1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
47 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
48 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
51 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
53 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
54 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
55 use util::config::UserConfig;
56 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
57 use util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
59 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
60 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
61 use util::errors::APIError;
66 use core::cell::RefCell;
67 use io::{Cursor, Read};
68 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
69 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
70 use core::time::Duration;
71 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
72 use std::time::Instant;
74 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
76 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
78 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
79 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
80 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
82 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
83 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
84 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
85 // before we forward it.
87 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
88 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
89 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
90 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
91 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
93 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
94 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
96 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
105 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
109 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
110 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
111 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
112 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
113 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
114 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
115 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
120 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
121 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
124 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
125 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
126 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
127 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
128 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
131 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
133 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
135 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
136 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
137 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
139 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
141 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
145 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
149 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
150 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
151 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
152 short_channel_id: u64,
154 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
156 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
157 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
162 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
163 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
164 /// are part of the same payment.
165 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
166 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
167 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
170 struct ClaimableHTLC {
171 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
174 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
177 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
178 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
179 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
180 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
183 session_priv: SecretKey,
184 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
185 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
186 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
191 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
192 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
194 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
195 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
200 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
201 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
203 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
211 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
212 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
214 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
219 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
221 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
222 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
223 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
224 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
225 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
227 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
228 err: msgs::LightningError,
229 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
231 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
233 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
235 err: LightningError {
237 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
238 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
244 shutdown_finish: None,
248 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
250 err: LightningError {
252 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
254 shutdown_finish: None,
258 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
259 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
262 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
264 err: LightningError {
266 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
267 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
273 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
277 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
280 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
282 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
284 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
286 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
287 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
293 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
295 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
296 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
303 shutdown_finish: None,
308 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
309 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
310 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
311 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
312 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
314 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
315 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
316 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
317 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
318 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
319 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
320 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
322 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
326 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
327 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
328 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
329 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
330 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
331 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
332 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
333 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
334 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
335 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
336 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
337 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
339 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
340 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
341 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
342 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
345 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
346 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
347 /// quite some time lag.
348 enum BackgroundEvent {
349 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
350 /// commitment transaction.
351 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
354 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
355 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
357 latest_features: InitFeatures,
360 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
361 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
363 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
365 struct PendingInboundPayment {
366 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
367 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
368 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
369 /// this payment being removed.
371 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
372 user_payment_id: u64,
373 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
374 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
375 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
378 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
379 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
380 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
381 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
382 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
383 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
384 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
385 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
387 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
388 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
389 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
390 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
391 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
392 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
393 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
394 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
395 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
397 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
398 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
400 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
401 /// to individual Channels.
403 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
404 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
405 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
406 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
408 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
409 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
410 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
411 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
412 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
413 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
414 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
416 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
417 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
418 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
419 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
422 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
423 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
424 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
425 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
426 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
428 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
429 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
430 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
431 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
432 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
433 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
434 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
435 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
436 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
437 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
440 default_configuration: UserConfig,
441 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
447 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
449 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
450 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
452 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
453 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
454 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
455 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
457 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
458 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
459 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
460 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
461 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
462 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
464 /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
465 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
466 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
467 /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
468 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
469 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
470 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
471 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
473 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
474 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashSet<[u8; 32]>>,
476 our_network_key: SecretKey,
477 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
479 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
480 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
481 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
483 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
484 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
485 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
486 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
488 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
489 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
490 /// are currently open with that peer.
491 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
492 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
495 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
496 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
498 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
499 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
500 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
501 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
502 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
503 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
504 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
505 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
506 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
508 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
515 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
517 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
518 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
519 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
520 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
521 pub struct ChainParameters {
522 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
523 pub network: Network,
525 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
527 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
528 pub best_block: BestBlock,
531 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
537 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
538 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
539 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
540 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
541 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
542 /// updates are ready for persistence).
544 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
545 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
546 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
547 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
548 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
550 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
551 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
554 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
555 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
556 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
559 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
560 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
562 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
563 persistence_notifier: notifier,
564 should_persist: persist_check,
565 _read_guard: read_guard,
570 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
572 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
573 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
578 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
579 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
581 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
583 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
584 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
585 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
586 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
587 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
589 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
590 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
592 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
594 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
595 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
596 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
597 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
598 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
599 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
600 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
602 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
603 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
605 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
606 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
607 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
608 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
610 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
611 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
612 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
613 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
614 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
615 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
618 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
620 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
621 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
624 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
626 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
627 /// to better separate parameters.
628 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
629 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
630 /// The node_id of our counterparty
631 pub node_id: PublicKey,
632 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
633 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
634 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
635 pub features: InitFeatures,
636 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
637 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
638 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
640 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
642 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
643 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
644 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
645 /// payments to us through this channel.
646 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
649 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
650 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
651 pub struct ChannelDetails {
652 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
653 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
654 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
655 /// lifetime of the channel.
656 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
657 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
658 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
659 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
660 /// our counterparty already.
662 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
663 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
664 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
665 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
666 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
667 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
668 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
669 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
670 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
671 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
672 /// this value on chain.
674 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
676 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
678 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
679 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
680 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
682 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
683 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
684 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
685 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
687 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
688 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
689 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
690 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
691 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
692 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
693 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
694 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
695 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
697 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
698 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
699 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
700 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
701 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
702 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
703 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
704 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
705 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
707 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
709 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
710 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
711 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
712 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
713 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
714 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
715 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
716 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
717 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
719 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
720 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
721 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
722 pub is_outbound: bool,
723 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
724 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
725 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
726 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
727 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
729 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
730 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
731 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
732 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
734 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
736 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
740 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
741 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
743 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
744 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
745 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
746 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
747 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
748 ParameterError(APIError),
749 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
750 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
751 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
754 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
756 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
757 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
758 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
759 /// paths than the ones selected).
760 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
761 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
762 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
763 /// in over-/re-payment.
765 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
766 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
767 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
769 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
770 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
771 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
772 /// with the latest update_id.
773 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
776 macro_rules! handle_error {
777 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
780 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
781 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
783 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
784 // entering the macro.
785 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
788 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
790 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
791 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
792 if let Some(update) = update_option {
793 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
799 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
800 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
802 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
803 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
804 action: err.action.clone()
808 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
809 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
812 // Return error in case higher-API need one
819 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
820 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
821 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
823 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
824 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
826 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
827 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
828 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
829 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
831 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
832 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
834 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
835 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
836 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
837 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
839 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
840 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
846 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
847 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
851 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
853 $entry.remove_entry();
861 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
862 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
866 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
868 $entry.remove_entry();
876 macro_rules! remove_channel {
877 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
879 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
880 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
881 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
888 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
889 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
890 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
892 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
894 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
895 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
896 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
897 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
899 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
900 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
901 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
902 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
903 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
904 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
905 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
906 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
907 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
908 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id,
909 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
912 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
913 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
914 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
915 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
917 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
918 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
920 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
921 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
923 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
924 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
925 if !$resend_commitment {
926 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
929 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
931 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
932 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
936 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
937 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
939 $entry.remove_entry();
945 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
946 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
947 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
949 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
950 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
954 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
955 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
956 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
957 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
958 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
961 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
966 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
967 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
968 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
969 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
970 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
971 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
973 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
974 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
976 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
977 if !forwards.is_empty() {
978 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
979 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
982 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
983 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
984 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
985 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
986 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
987 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
988 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
989 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
990 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
991 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
992 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
993 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
996 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
997 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
998 // before it should be allowed to.
999 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1000 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1001 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1004 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1005 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1006 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1007 msg: announcement_sigs,
1010 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1013 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1014 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1015 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1016 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1017 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1018 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1019 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1020 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1021 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1022 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1023 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1024 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1025 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1026 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1027 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1028 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1029 let mut order = $order;
1031 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1033 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1037 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1038 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1039 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1040 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1045 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1046 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1047 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1048 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1049 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1054 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1058 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1063 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1064 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1065 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1070 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1071 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1072 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1073 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1074 assert!(res.is_ok());
1077 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1081 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1082 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1083 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1085 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1087 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1088 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1093 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1094 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1095 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1096 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1097 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1100 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1102 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1103 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1105 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1107 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1109 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1110 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1111 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1112 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1113 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1114 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1117 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1118 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1119 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1123 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1125 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1126 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1127 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1128 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1129 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1130 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1132 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1133 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1135 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1136 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1139 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1140 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1142 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1144 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1145 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1146 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1147 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1155 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1156 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1157 &self.default_configuration
1160 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1162 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1163 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1164 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1165 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1166 /// otherwise ignored.
1168 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1169 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1171 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1172 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1174 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1175 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1176 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten.
1177 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1178 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1179 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1183 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1184 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1185 Some(peer_state) => {
1186 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1187 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1188 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1189 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?
1191 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1194 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1196 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1197 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1198 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1200 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1201 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1202 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1203 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1204 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1206 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1209 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1211 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1212 node_id: their_network_key,
1218 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1219 let mut res = Vec::new();
1221 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1222 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1223 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1224 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1225 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1226 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1227 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1228 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1229 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1230 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1231 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1232 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1233 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1235 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1236 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1237 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1238 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1239 inbound_capacity_msat,
1240 outbound_capacity_msat,
1241 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1242 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1243 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1244 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1245 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1246 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1247 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1251 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1252 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1253 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1254 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1260 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1261 /// more information.
1262 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1263 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1266 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1267 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1269 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1270 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1272 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1273 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1274 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1275 // really wanted anyway.
1276 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1279 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1280 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1281 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1283 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1284 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1285 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1287 let counterparty_node_id;
1288 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1289 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1290 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1291 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1292 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1293 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1294 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1295 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1296 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1297 Some(peer_state) => {
1298 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1299 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1300 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features)?
1302 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1304 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1306 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1307 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1308 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1309 let (result, is_permanent) =
1310 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1312 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1318 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1319 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1323 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1324 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1325 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1326 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1333 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1337 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1338 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1341 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1346 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1347 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1348 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1349 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1350 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1352 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1353 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1354 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1355 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1356 // ignore the result here.
1357 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1361 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1363 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1364 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1365 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1366 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1367 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1368 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1371 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1372 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1374 chan.remove_entry().1
1376 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1379 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1380 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1381 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1382 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1383 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1388 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1391 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1392 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1393 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1394 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1395 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1396 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1397 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1398 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1399 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1400 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1401 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1411 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1412 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1413 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1414 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1415 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1419 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1420 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1421 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1423 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1424 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1425 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1426 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1427 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1428 failure_code: $err_code,
1429 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1434 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1435 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1438 let shared_secret = {
1439 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1440 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1443 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1445 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1446 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1447 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1448 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1449 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1450 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1451 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1452 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1455 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1456 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1457 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1458 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1459 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1462 let mut channel_state = None;
1463 macro_rules! return_err {
1464 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1466 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1467 if channel_state.is_none() {
1468 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1470 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1471 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1472 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1473 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1474 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1479 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1480 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1481 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1482 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1484 let error_code = match err {
1485 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1486 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1487 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1488 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1489 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1491 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1494 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1495 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1496 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1503 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1506 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1507 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1508 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1509 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1510 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1511 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1512 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1513 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1514 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1515 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1516 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1517 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1521 // final_expiry_too_soon
1522 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1523 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1524 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1525 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1526 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1527 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1528 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1530 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1531 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1532 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1534 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1535 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1536 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1539 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1540 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1541 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1542 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1543 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1544 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1545 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1546 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1548 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1550 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1551 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1552 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1553 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1554 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1555 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1556 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1557 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1558 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1561 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1563 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1566 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1571 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1572 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1573 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1574 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1576 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1578 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1579 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1580 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1581 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1584 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1585 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1586 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1588 // Check two things:
1589 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1590 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1591 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1593 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1595 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1596 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1597 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1599 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1601 let blinding_factor = {
1602 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1603 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1604 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1605 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1608 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1610 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1612 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1615 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1616 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1619 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1620 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1621 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1622 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1623 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1627 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1628 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1629 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1632 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1633 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1634 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1635 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1639 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1640 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1641 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1642 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1643 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1644 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1645 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1646 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1647 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1648 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1649 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1651 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1654 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1656 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1657 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1658 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1659 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1660 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1663 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1664 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1665 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1666 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1667 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1668 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1669 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1671 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1672 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1674 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1675 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1676 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1677 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1678 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1680 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1681 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1683 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1684 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1685 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1686 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1687 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1689 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1690 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1692 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1693 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1694 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1695 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1701 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1702 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1703 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1704 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1706 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1707 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1709 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1710 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1711 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1713 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1715 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1720 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1723 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1724 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1725 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1727 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1728 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1729 if !chan.should_announce() {
1730 return Err(LightningError {
1731 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1732 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1735 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1736 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1739 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1740 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1741 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1742 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1743 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1744 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1745 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1746 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1747 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1751 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1753 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1754 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1756 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1757 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1758 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1759 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1760 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1761 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
1762 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1763 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1766 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1767 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1769 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1775 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1776 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1777 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1778 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1779 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1780 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1782 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1783 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1784 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
1785 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1786 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1788 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1790 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1791 assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().insert(session_priv_bytes));
1793 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1794 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1795 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1796 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1797 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1800 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1801 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1803 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1804 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1806 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1807 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1809 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1811 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1812 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1813 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1815 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1816 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1817 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1818 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1819 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1820 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1821 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1822 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1823 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1826 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
1827 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1828 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1829 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1830 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1831 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1832 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1833 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1841 } else { unreachable!(); }
1845 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1846 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1848 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1853 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1855 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1856 /// fields for more info.
1858 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1859 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1860 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1861 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1862 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1863 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1865 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1867 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1868 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1869 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1871 /// In general, a path may raise:
1872 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1873 /// node public key) is specified.
1874 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1875 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1877 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1878 /// relevant updates.
1880 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1881 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1882 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1884 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1885 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1886 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1887 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1889 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1890 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1891 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1892 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1893 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None)
1896 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1897 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1898 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1900 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1901 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1902 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1903 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1904 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1906 let mut total_value = 0;
1907 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1908 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1909 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1910 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1911 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1912 continue 'path_check;
1914 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1915 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1916 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1917 continue 'path_check;
1920 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1921 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1923 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1924 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1927 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1928 let mut results = Vec::new();
1929 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1930 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, &keysend_preimage));
1932 let mut has_ok = false;
1933 let mut has_err = false;
1934 for res in results.iter() {
1935 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1936 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1937 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1938 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1945 if has_err && has_ok {
1946 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1948 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1954 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
1955 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
1956 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
1957 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
1958 /// never reach the recipient.
1960 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
1961 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
1963 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1964 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
1965 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
1967 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
1969 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
1970 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage)) {
1971 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
1976 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
1977 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
1978 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
1979 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1981 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1983 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
1985 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1986 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1987 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1988 } else { unreachable!(); })
1991 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1993 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1994 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1997 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1998 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2003 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2004 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2005 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2008 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2009 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2010 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2012 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2020 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2021 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2022 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2026 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2028 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2029 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2031 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2033 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2034 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2035 /// keys per-channel).
2037 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2038 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2039 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2041 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2042 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2043 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2045 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2046 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2047 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2049 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2050 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2051 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2052 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2056 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2057 let mut output_index = None;
2058 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2059 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2060 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2061 if output_index.is_some() {
2062 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2063 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2066 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2067 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2068 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2071 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2074 if output_index.is_none() {
2075 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2076 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2079 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2083 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2084 if !chan.should_announce() {
2085 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2089 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2091 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2093 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2094 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2096 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2097 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2098 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2099 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2100 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2105 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2106 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2107 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2109 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2112 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2113 // smaller than 500:
2114 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2116 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2117 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2118 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2119 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2120 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2121 /// our network addresses.
2123 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2124 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2126 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2127 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2128 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2129 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2131 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2133 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2134 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2135 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2137 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2138 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2141 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2142 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2143 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2145 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2146 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2147 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2148 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2149 rgb, alias, addresses,
2150 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2151 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2153 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2154 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2156 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2157 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2159 let mut announced_chans = false;
2160 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2161 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2162 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2164 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2169 announced_chans = true;
2171 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2172 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2173 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2177 if announced_chans {
2178 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2179 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2180 signature: node_announce_sig,
2181 contents: announcement
2187 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2189 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2190 /// Will likely generate further events.
2191 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2192 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2194 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2195 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2196 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2198 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2199 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2201 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2202 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2203 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2204 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2206 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2207 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2208 match forward_info {
2209 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2210 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2211 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2212 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2213 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2214 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2215 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2217 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2218 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2221 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2222 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2223 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2224 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2225 // problem, not ours.
2232 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2233 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2234 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2235 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2236 match forward_info {
2237 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2238 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2240 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2241 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2242 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2243 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2244 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2245 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2246 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2247 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2249 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2251 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2252 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2254 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2256 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2257 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2258 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2264 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2266 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2267 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2268 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2269 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2270 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2271 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2272 // this channel currently :/.
2278 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2279 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2281 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2282 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2283 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2285 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2286 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2288 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2290 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2291 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2292 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2295 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2297 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2298 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2299 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2300 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2301 // messages when we can.
2302 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2303 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2304 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2311 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2312 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2315 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2316 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2317 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2318 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2319 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
2320 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2322 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2323 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2324 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2325 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2326 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2328 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2330 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2332 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2336 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2337 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2340 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2341 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2342 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2343 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2344 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2345 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2346 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2347 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2348 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2350 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2358 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2359 match forward_info {
2360 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2361 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2362 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2363 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2364 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2365 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2366 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2367 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2369 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2372 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2373 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2374 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2375 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2376 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2377 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2379 value: amt_to_forward,
2384 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2386 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2387 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2388 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2390 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2391 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2392 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2393 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2394 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2396 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2401 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2402 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2403 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2404 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2405 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2406 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2407 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2408 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2409 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2410 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2411 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2412 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2413 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2415 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2416 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2417 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2418 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2419 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2421 amt: amt_to_forward,
2422 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2425 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2426 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2427 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2433 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2435 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2438 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2439 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2442 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2443 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2444 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2445 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2446 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2447 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2448 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2450 let mut total_value = 0;
2451 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2452 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2453 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2454 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2455 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2456 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2460 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2461 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2462 total_value += htlc.value;
2463 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2464 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2465 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2466 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2467 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2468 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2470 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2472 _ => unreachable!(),
2475 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2476 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2477 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2478 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2481 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2482 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2484 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2485 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2486 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2487 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2491 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2492 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2494 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2496 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2497 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2504 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2505 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2513 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2514 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2517 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2518 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2521 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2522 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2523 events.append(&mut new_events);
2526 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2528 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2529 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2531 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2532 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2533 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2534 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2535 if background_events.is_empty() {
2539 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2541 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2542 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2543 // monitor updating completing.
2544 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2551 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2552 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2553 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2554 self.process_background_events();
2557 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
2558 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
2559 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
2561 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
2563 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
2564 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2565 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2566 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2567 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2569 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2570 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2571 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2572 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2573 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2574 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2575 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2576 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2577 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2578 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2579 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2583 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2584 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2586 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2587 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2588 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2592 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2593 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2603 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2604 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2605 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2606 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2607 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2608 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2609 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2611 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2612 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2613 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2614 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2615 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2616 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2617 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2618 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2619 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2620 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2621 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2627 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2628 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2629 // be surfaced to the user.
2630 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2631 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2633 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2634 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2635 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2636 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2637 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
2638 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2640 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2643 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2645 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2646 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2647 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2649 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2651 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2652 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2653 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2655 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2656 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2658 rejected_by_dest: false,
2666 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2673 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2674 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2675 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2676 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2677 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2678 /// still-available channels.
2679 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2680 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2681 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2682 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2685 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2686 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2687 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2689 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, .. } => {
2691 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2692 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2693 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2695 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2698 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2699 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2700 match &onion_error {
2701 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2703 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2705 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2706 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2707 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2708 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2709 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2710 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2711 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2716 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2717 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2718 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2719 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2721 error_code: onion_error_code,
2723 error_data: onion_error_data
2727 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2733 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2734 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2735 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2736 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2738 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2739 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2740 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2741 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2742 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2743 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2745 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2747 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2753 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2754 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2755 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2756 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2757 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2758 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2760 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2761 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2762 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2766 let mut forward_event = None;
2767 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2768 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2770 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2771 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2772 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2774 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2775 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2778 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2779 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2780 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2781 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2782 time_forwardable: time
2789 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2790 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2791 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2793 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
2794 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
2795 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
2796 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
2798 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2800 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
2801 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
2802 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
2803 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2805 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2807 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2808 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
2809 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2810 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2812 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2813 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2814 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2815 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2817 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2818 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2819 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2820 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2821 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2823 let mut valid_mpp = true;
2824 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2825 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2831 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2832 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2833 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2835 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2836 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2837 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2838 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2839 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2840 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2841 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2843 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2844 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
2845 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
2846 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2847 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2848 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
2849 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2850 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
2852 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2853 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
2854 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
2855 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
2856 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
2857 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
2859 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2864 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2865 // which were generated.
2866 channel_state.take();
2868 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2869 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2870 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2877 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
2878 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2879 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2880 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2881 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2883 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
2887 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2888 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2889 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
2890 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
2891 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2892 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
2893 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2894 payment_preimage, e);
2895 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
2896 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2897 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
2898 Some(htlc_value_msat)
2901 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2902 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
2903 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2904 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2905 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2906 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2907 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2908 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2909 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2910 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2916 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
2918 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
2921 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
2922 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2923 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
2924 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
2925 payment_preimage, e);
2927 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2928 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
2930 chan.remove_entry();
2932 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
2935 } else { unreachable!(); }
2938 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
2940 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2941 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2943 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2944 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2945 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2947 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2948 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2952 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
2955 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2956 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2957 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
2958 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
2959 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
2960 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
2961 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
2964 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
2965 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2966 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2967 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2968 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2971 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2972 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2973 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2974 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2975 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2976 payment_preimage, e);
2978 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
2979 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
2980 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
2981 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
2984 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2985 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
2986 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2987 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
2991 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
2992 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
2993 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
2996 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2997 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
2999 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3007 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3008 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3009 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3012 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
3013 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
3016 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
3017 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
3019 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
3020 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
3021 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
3022 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
3024 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
3025 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
3026 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
3027 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
3028 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
3029 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
3030 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
3031 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
3032 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3033 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3035 let chan_restoration_res;
3036 let mut pending_failures = {
3037 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3038 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3039 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3040 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3041 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3043 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3047 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3048 let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3049 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3050 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3051 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3052 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3053 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3054 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3055 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3058 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
3059 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3060 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3064 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3065 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3066 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3070 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3071 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3072 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3075 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
3076 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3077 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3078 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3079 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3080 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3081 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3082 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3083 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3084 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3086 entry.insert(channel);
3092 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3093 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3094 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3095 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3096 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3097 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3098 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3099 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3101 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3102 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3104 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3107 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3108 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3109 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3110 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3112 user_channel_id: user_id,
3117 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3118 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3119 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3120 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3121 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3122 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3123 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3124 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3125 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3127 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3129 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3132 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3133 // lock before watch_channel
3134 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3136 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3137 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3138 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3139 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3140 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3141 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3142 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3143 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3144 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3145 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3146 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3148 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3149 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3150 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3151 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3152 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3153 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3157 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3158 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3159 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3160 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3161 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3163 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3164 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3165 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3174 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3176 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3177 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3178 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3179 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3180 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3181 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3182 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3184 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3185 Ok(update) => update,
3186 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3188 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3189 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3193 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3196 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3197 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3201 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3202 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3203 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3204 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3205 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3206 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3207 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3209 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3210 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3211 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3212 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3213 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3214 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3215 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3216 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3217 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3218 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3219 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3220 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3221 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3222 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3223 msg: announcement_sigs,
3225 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3226 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3227 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3228 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3233 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3237 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3238 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3239 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3240 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3241 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3243 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3244 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3245 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3246 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3249 let (shutdown, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3250 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3252 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3253 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3254 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3255 let (result, is_permanent) =
3256 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3258 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3264 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3265 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3266 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3270 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3271 // TODO: Do not send this if the monitor update failed.
3272 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3273 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3280 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3283 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3284 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3287 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3291 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3292 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3293 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3294 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3295 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3296 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3297 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3298 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3300 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3301 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3302 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3303 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3308 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3309 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3310 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3311 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3312 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3313 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3314 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3316 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3317 } else { (tx, None) }
3319 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3322 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3323 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3324 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3326 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3327 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3328 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3329 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3337 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3338 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3339 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3340 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3342 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3343 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3344 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3345 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3347 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3348 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3350 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3351 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3352 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3353 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3356 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3357 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
3358 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
3359 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
3360 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3361 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3362 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3363 match pending_forward_info {
3364 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3365 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3366 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3367 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3368 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3369 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3370 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3374 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3375 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3376 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3377 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3378 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3379 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
3380 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3381 // no problem just calling this
3382 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3383 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3385 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3386 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3387 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3390 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3392 _ => pending_forward_info
3395 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3397 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3402 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3403 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3404 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3405 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3406 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3407 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3408 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3409 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3411 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3413 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3416 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
3420 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3421 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3422 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3423 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3424 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3425 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3426 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3428 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3430 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3435 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3436 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3437 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3438 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3439 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3440 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3441 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3443 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3444 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3445 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3447 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3450 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3454 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3455 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3456 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3457 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3458 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3459 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3460 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3462 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
3463 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
3464 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3465 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3466 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3467 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3468 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3473 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3474 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3475 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
3477 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3478 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3479 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3481 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3482 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3483 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3484 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3485 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3486 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3487 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3488 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3490 commitment_signed: msg,
3494 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3495 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3496 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3502 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3507 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3508 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3509 let mut forward_event = None;
3510 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3511 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3512 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3513 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3515 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3516 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3517 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3518 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3519 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
3521 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3522 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3523 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3525 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3526 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3527 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3532 match forward_event {
3534 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3535 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3536 time_forwardable: time
3544 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3545 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3547 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3548 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3549 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3550 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3551 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3552 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3554 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3555 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3556 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3557 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3558 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3559 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3560 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3561 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3563 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3565 } else { unreachable!(); }
3568 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3569 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3570 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3574 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3575 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3576 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3580 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3582 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3585 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3587 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3588 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3589 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3591 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3598 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3599 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3600 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3601 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3602 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3603 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3604 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3606 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3608 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3613 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3614 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3615 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3617 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3618 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3619 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3620 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3622 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3623 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3626 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3627 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3628 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
3629 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
3630 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3633 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3638 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
3639 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3640 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3641 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3642 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3643 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3645 // It's not a local channel
3646 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
3649 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3650 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3651 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3652 if chan.get().should_announce() {
3653 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
3654 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
3655 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
3656 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3658 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3660 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3661 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
3662 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
3663 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3665 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3668 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3670 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
3673 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3674 let chan_restoration_res;
3675 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
3676 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3677 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3679 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3680 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3681 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3682 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3684 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3685 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3686 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3687 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3688 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
3689 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3690 let mut channel_update = None;
3691 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3692 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3693 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3696 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3697 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
3698 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
3699 // they have the latest channel parameters.
3700 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3701 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3702 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3705 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
3706 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
3707 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3708 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3710 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
3712 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3715 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3716 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
3718 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
3719 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
3724 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3725 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3726 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3727 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3728 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3730 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3731 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3732 let counterparty_node_id;
3733 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3734 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3735 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3737 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3738 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3739 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3740 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3741 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3743 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3744 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3746 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3747 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3749 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3750 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3751 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3753 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3756 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating fee resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3757 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3758 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3759 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3760 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3761 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3762 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3763 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3764 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3774 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3775 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3776 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3780 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
3781 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
3782 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3783 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
3784 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
3785 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
3786 match monitor_event {
3787 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3788 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3789 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3790 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
3792 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3793 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3796 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3797 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3798 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3799 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3800 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3801 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3802 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3803 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3804 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3806 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3807 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3808 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3812 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3813 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3814 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3815 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3823 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3824 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3827 has_pending_monitor_events
3830 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
3831 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
3832 /// update was applied.
3834 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
3835 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
3836 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
3837 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
3838 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
3839 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
3840 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3841 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3843 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3844 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3845 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3846 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3847 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3849 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
3850 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
3851 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3852 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
3853 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
3855 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
3856 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3857 has_monitor_update = true;
3858 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
3859 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
3860 if close_channel { return false; }
3862 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3863 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3864 updates: commitment_update,
3871 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
3872 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
3879 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
3880 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3881 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
3884 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3885 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3891 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3892 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3894 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3895 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3896 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3897 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3898 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3899 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3900 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3901 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3902 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3903 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3904 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3905 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3906 assert!(should_broadcast);
3907 } else { unreachable!(); }
3908 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3910 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3914 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3915 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
3917 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3919 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3920 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3921 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3922 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3923 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
3924 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
3925 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
3926 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
3927 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
3928 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
3929 // never fail a payment too early.
3930 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
3932 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
3935 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
3940 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
3943 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
3944 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
3946 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
3947 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
3948 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
3950 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
3952 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
3953 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3954 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
3955 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3956 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
3957 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3958 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3961 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3962 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
3965 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
3966 /// stored external to LDK.
3968 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
3969 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
3970 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
3972 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
3973 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
3975 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
3976 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
3977 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
3978 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
3979 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
3981 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
3982 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
3983 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
3984 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
3986 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
3987 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
3988 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
3989 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
3990 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
3992 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
3993 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
3994 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
3995 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
3996 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
3998 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
3999 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4000 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4002 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4004 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4005 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4007 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4008 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4009 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
4010 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4011 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4014 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4015 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4016 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4017 let event_handler = |event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
4018 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4023 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4024 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4025 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4026 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4027 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4030 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4031 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4032 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4033 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4035 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4036 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4037 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4038 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4041 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4042 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4045 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4046 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4047 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4049 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4050 events.replace(pending_events);
4059 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4061 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4062 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4063 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4064 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4067 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4069 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4070 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4072 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4073 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4074 /// restarting from an old state.
4075 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4076 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4077 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4079 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4080 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4081 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4082 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4085 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4086 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4087 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4090 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4091 handler.handle_event(event);
4099 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4101 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4102 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4103 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4104 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4107 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4109 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4110 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4111 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4112 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4113 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4116 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4117 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4118 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4121 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4122 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4123 let new_height = height - 1;
4125 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4126 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4127 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4128 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4129 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4130 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4133 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4137 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4139 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4140 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4141 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4142 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4145 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4146 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4147 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4148 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4150 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4151 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4153 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4154 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4157 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4158 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4159 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4160 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4162 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4163 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4165 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4167 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4169 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4171 macro_rules! max_time {
4172 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4174 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4175 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4176 // having an explicit local time source.
4177 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4178 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4179 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4180 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4181 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4187 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4188 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4189 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4190 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4191 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4195 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4196 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4197 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4198 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4199 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4200 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4206 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4207 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4208 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4209 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4210 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4211 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4212 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4213 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4218 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4220 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4221 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4222 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4223 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4226 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4227 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4229 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4230 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4231 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4232 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4233 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4235 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4236 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4238 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4239 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4240 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4241 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4242 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4243 let res = f(channel);
4244 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4245 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4246 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4247 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4248 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4252 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4253 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4254 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4255 msg: funding_locked,
4257 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4258 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4259 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4260 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4261 msg: announcement_sigs,
4263 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4264 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4265 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4266 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4267 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4270 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4272 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4274 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4275 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4276 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4278 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4279 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4280 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4281 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4282 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4286 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4287 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4288 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4295 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4296 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4297 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4298 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4299 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4300 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4301 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4302 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4303 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4304 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4305 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4306 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4307 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4312 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4317 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4319 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4320 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4324 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4325 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4326 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4328 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4329 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4330 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4331 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4334 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4335 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4337 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4338 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4341 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4342 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4343 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4344 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4345 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4349 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4350 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4351 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4352 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4356 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4357 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4358 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4359 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4360 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4361 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4364 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4365 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4366 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4369 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4370 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4371 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4374 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4375 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4376 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4379 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4380 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4381 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4384 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4385 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4386 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4389 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4390 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4391 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4394 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4395 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4396 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4399 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4400 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4401 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4404 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4405 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4406 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4409 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4410 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4411 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4414 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4415 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4416 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4419 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4420 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4421 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4424 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4425 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4426 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4429 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4430 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4431 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4434 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4435 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4436 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4439 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4440 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4441 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4444 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4449 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4450 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4451 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4454 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4455 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4456 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4457 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4459 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4460 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4461 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4462 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4463 if no_connection_possible {
4464 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4465 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4466 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4467 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4468 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4470 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4471 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4472 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4482 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4483 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4484 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4485 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4486 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4487 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4488 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4492 no_channels_remain = false;
4498 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4500 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4501 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4502 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4503 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4504 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4505 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4506 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4507 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4508 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4509 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4510 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4511 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4512 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4513 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4514 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4515 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4516 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
4517 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4518 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4519 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4523 if no_channels_remain {
4524 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4527 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4528 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4532 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4533 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4535 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4538 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4539 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4540 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4541 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4542 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4545 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4546 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4551 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4552 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4553 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4554 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4555 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4556 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4557 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4558 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4559 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4563 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4564 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4565 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4571 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4574 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4575 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4577 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4578 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4579 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4580 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4581 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4585 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4586 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4591 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4592 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4593 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4594 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4595 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4596 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4599 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4602 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4608 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4609 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4614 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4615 let result = *guard;
4623 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4624 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4625 let current_time = Instant::now();
4627 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4628 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4633 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4634 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4635 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4636 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4637 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4639 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4640 let result = *guard;
4641 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4645 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4646 None => return result,
4652 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4654 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4655 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4656 *persistence_lock = true;
4657 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4662 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4663 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4665 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
4667 (0, onion_packet, required),
4668 (2, short_channel_id, required),
4671 (0, payment_data, required),
4672 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4674 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
4675 (0, payment_preimage, required),
4676 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4680 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
4681 (0, routing, required),
4682 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
4683 (4, payment_hash, required),
4684 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
4685 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
4688 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailureMsg, ;
4692 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
4697 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
4698 (0, short_channel_id, required),
4699 (2, outpoint, required),
4700 (4, htlc_id, required),
4701 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
4704 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
4705 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4706 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
4707 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
4710 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
4711 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
4712 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
4717 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
4718 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
4719 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
4725 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
4726 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4727 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
4729 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
4730 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
4731 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4735 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
4736 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
4737 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
4739 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
4741 if payment_data.is_some() {
4742 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4744 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
4747 if payment_data.is_none() {
4748 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4750 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
4754 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
4762 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCSource,
4763 (0, OutboundRoute) => {
4764 (0, session_priv, required),
4765 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
4766 (4, path, vec_type),
4768 (1, PreviousHopData)
4771 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
4772 (0, LightningError) => {
4776 (0, failure_code, required),
4777 (2, data, vec_type),
4781 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
4783 (0, forward_info, required),
4784 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
4785 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
4786 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
4789 (0, htlc_id, required),
4790 (2, err_packet, required),
4794 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
4795 (0, payment_secret, required),
4796 (2, expiry_time, required),
4797 (4, user_payment_id, required),
4798 (6, payment_preimage, required),
4799 (8, min_value_msat, required),
4802 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4803 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4804 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4805 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4806 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4809 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4810 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4812 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4814 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4816 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4817 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4818 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4821 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4822 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4823 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4824 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4825 unfunded_channels += 1;
4828 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4829 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4830 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4831 channel.write(writer)?;
4835 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4836 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4837 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4838 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4839 for forward in pending_forwards {
4840 forward.write(writer)?;
4844 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4845 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4846 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4847 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4848 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4849 htlc.write(writer)?;
4853 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4854 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4855 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4856 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4857 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4858 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4861 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4862 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4863 for event in events.iter() {
4864 event.write(writer)?;
4867 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4868 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4869 for event in background_events.iter() {
4871 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4873 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4874 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4879 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4880 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4882 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4883 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4884 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
4885 hash.write(writer)?;
4886 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
4889 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4890 (pending_outbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4891 for session_priv in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
4892 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4895 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
4901 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4903 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4905 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4906 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4907 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4908 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4909 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4910 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4911 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4912 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4913 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4914 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4915 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4917 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4918 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4920 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4921 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4922 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4923 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4924 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4925 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4926 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4927 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4928 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4929 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4930 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4933 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4934 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4936 pub keys_manager: K,
4938 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4940 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4941 pub fee_estimator: F,
4942 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4944 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4945 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4946 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4947 pub chain_monitor: M,
4949 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4950 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4951 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4952 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4953 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4954 /// deserialization.
4956 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4957 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4958 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4960 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4961 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4963 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4964 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4965 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4966 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4968 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4971 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4972 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4975 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4976 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4977 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4978 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4979 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4980 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4983 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4984 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4985 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4986 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4987 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4989 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4990 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4995 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4996 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4997 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4998 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4999 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5000 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5001 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5002 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5005 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5006 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5007 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5011 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5012 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5013 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5014 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5015 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5016 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5019 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5020 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5022 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5023 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5024 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5026 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5028 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5029 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5030 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5031 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5032 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5033 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
5034 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5035 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5036 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5037 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5038 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5039 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5040 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5041 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5042 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5043 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5044 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5045 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5046 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5047 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5048 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5049 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5050 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5051 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5052 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5053 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5054 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5055 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5056 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5057 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5058 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5059 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5060 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5061 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5063 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5064 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5066 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5069 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5070 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5071 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5072 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5073 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5074 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5078 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5079 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5080 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5084 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5085 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5086 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5087 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5088 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5089 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5090 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5091 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5092 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5094 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5097 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5098 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5099 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5100 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5101 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5102 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5103 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5104 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5106 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5109 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5110 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5111 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5112 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5113 let peer_state = PeerState {
5114 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5116 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5119 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5120 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5121 for _ in 0..event_count {
5122 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5123 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5128 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5129 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5130 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5131 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5132 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5133 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5137 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5138 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5140 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5141 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5142 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5143 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5144 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5148 let pending_outbound_payments_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5149 let mut pending_outbound_payments: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5150 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count {
5151 if !pending_outbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?) {
5152 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5156 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
5158 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5159 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5161 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
5163 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
5164 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
5165 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
5167 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
5169 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
5174 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
5176 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
5177 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments),
5179 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
5180 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
5183 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
5184 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
5186 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
5188 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
5189 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
5190 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
5191 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
5193 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
5194 logger: args.logger,
5195 default_configuration: args.default_config,
5198 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5199 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5202 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
5203 //connection or two.
5205 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
5211 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5212 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5213 use core::time::Duration;
5214 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
5215 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5216 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5218 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5219 use routing::router::{get_keysend_route, get_route};
5220 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
5221 use util::test_utils;
5223 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5225 fn test_wait_timeout() {
5226 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
5228 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
5231 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
5232 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
5234 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
5235 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
5236 thread::spawn(move || {
5238 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
5239 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5240 *persistence_lock = true;
5243 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
5249 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
5250 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
5252 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
5255 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5260 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
5262 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
5265 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5272 fn test_notify_limits() {
5273 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
5274 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
5275 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5276 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5277 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5278 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5280 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
5281 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
5282 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5283 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5284 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5286 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5288 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
5289 // to connect messages with new values
5290 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5291 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5292 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5293 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5295 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
5296 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5297 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5298 // ... but the last node should not.
5299 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5300 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
5301 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5302 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5304 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
5305 // about the channel.
5306 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5307 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5308 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5310 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
5312 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5313 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5314 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5315 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5316 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5317 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5319 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
5320 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5321 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5323 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
5324 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
5325 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
5326 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
5327 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
5328 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
5330 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
5331 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
5332 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5333 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5334 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5335 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5336 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5337 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5339 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
5340 // the channel info has updated.
5341 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5342 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5343 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5344 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5345 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5346 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5350 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
5351 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
5353 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5354 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5355 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5356 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5357 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5358 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5360 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
5361 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5362 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5363 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
5364 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
5365 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
5366 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
5367 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
5368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5369 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5370 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5371 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
5373 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
5374 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5376 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5377 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5378 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5379 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5380 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5382 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5383 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5384 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5386 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5387 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5388 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5389 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5390 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5391 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5392 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5393 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5394 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5396 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
5397 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
5398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5399 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5400 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5401 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
5403 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
5404 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
5405 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
5406 // lightning messages manually.
5407 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5408 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5409 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5410 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5411 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
5412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5413 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5414 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
5415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5416 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5417 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
5418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5419 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5420 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5421 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5422 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5423 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5424 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
5425 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5427 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
5428 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5429 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5430 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5431 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5432 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
5433 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5435 // There's an existing bug that generates a PaymentSent event for each MPP path, so handle that here.
5436 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5438 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5439 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5441 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5444 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5445 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5447 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5452 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
5453 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
5454 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
5455 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
5456 // fails as expected.
5457 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5458 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5459 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5460 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5461 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5462 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5464 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
5465 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
5466 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
5468 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
5469 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5470 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5472 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5473 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5474 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5475 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5476 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5477 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5478 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5479 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5480 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5482 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5483 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5484 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5485 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5486 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5487 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5488 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5489 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5490 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5492 // Finally, claim the original payment.
5493 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5495 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
5496 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5497 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5498 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5499 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5500 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5501 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5502 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
5503 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
5504 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
5506 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
5507 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5508 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5509 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5510 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5511 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5512 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5513 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5514 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5516 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5517 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5518 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5519 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5520 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5521 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5522 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5523 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5524 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5525 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5526 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5527 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5528 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5530 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
5531 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5535 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
5536 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
5537 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
5538 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5539 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5540 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5541 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5543 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5544 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5545 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5546 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5548 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5549 let network_graph = nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
5550 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5551 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5552 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5553 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5555 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5556 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
5557 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5558 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5560 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5561 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5562 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5563 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5564 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5565 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5566 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5568 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
5572 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
5573 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
5574 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5575 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5576 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5577 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5579 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5580 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5581 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5582 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5584 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5585 let network_graph = nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
5586 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5587 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5588 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5589 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5591 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5592 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5593 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
5594 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5597 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5598 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5599 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5600 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5601 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5602 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5603 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5605 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
5609 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
5612 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
5613 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
5614 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
5615 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
5616 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5617 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5618 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
5619 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
5620 use routing::router::get_route;
5621 use util::test_utils;
5622 use util::config::UserConfig;
5623 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
5625 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5626 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5627 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
5629 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
5633 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
5634 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
5635 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
5636 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
5637 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
5638 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
5639 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
5644 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
5645 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
5648 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
5649 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
5650 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
5652 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
5653 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5655 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
5656 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
5658 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
5659 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
5661 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5662 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
5663 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
5664 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
5665 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5667 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5669 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
5671 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5672 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
5673 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
5674 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
5675 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5677 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5679 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
5681 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5682 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5683 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
5684 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5685 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5688 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
5689 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5690 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
5692 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
5693 } else { panic!(); }
5695 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5696 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5698 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
5701 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5704 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
5705 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
5707 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5708 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5709 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
5710 match msg_events[0] {
5711 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
5712 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
5713 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
5717 match msg_events[1] {
5718 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5722 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
5724 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
5725 macro_rules! send_payment {
5726 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
5727 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
5728 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
5729 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
5731 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
5732 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
5734 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
5735 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
5737 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5738 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
5739 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5740 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
5741 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5742 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5743 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5744 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5746 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
5747 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
5748 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5750 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
5751 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
5752 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5753 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5754 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
5756 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
5759 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
5760 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5761 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5762 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5764 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
5769 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
5770 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);