_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/channel.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
  11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
  12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
  13 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  14 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
  16
  17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
  20
  21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
  23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
  24
  25 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
  26 use ln::msgs;
  27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
  28 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
  29 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
  30 use ln::chan_utils;
  31 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
  32 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
  33 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
  34 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
  35 use util::transaction_utils;
  36 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
  37 use util::logger::Logger;
  38 use util::errors::APIError;
  39 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
  40
  41 use std;
  42 use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
  43 use std::ops::Deref;
  44 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
  45 use std::sync::Mutex;
  46 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
  47 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0;
  48
  49 #[cfg(test)]
  50 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
  51         pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
  52         pub channel_value_msat: u64,
  53         pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
  54         pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  55         pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  56         pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
  57         pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
  58         pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
  59 }
  60
  61 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
  62         FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
  63         FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
  64         Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
  65 }
  66
  67 enum InboundHTLCState {
  68         /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
  69         /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
  70         RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
  71         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
  72         /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
  73         /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
  74         /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
  75         /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
  76         /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
  77         /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
  78         /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
  79         /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
  80         /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
  81         /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
  82         /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
  83         ///
  84         /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
  85         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc)   --> local
  86         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
  87         /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack               <-- local
  88         /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
  89         /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
  90         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc)   --> local
  91         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
  92         /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
  93         /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
  94         /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
  95         /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
  96         /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
  97         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
  98         /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
  99         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
 100         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
 101         /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
 102         /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
 103         /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
 104         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 105         AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
 106         Committed,
 107         /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 108         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 109         /// we'll drop it.
 110         /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
 111         /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
 112         /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
 113         /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
 114         /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
 115         /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
 116         /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
 117         LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
 118 }
 119
 120 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
 121         htlc_id: u64,
 122         amount_msat: u64,
 123         cltv_expiry: u32,
 124         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 125         state: InboundHTLCState,
 126 }
 127
 128 enum OutboundHTLCState {
 129         /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 130         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 131         /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
 132         /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
 133         ///  * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
 134         ///    money back (though we won't), and,
 135         ///  * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
 136         ///    allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
 137         ///    doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
 138         ///    we'll never get out of sync).
 139         /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
 140         /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
 141         LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
 142         Committed,
 143         /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
 144         /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
 145         RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 146         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 147         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 148         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 149         /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
 150         /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
 151         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 152         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 153         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 154         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 155         /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
 156         /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
 157         AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 158 }
 159
 160 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
 161         htlc_id: u64,
 162         amount_msat: u64,
 163         cltv_expiry: u32,
 164         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 165         state: OutboundHTLCState,
 166         source: HTLCSource,
 167 }
 168
 169 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
 170 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
 171         AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
 172                 // always outbound
 173                 amount_msat: u64,
 174                 cltv_expiry: u32,
 175                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 176                 source: HTLCSource,
 177                 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
 178         },
 179         ClaimHTLC {
 180                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
 181                 htlc_id: u64,
 182         },
 183         FailHTLC {
 184                 htlc_id: u64,
 185                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
 186         },
 187 }
 188
 189 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
 190 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
 191 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
 192 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
 193 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
 194 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
 195 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
 196 enum ChannelState {
 197         /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
 198         OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
 199         /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
 200         TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
 201         /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
 202         /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
 203         /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
 204         FundingCreated = 4,
 205         /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
 206         /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
 207         /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
 208         FundingSent = 8,
 209         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
 210         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 211         TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
 212         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
 213         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 214         OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
 215         ChannelFunded = 64,
 216         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
 217         /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
 218         /// dance.
 219         PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
 220         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
 221         /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
 222         /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
 223         MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
 224         /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
 225         /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
 226         /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
 227         /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
 228         /// later.
 229         /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
 230         AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
 231         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
 232         /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
 233         /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
 234         RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
 235         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
 236         /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
 237         /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
 238         /// us their shutdown.
 239         LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
 240         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
 241         /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
 242         ShutdownComplete = 4096,
 243 }
 244 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
 245 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
 246
 247 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
 248
 249 /// Liveness is called to fluctuate given peer disconnecton/monitor failures/closing.
 250 /// If channel is public, network should have a liveness view announced by us on a
 251 /// best-effort, which means we may filter out some status transitions to avoid spam.
 252 /// See further timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
 253 #[derive(PartialEq)]
 254 enum UpdateStatus {
 255         /// Status has been gossiped.
 256         Fresh,
 257         /// Status has been changed.
 258         DisabledMarked,
 259         /// Status has been marked to be gossiped at next flush
 260         DisabledStaged,
 261 }
 262
 263 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
 264 enum HTLCInitiator {
 265         LocalOffered,
 266         RemoteOffered,
 267 }
 268
 269 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
 270 struct HTLCCandidate {
 271         amount_msat: u64,
 272         origin: HTLCInitiator,
 273 }
 274
 275 impl HTLCCandidate {
 276         fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
 277                 Self {
 278                         amount_msat,
 279                         origin,
 280                 }
 281         }
 282 }
 283
 284 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
 285 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
 286         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
 287         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
 288         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
 289         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
 290         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
 291         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
 292         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
 293         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
 294 }
 295
 296 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
 297 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
 298 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
 299 // inbound channel.
 300 //
 301 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
 302 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
 303 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
 304         config: ChannelConfig,
 305
 306         user_id: u64,
 307
 308         channel_id: [u8; 32],
 309         channel_state: u32,
 310         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
 311         channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 312
 313         latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
 314
 315         holder_signer: Signer,
 316         shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
 317         destination_script: Script,
 318
 319         // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
 320         // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
 321         // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
 322
 323         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 324         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 325         value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
 326         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
 327         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
 328         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
 329
 330         /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
 331         /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
 332         /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
 333         /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
 334         /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
 335         /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
 336         /// send it first.
 337         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
 338
 339         monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
 340         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
 341         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
 342         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
 343         monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
 344
 345         // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
 346         // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
 347         // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
 348         //
 349         // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
 350         // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
 351         // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
 352         // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
 353         // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
 354         // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
 355         // commitment_signed.
 356         pending_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 357         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
 358         // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
 359         // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
 360         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 361         holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 362         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
 363         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
 364         update_time_counter: u32,
 365         feerate_per_kw: u32,
 366
 367         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 368         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
 369         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 370         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 371         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
 372         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 373
 374         last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
 375
 376         /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
 377         /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
 378         /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
 379         /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
 380         funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
 381         short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
 382         funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
 383
 384         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 385         #[cfg(test)]
 386         pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 387         #[cfg(not(test))]
 388         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 389         #[cfg(test)]
 390         pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 391         #[cfg(not(test))]
 392         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 393         //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
 394         /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
 395         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
 396         // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
 397         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 398         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 399         #[cfg(test)]
 400         pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 401         #[cfg(not(test))]
 402         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 403         //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 404         minimum_depth: u32,
 405
 406         counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
 407
 408         pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
 409
 410         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 411
 412         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 413         counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
 414
 415         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
 416
 417         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
 418
 419         network_sync: UpdateStatus,
 420
 421         // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
 422         // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
 423         // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
 424         // `build_commitment_transaction`.
 425         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 426         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
 427         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 428         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
 429 }
 430
 431 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 432 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
 433         fee: u64,
 434         total_pending_htlcs: usize,
 435         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
 436         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
 437         feerate: u32,
 438 }
 439
 440 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
 441 /// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
 442 /// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
 443 /// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
 444 const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
 445 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
 446 const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
 447
 448 #[cfg(not(test))]
 449 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 450 #[cfg(test)]
 451 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 452 #[cfg(not(test))]
 453 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 454 #[cfg(test)]
 455 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 456
 457 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
 458 /// it's 2^24.
 459 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
 460
 461 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
 462 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
 463 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
 464 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
 465         Ignore(String),
 466         Close(String),
 467         CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
 468 }
 469
 470 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
 471         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
 472                 match self {
 473                         &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
 474                         &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
 475                         &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
 476                 }
 477         }
 478 }
 479
 480 macro_rules! secp_check {
 481         ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
 482                 match $res {
 483                         Ok(thing) => thing,
 484                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
 485                 }
 486         };
 487 }
 488
 489 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
 490         // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
 491         fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 492                 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
 493         }
 494
 495         /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
 496         /// required by us.
 497         ///
 498         /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
 499         pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 500                 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
 501                 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
 502         }
 503
 504         fn derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u32) -> u64 {
 505                 cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate as u64 * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
 506         }
 507
 508         // Constructors:
 509         pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
 510         where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
 511               F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 512         {
 513                 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
 514                 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
 515                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
 516
 517                 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 518                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
 519                 }
 520                 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
 521                 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
 522                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
 523                 }
 524                 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 525                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
 526                 }
 527                 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 528                 if Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
 529                         return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
 530                 }
 531
 532                 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
 533
 534                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 535                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
 536
 537                 Ok(Channel {
 538                         user_id,
 539                         config: config.channel_options.clone(),
 540
 541                         channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
 542                         channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
 543                         secp_ctx,
 544                         channel_value_satoshis,
 545
 546                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 547
 548                         holder_signer,
 549                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
 550                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 551
 552                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 553                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 554                         value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
 555
 556                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 557                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 558                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 559                         pending_update_fee: None,
 560                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 561                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 562                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 563                         update_time_counter: 1,
 564
 565                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 566
 567                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 568                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 569                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 570                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 571                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 572
 573                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 574                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 575                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 576                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 577
 578                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 579
 580                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 581                         short_channel_id: None,
 582                         funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
 583
 584                         feerate_per_kw: feerate,
 585                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
 586                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
 587                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
 588                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
 589                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
 590                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 591                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
 592                         minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
 593
 594                         counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
 595
 596                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
 597                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
 598                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 599                                 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
 600                                 counterparty_parameters: None,
 601                                 funding_outpoint: None
 602                         },
 603                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
 604
 605                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 606                         counterparty_node_id,
 607
 608                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
 609
 610                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 611
 612                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
 613
 614                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 615                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 616                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 617                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 618                 })
 619         }
 620
 621         fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
 622                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
 623         {
 624                 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 625                 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
 626                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
 627                 }
 628                 let upper_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64  * 2;
 629                 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
 630                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
 631                 }
 632                 Ok(())
 633         }
 634
 635         /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
 636         /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
 637         pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
 638                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
 639           F::Target: FeeEstimator
 640         {
 641                 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
 642                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
 643                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
 644                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
 645                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
 646                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
 647                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
 648                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
 649                 };
 650                 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
 651
 652                 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 653                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
 654                 }
 655
 656                 // Check sanity of message fields:
 657                 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 658                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 659                 }
 660                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 661                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 662                 }
 663                 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 664                 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
 665                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
 666                 }
 667                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 668                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 669                 }
 670                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
 671                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
 672                 }
 673                 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 674                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
 675                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
 676                 }
 677                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
 678
 679                 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
 680                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
 681                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
 682                 }
 683                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
 684                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
 685                 }
 686                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
 687                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
 688                 }
 689
 690                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
 691                 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
 692                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
 693                 }
 694                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
 695                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat,  config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
 696                 }
 697                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
 698                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
 699                 }
 700                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
 701                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 702                 }
 703                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
 704                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
 705                 }
 706                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
 707                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 708                 }
 709                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
 710                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 711                 }
 712
 713                 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
 714
 715                 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
 716                 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
 717                         if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
 718                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
 719                         }
 720                 }
 721                 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
 722                 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
 723
 724                 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 725
 726                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
 727                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
 728                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
 729                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 730                 }
 731                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
 732                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 733                 }
 734                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
 735                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 736                 }
 737
 738                 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
 739                 // for full fee payment
 740                 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
 741                 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 742                 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
 743                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
 744                 }
 745
 746                 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
 747                 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 748                 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
 749                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
 750                 }
 751
 752                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
 753                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
 754                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
 755                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
 756                                         if script.len() == 0 {
 757                                                 None
 758                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
 759                                         } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
 760                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
 761                                         } else {
 762                                                 Some(script.clone())
 763                                         }
 764                                 },
 765                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
 766                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
 767                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
 768                                 }
 769                         }
 770                 } else { None };
 771
 772                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 773                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
 774
 775                 let chan = Channel {
 776                         user_id,
 777                         config: local_config,
 778
 779                         channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
 780                         channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
 781                         secp_ctx,
 782
 783                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 784
 785                         holder_signer,
 786                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
 787                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 788
 789                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 790                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 791                         value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
 792
 793                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 794                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 795                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 796                         pending_update_fee: None,
 797                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 798                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 799                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 800                         update_time_counter: 1,
 801
 802                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 803
 804                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 805                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 806                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 807                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 808                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 809
 810                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 811                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 812                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 813                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 814
 815                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 816
 817                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 818                         short_channel_id: None,
 819                         funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
 820
 821                         feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
 822                         channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
 823                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
 824                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
 825                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
 826                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
 827                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
 828                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 829                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
 830                         minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
 831
 832                         counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
 833
 834                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
 835                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
 836                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 837                                 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
 838                                 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
 839                                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
 840                                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
 841                                 }),
 842                                 funding_outpoint: None
 843                         },
 844                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
 845
 846                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 847                         counterparty_node_id,
 848
 849                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
 850
 851                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 852
 853                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
 854
 855                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 856                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 857                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 858                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 859                 };
 860
 861                 Ok(chan)
 862         }
 863
 864         /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
 865         /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
 866         /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
 867         /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
 868         /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
 869         /// an HTLC to a).
 870         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
 871         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
 872         /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
 873         /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
 874         /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
 875         /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
 876         /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
 877         /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
 878         /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
 879         /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
 880         /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
 881         #[inline]
 882         fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
 883                 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
 884                 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
 885                 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
 886
 887                 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
 888                 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 889                 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 890                 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
 891
 892                 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
 893
 894                 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
 895                         ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
 896                                 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 897                                         offered: $offered,
 898                                         amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
 899                                         cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
 900                                         payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
 901                                         transaction_output_index: None
 902                                 }
 903                         }
 904                 }
 905
 906                 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
 907                         ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
 908                                 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
 909                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
 910                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
 911                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 912                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 913                                         } else {
 914                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 915                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 916                                         }
 917                                 } else {
 918                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
 919                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
 920                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 921                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 922                                         } else {
 923                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 924                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 925                                         }
 926                                 }
 927                         }
 928                 }
 929
 930                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
 931                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
 932                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
 933                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
 934                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
 935                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
 936                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
 937                         };
 938
 939                         if include {
 940                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
 941                                 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 942                         } else {
 943                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
 944                                 match &htlc.state {
 945                                         &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
 946                                                 if generated_by_local {
 947                                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
 948                                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 949                                                         }
 950                                                 }
 951                                         },
 952                                         _ => {},
 953                                 }
 954                         }
 955                 }
 956
 957                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
 958                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
 959                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
 960                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
 961                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
 962                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
 963                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
 964                         };
 965
 966                         if include {
 967                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
 968                                 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 969                         } else {
 970                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
 971                                 match htlc.state {
 972                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
 973                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 974                                         },
 975                                         OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
 976                                                 if !generated_by_local {
 977                                                         value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 978                                                 }
 979                                         },
 980                                         _ => {},
 981                                 }
 982                         }
 983                 }
 984
 985                 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
 986                 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
 987                 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
 988                 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
 989                 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
 990                 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
 991                 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
 992                 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
 993
 994                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 995                 {
 996                         // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
 997                         // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
 998                         let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
 999                                 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1000                         } else {
1001                                 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1002                         };
1003                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1004                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1005                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
1006                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1007                 }
1008
1009                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1010                 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1011                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1012                 } else {
1013                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
1014                 };
1015
1016                 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1017                 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1018
1019                 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1020                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1021                 } else {
1022                         value_to_a = 0;
1023                 }
1024
1025                 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1026                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1027                 } else {
1028                         value_to_b = 0;
1029                 }
1030
1031                 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1032
1033                 let channel_parameters =
1034                         if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1035                         else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1036                 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1037                                                                              value_to_a as u64,
1038                                                                              value_to_b as u64,
1039                                                                              keys.clone(),
1040                                                                              feerate_per_kw,
1041                                                                              &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1042                                                                              &channel_parameters
1043                 );
1044                 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1045                 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1046                 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1047                 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1048
1049                 (tx, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1050         }
1051
1052         #[inline]
1053         fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1054                 let channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1055                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1056         }
1057
1058         #[inline]
1059         fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1060                 let mut ret =
1061                 (4 +                                           // version
1062                  1 +                                           // input count
1063                  36 +                                          // prevout
1064                  1 +                                           // script length (0)
1065                  4 +                                           // sequence
1066                  1 +                                           // output count
1067                  4                                             // lock time
1068                  )*4 +                                         // * 4 for non-witness parts
1069                 2 +                                            // witness marker and flag
1070                 1 +                                            // witness element count
1071                 4 +                                            // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1072                 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1073                 2*(1 + 71);                                    // two signatures + sighash type flags
1074                 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1075                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1076                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1077                 }
1078                 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1079                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1080                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1081                 }
1082                 ret
1083         }
1084
1085         #[inline]
1086         fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1087                 let txins = {
1088                         let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1089                         ins.push(TxIn {
1090                                 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1091                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1092                                 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1093                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1094                         });
1095                         ins
1096                 };
1097
1098                 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1099                 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1100                 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1101
1102                 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1103                 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1104                 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1105
1106                 if value_to_self < 0 {
1107                         assert!(self.is_outbound());
1108                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1109                 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1110                         assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1111                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1112                 }
1113
1114                 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1115                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1116                                 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1117                                 value: value_to_remote as u64
1118                         }, ()));
1119                 }
1120
1121                 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1122                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1123                                 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1124                                 value: value_to_self as u64
1125                         }, ()));
1126                 }
1127
1128                 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1129
1130                 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1131                 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1132                         outputs.push(out.0);
1133                 }
1134
1135                 (Transaction {
1136                         version: 2,
1137                         lock_time: 0,
1138                         input: txins,
1139                         output: outputs,
1140                 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1141         }
1142
1143         fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1144                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1145         }
1146
1147         #[inline]
1148         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1149         /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1150         /// our counterparty!)
1151         /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1152         /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1153         fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1154                 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1155                 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1156                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1157                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1158
1159                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1160         }
1161
1162         #[inline]
1163         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1164         /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1165         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1166         fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1167                 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1168                 //may see payments to it!
1169                 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1170                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1171                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1172
1173                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1174         }
1175
1176         /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1177         /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1178         /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1179         pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1180                 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1181         }
1182
1183         /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1184         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1185         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1186         fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Transaction {
1187                 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay() } else { self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay() }, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1188         }
1189
1190         /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1191         /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1192         /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1193         ///
1194         /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1195         /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1196         fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1197                 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1198                 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1199                 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1200                 // either.
1201                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1202                         panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1203                 }
1204                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1205
1206                 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1207
1208                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1209                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1210                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1211
1212                 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1213                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1214                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1215                                 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1216                                 match htlc.state {
1217                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1218                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1219                                                 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1220                                                 } else {
1221                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1222                                                 }
1223                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1224                                                 return Ok((None, None));
1225                                         },
1226                                         _ => {
1227                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1228                                                 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1229                                         }
1230                                 }
1231                                 pending_idx = idx;
1232                                 break;
1233                         }
1234                 }
1235                 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1236                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1237                 }
1238
1239                 // Now update local state:
1240                 //
1241                 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1242                 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1243                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1244                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1245                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1246                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1247                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1248                         }],
1249                 };
1250
1251                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1252                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1253                                 match pending_update {
1254                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1255                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1256                                                         // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1257                                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1258                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1259                                                         return Ok((None, None));
1260                                                 }
1261                                         },
1262                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1263                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1264                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1265                                                         // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1266                                                         // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1267                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1268                                                         return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1269                                                 }
1270                                         },
1271                                         _ => {}
1272                                 }
1273                         }
1274                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1275                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1276                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1277                         });
1278                         return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1279                 }
1280
1281                 {
1282                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1283                         if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1284                         } else {
1285                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1286                                 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1287                         }
1288                         log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1289                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1290                 }
1291
1292                 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1293                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1294                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1295                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1296                 }), Some(monitor_update)))
1297         }
1298
1299         pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1300                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger)? {
1301                         (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), Some(mut monitor_update)) => {
1302                                 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1303                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1304                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1305                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1306                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1307                                 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1308                         },
1309                         (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), None) => {
1310                                 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1311                                 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1312                         },
1313                         (None, Some(monitor_update)) => Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))),
1314                         (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1315                 }
1316         }
1317
1318         /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1319         /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1320         /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1321         ///
1322         /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1323         /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1324         pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
1325                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1326                         panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1327                 }
1328                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1329
1330                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1331                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1332                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1333
1334                 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1335                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1336                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1337                                 match htlc.state {
1338                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1339                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1340                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1341                                                 return Ok(None);
1342                                         },
1343                                         _ => {
1344                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1345                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1346                                         }
1347                                 }
1348                                 pending_idx = idx;
1349                         }
1350                 }
1351                 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1352                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1353                 }
1354
1355                 // Now update local state:
1356                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1357                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1358                                 match pending_update {
1359                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1360                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1361                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1362                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1363                                                 }
1364                                         },
1365                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1366                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1367                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1368                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1369                                                 }
1370                                         },
1371                                         _ => {}
1372                                 }
1373                         }
1374                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1375                                 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1376                                 err_packet,
1377                         });
1378                         return Ok(None);
1379                 }
1380
1381                 {
1382                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1383                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1384                 }
1385
1386                 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1387                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1388                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1389                         reason: err_packet
1390                 }))
1391         }
1392
1393         // Message handlers:
1394
1395         pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1396                 // Check sanity of message fields:
1397                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1398                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1399                 }
1400                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1401                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1402                 }
1403                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1404                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1405                 }
1406                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1407                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1408                 }
1409                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1410                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve ({}) and dust_limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1411                 }
1412                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1413                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1414                 }
1415                 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1416                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1417                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1418                 }
1419                 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1420                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1421                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1422                 }
1423                 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1424                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1425                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1426                 }
1427                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1428                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1429                 }
1430                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1431                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1432                 }
1433
1434                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1435                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1436                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1437                 }
1438                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1439                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1440                 }
1441                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1442                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1443                 }
1444                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1445                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1446                 }
1447                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
1448                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1449                 }
1450                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
1451                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1452                 }
1453                 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1454                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1455                 }
1456
1457                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1458                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1459                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1460                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1461                                         if script.len() == 0 {
1462                                                 None
1463                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1464                                         } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
1465                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
1466                                         } else {
1467                                                 Some(script.clone())
1468                                         }
1469                                 },
1470                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1471                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1472                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1473                                 }
1474                         }
1475                 } else { None };
1476
1477                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1478                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1479                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1480                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1481                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1482                 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1483
1484                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1485                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1486                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1487                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1488                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1489                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1490                 };
1491
1492                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1493                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1494                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1495                 });
1496
1497                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1498                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1499
1500                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1501
1502                 Ok(())
1503         }
1504
1505         fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1506                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1507
1508                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1509                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1510                 {
1511                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1512                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1513                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1514                         // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1515                         log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1516                         secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1517                 }
1518
1519                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1520                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1521
1522                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1523                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1524                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1525
1526                 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1527                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1528
1529                 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1530                 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1531         }
1532
1533         fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1534                 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1535         }
1536
1537         pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, last_block_hash: BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1538                 if self.is_outbound() {
1539                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1540                 }
1541                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1542                         // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1543                         // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1544                         // channel.
1545                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1546                 }
1547                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1548                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1549                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1550                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1551                 }
1552
1553                 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1554                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1555                 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks.  In particular
1556                 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1557                 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1558
1559                 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1560                         Ok(res) => res,
1561                         Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1562                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1563                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1564                         },
1565                         Err(e) => {
1566                                 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1567                                 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1568                                 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1569                         }
1570                 };
1571
1572                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1573                         initial_commitment_tx,
1574                         msg.signature,
1575                         Vec::new(),
1576                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1577                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1578                 );
1579
1580                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1581
1582                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1583                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1584                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1585                 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1586                                                           &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1587                                                           &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1588                                                           &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1589                                                           funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1590                                                           obscure_factor,
1591                                                           holder_commitment_tx, last_block_hash);
1592
1593                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1594
1595                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1596                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1597                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1598                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1599
1600                 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1601                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
1602                         signature
1603                 }, channel_monitor))
1604         }
1605
1606         /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1607         /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1608         pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, last_block_hash: BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1609                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1610                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1611                 }
1612                 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1613                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1614                 }
1615                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1616                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1617                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1618                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1619                 }
1620
1621                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1622
1623                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1624                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1625                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1626                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1627
1628                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1629
1630                 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1631                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1632                 {
1633                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1634                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1635                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1636                         // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1637                         if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1638                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1639                         }
1640                 }
1641
1642                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1643                         initial_commitment_tx,
1644                         msg.signature,
1645                         Vec::new(),
1646                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1647                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1648                 );
1649
1650
1651                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1652                 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1653                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1654                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1655                 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1656                                                           &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1657                                                           &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1658                                                           &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1659                                                           funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1660                                                           obscure_factor,
1661                                                           holder_commitment_tx, last_block_hash);
1662
1663                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1664
1665                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1666                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1667                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1668                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1669
1670                 Ok(channel_monitor)
1671         }
1672
1673         pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1674                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1675                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1676                 }
1677
1678                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1679
1680                 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1681                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1682                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1683                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1684                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
1685                 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1686                                  // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1687                                  self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1688                                  self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1689                                 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1690                                 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1691                                                       (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1692                         if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1693                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1694                         }
1695                         // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1696                         return Ok(());
1697                 } else {
1698                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1699                 }
1700
1701                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1702                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1703                 Ok(())
1704         }
1705
1706         /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1707         fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1708                 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1709                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1710                         htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1711                 }
1712                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1713         }
1714
1715         /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1716         /// holding cell.
1717         fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1718                 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1719                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1720                         htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1721                 }
1722
1723                 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1724                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1725                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1726                                 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1727                                 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1728                         }
1729                 }
1730
1731                 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1732         }
1733
1734         /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1735         /// Doesn't bother handling the
1736         /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1737         /// corner case properly.
1738         pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1739                 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1740                 (cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1741                 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1742         }
1743
1744         // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1745         // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1746         fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1747                 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1748                 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1749                 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1750         }
1751
1752         // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1753         // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
1754         // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
1755         // are excluded.
1756         fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1757                 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1758
1759                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1760                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1761
1762                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1763                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1764                 match htlc.origin {
1765                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1766                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1767                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1768                                 }
1769                         },
1770                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1771                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1772                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1773                                 }
1774                         }
1775                 }
1776
1777                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1778                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1779                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1780                                 continue
1781                         }
1782                         // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1783                         // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1784                         included_htlcs += 1;
1785                 }
1786
1787                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1788                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1789                                 continue
1790                         }
1791                         match htlc.state {
1792                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1793                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1794                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1795                                 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1796                                 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1797                                 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1798                                 _ => {},
1799                         }
1800                 }
1801
1802                 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1803                         match htlc {
1804                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1805                                         if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1806                                                 continue
1807                                         }
1808                                         included_htlcs += 1
1809                                 },
1810                                 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1811                                          // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1812                         }
1813                 }
1814
1815                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1816                 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1817                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1818                 {
1819                         let mut fee = res;
1820                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1821                                 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1822                         }
1823                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1824                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1825                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1826                                 fee,
1827                                 total_pending_htlcs,
1828                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1829                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1830                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1831                                 },
1832                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1833                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1834                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1835                                 },
1836                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1837                         };
1838                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1839                 }
1840                 res
1841         }
1842
1843         // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1844         // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
1845         // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
1846         // excluded.
1847         fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1848                 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1849
1850                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1851                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1852
1853                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1854                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1855                 match htlc.origin {
1856                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1857                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1858                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1859                                 }
1860                         },
1861                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1862                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1863                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1864                                 }
1865                         }
1866                 }
1867
1868                 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1869                 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1870                 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1871                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1872                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1873                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1874                                 continue
1875                         }
1876                         included_htlcs += 1;
1877                 }
1878
1879                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1880                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1881                                 continue
1882                         }
1883                         // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1884                         // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1885                         match htlc.state {
1886                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1887                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1888                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1889                                 _ => {},
1890                         }
1891                 }
1892
1893                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1894                 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1895                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1896                 {
1897                         let mut fee = res;
1898                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1899                                 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1900                         }
1901                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1902                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1903                                 fee,
1904                                 total_pending_htlcs,
1905                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1906                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1907                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1908                                 },
1909                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1910                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1911                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1912                                 },
1913                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1914                         };
1915                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1916                 }
1917                 res
1918         }
1919
1920         pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1921         where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
1922                 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
1923                 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1924                 if local_sent_shutdown {
1925                         pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
1926                 }
1927                 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
1928                 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1929                 if remote_sent_shutdown {
1930                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1931                 }
1932                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1933                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1934                 }
1935                 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1936                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
1937                 }
1938                 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
1939                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
1940                 }
1941                 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
1942                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
1943                 }
1944
1945                 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1946                 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1947                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
1948                 }
1949                 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1950                 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1951                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1952                 }
1953                 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1954                 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1955                 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1956                 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1957                 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1958                 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1959                 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1960                 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1961                 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1962                 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1963                 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1964                 // transaction).
1965                 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
1966                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1967                         if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
1968                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1969                         } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
1970                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1971                         }
1972                 }
1973
1974                 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
1975                         self.value_to_self_msat + htlc_inbound_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
1976                 let pending_remote_value_msat =
1977                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
1978                 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
1979                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
1980                 }
1981
1982                 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
1983                 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
1984                 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
1985                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
1986                         self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
1987                 };
1988                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
1989                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
1990                 };
1991
1992                 let chan_reserve_msat =
1993                         Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
1994                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
1995                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
1996                 }
1997
1998                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1999                         // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2000                         // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2001                         // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2002                         // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2003                         // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2004                         // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2005                         // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2006                         // sensitive to fee spikes.
2007                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2008                         let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2009                         if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2010                                 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2011                                 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2012                                 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation");
2013                                 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2014                         }
2015                 } else {
2016                         // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2017                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2018                         let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2019                         if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2020                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2021                         }
2022                 }
2023                 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2024                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2025                 }
2026                 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2027                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2028                 }
2029
2030                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2031                         if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2032                                 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2033                         }
2034                 }
2035
2036                 // Now update local state:
2037                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2038                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2039                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2040                         amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2041                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2042                         cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2043                         state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2044                 });
2045                 Ok(())
2046         }
2047
2048         /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2049         #[inline]
2050         fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2051                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2052                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2053                                 match check_preimage {
2054                                         None => {},
2055                                         Some(payment_hash) =>
2056                                                 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2057                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2058                                                 }
2059                                 };
2060                                 match htlc.state {
2061                                         OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2062                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2063                                         OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2064                                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2065                                         },
2066                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2067                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2068                                 }
2069                                 return Ok(&htlc.source);
2070                         }
2071                 }
2072                 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2073         }
2074
2075         pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2076                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2077                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2078                 }
2079                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2080                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2081                 }
2082
2083                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2084                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
2085         }
2086
2087         pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2088                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2089                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2090                 }
2091                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2092                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2093                 }
2094
2095                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2096                 Ok(())
2097         }
2098
2099         pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2100                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2101                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2102                 }
2103                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2104                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2105                 }
2106
2107                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2108                 Ok(())
2109         }
2110
2111         pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2112         where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2113                                 L::Target: Logger
2114         {
2115                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2116                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2117                 }
2118                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2119                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2120                 }
2121                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2122                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2123                 }
2124
2125                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2126
2127                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2128
2129                 let mut update_fee = false;
2130                 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2131                         update_fee = true;
2132                         self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
2133                 } else {
2134                         self.feerate_per_kw
2135                 };
2136
2137                 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid) = {
2138                         let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
2139                         let commitment_txid = {
2140                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2141                                 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2142                                 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2143
2144                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
2145                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2146                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2147                                 }
2148                                 bitcoin_tx.txid
2149                         };
2150                         let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2151                         (commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid)
2152                 };
2153
2154                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2155                 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
2156                 if update_fee {
2157                         let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2158                         if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2159                                 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2160                         }
2161                 }
2162                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2163                 {
2164                         if self.is_outbound() {
2165                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2166                                 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2167                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2168                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2169                                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2170                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2171                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2172                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2173                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2174                                                         assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2175                                                 }
2176                                 }
2177                         }
2178                 }
2179
2180                 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2181                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2182                 }
2183
2184                 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2185                 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2186                 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2187                         if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2188                                 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &keys, feerate_per_kw);
2189                                 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2190                                 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2191                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
2192                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2193                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2194                                 }
2195                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2196                         } else {
2197                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2198                         }
2199                 }
2200
2201                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2202                         commitment_tx,
2203                         msg.signature,
2204                         msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2205                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2206                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2207                 );
2208
2209                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2210                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2211
2212                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2213                 let mut need_commitment = false;
2214                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2215                         if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
2216                                 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
2217                                 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
2218                                 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
2219                                 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
2220                                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
2221                                         need_commitment = true;
2222                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2223                                 }
2224                         }
2225                 }
2226
2227                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2228                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2229                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2230                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2231                                 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2232                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2233                         }]
2234                 };
2235
2236                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2237                         let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2238                                 Some(forward_info.clone())
2239                         } else { None };
2240                         if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2241                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2242                                 need_commitment = true;
2243                         }
2244                 }
2245                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2246                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2247                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
2248                         } else { None } {
2249                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2250                                 need_commitment = true;
2251                         }
2252                 }
2253
2254                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2255                 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2256                 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2257                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2258
2259                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2260                         // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2261                         // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2262                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2263                         if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2264                                 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2265                                 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2266                                 // includes the right HTLCs.
2267                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2268                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2269                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2270                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2271                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2272                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2273                         }
2274                         // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2275                         // re-send the message on restoration)
2276                         return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2277                 }
2278
2279                 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2280                         // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2281                         // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2282                         // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2283                         let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2284                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2285                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2286                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2287                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2288                         (Some(msg), None)
2289                 } else if !need_commitment {
2290                         (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2291                 } else { (None, None) };
2292
2293                 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2294                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2295                         per_commitment_secret,
2296                         next_per_commitment_point,
2297                 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2298         }
2299
2300         /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2301         /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2302         fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2303                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2304                 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2305                         log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
2306
2307                         let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2308                                 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2309                                 updates: Vec::new(),
2310                         };
2311
2312                         let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2313                         mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2314                         let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2315                         let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2316                         let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2317                         let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2318                         for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2319                                 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2320                                 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2321                                 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2322                                 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2323                                 // to rebalance channels.
2324                                 match &htlc_update {
2325                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2326                                                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2327                                                         Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2328                                                         Err(e) => {
2329                                                                 match e {
2330                                                                         ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2331                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2332                                                                                 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2333                                                                                 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2334                                                                                 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2335                                                                                 // into the holding cell without ever being
2336                                                                                 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2337                                                                                 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2338                                                                                 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2339                                                                         },
2340                                                                         _ => {
2341                                                                                 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2342                                                                         },
2343                                                                 }
2344                                                         }
2345                                                 }
2346                                         },
2347                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2348                                                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2349                                                         Ok((update_fulfill_msg_option, additional_monitor_update_opt)) => {
2350                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2351                                                                 if let Some(mut additional_monitor_update) = additional_monitor_update_opt {
2352                                                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2353                                                                 }
2354                                                         },
2355                                                         Err(e) => {
2356                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2357                                                                 else {
2358                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
2359                                                                 }
2360                                                         }
2361                                                 }
2362                                         },
2363                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2364                                                 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
2365                                                         Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
2366                                                         Err(e) => {
2367                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2368                                                                 else {
2369                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2370                                                                 }
2371                                                         }
2372                                                 }
2373                                         },
2374                                 }
2375                         }
2376                         if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2377                                 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2378                         }
2379                         let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2380                                 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2381                                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2382                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2383                                         feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2384                                 })
2385                         } else {
2386                                 None
2387                         };
2388
2389                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2390                         // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2391                         // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2392                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2393                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2394
2395                         Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2396                                 update_add_htlcs,
2397                                 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2398                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2399                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2400                                 update_fee,
2401                                 commitment_signed,
2402                         }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2403                 } else {
2404                         Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2405                 }
2406         }
2407
2408         /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2409         /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2410         /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2411         /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2412         /// revoke_and_ack message.
2413         pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2414                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2415                                         L::Target: Logger,
2416         {
2417                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2418                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2419                 }
2420                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2421                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2422                 }
2423                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2424                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2425                 }
2426
2427                 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2428                         if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2429                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2430                         }
2431                 }
2432
2433                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2434                         // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2435                         // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2436                         // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2437                         // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2438                         // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2439                         // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2440                         // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2441                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2442                 }
2443
2444                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2445                 {
2446                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2447                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2448                 }
2449
2450                 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2451                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2452                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2453                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2454                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2455                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2456                                 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2457                                 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2458                         }],
2459                 };
2460
2461                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2462                 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2463                 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2464                 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2465                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2466                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2467                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2468                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2469
2470                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
2471                 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2472                 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2473                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2474                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2475                 let mut require_commitment = false;
2476                 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2477
2478                 {
2479                         // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2480                         let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2481                         let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2482
2483                         // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2484                         pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2485                                 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2486                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2487                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2488                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2489                                         }
2490                                         false
2491                                 } else { true }
2492                         });
2493                         pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2494                                 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2495                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2496                                         if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2497                                                 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2498                                         } else {
2499                                                 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2500                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2501                                         }
2502                                         false
2503                                 } else { true }
2504                         });
2505                         for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2506                                 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2507                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2508                                         true
2509                                 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2510                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2511                                         true
2512                                 } else { false };
2513                                 if swap {
2514                                         let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2515                                         mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2516
2517                                         if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2518                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2519                                                 require_commitment = true;
2520                                         } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2521                                                 match forward_info {
2522                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2523                                                                 require_commitment = true;
2524                                                                 match fail_msg {
2525                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2526                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2527                                                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2528                                                                         },
2529                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2530                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2531                                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2532                                                                         },
2533                                                                 }
2534                                                         },
2535                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2536                                                                 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2537                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2538                                                         }
2539                                                 }
2540                                         }
2541                                 }
2542                         }
2543                         for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2544                                 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2545                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2546                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2547                                 }
2548                                 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2549                                         Some(fail_reason.take())
2550                                 } else { None } {
2551                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2552                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2553                                         require_commitment = true;
2554                                 }
2555                         }
2556                 }
2557                 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2558
2559                 if self.is_outbound() {
2560                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2561                                 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2562                         }
2563                 } else {
2564                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2565                                 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2566                                 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2567                                 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2568                                 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2569                                 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2570                                 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2571                                         require_commitment = true;
2572                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2573                                 }
2574                         }
2575                 }
2576
2577                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2578                         // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2579                         // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2580                         if require_commitment {
2581                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2582                                 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2583                                 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2584                                 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2585                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2586                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2587                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2588                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2589                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2590                         }
2591                         self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2592                         self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2593                         return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2594                 }
2595
2596                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2597                         (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2598                                 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2599                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2600                                         commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2601                                 }
2602                                 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2603                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2604                                         commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2605                                 }
2606
2607                                 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2608                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2609                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2610                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2611
2612                                 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2613                         },
2614                         (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2615                                 if require_commitment {
2616                                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2617
2618                                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2619                                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2620                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2621                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2622
2623                                         Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2624                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2625                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2626                                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2627                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2628                                                 update_fee: None,
2629                                                 commitment_signed
2630                                         }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2631                                 } else {
2632                                         Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2633                                 }
2634                         }
2635                 }
2636
2637         }
2638
2639         /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2640         /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2641         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2642         fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2643                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2644                         panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2645                 }
2646                 if !self.is_usable() {
2647                         panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2648                 }
2649                 if !self.is_live() {
2650                         panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2651                 }
2652
2653                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2654                         self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2655                         return None;
2656                 }
2657
2658                 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2659                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2660
2661                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2662                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2663                         feerate_per_kw,
2664                 })
2665         }
2666
2667         pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2668                 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2669                         Some(update_fee) => {
2670                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2671                                 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2672                         },
2673                         None => Ok(None)
2674                 }
2675         }
2676
2677         /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2678         /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2679         /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2680         /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2681         /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2682         /// completed.
2683         pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> where L::Target: Logger {
2684                 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2685
2686                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2687                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2688                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2689                         return outbound_drops;
2690                 }
2691                 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2692                 // will be retransmitted.
2693                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2694
2695                 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2696                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2697                         match htlc.state {
2698                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2699                                         // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2700                                         // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2701                                         // this HTLC accordingly
2702                                         inbound_drop_count += 1;
2703                                         false
2704                                 },
2705                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2706                                         // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2707                                         // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2708                                         // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2709                                         true
2710                                 },
2711                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2712                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2713                                         // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2714                                         // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2715                                         // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2716                                         // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2717                                         true
2718                                 },
2719                         }
2720                 });
2721                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2722
2723                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2724                         if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2725                                 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2726                                 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2727                                 // the update upon reconnection.
2728                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2729                         }
2730                 }
2731
2732                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2733                         match htlc_update {
2734                                 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are
2735                                 // no holding cell HTLC update_adds, so if in the future we stop
2736                                 // dropping added HTLCs here and failing them backwards, then there will
2737                                 // need to be corresponding changes made in the Channel's re-establish
2738                                 // logic.
2739                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2740                                         outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2741                                         false
2742                                 },
2743                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2744                         }
2745                 });
2746                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2747                 log_debug!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2748                 outbound_drops
2749         }
2750
2751         /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2752         /// updates are partially paused.
2753         /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2754         /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2755         /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2756         /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2757         pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2758                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2759                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2760                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2761                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2762                 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2763                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2764                 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2765                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2766         }
2767
2768         /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2769         /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2770         /// to the remote side.
2771         pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
2772                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2773                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2774
2775                 let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound();
2776
2777                 // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
2778                 // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
2779                 // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
2780                 // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
2781                 // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
2782                 // monitor was persisted.
2783                 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2784                         assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
2785                         self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2786                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2787                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2788                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2789                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2790                         })
2791                 } else { None };
2792
2793                 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2794                 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2795                 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2796                 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2797
2798                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2799                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2800                         self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2801                         return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
2802                 }
2803
2804                 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2805                         Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2806                 } else { None };
2807                 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2808                         Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
2809                 } else { None };
2810
2811                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2812                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2813                 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2814                 log_trace!(logger, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2815                         if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
2816                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
2817                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2818                         match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2819                 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
2820         }
2821
2822         pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2823                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2824         {
2825                 if self.is_outbound() {
2826                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
2827                 }
2828                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2829                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2830                 }
2831                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2832                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw);
2833                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2834                 Ok(())
2835         }
2836
2837         fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2838                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2839                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2840                 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2841                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2842                         per_commitment_secret,
2843                         next_per_commitment_point,
2844                 }
2845         }
2846
2847         fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
2848                 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2849                 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2850                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2851                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2852
2853                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2854                         if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2855                                 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2856                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2857                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2858                                         amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2859                                         payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2860                                         cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2861                                         onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2862                                 });
2863                         }
2864                 }
2865
2866                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2867                         if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2868                                 match reason {
2869                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2870                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2871                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2872                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2873                                                         reason: err_packet.clone()
2874                                                 });
2875                                         },
2876                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2877                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2878                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2879                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2880                                                         sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2881                                                         failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2882                                                 });
2883                                         },
2884                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2885                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2886                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2887                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2888                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2889                                                 });
2890                                         },
2891                                 }
2892                         }
2893                 }
2894
2895                 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2896                                 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2897                 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2898                         update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2899                         update_fee: None,
2900                         commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2901                 }
2902         }
2903
2904         /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2905         /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2906         pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2907                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2908                         // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2909                         // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2910                         // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2911                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
2912                 }
2913
2914                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2915                         msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2916                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2917                 }
2918
2919                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
2920                         match msg.data_loss_protect {
2921                                 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
2922                                         let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2923                                         let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
2924                                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
2925                                         if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
2926                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
2927                                         }
2928                                         if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2929                                                 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
2930                                                         "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
2931                                                 ));
2932                                         }
2933                                 },
2934                                 OptionalField::Absent => {}
2935                         }
2936                 }
2937
2938                 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2939                 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2940                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2941
2942                 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2943                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2944                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2945                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2946                         })
2947                 } else { None };
2948
2949                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2950                         // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
2951                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
2952                                         self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2953                                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2954                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
2955                                 }
2956                                 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2957                                 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2958                         }
2959
2960                         // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2961                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2962                         return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2963                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2964                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2965                         }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2966                 }
2967
2968                 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2969                         // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2970                         // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2971                         None
2972                 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2973                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2974                                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2975                                 None
2976                         } else {
2977                                 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2978                         }
2979                 } else {
2980                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
2981                 };
2982
2983                 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2984                 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2985                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2986                 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2987                 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2988
2989                 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2990                         // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2991                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2992                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2993                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2994                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2995                         })
2996                 } else { None };
2997
2998                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
2999                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
3000                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3001                         } else {
3002                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3003                         }
3004
3005                         if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3006                                 // Note that if in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3007                                 // disconnect, this logic will need to be updated.
3008                                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3009                                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } = htlc_update {
3010                                                 debug_assert!(false, "There shouldn't be any add-HTLCs in the holding cell now because they should have been dropped on peer disconnect. Panic here because said HTLCs won't be handled correctly.");
3011                                         }
3012                                 }
3013
3014                                 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3015                                 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3016                                 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3017                                 // now!
3018                                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3019                                         Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3020                                         Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3021                                         Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3022                                                 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3023                                                 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3024                                                 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
3025                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3026                                         },
3027                                         Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3028                                                 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3029                                                 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3030                                                 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
3031                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3032                                         },
3033                                 }
3034                         } else {
3035                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3036                         }
3037                 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3038                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
3039                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3040                         } else {
3041                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3042                         }
3043
3044                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3045                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3046                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3047                         }
3048
3049                         return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3050                 } else {
3051                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3052                 }
3053         }
3054
3055         fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
3056                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3057         {
3058                 if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
3059                                 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
3060                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3061                         return None;
3062                 }
3063
3064                 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3065                 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
3066                         proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
3067                 }
3068                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3069                 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3070
3071                 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
3072                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3073                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3074                         .ok();
3075                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3076                 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
3077
3078                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
3079                 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3080                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3081                         fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3082                         signature: sig.unwrap(),
3083                 })
3084         }
3085
3086         pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3087                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3088         {
3089                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3090                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3091                 }
3092                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3093                         // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3094                         // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3095                         // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3096                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3097                 }
3098                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3099                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3100                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3101                         }
3102                 }
3103                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3104
3105                 if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, &msg.scriptpubkey) {
3106                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3107                 }
3108
3109                 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3110                         if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3111                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3112                         }
3113                 } else {
3114                         self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
3115                 }
3116
3117                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3118
3119                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3120                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3121
3122                 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3123                 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3124                 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3125                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3126                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3127                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3128                         match htlc_update {
3129                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3130                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3131                                         false
3132                                 },
3133                                 _ => true
3134                         }
3135                 });
3136                 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
3137                 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
3138                 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3139
3140                 let shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3141                         None
3142                 } else {
3143                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3144                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3145                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3146                         })
3147                 };
3148
3149                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3150                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3151
3152                 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3153         }
3154
3155         fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3156                 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3157                 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3158                 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3159
3160                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3161
3162                 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3163                 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3164                 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3165                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3166                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3167                 } else {
3168                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3169                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3170                 }
3171                 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3172                 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3173
3174                 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3175         }
3176
3177         pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3178                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3179         {
3180                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3181                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3182                 }
3183                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3184                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3185                 }
3186                 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3187                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3188                 }
3189                 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3190                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3191                 }
3192
3193                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3194                 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3195                 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3196                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3197                 }
3198                 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3199
3200                 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3201                         Ok(_) => {},
3202                         Err(_e) => {
3203                                 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3204                                 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3205                                 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3206                                 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3207                                 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3208                         },
3209                 };
3210
3211                 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3212                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3213                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3214                 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3215                         if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3216                                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3217                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3218                                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3219                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3220                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3221                                 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3222                         }
3223                 }
3224
3225                 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3226                         ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3227                                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3228                                 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3229                                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3230                                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3231                                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3232                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3233                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3234                                 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3235                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3236                                         fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3237                                         signature: sig,
3238                                 }), None))
3239                         }
3240                 }
3241
3242                 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3243                 if self.is_outbound() {
3244                         let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3245                         if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3246                                 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3247                                         if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3248                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3249                                         }
3250                                 }
3251                                 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3252                         }
3253                 } else {
3254                         min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3255                 }
3256                 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3257                         if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3258                                 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3259                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3260                                 }
3261                         }
3262                         propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3263                 }
3264
3265                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3266                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3267                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3268                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3269                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3270                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3271
3272                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3273                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3274
3275                 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3276                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3277                         fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3278                         signature: sig,
3279                 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3280         }
3281
3282         // Public utilities:
3283
3284         pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3285                 self.channel_id
3286         }
3287
3288         /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3289         /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3290         pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3291                 self.user_id
3292         }
3293
3294         /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3295         /// is_usable() returns true).
3296         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3297         pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3298                 self.short_channel_id
3299         }
3300
3301         /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3302         /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3303         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3304                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3305         }
3306
3307         fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3308                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3309         }
3310
3311         fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3312                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3313         }
3314
3315         fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3316                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().selected_contest_delay
3317         }
3318
3319         fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3320                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3321         }
3322
3323         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3324         pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3325                 self.counterparty_node_id
3326         }
3327
3328         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3329         #[cfg(test)]
3330         pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3331                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3332         }
3333
3334         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3335         pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3336                 return cmp::min(
3337                         // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3338                         // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3339                         // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3340                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
3341
3342                         Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3343                 );
3344         }
3345
3346         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3347         pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3348                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3349         }
3350
3351         pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3352                 self.channel_value_satoshis
3353         }
3354
3355         pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3356                 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
3357         }
3358
3359         #[cfg(test)]
3360         pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3361                 self.feerate_per_kw
3362         }
3363
3364         pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3365                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3366         }
3367
3368         pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3369                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3370         }
3371
3372         pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3373                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3374         }
3375
3376         #[cfg(test)]
3377         pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3378                 &self.holder_signer
3379         }
3380
3381         #[cfg(test)]
3382         pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3383                 ChannelValueStat {
3384                         value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3385                         channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3386                         channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
3387                         pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3388                         pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3389                         holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3390                                 let mut res = 0;
3391                                 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3392                                         match h {
3393                                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3394                                                         res += amount_msat;
3395                                                 }
3396                                                 _ => {}
3397                                         }
3398                                 }
3399                                 res
3400                         },
3401                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3402                         counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3403                 }
3404         }
3405
3406         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3407         pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3408                 self.update_time_counter
3409         }
3410
3411         pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3412                 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3413         }
3414
3415         pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3416                 self.config.announced_channel
3417         }
3418
3419         pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3420                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3421         }
3422
3423         /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3424         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3425         pub fn get_holder_fee_base_msat<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &F) -> u32
3426                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3427         {
3428                 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
3429                 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
3430
3431                 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
3432                 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
3433
3434                 if self.is_outbound() {
3435                         // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
3436                         res += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
3437                 }
3438
3439                 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
3440                 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) as u64 * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
3441
3442                 res as u32
3443         }
3444
3445         /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3446         pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3447                 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3448         }
3449
3450         /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3451         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3452         pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3453                 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3454                 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3455         }
3456
3457         /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3458         /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3459         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3460         pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3461                 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
3462         }
3463
3464         /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3465         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3466         pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3467                 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3468         }
3469
3470         /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3471         pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3472                 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3473         }
3474
3475         /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3476         /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3477         /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3478         pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3479                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32  {
3480                         assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3481                         true
3482                 } else { false }
3483         }
3484
3485         pub fn to_disabled_staged(&mut self) {
3486                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged;
3487         }
3488
3489         pub fn to_disabled_marked(&mut self) {
3490                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked;
3491         }
3492
3493         pub fn to_fresh(&mut self) {
3494                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::Fresh;
3495         }
3496
3497         pub fn is_disabled_staged(&self) -> bool {
3498                 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged
3499         }
3500
3501         pub fn is_disabled_marked(&self) -> bool {
3502                 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked
3503         }
3504
3505         /// When we receive a new block, we (a) check whether the block contains the funding
3506         /// transaction (which would start us counting blocks until we send the funding_signed), and
3507         /// (b) check the height of the block against outbound holding cell HTLCs in case we need to
3508         /// give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything else (e.g. commitment
3509         /// transaction broadcasts, channel closure detection, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3510         /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3511         ///
3512         /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3513         /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3514         /// post-shutdown.
3515         /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
3516         ///
3517         /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3518         /// back.
3519         pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3520                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3521                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3522                         match htlc_update {
3523                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3524                                         if *cltv_expiry <= height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3525                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3526                                                 false
3527                                         } else { true }
3528                                 },
3529                                 _ => true
3530                         }
3531                 });
3532
3533                 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3534                         self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
3535                 }
3536
3537                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3538                 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3539                         for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3540                                 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3541                                 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
3542                                         let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
3543                                         if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3544                                                         tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3545                                                 if self.is_outbound() {
3546                                                         // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3547                                                         // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3548                                                         // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3549                                                         // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3550                                                         // channel and move on.
3551                                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3552                                                         panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3553                                                 }
3554                                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3555                                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3556                                                 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3557                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3558                                                         data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
3559                                                 });
3560                                         } else {
3561                                                 if self.is_outbound() {
3562                                                         for input in tx.input.iter() {
3563                                                                 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3564                                                                         // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3565                                                                         // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3566                                                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3567                                                                         panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3568                                                                 }
3569                                                         }
3570                                                 }
3571                                                 if height > 0xff_ff_ff || (index_in_block) > 0xff_ff_ff {
3572                                                         panic!("Block was bogus - either height 16 million or had > 16 million transactions");
3573                                                 }
3574                                                 assert!(txo_idx <= 0xffff); // txo_idx is a (u16 as usize), so this is just listed here for completeness
3575                                                 self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
3576                                                 self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64)         << (5*8)) |
3577                                                                              ((index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
3578                                                                              ((txo_idx as u64)        << (0*8)));
3579                                         }
3580                                 }
3581                         }
3582                 }
3583
3584                 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time);
3585                 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3586                         if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
3587                                 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3588                                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3589                                         true
3590                                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3591                                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3592                                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
3593                                         true
3594                                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3595                                         // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3596                                         // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3597                                         false
3598                                 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3599                                         panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3600                                 } else {
3601                                         // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3602                                         // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3603                                         false
3604                                 };
3605                                 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.block_hash());
3606
3607                                 //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
3608                                 //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
3609                                 //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
3610                                 //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
3611                                 if need_commitment_update {
3612                                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3613                                                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3614                                                 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3615                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3616                                                         next_per_commitment_point,
3617                                                 }), timed_out_htlcs));
3618                                         } else {
3619                                                 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3620                                                 return Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs));
3621                                         }
3622                                 }
3623                         }
3624                 }
3625                 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3626         }
3627
3628         /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
3629         /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
3630         /// unconfirmation/reorg.
3631         pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
3632                 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3633                         self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
3634                         if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
3635                                 return true;
3636                         }
3637                 }
3638                 if Some(header.block_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
3639                         self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
3640                 }
3641                 false
3642         }
3643
3644         // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3645         // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3646
3647         pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3648                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3649                         panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3650                 }
3651                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3652                         panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3653                 }
3654
3655                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3656                         panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3657                 }
3658
3659                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3660                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3661
3662                 msgs::OpenChannel {
3663                         chain_hash,
3664                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3665                         funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3666                         push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3667                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3668                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3669                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3670                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3671                         feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
3672                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3673                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3674                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3675                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3676                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3677                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3678                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3679                         first_per_commitment_point,
3680                         channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3681                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3682                 }
3683         }
3684
3685         pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3686                 if self.is_outbound() {
3687                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3688                 }
3689                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3690                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3691                 }
3692                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3693                         panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3694                 }
3695
3696                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3697                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3698
3699                 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3700                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3701                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3702                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3703                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3704                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3705                         minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3706                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3707                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3708                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3709                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3710                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3711                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3712                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3713                         first_per_commitment_point,
3714                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3715                 }
3716         }
3717
3718         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3719         fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3720                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3721                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
3722                 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3723                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
3724         }
3725
3726         /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3727         /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3728         /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3729         /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3730         /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3731         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3732         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3733         pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3734                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3735                         panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3736                 }
3737                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3738                         panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3739                 }
3740                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3741                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3742                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3743                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3744                 }
3745
3746                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
3747                 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
3748
3749                 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
3750                         Ok(res) => res,
3751                         Err(e) => {
3752                                 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3753                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3754                                 return Err(e);
3755                         }
3756                 };
3757
3758                 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3759
3760                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3761
3762                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3763                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3764
3765                 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
3766                         temporary_channel_id,
3767                         funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3768                         funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3769                         signature
3770                 })
3771         }
3772
3773         /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3774         /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3775         /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3776         /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3777         /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3778         /// closing).
3779         /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3780         /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3781         pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3782                 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3783                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
3784                 }
3785                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3786                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
3787                 }
3788                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3789                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
3790                 }
3791
3792                 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
3793
3794                 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3795                         features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3796                         chain_hash,
3797                         short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3798                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
3799                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
3800                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3801                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
3802                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3803                 };
3804
3805                 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3806                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
3807
3808                 Ok((msg, sig))
3809         }
3810
3811         /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3812         /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3813         pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
3814                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3815                 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3816                 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
3817                 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
3818                 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
3819                 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
3820                 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
3821                 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
3822                 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
3823                 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
3824                 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3825                         let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
3826                         log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
3827                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3828                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
3829                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
3830                         })
3831                 } else {
3832                         log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret");
3833                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3834                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
3835                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
3836                         })
3837                 };
3838                 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3839                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3840                         // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3841                         // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3842                         // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3843                         // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3844                         // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3845                         // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3846
3847                         // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3848                         // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3849                         next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
3850                         // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3851                         // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3852                         // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3853                         // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3854                         // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3855                         // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3856                         // overflow here.
3857                         next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3858                         data_loss_protect,
3859                 }
3860         }
3861
3862
3863         // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3864
3865         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3866         /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3867         /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3868         /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3869         /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3870         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3871         /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
3872         pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
3873                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3874                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
3875                 }
3876                 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
3877                 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
3878                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
3879                 }
3880
3881                 if amount_msat == 0 {
3882                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3883                 }
3884
3885                 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
3886                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
3887                 }
3888
3889                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3890                         // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3891                         // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3892                         // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3893                         // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3894                         // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3895                         // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3896                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update".to_owned()));
3897                 }
3898
3899                 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3900                 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3901                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3902                 }
3903                 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3904                 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3905                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3906                 }
3907
3908                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3909                         // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3910                         let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
3911                         let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
3912                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3913                         let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3914                         if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3915                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3916                         }
3917                 }
3918
3919                 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - htlc_outbound_value_msat;
3920                 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
3921                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
3922                 }
3923
3924                 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
3925                 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
3926                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3927                         2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
3928                 } else { 0 };
3929                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
3930                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
3931                 }
3932
3933                 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
3934                 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
3935                 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3936                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
3937                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
3938                 }
3939
3940                 // Now update local state:
3941                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3942                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3943                                 amount_msat,
3944                                 payment_hash,
3945                                 cltv_expiry,
3946                                 source,
3947                                 onion_routing_packet,
3948                         });
3949                         return Ok(None);
3950                 }
3951
3952                 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3953                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3954                         amount_msat,
3955                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3956                         cltv_expiry,
3957                         state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
3958                         source,
3959                 });
3960
3961                 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3962                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3963                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3964                         amount_msat,
3965                         payment_hash,
3966                         cltv_expiry,
3967                         onion_routing_packet,
3968                 };
3969                 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
3970
3971                 Ok(Some(res))
3972         }
3973
3974         /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
3975         /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
3976         /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
3977         /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
3978         pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3979                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3980                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
3981                 }
3982                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3983                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
3984                 }
3985                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3986                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3987                 }
3988                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
3989                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3990                 }
3991                 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
3992                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3993                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3994                                 have_updates = true;
3995                         }
3996                         if have_updates { break; }
3997                 }
3998                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3999                         if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4000                                 have_updates = true;
4001                         }
4002                         if have_updates { break; }
4003                 }
4004                 if !have_updates {
4005                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
4006                 }
4007                 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
4008         }
4009         /// Only fails in case of bad keys
4010         fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4011                 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4012                 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4013                 // is acceptable.
4014                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4015                         let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4016                                 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4017                         } else { None };
4018                         if let Some(state) = new_state {
4019                                 htlc.state = state;
4020                         }
4021                 }
4022                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4023                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4024                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
4025                         } else { None } {
4026                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4027                         }
4028                 }
4029                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4030
4031                 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4032                         Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4033                                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4034                                 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4035                                         htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4036                                 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4037                         },
4038                         Err(e) => return Err(e),
4039                 };
4040
4041                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4042                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4043                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4044                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4045                                 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4046                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4047                                 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4048                                 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4049                         }]
4050                 };
4051                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4052                 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4053         }
4054
4055         /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4056         /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4057         fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4058                 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4059                 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
4060                         if self.is_outbound() {
4061                                 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4062                         }
4063                 }
4064
4065                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4066                 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
4067                 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4068                 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4069
4070                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4071                 {
4072                         if !self.is_outbound() {
4073                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4074                                 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4075                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4076                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4077                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4078                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4079                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4080                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4081                                                         let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.1);
4082                                                         assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4083                                                 }
4084                                 }
4085                         }
4086                 }
4087
4088                 {
4089                         let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len());
4090                         for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
4091                                 htlcs.push(htlc);
4092                         }
4093
4094                         let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4095                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4096                         signature = res.0;
4097                         htlc_signatures = res.1;
4098
4099                         log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {}",
4100                                 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4101                                 &counterparty_commitment_txid,
4102                                 encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4103                                 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
4104
4105                         for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4106                                 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
4107                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4108                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4109                                         log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4110                                         log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
4111                         }
4112                 }
4113
4114                 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4115                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4116                         signature,
4117                         htlc_signatures,
4118                 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
4119         }
4120
4121         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4122         /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4123         /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4124         /// more info.
4125         pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4126                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4127                         Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4128                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4129                                 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4130                         },
4131                         None => Ok(None)
4132                 }
4133         }
4134
4135         pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4136                 let usable_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
4137                 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= usable_channel_value_msat {
4138                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
4139                 }
4140                 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4141                         fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
4142                         fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
4143                         cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
4144                 });
4145
4146                 Ok(())
4147         }
4148
4149         /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4150         /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4151         pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
4152                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4153                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4154                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4155                         }
4156                 }
4157                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4158                         if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4159                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4160                         }
4161                         else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4162                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4163                         }
4164                 }
4165                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4166                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4167                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4168                 }
4169
4170                 let closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
4171
4172                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4173                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4174                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4175                 } else {
4176                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4177                 }
4178                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4179
4180                 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4181                 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4182                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4183                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4184                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4185                         match htlc_update {
4186                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4187                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4188                                         false
4189                                 },
4190                                 _ => true
4191                         }
4192                 });
4193
4194                 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
4195                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4196                         scriptpubkey: closing_script,
4197                 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4198         }
4199
4200         /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4201         /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4202         /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4203         /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4204         /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4205         pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4206                 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
4207                 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
4208                 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
4209                 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4210                 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4211
4212                 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4213                 // return them to fail the payment.
4214                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4215                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4216                         match htlc_update {
4217                                 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4218                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4219                                 },
4220                                 _ => {}
4221                         }
4222                 }
4223                 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4224                         // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4225                         // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4226                         // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4227                         // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4228                         // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4229                         // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4230                         // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4231                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4232                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4233                                 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4234                                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4235                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4236                                 }))
4237                         } else { None }
4238                 } else { None };
4239
4240                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4241                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4242                 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4243         }
4244 }
4245
4246 fn is_unsupported_shutdown_script(their_features: &InitFeatures, script: &Script) -> bool {
4247         // We restrain shutdown scripts to standards forms to avoid transactions not propagating on the p2p tx-relay network
4248
4249         // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms,
4250         // which for a a BIP-141-compliant witness program is at max 42 bytes in length.
4251         // So don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
4252         let is_script_too_long = script.len() > 42;
4253         if is_script_too_long {
4254                 return true;
4255         }
4256
4257         if their_features.supports_shutdown_anysegwit() && script.is_witness_program() && script.as_bytes()[0] != OP_PUSHBYTES_0.into_u8() {
4258                 return false;
4259         }
4260
4261         return !script.is_p2pkh() && !script.is_p2sh() && !script.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !script.is_v0_p2wsh()
4262 }
4263
4264 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4265 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4266
4267 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4268         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4269                 match self {
4270                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
4271                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
4272                                 error_packet.write(writer)?;
4273                         },
4274                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
4275                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4276                                 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
4277                                 err_code.write(writer)?;
4278                         },
4279                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4280                                 2u8.write(writer)?;
4281                                 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4282                         },
4283                 }
4284                 Ok(())
4285         }
4286 }
4287
4288 impl Readable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4289         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4290                 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4291                         0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
4292                         1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4293                         2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
4294                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4295                 })
4296         }
4297 }
4298
4299 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4300         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4301                 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4302                 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
4303
4304                 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4305                 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4306
4307                 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4308                 self.config.write(writer)?;
4309
4310                 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4311                 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4312                 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4313
4314                 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4315
4316                 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4317                 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
4318                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::usize::MAX);
4319                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::u32::MAX as usize);
4320                 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4321                 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
4322
4323                 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4324                 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4325
4326                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4327                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4328                 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4329
4330                 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4331                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4332                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4333                                 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4334                         }
4335                 }
4336                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4337                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4338                         if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4339                                 continue; // Drop
4340                         }
4341                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4342                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4343                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4344                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4345                         match &htlc.state {
4346                                 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4347                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4348                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4349                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4350                                 },
4351                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4352                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4353                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4354                                 },
4355                                 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4356                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4357                                 },
4358                                 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4359                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4360                                         removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4361                                 },
4362                         }
4363                 }
4364
4365                 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4366                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4367                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4368                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4369                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4370                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4371                         htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4372                         match &htlc.state {
4373                                 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4374                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4375                                         onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4376                                 },
4377                                 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4378                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4379                                 },
4380                                 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
4381                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4382                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4383                                 },
4384                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4385                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4386                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4387                                 },
4388                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4389                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4390                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4391                                 },
4392                         }
4393                 }
4394
4395                 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4396                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4397                         match update {
4398                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4399                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4400                                         amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4401                                         cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4402                                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4403                                         source.write(writer)?;
4404                                         onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4405                                 },
4406                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4407                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4408                                         payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4409                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4410                                 },
4411                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4412                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4413                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4414                                         err_packet.write(writer)?;
4415                                 }
4416                         }
4417                 }
4418
4419                 match self.resend_order {
4420                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4421                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4422                 }
4423
4424                 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4425                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4426                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4427
4428                 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4429                 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4430                         pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4431                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4432                 }
4433
4434                 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4435                 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4436                         htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4437                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4438                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4439                 }
4440
4441                 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4442                 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4443
4444                 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4445                 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4446                 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4447                 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4448
4449                 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4450                         Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4451                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4452                                 feerate.write(writer)?;
4453                                 fee.write(writer)?;
4454                                 sig.write(writer)?;
4455                         },
4456                         None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4457                 }
4458
4459                 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4460                 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4461                 self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
4462
4463                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4464                 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4465                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4466                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4467                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4468                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4469                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4470                 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
4471
4472                 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
4473                         Some(info) => {
4474                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4475                                 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
4476                                 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4477                                 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4478                         },
4479                         None => 0u8.write(writer)?
4480                 }
4481
4482                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
4483                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4484
4485                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4486                 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
4487
4488                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4489
4490                 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4491                 Ok(())
4492         }
4493 }
4494
4495 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4496 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
4497                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4498         fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4499                 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4500                 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4501                 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4502                         return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4503                 }
4504
4505                 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4506                 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
4507
4508                 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4509                 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4510                 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4511
4512                 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4513
4514                 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4515                 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
4516                 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
4517                         // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
4518                         let mut data = [0; 1024];
4519                         let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
4520                         reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
4521                         keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
4522                 }
4523                 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
4524
4525                 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4526                 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4527
4528                 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4529                 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4530                 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4531
4532                 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4533                 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4534                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
4535                         pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4536                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4537                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4538                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4539                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4540                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4541                                         1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4542                                         2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4543                                         3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4544                                         4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4545                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4546                                 },
4547                         });
4548                 }
4549
4550                 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4551                 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4552                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4553                         pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4554                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4555                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4556                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4557                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4558                                 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4559                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4560                                         0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4561                                         1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4562                                         2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4563                                         3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4564                                         4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4565                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4566                                 },
4567                         });
4568                 }
4569
4570                 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4571                 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4572                 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4573                         holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4574                                 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4575                                         amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4576                                         cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4577                                         payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4578                                         source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4579                                         onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4580                                 },
4581                                 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4582                                         payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4583                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4584                                 },
4585                                 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4586                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4587                                         err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4588                                 },
4589                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4590                         });
4591                 }
4592
4593                 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4594                         0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4595                         1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4596                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4597                 };
4598
4599                 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4600                 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4601                 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4602
4603                 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4604                 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4605                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4606                         monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4607                 }
4608
4609                 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4610                 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4611                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4612                         monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4613                 }
4614
4615                 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4616                 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4617
4618                 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4619                 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4620                 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
4621                 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4622
4623                 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4624                         0 => None,
4625                         1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4626                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4627                 };
4628
4629                 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4630                 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4631                 let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
4632
4633                 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4634                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4635                 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4636                 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4637                 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4638                 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4639                 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
4640                 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
4641
4642                 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4643                         0 => None,
4644                         1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4645                                 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4646                                 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
4647                                 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
4648                         }),
4649                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4650                 };
4651
4652                 let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
4653                 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4654
4655                 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4656                 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4657
4658                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4659                 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4660
4661                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4662                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
4663
4664                 Ok(Channel {
4665                         user_id,
4666
4667                         config,
4668                         channel_id,
4669                         channel_state,
4670                         secp_ctx,
4671                         channel_value_satoshis,
4672
4673                         latest_monitor_update_id,
4674
4675                         holder_signer,
4676                         shutdown_pubkey,
4677                         destination_script,
4678
4679                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4680                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4681                         value_to_self_msat,
4682
4683                         pending_inbound_htlcs,
4684                         pending_outbound_htlcs,
4685                         holding_cell_htlc_updates,
4686
4687                         resend_order,
4688
4689                         monitor_pending_funding_locked,
4690                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
4691                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
4692                         monitor_pending_forwards,
4693                         monitor_pending_failures,
4694
4695                         pending_update_fee,
4696                         holding_cell_update_fee,
4697                         next_holder_htlc_id,
4698                         next_counterparty_htlc_id,
4699                         update_time_counter,
4700                         feerate_per_kw,
4701
4702                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4703                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4704                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4705                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4706
4707                         last_sent_closing_fee,
4708
4709                         funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4710                         short_channel_id,
4711                         funding_tx_confirmations,
4712
4713                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
4714                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4715                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4716                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4717                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
4718                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4719                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
4720                         minimum_depth,
4721
4722                         counterparty_forwarding_info,
4723
4724                         channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
4725                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
4726
4727                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
4728                         counterparty_node_id,
4729
4730                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4731
4732                         commitment_secrets,
4733
4734                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
4735
4736                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4737                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4738                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4739                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4740                 })
4741         }
4742 }
4743
4744 #[cfg(test)]
4745 mod tests {
4746         use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4747         use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4748         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4749         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
4750         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4751         use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4752         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4753         use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4754         use hex;
4755         use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4756         use ln::channel::{Channel,Sign,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
4757         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4758         use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4759         use ln::msgs::{OptionalField, DataLossProtect, DecodeError};
4760         use ln::chan_utils;
4761         use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
4762         use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4763         use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface};
4764         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4765         use util::config::UserConfig;
4766         use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
4767         use util::test_utils;
4768         use util::logger::Logger;
4769         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
4770         use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4771         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4772         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4773         use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
4774         use std::sync::Arc;
4775
4776         struct TestFeeEstimator {
4777                 fee_est: u32
4778         }
4779         impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4780                 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
4781                         self.fee_est
4782                 }
4783         }
4784
4785         #[test]
4786         fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4787                 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4788                         "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4789         }
4790
4791         struct Keys {
4792                 signer: InMemorySigner,
4793         }
4794         impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4795                 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
4796
4797                 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4798                 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4799                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4800                         let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4801                         let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4802                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4803                 }
4804
4805                 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4806                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4807                         let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4808                         PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4809                 }
4810
4811                 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
4812                         self.signer.clone()
4813                 }
4814                 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4815                 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
4816         }
4817
4818         fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
4819                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
4820         }
4821
4822         // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
4823         // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
4824         #[test]
4825         fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
4826                 let original_fee = 253;
4827                 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
4828                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4829                 let seed = [42; 32];
4830                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4831                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4832
4833                 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4834                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4835                 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4836
4837                 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
4838                 // same as the old fee.
4839                 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
4840                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4841                 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
4842         }
4843
4844         #[test]
4845         fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
4846                 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
4847                 // dust limits are used.
4848                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4849                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4850                 let seed = [42; 32];
4851                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4852                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4853
4854                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
4855                 // they have different dust limits.
4856
4857                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
4858                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4859                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4860                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4861
4862                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4863                 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
4864                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4865                 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis, 1560);
4866                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4867                 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
4868
4869                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
4870                 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4871                 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
4872                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
4873
4874                 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
4875                 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
4876                 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4877                         htlc_id: 0,
4878                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
4879                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
4880                         cltv_expiry: 300000000,
4881                         state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4882                 });
4883
4884                 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4885                         htlc_id: 1,
4886                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
4887                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
4888                         cltv_expiry: 200000000,
4889                         state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4890                         source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4891                                 path: Vec::new(),
4892                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4893                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
4894                         }
4895                 });
4896
4897                 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
4898                 // the dust limit check.
4899                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4900                 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4901                 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
4902                 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
4903
4904                 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
4905                 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
4906                 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
4907                 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
4908                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4909                 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4910                 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
4911         }
4912
4913         #[test]
4914         fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
4915                 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
4916                 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
4917                 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
4918                 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
4919                 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
4920                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4921                 let seed = [42; 32];
4922                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4923                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4924
4925                 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4926                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4927                 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4928
4929                 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
4930                 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
4931
4932                 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
4933                 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
4934                 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
4935                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4936                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4937                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
4938
4939                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
4940                 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
4941                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4942                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4943                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
4944
4945                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
4946
4947                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
4948                 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
4949                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4950                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4951                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
4952
4953                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
4954                 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
4955                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4956                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4957                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
4958         }
4959
4960         #[test]
4961         fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
4962                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4963                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4964                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4965                 let seed = [42; 32];
4966                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4967                 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
4968                 let last_block_hash = chain_hash;
4969                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4970
4971                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
4972
4973                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
4974                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4975                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4976                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4977
4978                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4979                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
4980                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4981                 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
4982
4983                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
4984                 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4985                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
4986
4987                 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
4988                 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4989                 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4990                         value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
4991                 }]};
4992                 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
4993                 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
4994                 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, last_block_hash, &&logger).unwrap();
4995
4996                 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
4997                 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, last_block_hash, &&logger);
4998
4999                 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
5000                 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
5001                 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5002                 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5003                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5004                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5005                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5006                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5007                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5008                         },
5009                         _ => panic!()
5010                 }
5011
5012                 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
5013                 // is sane.
5014                 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5015                 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5016                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5017                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5018                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5019                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5020                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5021                         },
5022                         _ => panic!()
5023                 }
5024         }
5025
5026         #[test]
5027         fn outbound_commitment_test() {
5028                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
5029                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5030                 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
5031                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5032
5033                 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
5034                         &secp_ctx,
5035                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5036                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5037                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5038                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5039                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5040
5041                         // These aren't set in the test vectors:
5042                         [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
5043                         10_000_000,
5044                         [0; 32]
5045                 );
5046
5047                 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5048                                 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
5049                 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
5050
5051                 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5052                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
5053                 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
5054                 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
5055                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5056
5057                 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
5058
5059                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5060                         funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5061                         revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5062                         payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
5063                         delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5064                         htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
5065                 };
5066                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5067                         CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5068                                 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5069                                 selected_contest_delay: 144
5070                         });
5071                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5072                 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5073
5074                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5075                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5076
5077                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5078                            hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5079
5080                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5081                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5082
5083                 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5084                 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5085                 // build_commitment_transaction.
5086                 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5087                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5088                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5089                 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5090                 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5091
5092                 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5093                         ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5094                                 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5095                         } ) => { {
5096                                 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
5097                                         let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
5098
5099                                         let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
5100                                                 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
5101                                                 .collect();
5102                                         (res.0, htlcs)
5103                                 };
5104                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
5105                                 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
5106                                 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5107                                 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5108                                 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
5109                                 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
5110
5111                                 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
5112                                 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5113                                 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
5114                                 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5115                                 $({
5116                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5117                                         per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
5118                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
5119                                 })*
5120                                 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
5121
5122                                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
5123                                         commitment_tx.clone(),
5124                                         counterparty_signature,
5125                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs,
5126                                         &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
5127                                         chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
5128                                 );
5129                                 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
5130                                 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
5131
5132                                 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5133                                 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
5134                                 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
5135
5136                                 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
5137                                 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
5138
5139                                 $({
5140                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5141
5142                                         let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
5143                                         let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
5144                                         let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
5145                                         let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
5146                                         secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
5147
5148                                         let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5149                                         if !htlc.offered {
5150                                                 for i in 0..5 {
5151                                                         let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
5152                                                         if out == htlc.payment_hash {
5153                                                                 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
5154                                                         }
5155                                                 }
5156
5157                                                 assert!(preimage.is_some());
5158                                         }
5159
5160                                         let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
5161                                         assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
5162
5163                                         let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5164                                         assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
5165                                         let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
5166                                         let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
5167                                         let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
5168                                         assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
5169                                                         hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
5170                                 })*
5171                                 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
5172                         } }
5173                 }
5174
5175                 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
5176                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
5177
5178                 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
5179                                                  "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
5180                                                  "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", {});
5181
5182                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5183                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5184                                 htlc_id: 0,
5185                                 amount_msat: 1000000,
5186                                 cltv_expiry: 500,
5187                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5188                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5189                         };
5190                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
5191                         out
5192                 });
5193                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5194                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5195                                 htlc_id: 1,
5196                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5197                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
5198                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5199                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5200                         };
5201                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5202                         out
5203                 });
5204                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5205                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5206                                 htlc_id: 2,
5207                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5208                                 cltv_expiry: 502,
5209                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5210                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5211                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5212                         };
5213                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
5214                         out
5215                 });
5216                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5217                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5218                                 htlc_id: 3,
5219                                 amount_msat: 3000000,
5220                                 cltv_expiry: 503,
5221                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5222                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5223                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5224                         };
5225                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
5226                         out
5227                 });
5228                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5229                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5230                                 htlc_id: 4,
5231                                 amount_msat: 4000000,
5232                                 cltv_expiry: 504,
5233                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5234                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5235                         };
5236                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
5237                         out
5238                 });
5239
5240                 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5241                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5242                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
5243
5244                 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
5245                                  "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
5246                                  "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", {
5247
5248                                   { 0,
5249                                   "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
5250                                   "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
5251                                   "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" },
5252
5253                                   { 1,
5254                                   "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
5255                                   "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
5256                                   "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" },
5257
5258                                   { 2,
5259                                   "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
5260                                   "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
5261                                   "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" },
5262
5263                                   { 3,
5264                                   "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
5265                                   "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
5266                                   "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" },
5267
5268                                   { 4,
5269                                   "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
5270                                   "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
5271                                   "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" }
5272                 } );
5273
5274                 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5275                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5276                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
5277
5278                 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
5279                                  "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
5280                                  "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", {
5281
5282                                   { 0,
5283                                   "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
5284                                   "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
5285                                   "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" },
5286
5287                                   { 1,
5288                                   "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
5289                                   "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
5290                                   "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" },
5291
5292                                   { 2,
5293                                   "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
5294                                   "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
5295                                   "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" },
5296
5297                                   { 3,
5298                                   "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
5299                                   "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
5300                                   "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" },
5301
5302                                   { 4,
5303                                   "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
5304                                   "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
5305                                   "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" }
5306                 } );
5307
5308                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5309                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5310                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
5311
5312                 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
5313                                  "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
5314                                  "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", {
5315
5316                                   { 0,
5317                                   "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
5318                                   "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
5319                                   "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" },
5320
5321                                   { 1,
5322                                   "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
5323                                   "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
5324                                   "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" },
5325
5326                                   { 2,
5327                                   "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
5328                                   "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
5329                                   "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" },
5330
5331                                   { 3,
5332                                   "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
5333                                   "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
5334                                   "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" }
5335                 } );
5336
5337                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5338                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5339                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
5340
5341                 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
5342                                  "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
5343                                  "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", {
5344
5345                                   { 0,
5346                                   "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
5347                                   "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
5348                                   "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" },
5349
5350                                   { 1,
5351                                   "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
5352                                   "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
5353                                   "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" },
5354
5355                                   { 2,
5356                                   "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
5357                                   "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
5358                                   "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" },
5359
5360                                   { 3,
5361                                   "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
5362                                   "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
5363                                   "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" }
5364                 } );
5365
5366                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5367                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5368                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
5369
5370                 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
5371                                  "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
5372                                  "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", {
5373
5374                                   { 0,
5375                                   "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
5376                                   "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
5377                                   "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" },
5378
5379                                   { 1,
5380                                   "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
5381                                   "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
5382                                   "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" },
5383
5384                                   { 2,
5385                                   "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
5386                                   "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
5387                                   "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" }
5388                 } );
5389
5390                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5391                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5392                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
5393
5394                 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
5395                                  "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
5396                                  "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", {
5397
5398                                   { 0,
5399                                   "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
5400                                   "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
5401                                   "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" },
5402
5403                                   { 1,
5404                                   "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
5405                                   "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
5406                                   "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" },
5407
5408                                   { 2,
5409                                   "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
5410                                   "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
5411                                   "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" }
5412                 } );
5413
5414                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5415                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5416                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
5417
5418                 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
5419                                  "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
5420                                  "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", {
5421
5422                                   { 0,
5423                                   "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
5424                                   "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
5425                                   "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" },
5426
5427                                   { 1,
5428                                   "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
5429                                   "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
5430                                   "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" }
5431                 } );
5432
5433                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5434                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5435                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
5436
5437                 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
5438                                  "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
5439                                  "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", {
5440
5441                                   { 0,
5442                                   "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
5443                                   "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
5444                                   "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" },
5445
5446                                   { 1,
5447                                   "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
5448                                   "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
5449                                   "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" }
5450                 } );
5451
5452                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5453                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5454                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
5455
5456                 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
5457                                  "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
5458                                  "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", {
5459
5460                                   { 0,
5461                                   "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
5462                                   "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
5463                                   "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" }
5464                 } );
5465
5466                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5467                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5468                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
5469
5470                 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
5471                                  "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
5472                                  "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", {
5473
5474                                   { 0,
5475                                   "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
5476                                   "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
5477                                   "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" }
5478                 } );
5479
5480                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5481                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5482                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
5483
5484                 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
5485                                  "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
5486                                  "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", {});
5487
5488                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5489                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5490                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
5491
5492                 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
5493                                  "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
5494                                  "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", {});
5495
5496                 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5497                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5498                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
5499
5500                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5501                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5502                                  "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", {});
5503
5504                 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
5505                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5506                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
5507
5508                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5509                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5510                                  "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", {});
5511
5512                 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
5513                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
5514                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
5515                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
5516                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5517                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5518                                 htlc_id: 1,
5519                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5520                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
5521                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5522                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5523                         };
5524                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5525                         out
5526                 });
5527                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
5528                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5529                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5530                                 htlc_id: 6,
5531                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
5532                                 cltv_expiry: 506,
5533                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5534                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5535                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5536                         };
5537                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5538                         out
5539                 });
5540                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5541                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5542                                 htlc_id: 5,
5543                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
5544                                 cltv_expiry: 505,
5545                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5546                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5547                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5548                         };
5549                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5550                         out
5551                 });
5552
5553                 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
5554                                  "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
5555                                  "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", {
5556
5557                                   { 0,
5558                                   "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
5559                                   "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
5560                                   "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" },
5561                                   { 1,
5562                                   "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
5563                                   "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
5564                                   "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" },
5565                                   { 2,
5566                                   "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
5567                                   "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
5568                                   "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" }
5569                 } );
5570         }
5571
5572         #[test]
5573         fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
5574                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
5575
5576                 let mut seed = [0; 32];
5577                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
5578                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5579                            hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
5580
5581                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
5582                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5583                            hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
5584
5585                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
5586                            hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
5587
5588                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
5589                            hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
5590
5591                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
5592                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
5593                            hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
5594         }
5595
5596         #[test]
5597         fn test_key_derivation() {
5598                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
5599                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5600
5601                 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5602                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5603
5604                 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
5605                 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
5606
5607                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5608                 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
5609
5610                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5611                                 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
5612
5613                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5614                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5615
5616                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5617                                 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
5618
5619                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5620                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5621         }
5622 }