595                 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1596                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
1597                         signature
1598                 }, channel_monitor))
1599         }
1600
1601         /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1602         /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1603         pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, last_block_hash: BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1604                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1605                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1606                 }
1607                 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1608                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1609                 }
1610                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1611                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1612                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1613                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1614                 }
1615
1616                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1617
1618                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1619                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1620                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1621                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1622
1623                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1624
1625                 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1626                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1627                 {
1628                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1629                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1630                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1631                         // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1632                         if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1633                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1634                         }
1635                 }
1636
1637                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1638                         initial_commitment_tx,
1639                         msg.signature,
1640                         Vec::new(),
1641                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1642                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1643                 );
1644
1645
1646                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1647                 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1648                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1649                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1650                 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1651                                                           &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1652                                                           &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1653                                                           &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1654                                                           funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1655                                                           obscure_factor,
1656                                                           holder_commitment_tx, last_block_hash);
1657
1658                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1659
1660                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1661                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1662                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1663                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1664
1665                 Ok(channel_monitor)
1666         }
1667
1668         pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1669                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1670                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1671                 }
1672
1673                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1674
1675                 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1676                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1677                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1678                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1679                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
1680                 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1681                                  // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1682                                  self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1683                                  self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1684                                 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1685                                 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1686                                                       (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1687                         if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1688                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1689                         }
1690                         // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1691                         return Ok(());
1692                 } else {
1693                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1694                 }
1695
1696                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1697                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1698                 Ok(())
1699         }
1700
1701         /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1702         fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1703                 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1704                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1705                         htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1706                 }
1707                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1708         }
1709
1710         /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1711         /// holding cell.
1712         fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1713                 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1714                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1715                         htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1716                 }
1717
1718                 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1719                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1720                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1721                                 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1722                                 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1723                         }
1724                 }
1725
1726                 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1727         }
1728
1729         /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1730         /// Doesn't bother handling the
1731         /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1732         /// corner case properly.
1733         pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1734                 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1735                 (cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1736                 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1737         }
1738
1739         // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1740         // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1741         fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1742                 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1743                 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1744                 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1745         }
1746
1747         // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1748         // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
1749         // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
1750         // are excluded.
1751         fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1752                 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1753
1754                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1755                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1756
1757                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1758                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1759                 match htlc.origin {
1760                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1761                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1762                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1763                                 }
1764                         },
1765                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1766                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1767                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1768                                 }
1769                         }
1770                 }
1771
1772                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1773                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1774                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1775                                 continue
1776                         }
1777                         // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1778                         // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1779                         included_htlcs += 1;
1780                 }
1781
1782                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1783                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1784                                 continue
1785                         }
1786                         match htlc.state {
1787                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1788                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1789                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1790                                 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1791                                 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1792                                 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1793                                 _ => {},
1794                         }
1795                 }
1796
1797                 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1798                         match htlc {
1799                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1800                                         if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1801                                                 continue
1802                                         }
1803                                         included_htlcs += 1
1804                                 },
1805                                 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1806                                          // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1807                         }
1808                 }
1809
1810                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1811                 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1812                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1813                 {
1814                         let mut fee = res;
1815                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1816                                 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1817                         }
1818                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1819                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1820                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1821                                 fee,
1822                                 total_pending_htlcs,
1823                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1824                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1825                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1826                                 },
1827                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1828                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1829                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1830                                 },
1831                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1832                         };
1833                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1834                 }
1835                 res
1836         }
1837
1838         // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1839         // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
1840         // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
1841         // excluded.
1842         fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1843                 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1844
1845                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1846                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1847
1848                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1849                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1850                 match htlc.origin {
1851                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1852                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1853                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1854                                 }
1855                         },
1856                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1857                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1858                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1859                                 }
1860                         }
1861                 }
1862
1863                 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1864                 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1865                 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1866                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1867                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1868                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1869                                 continue
1870                         }
1871                         included_htlcs += 1;
1872                 }
1873
1874                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1875                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1876                                 continue
1877                         }
1878                         // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1879                         // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1880                         match htlc.state {
1881                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1882                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1883                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1884                                 _ => {},
1885                         }
1886                 }
1887
1888                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1889                 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1890                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1891                 {
1892                         let mut fee = res;
1893                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1894                                 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1895                         }
1896                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1897                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1898                                 fee,
1899                                 total_pending_htlcs,
1900                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1901                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1902                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1903                                 },
1904                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1905                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1906                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1907                                 },
1908                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1909                         };
1910                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1911                 }
1912                 res
1913         }
1914
1915         pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1916         where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
1917                 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
1918                 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1919                 if local_sent_shutdown {
1920                         pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
1921                 }
1922                 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
1923                 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1924                 if remote_sent_shutdown {
1925                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1926                 }
1927                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1928                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1929                 }
1930                 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1931                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
1932                 }
1933                 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
1934                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
1935                 }
1936                 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
1937                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
1938                 }
1939
1940                 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1941                 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1942                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
1943                 }
1944                 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1945                 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1946                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1947                 }
1948                 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1949                 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1950                 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1951                 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1952                 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1953                 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1954                 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1955                 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1956                 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1957                 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1958                 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1959                 // transaction).
1960                 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
1961                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1962                         if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
1963                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1964                         } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
1965                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1966                         }
1967                 }
1968
1969                 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
1970                         self.value_to_self_msat + htlc_inbound_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
1971                 let pending_remote_value_msat =
1972                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
1973                 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
1974                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
1975                 }
1976
1977                 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
1978                 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
1979                 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
1980                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
1981                         self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
1982                 };
1983                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
1984                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
1985                 };
1986
1987                 let chan_reserve_msat =
1988                         Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
1989                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
1990                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
1991                 }
1992
1993                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1994                         // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
1995                         // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
1996                         // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
1997                         // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
1998                         // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
1999                         // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2000                         // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2001                         // sensitive to fee spikes.
2002                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2003                         let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2004                         if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2005                                 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2006                                 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2007                                 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation");
2008                                 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2009                         }
2010                 } else {
2011                         // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2012                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2013                         let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2014                         if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2015                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2016                         }
2017                 }
2018                 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2019                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2020                 }
2021                 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2022                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2023                 }
2024
2025                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2026                         if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2027                                 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2028                         }
2029                 }
2030
2031                 // Now update local state:
2032                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2033                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2034                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2035                         amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2036                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2037                         cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2038                         state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2039                 });
2040                 Ok(())
2041         }
2042
2043         /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2044         #[inline]
2045         fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2046                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2047                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2048                                 match check_preimage {
2049                                         None => {},
2050                                         Some(payment_hash) =>
2051                                                 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2052                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2053                                                 }
2054                                 };
2055                                 match htlc.state {
2056                                         OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2057                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2058                                         OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2059                                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2060                                         },
2061                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2062                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2063                                 }
2064                                 return Ok(&htlc.source);
2065                         }
2066                 }
2067                 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2068         }
2069
2070         pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2071                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2072                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2073                 }
2074                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2075                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2076                 }
2077
2078                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2079                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
2080         }
2081
2082         pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2083                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2084                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2085                 }
2086                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2087                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2088                 }
2089
2090                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2091                 Ok(())
2092         }
2093
2094         pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2095                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2096                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2097                 }
2098                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2099                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2100                 }
2101
2102                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2103                 Ok(())
2104         }
2105
2106         pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2107         where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2108                                 L::Target: Logger
2109         {
2110                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2111                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2112                 }
2113                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2114                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2115                 }
2116                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2117                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2118                 }
2119
2120                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2121
2122                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2123
2124                 let mut update_fee = false;
2125                 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2126                         update_fee = true;
2127                         self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
2128                 } else {
2129                         self.feerate_per_kw
2130                 };
2131
2132                 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid) = {
2133                         let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
2134                         let commitment_txid = {
2135                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2136                                 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2137                                 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2138
2139                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
2140                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2141                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2142                                 }
2143                                 bitcoin_tx.txid
2144                         };
2145                         let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2146                         (commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid)
2147                 };
2148
2149                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2150                 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
2151                 if update_fee {
2152                         let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2153                         if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2154                                 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2155                         }
2156                 }
2157                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2158                 {
2159                         if self.is_outbound() {
2160                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2161                                 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2162                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2163                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2164                                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2165                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2166                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2167                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2168                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2169                                                         assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2170                                                 }
2171                                 }
2172                         }
2173                 }
2174
2175                 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2176                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2177                 }
2178
2179                 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2180                 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2181                 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2182                         if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2183                                 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &keys, feerate_per_kw);
2184                                 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2185                                 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2186                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
2187                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2188                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2189                                 }
2190                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2191                         } else {
2192                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2193                         }
2194                 }
2195
2196                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2197                         commitment_tx,
2198                         msg.signature,
2199                         msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2200                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2201                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2202                 );
2203
2204                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2205                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2206
2207                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2208                 let mut need_commitment = false;
2209                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2210                         if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
2211                                 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
2212                                 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
2213                                 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
2214                                 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
2215                                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
2216                                         need_commitment = true;
2217                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2218                                 }
2219                         }
2220                 }
2221
2222                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2223                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2224                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2225                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2226                                 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2227                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2228                         }]
2229                 };
2230
2231                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2232                         let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2233                                 Some(forward_info.clone())
2234                         } else { None };
2235                         if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2236                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2237                                 need_commitment = true;
2238                         }
2239                 }
2240                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2241                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2242                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
2243                         } else { None } {
2244                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2245                                 need_commitment = true;
2246                         }
2247                 }
2248
2249                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2250                 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2251                 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2252                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2253
2254                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2255                         // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2256                         // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2257                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2258                         if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2259                                 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2260                                 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2261                                 // includes the right HTLCs.
2262                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2263                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2264                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2265                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2266                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2267                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2268                         }
2269                         // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2270                         // re-send the message on restoration)
2271                         return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2272                 }
2273
2274                 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2275                         // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2276                         // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2277                         // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2278                         let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2279                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2280                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2281                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2282                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2283                         (Some(msg), None)
2284                 } else if !need_commitment {
2285                         (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2286                 } else { (None, None) };
2287
2288                 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2289                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2290                         per_commitment_secret,
2291                         next_per_commitment_point,
2292                 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2293         }
2294
2295         /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2296         /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2297         fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2298                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2299                 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2300                         log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
2301
2302                         let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2303                                 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2304                                 updates: Vec::new(),
2305                         };
2306
2307                         let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2308                         mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2309                         let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2310                         let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2311                         let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2312                         let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2313                         for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2314                                 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2315                                 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2316                                 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2317                                 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2318                                 // to rebalance channels.
2319                                 match &htlc_update {
2320                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2321                                                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2322                                                         Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2323                                                         Err(e) => {
2324                                                                 match e {
2325                                                                         ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2326                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2327                                                                                 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2328                                                                                 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2329                                                                                 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2330                                                                                 // into the holding cell without ever being
2331                                                                                 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2332                                                                                 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2333                                                                                 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2334                                                                         },
2335                                                                         _ => {
2336                                                                                 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2337                                                                         },
2338                                                                 }
2339                                                         }
2340                                                 }
2341                                         },
2342                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2343                                                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2344                                                         Ok((update_fulfill_msg_option, additional_monitor_update_opt)) => {
2345                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2346                                                                 if let Some(mut additional_monitor_update) = additional_monitor_update_opt {
2347                                                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2348                                                                 }
2349                                                         },
2350                                                         Err(e) => {
2351                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2352                                                                 else {
2353                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
2354                                                                 }
2355                                                         }
2356                                                 }
2357                                         },
2358                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2359                                                 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
2360                                                         Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
2361                                                         Err(e) => {
2362                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2363                                                                 else {
2364                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2365                                                                 }
2366                                                         }
2367                                                 }
2368                                         },
2369                                 }
2370                         }
2371                         if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2372                                 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2373                         }
2374                         let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2375                                 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2376                                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2377                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2378                                         feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2379                                 })
2380                         } else {
2381                                 None
2382                         };
2383
2384                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2385                         // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2386                         // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2387                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2388                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2389
2390                         Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2391                                 update_add_htlcs,
2392                                 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2393                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2394                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2395                                 update_fee,
2396                                 commitment_signed,
2397                         }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2398                 } else {
2399                         Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2400                 }
2401         }
2402
2403         /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2404         /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2405         /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2406         /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2407         /// revoke_and_ack message.
2408         pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2409                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2410                                         L::Target: Logger,
2411         {
2412                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2413                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2414                 }
2415                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2416                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2417                 }
2418                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2419                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2420                 }
2421
2422                 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2423                         if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2424                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2425                         }
2426                 }
2427
2428                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2429                         // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2430                         // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2431                         // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2432                         // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2433                         // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2434                         // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2435                         // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2436                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2437                 }
2438
2439                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2440                 {
2441                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2442                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2443                 }
2444
2445                 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2446                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2447                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2448                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2449                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2450                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2451                                 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2452                                 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2453                         }],
2454                 };
2455
2456                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2457                 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2458                 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2459                 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2460                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2461                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2462                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2463                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2464
2465                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
2466                 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2467                 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2468                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2469                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2470                 let mut require_commitment = false;
2471                 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2472
2473                 {
2474                         // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2475                         let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2476                         let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2477
2478                         // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2479                         pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2480                                 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2481                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2482                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2483                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2484                                         }
2485                                         false
2486                                 } else { true }
2487                         });
2488                         pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2489                                 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2490                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2491                                         if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2492                                                 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2493                                         } else {
2494                                                 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2495                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2496                                         }
2497                                         false
2498                                 } else { true }
2499                         });
2500                         for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2501                                 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2502                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2503                                         true
2504                                 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2505                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2506                                         true
2507                                 } else { false };
2508                                 if swap {
2509                                         let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2510                                         mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2511
2512                                         if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2513                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2514                                                 require_commitment = true;
2515                                         } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2516                                                 match forward_info {
2517                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2518                                                                 require_commitment = true;
2519                                                                 match fail_msg {
2520                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2521                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2522                                                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2523                                                                         },
2524                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2525                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2526                                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2527                                                                         },
2528                                                                 }
2529                                                         },
2530                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2531                                                                 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2532                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2533                                                         }
2534                                                 }
2535                                         }
2536                                 }
2537                         }
2538                         for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2539                                 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2540                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2541                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2542                                 }
2543                                 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2544                                         Some(fail_reason.take())
2545                                 } else { None } {
2546                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2547                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2548                                         require_commitment = true;
2549                                 }
2550                         }
2551                 }
2552                 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2553
2554                 if self.is_outbound() {
2555                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2556                                 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2557                         }
2558                 } else {
2559                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2560                                 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2561                                 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2562                                 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2563                                 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2564                                 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2565                                 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2566                                         require_commitment = true;
2567                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2568                                 }
2569                         }
2570                 }
2571
2572                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2573                         // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2574                         // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2575                         if require_commitment {
2576                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2577                                 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2578                                 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2579                                 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2580                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2581                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2582                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2583                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2584                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2585                         }
2586                         self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2587                         self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2588                         return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2589                 }
2590
2591                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2592                         (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2593                                 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2594                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2595                                         commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2596                                 }
2597                                 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2598                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2599                                         commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2600                                 }
2601
2602                                 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2603                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2604                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2605                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2606
2607                                 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2608                         },
2609                         (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2610                                 if require_commitment {
2611                                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2612
2613                                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2614                                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2615                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2616                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2617
2618                                         Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2619                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2620                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2621                                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2622                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2623                                                 update_fee: None,
2624                                                 commitment_signed
2625                                         }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2626                                 } else {
2627                                         Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2628                                 }
2629                         }
2630                 }
2631
2632         }
2633
2634         /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2635         /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2636         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2637         fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2638                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2639                         panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2640                 }
2641                 if !self.is_usable() {
2642                         panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2643                 }
2644                 if !self.is_live() {
2645                         panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2646                 }
2647
2648                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2649                         self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2650                         return None;
2651                 }
2652
2653                 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2654                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2655
2656                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2657                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2658                         feerate_per_kw,
2659                 })
2660         }
2661
2662         pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2663                 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2664                         Some(update_fee) => {
2665                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2666                                 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2667                         },
2668                         None => Ok(None)
2669                 }
2670         }
2671
2672         /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2673         /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2674         /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2675         /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2676         /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2677         /// completed.
2678         pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> where L::Target: Logger {
2679                 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2680
2681                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2682                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2683                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2684                         return outbound_drops;
2685                 }
2686                 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2687                 // will be retransmitted.
2688                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2689
2690                 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2691                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2692                         match htlc.state {
2693                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2694                                         // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2695                                         // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2696                                         // this HTLC accordingly
2697                                         inbound_drop_count += 1;
2698                                         false
2699                                 },
2700                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2701                                         // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2702                                         // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2703                                         // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2704                                         true
2705                                 },
2706                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2707                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2708                                         // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2709                                         // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2710                                         // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2711                                         // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2712                                         true
2713                                 },
2714                         }
2715                 });
2716                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2717
2718                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2719                         if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2720                                 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2721                                 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2722                                 // the update upon reconnection.
2723                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2724                         }
2725                 }
2726
2727                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2728                         match htlc_update {
2729                                 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are
2730                                 // no holding cell HTLC update_adds, so if in the future we stop
2731                                 // dropping added HTLCs here and failing them backwards, then there will
2732                                 // need to be corresponding changes made in the Channel's re-establish
2733                                 // logic.
2734                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2735                                         outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2736                                         false
2737                                 },
2738                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2739                         }
2740                 });
2741                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2742                 log_debug!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2743                 outbound_drops
2744         }
2745
2746         /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2747         /// updates are partially paused.
2748         /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2749         /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2750         /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2751         /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2752         pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2753                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2754                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2755                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2756                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2757                 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2758                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2759                 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2760                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2761         }
2762
2763         /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2764         /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2765         /// to the remote side.
2766         pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
2767                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2768                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2769
2770                 let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound();
2771
2772                 // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
2773                 // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
2774                 // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
2775                 // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
2776                 // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
2777                 // monitor was persisted.
2778                 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2779                         assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
2780                         self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2781                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2782                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2783                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2784                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2785                         })
2786                 } else { None };
2787
2788                 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2789                 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2790                 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2791                 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2792
2793                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2794                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2795                         self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2796                         return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
2797                 }
2798
2799                 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2800                         Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2801                 } else { None };
2802                 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2803                         Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
2804                 } else { None };
2805
2806                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2807                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2808                 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2809                 log_trace!(logger, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2810                         if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
2811                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
2812                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2813                         match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2814                 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
2815         }
2816
2817         pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2818                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2819         {
2820                 if self.is_outbound() {
2821                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
2822                 }
2823                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2824                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2825                 }
2826                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2827                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw);
2828                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2829                 Ok(())
2830         }
2831
2832         fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2833                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2834                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2835                 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2836                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2837                         per_commitment_secret,
2838                         next_per_commitment_point,
2839                 }
2840         }
2841
2842         fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
2843                 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2844                 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2845                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2846                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2847
2848                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2849                         if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2850                                 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2851                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2852                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2853                                         amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2854                                         payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2855                                         cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2856                                         onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2857                                 });
2858                         }
2859                 }
2860
2861                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2862                         if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2863                                 match reason {
2864                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2865                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2866                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2867                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2868                                                         reason: err_packet.clone()
2869                                                 });
2870                                         },
2871                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2872                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2873                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2874                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2875                                                         sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2876                                                         failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2877                                                 });
2878                                         },
2879                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2880                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2881                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2882                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2883                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2884                                                 });
2885                                         },
2886                                 }
2887                         }
2888                 }
2889
2890                 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2891                                 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2892                 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2893                         update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2894                         update_fee: None,
2895                         commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2896                 }
2897         }
2898
2899         /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2900         /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2901         pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2902                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2903                         // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2904                         // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2905                         // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2906                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
2907                 }
2908
2909                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2910                         msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2911                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2912                 }
2913
2914                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
2915                         match msg.data_loss_protect {
2916                                 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
2917                                         let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2918                                         let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
2919                                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
2920                                         if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
2921                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
2922                                         }
2923                                         if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2924                                                 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
2925                                                         "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
2926                                                 ));
2927                                         }
2928                                 },
2929                                 OptionalField::Absent => {}
2930                         }
2931                 }
2932
2933                 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2934                 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2935                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2936
2937                 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2938                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2939                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2940                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2941                         })
2942                 } else { None };
2943
2944                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2945                         // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
2946                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
2947                                         self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2948                                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2949                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
2950                                 }
2951                                 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2952                                 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2953                         }
2954
2955                         // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2956                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2957                         return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2958                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2959                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2960                         }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2961                 }
2962
2963                 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2964                         // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2965                         // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2966                         None
2967                 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2968                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2969                                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2970                                 None
2971                         } else {
2972                                 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2973                         }
2974                 } else {
2975                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
2976                 };
2977
2978                 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2979                 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2980                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2981                 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2982                 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2983
2984                 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2985                         // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2986                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2987                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2988                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2989                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2990                         })
2991                 } else { None };
2992
2993                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
2994                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
2995                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2996                         } else {
2997                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2998                         }
2999
3000                         if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3001                                 // Note that if in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3002                                 // disconnect, this logic will need to be updated.
3003                                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3004                                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } = htlc_update {
3005                                                 debug_assert!(false, "There shouldn't be any add-HTLCs in the holding cell now because they should have been dropped on peer disconnect. Panic here because said HTLCs won't be handled correctly.");
3006                                         }
3007                                 }
3008
3009                                 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3010                                 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3011                                 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3012                                 // now!
3013                                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3014                                         Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3015                                         Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3016                                         Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3017                                                 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3018                                                 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3019                                                 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
3020                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3021                                         },
3022                                         Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3023                                                 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3024                                                 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3025                                                 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
3026                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3027                                         },
3028                                 }
3029                         } else {
3030                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3031                         }
3032                 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3033                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
3034                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3035                         } else {
3036                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3037                         }
3038
3039                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3040                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3041                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3042                         }
3043
3044                         return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3045                 } else {
3046                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3047                 }
3048         }
3049
3050         fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
3051                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3052         {
3053                 if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
3054                                 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
3055                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3056                         return None;
3057                 }
3058
3059                 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3060                 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
3061                         proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
3062                 }
3063                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3064                 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3065
3066                 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
3067                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3068                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3069                         .ok();
3070                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3071                 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
3072
3073                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
3074                 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3075                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3076                         fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3077                         signature: sig.unwrap(),
3078                 })
3079         }
3080
3081         pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3082                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3083         {
3084                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3085                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3086                 }
3087                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3088                         // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3089                         // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3090                         // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3091                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3092                 }
3093                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3094                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3095                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3096                         }
3097                 }
3098                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3099
3100                 if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, &msg.scriptpubkey) {
3101                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3102                 }
3103
3104                 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3105                         if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3106                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3107                         }
3108                 } else {
3109                         self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
3110                 }
3111
3112                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3113
3114                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3115                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3116
3117                 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3118                 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3119                 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3120                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3121                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3122                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3123                         match htlc_update {
3124                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3125                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3126                                         false
3127                                 },
3128                                 _ => true
3129                         }
3130                 });
3131                 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
3132                 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
3133                 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3134
3135                 let shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3136                         None
3137                 } else {
3138                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3139                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3140                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3141                         })
3142                 };
3143
3144                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3145                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3146
3147                 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3148         }
3149
3150         fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3151                 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3152                 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3153                 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3154
3155                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3156
3157                 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3158                 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3159                 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3160                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3161                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3162                 } else {
3163                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3164                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3165                 }
3166                 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3167                 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3168
3169                 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3170         }
3171
3172         pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3173                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3174         {
3175                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3176                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3177                 }
3178                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3179                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3180                 }
3181                 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3182                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3183                 }
3184                 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3185                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3186                 }
3187
3188                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3189                 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3190                 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3191                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3192                 }
3193                 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3194
3195                 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3196                         Ok(_) => {},
3197                         Err(_e) => {
3198                                 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3199                                 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3200                                 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3201                                 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3202                                 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3203                         },
3204                 };
3205
3206                 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3207                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3208                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3209                 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3210                         if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3211                                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3212                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3213                                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3214                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3215                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3216                                 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3217                         }
3218                 }
3219
3220                 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3221                         ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3222                                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3223                                 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3224                                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3225                                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3226                                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3227                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3228                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3229                                 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3230                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3231                                         fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3232                                         signature: sig,
3233                                 }), None))
3234                         }
3235                 }
3236
3237                 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3238                 if self.is_outbound() {
3239                         let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3240                         if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3241                                 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3242                                         if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3243                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3244                                         }
3245                                 }
3246                                 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3247                         }
3248                 } else {
3249                         min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3250                 }
3251                 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3252                         if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3253                                 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3254                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3255                                 }
3256                         }
3257                         propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3258                 }
3259
3260                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3261                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3262                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3263                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3264                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3265                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3266
3267                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3268                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3269
3270                 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3271                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3272                         fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3273                         signature: sig,
3274                 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3275         }
3276
3277         // Public utilities:
3278
3279         pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3280                 self.channel_id
3281         }
3282
3283         /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3284         /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3285         pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3286                 self.user_id
3287         }
3288
3289         /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3290         /// is_usable() returns true).
3291         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3292         pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3293                 self.short_channel_id
3294         }
3295
3296         /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3297         /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3298         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3299                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3300         }
3301
3302         fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3303                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3304         }
3305
3306         fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3307                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3308         }
3309
3310         fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3311                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().selected_contest_delay
3312         }
3313
3314         fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3315                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3316         }
3317
3318         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3319         pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3320                 self.counterparty_node_id
3321         }
3322
3323         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3324         #[cfg(test)]
3325         pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3326                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3327         }
3328
3329         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3330         pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3331                 return cmp::min(
3332                         // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3333                         // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3334                         // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3335                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
3336
3337                         Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3338                 );
3339         }
3340
3341         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3342         pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3343                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3344         }
3345
3346         pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3347                 self.channel_value_satoshis
3348         }
3349
3350         pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3351                 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
3352         }
3353
3354         pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
3355                 cmp::max(self.config.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
3356         }
3357
3358         #[cfg(test)]
3359         pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3360                 self.feerate_per_kw
3361         }
3362
3363         pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3364                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3365         }
3366
3367         pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3368                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3369         }
3370
3371         pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3372                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3373         }
3374
3375         #[cfg(test)]
3376         pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3377                 &self.holder_signer
3378         }
3379
3380         #[cfg(test)]
3381         pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3382                 ChannelValueStat {
3383                         value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3384                         channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3385                         channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
3386                         pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3387                         pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3388                         holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3389                                 let mut res = 0;
3390                                 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3391                                         match h {
3392                                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3393                                                         res += amount_msat;
3394                                                 }
3395                                                 _ => {}
3396                                         }
3397                                 }
3398                                 res
3399                         },
3400                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3401                         counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3402                 }
3403         }
3404
3405         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3406         pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3407                 self.update_time_counter
3408         }
3409
3410         pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3411                 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3412         }
3413
3414         pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3415                 self.config.announced_channel
3416         }
3417
3418         pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3419                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3420         }
3421
3422         /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3423         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3424         pub fn get_holder_fee_base_msat<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &F) -> u32
3425                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3426         {
3427                 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
3428                 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
3429
3430                 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
3431                 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
3432
3433                 if self.is_outbound() {
3434                         // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
3435                         res += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
3436                 }
3437
3438                 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
3439                 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) as u64 * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
3440
3441                 res as u32
3442         }
3443
3444         /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3445         pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3446                 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3447         }
3448
3449         /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3450         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3451         pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3452                 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3453                 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3454         }
3455
3456         /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3457         /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3458         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3459         pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3460                 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
3461         }
3462
3463         /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3464         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3465         pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3466                 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3467         }
3468
3469         /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3470         pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3471                 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3472         }
3473
3474         /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3475         /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3476         /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3477         pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3478                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32  {
3479                         assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3480                         true
3481                 } else { false }
3482         }
3483
3484         pub fn to_disabled_staged(&mut self) {
3485                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged;
3486         }
3487
3488         pub fn to_disabled_marked(&mut self) {
3489                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked;
3490         }
3491
3492         pub fn to_fresh(&mut self) {
3493                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::Fresh;
3494         }
3495
3496         pub fn is_disabled_staged(&self) -> bool {
3497                 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged
3498         }
3499
3500         pub fn is_disabled_marked(&self) -> bool {
3501                 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked
3502         }
3503
3504         fn check_get_funding_locked(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
3505                 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3506                         return None;
3507                 }
3508
3509                 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3510                 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
3511                         self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
3512                 }
3513
3514                 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth as i64 {
3515                         return None;
3516                 }
3517
3518                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3519                 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3520                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3521                         true
3522                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3523                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3524                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
3525                         true
3526                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3527                         // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3528                         false
3529                 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3530                         panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3531                 } else {
3532                         // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3533                         false
3534                 };
3535
3536                 if need_commitment_update {
3537                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3538                                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3539                                 return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3540                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3541                                         next_per_commitment_point,
3542                                 });
3543                         } else {
3544                                 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3545                         }
3546                 }
3547                 None
3548         }
3549
3550         /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
3551         /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
3552         /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
3553         pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData, logger: &L)
3554                         -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3555                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3556                 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3557                         if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3558                                 // If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring
3559                                 // whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one.
3560                                 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3561                                         if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
3562                                                 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
3563                                                 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3564                                                                 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3565                                                         if self.is_outbound() {
3566                                                                 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3567                                                                 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3568                                                                 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3569                                                                 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3570                                                                 // channel and move on.
3571                                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3572                                                                 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3573                                                         }
3574                                                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3575                                                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
3576                                                         return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3577                                                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3578                                                                 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index".to_owned()
3579                                                         });
3580                                                 } else {
3581                                                         if self.is_outbound() {
3582                                                                 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3583                                                                         if input.witness.is_empty() {
3584                                                                                 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3585                                                                                 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3586                                                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3587                                                                                 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3588                                                                         }
3589                                                                 }
3590                                                         }
3591                                                         self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height as u64;
3592                                                         self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
3593                                                         self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
3594                                                                 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
3595                                                                 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
3596                                                         }
3597                                                 }
3598                                         }
3599                                         // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for funding_locked here and
3600                                         // send it immediately instead of waiting for an update_best_block call (which
3601                                         // may have already happened for this block).
3602                                         if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3603                                                 return Ok(Some(funding_locked));
3604                                         }
3605                                 }
3606                                 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3607                                         if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3608                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3609                                                 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3610                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3611                                                         data: "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.".to_owned()
3612                                                 });
3613                                         }
3614                                 }
3615                         }
3616                 }
3617                 Ok(None)
3618         }
3619
3620         /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
3621         /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
3622         /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3623         /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3624         ///
3625         /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3626         /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3627         /// post-shutdown.
3628         ///
3629         /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3630         /// back.
3631         pub fn update_best_block(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3632                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3633                 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
3634                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3635                         match htlc_update {
3636                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3637                                         if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
3638                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3639                                                 false
3640                                         } else { true }
3641                                 },
3642                                 _ => true
3643                         }
3644                 });
3645
3646                 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
3647
3648                 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3649                         return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs));
3650                 }
3651
3652                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3653                 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
3654                    (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 {
3655                         let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3656                         if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3657                                 // Note that check_get_funding_locked may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
3658                                 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
3659                                 // indicate we've already sent a funding_locked
3660                                 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
3661                         }
3662
3663                         // If we've sent funding_locked (or have both sent and received funding_locked), and
3664                         // the funding transaction's confirmation count has dipped below minimum_depth / 2,
3665                         // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
3666                         // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
3667                         if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth as i64 / 2 {
3668                                 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3669                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3670                                         data: format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.", self.minimum_depth, funding_tx_confirmations),
3671                                 });
3672                         }
3673                 }
3674
3675                 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3676         }
3677
3678         // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3679         // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3680
3681         pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3682                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3683                         panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3684                 }
3685                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3686                         panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3687                 }
3688
3689                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3690                         panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3691                 }
3692
3693                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3694                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3695
3696                 msgs::OpenChannel {
3697                         chain_hash,
3698                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3699                         funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3700                         push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3701                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3702                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3703                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3704                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3705                         feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
3706                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3707                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3708                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3709                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3710                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3711                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3712                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3713                         first_per_commitment_point,
3714                         channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3715                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3716                 }
3717         }
3718
3719         pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3720                 if self.is_outbound() {
3721                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3722                 }
3723                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3724                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3725                 }
3726                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3727                         panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3728                 }
3729
3730                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3731                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3732
3733                 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3734                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3735                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3736                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3737                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3738                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3739                         minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3740                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3741                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3742                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3743                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3744                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3745                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3746                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3747                         first_per_commitment_point,
3748                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3749                 }
3750         }
3751
3752         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3753         fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3754                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3755                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
3756                 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3757                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
3758         }
3759
3760         /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3761         /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3762         /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3763         /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3764         /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3765         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3766         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3767         pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3768                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3769                         panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3770                 }
3771                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3772                         panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3773                 }
3774                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3775                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3776                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3777                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3778                 }
3779
3780                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
3781                 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
3782
3783                 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
3784                         Ok(res) => res,
3785                         Err(e) => {
3786                                 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3787                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3788                                 return Err(e);
3789                         }
3790                 };
3791
3792                 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3793
3794                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3795
3796                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3797                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3798
3799                 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
3800                         temporary_channel_id,
3801                         funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3802                         funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3803                         signature
3804                 })
3805         }
3806
3807         /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3808         /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3809         /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3810         /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3811         /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3812         /// closing).
3813         /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3814         /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3815         pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3816                 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3817                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
3818                 }
3819                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3820                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
3821                 }
3822                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3823                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
3824                 }
3825
3826                 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
3827
3828                 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3829                         features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3830                         chain_hash,
3831                         short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3832                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
3833                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
3834                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3835                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
3836                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3837                 };
3838
3839                 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3840                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
3841
3842                 Ok((msg, sig))
3843         }
3844
3845         /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3846         /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3847         pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
3848                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3849                 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3850                 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
3851                 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
3852                 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
3853                 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
3854                 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
3855                 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
3856                 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
3857                 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
3858                 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3859                         let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
3860                         log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
3861                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3862                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
3863                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
3864                         })
3865                 } else {
3866                         log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret");
3867                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3868                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
3869                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
3870                         })
3871                 };
3872                 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3873                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3874                         // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3875                         // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3876                         // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3877                         // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3878                         // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3879                         // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3880
3881                         // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3882                         // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3883                         next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
3884                         // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3885                         // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3886                         // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3887                         // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3888                         // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3889                         // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3890                         // overflow here.
3891                         next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3892                         data_loss_protect,
3893                 }
3894         }
3895
3896
3897         // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3898
3899         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3900         /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3901         /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3902         /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3903         /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3904         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3905         /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
3906         pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
3907                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3908                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
3909                 }
3910                 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
3911                 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
3912                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
3913                 }
3914
3915                 if amount_msat == 0 {
3916                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3917                 }
3918
3919                 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
3920                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
3921                 }
3922
3923                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3924                         // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3925                         // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3926                         // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3927                         // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3928                         // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3929                         // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3930                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update".to_owned()));
3931                 }
3932
3933                 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3934                 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3935                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3936                 }
3937                 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3938                 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3939                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3940                 }
3941
3942                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3943                         // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3944                         let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
3945                         let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
3946                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3947                         let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3948                         if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3949                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3950                         }
3951                 }
3952
3953                 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - htlc_outbound_value_msat;
3954                 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
3955                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
3956                 }
3957
3958                 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
3959                 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
3960                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3961                         2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
3962                 } else { 0 };
3963                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
3964                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
3965                 }
3966
3967                 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
3968                 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
3969                 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3970                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
3971                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
3972                 }
3973
3974                 // Now update local state:
3975                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3976                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3977                                 amount_msat,
3978                                 payment_hash,
3979                                 cltv_expiry,
3980                                 source,
3981                                 onion_routing_packet,
3982                         });
3983                         return Ok(None);
3984                 }
3985
3986                 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3987                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3988                         amount_msat,
3989                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3990                         cltv_expiry,
3991                         state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
3992                         source,
3993                 });
3994
3995                 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3996                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3997                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3998                         amount_msat,
3999                         payment_hash,
4000                         cltv_expiry,
4001                         onion_routing_packet,
4002                 };
4003                 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
4004
4005                 Ok(Some(res))
4006         }
4007
4008         /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
4009         /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
4010         /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
4011         /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
4012         pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4013                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4014                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
4015                 }
4016                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
4017                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
4018                 }
4019                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
4020                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4021                 }
4022                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
4023                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4024                 }
4025                 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
4026                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4027                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4028                                 have_updates = true;
4029                         }
4030                         if have_updates { break; }
4031                 }
4032                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4033                         if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4034                                 have_updates = true;
4035                         }
4036                         if have_updates { break; }
4037                 }
4038                 if !have_updates {
4039                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
4040                 }
4041                 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
4042         }
4043         /// Only fails in case of bad keys
4044         fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4045                 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4046                 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4047                 // is acceptable.
4048                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4049                         let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4050                                 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4051                         } else { None };
4052                         if let Some(state) = new_state {
4053                                 htlc.state = state;
4054                         }
4055                 }
4056                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4057                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4058                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
4059                         } else { None } {
4060                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4061                         }
4062                 }
4063                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4064
4065                 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4066                         Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4067                                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4068                                 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4069                                         htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4070                                 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4071                         },
4072                         Err(e) => return Err(e),
4073                 };
4074
4075                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4076                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4077                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4078                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4079                                 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4080                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4081                                 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4082                                 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4083                         }]
4084                 };
4085                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4086                 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4087         }
4088
4089         /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4090         /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4091         fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4092                 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4093                 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
4094                         if self.is_outbound() {
4095                                 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4096                         }
4097                 }
4098
4099                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4100                 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
4101                 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4102                 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4103
4104                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4105                 {
4106                         if !self.is_outbound() {
4107                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4108                                 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4109                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4110                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4111                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4112                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4113                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4114                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4115                                                         let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.1);
4116                                                         assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4117                                                 }
4118                                 }
4119                         }
4120                 }
4121
4122                 {
4123                         let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len());
4124                         for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
4125                                 htlcs.push(htlc);
4126                         }
4127
4128                         let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4129                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4130                         signature = res.0;
4131                         htlc_signatures = res.1;
4132
4133                         log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {}",
4134                                 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4135                                 &counterparty_commitment_txid,
4136                                 encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4137                                 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
4138
4139                         for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4140                                 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
4141                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4142                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4143                                         log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4144                                         log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
4145                         }
4146                 }
4147
4148                 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4149                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4150                         signature,
4151                         htlc_signatures,
4152                 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
4153         }
4154
4155         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4156         /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4157         /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4158         /// more info.
4159         pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4160                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4161                         Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4162                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4163                                 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4164                         },
4165                         None => Ok(None)
4166                 }
4167         }
4168
4169         /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
4170         pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
4171                 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
4172         }
4173
4174         pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4175                 let usable_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
4176                 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= usable_channel_value_msat {
4177                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
4178                 }
4179                 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4180                         fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
4181                         fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
4182                         cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
4183                 });
4184
4185                 Ok(())
4186         }
4187
4188         /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4189         /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4190         pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
4191                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4192                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4193                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4194                         }
4195                 }
4196                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4197                         if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4198                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4199                         }
4200                         else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4201                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4202                         }
4203                 }
4204                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4205                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4206                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4207                 }
4208
4209                 let closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
4210
4211                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4212                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4213                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4214                 } else {
4215                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4216                 }
4217                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4218
4219                 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4220                 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4221                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4222                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4223                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4224                         match htlc_update {
4225                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4226                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4227                                         false
4228                                 },
4229                                 _ => true
4230                         }
4231                 });
4232
4233                 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
4234                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4235                         scriptpubkey: closing_script,
4236                 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4237         }
4238
4239         /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4240         /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4241         /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4242         /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4243         /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4244         pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4245                 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
4246                 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
4247                 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
4248                 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4249                 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4250
4251                 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4252                 // return them to fail the payment.
4253                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4254                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4255                         match htlc_update {
4256                                 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4257                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4258                                 },
4259                                 _ => {}
4260                         }
4261                 }
4262                 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4263                         // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4264                         // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4265                         // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4266                         // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4267                         // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4268                         // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4269                         // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4270                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4271                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4272                                 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4273                                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4274                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4275                                 }))
4276                         } else { None }
4277                 } else { None };
4278
4279                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4280                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4281                 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4282         }
4283 }
4284
4285 fn is_unsupported_shutdown_script(their_features: &InitFeatures, script: &Script) -> bool {
4286         // We restrain shutdown scripts to standards forms to avoid transactions not propagating on the p2p tx-relay network
4287
4288         // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms,
4289         // which for a a BIP-141-compliant witness program is at max 42 bytes in length.
4290         // So don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
4291         let is_script_too_long = script.len() > 42;
4292         if is_script_too_long {
4293                 return true;
4294         }
4295
4296         if their_features.supports_shutdown_anysegwit() && script.is_witness_program() && script.as_bytes()[0] != OP_PUSHBYTES_0.into_u8() {
4297                 return false;
4298         }
4299
4300         return !script.is_p2pkh() && !script.is_p2sh() && !script.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !script.is_v0_p2wsh()
4301 }
4302
4303 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4304 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4305
4306 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4307         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4308                 match self {
4309                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
4310                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
4311                                 error_packet.write(writer)?;
4312                         },
4313                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
4314                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4315                                 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
4316                                 err_code.write(writer)?;
4317                         },
4318                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4319                                 2u8.write(writer)?;
4320                                 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4321                         },
4322                 }
4323                 Ok(())
4324         }
4325 }
4326
4327 impl Readable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4328         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4329                 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4330                         0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
4331                         1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4332                         2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
4333                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4334                 })
4335         }
4336 }
4337
4338 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4339         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4340                 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4341                 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
4342
4343                 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4344                 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4345
4346                 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4347                 self.config.write(writer)?;
4348
4349                 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4350                 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4351                 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4352
4353                 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4354
4355                 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4356                 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
4357                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::usize::MAX);
4358                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::u32::MAX as usize);
4359                 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4360                 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
4361
4362                 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4363                 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4364
4365                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4366                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4367                 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4368
4369                 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4370                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4371                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4372                                 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4373                         }
4374                 }
4375                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4376                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4377                         if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4378                                 continue; // Drop
4379                         }
4380                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4381                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4382                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4383                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4384                         match &htlc.state {
4385                                 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4386                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4387                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4388                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4389                                 },
4390                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4391                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4392                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4393                                 },
4394                                 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4395                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4396                                 },
4397                                 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4398                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4399                                         removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4400                                 },
4401                         }
4402                 }
4403
4404                 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4405                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4406                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4407                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4408                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4409                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4410                         htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4411                         match &htlc.state {
4412                                 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4413                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4414                                         onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4415                                 },
4416                                 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4417                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4418                                 },
4419                                 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
4420                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4421                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4422                                 },
4423                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4424                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4425                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4426                                 },
4427                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4428                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4429                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4430                                 },
4431                         }
4432                 }
4433
4434                 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4435                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4436                         match update {
4437                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4438                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4439                                         amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4440                                         cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4441                                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4442                                         source.write(writer)?;
4443                                         onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4444                                 },
4445                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4446                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4447                                         payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4448                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4449                                 },
4450                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4451                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4452                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4453                                         err_packet.write(writer)?;
4454                                 }
4455                         }
4456                 }
4457
4458                 match self.resend_order {
4459                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4460                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4461                 }
4462
4463                 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4464                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4465                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4466
4467                 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4468                 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4469                         pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4470                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4471                 }
4472
4473                 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4474                 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4475                         htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4476                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4477                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4478                 }
4479
4480                 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4481                 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4482
4483                 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4484                 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4485                 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4486                 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4487
4488                 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4489                         Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4490                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4491                                 feerate.write(writer)?;
4492                                 fee.write(writer)?;
4493                                 sig.write(writer)?;
4494                         },
4495                         None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4496                 }
4497
4498                 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4499                 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
4500                 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4501
4502                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4503                 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4504                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4505                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4506                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4507                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4508                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4509                 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
4510
4511                 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
4512                         Some(info) => {
4513                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4514                                 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
4515                                 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4516                                 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4517                         },
4518                         None => 0u8.write(writer)?
4519                 }
4520
4521                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
4522                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4523
4524                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4525                 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
4526
4527                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4528
4529                 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4530                 Ok(())
4531         }
4532 }
4533
4534 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4535 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
4536                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4537         fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4538                 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4539                 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4540                 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4541                         return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4542                 }
4543
4544                 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4545                 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
4546
4547                 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4548                 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4549                 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4550
4551                 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4552
4553                 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4554                 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
4555                 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
4556                         // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
4557                         let mut data = [0; 1024];
4558                         let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
4559                         reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
4560                         keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
4561                 }
4562                 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
4563
4564                 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4565                 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4566
4567                 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4568                 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4569                 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4570
4571                 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4572                 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4573                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
4574                         pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4575                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4576                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4577                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4578                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4579                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4580                                         1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4581                                         2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4582                                         3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4583                                         4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4584                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4585                                 },
4586                         });
4587                 }
4588
4589                 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4590                 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4591                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4592                         pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4593                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4594                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4595                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4596                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4597                                 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4598                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4599                                         0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4600                                         1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4601                                         2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4602                                         3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4603                                         4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4604                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4605                                 },
4606                         });
4607                 }
4608
4609                 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4610                 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4611                 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4612                         holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4613                                 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4614                                         amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4615                                         cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4616                                         payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4617                                         source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4618                                         onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4619                                 },
4620                                 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4621                                         payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4622                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4623                                 },
4624                                 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4625                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4626                                         err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4627                                 },
4628                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4629                         });
4630                 }
4631
4632                 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4633                         0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4634                         1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4635                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4636                 };
4637
4638                 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4639                 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4640                 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4641
4642                 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4643                 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4644                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4645                         monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4646                 }
4647
4648                 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4649                 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4650                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4651                         monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4652                 }
4653
4654                 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4655                 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4656
4657                 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4658                 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4659                 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
4660                 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4661
4662                 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4663                         0 => None,
4664                         1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4665                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4666                 };
4667
4668                 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4669                 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
4670                 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4671
4672                 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4673                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4674                 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4675                 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4676                 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4677                 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4678                 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
4679                 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
4680
4681                 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4682                         0 => None,
4683                         1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4684                                 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4685                                 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
4686                                 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
4687                         }),
4688                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4689                 };
4690
4691                 let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
4692                 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4693
4694                 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4695                 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4696
4697                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4698                 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4699
4700                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4701                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
4702
4703                 Ok(Channel {
4704                         user_id,
4705
4706                         config,
4707                         channel_id,
4708                         channel_state,
4709                         secp_ctx,
4710                         channel_value_satoshis,
4711
4712                         latest_monitor_update_id,
4713
4714                         holder_signer,
4715                         shutdown_pubkey,
4716                         destination_script,
4717
4718                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4719                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4720                         value_to_self_msat,
4721
4722                         pending_inbound_htlcs,
4723                         pending_outbound_htlcs,
4724                         holding_cell_htlc_updates,
4725
4726                         resend_order,
4727
4728                         monitor_pending_funding_locked,
4729                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
4730                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
4731                         monitor_pending_forwards,
4732                         monitor_pending_failures,
4733
4734                         pending_update_fee,
4735                         holding_cell_update_fee,
4736                         next_holder_htlc_id,
4737                         next_counterparty_htlc_id,
4738                         update_time_counter,
4739                         feerate_per_kw,
4740
4741                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4742                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4743                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4744                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4745
4746                         last_sent_closing_fee,
4747
4748                         funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4749                         funding_tx_confirmation_height,
4750                         short_channel_id,
4751
4752                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
4753                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4754                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4755                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4756                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
4757                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4758                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
4759                         minimum_depth,
4760
4761                         counterparty_forwarding_info,
4762
4763                         channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
4764                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
4765
4766                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
4767                         counterparty_node_id,
4768
4769                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4770
4771                         commitment_secrets,
4772
4773                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
4774
4775                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4776                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4777                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4778                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4779                 })
4780         }
4781 }
4782
4783 #[cfg(test)]
4784 mod tests {
4785         use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4786         use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4787         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4788         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
4789         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4790         use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4791         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4792         use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4793         use hex;
4794         use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4795         use ln::channel::{Channel,Sign,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
4796         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4797         use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4798         use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
4799         use ln::chan_utils;
4800         use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
4801         use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4802         use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface};
4803         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4804         use util::config::UserConfig;
4805         use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
4806         use util::test_utils;
4807         use util::logger::Logger;
4808         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
4809         use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
4810         use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4811         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4812         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4813         use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
4814         use std::sync::Arc;
4815
4816         struct TestFeeEstimator {
4817                 fee_est: u32
4818         }
4819         impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4820                 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
4821                         self.fee_est
4822                 }
4823         }
4824
4825         #[test]
4826         fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4827                 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4828                         "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4829         }
4830
4831         struct Keys {
4832                 signer: InMemorySigner,
4833         }
4834         impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4835                 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
4836
4837                 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4838                 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4839                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4840                         let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4841                         let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4842                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4843                 }
4844
4845                 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4846                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4847                         let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4848                         PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4849                 }
4850
4851                 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
4852                         self.signer.clone()
4853                 }
4854                 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4855                 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
4856         }
4857
4858         fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
4859                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
4860         }
4861
4862         // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
4863         // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
4864         #[test]
4865         fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
4866                 let original_fee = 253;
4867                 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
4868                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4869                 let seed = [42; 32];
4870                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4871                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4872
4873                 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4874                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4875                 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4876
4877                 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
4878                 // same as the old fee.
4879                 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
4880                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4881                 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
4882         }
4883
4884         #[test]
4885         fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
4886                 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
4887                 // dust limits are used.
4888                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4889                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4890                 let seed = [42; 32];
4891                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4892                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4893
4894                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
4895                 // they have different dust limits.
4896
4897                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
4898                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4899                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4900                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4901
4902                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4903                 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
4904                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4905                 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis, 1560);
4906                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4907                 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
4908
4909                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
4910                 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4911                 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
4912                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
4913
4914                 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
4915                 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
4916                 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4917                         htlc_id: 0,
4918                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
4919                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
4920                         cltv_expiry: 300000000,
4921                         state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4922                 });
4923
4924                 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4925                         htlc_id: 1,
4926                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
4927                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
4928                         cltv_expiry: 200000000,
4929                         state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4930                         source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4931                                 path: Vec::new(),
4932                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4933                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
4934                         }
4935                 });
4936
4937                 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
4938                 // the dust limit check.
4939                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4940                 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4941                 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
4942                 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
4943
4944                 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
4945                 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
4946                 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
4947                 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
4948                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4949                 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4950                 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
4951         }
4952
4953         #[test]
4954         fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
4955                 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
4956                 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
4957                 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
4958                 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
4959                 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
4960                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4961                 let seed = [42; 32];
4962                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4963                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4964
4965                 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4966                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4967                 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4968
4969                 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
4970                 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
4971
4972                 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
4973                 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
4974                 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
4975                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4976                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4977                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
4978
4979                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
4980                 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
4981                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4982                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4983                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
4984
4985                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
4986
4987                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
4988                 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
4989                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4990                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4991                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
4992
4993                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
4994                 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
4995                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4996                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4997                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
4998         }
4999
5000         #[test]
5001         fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
5002                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5003                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5004                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5005                 let seed = [42; 32];
5006                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5007                 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5008                 let last_block_hash = chain_hash;
5009                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5010
5011                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
5012
5013                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5014                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5015                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5016                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5017
5018                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5019                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
5020                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5021                 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5022
5023                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
5024                 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5025                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5026
5027                 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
5028                 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5029                 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5030                         value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
5031                 }]};
5032                 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
5033                 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
5034                 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, last_block_hash, &&logger).unwrap();
5035
5036                 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
5037                 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, last_block_hash, &&logger);
5038
5039                 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
5040                 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
5041                 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5042                 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5043                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5044                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5045                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5046                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5047                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5048                         },
5049                         _ => panic!()
5050                 }
5051
5052                 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
5053                 // is sane.
5054                 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5055                 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5056                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5057                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5058                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5059                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5060                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5061                         },
5062                         _ => panic!()
5063                 }
5064         }
5065
5066         #[test]
5067         fn channel_update() {
5068                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5069                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5070                 let seed = [42; 32];
5071                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5072                 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5073                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5074
5075                 // Create a channel.
5076                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5077                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5078                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5079                 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
5080                 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
5081                 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
5082
5083                 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
5084                 let update = ChannelUpdate {
5085                         contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
5086                                 chain_hash,
5087                                 short_channel_id: 0,
5088                                 timestamp: 0,
5089                                 flags: 0,
5090                                 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
5091                                 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
5092                                 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
5093                                 fee_base_msat: 110,
5094                                 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
5095                                 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5096                         },
5097                         signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
5098                 };
5099                 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
5100
5101                 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
5102                 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
5103                 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
5104                 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
5105                         Some(info) => {
5106                                 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
5107                                 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
5108                                 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
5109                         },
5110                         None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
5111                 }
5112         }
5113
5114         #[test]
5115         fn outbound_commitment_test() {
5116                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
5117                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5118                 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
5119                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5120
5121                 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
5122                         &secp_ctx,
5123                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5124                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5125                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5126                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5127                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5128
5129                         // These aren't set in the test vectors:
5130                         [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
5131                         10_000_000,
5132                         [0; 32]
5133                 );
5134
5135                 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5136                                 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
5137                 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
5138
5139                 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5140                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
5141                 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
5142                 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
5143                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5144
5145                 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
5146
5147                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5148                         funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5149                         revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5150                         payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
5151                         delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5152                         htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
5153                 };
5154                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5155                         CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5156                                 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5157                                 selected_contest_delay: 144
5158                         });
5159                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5160                 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5161
5162                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5163                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5164
5165                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5166                            hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5167
5168                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5169                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5170
5171                 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5172                 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5173                 // build_commitment_transaction.
5174                 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5175                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5176                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5177                 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5178                 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5179
5180                 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5181                         ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5182                                 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5183                         } ) => { {
5184                                 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
5185                                         let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
5186
5187                                         let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
5188                                                 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
5189                                                 .collect();
5190                                         (res.0, htlcs)
5191                                 };
5192                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
5193                                 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
5194                                 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5195                                 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5196                                 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
5197                                 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
5198
5199                                 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
5200                                 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5201                                 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
5202                                 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5203                                 $({
5204                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5205                                         per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
5206                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
5207                                 })*
5208                                 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
5209
5210                                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
5211                                         commitment_tx.clone(),
5212                                         counterparty_signature,
5213                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs,
5214                                         &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
5215                                         chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
5216                                 );
5217                                 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
5218                                 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
5219
5220                                 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5221                                 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
5222                                 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
5223
5224                                 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
5225                                 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
5226
5227                                 $({
5228                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5229
5230                                         let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
5231                                         let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
5232                                         let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
5233                                         let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
5234                                         secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
5235
5236                                         let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5237                                         if !htlc.offered {
5238                                                 for i in 0..5 {
5239                                                         let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
5240                                                         if out == htlc.payment_hash {
5241                                                                 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
5242                                                         }
5243                                                 }
5244
5245                                                 assert!(preimage.is_some());
5246                                         }
5247
5248                                         let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
5249                                         assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
5250
5251                                         let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5252                                         assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
5253                                         let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
5254                                         let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
5255                                         let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
5256                                         assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
5257                                                         hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
5258                                 })*
5259                                 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
5260                         } }
5261                 }
5262
5263                 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
5264                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
5265
5266                 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
5267                                                  "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
5268                                                  "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", {});
5269
5270                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5271                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5272                                 htlc_id: 0,
5273                                 amount_msat: 1000000,
5274                                 cltv_expiry: 500,
5275                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5276                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5277                         };
5278                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
5279                         out
5280                 });
5281                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5282                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5283                                 htlc_id: 1,
5284                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5285                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
5286                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5287                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5288                         };
5289                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5290                         out
5291                 });
5292                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5293                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5294                                 htlc_id: 2,
5295                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5296                                 cltv_expiry: 502,
5297                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5298                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5299                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5300                         };
5301                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
5302                         out
5303                 });
5304                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5305                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5306                                 htlc_id: 3,
5307                                 amount_msat: 3000000,
5308                                 cltv_expiry: 503,
5309                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5310                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5311                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5312                         };
5313                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
5314                         out
5315                 });
5316                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5317                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5318                                 htlc_id: 4,
5319                                 amount_msat: 4000000,
5320                                 cltv_expiry: 504,
5321                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5322                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5323                         };
5324                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
5325                         out
5326                 });
5327
5328                 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5329                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5330                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
5331
5332                 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
5333                                  "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
5334                                  "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", {
5335
5336                                   { 0,
5337                                   "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
5338                                   "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
5339                                   "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" },
5340
5341                                   { 1,
5342                                   "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
5343                                   "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
5344                                   "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
5345
5346                                   { 2,
5347                                   "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
5348                                   "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
5349                                   "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" },
5350
5351                                   { 3,
5352                                   "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
5353                                   "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
5354                                   "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" },
5355
5356                                   { 4,
5357                                   "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
5358                                   "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
5359                                   "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" }
5360                 } );
5361
5362                 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5363                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5364                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
5365
5366                 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
5367                                  "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
5368                                  "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", {
5369
5370                                   { 0,
5371                                   "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
5372                                   "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
5373                                   "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" },
5374
5375                                   { 1,
5376                                   "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
5377                                   "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
5378                                   "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" },
5379
5380                                   { 2,
5381                                   "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
5382                                   "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
5383                                   "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" },
5384
5385                                   { 3,
5386                                   "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
5387                                   "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
5388                                   "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" },
5389
5390                                   { 4,
5391                                   "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
5392                                   "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
5393                                   "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" }
5394                 } );
5395
5396                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5397                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5398                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
5399
5400                 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
5401                                  "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
5402                                  "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", {
5403
5404                                   { 0,
5405                                   "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
5406                                   "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
5407                                   "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" },
5408
5409                                   { 1,
5410                                   "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
5411                                   "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
5412                                   "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" },
5413
5414                                   { 2,
5415                                   "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
5416                                   "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
5417                                   "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" },
5418
5419                                   { 3,
5420                                   "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
5421                                   "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
5422                                   "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" }
5423                 } );
5424
5425                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5426                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5427                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
5428
5429                 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
5430                                  "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
5431                                  "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", {
5432
5433                                   { 0,
5434                                   "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
5435                                   "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
5436                                   "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" },
5437
5438                                   { 1,
5439                                   "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
5440                                   "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
5441                                   "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" },
5442
5443                                   { 2,
5444                                   "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
5445                                   "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
5446                                   "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" },
5447
5448                                   { 3,
5449                                   "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
5450                                   "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
5451                                   "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" }
5452                 } );
5453
5454                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5455                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5456                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
5457
5458                 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
5459                                  "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
5460                                  "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", {
5461
5462                                   { 0,
5463                                   "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
5464                                   "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
5465                                   "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" },
5466
5467                                   { 1,
5468                                   "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
5469                                   "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
5470                                   "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" },
5471
5472                                   { 2,
5473                                   "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
5474                                   "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
5475                                   "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" }
5476                 } );
5477
5478                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5479                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5480                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
5481
5482                 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
5483                                  "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
5484                                  "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", {
5485
5486                                   { 0,
5487                                   "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
5488                                   "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
5489                                   "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" },
5490
5491                                   { 1,
5492                                   "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
5493                                   "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
5494                                   "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd010000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a001483045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b7701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
5495
5496                                   { 2,
5497                                   "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
5498                                   "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
5499                                   "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" }
5500                 } );
5501
5502                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5503                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5504                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
5505
5506                 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
5507                                  "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
5508                                  "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", {
5509
5510                                   { 0,
5511                                   "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
5512                                   "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
5513                                   "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" },
5514
5515                                   { 1,
5516                                   "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
5517                                   "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
5518                                   "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" }
5519                 } );
5520
5521                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5522                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5523                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
5524
5525                 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
5526                                  "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
5527                                  "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", {
5528
5529                                   { 0,
5530                                   "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
5531                                   "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
5532                                   "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" },
5533
5534                                   { 1,
5535                                   "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
5536                                   "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
5537                                   "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0100000000000000000176050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb58170147304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5538                 } );
5539
5540                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5541                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5542                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
5543
5544                 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
5545                                  "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
5546                                  "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", {
5547
5548                                   { 0,
5549                                   "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
5550                                   "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
5551                                   "0200000000010120060e4a29579d429f0f27c17ee5f1ee282f20d706d6f90b63d35946d8f3029a0000000000000000000175050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a01483045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5552                 } );
5553
5554                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5555                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5556                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
5557
5558                 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
5559                                  "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
5560                                  "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", {
5561
5562                                   { 0,
5563                                   "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
5564                                   "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
5565                                   "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" }
5566                 } );
5567
5568                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5569                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5570                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
5571
5572                 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
5573                                  "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
5574                                  "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", {});
5575
5576                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5577                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5578                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
5579
5580                 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
5581                                  "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
5582                                  "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", {});
5583
5584                 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5585                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5586                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
5587
5588                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5589                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5590                                  "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", {});
5591
5592                 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
5593                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5594                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
5595
5596                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5597                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5598                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
5599
5600                 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
5601                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
5602                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
5603                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
5604                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5605                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5606                                 htlc_id: 1,
5607                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5608                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
5609                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5610                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5611                         };
5612                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5613                         out
5614                 });
5615                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
5616                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5617                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5618                                 htlc_id: 6,
5619                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
5620                                 cltv_expiry: 506,
5621                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5622                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5623                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5624                         };
5625                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5626                         out
5627                 });
5628                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5629                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5630                                 htlc_id: 5,
5631                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
5632                                 cltv_expiry: 505,
5633                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5634                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5635                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5636                         };
5637                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5638                         out
5639                 });
5640
5641                 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
5642                                  "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
5643                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2d8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121b8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121bc0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484a79f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f014730440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df901475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
5644
5645                                   { 0,
5646                                   "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
5647                                   "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
5648                                   "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" },
5649                                   { 1,
5650                                   "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
5651                                   "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
5652                                   "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" },
5653                                   { 2,
5654                                   "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
5655                                   "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
5656                                   "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" }
5657                 } );
5658         }
5659
5660         #[test]
5661         fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
5662                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
5663
5664                 let mut seed = [0; 32];
5665                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
5666                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5667                            hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
5668
5669                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
5670                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5671                            hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
5672
5673                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
5674                            hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
5675
5676                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
5677                            hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
5678
5679                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
5680                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
5681                            hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
5682         }
5683
5684         #[test]
5685         fn test_key_derivation() {
5686                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
5687                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5688
5689                 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5690                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5691
5692                 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
5693                 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
5694
5695                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5696                 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
5697
5698                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5699                                 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
5700
5701                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5702                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5703
5704                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5705                                 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
5706
5707                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5708                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5709         }
5710 }