1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::Logger;
60 use util::errors::APIError;
63 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
64 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
65 use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
66 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
67 use std::time::Duration;
68 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
69 use std::time::Instant;
70 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
72 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
103 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
104 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
105 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
106 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
107 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
108 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
109 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
112 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
113 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
114 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
115 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
118 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
121 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
122 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
125 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
127 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
129 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
130 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
131 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
133 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
135 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
139 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
143 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
144 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
145 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
146 short_channel_id: u64,
148 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
150 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
151 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
155 struct ClaimableHTLC {
156 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
158 /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a
159 /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
160 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
161 /// are part of the same payment.
162 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
166 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
167 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
168 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
169 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
172 session_priv: SecretKey,
173 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
174 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
175 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
180 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
181 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
183 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
184 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
189 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
190 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
192 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
200 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
201 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
202 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
203 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
204 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
205 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
206 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
207 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
208 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
209 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
210 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
211 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
213 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
215 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
216 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
217 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
218 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
219 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
221 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
222 err: msgs::LightningError,
223 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
225 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
227 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
229 err: LightningError {
231 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
232 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
238 shutdown_finish: None,
242 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
244 err: LightningError {
246 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
248 shutdown_finish: None,
252 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
253 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
256 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
258 err: LightningError {
260 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
261 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
267 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
271 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
274 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
276 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
278 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
280 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
281 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
287 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
289 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
290 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
297 shutdown_finish: None,
302 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
303 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
304 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
305 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
306 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
308 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
309 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
310 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
311 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
312 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
313 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
314 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
316 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
320 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
321 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
322 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
323 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
324 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
325 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
326 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
327 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
328 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
329 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking HTLCs that
330 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
331 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
332 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
334 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
335 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
336 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
337 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
340 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
341 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
342 /// quite some time lag.
343 enum BackgroundEvent {
344 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
345 /// commitment transaction.
346 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
349 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
350 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
352 latest_features: InitFeatures,
355 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
356 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
357 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
358 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
359 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
360 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
361 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
362 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
364 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
365 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
366 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
367 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
368 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
369 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
370 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
371 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
372 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
374 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
375 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
377 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
378 /// to individual Channels.
380 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
381 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
382 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
383 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
385 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
386 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
387 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
388 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
389 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
390 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
391 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
393 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
394 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
395 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
396 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
399 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
400 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
401 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
402 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
403 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
405 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
406 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
407 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
408 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
409 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
410 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
411 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
412 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
413 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
414 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
417 default_configuration: UserConfig,
418 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
424 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
426 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
427 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
429 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
430 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
431 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
432 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
433 our_network_key: SecretKey,
434 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
436 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
437 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
438 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
440 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
441 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
442 /// are currently open with that peer.
443 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
444 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
446 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
448 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
449 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
450 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
451 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
452 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
453 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
454 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the PersistenceNotifier
455 /// the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
456 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
458 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
465 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
467 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
468 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
469 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
470 pub struct ChainParameters {
471 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
472 pub network: Network,
474 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
476 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
477 pub best_block: BestBlock,
480 /// The best known block as identified by its hash and height.
481 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
482 pub struct BestBlock {
483 block_hash: BlockHash,
488 /// Returns the best block from the genesis of the given network.
489 pub fn from_genesis(network: Network) -> Self {
491 block_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(),
496 /// Returns the best block as identified by the given block hash and height.
497 pub fn new(block_hash: BlockHash, height: u32) -> Self {
498 BestBlock { block_hash, height }
501 /// Returns the best block hash.
502 pub fn block_hash(&self) -> BlockHash { self.block_hash }
504 /// Returns the best block height.
505 pub fn height(&self) -> u32 { self.height }
508 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
509 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
510 /// `await_persistable_update` that new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
511 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
512 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
513 /// updates are ready for persistence).
514 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
515 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
516 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
517 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
520 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
521 fn new(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> Self {
522 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
525 persistence_notifier: notifier,
526 _read_guard: read_guard,
531 impl<'a> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
533 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
537 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
538 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
540 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
542 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
543 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
544 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
545 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
546 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
548 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
549 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly six hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
551 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
553 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
554 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
555 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
556 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
557 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
558 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 6;
559 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
561 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
562 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
563 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
564 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
565 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
566 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
569 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
571 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
572 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
575 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
577 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
579 pub struct ChannelDetails {
580 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
581 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
582 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
583 /// lifetime of the channel.
584 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
585 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
586 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
587 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
588 /// The node_id of our counterparty
589 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
590 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
591 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
592 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
593 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
594 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
595 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
596 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
598 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
599 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
600 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
601 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
602 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
603 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
604 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
605 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
606 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
607 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
608 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
609 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
610 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
613 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
614 /// payments to us through this channel.
615 pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
618 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
619 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
621 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
622 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
623 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
624 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
625 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
626 ParameterError(APIError),
627 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
628 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
629 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
632 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
634 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
635 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
636 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
637 /// paths than the ones selected).
638 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
639 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
640 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
641 /// in over-/re-payment.
643 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
644 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
645 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
647 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
648 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
649 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
650 /// with the latest update_id.
651 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
654 macro_rules! handle_error {
655 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
658 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
659 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
661 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
662 // entering the macro.
663 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
666 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
668 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
669 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
670 if let Some(update) = update_option {
671 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
677 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
678 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
680 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
681 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
682 action: err.action.clone()
686 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
687 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
690 // Return error in case higher-API need one
697 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
698 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
701 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
702 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
704 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
705 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
706 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
707 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
708 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
710 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
712 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
717 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
718 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
721 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
722 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
724 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
725 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
726 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
727 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
728 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
730 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
732 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
733 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
734 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
735 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
736 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
738 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
739 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
745 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
746 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
747 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
749 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
751 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
752 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
753 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
754 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
755 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
757 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
758 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
759 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
760 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
761 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
762 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
763 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
764 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
765 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
766 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
769 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
770 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
771 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
772 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
774 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
775 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
777 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
778 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
780 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
781 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
782 if !$resend_commitment {
783 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
786 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
788 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
789 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key()))
795 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
796 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
797 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
799 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
800 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
804 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
805 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
806 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
807 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
808 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
811 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
816 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
817 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
818 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
819 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
820 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
823 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
825 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
826 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
828 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
830 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
832 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
833 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
834 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
835 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
836 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
837 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
840 default_configuration: config.clone(),
841 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
842 fee_estimator: fee_est,
846 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
848 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
849 by_id: HashMap::new(),
850 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
851 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
852 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
853 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
855 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
856 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
859 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
861 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
863 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
864 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
865 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
866 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
874 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
875 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
876 &self.default_configuration
879 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
881 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
882 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
883 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
884 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
885 /// otherwise ignored.
887 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
888 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
890 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
891 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
892 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
893 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
894 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
897 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
898 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
899 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
901 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
902 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
903 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
905 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
906 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
907 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
908 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
909 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
911 panic!("RNG is bad???");
914 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
916 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
917 node_id: their_network_key,
923 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
924 let mut res = Vec::new();
926 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
927 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
928 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
929 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
930 res.push(ChannelDetails {
931 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
932 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
933 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
934 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
935 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
936 inbound_capacity_msat,
937 outbound_capacity_msat,
938 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
939 is_live: channel.is_live(),
940 counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
944 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
945 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
946 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
947 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
953 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
954 /// more information.
955 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
956 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
959 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
960 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
962 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
963 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
964 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
965 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
966 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
967 // really wanted anyway.
968 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
971 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
972 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
973 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
975 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
976 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
977 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
979 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
980 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
981 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
982 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
983 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
984 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
985 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
986 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
989 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
990 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
991 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
993 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
994 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
996 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
999 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1000 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1002 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1003 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1008 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
1009 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1010 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1019 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1020 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1021 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1022 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1023 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1025 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1026 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1027 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1028 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1029 // ignore the result here.
1030 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1034 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1036 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1037 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1038 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1039 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1040 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1041 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1044 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1045 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1047 chan.remove_entry().1
1049 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1052 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1053 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1054 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1055 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1056 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1061 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1064 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1065 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1066 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1067 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1068 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1069 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1070 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1071 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1072 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1073 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1074 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1084 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1085 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1086 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1087 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1088 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1092 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1093 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1094 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1096 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1097 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1098 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1099 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1100 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1101 failure_code: $err_code,
1102 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1107 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1108 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1111 let shared_secret = {
1112 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1113 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1116 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1118 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1119 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1120 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1121 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1122 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1123 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1124 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1125 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1128 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1129 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1130 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1131 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1132 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1135 let mut channel_state = None;
1136 macro_rules! return_err {
1137 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1139 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1140 if channel_state.is_none() {
1141 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1143 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1144 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1145 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1146 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1147 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1152 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1153 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1154 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1155 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1157 let error_code = match err {
1158 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1159 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1160 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1161 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1162 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1164 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1167 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1168 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1169 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1176 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1179 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1180 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1181 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1182 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1183 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1184 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1185 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1186 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1187 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1188 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1189 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1190 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1194 // final_expiry_too_soon
1195 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1196 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1197 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1198 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1199 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1200 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1202 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1203 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1204 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1206 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1207 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1208 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1211 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1212 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1213 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1214 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1217 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1218 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1219 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1220 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1222 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1223 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1225 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1227 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1228 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1229 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1230 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1233 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1234 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1235 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1237 // Check two things:
1238 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1239 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1240 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1242 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1244 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1245 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1246 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1248 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1250 let blinding_factor = {
1251 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1252 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1253 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1254 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1257 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1259 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1261 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1264 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1265 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1268 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1269 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1270 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1271 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1272 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1276 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1277 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1278 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1281 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1282 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1283 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1284 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1288 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1289 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1290 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1291 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1292 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1293 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1294 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1295 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1296 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1297 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1299 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1301 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1302 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1304 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1305 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1306 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1307 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1308 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1309 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1310 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1312 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1313 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1315 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1316 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1317 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1319 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1320 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1322 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1323 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1324 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1325 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1326 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1328 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1329 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1331 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1332 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1333 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1334 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1340 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1341 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1342 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1343 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1345 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1346 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1348 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1349 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1350 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1352 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1354 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1359 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1362 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1363 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1364 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1365 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1366 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1370 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1372 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1373 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1375 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1376 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1377 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1378 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1379 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1380 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1381 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1382 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1385 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1386 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1388 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1394 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1395 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1396 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1397 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1398 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1400 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1401 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1402 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1403 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1404 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1406 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1408 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1410 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1411 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1412 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1413 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1414 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1417 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1418 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1420 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1421 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1423 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1424 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1426 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1428 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1429 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1430 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1432 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1433 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1434 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1435 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1436 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1437 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1438 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1439 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1440 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1443 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1444 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1445 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1446 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1447 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1448 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1449 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1457 } else { unreachable!(); }
1461 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1462 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1464 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1469 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1471 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1472 /// fields for more info.
1474 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1475 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1476 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1477 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1478 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1479 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1481 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1483 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1484 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1485 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1487 /// In general, a path may raise:
1488 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1489 /// node public key) is specified.
1490 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1491 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1493 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1494 /// relevant updates.
1496 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1497 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1498 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1500 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1501 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1502 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1503 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1505 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1506 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1507 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1508 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1509 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1510 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1512 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1513 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1514 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1515 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1516 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1518 let mut total_value = 0;
1519 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1520 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1521 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1522 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1523 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1524 continue 'path_check;
1526 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1527 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1528 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1529 continue 'path_check;
1532 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1533 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1535 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1536 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1539 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1540 let mut results = Vec::new();
1541 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1542 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1544 let mut has_ok = false;
1545 let mut has_err = false;
1546 for res in results.iter() {
1547 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1548 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1549 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1550 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1557 if has_err && has_ok {
1558 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1560 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1566 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
1567 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
1568 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
1569 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1571 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1573 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
1575 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1576 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1577 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1578 } else { unreachable!(); })
1581 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1583 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1584 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1587 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1588 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
1593 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1594 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1595 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1598 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1599 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1600 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1602 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1610 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1611 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
1612 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
1616 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1618 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
1619 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1621 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1623 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
1624 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
1625 /// keys per-channel).
1627 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
1628 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
1629 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
1631 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
1632 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
1633 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
1634 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1635 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1637 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
1638 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
1639 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1640 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
1644 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
1645 let mut output_index = None;
1646 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1647 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1648 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
1649 if output_index.is_some() {
1650 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1651 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
1654 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
1655 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1656 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
1659 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
1662 if output_index.is_none() {
1663 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1664 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
1667 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
1671 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1672 if !chan.should_announce() {
1673 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1677 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1679 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1681 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1682 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1684 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1685 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1686 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1687 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1688 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1693 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1694 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1695 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1697 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1700 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1701 // smaller than 500:
1702 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1704 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1705 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1706 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1708 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1709 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1711 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1712 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1713 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1714 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1716 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1717 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1718 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1720 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1721 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1724 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1725 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1726 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1727 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1728 rgb, alias, addresses,
1729 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1730 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1732 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1734 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1735 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1736 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1737 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1738 contents: announcement
1743 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1745 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1746 /// Will likely generate further events.
1747 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1748 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1750 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1751 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1752 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1754 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1755 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1757 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1758 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1759 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1760 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1762 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1763 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1764 match forward_info {
1765 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
1766 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1767 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1768 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1769 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1770 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1771 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1773 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1774 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1777 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1778 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1779 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1780 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1781 // problem, not ours.
1788 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1789 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1790 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1791 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1792 match forward_info {
1793 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1794 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1796 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
1797 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1798 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1799 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1800 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1801 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1802 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1803 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1805 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1807 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1808 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1810 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1812 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1813 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1814 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1820 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1822 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1823 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1824 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1825 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1826 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1827 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1828 // this channel currently :/.
1834 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1835 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1837 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1838 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1839 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1841 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1842 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1844 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1846 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1847 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1848 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1851 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1853 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1854 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1855 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1856 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1857 // messages when we can.
1858 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1859 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1860 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1867 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1868 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
1871 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1872 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1873 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1874 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1875 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1876 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1878 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1879 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1880 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1881 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1882 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1884 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1886 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1888 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
1892 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1893 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1896 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1897 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1898 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1899 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1900 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1901 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1902 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1904 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1912 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1913 match forward_info {
1914 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1915 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1916 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
1917 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1918 let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1919 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1920 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1921 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1922 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1925 let mut total_value = 0;
1926 let payment_secret_opt =
1927 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None };
1928 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt))
1929 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1930 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1932 value: amt_to_forward,
1933 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1934 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
1936 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1937 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1938 total_value += htlc.value;
1939 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1940 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1942 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1944 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
1945 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1946 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1947 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
1948 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
1950 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1951 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1952 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1953 htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1954 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1956 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
1959 } else if total_value == data.total_msat {
1960 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1962 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1967 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1969 payment_secret: None,
1970 amt: amt_to_forward,
1974 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1975 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1977 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1978 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1986 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1987 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1990 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1991 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
1994 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1995 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1996 events.append(&mut new_events);
1999 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2001 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2002 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2004 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2005 fn process_background_events(&self) {
2006 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2007 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2008 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2010 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2011 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2012 // monitor updating completing.
2013 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2019 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2020 pub(crate) fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2021 self.process_background_events();
2024 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
2025 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
2026 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
2028 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
2030 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
2031 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2032 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2033 self.process_background_events();
2035 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2036 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2037 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2038 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
2039 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2040 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2045 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
2047 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
2048 chan.to_disabled_staged();
2053 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2054 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2055 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2056 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2057 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2058 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
2059 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2061 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2062 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
2063 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2064 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2065 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2066 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2067 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2068 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2069 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2070 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2071 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2077 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2078 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2079 // be surfaced to the user.
2080 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2081 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2083 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2084 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2085 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2086 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2087 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
2088 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2090 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2093 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2095 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2096 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2097 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2099 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2100 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2101 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2103 rejected_by_dest: false,
2115 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2116 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2117 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2118 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2119 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2120 /// still-available channels.
2121 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2122 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2123 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2124 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2127 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2128 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2129 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2131 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
2132 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2133 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2134 match &onion_error {
2135 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2137 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2139 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2140 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2141 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2142 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2143 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2144 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2145 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2150 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2151 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2152 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2153 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2155 error_code: onion_error_code,
2157 error_data: onion_error_data
2161 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2167 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2168 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2169 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2170 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2172 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2173 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2174 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2175 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2176 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2177 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2179 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2181 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2187 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2188 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2189 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2190 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2191 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2192 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2194 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2195 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2196 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2200 let mut forward_event = None;
2201 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2202 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2204 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2205 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2206 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2208 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2209 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2212 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2213 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2214 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2215 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2216 time_forwardable: time
2223 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2224 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2225 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2227 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
2228 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
2229 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
2230 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
2231 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
2232 /// motivated attackers.
2234 /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
2235 /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
2237 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2238 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
2239 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2241 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2243 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2244 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
2245 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2246 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2248 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2249 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2250 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2251 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2253 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2254 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2255 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2256 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2257 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2260 let (is_mpp, mut valid_mpp) = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
2261 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
2262 (true, data.total_msat >= expected_amount)
2264 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
2268 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2269 if !is_mpp || !valid_mpp { break; }
2270 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2275 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2276 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2277 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2278 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2279 if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) {
2280 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2281 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2282 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2283 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2284 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2285 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2287 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2289 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2290 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2291 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2292 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2293 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2294 } else { errs.push(e); }
2296 Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2298 log_warn!(self.logger, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed.");
2300 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2305 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2306 // which were generated.
2307 channel_state.take();
2309 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2310 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2311 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2318 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2319 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2320 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2321 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2322 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2328 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2329 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2330 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2331 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2332 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2333 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2334 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2335 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2337 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2341 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2342 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2343 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2344 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2345 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2346 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2347 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2348 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2357 // TODO: Do something with e?
2358 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2359 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2360 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2361 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2362 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2363 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2364 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2368 } else { unreachable!(); }
2371 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2373 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2374 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2375 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2376 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2380 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2381 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2382 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2385 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2386 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2387 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2388 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2391 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2392 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2393 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2394 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2395 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2396 payment_preimage, e);
2400 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2402 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2403 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2404 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2410 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2411 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2412 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2415 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2416 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2419 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2420 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2422 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2423 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2424 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2425 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2427 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2428 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2429 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2430 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2431 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2432 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2433 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2434 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2435 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2436 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2438 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2439 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2440 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2441 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2444 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2445 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2446 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2447 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2448 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2452 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2456 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2457 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2458 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), funding_txo.clone(), pending_forwards));
2460 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2462 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2463 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2464 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2465 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2470 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2471 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2472 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2473 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2474 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2479 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2483 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2488 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
2489 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2491 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2492 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2493 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2496 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2497 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2498 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2499 msg: announcement_sigs,
2502 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2506 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2508 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2509 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2511 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2513 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2514 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2518 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2519 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2520 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2523 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2524 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2525 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2526 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2527 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2528 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2529 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2530 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2531 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2532 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2534 entry.insert(channel);
2540 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2541 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2542 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2543 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2544 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2545 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2546 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2547 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2549 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2550 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2552 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2555 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2556 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2557 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2558 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2560 user_channel_id: user_id,
2565 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2566 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2567 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2568 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2569 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2570 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2571 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2572 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2573 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2575 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2577 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2580 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2581 // lock before watch_channel
2582 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2584 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2585 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2586 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2587 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2588 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2589 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
2590 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
2591 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
2592 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
2593 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
2594 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
2596 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2597 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2598 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2599 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2600 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2601 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2605 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2606 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2607 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2608 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2609 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2611 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2612 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2613 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2622 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2624 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2625 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2626 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2627 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2628 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2629 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2630 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2632 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
2633 Ok(update) => update,
2634 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2636 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2637 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2641 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2644 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
2648 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2649 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2650 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2651 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2652 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2653 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2654 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2656 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2657 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2658 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2659 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2660 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2661 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2662 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2663 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2664 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2665 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2666 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2667 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2668 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2669 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2670 msg: announcement_sigs,
2675 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2679 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2680 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2681 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2682 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2684 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2685 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2686 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2687 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2689 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2690 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2691 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2692 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2696 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2697 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2698 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2702 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2703 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2704 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2706 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2707 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2709 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2712 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2713 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2715 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2716 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2717 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2718 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2726 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2727 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2728 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2729 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2730 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2731 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2732 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2733 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2735 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2736 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2737 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2738 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2743 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2744 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2745 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2746 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2747 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2748 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2749 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2751 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2752 } else { (tx, None) }
2754 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2757 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2758 log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2759 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2761 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2762 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2763 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2764 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2772 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2773 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2774 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2775 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2777 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2778 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2779 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2780 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2782 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2783 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2785 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2786 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2787 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2788 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2791 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
2792 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
2793 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
2794 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
2795 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2796 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2797 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2798 match pending_forward_info {
2799 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2800 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
2801 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
2802 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2803 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2804 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2805 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
2809 // The only case where we'd be unable to
2810 // successfully get a channel update is if the
2811 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
2812 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
2813 // payments over the channel back to themselves
2814 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
2815 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
2816 // no problem just calling this
2817 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
2818 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2820 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2821 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2822 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2825 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
2827 _ => pending_forward_info
2830 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2832 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2837 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2838 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2840 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2841 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2842 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2843 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2844 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2846 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2848 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2851 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2855 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2856 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2857 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2858 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2859 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2860 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2861 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2863 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2865 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2870 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2871 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2872 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2873 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2874 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2875 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2876 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2878 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2879 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
2880 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2882 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2885 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2889 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2890 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2891 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2892 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2893 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2894 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2895 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2897 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2898 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
2899 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2900 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2901 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2902 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2903 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2908 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2909 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2910 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2912 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2913 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2914 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2916 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2917 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2918 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2919 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2920 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2921 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2922 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2923 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2925 commitment_signed: msg,
2929 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2930 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2931 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2937 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2942 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2943 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2944 let mut forward_event = None;
2945 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2946 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2947 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2948 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2950 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2951 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
2952 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2953 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
2955 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2956 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2957 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2959 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2960 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2961 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2966 match forward_event {
2968 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2969 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2970 time_forwardable: time
2978 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2979 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2981 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2982 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2983 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2984 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2985 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2986 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2988 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2989 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
2990 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2991 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
2992 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2993 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2994 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2995 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
2997 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
2999 } else { unreachable!(); }
3002 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3003 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3004 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3008 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3009 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3010 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3014 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3016 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3019 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3021 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3022 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3023 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3025 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3032 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3033 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3034 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3035 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3036 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3037 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3038 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3040 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3042 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3047 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3048 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3049 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3051 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3052 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3053 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3054 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3056 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3057 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3060 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
3061 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
3062 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
3064 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
3065 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
3067 let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 };
3068 let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 };
3069 match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key),
3070 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) {
3072 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key));
3073 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3076 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key));
3077 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3083 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
3085 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3086 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3087 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
3088 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
3089 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
3090 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
3091 contents: announcement,
3093 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
3096 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3101 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3102 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3103 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3104 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3105 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3107 // It's not a local channel
3111 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3112 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3113 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3114 // TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
3115 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3117 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3119 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3124 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3125 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3126 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3128 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3129 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3130 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3131 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3133 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3134 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3135 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3136 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3137 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
3138 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3139 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
3140 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3141 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
3142 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
3143 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
3144 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
3145 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3147 if commitment_update.is_none() {
3148 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3150 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
3151 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
3154 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
3155 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3156 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3160 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
3161 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
3162 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3163 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3168 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
3169 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3170 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3171 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3177 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
3181 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
3186 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3187 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3188 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3198 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3199 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3200 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3201 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3202 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3204 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3205 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3206 let counterparty_node_id;
3207 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3208 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3209 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3211 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3212 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3213 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3214 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3215 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3217 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3218 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3220 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3221 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3223 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3224 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3225 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3227 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3230 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3231 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3232 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3233 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3234 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3235 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3236 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3237 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3247 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3248 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3249 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3253 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`.
3254 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) {
3255 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3257 for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() {
3258 match monitor_event {
3259 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3260 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3261 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3262 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3264 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3265 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3268 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3269 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3270 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3271 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3272 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3273 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3274 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3275 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3276 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3278 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3279 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3280 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3284 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3285 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3286 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3287 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3296 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3297 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3301 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3302 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3304 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3305 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3306 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3307 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3308 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3309 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3310 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3311 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3312 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3313 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3314 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3315 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3316 assert!(should_broadcast);
3317 } else { unreachable!(); }
3318 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3320 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3325 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3326 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3327 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3328 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3329 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3332 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3333 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3334 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3335 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3337 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3338 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3339 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3344 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3345 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3346 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3347 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3348 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3351 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
3352 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3353 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3354 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3356 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3357 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3358 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
3363 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3365 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3366 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3367 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3368 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3371 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
3373 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3374 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
3375 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
3376 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
3377 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
3380 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
3381 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, height, &txdata);
3382 self.update_best_block(&block.header, height);
3385 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3386 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3387 let new_height = height - 1;
3389 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
3390 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
3391 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
3392 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
3393 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
3394 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
3397 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.update_best_block(new_height, header.time));
3401 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3402 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3403 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3404 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3405 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3408 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
3409 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
3411 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
3412 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
3413 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3414 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3415 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3417 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3418 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3420 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3421 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3422 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3423 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3424 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3425 let res = f(channel);
3426 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3427 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3428 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3429 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3430 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3434 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3435 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3436 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3437 msg: funding_locked,
3439 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3440 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3441 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3442 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3443 msg: announcement_sigs,
3446 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3448 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3450 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3451 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3452 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3454 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
3455 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
3456 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3457 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3458 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3462 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3463 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3464 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3471 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
3472 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| {
3473 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3474 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3475 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3476 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3477 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3478 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3479 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3480 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3481 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3482 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3483 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3488 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3493 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
3495 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3496 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3500 /// Updates channel state to take note of transactions which were confirmed in the given block
3501 /// at the given height.
3503 /// Note that you must still call (or have called) [`update_best_block`] with the block
3504 /// information which is included here.
3506 /// This method may be called before or after [`update_best_block`] for a given block's
3507 /// transaction data and may be called multiple times with additional transaction data for a
3510 /// This method may be called for a previous block after an [`update_best_block`] call has
3511 /// been made for a later block, however it must *not* be called with transaction data from a
3512 /// block which is no longer in the best chain (ie where [`update_best_block`] has already
3513 /// been informed about a blockchain reorganization which no longer includes the block which
3514 /// corresponds to `header`).
3516 /// [`update_best_block`]: `Self::update_best_block`
3517 pub fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData) {
3518 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3519 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3520 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3522 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3523 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
3525 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3526 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
3529 /// Updates channel state with the current best blockchain tip. You should attempt to call this
3530 /// quickly after a new block becomes available, however if multiple new blocks become
3531 /// available at the same time, only a single `update_best_block()` call needs to be made.
3533 /// This method should also be called immediately after any block disconnections, once at the
3534 /// reorganization fork point, and once with the new chain tip. Calling this method at the
3535 /// blockchain reorganization fork point ensures we learn when a funding transaction which was
3536 /// previously confirmed is reorganized out of the blockchain, ensuring we do not continue to
3537 /// accept payments which cannot be enforced on-chain.
3539 /// In both the block-connection and block-disconnection case, this method may be called either
3540 /// once per block connected or disconnected, or simply at the fork point and new tip(s),
3541 /// skipping any intermediary blocks.
3542 pub fn update_best_block(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3543 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3544 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3545 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3547 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3548 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3550 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3552 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3554 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.update_best_block(height, header.time));
3557 // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
3558 // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3559 // having an explicit local time source.
3560 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
3561 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
3562 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3563 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3564 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3570 /// Gets the set of txids which should be monitored for their confirmation state.
3572 /// If you're providing information about reorganizations via [`transaction_unconfirmed`], this
3573 /// is the set of transactions which you may need to call [`transaction_unconfirmed`] for.
3575 /// This may be useful to poll to determine the set of transactions which must be registered
3576 /// with an Electrum server or for which an Electrum server needs to be polled to determine
3577 /// transaction confirmation state.
3579 /// This may update after any [`transactions_confirmed`] or [`block_connected`] call.
3581 /// Note that this is NOT the set of transactions which must be included in calls to
3582 /// [`transactions_confirmed`] if they are confirmed, but a small subset of it.
3584 /// [`transactions_confirmed`]: Self::transactions_confirmed
3585 /// [`transaction_unconfirmed`]: Self::transaction_unconfirmed
3586 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
3587 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3588 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3589 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
3590 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
3591 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
3592 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
3598 /// Marks a transaction as having been reorganized out of the blockchain.
3600 /// If a transaction is included in [`get_relevant_txids`], and is no longer in the main branch
3601 /// of the blockchain, this function should be called to indicate that the transaction should
3602 /// be considered reorganized out.
3604 /// Once this is called, the given transaction will no longer appear on [`get_relevant_txids`],
3605 /// though this may be called repeatedly for a given transaction without issue.
3607 /// Note that if the transaction is confirmed on the main chain in a different block (indicated
3608 /// via a call to [`transactions_confirmed`]), it may re-appear in [`get_relevant_txids`], thus
3609 /// be very wary of race-conditions wherein the final state of a transaction indicated via
3610 /// these APIs is not the same as its state on the blockchain.
3612 /// [`transactions_confirmed`]: Self::transactions_confirmed
3613 /// [`get_relevant_txids`]: Self::get_relevant_txids
3614 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3615 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3616 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
3617 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3618 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
3619 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed().map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
3620 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3621 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3625 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
3626 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
3627 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3629 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
3630 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3631 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3632 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
3635 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
3636 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3638 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
3639 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
3642 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3643 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
3644 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
3645 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
3646 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3651 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
3652 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3653 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3654 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3655 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3656 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3659 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3660 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3661 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3664 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3665 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3666 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3669 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3670 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3671 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3674 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3675 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3676 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3679 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3680 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3681 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3684 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3685 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3686 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3689 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3690 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3691 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3694 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3695 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3696 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3699 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3700 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3701 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3704 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3705 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3706 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3709 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3710 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3711 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3714 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3715 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3716 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3719 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3720 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3721 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3724 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3725 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3726 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3729 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3730 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3731 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3734 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3735 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3736 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3739 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3740 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3741 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3744 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3745 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3746 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3747 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3748 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3750 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3751 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3752 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3753 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3754 if no_connection_possible {
3755 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3756 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3757 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3758 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3759 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3761 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3762 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3763 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3773 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3774 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3775 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3776 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are no
3777 // holding cell add-HTLCs, so if in the future we stop removing uncommitted HTLCs
3778 // on peer disconnect here, there will need to be corresponding changes in
3779 // reestablish logic.
3780 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
3781 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3782 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3783 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3784 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3786 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3787 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3788 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3792 no_channels_remain = false;
3798 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3800 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3801 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3802 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3803 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3804 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3805 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3806 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3807 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3808 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3809 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3810 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3811 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3812 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3813 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3814 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3815 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3816 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
3817 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
3818 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
3822 if no_channels_remain {
3823 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
3826 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3827 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3829 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3830 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3831 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3836 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3837 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3839 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3842 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3843 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
3844 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3845 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3846 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3849 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3850 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3855 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3856 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3857 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3858 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3859 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3860 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3861 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3862 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3863 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3867 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3868 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3869 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
3875 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3878 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3879 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3881 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3882 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3883 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
3884 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
3885 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
3889 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
3890 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
3895 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
3896 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
3897 struct PersistenceNotifier {
3898 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
3899 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
3900 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
3903 impl PersistenceNotifier {
3906 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
3912 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
3913 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3914 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
3915 let result = *guard;
3923 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3924 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3925 let current_time = Instant::now();
3927 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
3928 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3929 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
3930 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
3931 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
3932 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
3933 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
3935 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
3936 let result = *guard;
3937 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
3941 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
3942 None => return result,
3948 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
3950 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
3951 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
3952 *persistence_lock = true;
3953 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
3958 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3959 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3961 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3962 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3963 match &self.routing {
3964 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3966 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3967 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3969 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3971 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3972 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3975 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3976 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3977 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3978 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3983 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3984 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3985 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3986 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3987 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3988 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3989 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3991 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3992 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3993 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3995 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3997 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3998 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3999 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
4000 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
4005 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
4006 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4008 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
4010 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
4012 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
4014 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
4021 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
4022 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
4023 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4024 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4025 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4026 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4031 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
4032 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4034 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
4036 forward_info.write(writer)?;
4038 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
4040 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
4047 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
4048 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
4049 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4050 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4051 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4052 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4057 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
4061 incoming_packet_shared_secret
4064 impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
4071 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
4072 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4074 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
4076 hop_data.write(writer)?;
4078 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
4080 path.write(writer)?;
4081 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4082 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
4089 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
4090 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
4091 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4092 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4093 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4094 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
4095 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
4096 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4098 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4103 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
4104 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4106 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
4110 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
4112 failure_code.write(writer)?;
4113 data.write(writer)?;
4120 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
4121 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
4122 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4123 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
4124 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4125 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
4126 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
4128 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4133 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
4134 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4136 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_funding_outpoint, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
4138 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4139 prev_funding_outpoint.write(writer)?;
4140 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4141 forward_info.write(writer)?;
4143 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4145 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4146 err_packet.write(writer)?;
4153 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
4154 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
4155 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4156 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
4157 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4158 prev_funding_outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
4159 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4160 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
4162 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
4163 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4164 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4166 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4171 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4172 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4173 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4174 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4175 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4178 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4179 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4181 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4182 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4184 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4186 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4187 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4188 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4191 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4192 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4193 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4194 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4195 unfunded_channels += 1;
4198 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4199 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4200 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4201 channel.write(writer)?;
4205 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4206 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4207 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4208 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4209 for forward in pending_forwards {
4210 forward.write(writer)?;
4214 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4215 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4216 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4217 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4218 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4219 htlc.write(writer)?;
4223 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4224 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4225 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4226 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4227 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4228 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4231 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4232 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4233 for event in events.iter() {
4234 event.write(writer)?;
4237 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4238 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4239 for event in background_events.iter() {
4241 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4243 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4244 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4249 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4255 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4257 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4259 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4260 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4261 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4262 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4263 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4264 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4265 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4266 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4267 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4268 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4269 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4271 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4272 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4274 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4275 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4276 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4277 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4278 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4279 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4280 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4281 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4282 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4283 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4284 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4287 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4288 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4290 pub keys_manager: K,
4292 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4294 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4295 pub fee_estimator: F,
4296 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4298 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4299 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4300 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4301 pub chain_monitor: M,
4303 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4304 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4305 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4306 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4307 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4308 /// deserialization.
4310 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4311 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4312 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4314 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4315 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4317 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4318 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4319 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4320 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4322 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4325 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4326 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4329 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4330 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4331 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4332 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4333 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4334 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4337 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4338 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4339 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4340 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4341 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4343 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4344 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4349 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4350 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4351 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4352 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4353 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4354 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4355 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4356 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4359 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4360 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4361 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4365 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4366 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4367 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4368 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4369 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4370 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4373 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4374 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4375 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4376 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4377 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4380 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4381 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4382 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4384 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4386 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4387 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4388 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4389 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4390 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4391 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4392 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4393 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4394 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4395 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4396 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4397 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4398 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4399 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4400 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4401 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4402 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4403 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4404 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4405 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4406 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4407 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4408 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4410 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4411 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4413 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4416 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4420 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4421 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4422 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4426 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4427 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4428 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4429 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4430 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4431 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4432 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4433 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4434 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4436 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
4439 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4440 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4441 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
4442 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4443 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4444 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
4445 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
4446 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4448 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
4451 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4452 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
4453 for _ in 0..peer_count {
4454 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4455 let peer_state = PeerState {
4456 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
4458 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
4461 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4462 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
4463 for _ in 0..event_count {
4464 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4465 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
4470 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4471 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
4472 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
4473 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4474 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
4475 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4479 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4481 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4482 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4484 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
4486 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
4487 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
4488 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
4490 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
4492 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
4497 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
4499 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
4500 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
4503 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
4505 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
4507 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
4508 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
4509 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
4510 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
4512 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
4513 logger: args.logger,
4514 default_configuration: args.default_config,
4517 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4518 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4521 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4522 //connection or two.
4524 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
4530 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
4532 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
4534 use std::time::Duration;
4537 fn test_wait_timeout() {
4538 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
4539 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
4541 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
4542 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
4543 thread::spawn(move || {
4545 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
4546 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4547 *persistence_lock = true;
4550 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
4556 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
4557 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
4559 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
4562 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4567 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
4569 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
4572 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4579 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
4582 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
4583 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
4584 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
4585 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
4586 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4587 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4588 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
4589 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
4590 use routing::router::get_route;
4591 use util::test_utils;
4592 use util::config::UserConfig;
4593 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
4595 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4596 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4597 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
4599 use std::sync::Mutex;
4603 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
4604 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
4605 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
4606 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
4607 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
4608 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
4609 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
4614 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
4615 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
4618 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
4619 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
4620 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
4622 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
4623 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
4625 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())};
4626 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
4628 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
4629 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
4631 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4632 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
4633 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
4634 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
4635 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4637 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
4639 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
4641 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4642 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
4643 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
4644 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
4645 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4647 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
4649 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
4651 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
4652 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4653 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4656 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
4657 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4658 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
4660 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4661 } else { panic!(); }
4663 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4664 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4666 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
4669 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4672 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
4673 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
4675 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4676 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4678 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
4680 macro_rules! send_payment {
4681 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
4682 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
4683 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), None, Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
4685 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
4686 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
4688 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap();
4689 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
4690 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4691 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
4692 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4693 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4694 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4695 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4697 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
4698 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
4699 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage, &None, 10_000));
4701 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
4702 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
4703 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4704 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4705 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
4707 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
4710 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
4711 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4712 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4713 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4715 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
4720 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
4721 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);