1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
4 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
5 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
7 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
9 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
10 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
12 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
14 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
15 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
18 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
20 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
21 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
23 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, LocalCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys};
25 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
26 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
27 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
28 use util::transaction_utils;
29 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
30 use util::logger::{Logger, LogHolder};
31 use util::errors::APIError;
32 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
35 use std::default::Default;
36 use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
40 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
41 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
42 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
43 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
44 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
45 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
46 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
47 pub their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
50 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
51 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
52 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
53 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
56 enum InboundHTLCState {
57 /// Added by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx.
58 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
59 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
60 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
61 /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
62 /// We also have not yet included this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on
63 /// a remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
64 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
65 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
66 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
67 /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
68 /// We have included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
70 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
72 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
73 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
75 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
76 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
77 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
78 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
79 /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
80 /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
81 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info will not include this HTLC.
82 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
85 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
89 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
90 state: InboundHTLCState,
93 enum OutboundHTLCState {
94 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
95 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
96 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
97 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
98 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
99 /// money back (though we won't), and,
100 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
101 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
102 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
103 /// we'll never get out of sync).
104 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
105 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
106 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
108 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
109 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
110 RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
111 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
112 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
113 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
114 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
115 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
116 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
117 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
118 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
119 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
120 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
121 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
122 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
125 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
129 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
130 state: OutboundHTLCState,
134 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
135 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
136 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
140 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
142 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
145 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
150 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
154 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
155 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
156 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
157 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
158 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
159 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
160 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
162 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
163 OurInitSent = (1 << 0),
164 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
165 TheirInitSent = (1 << 1),
166 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
167 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
168 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
170 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
171 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
172 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
174 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
175 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
176 TheirFundingLocked = (1 << 4),
177 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
178 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
179 OurFundingLocked = (1 << 5),
181 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
182 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
184 PeerDisconnected = (1 << 7),
185 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
186 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
187 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
188 MonitorUpdateFailed = (1 << 8),
189 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
190 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
191 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
192 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
194 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
195 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = (1 << 9),
196 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
197 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
198 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
199 RemoteShutdownSent = (1 << 10),
200 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
201 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
202 /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
203 /// us their shutdown.
204 LocalShutdownSent = (1 << 11),
205 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
206 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
207 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
209 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32);
210 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
212 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
214 /// Liveness is called to fluctuate given peer disconnecton/monitor failures/closing.
215 /// If channel is public, network should have a liveness view announced by us on a
216 /// best-effort, which means we may filter out some status transitions to avoid spam.
217 /// See further timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
220 /// Status has been gossiped.
222 /// Status has been changed.
224 /// Status has been marked to be gossiped at next flush
228 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
229 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
230 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
232 pub(super) struct Channel<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
233 config: ChannelConfig,
237 channel_id: [u8; 32],
239 channel_outbound: bool,
240 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
241 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
243 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
246 local_keys: ChanSigner,
248 pub(super) local_keys: ChanSigner,
249 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
251 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
252 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
253 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
255 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
256 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
257 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
258 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
259 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
260 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
262 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
263 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
264 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
265 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
266 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
267 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
269 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
271 monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
272 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
273 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
274 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
275 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
277 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
278 // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
279 // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
281 // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
282 // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
283 // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
284 // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
285 // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
286 // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
287 // commitment_signed.
288 pending_update_fee: Option<u64>,
289 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
290 // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
291 // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
292 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
293 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u64>,
294 next_local_htlc_id: u64,
295 next_remote_htlc_id: u64,
296 channel_update_count: u32,
299 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
300 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
301 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
302 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
303 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
304 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
306 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, our_sig)
308 funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
310 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
311 /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
312 /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
313 /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
314 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<Sha256dHash>,
315 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
316 /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
317 /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
318 pub(super) last_block_connected: Sha256dHash,
319 funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
321 their_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
323 pub(super) our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
325 our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
327 pub(super) their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
329 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
330 //get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
331 /// minimum channel reserve for **self** to maintain - set by them.
332 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
333 //get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(): u64,
334 their_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
335 our_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
336 their_to_self_delay: u16,
337 our_to_self_delay: u16,
339 pub their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
341 their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
342 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: our_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
345 their_pubkeys: Option<ChannelPublicKeys>,
347 their_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
349 their_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
350 their_node_id: PublicKey,
352 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
354 channel_monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
355 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
357 network_sync: UpdateStatus,
362 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
363 /// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
364 /// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
365 /// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
366 const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
367 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
368 const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
371 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
373 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
375 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
377 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
379 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
381 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = (1 << 24);
383 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
384 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
385 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
386 pub(super) enum ChannelError<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
387 Ignore(&'static str),
389 CloseDelayBroadcast {
391 update: Option<ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
395 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> fmt::Debug for ChannelError<ChanSigner> {
396 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
398 &ChannelError::Ignore(e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
399 &ChannelError::Close(e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
400 &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", msg)
405 macro_rules! secp_check {
406 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
409 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
414 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> Channel<ChanSigner> {
415 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
416 fn get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
417 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
420 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value **they** need to maintain
422 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
423 pub(crate) fn get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
424 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
425 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
428 fn derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u64) -> u64 {
429 cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
432 fn derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(_at_open_channel_feerate_per_kw: u64) -> u64 {
437 pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, APIError> {
438 let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false, channel_value_satoshis);
440 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
441 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "funding value > 2^24"});
444 if push_msat > channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
445 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "push value > channel value"});
447 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
448 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"});
452 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
453 if Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
454 return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
457 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
459 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
460 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(chan_keys.clone(),
461 chan_keys.funding_key(), chan_keys.revocation_base_key(), chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key(),
462 chan_keys.htlc_base_key(), chan_keys.payment_base_key(), &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
463 keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
467 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
469 channel_id: keys_provider.get_channel_id(),
470 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
471 channel_outbound: true,
473 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
475 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
477 local_keys: chan_keys,
478 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
479 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
480 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
481 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
483 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
484 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
485 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
486 pending_update_fee: None,
487 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
488 next_local_htlc_id: 0,
489 next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
490 channel_update_count: 1,
492 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
494 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
495 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
496 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
497 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
498 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
500 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
501 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
502 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
503 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
505 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
508 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
509 short_channel_id: None,
510 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
511 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
513 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
514 their_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
515 our_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
516 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
517 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
518 their_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
519 our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(feerate),
520 their_to_self_delay: 0,
521 our_to_self_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
522 their_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
523 minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
526 their_cur_commitment_point: None,
528 their_prev_commitment_point: None,
529 their_node_id: their_node_id,
531 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
533 channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
534 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
536 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
542 fn check_remote_fee(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
543 if (feerate_per_kw as u64) < fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) {
544 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too low"));
546 if (feerate_per_kw as u64) > fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) * 2 {
547 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too high"));
552 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
553 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
554 pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>, their_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
555 let mut chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
556 let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
557 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
558 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
559 payment_basepoint: msg.payment_basepoint,
560 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
561 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
563 chan_keys.set_remote_channel_pubkeys(&their_pubkeys);
564 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
566 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
567 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"));
570 // Check sanity of message fields:
571 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
572 return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding value > 2^24"));
574 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
575 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
577 if msg.push_msat > (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
578 return Err(ChannelError::Close("push_msat larger than funding value"));
580 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
581 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
583 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
584 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus; channel reserve is less than dust limit"));
586 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
587 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
589 Channel::<ChanSigner>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
591 if msg.to_self_delay > config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay || msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
592 return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
594 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
595 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
597 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
598 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accpted_htlcs > 483"));
601 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
602 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
603 return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
605 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
606 return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
608 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
609 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
611 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
612 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
614 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
615 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
617 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
618 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
620 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
621 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
624 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
626 let their_announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
627 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
628 if local_config.announced_channel != their_announce {
629 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours"));
632 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
633 local_config.announced_channel = their_announce;
635 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
637 let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
638 let our_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
639 if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
640 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Suitable channel reserve not found. aborting"));
642 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
643 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel_reserve_satoshis too small"));
645 if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
646 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit too high for our channel reserve"));
649 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
650 // for full fee payment
651 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
652 if funders_amount_msat < background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT {
653 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
656 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
657 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
658 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= our_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
659 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
662 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
663 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(chan_keys.clone(),
664 chan_keys.funding_key(), chan_keys.revocation_base_key(), chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key(),
665 chan_keys.htlc_base_key(), chan_keys.payment_base_key(), &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
666 keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
668 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
669 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
670 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
671 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
672 if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
674 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
675 } else if script.len() == 0 {
677 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
679 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format"));
682 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
683 &OptionalField::Absent => {
684 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out"));
689 let mut chan = Channel {
691 config: local_config,
693 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
694 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
695 channel_outbound: false,
698 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
700 local_keys: chan_keys,
701 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
702 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
703 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
704 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
706 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
707 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
708 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
709 pending_update_fee: None,
710 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
711 next_local_htlc_id: 0,
712 next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
713 channel_update_count: 1,
715 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
717 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
718 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
719 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
720 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
721 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
723 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
724 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
725 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
726 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
728 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
731 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
732 short_channel_id: None,
733 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
734 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
736 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw as u64,
737 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
738 their_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
739 our_dust_limit_satoshis: our_dust_limit_satoshis,
740 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
741 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
742 their_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
743 our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64),
744 their_to_self_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
745 our_to_self_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
746 their_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
747 minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
749 their_pubkeys: Some(their_pubkeys),
750 their_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
752 their_prev_commitment_point: None,
753 their_node_id: their_node_id,
755 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
757 channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
758 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
760 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
765 let obscure_factor = chan.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
766 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
767 chan.channel_monitor.set_basic_channel_info(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint, msg.to_self_delay, funding_redeemscript, msg.funding_satoshis, obscure_factor);
772 // Utilities to derive keys:
774 fn build_local_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> SecretKey {
775 let res = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed(), idx);
776 SecretKey::from_slice(&res).unwrap()
779 // Utilities to build transactions:
781 fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
782 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
783 let our_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.payment_base_key());
785 let their_payment_basepoint = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().payment_basepoint.serialize();
786 if self.channel_outbound {
787 sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
788 sha.input(their_payment_basepoint);
790 sha.input(their_payment_basepoint);
791 sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
793 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
795 ((res[26] as u64) << 5*8) |
796 ((res[27] as u64) << 4*8) |
797 ((res[28] as u64) << 3*8) |
798 ((res[29] as u64) << 2*8) |
799 ((res[30] as u64) << 1*8) |
800 ((res[31] as u64) << 0*8)
803 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
804 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
805 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
806 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
807 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
809 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
810 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
811 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
812 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
813 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
814 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
815 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
816 /// Returns (the transaction built, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
817 /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
818 /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
819 /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
821 fn build_commitment_transaction(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> (Transaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) {
822 let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
825 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
827 previous_output: self.funding_txo.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
828 script_sig: Script::new(),
829 sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
835 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2);
836 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
838 let dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.our_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.their_dust_limit_satoshis };
839 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
840 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
841 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
843 log_trace!(self, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
845 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
846 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
847 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
849 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
850 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
851 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
852 transaction_output_index: None
857 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
858 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
859 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
860 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
861 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
862 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
864 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
865 value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
866 }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
868 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
869 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
872 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
873 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
874 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
875 txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output"
876 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
877 value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
878 }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
880 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
881 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
887 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
888 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
889 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
890 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
891 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
892 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
893 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
897 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
898 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
900 log_trace!(self, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
902 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
903 if generated_by_local {
904 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
905 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
914 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
915 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
916 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
917 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
918 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
919 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
920 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
924 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
925 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
927 log_trace!(self, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
929 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
930 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
932 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
933 if !generated_by_local {
934 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
942 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
943 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
944 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
945 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
946 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
947 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
948 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
949 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
951 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
953 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
954 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
955 let mut max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
956 self.max_commitment_tx_output_local.lock().unwrap()
958 self.max_commitment_tx_output_remote.lock().unwrap()
960 debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
961 max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
962 debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
963 max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
966 let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (txouts.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
967 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.channel_outbound {
968 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
970 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
973 let value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
974 let value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
976 if value_to_a >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
977 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
979 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&keys.revocation_key,
980 if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { self.our_to_self_delay },
981 &keys.a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
982 value: value_to_a as u64
986 if value_to_b >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
987 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
989 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
990 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&keys.b_payment_key.serialize())[..])
992 value: value_to_b as u64
996 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
997 if let &Some(ref a_htlc) = a {
998 if let &Some(ref b_htlc) = b {
999 a_htlc.0.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlc.0.cltv_expiry)
1000 // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
1001 // here for fuzztarget mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
1003 .then(a_htlc.0.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlc.0.payment_hash.0))
1004 // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
1005 // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
1006 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1007 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1010 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
1011 let mut htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len() + included_dust_htlcs.len());
1012 for (idx, mut out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
1013 outputs.push(out.0);
1014 if let Some((mut htlc, source_option)) = out.1.take() {
1015 htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
1016 htlcs_included.push((htlc, source_option));
1019 let non_dust_htlc_count = htlcs_included.len();
1020 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1024 lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
1027 }, non_dust_htlc_count, htlcs_included)
1031 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1032 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1033 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1037 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(a_scriptpubkey: &Script, b_scriptpubkey: &Script) -> u64 {
1038 (4 + 1 + 36 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 2*(8+1) + 4 + a_scriptpubkey.len() as u64 + b_scriptpubkey.len() as u64)*4 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2*(1 + 72)
1042 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1044 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1046 previous_output: self.funding_txo.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1047 script_sig: Script::new(),
1048 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1049 witness: Vec::new(),
1054 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1055 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1056 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1058 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1059 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.channel_outbound { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1060 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1062 if value_to_self < 0 {
1063 assert!(self.channel_outbound);
1064 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1065 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1066 assert!(!self.channel_outbound);
1067 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1070 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1071 txouts.push((TxOut {
1072 script_pubkey: self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1073 value: value_to_remote as u64
1077 if value_to_self as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1078 txouts.push((TxOut {
1079 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1080 value: value_to_self as u64
1084 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1086 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1087 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1088 outputs.push(out.0);
1096 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1100 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1101 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1102 /// our counterparty!)
1103 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke ownership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1104 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1105 fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
1106 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number));
1107 let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key());
1108 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key());
1109 let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
1111 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.payment_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
1115 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1116 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1117 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1118 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
1119 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1120 //may see payments to it!
1121 let payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.payment_base_key());
1122 let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.revocation_base_key());
1123 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key());
1124 let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
1126 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &their_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
1129 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1130 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1131 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1132 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1133 let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key());
1134 make_funding_redeemscript(&our_funding_key, self.their_funding_pubkey())
1137 /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1138 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1139 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1140 fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Sha256dHash, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Transaction {
1141 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { self.our_to_self_delay }, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1144 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1145 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
1146 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
1147 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
1148 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1149 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1150 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1152 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1153 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1155 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1157 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1159 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1160 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1161 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1163 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1164 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1165 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1166 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1168 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1169 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1170 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1172 log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1174 return Ok((None, None));
1177 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1178 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1185 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1186 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1189 // Now update local state:
1191 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1192 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1193 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1194 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1195 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1196 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1197 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1200 self.channel_monitor.update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
1202 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1203 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1204 match pending_update {
1205 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1206 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1207 return Ok((None, None));
1210 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1211 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1212 log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1213 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1214 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1215 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1221 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1222 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1223 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1225 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1229 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1230 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1232 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1233 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1235 log_trace!(self, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1236 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1239 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1240 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1241 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1242 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1243 }), Some(monitor_update)))
1246 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
1247 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage)? {
1248 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), Some(mut monitor_update)) => {
1249 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1250 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1251 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1252 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1253 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1254 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1256 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), None) => {
1257 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1258 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1260 (None, Some(monitor_update)) => Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))),
1261 (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1265 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1266 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
1267 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
1268 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
1269 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1270 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1272 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1274 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1275 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1276 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1278 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1279 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1280 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1282 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1283 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1287 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1288 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1294 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1295 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1298 // Now update local state:
1299 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1300 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1301 match pending_update {
1302 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1303 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1304 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1307 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1308 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1309 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1315 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1316 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1323 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1324 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1327 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1328 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1329 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1334 // Message handlers:
1336 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
1337 // Check sanity of message fields:
1338 if !self.channel_outbound {
1339 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer"));
1341 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1342 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time"));
1344 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1345 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
1347 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1348 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
1350 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1351 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve and dust_limit"));
1353 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1354 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
1356 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
1357 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit is bigger than our channel reverse"));
1359 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
1360 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
1362 if msg.to_self_delay > config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay || msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1363 return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
1365 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1366 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
1368 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
1369 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accepted_htlcs > 483"));
1372 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1373 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1374 return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
1376 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1377 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
1379 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1380 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
1382 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1383 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
1385 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
1386 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
1388 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
1389 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
1391 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1392 return Err(ChannelError::Close("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large"));
1395 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1396 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1397 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1398 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
1399 if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1400 Some(script.clone())
1401 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1402 } else if script.len() == 0 {
1404 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1406 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format"));
1409 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1410 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1411 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out"));
1416 self.their_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1417 self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1418 self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1419 self.their_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1420 self.their_to_self_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
1421 self.their_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1422 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1424 let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1425 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1426 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1427 payment_basepoint: msg.payment_basepoint,
1428 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1429 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1432 self.local_keys.set_remote_channel_pubkeys(&their_pubkeys);
1433 self.their_pubkeys = Some(their_pubkeys);
1435 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1436 self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = their_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1438 let obscure_factor = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
1439 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1440 self.channel_monitor.set_basic_channel_info(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint, msg.to_self_delay, funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, obscure_factor);
1442 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1447 fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature) -> Result<(Transaction, LocalCommitmentTransaction, Signature, TxCreationKeys), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
1448 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1450 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1451 let local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1452 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1454 // They sign the "local" commitment transaction...
1455 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, self.their_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");
1457 let localtx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_initial_commitment_tx, sig, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), self.their_funding_pubkey());
1459 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1460 let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1461 let remote_signature = self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &remote_initial_commitment_tx, &remote_keys, &Vec::new(), self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
1462 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed"))?.0;
1464 // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1465 Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, localtx, remote_signature, local_keys))
1468 fn their_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1469 &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().expect("their_funding_pubkey() only allowed after accept_channel").funding_pubkey
1472 pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
1473 if self.channel_outbound {
1474 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?"));
1476 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1477 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1478 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1480 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!"));
1482 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1483 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1484 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1485 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1488 let funding_txo = OutPoint::new(msg.funding_txid, msg.funding_output_index);
1489 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_txo.clone());
1491 let (remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, our_signature, local_keys) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature) {
1494 self.funding_txo = None;
1499 let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1500 self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
1502 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1504 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
1505 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new()).unwrap();
1506 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1507 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1508 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1509 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1511 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1512 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1513 signature: our_signature
1514 }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
1517 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1518 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1519 pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<ChannelMonitorUpdate, (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError<ChanSigner>)> {
1520 if !self.channel_outbound {
1521 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?")));
1523 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1524 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!")));
1526 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1527 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 ||
1528 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1529 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1532 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1534 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
1535 let local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1536 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1538 let their_funding_pubkey = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
1540 // They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1541 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, their_funding_pubkey) {
1542 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer")));
1545 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1546 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1547 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1548 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
1549 commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), their_funding_pubkey),
1550 local_keys, feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs: Vec::new(),
1553 self.channel_monitor.update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
1554 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32));
1555 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1557 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
1560 Err((Some(monitor_update),
1561 ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented funding_signed from allowing funding broadcast")))
1565 pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
1566 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1567 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1570 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1572 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1573 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1574 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1575 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1576 self.channel_update_count += 1;
1577 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1578 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1579 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1580 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1581 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1582 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1583 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1584 if self.their_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1585 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point"));
1587 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1590 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time"));
1593 self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
1594 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1598 /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1599 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1600 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1601 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1602 htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1604 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1607 /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1609 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1610 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1611 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1612 htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1615 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1616 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1617 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1618 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1619 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1623 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1626 /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1627 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1628 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1629 /// corner case properly.
1630 pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1631 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1632 (cmp::min(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1633 cmp::min(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1636 pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingHTLCStatus) -> Result<(), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
1637 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1638 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1640 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1641 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1643 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1644 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel"));
1646 if msg.amount_msat < self.our_htlc_minimum_msat {
1647 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value"));
1650 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1651 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1652 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs"));
1654 // Check our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1655 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
1656 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value"));
1658 // Check our_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1659 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1660 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1661 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1662 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1663 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1664 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1665 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1666 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1667 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1668 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1670 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
1671 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1672 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
1673 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1674 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
1675 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1678 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat + self.value_to_self_msat > (self.channel_value_satoshis - Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)) * 1000 + removed_outbound_total_msat {
1679 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"));
1681 if self.next_remote_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
1682 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote skipped HTLC ID"));
1684 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
1685 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height"));
1688 //TODO: Check msg.cltv_expiry further? Do this in channel manager?
1690 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
1691 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_state {
1692 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
1696 // Now update local state:
1697 self.next_remote_htlc_id += 1;
1698 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
1699 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1700 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
1701 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
1702 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1703 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_state),
1708 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
1710 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
1711 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1712 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
1713 match check_preimage {
1715 Some(payment_hash) =>
1716 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
1717 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC with an incorrect preimage"));
1721 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
1722 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed")),
1723 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
1724 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
1726 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
1727 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC that they'd already fulfilled/failed")),
1729 return Ok(&htlc.source);
1732 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find"))
1735 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
1736 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1737 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1739 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1740 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1743 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
1744 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
1747 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
1748 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1749 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1751 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1752 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1755 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
1759 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc<'a>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
1760 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1761 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1763 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1764 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1767 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
1771 pub fn commitment_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError<ChanSigner>)> {
1772 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1773 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state")));
1775 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1776 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish")));
1778 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
1779 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds")));
1782 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1784 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
1786 let mut update_fee = false;
1787 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.channel_outbound && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
1789 self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
1794 let mut local_commitment_tx = {
1795 let mut commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw);
1796 let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.drain(..).map(|htlc| (htlc.0, htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
1797 (commitment_tx.0, commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned)
1799 let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
1800 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1801 log_trace!(self, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.their_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&local_commitment_tx.0), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1802 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey()) {
1803 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer")));
1806 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
1808 let num_htlcs = local_commitment_tx.1;
1809 let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1811 if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1812 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee")));
1816 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1 {
1817 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote")));
1820 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.2.len());
1821 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in local_commitment_tx.2.drain(..).enumerate() {
1822 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1823 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &local_keys, feerate_per_kw);
1824 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys);
1825 log_trace!(self, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(local_keys.b_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
1826 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
1827 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key) {
1828 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer")));
1830 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
1832 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
1836 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1));
1837 let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed(), self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
1839 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
1840 let mut need_our_commitment = false;
1841 if !self.channel_outbound {
1842 if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
1843 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
1844 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
1845 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
1846 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
1847 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
1848 need_our_commitment = true;
1849 self.pending_update_fee = None;
1854 let their_funding_pubkey = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
1856 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1857 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1858 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1859 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
1860 commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_commitment_tx.0, &msg.signature, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), &their_funding_pubkey),
1861 local_keys, feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
1864 self.channel_monitor.update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
1866 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1867 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
1868 Some(forward_info.clone())
1870 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
1871 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
1872 need_our_commitment = true;
1875 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1876 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
1877 Some(fail_reason.take())
1879 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
1880 need_our_commitment = true;
1884 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1885 // Note that if we need_our_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
1886 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
1887 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1889 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
1890 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
1891 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
1892 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
1893 if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
1894 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
1895 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
1896 // includes the right HTLCs.
1897 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
1898 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check().map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
1899 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1900 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1901 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1902 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1904 // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
1905 // re-send the message on restoration)
1906 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA")));
1909 let (our_commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
1910 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
1911 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
1912 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
1913 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check().map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
1914 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1915 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1916 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1917 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1919 } else if !need_our_commitment {
1920 (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
1921 } else { (None, None) };
1923 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1924 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1925 per_commitment_secret: per_commitment_secret,
1926 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
1927 }, our_commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
1930 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
1931 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
1932 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
1933 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
1934 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
1935 log_trace!(self, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
1937 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1938 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
1939 updates: Vec::new(),
1942 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
1943 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
1944 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1945 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1946 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1948 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1949 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
1950 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
1951 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
1952 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
1953 // to rebalance channels.
1954 if err.is_some() { // We're back to AwaitingRemoteRevoke (or are about to fail the channel)
1955 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
1957 match &htlc_update {
1958 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
1959 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
1960 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
1963 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
1964 log_info!(self, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1967 log_info!(self, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} resulting in a channel closure during holding_cell freeing", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1974 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
1975 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage) {
1976 Ok((update_fulfill_msg_option, additional_monitor_update_opt)) => {
1977 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
1978 if let Some(mut additional_monitor_update) = additional_monitor_update_opt {
1979 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
1983 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
1985 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
1990 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
1991 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
1992 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
1994 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
1996 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2003 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
2004 if let Some(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) = err {
2005 // If we failed to add the HTLC, but got an Ignore error, we should
2006 // still send the new commitment_signed, so reset the err to None.
2012 //TODO: Need to examine the type of err - if it's a fee issue or similar we may want to
2013 //fail it back the route, if it's a temporary issue we can ignore it...
2016 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2017 // This should never actually happen and indicates we got some Errs back
2018 // from update_fulfill_htlc/update_fail_htlc, but we handle it anyway in
2019 // case there is some strange way to hit duplicate HTLC removes.
2022 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2023 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2024 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2025 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2026 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2032 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2033 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2034 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2035 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2036 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2038 Ok(Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2040 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2042 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2043 update_fee: update_fee,
2045 }, monitor_update)))
2054 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2055 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2056 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2057 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2058 /// revoke_and_ack message.
2059 pub fn revoke_and_ack(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
2060 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2061 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state"));
2063 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2064 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2066 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2067 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
2070 if let Some(their_prev_commitment_point) = self.their_prev_commitment_point {
2071 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret")) != their_prev_commitment_point {
2072 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey"));
2076 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2077 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2078 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2079 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2080 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2081 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2082 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2083 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2084 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack"));
2087 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2088 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one"))?;
2089 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2090 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2091 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2092 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2093 idx: self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2094 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2097 self.channel_monitor.update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
2099 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2100 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2101 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2102 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2103 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2104 self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
2105 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2106 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2108 log_trace!(self, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
2109 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2110 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2111 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2112 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2113 let mut require_commitment = false;
2114 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2117 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2118 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2119 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2120 let logger = LogHolder { logger: &self.logger };
2122 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2123 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2124 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2125 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2126 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2127 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2132 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2133 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2134 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2135 if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2136 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2138 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2139 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2144 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2145 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2146 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2148 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2149 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2153 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2154 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2156 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2157 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2158 require_commitment = true;
2159 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2160 match forward_info {
2161 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2162 require_commitment = true;
2164 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2165 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2166 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2168 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2169 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2170 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2174 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2175 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2176 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2182 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2183 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2184 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2185 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2187 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2188 Some(fail_reason.take())
2190 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2191 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2192 require_commitment = true;
2196 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2198 if self.channel_outbound {
2199 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2200 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2203 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2204 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2205 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2206 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2207 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2208 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2209 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2210 require_commitment = true;
2211 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2216 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2217 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2218 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2219 if require_commitment {
2220 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2221 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2222 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2223 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2224 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2225 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2226 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2227 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2228 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2230 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2231 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2232 return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update))
2235 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs()? {
2236 Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)) => {
2237 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2238 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2239 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2241 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2242 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2243 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2246 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2247 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2248 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2249 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2251 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update))
2254 if require_commitment {
2255 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2257 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2258 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2259 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2260 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2262 Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2263 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2264 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2266 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2269 }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update))
2271 Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update))
2278 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2279 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2280 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2281 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2282 if !self.channel_outbound {
2283 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2285 if !self.is_usable() {
2286 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2288 if !self.is_live() {
2289 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2292 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2293 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2297 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2298 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2300 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2301 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2302 feerate_per_kw: feerate_per_kw as u32,
2306 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
2307 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2308 Some(update_fee) => {
2309 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2310 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2316 /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2317 /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2318 /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2319 /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2320 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2322 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&mut self) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> {
2323 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2325 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2326 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2327 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2328 return outbound_drops;
2330 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2331 // will be retransmitted.
2332 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2334 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2335 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2337 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2338 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2339 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2340 // this HTLC accordingly
2341 inbound_drop_count += 1;
2344 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2345 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2346 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2347 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2350 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2351 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2352 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2353 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2354 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2355 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2360 self.next_remote_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2362 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2363 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2364 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2365 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2366 // the update upon reconnection.
2367 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2371 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2373 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2374 outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2377 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2380 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2381 log_debug!(self, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2385 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2386 /// updates are partially paused.
2387 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2388 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2389 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2390 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2391 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2392 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2393 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2394 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2395 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2396 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2397 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2398 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2399 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2402 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2403 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2404 /// to the remote side.
2405 pub fn monitor_updating_restored(&mut self) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) {
2406 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2407 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2409 let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_outbound;
2411 // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
2412 // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
2413 // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
2414 // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
2415 // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
2416 // monitor was persisted.
2417 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2418 assert!(!self.channel_outbound, "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
2419 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2420 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2421 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2422 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2423 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2424 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2428 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2429 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2430 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2431 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2433 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2434 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2435 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2436 return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
2439 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2440 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2442 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2443 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update())
2446 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2447 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2448 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2449 log_trace!(self, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2450 if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
2451 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
2452 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2453 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2454 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
2457 pub fn update_fee(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
2458 if self.channel_outbound {
2459 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee"));
2461 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2462 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2464 Channel::<ChanSigner>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2465 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64);
2466 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2470 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2471 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number));
2472 let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed(), self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2473 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2474 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2475 per_commitment_secret,
2476 next_per_commitment_point,
2480 fn get_last_commitment_update(&self) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2481 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2482 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2483 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2484 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2486 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2487 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2488 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2489 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2490 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2491 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2492 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2493 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2494 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2499 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2500 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2502 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2503 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2504 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2505 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2506 reason: err_packet.clone()
2509 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2510 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2511 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2512 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2513 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2514 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2517 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2518 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2519 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2520 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2521 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2528 log_trace!(self, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2529 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2530 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2531 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2533 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update().expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2537 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2538 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2539 pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
2540 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2541 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2542 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2543 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2544 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect"));
2547 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2548 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2549 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish"));
2552 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
2553 match msg.data_loss_protect {
2554 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
2555 if chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed(), INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1) != data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret {
2556 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided"));
2558 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2559 self.channel_monitor.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(data_loss.my_current_per_commitment_point);
2560 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting", update: Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())});
2563 OptionalField::Absent => {}
2567 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2568 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2569 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2571 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2572 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2573 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2574 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2578 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2579 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
2580 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
2581 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2582 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2583 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet"));
2585 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2586 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2589 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2590 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2591 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2592 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2593 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2594 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2595 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2598 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2599 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2600 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2602 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2603 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2604 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2607 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2610 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction"));
2613 // We increment cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2614 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2615 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2616 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2617 let our_next_remote_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2619 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2620 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2621 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2622 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2623 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2624 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2625 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2629 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number {
2630 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2631 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2633 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2636 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2637 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
2638 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
2639 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
2641 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs() {
2642 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
2643 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
2644 Ok(Some((commitment_update, monitor_update))) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
2645 Ok(None) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
2648 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2650 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number - 1 {
2651 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2652 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2654 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2657 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2658 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2659 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2662 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update()), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2664 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction"));
2668 fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned> {
2669 if !self.channel_outbound || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
2670 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
2671 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2675 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2676 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
2677 proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
2679 let tx_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
2680 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate * tx_weight / 1000;
2682 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
2683 let our_sig = self.local_keys
2684 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
2686 if our_sig.is_none() { return None; }
2688 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, our_sig.clone().unwrap()));
2689 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2690 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2691 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
2692 signature: our_sig.unwrap(),
2696 pub fn shutdown(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
2697 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2698 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2700 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2701 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
2702 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
2703 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
2704 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation"));
2706 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2707 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2708 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs"));
2711 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2713 // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
2714 // 34 bytes in length, so don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
2715 if self.channel_outbound && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
2716 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown_scriptpubkey of absurd length from remote peer"));
2719 //Check shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must
2720 if !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2pkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2sh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2721 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey from remote peer"));
2724 if self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
2725 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
2726 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey which did not match their previous scriptpubkey"));
2729 self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
2732 // From here on out, we may not fail!
2734 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
2735 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2737 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
2738 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
2739 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
2740 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
2741 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2742 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2744 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2745 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2751 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
2752 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
2753 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
2755 let our_shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
2758 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2759 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2760 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2764 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
2765 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2767 Ok((our_shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
2770 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, our_sig: &Signature) {
2771 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
2772 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
2773 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
2775 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
2777 let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()).serialize();
2778 let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey().serialize();
2779 if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
2780 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2781 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2783 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2784 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2786 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2787 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2789 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
2792 pub fn closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
2793 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
2794 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown"));
2796 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2797 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2799 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
2800 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs"));
2802 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21000000 * 10000000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
2803 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee"));
2806 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2807 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
2808 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
2809 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim"));
2811 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
2813 let their_funding_pubkey = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
2815 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, their_funding_pubkey) {
2818 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
2819 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
2820 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
2821 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
2822 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.their_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer");
2826 if let Some((_, last_fee, our_sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2827 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
2828 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &our_sig);
2829 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2830 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2831 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
2835 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
2836 ($new_feerate: expr) => {
2837 let closing_tx_max_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
2838 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000, false);
2839 let our_sig = self.local_keys
2840 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
2841 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction"))?;
2842 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, our_sig.clone()));
2843 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2844 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2845 fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
2851 let proposed_sat_per_kw = msg.fee_satoshis * 1000 / closing_tx.get_weight() as u64;
2852 if self.channel_outbound {
2853 let our_max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2854 if proposed_sat_per_kw > our_max_feerate {
2855 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2856 if our_max_feerate <= last_feerate {
2857 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher than our Normal feerate"));
2860 propose_new_feerate!(our_max_feerate);
2863 let our_min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2864 if proposed_sat_per_kw < our_min_feerate {
2865 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2866 if our_min_feerate >= last_feerate {
2867 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower than our Background feerate"));
2870 propose_new_feerate!(our_min_feerate);
2874 let our_sig = self.local_keys
2875 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
2876 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction"))?;
2877 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &our_sig);
2879 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2880 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2882 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2883 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2884 fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
2886 }), Some(closing_tx)))
2889 // Public utilities:
2891 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
2895 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2896 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2897 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
2901 /// May only be called after funding has been initiated (ie is_funding_initiated() is true)
2902 pub fn channel_monitor(&mut self) -> &mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
2903 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2904 panic!("Can't get a channel monitor until funding has been created");
2906 &mut self.channel_monitor
2909 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
2910 /// is_usable() returns true).
2911 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2912 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2913 self.short_channel_id
2916 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2917 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
2918 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2922 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2923 pub fn get_their_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2927 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2928 pub fn get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2929 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
2932 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2933 pub fn get_their_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2934 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
2937 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2938 self.channel_value_satoshis
2941 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2942 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
2946 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u64 {
2950 pub fn get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
2951 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1
2954 pub fn get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
2955 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
2958 pub fn get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
2959 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2
2963 pub fn get_local_keys(&self) -> &ChanSigner {
2968 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
2970 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
2971 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
2972 channel_reserve_msat: self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
2973 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
2974 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
2975 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
2977 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2979 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
2987 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
2991 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2992 pub fn get_channel_update_count(&self) -> u32 {
2993 self.channel_update_count
2996 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2997 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3000 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3001 self.config.announced_channel
3004 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3005 self.channel_outbound
3008 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3009 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3010 pub fn get_our_fee_base_msat(&self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> u32 {
3011 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
3012 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
3014 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
3015 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
3017 if self.channel_outbound {
3018 // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
3019 res += self.feerate_per_kw * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
3022 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
3023 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
3028 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3029 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3030 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3033 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3034 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3035 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3036 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3037 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3040 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3041 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3042 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3043 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3044 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
3047 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3048 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3049 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3050 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3053 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3054 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3055 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32
3058 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3059 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3060 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3061 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3062 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
3063 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3068 pub fn to_disabled_staged(&mut self) {
3069 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged;
3072 pub fn to_disabled_marked(&mut self) {
3073 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked;
3076 pub fn to_fresh(&mut self) {
3077 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::Fresh;
3080 pub fn is_disabled_staged(&self) -> bool {
3081 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged
3084 pub fn is_disabled_marked(&self) -> bool {
3085 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked
3088 /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being connected.
3089 /// Note that we only need to use this to detect funding_signed, anything else is handled by
3090 /// the channel_monitor.
3091 /// In case of Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard requirements
3092 /// apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed post-shutdown.
3093 /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
3094 pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3095 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3096 if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3097 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3098 self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
3101 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3102 for (ref tx, index_in_block) in txn_matched.iter().zip(indexes_of_txn_matched) {
3103 if tx.txid() == self.funding_txo.unwrap().txid {
3104 let txo_idx = self.funding_txo.unwrap().index as usize;
3105 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3106 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3107 if self.channel_outbound {
3108 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3109 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3110 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3111 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3112 // channel and move on.
3113 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3114 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3116 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3117 self.channel_update_count += 1;
3118 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3119 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3120 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
3123 if self.channel_outbound {
3124 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3125 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3126 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3127 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3128 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3129 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3133 self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
3134 self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
3135 ((*index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
3136 ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
3141 if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3142 self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
3143 self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
3144 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3145 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
3146 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3147 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3149 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3150 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3151 self.channel_update_count += 1;
3153 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3154 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3155 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3157 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3158 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3160 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3161 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3164 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.bitcoin_hash());
3166 //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
3167 //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
3168 //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
3169 //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
3170 if need_commitment_update {
3171 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3172 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
3173 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
3174 return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3175 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3176 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
3179 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3189 /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
3190 /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
3191 /// unconfirmation/reorg.
3192 pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
3193 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3194 self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
3195 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
3199 if Some(header.bitcoin_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
3200 self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
3202 self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
3203 self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
3207 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3208 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3210 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: Sha256dHash, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3211 if !self.channel_outbound {
3212 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3214 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3215 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3218 if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3219 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3222 let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
3225 chain_hash: chain_hash,
3226 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3227 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3228 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3229 dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
3230 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3231 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3232 htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
3233 feerate_per_kw: fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u32,
3234 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
3235 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3236 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()),
3237 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.revocation_base_key()),
3238 payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.payment_base_key()),
3239 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key()),
3240 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key()),
3241 first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
3242 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3243 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3247 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3248 if self.channel_outbound {
3249 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3251 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3252 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3254 if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3255 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3258 let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
3260 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3261 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3262 dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
3263 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3264 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3265 htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
3266 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3267 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
3268 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3269 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()),
3270 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.revocation_base_key()),
3271 payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.payment_base_key()),
3272 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key()),
3273 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key()),
3274 first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
3275 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3279 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3280 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<(Signature, Transaction), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
3281 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3282 let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
3283 Ok((self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &remote_initial_commitment_tx, &remote_keys, &Vec::new(), self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
3284 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed"))?.0, remote_initial_commitment_tx))
3287 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3288 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3289 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3290 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3291 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3292 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3293 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3294 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint) -> Result<(msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
3295 if !self.channel_outbound {
3296 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3298 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3299 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3301 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3302 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3303 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3304 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3307 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_txo.clone());
3308 let (our_signature, commitment_tx) = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature() {
3311 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3312 self.funding_txo = None;
3317 let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3318 self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
3319 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3321 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3322 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
3323 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3324 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3325 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3327 Ok((msgs::FundingCreated {
3328 temporary_channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
3329 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3330 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3331 signature: our_signature
3332 }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
3335 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3336 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3337 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3338 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3339 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3341 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3342 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3343 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: Sha256dHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
3344 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3345 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements"));
3347 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3348 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked"));
3350 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3351 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing"));
3354 let were_node_one = our_node_id.serialize()[..] < self.their_node_id.serialize()[..];
3355 let our_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key());
3357 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3358 features: ChannelFeatures::supported(),
3359 chain_hash: chain_hash,
3360 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3361 node_id_1: if were_node_one { our_node_id } else { self.get_their_node_id() },
3362 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_their_node_id() } else { our_node_id },
3363 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3364 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { our_bitcoin_key },
3365 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3368 let sig = self.local_keys.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3369 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement"))?;
3374 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3375 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3376 pub fn get_channel_reestablish(&self) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3377 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3378 assert_ne!(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3379 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3380 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
3381 log_trace!(self, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
3382 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3383 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
3384 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1))
3387 log_debug!(self, "We don't seen yet any revoked secret, if this channnel has already been updated it means we are fallen-behind, you should wait for other peer closing");
3388 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3389 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
3390 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number))
3393 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3394 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3395 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3396 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3397 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3398 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3399 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3400 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3402 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3403 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3404 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
3405 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3406 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3407 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3408 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3409 // cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3410 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3412 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3418 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3420 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3421 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3422 /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3423 /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3424 /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3425 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3426 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
3427 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
3428 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3429 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down"));
3432 if amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3433 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send more than the total value of the channel"));
3435 if amount_msat < self.their_htlc_minimum_msat {
3436 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value"));
3439 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3440 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3441 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3442 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3443 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3444 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3445 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3446 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update"));
3449 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3450 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.their_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3451 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs"));
3453 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3454 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3455 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept"));
3458 // Check self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
3459 // reserve for them to have something to claim if we misbehave)
3460 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + amount_msat + htlc_outbound_value_msat {
3461 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over their reserve value"));
3464 //TODO: Check cltv_expiry? Do this in channel manager?
3466 // Now update local state:
3467 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3468 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3469 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3470 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3471 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3473 onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
3478 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3479 htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
3480 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3481 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3482 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3483 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
3487 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3488 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3489 htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
3490 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3491 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3492 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3493 onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
3495 self.next_local_htlc_id += 1;
3500 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
3501 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
3502 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
3503 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
3504 pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
3505 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3506 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
3508 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3509 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
3511 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3512 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3514 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
3515 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3517 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
3518 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3519 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3520 have_updates = true;
3522 if have_updates { break; }
3524 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3525 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3526 have_updates = true;
3528 if have_updates { break; }
3531 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
3533 self.send_commitment_no_status_check()
3535 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
3536 fn send_commitment_no_status_check(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
3537 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
3538 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
3540 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3541 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3542 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
3544 if let Some(state) = new_state {
3548 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3549 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
3550 Some(fail_reason.take())
3552 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
3555 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3557 let (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update() {
3558 Ok((res, (remote_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
3559 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3560 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
3561 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
3562 (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
3564 Err(e) => return Err(e),
3567 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3568 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3569 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3570 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
3571 unsigned_commitment_tx: remote_commitment_tx.clone(),
3572 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
3573 commitment_number: self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
3574 their_revocation_point: self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
3577 self.channel_monitor.update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone()).unwrap();
3578 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
3579 Ok((res, monitor_update))
3582 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
3583 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
3584 fn send_commitment_no_state_update(&self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
3585 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
3586 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
3587 if self.channel_outbound {
3588 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3592 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3593 let remote_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw);
3594 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
3597 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(remote_commitment_tx.2.len());
3598 for &(ref htlc, _) in remote_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
3602 let res = self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(feerate_per_kw, &remote_commitment_tx.0, &remote_keys, &htlcs, self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
3603 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed"))?;
3605 htlc_signatures = res.1;
3607 log_trace!(self, "Signed remote commitment tx {} with redeemscript {} -> {}",
3608 encode::serialize_hex(&remote_commitment_tx.0),
3609 encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
3610 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
3612 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
3613 log_trace!(self, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
3614 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_tx.0.txid(), feerate_per_kw, self.our_to_self_delay, htlc, &remote_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &remote_keys.revocation_key)),
3615 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &remote_keys)),
3616 log_bytes!(remote_keys.a_htlc_key.serialize()),
3617 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
3621 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
3622 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3625 }, (remote_commitment_tx.0, remote_commitment_tx.2)))
3628 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
3629 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
3630 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
3632 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError<ChanSigner>> {
3633 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
3634 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
3635 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
3636 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3642 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
3643 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
3644 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
3645 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3646 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3647 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first"});
3650 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
3651 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3652 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress"});
3654 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
3655 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote"});
3658 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3659 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3660 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?"});
3663 let our_closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3665 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3666 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3667 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3669 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3671 self.channel_update_count += 1;
3673 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
3674 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
3675 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3676 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3677 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3679 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3680 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3687 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
3688 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3689 scriptpubkey: our_closing_script,
3690 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3693 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3694 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3695 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3696 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3697 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3698 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
3699 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3701 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3702 // return them to fail the payment.
3703 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3704 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3706 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3707 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
3713 for _htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3714 //TODO: Do something with the remaining HTLCs
3715 //(we need to have the ChannelManager monitor them so we can claim the inbound HTLCs
3719 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3720 self.channel_update_count += 1;
3721 (self.channel_monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), dropped_outbound_htlcs)
3725 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3726 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3728 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
3729 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3731 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
3733 error_packet.write(writer)?;
3735 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
3737 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
3738 err_code.write(writer)?;
3740 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3742 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
3749 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
3750 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3751 Ok(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3752 0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
3753 1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
3754 2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
3755 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3760 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> Writeable for Channel<ChanSigner> {
3761 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3762 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
3763 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
3765 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3766 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3768 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
3769 self.config.write(writer)?;
3771 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
3772 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
3773 self.channel_outbound.write(writer)?;
3774 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3776 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
3778 self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
3779 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3781 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
3782 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
3783 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
3785 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
3786 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3787 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3788 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
3791 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
3792 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3793 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
3796 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3797 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3798 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3799 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3801 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
3802 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
3804 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
3806 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
3808 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
3810 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3813 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
3815 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
3820 macro_rules! write_option {
3823 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3832 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3833 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3834 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3835 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3836 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3837 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3838 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
3840 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
3842 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3844 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3847 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
3849 write_option!(*fail_reason);
3851 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
3853 write_option!(*fail_reason);
3855 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
3857 write_option!(*fail_reason);
3862 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3863 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3865 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
3867 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3868 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3869 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3870 source.write(writer)?;
3871 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
3873 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
3875 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
3876 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3878 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3880 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3881 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3886 match self.resend_order {
3887 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3888 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
3891 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
3892 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
3893 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
3895 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3896 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
3897 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
3898 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3901 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3902 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
3903 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
3904 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3905 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
3908 write_option!(self.pending_update_fee);
3909 write_option!(self.holding_cell_update_fee);
3911 self.next_local_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3912 (self.next_remote_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
3913 self.channel_update_count.write(writer)?;
3914 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
3916 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3917 Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
3919 feerate.write(writer)?;
3923 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3926 write_option!(self.funding_txo);
3927 write_option!(self.funding_tx_confirmed_in);
3928 write_option!(self.short_channel_id);
3930 self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
3931 self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
3933 self.their_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3934 self.our_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3935 self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
3936 self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3937 self.their_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
3938 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
3939 self.their_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
3940 self.our_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
3941 self.their_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
3942 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
3944 write_option!(self.their_pubkeys);
3945 write_option!(self.their_cur_commitment_point);
3947 write_option!(self.their_prev_commitment_point);
3948 self.their_node_id.write(writer)?;
3950 write_option!(self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3952 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
3954 self.channel_monitor.write_for_disk(writer)?;
3959 impl<R : ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for Channel<ChanSigner> {
3960 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3961 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3962 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3963 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3964 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3967 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3968 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
3970 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3971 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
3972 let channel_outbound = Readable::read(reader)?;
3973 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3975 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3977 let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
3978 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3980 let cur_local_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
3981 let cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
3982 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
3984 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3985 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
3986 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
3987 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3988 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3989 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3990 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3991 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3992 state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3993 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
3994 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
3995 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
3996 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
3997 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4002 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4003 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4004 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4005 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4006 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4007 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4008 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4009 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4010 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4011 state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
4012 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4013 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4014 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4015 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4016 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4017 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4022 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4023 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4024 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4025 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
4026 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4027 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4028 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4029 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4030 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4031 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4033 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4034 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4035 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4037 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4038 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4039 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4041 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4045 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
4046 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4047 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4048 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4051 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4052 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4053 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4055 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4056 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4057 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4058 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4061 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4062 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4063 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4064 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4067 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4068 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4070 let next_local_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4071 let next_remote_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4072 let channel_update_count = Readable::read(reader)?;
4073 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4075 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
4077 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4078 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4081 let funding_txo = Readable::read(reader)?;
4082 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4083 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4085 let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
4086 let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
4088 let their_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4089 let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4090 let their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4091 let their_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4092 let their_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4093 let our_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4094 let their_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
4095 let our_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
4096 let their_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
4097 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
4099 let their_pubkeys = Readable::read(reader)?;
4100 let their_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4102 let their_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4103 let their_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4105 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4106 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4108 let (monitor_last_block, channel_monitor) = ReadableArgs::read(reader, logger.clone())?;
4109 // We drop the ChannelMonitor's last block connected hash cause we don't actually bother
4110 // doing full block connection operations on the internal ChannelMonitor copies
4111 if monitor_last_block != last_block_connected {
4112 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4122 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
4123 channel_value_satoshis,
4125 latest_monitor_update_id,
4130 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
4131 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
4134 pending_inbound_htlcs,
4135 pending_outbound_htlcs,
4136 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
4140 monitor_pending_funding_locked,
4141 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
4142 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
4143 monitor_pending_forwards,
4144 monitor_pending_failures,
4147 holding_cell_update_fee,
4149 next_remote_htlc_id,
4150 channel_update_count,
4153 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4154 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4155 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4156 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4158 last_sent_closing_fee,
4161 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4163 last_block_connected,
4164 funding_tx_confirmations,
4166 their_dust_limit_satoshis,
4167 our_dust_limit_satoshis,
4168 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4169 their_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4170 their_htlc_minimum_msat,
4171 our_htlc_minimum_msat,
4172 their_to_self_delay,
4174 their_max_accepted_htlcs,
4178 their_cur_commitment_point,
4180 their_prev_commitment_point,
4183 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4188 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
4197 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4198 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4199 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4200 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
4201 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4202 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
4204 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4205 use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
4206 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4208 use ln::chan_utils::{LocalCommitmentTransaction, ChannelPublicKeys};
4209 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4210 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemoryChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
4211 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4212 use util::config::UserConfig;
4213 use util::test_utils;
4214 use util::logger::Logger;
4215 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
4216 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4217 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4218 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
4219 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
4220 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
4223 struct TestFeeEstimator {
4226 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4227 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64 {
4233 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4234 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4235 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4239 chan_keys: InMemoryChannelKeys,
4241 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4242 type ChanKeySigner = InMemoryChannelKeys;
4244 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4245 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4246 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4247 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4248 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4249 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4252 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4253 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4254 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4255 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4258 fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
4259 self.chan_keys.clone()
4261 fn get_onion_rand(&self) -> (SecretKey, [u8; 32]) { panic!(); }
4262 fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4265 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
4266 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
4270 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
4271 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
4272 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4273 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4274 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4276 let chan_keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
4278 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4279 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4280 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4281 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4282 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4284 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
4285 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
4289 assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan_keys.funding_key()).serialize()[..],
4290 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
4291 let keys_provider: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = InMemoryChannelKeys>> = Arc::new(Keys { chan_keys });
4293 let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4294 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
4295 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
4296 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&feeest, &keys_provider, their_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, Arc::clone(&logger), &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
4297 chan.their_to_self_delay = 144;
4298 chan.our_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
4300 let funding_info = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), 0);
4301 chan.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
4303 let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
4304 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
4305 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4306 payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
4307 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
4308 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
4311 assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.payment_basepoint.serialize()[..],
4312 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
4314 assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
4315 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
4317 assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
4318 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
4320 // We can't just use build_local_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
4321 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
4322 // build_commitment_transaction.
4323 let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key());
4324 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4325 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
4326 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key());
4327 let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.payment_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
4329 chan.their_pubkeys = Some(their_pubkeys);
4331 let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);
4333 macro_rules! test_commitment {
4334 ( $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr) => {
4336 let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw);
4337 let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
4338 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
4342 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4343 let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4344 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&unsigned_tx.0).sighash_all(&unsigned_tx.0.input[0], &redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
4345 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, chan.their_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
4347 let mut localtx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx.0.clone(), &their_signature, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan.local_keys.funding_key()), chan.their_funding_pubkey());
4348 localtx.add_local_sig(chan.local_keys.funding_key(), &redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis, &chan.secp_ctx);
4350 assert_eq!(serialize(localtx.with_valid_witness())[..],
4351 hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
4355 macro_rules! test_htlc_output {
4356 ( $htlc_idx: expr, $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr ) => {
4357 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4359 let ref htlc = unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx];
4360 let mut htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
4361 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
4362 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
4363 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.b_htlc_key).unwrap();
4365 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4368 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
4369 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
4370 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
4374 assert!(preimage.is_some());
4377 chan_utils::sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &remote_signature, &preimage, &htlc, &keys.a_htlc_key, &keys.b_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key, &keys.per_commitment_point, chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key(), &chan.secp_ctx).unwrap();
4378 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..],
4379 hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
4384 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
4385 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
4387 test_commitment!("3045022100f51d2e566a70ba740fc5d8c0f07b9b93d2ed741c3c0860c613173de7d39e7968022041376d520e9c0e1ad52248ddf4b22e12be8763007df977253ef45a4ca3bdb7c0",
4388 "3044022051b75c73198c6deee1a875871c3961832909acd297c6b908d59e3319e5185a46022055c419379c5051a78d00dbbce11b5b664a0c22815fbcc6fcef6b1937c3836939",
4389 "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");
4392 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4393 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4395 amount_msat: 1000000,
4397 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4398 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4400 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
4403 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4404 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4406 amount_msat: 2000000,
4408 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4409 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4411 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
4414 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4415 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4417 amount_msat: 2000000,
4419 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4420 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4421 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4423 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
4426 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4427 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4429 amount_msat: 3000000,
4431 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4432 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4433 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4435 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
4438 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4439 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4441 amount_msat: 4000000,
4443 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4444 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4446 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
4451 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4452 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4453 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
4455 test_commitment!("304402204fd4928835db1ccdfc40f5c78ce9bd65249b16348df81f0c44328dcdefc97d630220194d3869c38bc732dd87d13d2958015e2fc16829e74cd4377f84d215c0b70606",
4456 "30440220275b0c325a5e9355650dc30c0eccfbc7efb23987c24b556b9dfdd40effca18d202206caceb2c067836c51f296740c7ae807ffcbfbf1dd3a0d56b6de9a5b247985f06",
4457 "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");
4459 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);
4461 test_htlc_output!(0,
4462 "304402206a6e59f18764a5bf8d4fa45eebc591566689441229c918b480fb2af8cc6a4aeb02205248f273be447684b33e3c8d1d85a8e0ca9fa0bae9ae33f0527ada9c162919a6",
4463 "304402207cb324fa0de88f452ffa9389678127ebcf4cabe1dd848b8e076c1a1962bf34720220116ed922b12311bd602d67e60d2529917f21c5b82f25ff6506c0f87886b4dfd5",
4464 "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");
4466 test_htlc_output!(1,
4467 "3045022100d5275b3619953cb0c3b5aa577f04bc512380e60fa551762ce3d7a1bb7401cff9022037237ab0dac3fe100cde094e82e2bed9ba0ed1bb40154b48e56aa70f259e608b",
4468 "3045022100c89172099507ff50f4c925e6c5150e871fb6e83dd73ff9fbb72f6ce829a9633f02203a63821d9162e99f9be712a68f9e589483994feae2661e4546cd5b6cec007be5",
4469 "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");
4471 test_htlc_output!(2,
4472 "304402201b63ec807771baf4fdff523c644080de17f1da478989308ad13a58b51db91d360220568939d38c9ce295adba15665fa68f51d967e8ed14a007b751540a80b325f202",
4473 "3045022100def389deab09cee69eaa1ec14d9428770e45bcbe9feb46468ecf481371165c2f022015d2e3c46600b2ebba8dcc899768874cc6851fd1ecb3fffd15db1cc3de7e10da",
4474 "020000000001018154ecccf11a5fb56c39654c4deb4d2296f83c69268280b94d021370c94e219702000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402201b63ec807771baf4fdff523c644080de17f1da478989308ad13a58b51db91d360220568939d38c9ce295adba15665fa68f51d967e8ed14a007b751540a80b325f20201483045022100def389deab09cee69eaa1ec14d9428770e45bcbe9feb46468ecf481371165c2f022015d2e3c46600b2ebba8dcc899768874cc6851fd1ecb3fffd15db1cc3de7e10da012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000");
4476 test_htlc_output!(3,
4477 "3045022100daee1808f9861b6c3ecd14f7b707eca02dd6bdfc714ba2f33bc8cdba507bb182022026654bf8863af77d74f51f4e0b62d461a019561bb12acb120d3f7195d148a554",
4478 "30440220643aacb19bbb72bd2b635bc3f7375481f5981bace78cdd8319b2988ffcc6704202203d27784ec8ad51ed3bd517a05525a5139bb0b755dd719e0054332d186ac08727",
4479 "020000000001018154ecccf11a5fb56c39654c4deb4d2296f83c69268280b94d021370c94e219703000000000000000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100daee1808f9861b6c3ecd14f7b707eca02dd6bdfc714ba2f33bc8cdba507bb182022026654bf8863af77d74f51f4e0b62d461a019561bb12acb120d3f7195d148a554014730440220643aacb19bbb72bd2b635bc3f7375481f5981bace78cdd8319b2988ffcc6704202203d27784ec8ad51ed3bd517a05525a5139bb0b755dd719e0054332d186ac0872701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000");
4481 test_htlc_output!(4,
4482 "304402207e0410e45454b0978a623f36a10626ef17b27d9ad44e2760f98cfa3efb37924f0220220bd8acd43ecaa916a80bd4f919c495a2c58982ce7c8625153f8596692a801d",
4483 "30440220549e80b4496803cbc4a1d09d46df50109f546d43fbbf86cd90b174b1484acd5402205f12a4f995cb9bded597eabfee195a285986aa6d93ae5bb72507ebc6a4e2349e",
4484 "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");
4488 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4489 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4490 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
4492 test_commitment!("3045022100a5c01383d3ec646d97e40f44318d49def817fcd61a0ef18008a665b3e151785502203e648efddd5838981ef55ec954be69c4a652d021e6081a100d034de366815e9b",
4493 "304502210094bfd8f5572ac0157ec76a9551b6c5216a4538c07cd13a51af4a54cb26fa14320220768efce8ce6f4a5efac875142ff19237c011343670adf9c7ac69704a120d1163",
4494 "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");
4496 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);
4498 test_htlc_output!(0,
4499 "30440220385a5afe75632f50128cbb029ee95c80156b5b4744beddc729ad339c9ca432c802202ba5f48550cad3379ac75b9b4fedb86a35baa6947f16ba5037fb8b11ab343740",
4500 "304402205999590b8a79fa346e003a68fd40366397119b2b0cdf37b149968d6bc6fbcc4702202b1e1fb5ab7864931caed4e732c359e0fe3d86a548b557be2246efb1708d579a",
4501 "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");
4503 test_htlc_output!(1,
4504 "304402207ceb6678d4db33d2401fdc409959e57c16a6cb97a30261d9c61f29b8c58d34b90220084b4a17b4ca0e86f2d798b3698ca52de5621f2ce86f80bed79afa66874511b0",
4505 "304402207ff03eb0127fc7c6cae49cc29e2a586b98d1e8969cf4a17dfa50b9c2647720b902205e2ecfda2252956c0ca32f175080e75e4e390e433feb1f8ce9f2ba55648a1dac",
4506 "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");
4508 test_htlc_output!(2,
4509 "304402206a401b29a0dff0d18ec903502c13d83e7ec019450113f4a7655a4ce40d1f65ba0220217723a084e727b6ca0cc8b6c69c014a7e4a01fcdcba3e3993f462a3c574d833",
4510 "3045022100d50d067ca625d54e62df533a8f9291736678d0b86c28a61bb2a80cf42e702d6e02202373dde7e00218eacdafb9415fe0e1071beec1857d1af3c6a201a44cbc47c877",
4511 "020000000001018323148ce2419f21ca3d6780053747715832e18ac780931a514b187768882bb6020000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206a401b29a0dff0d18ec903502c13d83e7ec019450113f4a7655a4ce40d1f65ba0220217723a084e727b6ca0cc8b6c69c014a7e4a01fcdcba3e3993f462a3c574d83301483045022100d50d067ca625d54e62df533a8f9291736678d0b86c28a61bb2a80cf42e702d6e02202373dde7e00218eacdafb9415fe0e1071beec1857d1af3c6a201a44cbc47c877012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000");
4513 test_htlc_output!(3,
4514 "30450221009b1c987ba599ee3bde1dbca776b85481d70a78b681a8d84206723e2795c7cac002207aac84ad910f8598c4d1c0ea2e3399cf6627a4e3e90131315bc9f038451ce39d",
4515 "3045022100db9dc65291077a52728c622987e9895b7241d4394d6dcb916d7600a3e8728c22022036ee3ee717ba0bb5c45ee84bc7bbf85c0f90f26ae4e4a25a6b4241afa8a3f1cb",
4516 "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");
4518 test_htlc_output!(4,
4519 "3045022100cc28030b59f0914f45b84caa983b6f8effa900c952310708c2b5b00781117022022027ba2ccdf94d03c6d48b327f183f6e28c8a214d089b9227f94ac4f85315274f0",
4520 "304402202d1a3c0d31200265d2a2def2753ead4959ae20b4083e19553acfffa5dfab60bf022020ede134149504e15b88ab261a066de49848411e15e70f9e6a5462aec2949f8f",
4521 "020000000001018323148ce2419f21ca3d6780053747715832e18ac780931a514b187768882bb604000000000000000001da0d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100cc28030b59f0914f45b84caa983b6f8effa900c952310708c2b5b00781117022022027ba2ccdf94d03c6d48b327f183f6e28c8a214d089b9227f94ac4f85315274f00147304402202d1a3c0d31200265d2a2def2753ead4959ae20b4083e19553acfffa5dfab60bf022020ede134149504e15b88ab261a066de49848411e15e70f9e6a5462aec2949f8f012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000");
4525 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4526 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4527 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
4529 test_commitment!("3044022072714e2fbb93cdd1c42eb0828b4f2eff143f717d8f26e79d6ada4f0dcb681bbe02200911be4e5161dd6ebe59ff1c58e1997c4aea804f81db6b698821db6093d7b057",
4530 "3045022100a2270d5950c89ae0841233f6efea9c951898b301b2e89e0adbd2c687b9f32efa02207943d90f95b9610458e7c65a576e149750ff3accaacad004cd85e70b235e27de",
4531 "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");
4533 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);
4535 test_htlc_output!(0,
4536 "3044022062ef2e77591409d60d7817d9bb1e71d3c4a2931d1a6c7c8307422c84f001a251022022dad9726b0ae3fe92bda745a06f2c00f92342a186d84518588cf65f4dfaada8",
4537 "3045022100a4c574f00411dd2f978ca5cdc1b848c311cd7849c087ad2f21a5bce5e8cc5ae90220090ae39a9bce2fb8bc879d7e9f9022df249f41e25e51f1a9bf6447a9eeffc098",
4538 "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");
4540 test_htlc_output!(1,
4541 "3045022100e968cbbb5f402ed389fdc7f6cd2a80ed650bb42c79aeb2a5678444af94f6c78502204b47a1cb24ab5b0b6fe69fe9cfc7dba07b9dd0d8b95f372c1d9435146a88f8d4",
4542 "304402207679cf19790bea76a733d2fa0672bd43ab455687a068f815a3d237581f57139a0220683a1a799e102071c206b207735ca80f627ab83d6616b4bcd017c5d79ef3e7d0",
4543 "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");
4545 test_htlc_output!(2,
4546 "3045022100aa91932e305292cf9969cc23502bbf6cef83a5df39c95ad04a707c4f4fed5c7702207099fc0f3a9bfe1e7683c0e9aa5e76c5432eb20693bf4cb182f04d383dc9c8c2",
4547 "304402200df76fea718745f3c529bac7fd37923e7309ce38b25c0781e4cf514dd9ef8dc802204172295739dbae9fe0474dcee3608e3433b4b2af3a2e6787108b02f894dcdda3",
4548 "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");
4550 test_htlc_output!(3,
4551 "3044022035cac88040a5bba420b1c4257235d5015309113460bc33f2853cd81ca36e632402202fc94fd3e81e9d34a9d01782a0284f3044370d03d60f3fc041e2da088d2de58f",
4552 "304402200daf2eb7afd355b4caf6fb08387b5f031940ea29d1a9f35071288a839c9039e4022067201b562456e7948616c13acb876b386b511599b58ac1d94d127f91c50463a6",
4553 "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");
4557 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4558 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4559 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
4561 test_commitment!("3044022001d55e488b8b035b2dd29d50b65b530923a416d47f377284145bc8767b1b6a75022019bb53ddfe1cefaf156f924777eaaf8fdca1810695a7d0a247ad2afba8232eb4",
4562 "304402203ca8f31c6a47519f83255dc69f1894d9a6d7476a19f498d31eaf0cd3a85eeb63022026fd92dc752b33905c4c838c528b692a8ad4ced959990b5d5ee2ff940fa90eea",
4563 "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");
4565 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);
4567 test_htlc_output!(0,
4568 "3045022100d1cf354de41c1369336cf85b225ed033f1f8982a01be503668df756a7e668b66022001254144fb4d0eecc61908fccc3388891ba17c5d7a1a8c62bdd307e5a513f992",
4569 "3044022056eb1af429660e45a1b0b66568cb8c4a3aa7e4c9c292d5d6c47f86ebf2c8838f022065c3ac4ebe980ca7a41148569be4ad8751b0a724a41405697ec55035dae66402",
4570 "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");
4572 test_htlc_output!(1,
4573 "3045022100d065569dcb94f090345402736385efeb8ea265131804beac06dd84d15dd2d6880220664feb0b4b2eb985fadb6ec7dc58c9334ea88ce599a9be760554a2d4b3b5d9f4",
4574 "3045022100914bb232cd4b2690ee3d6cb8c3713c4ac9c4fb925323068d8b07f67c8541f8d9022057152f5f1615b793d2d45aac7518989ae4fe970f28b9b5c77504799d25433f7f",
4575 "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");
4577 test_htlc_output!(2,
4578 "3045022100d4e69d363de993684eae7b37853c40722a4c1b4a7b588ad7b5d8a9b5006137a102207a069c628170ee34be5612747051bdcc087466dbaa68d5756ea81c10155aef18",
4579 "304402200e362443f7af830b419771e8e1614fc391db3a4eb799989abfc5ab26d6fcd032022039ab0cad1c14dfbe9446bf847965e56fe016e0cbcf719fd18c1bfbf53ecbd9f9",
4580 "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");
4582 test_htlc_output!(3,
4583 "30450221008ec888e36e4a4b3dc2ed6b823319855b2ae03006ca6ae0d9aa7e24bfc1d6f07102203b0f78885472a67ff4fe5916c0bb669487d659527509516fc3a08e87a2cc0a7c",
4584 "304402202c3e14282b84b02705dfd00a6da396c9fe8a8bcb1d3fdb4b20a4feba09440e8b02202b058b39aa9b0c865b22095edcd9ff1f71bbfe20aa4993755e54d042755ed0d5",
4585 "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");
4589 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4590 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4591 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
4593 test_commitment!("3045022100f2377f7a67b7fc7f4e2c0c9e3a7de935c32417f5668eda31ea1db401b7dc53030220415fdbc8e91d0f735e70c21952342742e25249b0d062d43efbfc564499f37526",
4594 "30440220443cb07f650aebbba14b8bc8d81e096712590f524c5991ac0ed3bbc8fd3bd0c7022028a635f548e3ca64b19b69b1ea00f05b22752f91daf0b6dab78e62ba52eb7fd0",
4595 "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");
4597 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);
4599 test_htlc_output!(0,
4600 "3045022100eed143b1ee4bed5dc3cde40afa5db3e7354cbf9c44054b5f713f729356f08cf7022077161d171c2bbd9badf3c9934de65a4918de03bbac1450f715275f75b103f891",
4601 "3045022100a0d043ed533e7fb1911e0553d31a8e2f3e6de19dbc035257f29d747c5e02f1f5022030cd38d8e84282175d49c1ebe0470db3ebd59768cf40780a784e248a43904fb8",
4602 "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");
4604 test_htlc_output!(1,
4605 "3044022071e9357619fd8d29a411dc053b326a5224c5d11268070e88ecb981b174747c7a02202b763ae29a9d0732fa8836dd8597439460b50472183f420021b768981b4f7cf6",
4606 "3045022100adb1d679f65f96178b59f23ed37d3b70443118f345224a07ecb043eee2acc157022034d24524fe857144a3bcfff3065a9994d0a6ec5f11c681e49431d573e242612d",
4607 "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");
4609 test_htlc_output!(2,
4610 "3045022100c9458a4d2cbb741705577deb0a890e5cb90ee141be0400d3162e533727c9cb2102206edcf765c5dc5e5f9b976ea8149bf8607b5a0efb30691138e1231302b640d2a4",
4611 "304402200831422aa4e1ee6d55e0b894201770a8f8817a189356f2d70be76633ffa6a6f602200dd1b84a4855dc6727dd46c98daae43dfc70889d1ba7ef0087529a57c06e5e04",
4612 "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");
4616 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4617 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4618 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
4620 test_commitment!("3045022100d33c4e541aa1d255d41ea9a3b443b3b822ad8f7f86862638aac1f69f8f760577022007e2a18e6931ce3d3a804b1c78eda1de17dbe1fb7a95488c9a4ec86203953348",
4621 "304402203b1b010c109c2ecbe7feb2d259b9c4126bd5dc99ee693c422ec0a5781fe161ba0220571fe4e2c649dea9c7aaf7e49b382962f6a3494963c97d80fef9a430ca3f7061",
4622 "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");
4624 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);
4626 test_htlc_output!(0,
4627 "30450221009ed2f0a67f99e29c3c8cf45c08207b765980697781bb727fe0b1416de0e7622902206052684229bc171419ed290f4b615c943f819c0262414e43c5b91dcf72ddcf44",
4628 "3044022004ad5f04ae69c71b3b141d4db9d0d4c38d84009fb3cfeeae6efdad414487a9a0022042d3fe1388c1ff517d1da7fb4025663d372c14728ed52dc88608363450ff6a2f",
4629 "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");
4631 test_htlc_output!(1,
4632 "30440220155d3b90c67c33a8321996a9be5b82431b0c126613be751d400669da9d5c696702204318448bcd48824439d2c6a70be6e5747446be47ff45977cf41672bdc9b6b12d",
4633 "304402201707050c870c1f77cc3ed58d6d71bf281de239e9eabd8ef0955bad0d7fe38dcc02204d36d80d0019b3a71e646a08fa4a5607761d341ae8be371946ebe437c289c915",
4634 "02000000000101fb824d4e4dafc0f567789dee3a6bce8d411fe80f5563d8cdfdcc7d7e4447d43a010000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220155d3b90c67c33a8321996a9be5b82431b0c126613be751d400669da9d5c696702204318448bcd48824439d2c6a70be6e5747446be47ff45977cf41672bdc9b6b12d0147304402201707050c870c1f77cc3ed58d6d71bf281de239e9eabd8ef0955bad0d7fe38dcc02204d36d80d0019b3a71e646a08fa4a5607761d341ae8be371946ebe437c289c91501008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000");
4636 test_htlc_output!(2,
4637 "3045022100a12a9a473ece548584aabdd051779025a5ed4077c4b7aa376ec7a0b1645e5a48022039490b333f53b5b3e2ddde1d809e492cba2b3e5fc3a436cd3ffb4cd3d500fa5a",
4638 "3045022100ff200bc934ab26ce9a559e998ceb0aee53bc40368e114ab9d3054d9960546e2802202496856ca163ac12c143110b6b3ac9d598df7254f2e17b3b94c3ab5301f4c3b0",
4639 "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");
4643 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4644 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4645 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
4647 test_commitment!("304402205e2f76d4657fb732c0dfc820a18a7301e368f5799e06b7828007633741bda6df0220458009ae59d0c6246065c419359e05eb2a4b4ef4a1b310cc912db44eb7924298",
4648 "304402203b12d44254244b8ff3bb4129b0920fd45120ab42f553d9976394b099d500c99e02205e95bb7a3164852ef0c48f9e0eaf145218f8e2c41251b231f03cbdc4f29a5429",
4649 "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");
4651 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);
4653 test_htlc_output!(0,
4654 "3045022100a8a78fa1016a5c5c3704f2e8908715a3cef66723fb95f3132ec4d2d05cd84fb4022025ac49287b0861ec21932405f5600cbce94313dbde0e6c5d5af1b3366d8afbfc",
4655 "3045022100be6ae1977fd7b630a53623f3f25c542317ccfc2b971782802a4f1ef538eb22b402207edc4d0408f8f38fd3c7365d1cfc26511b7cd2d4fecd8b005fba3cd5bc704390",
4656 "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");
4658 test_htlc_output!(1,
4659 "3045022100e769cb156aa2f7515d126cef7a69968629620ce82afcaa9e210969de6850df4602200b16b3f3486a229a48aadde520dbee31ae340dbadaffae74fbb56681fef27b92",
4660 "30440220665b9cb4a978c09d1ca8977a534999bc8a49da624d0c5439451dd69cde1a003d022070eae0620f01f3c1bd029cc1488da13fb40fdab76f396ccd335479a11c5276d8",
4661 "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");
4665 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4666 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4667 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
4669 test_commitment!("3045022100c1a3b0b60ca092ed5080121f26a74a20cec6bdee3f8e47bae973fcdceb3eda5502207d467a9873c939bf3aa758014ae67295fedbca52412633f7e5b2670fc7c381c1",
4670 "304402200e930a43c7951162dc15a2b7344f48091c74c70f7024e7116e900d8bcfba861c022066fa6cbda3929e21daa2e7e16a4b948db7e8919ef978402360d1095ffdaff7b0",
4671 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014ccf1af2f2aabee14bb40fa3851ab2301de8431106f916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402200e930a43c7951162dc15a2b7344f48091c74c70f7024e7116e900d8bcfba861c022066fa6cbda3929e21daa2e7e16a4b948db7e8919ef978402360d1095ffdaff7b001483045022100c1a3b0b60ca092ed5080121f26a74a20cec6bdee3f8e47bae973fcdceb3eda5502207d467a9873c939bf3aa758014ae67295fedbca52412633f7e5b2670fc7c381c101475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220");
4673 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);
4675 test_htlc_output!(0,
4676 "3045022100dfb73b4fe961b31a859b2bb1f4f15cabab9265016dd0272323dc6a9e85885c54022059a7b87c02861ee70662907f25ce11597d7b68d3399443a831ae40e777b76bdb",
4677 "304402202765b9c9ece4f127fa5407faf66da4c5ce2719cdbe47cd3175fc7d48b482e43d02205605125925e07bad1e41c618a4b434d72c88a164981c4b8af5eaf4ee9142ec3a",
4678 "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");
4680 test_htlc_output!(1,
4681 "3045022100ea9dc2a7c3c3640334dab733bb4e036e32a3106dc707b24227874fa4f7da746802204d672f7ac0fe765931a8df10b81e53a3242dd32bd9dc9331eb4a596da87954e9",
4682 "30440220048a41c660c4841693de037d00a407810389f4574b3286afb7bc392a438fa3f802200401d71fa87c64fe621b49ac07e3bf85157ac680acb977124da28652cc7f1a5c",
4683 "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");
4687 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4688 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4689 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
4691 test_commitment!("30450221008b7c191dd46893b67b628e618d2dc8e81169d38bade310181ab77d7c94c6675e02203b4dd131fd7c9deb299560983dcdc485545c98f989f7ae8180c28289f9e6bdb0",
4692 "3044022047305531dd44391dce03ae20f8735005c615eb077a974edb0059ea1a311857d602202e0ed6972fbdd1e8cb542b06e0929bc41b2ddf236e04cb75edd56151f4197506",
4693 "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");
4695 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);
4697 test_htlc_output!(0,
4698 "3044022044f65cf833afdcb9d18795ca93f7230005777662539815b8a601eeb3e57129a902206a4bf3e53392affbba52640627defa8dc8af61c958c9e827b2798ab45828abdd",
4699 "3045022100b94d931a811b32eeb885c28ddcf999ae1981893b21dd1329929543fe87ce793002206370107fdd151c5f2384f9ceb71b3107c69c74c8ed5a28a94a4ab2d27d3b0724",
4700 "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");
4704 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4705 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4706 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
4708 test_commitment!("304402206d6cb93969d39177a09d5d45b583f34966195b77c7e585cf47ac5cce0c90cefb022031d71ae4e33a4e80df7f981d696fbdee517337806a3c7138b7491e2cbb077a0e",
4709 "304402206a2679efa3c7aaffd2a447fd0df7aba8792858b589750f6a1203f9259173198a022008d52a0e77a99ab533c36206cb15ad7aeb2aa72b93d4b571e728cb5ec2f6fe26",
4710 "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");
4712 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);
4714 test_htlc_output!(0,
4715 "3045022100fcb38506bfa11c02874092a843d0cc0a8613c23b639832564a5f69020cb0f6ba02206508b9e91eaa001425c190c68ee5f887e1ad5b1b314002e74db9dbd9e42dbecf",
4716 "304502210086e76b460ddd3cea10525fba298405d3fe11383e56966a5091811368362f689a02200f72ee75657915e0ede89c28709acd113ede9e1b7be520e3bc5cda425ecd6e68",
4717 "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");
4721 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4722 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4723 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
4725 test_commitment!("304402200769ba89c7330dfa4feba447b6e322305f12ac7dac70ec6ba997ed7c1b598d0802204fe8d337e7fee781f9b7b1a06e580b22f4f79d740059560191d7db53f8765552",
4726 "3045022100a012691ba6cea2f73fa8bac37750477e66363c6d28813b0bb6da77c8eb3fb0270220365e99c51304b0b1a6ab9ea1c8500db186693e39ec1ad5743ee231b0138384b9",
4727 "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");
4729 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4733 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4734 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4735 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
4737 test_commitment!("3044022037f83ff00c8e5fb18ae1f918ffc24e54581775a20ff1ae719297ef066c71caa9022039c529cccd89ff6c5ed1db799614533844bd6d101da503761c45c713996e3bbd",
4738 "30440220514f977bf7edc442de8ce43ace9686e5ebdc0f893033f13e40fb46c8b8c6e1f90220188006227d175f5c35da0b092c57bea82537aed89f7778204dc5bacf4f29f2b9",
4739 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b800222020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80ec0c62d0000000000160014ccf1af2f2aabee14bb40fa3851ab2301de84311004004730440220514f977bf7edc442de8ce43ace9686e5ebdc0f893033f13e40fb46c8b8c6e1f90220188006227d175f5c35da0b092c57bea82537aed89f7778204dc5bacf4f29f2b901473044022037f83ff00c8e5fb18ae1f918ffc24e54581775a20ff1ae719297ef066c71caa9022039c529cccd89ff6c5ed1db799614533844bd6d101da503761c45c713996e3bbd01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220");
4741 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4745 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4746 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4747 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
4749 test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
4750 "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
4751 "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");
4753 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4757 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
4758 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4759 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
4761 test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
4762 "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
4763 "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");
4765 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4770 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
4771 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
4773 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4774 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
4775 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
4776 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
4778 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
4779 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
4780 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
4782 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
4783 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
4785 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
4786 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
4788 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
4789 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
4790 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
4794 fn test_key_derivation() {
4795 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
4796 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4798 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4799 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4801 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
4802 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
4804 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
4805 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
4807 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
4808 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
4810 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
4811 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
4813 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
4814 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
4816 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
4817 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());