1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
48 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
50 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
70 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
71 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
72 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
73 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
74 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
75 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
76 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
77 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
78 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
81 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
82 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
83 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
84 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
85 crate::sign::KeysManager,
89 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
90 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
93 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
96 use crate::prelude::*;
98 use core::cell::RefCell;
100 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
101 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
102 use core::time::Duration;
103 use core::ops::Deref;
105 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
106 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
107 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
109 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
111 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
112 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
113 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
115 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
116 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
117 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
118 // before we forward it.
120 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
121 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
122 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
123 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
124 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
126 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
129 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
130 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
132 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
133 /// do with the HTLC.
134 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
135 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
137 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
138 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
139 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
140 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
141 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
142 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
144 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
146 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
147 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
149 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
150 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
151 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
152 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
153 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
155 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
156 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
157 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
158 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
159 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
161 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
162 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
163 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
164 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
166 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
167 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
169 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
170 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
171 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
172 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
173 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
174 requires_blinded_error: bool,
176 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
177 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
178 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
180 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
181 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
183 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
184 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
185 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
187 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
188 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
189 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
191 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
192 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
193 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
194 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
196 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
197 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
198 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
200 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
201 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
202 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
203 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
204 requires_blinded_error: bool,
208 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
209 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
210 pub struct BlindedForward {
211 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
212 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
213 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
214 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
215 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
216 /// the introduction node.
217 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
220 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
221 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
222 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
224 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
225 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
226 Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
232 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
234 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
235 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
236 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
237 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
238 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
239 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
241 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
242 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
243 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
244 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
245 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
247 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
249 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
250 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
251 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
253 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
254 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
255 /// it along another path).
257 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
258 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
259 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
260 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
261 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
262 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
263 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
264 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
265 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
267 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
270 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
272 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
274 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
277 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
278 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
279 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
280 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
283 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
284 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
285 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
286 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
287 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
290 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
291 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
292 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
294 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
295 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
296 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
299 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
300 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
302 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
303 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
304 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
307 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
308 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
309 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
312 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
317 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
321 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
322 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
323 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
324 pub enum BlindedFailure {
325 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
326 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
327 FromIntroductionNode,
328 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
329 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
333 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
334 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
335 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
336 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
337 short_channel_id: u64,
338 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
340 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
341 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
342 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
343 channel_id: ChannelId,
345 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
346 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
351 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
353 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
354 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
355 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
357 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
358 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
361 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
362 struct ClaimableHTLC {
363 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
365 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
367 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
368 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
369 sender_intended_value: u64,
370 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
372 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
373 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
374 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
375 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
377 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
378 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
381 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
382 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
383 events::ClaimedHTLC {
384 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
385 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
386 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
387 value_msat: val.value,
388 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
393 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
394 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
396 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
397 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
398 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
401 /// Number of bytes in the id.
402 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
405 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
406 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
411 impl Readable for PaymentId {
412 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
413 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
418 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
419 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
420 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
424 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
426 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
427 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
428 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
430 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
431 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
436 impl Readable for InterceptId {
437 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
438 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
443 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
444 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
445 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
446 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
447 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
450 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
452 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
453 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
454 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
456 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
457 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
461 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
462 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
463 (0, short_channel_id, required),
464 (2, htlc_id, required),
466 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
467 (0, session_priv, required),
472 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
473 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
474 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
475 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
476 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
479 session_priv: SecretKey,
480 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
481 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
482 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
483 payment_id: PaymentId,
486 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
487 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
488 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
490 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
492 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
494 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
497 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
498 payment_id.hash(hasher);
499 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
505 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
507 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
508 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
509 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
510 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
511 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
512 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
516 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
517 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
518 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
519 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
520 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
521 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
523 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
529 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
530 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
532 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
533 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
534 pub enum FailureCode {
535 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
536 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
537 TemporaryNodeFailure,
538 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
539 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
540 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
541 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
542 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
543 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
544 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
545 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
546 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
547 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
549 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
550 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
551 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
554 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
555 fn into(self) -> u16 {
557 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
558 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
559 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
560 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
565 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
566 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
567 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
568 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
569 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
571 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
572 err: msgs::LightningError,
573 closes_channel: bool,
574 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
576 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
578 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
580 err: LightningError {
582 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
583 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
589 closes_channel: false,
590 shutdown_finish: None,
594 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
595 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
598 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
599 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
600 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
601 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
602 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
603 // commitment upon reconnecting.
604 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
606 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
609 err: LightningError { err, action },
610 closes_channel: true,
611 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
615 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
618 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
620 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
621 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
625 log_level: Level::Warn,
628 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
630 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
632 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
634 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
635 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
642 closes_channel: false,
643 shutdown_finish: None,
647 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
652 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
653 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
654 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
655 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
656 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
658 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
659 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
660 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
661 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
662 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
663 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
664 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
666 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
670 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
671 struct ClaimingPayment {
673 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
674 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
675 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
676 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
678 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
679 (0, amount_msat, required),
680 (2, payment_purpose, required),
681 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
682 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
683 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
686 struct ClaimablePayment {
687 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
688 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
689 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
692 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
693 struct ClaimablePayments {
694 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
695 /// failed/claimed by the user.
697 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
698 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
700 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
701 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
702 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
704 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
705 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
706 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
707 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
710 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
711 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
712 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
713 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
715 enum BackgroundEvent {
716 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
717 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
718 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
719 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
721 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
722 /// are regenerated on startup.
723 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
724 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
725 /// channel to continue normal operation.
727 /// In general this should be used rather than
728 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
729 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
730 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
732 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
733 /// are regenerated on startup.
734 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
735 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
736 funding_txo: OutPoint,
737 channel_id: ChannelId,
738 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
740 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
741 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
743 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
744 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
745 channel_id: ChannelId,
750 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
751 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
752 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
753 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
754 /// event can be generated.
755 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
756 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
757 /// operation of another channel.
759 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
760 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
761 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
762 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
764 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
765 event: events::Event,
766 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
768 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
769 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
770 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
772 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
773 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
774 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
775 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
776 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
778 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
779 /// stored for later processing.
780 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
781 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
782 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
783 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
784 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
788 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
789 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
790 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
791 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
792 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
793 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
794 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
795 (4, blocking_action, required),
796 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
797 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
798 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
800 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
801 (0, event, upgradable_required),
802 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
803 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
804 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
805 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
806 // downgrades to prior versions.
807 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
811 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
812 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
813 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
814 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
815 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
816 channel_id: ChannelId,
819 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
820 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
821 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
822 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
823 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
824 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
825 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
829 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
830 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
831 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
832 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
833 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
834 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
836 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
837 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
838 channel_id: ChannelId,
839 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
844 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
845 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
846 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
847 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
848 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
853 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
854 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
858 /// State we hold per-peer.
859 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
860 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
862 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
863 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
864 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
866 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
867 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
868 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
869 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
870 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
871 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
872 latest_features: InitFeatures,
873 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
874 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
875 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
876 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
877 /// user but which have not yet completed.
879 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
880 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
881 /// for a missing channel.
882 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
883 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
884 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
886 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
887 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
888 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
889 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
891 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
892 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
893 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
894 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
895 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
896 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
897 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
898 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
899 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
900 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
901 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
902 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
903 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
904 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
905 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
909 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
910 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
911 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
912 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
913 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
914 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
917 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
919 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
920 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
922 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
924 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
927 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
928 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
931 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
932 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
933 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
936 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
937 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
938 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
939 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
943 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
944 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
945 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
946 /// The original OpenChannel message.
947 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
948 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
949 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
952 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
953 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
954 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
956 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
957 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
959 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
962 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
963 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
964 struct PendingInboundPayment {
965 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
966 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
967 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
968 /// this payment being removed.
970 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
971 user_payment_id: u64,
972 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
973 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
974 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
977 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
978 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
979 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
980 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
981 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
982 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
983 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
984 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
986 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
987 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
988 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
996 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
999 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1000 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1001 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1006 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1007 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1008 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1009 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1010 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1011 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1012 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1013 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1014 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1016 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1017 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1018 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1027 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1030 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1031 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1032 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1037 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1039 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1041 pub trait AChannelManager {
1042 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1043 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1044 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1045 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1046 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1047 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1048 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1049 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1050 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1051 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1052 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1053 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1054 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1055 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1056 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1057 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1058 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1059 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1060 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1061 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1062 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1063 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1064 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1065 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1066 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1067 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1068 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1069 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1070 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1071 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1072 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1073 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1074 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1075 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1076 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1077 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1080 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1081 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1083 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1084 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1085 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1086 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1087 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1088 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1092 type Watch = M::Target;
1094 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1096 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1098 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1100 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1101 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1103 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1105 type Router = R::Target;
1107 type Logger = L::Target;
1109 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1112 /// A lightning node's channel state machine and payment management logic, which facilitates
1113 /// sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through lightning channels.
1115 /// [`ChannelManager`] is parameterized by a number of components to achieve this.
1116 /// - [`chain::Watch`] (typically [`ChainMonitor`]) for on-chain monitoring and enforcement of each
1118 /// - [`BroadcasterInterface`] for broadcasting transactions related to opening, funding, and
1119 /// closing channels
1120 /// - [`EntropySource`] for providing random data needed for cryptographic operations
1121 /// - [`NodeSigner`] for cryptographic operations scoped to the node
1122 /// - [`SignerProvider`] for providing signers whose operations are scoped to individual channels
1123 /// - [`FeeEstimator`] to determine transaction fee rates needed to have a transaction mined in a
1125 /// - [`Router`] for finding payment paths when initiating and retrying payments
1126 /// - [`Logger`] for logging operational information of varying degrees
1128 /// Additionally, it implements the following traits:
1129 /// - [`ChannelMessageHandler`] to handle off-chain channel activity from peers
1130 /// - [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] to similarly send such messages to peers
1131 /// - [`OffersMessageHandler`] for BOLT 12 message handling and sending
1132 /// - [`EventsProvider`] to generate user-actionable [`Event`]s
1133 /// - [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for notification of on-chain activity
1135 /// Thus, [`ChannelManager`] is typically used to parameterize a [`MessageHandler`] and an
1136 /// [`OnionMessenger`]. The latter is required to support BOLT 12 functionality.
1138 /// # `ChannelManager` vs `ChannelMonitor`
1140 /// It's important to distinguish between the *off-chain* management and *on-chain* enforcement of
1141 /// lightning channels. [`ChannelManager`] exchanges messages with peers to manage the off-chain
1142 /// state of each channel. During this process, it generates a [`ChannelMonitor`] for each channel
1143 /// and a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] for each relevant change, notifying its parameterized
1144 /// [`chain::Watch`] of them.
1146 /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`], such as [`ChainMonitor`], is responsible for aggregating
1147 /// these [`ChannelMonitor`]s and applying any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to them. It then monitors
1148 /// for any pertinent on-chain activity, enforcing claims as needed.
1150 /// This division of off-chain management and on-chain enforcement allows for interesting node
1151 /// setups. For instance, on-chain enforcement could be moved to a separate host or have added
1152 /// redundancy, possibly as a watchtower. See [`chain::Watch`] for the relevant interface.
1154 /// # Initialization
1156 /// Use [`ChannelManager::new`] with the most recent [`BlockHash`] when creating a fresh instance.
1157 /// Otherwise, if restarting, construct [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] with the necessary parameters and
1158 /// references to any deserialized [`ChannelMonitor`]s that were previously persisted. Use this to
1159 /// deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] and feed it any new chain data since it was last online, as
1160 /// detailed in the [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] documentation.
1163 /// use bitcoin::BlockHash;
1164 /// use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1165 /// use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
1166 /// # use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1167 /// use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
1168 /// # use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
1169 /// use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
1170 /// use lightning::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
1172 /// # fn read_channel_monitors() -> Vec<ChannelMonitor<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>> { vec![] }
1175 /// # L: lightning::util::logger::Logger,
1176 /// # ES: lightning::sign::EntropySource,
1177 /// # S: for <'b> lightning::routing::scoring::LockableScore<'b, ScoreLookUp = SL>,
1178 /// # SL: lightning::routing::scoring::ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>,
1180 /// # R: lightning::io::Read,
1182 /// # fee_estimator: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator,
1183 /// # chain_monitor: &dyn lightning::chain::Watch<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>,
1184 /// # tx_broadcaster: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface,
1185 /// # router: &lightning::routing::router::DefaultRouter<&NetworkGraph<&'a L>, &'a L, &ES, &S, SP, SL>,
1187 /// # entropy_source: &ES,
1188 /// # node_signer: &dyn lightning::sign::NodeSigner,
1189 /// # signer_provider: &lightning::sign::DynSignerProvider,
1190 /// # best_block: lightning::chain::BestBlock,
1191 /// # current_timestamp: u32,
1192 /// # mut reader: R,
1193 /// # ) -> Result<(), lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
1194 /// // Fresh start with no channels
1195 /// let params = ChainParameters {
1196 /// network: Network::Bitcoin,
1199 /// let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1200 /// let channel_manager = ChannelManager::new(
1201 /// fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, entropy_source, node_signer,
1202 /// signer_provider, default_config, params, current_timestamp
1205 /// // Restart from deserialized data
1206 /// let mut channel_monitors = read_channel_monitors();
1207 /// let args = ChannelManagerReadArgs::new(
1208 /// entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster,
1209 /// router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors.iter_mut().collect()
1211 /// let (block_hash, channel_manager) =
1212 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<_, _, _, _, _, _, _, _>)>::read(&mut reader, args)?;
1214 /// // Update the ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors with the latest chain data
1217 /// // Move the monitors to the ChannelManager's chain::Watch parameter
1218 /// for monitor in channel_monitors {
1219 /// chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
1227 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1228 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1229 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1230 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1232 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1233 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1234 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1235 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1236 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1237 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1238 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1239 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1240 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1242 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1243 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1244 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1246 /// # `ChannelUpdate` Messages
1248 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1249 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1250 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1251 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1252 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1254 /// # DoS Mitigation
1256 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1257 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1258 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1259 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1261 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1262 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1263 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1267 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1268 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1269 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1270 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1271 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1273 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1274 /// [`MessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::MessageHandler
1275 /// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::messenger::OnionMessenger
1276 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1277 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1278 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1279 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1280 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1281 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1282 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1283 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1286 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1287 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1288 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1289 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1290 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1294 // `pending_offers_messages`
1296 // `total_consistency_lock`
1298 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1300 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1302 // |__`per_peer_state`
1304 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1306 // |__`claimable_payments`
1308 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1312 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1314 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1316 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1320 // |__`pending_events`
1322 // |__`pending_background_events`
1324 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1326 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1327 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1328 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1329 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1330 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1331 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1335 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1336 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1337 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1343 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1345 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1347 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1348 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1350 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1351 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1352 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1353 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1355 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1356 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1358 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1359 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1360 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1361 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1362 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1363 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1364 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1365 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1367 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1369 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1370 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1372 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1374 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1375 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1376 /// and via the classic SCID.
1378 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1379 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1381 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1383 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1385 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1386 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1387 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1389 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1390 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1392 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1393 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1395 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1396 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1398 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1399 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1400 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1401 /// active channel list on load.
1403 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1404 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1406 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1408 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1409 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1410 /// the handling of the events.
1412 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1413 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1416 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1417 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1418 /// would break backwards compatability.
1419 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1420 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1421 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1423 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1425 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1427 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1429 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1431 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1432 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1433 /// confirmation depth.
1435 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1436 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1437 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1439 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1441 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1443 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1445 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1447 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1449 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1450 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1451 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1453 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1454 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1456 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1457 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1458 /// keeping additional state.
1459 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1461 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1462 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1463 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1464 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1466 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1467 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1469 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1470 /// are currently open with that peer.
1472 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1473 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1476 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1478 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1479 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1480 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1481 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1482 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1484 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1485 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1486 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1487 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1488 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1490 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1491 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1493 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1494 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1495 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1496 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1497 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1499 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1500 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1502 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1503 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1504 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1505 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1506 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1508 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1510 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1512 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1513 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1514 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1515 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1516 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1517 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1518 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1519 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1520 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1521 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1522 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1524 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1525 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1526 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1528 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1530 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1531 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1533 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1537 signer_provider: SP,
1542 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1544 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1545 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1546 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1547 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1548 pub struct ChainParameters {
1549 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1550 pub network: Network,
1552 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1554 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1555 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1558 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1562 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1563 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1566 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1567 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1568 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1569 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1570 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1571 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1573 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1574 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1575 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1576 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1577 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1578 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1580 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1581 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1584 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1585 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1586 /// events to handle.
1588 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1589 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1591 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1592 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1595 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1596 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1597 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1598 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1600 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1601 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1602 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1603 should_persist: move || {
1604 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1605 // processing and return that.
1606 let notify = persist_check();
1607 match (notify, force_notify) {
1608 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1609 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1610 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1611 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1612 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1615 _read_guard: read_guard,
1619 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1620 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1621 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1622 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1623 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1624 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1626 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1627 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1628 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1629 should_persist: persist_check,
1630 _read_guard: read_guard,
1635 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1636 fn drop(&mut self) {
1637 match (self.should_persist)() {
1638 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1639 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1640 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1642 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1643 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1644 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1649 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1650 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1652 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1654 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1655 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1656 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1657 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1658 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1660 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1661 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1663 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1665 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1666 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1667 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1668 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1669 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1670 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1671 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1672 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1673 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1674 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1675 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1676 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1677 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1679 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1680 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1682 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1683 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1684 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1685 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1687 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1688 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1689 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1690 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1691 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1692 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1694 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1696 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1697 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1699 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1701 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1702 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1704 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1705 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1706 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1708 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1709 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1710 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1712 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1713 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1714 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1715 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1717 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1718 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1719 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1721 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1722 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1723 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1725 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1726 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1727 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1728 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1729 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1730 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1731 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1732 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1733 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1734 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1735 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1738 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1739 /// to better separate parameters.
1740 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1741 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1742 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1743 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1744 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1745 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1746 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1747 pub features: InitFeatures,
1748 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1749 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1750 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1752 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1754 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1755 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1756 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1757 /// payments to us through this channel.
1758 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1759 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1760 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1761 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1762 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1763 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1764 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1767 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1768 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1769 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1770 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1771 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1772 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1773 /// lifetime of the channel.
1774 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1775 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1776 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1777 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1778 /// our counterparty already.
1779 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1780 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1782 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1783 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1784 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1785 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1787 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1788 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1790 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1791 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1793 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1794 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1795 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1796 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1797 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1798 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1799 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1800 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1801 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1804 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1806 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1807 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1808 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1809 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1810 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1811 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1812 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1814 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1815 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1817 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1818 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1819 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1820 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1821 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1822 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1823 /// this value on chain.
1825 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1827 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1829 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1830 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1831 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1832 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1833 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1834 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1835 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1837 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1838 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1839 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1840 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1841 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1842 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1844 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1845 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1846 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1847 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1848 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1850 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1851 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1852 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1853 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1855 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1856 pub balance_msat: u64,
1857 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1858 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1859 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1860 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1862 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1864 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1865 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1866 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1867 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1868 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1869 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1870 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1871 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1873 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1874 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1875 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1876 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1877 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1878 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1879 /// route which is valid.
1880 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1881 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1882 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1883 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1884 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1885 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1887 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1888 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1889 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1890 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1891 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1892 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1893 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1894 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1895 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1897 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1899 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1900 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1901 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1902 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1903 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1905 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1906 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1907 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1908 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1909 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1910 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1911 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1913 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1914 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1915 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1916 pub is_outbound: bool,
1917 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1918 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1919 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1920 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1921 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1923 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1924 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1925 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1926 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1927 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1928 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1929 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1931 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1932 pub is_usable: bool,
1933 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1934 pub is_public: bool,
1935 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1936 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1937 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1938 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1939 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1940 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1942 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1943 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1944 /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
1946 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1947 pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
1948 /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
1950 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1951 pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
1954 impl ChannelDetails {
1955 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1956 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1957 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1959 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1960 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1961 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1962 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1965 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1966 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1967 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1969 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1970 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1971 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1972 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1975 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1976 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1977 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1980 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1981 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1983 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1984 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1985 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1987 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1988 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1989 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1990 features: latest_features,
1991 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1992 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1993 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1994 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1995 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1996 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1997 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1998 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1999 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
2000 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2002 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
2003 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
2004 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
2005 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
2006 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
2007 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
2008 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
2009 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
2010 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
2011 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
2012 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
2013 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
2014 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
2015 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
2016 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2017 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2018 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
2019 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
2020 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
2021 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
2022 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
2023 is_usable: context.is_live(),
2024 is_public: context.should_announce(),
2025 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
2026 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2027 config: Some(context.config()),
2028 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
2029 pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
2030 pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
2035 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
2036 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
2037 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
2038 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
2039 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
2040 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
2041 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
2042 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
2043 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
2045 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
2047 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
2048 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
2050 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
2051 NegotiatingClosingFee,
2052 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
2053 /// to drop the channel.
2057 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
2058 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2059 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
2060 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
2061 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
2063 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2064 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2065 payment_id: PaymentId,
2067 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
2069 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2070 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2071 payment_id: PaymentId,
2072 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
2074 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2075 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
2076 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
2079 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
2080 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
2081 /// payment is removed from tracking.
2083 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2084 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2085 payment_id: PaymentId,
2086 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
2087 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
2088 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
2090 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
2091 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
2092 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
2094 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2095 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2096 payment_id: PaymentId,
2097 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
2098 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2102 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2104 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2106 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2107 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2108 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2109 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2111 pub phantom_scid: u64,
2112 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2113 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2116 macro_rules! handle_error {
2117 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2118 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2119 // entering the macro.
2120 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2121 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2125 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2126 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2128 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2129 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2130 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2131 let logger = WithContext::from(
2132 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
2134 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2136 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2137 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2138 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2143 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2146 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2148 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2149 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2150 action: err.action.clone()
2154 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
2155 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2156 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2157 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2158 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2162 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2169 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2170 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2171 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2172 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2174 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2175 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2176 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2178 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2179 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2180 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2181 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2182 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2184 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2185 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2187 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2191 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2192 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2193 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2195 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2196 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2198 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2199 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2201 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2202 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2203 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2204 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2205 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2206 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2208 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2213 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2214 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2216 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2217 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2219 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2220 match $channel_phase {
2221 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2222 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2224 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2225 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2227 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2228 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2230 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2231 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2232 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2234 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2235 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2236 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2242 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2243 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2247 let key = *$entry.key();
2248 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2250 $entry.remove_entry();
2258 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2259 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2263 let key = *$entry.key();
2264 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2266 $entry.remove_entry();
2274 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2275 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2277 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2278 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2284 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2285 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2286 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2287 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2288 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2290 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2291 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2292 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2293 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2294 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2295 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2296 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2297 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2298 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2299 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2304 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2305 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2306 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2307 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2308 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2309 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2310 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2311 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2312 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2313 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2315 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2320 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2321 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2322 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2323 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2324 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2325 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2326 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2327 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2328 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2330 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2335 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2336 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2337 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2338 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2339 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2340 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2341 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2342 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2343 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2344 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2345 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2346 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2348 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2349 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2350 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2356 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2357 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2359 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2360 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2361 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2362 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2363 updates.announcement_sigs);
2364 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2365 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2368 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2369 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2370 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2371 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2373 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2374 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2375 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2376 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2377 let mut batch_completed = false;
2378 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2379 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2380 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2381 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2383 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2384 channel_state.2 = true;
2386 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2388 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2390 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2393 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2394 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2395 if batch_completed {
2396 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2397 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2398 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2399 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2400 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2401 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2402 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2403 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2404 chan.set_batch_ready();
2405 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2406 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2410 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2411 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2412 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2417 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2419 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2420 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2422 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2423 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2424 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2425 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2430 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2431 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2432 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2433 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2435 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2436 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2437 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2438 panic!("{}", err_str);
2440 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2441 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2442 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2445 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2451 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2452 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2453 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2455 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2456 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2457 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2458 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2459 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2460 // filter for uniqueness here.
2461 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2462 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2463 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2464 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2466 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2467 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2469 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2470 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2471 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2477 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2478 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2479 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2480 while !processed_all_events {
2481 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2488 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2489 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2490 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2492 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2493 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2494 result = $self.process_background_events();
2496 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2497 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2498 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2499 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2503 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2504 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2505 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2506 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2509 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2511 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2512 $event_to_handle = event;
2514 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2515 post_event_actions.push(action);
2520 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2521 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2522 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2523 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2524 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2525 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2528 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2529 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2530 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2531 processed_all_events = false;
2535 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2536 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2537 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2539 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2540 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2541 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2547 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2549 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2550 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2551 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2552 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2553 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2554 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2558 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2560 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2562 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2563 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2565 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2567 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2568 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2569 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2572 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2573 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2574 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2576 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2577 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2578 current_timestamp: u32,
2580 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2581 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2582 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2583 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2585 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2586 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2587 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2592 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2594 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
2595 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2596 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2597 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2598 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
2599 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2600 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2601 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2603 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2606 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2607 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2609 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2611 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2613 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2615 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2616 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2617 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2618 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2619 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2620 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2621 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2622 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2624 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2634 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2635 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2636 &self.default_configuration
2639 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2640 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2641 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2644 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2645 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2647 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2649 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2653 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2658 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2660 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2661 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2662 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2663 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2664 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2666 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2667 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2669 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2670 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2671 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2673 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2674 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2675 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2677 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2678 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2680 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2681 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2682 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2683 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2684 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2685 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2687 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2688 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2689 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2690 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2691 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2692 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2695 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2696 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2697 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2699 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2701 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2702 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2704 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2706 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2707 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2708 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2713 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2714 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2715 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2716 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2717 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2718 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2722 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2727 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2729 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2730 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2731 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2733 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2735 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2738 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2741 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2742 node_id: their_network_key,
2745 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2748 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2749 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2750 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2751 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2752 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2753 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2754 // the same channel.
2755 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2757 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2758 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2759 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2760 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2761 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2762 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2763 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2764 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2765 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2769 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2770 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2771 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2779 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2780 /// more information.
2781 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2782 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2783 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2784 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2785 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2786 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2787 // the same channel.
2788 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2790 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2791 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2792 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2793 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2794 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2795 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2796 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2797 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2805 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2806 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2808 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2809 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2811 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2812 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2813 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2814 // really wanted anyway.
2815 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2818 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2819 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2820 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2821 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2823 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2824 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2825 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2826 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2827 let context_to_details = |context| {
2828 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2830 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2832 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2833 .map(context_to_details)
2839 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2840 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2842 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2843 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2844 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2846 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2847 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2848 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2849 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2850 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2851 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2853 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2854 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2855 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2857 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2858 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2859 payment_id: *payment_id,
2860 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2861 total_msat: *total_msat,
2864 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2865 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2867 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2868 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2870 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2875 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2876 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2878 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2879 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2882 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2884 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2885 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2887 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2888 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2890 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2891 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2892 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2893 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2894 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2895 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2896 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2897 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2899 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2900 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2901 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2902 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2903 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2907 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2908 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2910 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2911 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2912 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2913 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2916 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2917 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
2920 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2921 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2923 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2924 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2931 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2932 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2933 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2934 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2937 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2938 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2944 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2945 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2946 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2948 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2949 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2951 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2952 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2953 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2954 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2956 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2958 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2959 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2960 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2963 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2964 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2965 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2966 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2967 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2968 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2971 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2972 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2973 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2975 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2976 /// the channel being closed or not:
2977 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2978 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2979 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2980 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2981 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2982 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2983 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2985 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2986 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2987 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2988 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2990 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2992 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2993 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2994 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2997 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2998 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2999 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3000 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3001 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
3004 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
3005 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3006 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3007 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3008 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3011 let logger = WithContext::from(
3012 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
3015 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
3016 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
3017 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3018 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
3019 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3020 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
3021 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3023 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
3024 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
3025 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
3026 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
3027 // ignore the result here.
3028 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
3030 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3031 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
3032 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
3033 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
3034 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3035 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
3036 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
3037 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3038 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3039 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
3040 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3041 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
3044 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
3047 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
3048 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
3053 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3054 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
3055 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
3056 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
3057 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
3058 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
3059 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
3060 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
3063 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
3064 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
3065 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
3069 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3070 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3074 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
3075 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
3076 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
3077 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
3078 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3079 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3080 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
3081 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
3082 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3083 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
3084 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
3086 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
3088 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
3089 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3090 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
3091 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3092 mem::drop(peer_state);
3093 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3095 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
3096 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
3097 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
3099 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3100 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3101 // Unfunded channel has no update
3102 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3104 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
3105 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
3106 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3107 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3108 // Unfunded channel has no update
3109 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3112 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3113 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3114 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3115 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3117 (None, *peer_node_id)
3119 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3122 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3123 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
3124 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
3125 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3126 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3127 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
3128 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
3129 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3130 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3136 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3139 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3140 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3141 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3142 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3143 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3144 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3145 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3146 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3147 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3148 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3149 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3150 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3161 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3162 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3163 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3165 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3166 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3167 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3170 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3171 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3172 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3174 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3175 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3176 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3177 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3178 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3181 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3182 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3183 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3184 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3185 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3189 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3190 /// local transaction(s).
3191 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3192 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3193 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3197 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3198 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3200 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3202 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3203 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3206 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3207 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3208 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
3209 intro_node_blinding_point: Some(_), ..
3215 macro_rules! return_err {
3216 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3219 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3220 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3222 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3223 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3224 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3225 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3226 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3227 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3228 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3232 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3233 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3234 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3235 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3236 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3237 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3238 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3239 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3245 let NextPacketDetails {
3246 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3247 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3248 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3249 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3250 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3253 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3254 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3255 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3256 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3257 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3258 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3259 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3260 // phantom or an intercept.
3261 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3262 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3263 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3267 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3270 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3272 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3273 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3274 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3275 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3276 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3278 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3279 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3280 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3281 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3284 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3285 // have no consistency guarantees.
3286 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3290 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3291 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3292 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3293 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3294 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3296 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3297 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3298 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3299 // we don't have the channel here.
3300 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3302 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3304 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3305 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3306 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3307 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3308 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3309 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3310 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3311 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3312 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3313 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3314 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3316 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3319 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3320 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3322 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3323 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3330 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3332 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3333 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3335 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3336 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3337 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3338 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3339 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3341 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3342 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3348 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3349 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3350 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3351 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3353 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3354 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3356 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3357 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3358 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3360 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3361 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3362 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3363 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3364 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3365 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3366 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3370 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3372 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3375 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3376 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3377 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3378 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3379 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3380 macro_rules! return_err {
3381 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3383 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3384 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3385 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3386 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3387 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3388 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3389 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3390 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3391 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3395 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3396 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3397 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3398 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3399 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3405 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3407 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3408 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3409 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3410 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3413 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3414 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3415 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3416 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3417 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3419 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3422 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3423 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3424 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3425 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3426 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3432 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3433 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3434 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3436 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3437 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3438 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3440 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3441 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3442 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3443 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3444 return Err(LightningError {
3445 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3446 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3449 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3450 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3452 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3453 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3454 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3457 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3458 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3459 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3460 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3462 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3463 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3464 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3466 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3467 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3468 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3469 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3470 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3471 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3472 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3476 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3479 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3480 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3481 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3482 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3484 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3485 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3486 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3487 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3488 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3491 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3492 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3494 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3495 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3496 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3497 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3498 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3499 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3500 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3501 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3503 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3504 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3505 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3507 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3509 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3516 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3517 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3518 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3519 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3524 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3525 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3526 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3529 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3530 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3531 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3532 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3534 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3535 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3536 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3538 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3539 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3543 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3544 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3546 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3547 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3548 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3550 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3553 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3555 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3556 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3558 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3559 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3560 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3561 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3562 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3563 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3564 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3565 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3566 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3567 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3569 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3570 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3571 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3572 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3574 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3575 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3577 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3578 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3579 Some(monitor_update) => {
3580 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3582 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3583 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3584 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3585 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3586 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3587 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3588 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3596 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3599 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3600 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3601 // `channel_by_id` map.
3602 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3603 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3607 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3608 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3610 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3615 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3617 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3618 /// fields for more info.
3620 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3621 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3623 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3625 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3626 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3627 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3628 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3629 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3631 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3632 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3633 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3634 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3635 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3637 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3638 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3639 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3640 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3642 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3644 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3645 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3646 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3648 /// In general, a path may raise:
3649 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3650 /// node public key) is specified.
3651 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3652 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3653 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3654 /// relevant updates.
3656 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3657 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3658 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3660 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3661 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3662 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3663 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3664 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3665 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3666 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3667 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3668 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3669 self.pending_outbound_payments
3670 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3671 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3672 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3675 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3676 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3677 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3678 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3679 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3680 self.pending_outbound_payments
3681 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3682 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3683 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3684 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3688 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3689 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3690 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3691 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3692 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3693 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3697 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3698 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3699 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3703 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3704 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3707 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3708 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3709 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3710 self.pending_outbound_payments
3711 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3712 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3713 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3714 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3715 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3719 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3720 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3721 /// retries are exhausted.
3723 /// # Event Generation
3725 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3726 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3728 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3729 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3730 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3732 /// # Requested Invoices
3734 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3735 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3736 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3737 /// once the invoice has been received.
3739 /// # Restart Behavior
3741 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3742 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3743 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3745 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3746 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3747 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3748 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3751 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3752 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3753 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3754 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3755 /// never reach the recipient.
3757 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3758 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3760 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3761 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3763 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3764 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3765 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3766 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3767 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3768 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3769 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3772 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3773 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3775 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3778 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3779 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3780 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3781 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3782 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3783 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3784 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3785 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3788 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3789 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3790 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3791 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3792 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3793 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3794 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3795 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3796 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3799 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3802 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3803 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3806 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3807 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3809 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3810 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3811 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3812 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3813 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3814 let payment_params =
3815 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3817 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3819 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3822 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3823 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3825 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3826 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3827 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3828 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3830 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3831 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3832 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3833 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3834 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3835 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3836 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3837 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3838 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3839 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3841 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3842 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3843 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3844 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3848 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3850 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3851 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3854 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3856 let mut res = Vec::new();
3858 for mut path in route.paths {
3859 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3860 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3861 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3862 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3863 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3866 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3869 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3870 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3872 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3874 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3875 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3880 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3883 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3888 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3889 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3890 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3892 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3893 let used_liquidity =
3894 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3896 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3897 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3899 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3902 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3907 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3908 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3909 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3916 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3917 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3918 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3919 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3920 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3921 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3922 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3923 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3924 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3926 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3927 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3929 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3930 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3931 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3933 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3934 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3935 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3936 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3937 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
3938 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
3939 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
3940 } else { unreachable!(); });
3942 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3943 Err((chan, err)) => {
3944 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3945 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3946 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3947 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3948 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3954 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3955 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3957 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3958 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3961 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3962 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3963 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3967 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3968 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3969 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3973 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3974 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3975 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3977 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3978 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3979 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
3980 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
3981 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
3983 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
3984 funding_txo, o.get()
3986 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
3987 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3988 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3989 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
3990 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
3991 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
3994 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
4001 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4002 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
4003 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
4007 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
4009 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
4010 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
4012 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
4013 /// across the p2p network.
4015 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
4016 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
4018 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
4019 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
4020 /// keys per-channel).
4022 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
4023 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
4024 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
4026 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
4027 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
4028 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
4030 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
4031 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
4032 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
4033 /// for more details.
4035 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
4036 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
4037 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4038 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
4041 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
4043 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
4044 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
4046 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
4047 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
4048 /// signature for each channel.
4050 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
4051 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4052 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4053 let mut result = Ok(());
4055 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
4056 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
4057 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
4058 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4059 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
4064 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
4065 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4066 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
4070 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4071 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
4072 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
4073 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
4074 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
4075 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
4076 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
4077 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
4079 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4080 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
4085 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
4086 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
4087 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
4088 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
4092 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4093 match states.entry(txid) {
4094 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4095 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4096 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4100 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4103 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4104 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4105 temporary_channel_id,
4106 counterparty_node_id,
4107 funding_transaction.clone(),
4110 let mut output_index = None;
4111 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
4112 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4113 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4114 if output_index.is_some() {
4115 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4116 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
4119 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4122 if output_index.is_none() {
4123 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4124 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
4127 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4128 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4129 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4130 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4131 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4132 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4138 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4139 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4140 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4141 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4142 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4143 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4144 .into_iter().flatten()
4145 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4147 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4148 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4150 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4152 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4153 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4154 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4155 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4156 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4158 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4159 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4160 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4164 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4165 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4166 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4172 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4174 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4175 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4176 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4177 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4179 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4180 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4182 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4183 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4185 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4187 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4188 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4189 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4190 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4191 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4192 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4193 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4194 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4195 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4196 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4197 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4198 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4199 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4203 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4204 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4205 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4206 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4207 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4208 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4209 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4210 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4211 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4212 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4216 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4217 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4218 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4219 config.apply(config_update);
4220 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4223 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4224 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4225 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4226 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4227 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4228 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4235 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4236 debug_assert!(false);
4237 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4239 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4240 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4247 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4249 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4250 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4251 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4252 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4254 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4255 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4257 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4258 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4260 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4262 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4263 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4264 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4265 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4266 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4267 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4268 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4269 pub fn update_channel_config(
4270 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4271 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4272 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4275 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4276 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4278 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4279 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4281 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4282 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4283 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4284 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4285 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4287 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4288 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4289 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4292 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4295 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4296 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4297 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4298 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4299 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4300 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4301 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4303 let next_hop_scid = {
4304 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4305 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4306 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4307 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4308 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4309 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4310 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4311 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4312 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4313 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4316 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4318 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4319 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4320 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4323 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4324 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4325 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4326 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4327 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4334 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4335 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4336 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4339 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4340 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4341 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4342 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4345 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4347 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4348 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4349 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4350 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4351 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4354 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4355 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4356 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4357 payment.prev_channel_id,
4358 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4359 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4361 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4365 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4366 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4368 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4371 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4372 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4373 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4375 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4376 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4377 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4380 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4381 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4382 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4383 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4384 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4385 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4386 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4387 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4388 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4389 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4392 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4393 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4394 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4395 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4400 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4402 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4403 /// Will likely generate further events.
4404 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4405 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4407 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4408 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4409 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4411 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4412 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4414 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4415 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4416 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4417 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4419 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4420 match forward_info {
4421 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4422 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4423 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4424 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4425 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4428 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4429 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4430 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
4431 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4433 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4434 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4435 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4436 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4437 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4438 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4439 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4440 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4441 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4444 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4445 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4447 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4450 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4451 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4457 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4458 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4460 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4464 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4465 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4467 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4471 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4472 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4473 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4474 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4475 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4476 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4477 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4480 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4481 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4482 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4483 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4484 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4486 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4488 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4489 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4493 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4494 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4495 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4496 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4497 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4498 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4500 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4501 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4507 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4510 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4513 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4514 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4515 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4516 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4517 // problem, not ours.
4523 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4524 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4525 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4527 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4531 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4532 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4533 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4534 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4535 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4538 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4539 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4540 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4541 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4542 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4543 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4544 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4545 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4546 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4547 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4548 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4549 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4550 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4553 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4554 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4555 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4556 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4557 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4558 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4559 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4560 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4561 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4562 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4563 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4565 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4566 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4567 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4568 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4569 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4570 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4573 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4574 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4575 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4578 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4579 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4581 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4583 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4584 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4585 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4586 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4592 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4593 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4595 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4596 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4597 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4599 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4600 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4601 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4602 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4604 Some((res, htlc_id))
4607 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4608 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4609 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4610 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4612 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4614 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4615 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4616 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4622 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4626 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4627 match forward_info {
4628 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4629 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4630 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4631 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4632 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4635 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4636 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4637 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4638 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4639 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4641 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4642 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4643 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4644 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4645 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4647 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
4648 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
4649 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4651 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4652 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4656 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4657 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4660 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4663 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4664 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4665 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4666 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4667 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4668 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4669 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4670 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4671 phantom_shared_secret,
4674 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4675 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4676 // if routing nodes overpay
4677 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4678 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4680 total_value_received: None,
4681 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4684 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4687 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4689 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4690 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4691 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4692 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4693 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4694 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
4696 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4697 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4698 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4699 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4700 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4701 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4702 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4703 phantom_shared_secret,
4706 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4707 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4709 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4712 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4713 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4714 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4715 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4716 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4719 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4720 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4721 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4722 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4723 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4724 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4726 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4727 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4728 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4730 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4731 .entry(payment_hash)
4732 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4733 .or_insert_with(|| {
4734 committed_to_claimable = true;
4736 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4739 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4740 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4741 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4742 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4744 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4745 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4746 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4748 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4749 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4750 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4753 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4755 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4756 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4757 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4758 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4759 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4760 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4761 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4762 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4763 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4764 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4766 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4768 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4769 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4770 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4771 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4772 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4773 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4775 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4776 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4777 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4778 committed_to_claimable = true;
4780 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4781 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4782 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4783 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4784 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4785 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4786 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4787 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4788 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4792 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4793 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4794 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4795 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4796 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4798 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4800 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4801 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4803 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4804 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4805 committed_to_claimable = true;
4808 payment_claimable_generated
4812 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4813 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4814 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4815 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4816 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4817 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4818 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4819 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4820 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4821 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4822 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4823 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4824 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4825 Ok(result) => result,
4827 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4828 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4831 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4832 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4833 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4834 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4835 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4836 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4839 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4840 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4841 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4843 check_total_value!(purpose);
4845 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4846 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4847 check_total_value!(purpose);
4851 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4852 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4853 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4854 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4856 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4857 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4858 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4859 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4860 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4861 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4862 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4863 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4865 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4866 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4867 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4869 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4870 if payment_claimable_generated {
4871 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4877 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4878 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4886 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4887 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4888 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4889 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4891 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4892 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4894 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4896 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4897 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4898 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4900 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4902 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4903 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4904 events.append(&mut new_events);
4907 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4909 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4910 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4911 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4913 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4915 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4916 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4917 if background_events.is_empty() {
4918 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4921 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4923 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
4924 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4925 // monitor updating completing.
4926 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4928 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
4929 let mut updated_chan = false;
4931 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4932 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4933 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4934 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4935 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4936 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4937 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4938 updated_chan = true;
4939 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4940 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4942 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4945 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4950 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4951 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4954 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4955 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4956 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4957 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4958 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4959 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4960 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4962 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4963 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4964 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4965 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4966 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4972 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4975 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4976 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4977 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4978 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4979 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4982 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4983 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4985 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4987 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4988 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4989 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4991 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4992 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4993 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4994 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4996 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4997 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4999 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
5000 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5004 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
5005 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
5006 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
5007 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
5008 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
5009 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5010 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5012 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5013 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5015 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5016 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5017 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5018 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5019 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
5020 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
5022 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5027 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5028 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5036 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
5038 /// This currently includes:
5039 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
5040 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
5041 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
5043 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
5044 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
5045 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
5046 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
5047 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
5048 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
5049 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
5050 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
5052 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
5053 /// estimate fetches.
5055 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
5056 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
5057 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
5058 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5059 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5061 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5062 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5064 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
5065 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
5066 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
5067 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
5069 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
5070 chan_id: &ChannelId,
5071 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
5072 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
5073 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5074 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
5076 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5077 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
5078 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
5080 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
5081 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
5082 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
5083 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5084 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5085 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5086 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5087 channel_id: *chan_id,
5088 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5099 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5100 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5101 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5102 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5103 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5104 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5105 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5107 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5108 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5113 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5114 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5116 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5117 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5118 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5119 if needs_close { return false; }
5122 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5123 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5124 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5125 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5126 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5127 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5128 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5129 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5131 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5132 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5133 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5134 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5138 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5140 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5143 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5145 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5146 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5147 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5148 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5152 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5154 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5160 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5162 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5163 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5164 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5165 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5166 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5167 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5168 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5169 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5170 channel_id: *chan_id,
5171 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5179 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5180 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5181 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5183 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5184 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5185 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5187 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5188 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5189 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5190 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5192 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5193 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5194 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5195 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5200 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5201 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5202 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5203 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5204 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5205 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5206 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5207 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5208 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5214 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5216 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5217 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5222 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5223 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5224 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5225 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5226 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5227 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5228 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5229 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5230 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5231 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5232 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5233 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5234 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5235 // have no channels to the peer.
5236 let remove_entry = {
5237 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5238 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5241 entry.remove_entry();
5244 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5249 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5250 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5251 // This should be unreachable
5252 debug_assert!(false);
5255 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5256 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5257 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5258 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5259 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5260 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5261 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5264 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5265 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5266 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5268 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5269 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5276 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5277 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5278 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5279 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5280 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5283 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5284 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5287 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5288 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5291 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5292 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5293 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5294 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5295 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5296 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5297 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5300 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5301 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5304 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5305 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5306 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5307 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5308 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5315 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5316 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5317 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5319 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5320 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5321 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5322 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5324 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5325 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5326 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5327 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5328 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5329 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5332 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5333 /// reason for the failure.
5335 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5336 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5337 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5339 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5340 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5341 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5342 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5343 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5344 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5345 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5350 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5351 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5352 match failure_code {
5353 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5354 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5355 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5356 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5357 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5358 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5360 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5361 let fail_data = match data {
5362 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5365 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5370 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5371 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5373 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5375 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5376 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5377 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5378 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5379 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5380 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5381 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5383 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5385 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5386 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5388 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5393 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5394 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5395 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5396 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5397 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5398 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5399 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5400 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5401 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5402 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5404 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5405 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5406 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5407 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5409 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5410 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5411 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5412 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5413 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5417 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5418 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5419 // be surfaced to the user.
5420 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5421 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5422 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5424 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5425 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5426 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5427 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5428 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5429 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5430 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5431 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5432 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5434 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5435 debug_assert!(false);
5436 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5439 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5441 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5444 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5445 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5446 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5447 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5451 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5452 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5453 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5454 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5455 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5456 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5457 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5458 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5459 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5460 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5463 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5464 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5465 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5468 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5469 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5470 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5472 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5473 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5474 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5475 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5476 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5478 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5479 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5480 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
5483 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
5484 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5485 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5487 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5488 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5489 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5490 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5491 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5493 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5495 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5496 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5498 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5499 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5503 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5504 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5506 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5510 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5511 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5512 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5513 push_forward_ev = true;
5515 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5516 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5517 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5519 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5520 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5523 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5524 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5525 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5526 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5527 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
5528 failed_next_destination: destination,
5534 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5535 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5537 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5538 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5539 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5540 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5542 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5543 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5544 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5545 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5547 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5548 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5549 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5551 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5552 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5553 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5554 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5555 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5556 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5557 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5558 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5559 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5562 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5563 /// even type numbers.
5567 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5568 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5570 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5571 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5572 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5575 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5576 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5578 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5581 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5582 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5583 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5584 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5585 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5586 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5587 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5588 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5593 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5594 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5595 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5596 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5597 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5599 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5600 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5601 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5605 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5606 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5607 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5608 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5609 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5610 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5611 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5612 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5613 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5614 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5615 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5624 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5626 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5627 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5628 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5629 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5630 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5631 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5632 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5633 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5634 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5635 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5636 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5637 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5638 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5639 debug_assert!(false);
5643 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5645 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5646 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5647 debug_assert!(false);
5651 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5652 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5654 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5655 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5656 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5657 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5660 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5661 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5662 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5663 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5667 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5668 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
5669 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5670 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5671 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5672 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5673 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5676 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5677 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5678 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5679 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5680 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5681 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5686 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5687 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5688 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5689 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5690 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5691 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5692 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5694 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5697 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5698 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5699 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5700 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5704 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5705 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5706 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5707 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5709 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5710 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5711 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5712 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5714 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5715 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5716 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5717 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5720 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5721 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
5722 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5723 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5727 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5728 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5729 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5732 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5733 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5734 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5735 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5736 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5737 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5738 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5739 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5742 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5743 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5744 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5746 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5749 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5750 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5752 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5753 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5754 // monitor update as a background event.
5755 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5756 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5757 counterparty_node_id,
5758 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5759 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
5760 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5764 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5765 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5770 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5772 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5774 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
5775 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5776 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5777 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5778 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
5780 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
5782 debug_assert!(false,
5783 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5786 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5787 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5788 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5789 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5790 .get_mut(&channel_id)
5792 let mut found_blocker = false;
5793 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5794 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5795 // which case we need to only remove the one
5796 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5797 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5798 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5799 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5801 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5804 debug_assert!(false);
5813 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5814 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5815 counterparty_node_id: None,
5816 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5819 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
5823 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5824 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5825 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5826 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5827 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5828 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5829 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5830 // again on restart.
5831 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
5832 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5833 payment_preimage, update_res);
5836 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5837 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5839 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5840 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5841 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5842 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5843 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5844 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5845 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5846 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5847 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5848 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
5851 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5852 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5853 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5854 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5855 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5856 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5860 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5861 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5864 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5865 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5866 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
5867 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
5870 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5871 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5872 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5873 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5874 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5876 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5877 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
5878 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5880 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5881 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5884 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5885 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
5886 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
5887 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5888 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5889 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5890 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5891 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5892 let chan_to_release =
5893 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5894 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
5896 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5897 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5898 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5899 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5904 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5905 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5906 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5907 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5908 // in the background.
5909 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5910 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5911 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5912 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5914 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5915 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5916 funding_txo, update, ..
5918 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5919 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5920 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5921 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5923 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5929 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5930 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5931 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
5933 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5934 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5936 monitor_update.updates[0],
5937 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5942 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5943 // immediately once we get going.
5944 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5947 *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
5949 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5952 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5953 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5954 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5955 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5956 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5957 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
5958 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
5962 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5963 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5964 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5967 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
5968 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
5969 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5970 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5971 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5972 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
5973 prev_user_channel_id,
5974 next_user_channel_id,
5975 total_fee_earned_msat,
5977 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5978 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5980 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5984 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5985 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5986 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5992 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5993 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5994 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5997 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5998 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5999 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6000 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6002 for action in actions.into_iter() {
6004 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
6005 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6006 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
6008 payment_purpose: purpose,
6011 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
6013 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
6017 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
6019 sender_intended_total_msat,
6023 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6024 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
6026 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
6027 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
6028 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
6031 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6032 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
6034 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
6035 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
6036 downstream_funding_outpoint,
6037 downstream_channel_id,
6038 Some(blocking_action),
6045 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
6046 /// update completion.
6047 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
6048 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
6049 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
6050 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
6051 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
6052 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
6053 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6054 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
6055 &channel.context.channel_id(),
6056 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
6057 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
6058 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
6059 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
6060 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
6062 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
6064 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6065 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6066 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
6067 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
6070 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
6071 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
6073 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
6074 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6075 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6080 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6081 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6082 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6083 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6088 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6089 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6090 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6091 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6092 msg: revoke_and_ack,
6097 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6101 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6107 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6108 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6109 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6113 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6114 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6115 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6121 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6122 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6124 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6125 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6127 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6128 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6129 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6130 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6131 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6136 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6137 let mut peer_state_lock;
6138 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6139 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6140 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6141 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6143 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6146 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6147 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6148 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6149 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6150 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6153 let remaining_in_flight =
6154 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6155 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6158 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6159 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6160 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6161 remaining_in_flight);
6162 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6165 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6168 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6170 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6171 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6174 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6175 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6176 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6178 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6179 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6180 /// used to accept such channels.
6182 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6183 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6184 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6185 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6188 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6189 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6191 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6192 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6193 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6195 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6196 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6198 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6199 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6201 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6202 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6204 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6205 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6206 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6207 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6210 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6212 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6213 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6215 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6216 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6217 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6218 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6220 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6221 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6223 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6225 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6226 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6227 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6229 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6230 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6231 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6233 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6234 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6235 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6236 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6237 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6238 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6239 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6242 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6243 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6245 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6251 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6252 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6253 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6254 Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6256 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6260 Ok(mut channel) => {
6262 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6263 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6264 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6265 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6266 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6267 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6268 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6271 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6272 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6273 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6275 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6277 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6278 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6279 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6280 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6281 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6282 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6283 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6284 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6287 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6288 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6289 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6291 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6295 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6296 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6297 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6299 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6300 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6301 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6304 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6311 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6312 /// or 0-conf channels.
6314 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6315 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6316 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6317 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6318 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6319 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6321 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6322 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6323 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6324 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6325 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6326 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6327 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6331 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6334 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6335 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6337 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6338 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6340 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6341 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6342 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6343 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6344 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6346 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6349 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6350 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6351 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6354 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6355 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6356 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
6357 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
6358 // included in the unfunded count.
6359 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6360 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
6361 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6364 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6365 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6368 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6369 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6370 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6371 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6376 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6379 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6380 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6381 // likely to be lost on restart!
6382 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6383 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
6384 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6387 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6388 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
6389 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6392 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6393 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6394 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6395 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6396 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6398 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6399 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6401 debug_assert!(false);
6402 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6403 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6404 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6406 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6407 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6409 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6410 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6411 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6412 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6413 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6414 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6416 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6417 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6418 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6421 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6422 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6423 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6424 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6425 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6428 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
6429 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6431 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6432 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
6433 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6436 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6437 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6438 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6439 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6441 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6443 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6444 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6445 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6446 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6447 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
6448 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6451 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6452 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6453 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6458 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6459 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6460 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6461 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6462 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6463 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6464 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6467 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6472 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6473 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6474 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6475 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
6476 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6478 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6479 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6480 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
6481 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6484 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6485 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6487 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6488 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6489 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6491 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6495 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6496 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6497 // likely to be lost on restart!
6498 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6499 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6500 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6502 debug_assert!(false);
6503 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6505 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6506 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6507 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
6508 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6509 match phase.get_mut() {
6510 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6511 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6512 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6515 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6519 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
6522 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6523 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6524 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
6525 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6526 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6528 user_channel_id: user_id,
6533 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6534 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6536 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6537 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6539 debug_assert!(false);
6540 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6543 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6544 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6545 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6546 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6547 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6548 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6549 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6551 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6552 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6553 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6554 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6555 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6556 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6557 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6558 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6559 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6563 Some(mut phase) => {
6564 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6565 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6566 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6568 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6571 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6573 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6574 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6575 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6576 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6577 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6578 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6580 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6581 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6582 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6585 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6586 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6587 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6589 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6590 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6591 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6592 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6593 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6595 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6596 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6597 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6598 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6599 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6601 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6602 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6603 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6604 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6605 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6606 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6607 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6612 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6613 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6614 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6616 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6620 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6621 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6622 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6630 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6631 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6632 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6633 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6635 debug_assert!(false);
6636 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6639 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6640 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6641 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6642 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6643 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6644 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6645 let logger = WithContext::from(
6647 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6648 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6651 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6653 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
6654 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6655 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6656 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6657 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6658 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6659 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6660 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6661 } else { unreachable!(); }
6664 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6665 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
6666 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
6667 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
6668 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
6669 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
6670 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6674 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6675 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6676 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6677 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6678 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6679 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6683 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6686 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6690 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6691 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6692 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6693 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6694 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6696 debug_assert!(false);
6697 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6699 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6700 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6701 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6702 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6703 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6704 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6705 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6706 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6707 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6708 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6709 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6710 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6711 msg: announcement_sigs,
6713 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6714 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6715 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6716 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6717 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6718 // announcement_signatures.
6719 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6720 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6721 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6722 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6729 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6730 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6735 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6736 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6739 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6740 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6745 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6746 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6747 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6749 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6750 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6752 debug_assert!(false);
6753 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6755 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6756 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6757 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6758 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6760 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6761 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6762 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6763 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6765 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6768 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6769 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6770 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6771 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6773 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6774 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6775 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6776 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6777 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6778 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6782 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6783 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6784 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6785 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6788 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6789 let context = phase.context_mut();
6790 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6791 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6792 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6793 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6795 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
6796 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6797 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6798 let context = phase.context_mut();
6799 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6800 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6801 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6805 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6808 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6809 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6810 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6811 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6813 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6814 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6820 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6821 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6822 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6824 debug_assert!(false);
6825 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6827 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6828 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6829 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6830 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6831 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6832 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6833 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6834 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6835 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6836 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6837 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6842 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6843 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6844 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6845 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6846 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6847 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6848 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6850 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6851 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6854 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6857 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6858 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6859 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6860 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6862 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6863 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6864 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6865 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6866 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6871 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6872 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6873 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6878 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6879 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6880 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6881 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6883 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6884 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6885 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6886 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6888 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6889 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6891 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6892 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6893 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6895 debug_assert!(false);
6896 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6898 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6899 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6900 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6901 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6902 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6903 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6904 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6905 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6906 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6907 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6909 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6911 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6912 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6913 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6914 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6915 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6916 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6917 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6918 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6922 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6923 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6924 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6925 match pending_forward_info {
6926 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6927 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6929 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6930 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6931 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6932 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6933 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6935 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6936 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6937 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6938 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6939 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6942 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6944 _ => pending_forward_info
6947 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6948 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6950 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6951 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6954 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6959 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6961 let next_user_channel_id;
6962 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
6963 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6964 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6966 debug_assert!(false);
6967 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6969 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6970 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6971 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6972 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6973 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6974 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6975 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6976 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6978 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6980 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6981 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6982 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6984 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6985 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6986 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6987 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6988 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6989 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6990 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6991 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
6994 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6995 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6998 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7001 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
7002 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
7003 funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
7009 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7010 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7011 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7012 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7013 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7015 debug_assert!(false);
7016 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7018 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7019 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7020 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7021 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7022 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7023 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
7025 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7026 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7029 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7034 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7035 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7036 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7037 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7038 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7040 debug_assert!(false);
7041 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7043 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7044 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7045 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7046 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7047 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
7048 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
7049 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
7051 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7052 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
7054 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7055 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7059 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7063 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7064 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7065 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7067 debug_assert!(false);
7068 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7070 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7071 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7072 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7073 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7074 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7075 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7076 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7077 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7078 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7079 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7080 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7084 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7085 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7088 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7093 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7094 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7095 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7096 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7097 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7098 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7099 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7100 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7101 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7102 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7103 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7105 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7106 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7108 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7109 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7110 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7111 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7112 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7113 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7115 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7116 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7117 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7119 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7120 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7121 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7122 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7123 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7124 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7125 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7126 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7127 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7130 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7131 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7133 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7134 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
7135 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7136 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7137 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7138 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7139 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7140 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7141 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7142 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7143 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7144 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7147 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7148 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7149 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7154 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7155 // payments are being processed.
7156 if forward_htlcs_empty {
7157 push_forward_event = true;
7159 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7160 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7167 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7168 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7171 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7172 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7173 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7175 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7179 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7180 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7181 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7182 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7183 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7185 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7186 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7187 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7188 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7189 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7190 // real by taking more time.
7191 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7192 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7193 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7198 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7199 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7200 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7201 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7202 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7203 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7204 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7206 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7207 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7208 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7209 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7210 channel_funding_outpoint,
7212 counterparty_node_id,
7217 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7218 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7219 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7221 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7222 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7223 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7224 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7226 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7227 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7228 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7234 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7235 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7236 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7237 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7239 debug_assert!(false);
7240 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7241 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7242 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7243 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7244 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7245 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7246 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7247 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7248 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7249 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7250 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7251 *counterparty_node_id)
7253 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7254 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7255 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7256 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7257 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7258 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7259 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7263 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7264 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7267 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7270 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7274 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7275 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7276 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7278 debug_assert!(false);
7279 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7281 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7282 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7283 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7284 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7285 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7286 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7287 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7289 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7290 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7293 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7298 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7299 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7300 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7302 debug_assert!(false);
7303 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7305 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7306 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7307 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7308 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7309 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7310 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7311 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7314 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7315 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7316 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
7317 msg, &self.default_configuration
7318 ), chan_phase_entry),
7319 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7320 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7321 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7324 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7325 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7328 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7333 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7334 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7335 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7336 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7338 // It's not a local channel
7339 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7342 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7343 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7344 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7345 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7347 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7348 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7349 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7350 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7351 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7352 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7353 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7354 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7355 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7356 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7357 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7359 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7361 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7362 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7363 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7364 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7366 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7367 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7368 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7369 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7372 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7376 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7377 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7380 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7382 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7385 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7387 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7388 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7390 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7392 debug_assert!(false);
7393 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7394 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7398 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7399 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7400 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7401 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7402 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7403 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7404 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7405 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7406 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7407 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7408 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7409 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7410 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7411 let mut channel_update = None;
7412 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7413 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7414 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7417 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7418 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7419 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7420 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7421 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7422 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7423 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7428 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7429 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7430 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7431 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7432 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7433 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7437 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7438 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7441 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7442 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7444 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7445 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7446 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7447 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7448 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7449 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7451 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7452 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7453 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7454 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7455 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7456 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7457 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7458 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7459 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7460 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7461 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7462 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7463 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7464 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7465 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7466 next_funding_txid: None,
7469 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7470 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7471 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7477 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7478 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7479 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7480 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7483 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7484 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7489 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7490 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7491 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7493 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7494 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7495 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7496 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7497 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7498 match monitor_event {
7499 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7500 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
7501 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7502 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7503 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
7504 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
7505 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
7507 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7508 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
7509 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7510 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7513 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
7514 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7515 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7517 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7518 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7519 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7520 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7523 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7524 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7525 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7526 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7527 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7528 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7529 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
7530 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7531 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
7534 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
7536 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
7537 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7538 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7542 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7543 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7544 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7545 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
7553 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
7554 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7560 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7561 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7564 has_pending_monitor_events
7567 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7568 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7569 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7571 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7572 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7573 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7576 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7577 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7578 /// update was applied.
7579 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7580 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7581 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7583 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7584 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7585 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7586 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7588 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7589 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7591 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7592 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7593 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7594 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7596 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7597 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7598 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7599 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7600 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7601 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7603 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7604 has_monitor_update = true;
7606 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7607 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7608 continue 'peer_loop;
7617 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7618 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7619 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7625 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7626 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7628 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7629 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7631 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7632 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7633 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7634 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7636 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7637 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7639 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7640 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7641 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7642 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7647 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7648 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7653 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7654 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7657 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7658 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7659 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7665 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7669 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7670 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7671 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7672 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7673 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7674 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7675 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7679 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7680 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7681 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7682 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7683 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7689 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7690 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7691 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7692 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7693 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7694 let mut has_update = false;
7695 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7697 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7699 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7700 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7701 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7702 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7703 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7705 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7706 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7707 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7708 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7709 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7711 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7712 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7715 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7716 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7717 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7719 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7720 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7721 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7722 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7723 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7728 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7729 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7730 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7736 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7737 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7742 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7748 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7749 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7752 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7753 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7759 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7760 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7762 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7763 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7764 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7765 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7766 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7767 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7768 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7769 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7770 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7771 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7772 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7773 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7774 assert!(should_broadcast);
7775 } else { unreachable!(); }
7776 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7777 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7778 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
7781 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7786 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7787 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7788 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7789 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7793 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7794 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7795 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7796 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7797 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7799 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7803 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7808 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7810 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7812 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7813 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7814 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7815 &$self, description: String
7816 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7817 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7818 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7819 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7820 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7822 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7823 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7824 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7826 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7833 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7834 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7835 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7839 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7840 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7842 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7843 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7844 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7847 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7848 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7849 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7851 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7852 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7856 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7857 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7858 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7859 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7860 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7862 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7866 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7867 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7872 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7873 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7874 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7876 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7878 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7879 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7880 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7881 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7882 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7883 &$self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7884 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7885 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7886 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7887 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7888 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7889 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7891 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7892 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7893 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7895 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7896 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7899 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
7901 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7902 $self.pending_outbound_payments
7903 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7904 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7906 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7912 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7914 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7915 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7916 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7917 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7918 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7919 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7923 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7924 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
7925 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7926 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
7929 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7931 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7933 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7934 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7935 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7937 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7938 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7939 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7940 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7941 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7942 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7943 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7945 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7946 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7950 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7951 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7954 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7955 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7956 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7960 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7961 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7962 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7963 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7967 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7968 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7969 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7974 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7975 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
7976 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
7977 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
7980 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7981 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7982 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7983 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7984 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7985 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7986 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7987 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7988 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7989 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7990 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7991 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7992 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7993 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7994 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7996 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
7997 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7999 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
8001 let builder = match quantity {
8003 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
8005 let builder = match amount_msats {
8007 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
8009 let builder = match payer_note {
8011 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
8013 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
8014 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8016 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8018 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
8019 self.pending_outbound_payments
8020 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8021 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
8023 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8025 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8026 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
8027 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8028 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
8029 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
8032 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8034 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
8035 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
8036 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
8037 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
8038 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
8039 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8040 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
8041 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8042 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8044 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8051 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
8054 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
8055 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
8056 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
8060 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
8061 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
8062 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
8063 /// received and no retries will be made.
8068 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
8069 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
8072 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8073 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8074 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8075 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8076 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8078 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8079 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8081 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8082 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8085 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8087 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8088 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8089 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
8090 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8092 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8093 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8094 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8096 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8097 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8098 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8100 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8101 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8102 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8104 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8105 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8106 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8107 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8109 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8110 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8111 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8112 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
8113 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8116 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8118 for path in refund.paths() {
8119 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8120 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8121 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8122 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8124 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8130 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8134 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8137 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8138 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8140 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
8141 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
8142 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
8143 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8145 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8147 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8148 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8152 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8153 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8155 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8157 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8158 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8160 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8161 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8162 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8163 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
8164 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
8165 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8166 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8167 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8168 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8169 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8170 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8173 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8174 /// stored external to LDK.
8176 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8177 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8178 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8180 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8181 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8184 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8185 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8186 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8187 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8189 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8190 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8191 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8192 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8193 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8195 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8196 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8197 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8198 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8199 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8201 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8202 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8204 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8205 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8209 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8210 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8212 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8214 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8215 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8217 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8218 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8219 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8220 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8221 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8222 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8223 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8226 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8227 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8229 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8230 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8231 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8234 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8236 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8237 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8238 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8239 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8241 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8243 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8244 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8245 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8248 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8249 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8252 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8253 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8254 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8255 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
8256 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8257 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8259 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8260 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8261 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8262 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8263 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8265 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8267 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8270 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8271 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8275 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8276 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8278 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8279 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8280 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8281 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8283 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8284 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8285 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8286 Some(_) => continue,
8287 None => return scid_candidate
8292 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8294 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8295 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8297 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8298 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8299 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8303 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8304 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8305 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8307 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8308 /// times to get a unique scid.
8309 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8310 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8311 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8313 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8314 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8315 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8316 return scid_candidate
8320 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8321 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8322 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8323 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8325 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8326 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8327 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8328 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8329 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8330 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8332 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8333 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8334 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8343 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8344 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8345 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8346 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8347 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8351 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8352 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8353 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8354 events.push_back((event, None));
8358 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8359 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8360 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8364 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8365 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8369 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8370 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8373 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8374 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8375 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8376 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8377 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
8378 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
8379 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8381 let logger = WithContext::from(
8382 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
8385 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8386 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8387 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8388 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8389 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8390 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8391 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8392 .get_mut(&channel_id)
8394 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8398 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8399 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
8400 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8401 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8402 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8403 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8408 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
8410 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8411 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8412 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8413 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8415 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8416 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8417 if further_update_exists {
8418 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8423 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8430 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8431 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8437 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8438 for action in actions {
8440 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8441 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
8443 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8449 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8450 /// using the given event handler.
8452 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8453 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8457 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8461 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8463 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8464 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8465 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8466 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8467 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8468 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8472 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8473 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8474 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8475 /// is always placed next to each other.
8477 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8478 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8479 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8480 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8482 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8483 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8484 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8485 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8486 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8487 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8488 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8490 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8491 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8492 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8493 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8496 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8497 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8499 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8500 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8503 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8504 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8505 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8506 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8507 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8508 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8509 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8513 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8514 events.replace(pending_events);
8523 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8525 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8526 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8527 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8528 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8529 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8530 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8534 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8536 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8537 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8538 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8540 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8544 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8546 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8547 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8548 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8549 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8550 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8551 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8555 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8557 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8558 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
8559 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8560 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
8561 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8564 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8565 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8568 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8569 let _persistence_guard =
8570 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8571 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8572 let new_height = height - 1;
8574 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8575 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
8576 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8577 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
8578 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8579 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8582 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8586 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8588 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8589 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8590 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8591 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8592 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8593 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8597 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8598 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8599 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8600 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8602 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8603 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8605 let _persistence_guard =
8606 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8607 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8608 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8609 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8611 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8612 if height < last_best_block_height {
8613 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8614 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8618 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8619 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8620 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8621 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8623 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8624 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8626 let _persistence_guard =
8627 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8628 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8629 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8631 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8633 macro_rules! max_time {
8634 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8636 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8637 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8638 // having an explicit local time source.
8639 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8640 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8641 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8642 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8643 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8649 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8650 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8651 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8652 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8656 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8657 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8658 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8659 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8660 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8661 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8662 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8663 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8664 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8665 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8666 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8673 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8674 let _persistence_guard =
8675 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8676 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8677 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8678 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8679 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8680 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8681 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8682 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8687 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8689 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8690 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8691 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8692 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8693 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8694 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8698 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8699 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8701 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8702 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8703 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8704 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8705 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8707 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8708 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8710 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8711 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8712 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8713 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8714 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8715 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8717 // Retain unfunded channels.
8718 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8719 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
8720 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
8721 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
8722 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8723 let res = f(channel);
8724 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8725 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8726 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8727 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8728 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8730 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8731 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8732 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8733 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8734 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8735 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8736 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8737 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8742 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8747 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8748 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8751 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8752 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8753 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8754 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8755 msg: announcement_sigs,
8757 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8758 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8759 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8761 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8762 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8763 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8768 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8769 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8770 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8771 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8772 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8773 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8774 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8775 // is always consistent.
8776 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8777 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8778 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8779 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8780 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8783 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8784 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8785 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8786 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8787 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8788 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8789 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8790 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8794 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8795 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8796 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8797 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8798 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8799 data: reason_message,
8812 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8813 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8814 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8815 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8816 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8817 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8818 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8819 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8820 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8821 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8823 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8824 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8825 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8829 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8832 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8833 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8834 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8835 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8836 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8837 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8838 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8839 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8840 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8841 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8842 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
8843 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8846 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8847 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8848 _ => unreachable!(),
8850 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8851 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8852 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8853 let logger = WithContext::from(
8854 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
8856 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8862 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8864 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8865 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8869 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8870 /// may have events that need processing.
8872 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8873 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8875 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8876 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8877 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8878 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8881 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8882 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8883 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8886 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8887 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8888 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8891 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8892 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8893 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8894 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8897 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8898 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8899 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8900 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8903 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8904 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8906 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8907 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8908 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8909 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8910 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8913 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8914 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8915 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8916 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8919 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8920 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8921 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8922 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8925 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8926 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8927 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8928 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8931 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8932 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8933 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8934 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8938 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8939 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8941 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8942 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8943 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8944 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8945 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8946 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8950 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8951 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8952 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8953 // change to the contents.
8954 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8955 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8956 let persist = match &res {
8957 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8958 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8959 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8961 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8963 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8968 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8969 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8970 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8971 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8974 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8975 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8976 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8977 // change to the contents.
8978 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8979 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8980 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8984 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8985 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8986 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8987 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8990 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8991 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8992 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8995 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8996 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8997 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9000 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
9001 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9002 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
9003 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
9004 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
9005 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9006 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9007 let persist = match &res {
9008 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9009 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9011 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9016 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
9017 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9018 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
9019 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9022 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
9023 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9024 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
9025 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9028 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
9029 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9030 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
9031 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9034 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
9035 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9036 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
9037 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9040 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
9041 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9042 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9045 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
9046 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9047 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9050 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
9051 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9052 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9053 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9054 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9055 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9056 let persist = match &res {
9057 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9058 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9059 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9061 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9066 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
9067 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9068 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9071 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
9072 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9073 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9074 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9075 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9076 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9077 let persist = match &res {
9078 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9079 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9080 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9082 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9087 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9088 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9089 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9090 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9091 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9092 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9093 let persist = match &res {
9094 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9095 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9096 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9098 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9103 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9104 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9105 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9108 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9109 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9110 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9113 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9114 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9115 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9116 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9117 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9118 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9119 let persist = match &res {
9120 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9121 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9122 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9124 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9129 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9130 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9131 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9134 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9135 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9136 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9139 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9144 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9145 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9146 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9147 let persist = match &res {
9148 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9149 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9150 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9152 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9157 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9158 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9159 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9160 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9161 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9164 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
9165 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9166 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9168 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9169 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9170 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9171 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9172 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9173 let context = match phase {
9174 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9175 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9176 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9177 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9182 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
9183 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
9184 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
9187 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9188 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9191 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9192 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9195 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9196 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9200 // Clean up for removal.
9201 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9202 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9205 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9206 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9207 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9208 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9210 // V1 Channel Establishment
9211 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9212 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9213 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9214 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9215 // V2 Channel Establishment
9216 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9217 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9218 // Common Channel Establishment
9219 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9220 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9222 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9224 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9225 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9226 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9227 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9228 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9229 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9230 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9231 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9232 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9233 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9234 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9235 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9236 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9237 // Channel Operations
9238 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9239 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9240 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9241 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9242 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9243 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
9245 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
9246 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9247 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
9248 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9249 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
9250 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
9251 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
9252 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
9253 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
9256 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
9257 peer_state.is_connected = false;
9258 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
9259 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
9262 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
9264 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
9266 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
9267 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
9271 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
9272 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
9273 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
9274 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9278 let mut res = Ok(());
9280 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9281 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9282 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9283 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9284 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9285 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9286 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9289 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9290 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9291 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9292 if inbound_peer_limited {
9294 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9296 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9297 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9298 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9299 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9300 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9301 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9302 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9303 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9307 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9308 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9309 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9311 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9312 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9313 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9314 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9317 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9320 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9321 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9326 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9328 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9329 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9330 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9331 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9332 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9334 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9336 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9337 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9338 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9339 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9340 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9344 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9345 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9346 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9347 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
9351 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9352 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9353 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9354 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9355 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9356 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
9360 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
9361 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9362 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9363 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9364 debug_assert!(false);
9367 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9368 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9369 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
9370 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9371 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9372 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9373 debug_assert!(false);
9379 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9380 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9385 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9386 match &msg.data as &str {
9387 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9388 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9390 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9391 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9392 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9393 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9394 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9395 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9396 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9397 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9398 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9400 || -> NotifyOption {
9401 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9402 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9403 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
9404 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9405 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9406 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9407 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9408 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9412 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9413 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9414 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9415 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9416 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9417 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9419 log_level: Level::Trace,
9422 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
9423 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
9424 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9426 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
9435 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9437 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9438 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9439 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9440 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9441 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9442 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9443 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9444 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9445 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9446 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9447 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9449 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9450 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9451 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9455 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9456 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9457 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9458 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9459 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9460 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9461 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9462 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
9463 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9464 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9465 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9471 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9472 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
9473 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9474 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9475 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9481 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
9482 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9483 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
9487 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9488 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9492 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9493 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9496 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9497 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9500 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9501 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9504 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9505 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9506 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9507 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9510 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9511 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9512 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9513 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9516 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9517 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9518 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9519 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9522 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9523 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9524 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9525 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9528 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9529 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9530 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9531 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9534 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9535 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9536 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9537 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9540 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9541 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9542 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9543 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9546 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9547 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9548 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9549 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9552 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9553 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9554 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9555 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9559 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9560 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9562 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9563 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9564 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9565 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9566 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9567 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9571 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9572 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9573 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9576 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9577 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9580 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9581 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9583 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9584 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9586 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9587 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9591 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9592 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9593 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9595 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9597 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9598 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9602 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9603 amount_msats, payment_secret
9605 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9607 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9608 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9612 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9613 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9614 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9617 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9618 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9619 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9620 payment_paths, payment_hash
9622 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9623 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9624 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9626 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey>, _> =
9627 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9628 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9629 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9630 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9633 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9634 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9635 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9636 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9637 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9639 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<ExplicitSigningPubkey>, _> =
9640 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9641 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9642 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9643 .and_then(|invoice| {
9645 let mut invoice = invoice;
9646 match invoice.sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
9647 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
9649 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9650 Err(SignError::Signing) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9651 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9653 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9654 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9659 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9660 Err(error) => Some(error),
9664 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9665 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9667 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9669 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9670 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9673 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9674 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9675 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9682 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9683 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9689 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9690 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9694 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9695 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9696 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9697 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9698 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9702 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9703 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9705 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9706 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9707 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9708 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9709 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9712 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9713 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9714 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9715 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9718 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9719 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9720 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9721 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9724 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9725 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9726 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9727 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9730 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9731 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9732 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9733 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9734 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9735 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9736 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9737 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9738 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9739 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9740 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9741 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9742 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9743 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9744 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9745 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9746 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9747 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9748 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
9749 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9750 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9755 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9756 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9758 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9759 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9760 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9761 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9764 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9765 (2, node_id, required),
9766 (4, features, required),
9767 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9768 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9769 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9770 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9773 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9774 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9775 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9776 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9777 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9778 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9779 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9780 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9781 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9782 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9783 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9784 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9785 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9786 (7, self.config, option),
9787 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9788 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9789 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9790 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9791 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9792 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9793 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9794 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9795 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9796 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9797 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9798 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9799 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9800 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9801 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9802 (32, self.is_public, required),
9803 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9804 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9805 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9806 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9807 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9808 (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9809 (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9815 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9816 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9817 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9818 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9819 (2, channel_id, required),
9820 (3, channel_type, option),
9821 (4, counterparty, required),
9822 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9823 (6, funding_txo, option),
9824 (7, config, option),
9825 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9826 (9, confirmations, option),
9827 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9828 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9829 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9830 (16, balance_msat, required),
9831 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9832 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9833 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9834 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9835 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9836 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9837 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9838 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9839 (26, is_outbound, required),
9840 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9841 (30, is_usable, required),
9842 (32, is_public, required),
9843 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9844 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9845 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9846 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9847 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9848 (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9849 (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9852 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9853 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9854 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9855 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9856 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9860 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9862 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9863 outbound_scid_alias,
9867 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9868 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9870 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9871 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9872 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9873 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9874 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9875 confirmations_required,
9877 force_close_spend_delay,
9878 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9879 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9880 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9881 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9882 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9883 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9884 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9885 channel_shutdown_state,
9886 pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9887 pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9892 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9893 (2, channels, required_vec),
9894 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9895 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9898 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9899 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9900 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
9903 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9905 (0, onion_packet, required),
9906 (1, blinded, option),
9907 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9910 (0, payment_data, required),
9911 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9912 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9913 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9914 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9915 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9917 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9918 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9919 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9920 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9921 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9922 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9923 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9927 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9928 (0, routing, required),
9929 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9930 (4, payment_hash, required),
9931 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9932 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9933 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9934 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9938 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9939 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9941 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9943 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9944 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9945 reason.write(writer)?;
9947 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9948 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9951 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9952 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9953 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9954 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9961 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9962 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9963 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9966 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9967 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9968 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9969 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9973 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9974 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9975 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9976 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9977 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9980 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9981 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9982 // messages contained in the variants.
9983 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9984 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9985 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9987 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9988 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9989 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9990 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9991 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9994 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9995 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9996 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9997 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9998 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
10000 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10005 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
10010 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
10011 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
10012 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
10015 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
10016 (0, short_channel_id, required),
10017 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10018 (2, outpoint, required),
10019 (3, blinded_failure, option),
10020 (4, htlc_id, required),
10021 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
10022 (7, user_channel_id, option),
10023 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
10024 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10025 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10028 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
10029 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10030 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
10031 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
10032 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
10034 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10035 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
10036 (1, self.total_msat, required),
10037 (2, self.value, required),
10038 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
10039 (4, payment_data, option),
10040 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
10041 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
10042 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10043 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10049 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
10050 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10051 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10052 (0, prev_hop, required),
10053 (1, total_msat, option),
10054 (2, value_ser, required),
10055 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
10056 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
10057 (5, total_value_received, option),
10058 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
10059 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10060 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10062 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
10063 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
10064 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
10066 if payment_data.is_some() {
10067 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10069 if total_msat.is_none() {
10070 total_msat = Some(value);
10072 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
10075 if total_msat.is_none() {
10076 if payment_data.is_none() {
10077 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10079 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10081 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
10085 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10088 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10089 total_value_received,
10090 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10092 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10093 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10098 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10099 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10100 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10103 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10104 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10105 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10106 let mut payment_id = None;
10107 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10108 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10109 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10110 (0, session_priv, required),
10111 (1, payment_id, option),
10112 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10113 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10114 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10115 (6, blinded_tail, option),
10117 if payment_id.is_none() {
10118 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10120 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10122 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10123 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10124 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10126 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10127 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10128 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10129 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10133 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10134 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10135 first_hop_htlc_msat,
10137 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10140 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10141 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10146 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10147 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10149 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10150 0u8.write(writer)?;
10151 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10152 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10153 (0, session_priv, required),
10154 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10155 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10156 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10157 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10158 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10159 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10162 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10163 1u8.write(writer)?;
10164 field.write(writer)?;
10171 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10172 (0, forward_info, required),
10173 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10174 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10175 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10176 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10177 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10178 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10179 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10182 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10183 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10184 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10186 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10190 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10191 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10192 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10193 (0, htlc_id, required),
10194 (2, err_packet, required),
10197 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10198 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10199 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10200 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10201 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10202 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10203 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10204 (0, htlc_id, required),
10205 (1, failure_code, required),
10206 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10207 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10215 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10216 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10217 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
10219 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
10221 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
10222 (0, htlc_id, required),
10223 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
10224 (2, err_packet, required),
10225 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
10227 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
10228 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
10229 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10231 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
10235 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10236 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
10240 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10245 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
10246 (0, payment_secret, required),
10247 (2, expiry_time, required),
10248 (4, user_payment_id, required),
10249 (6, payment_preimage, required),
10250 (8, min_value_msat, required),
10253 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10255 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10256 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10257 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10258 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10259 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10260 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10264 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10265 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
10267 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10269 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
10271 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
10272 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
10273 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
10276 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
10278 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10279 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
10280 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10281 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10282 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10283 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10284 serializable_peer_count += 1;
10287 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
10288 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
10292 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
10294 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10295 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10296 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10297 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
10298 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
10299 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
10302 channel.write(writer)?;
10308 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10309 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10310 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
10311 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
10312 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10313 for forward in pending_forwards {
10314 forward.write(writer)?;
10319 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10321 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10322 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
10323 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10325 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
10326 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
10327 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10328 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
10329 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
10330 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10331 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
10332 htlc.write(writer)?;
10334 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
10335 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
10338 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
10339 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
10340 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10341 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
10342 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
10343 // per_peer_state lock at all.
10344 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
10347 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
10348 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10349 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
10350 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
10351 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10353 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10354 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10355 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10356 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10357 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10358 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10359 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10364 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10365 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10366 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10367 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10368 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10369 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10370 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10371 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10372 0u64.write(writer)?;
10374 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10375 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10376 event.write(writer)?;
10380 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10381 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10382 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10383 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10384 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10385 0u64.write(writer)?;
10387 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10388 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10389 // likely to be identical.
10390 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10391 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10393 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10394 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10395 hash.write(writer)?;
10396 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10399 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10400 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10401 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10402 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10403 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10406 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10407 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10409 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10410 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10411 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10412 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10415 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10416 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10417 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10418 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10422 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10423 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
10424 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10426 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10427 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10428 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10434 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10435 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10436 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10437 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10440 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10441 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10442 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10443 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10444 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10447 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10448 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10449 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10450 if !updates.is_empty() {
10451 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
10452 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10457 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10458 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10459 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10460 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10461 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10462 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10463 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10464 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10465 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10466 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10467 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10468 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10469 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10476 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10477 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10478 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10479 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10482 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10483 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10484 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10485 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10486 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10487 // check that the event is sane here.
10488 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10489 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10490 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10491 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10497 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10498 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10499 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10500 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10501 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10502 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10505 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10506 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10507 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10508 events.push_back((ev, action));
10509 } else if action.is_some() {
10510 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10517 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10518 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10519 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10520 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10521 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10522 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10525 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10527 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10529 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10530 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10531 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10532 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10533 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10534 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10535 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10536 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10537 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10538 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10539 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10540 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10541 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10543 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10544 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10546 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10547 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10549 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10550 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10551 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10552 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10553 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10554 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10556 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10557 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10559 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10560 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10561 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10562 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10563 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10564 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10568 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10569 pub entropy_source: ES,
10571 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10572 pub node_signer: NS,
10574 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10575 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10577 pub signer_provider: SP,
10579 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10581 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10582 pub fee_estimator: F,
10583 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10585 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10586 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10587 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10588 pub chain_monitor: M,
10590 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10591 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10592 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10593 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10594 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10595 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10597 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10599 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10600 /// deserialization.
10602 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10603 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10604 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10606 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10607 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10609 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10610 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10611 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10612 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10614 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10617 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10618 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10621 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10622 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10624 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10625 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10626 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10627 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10628 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10629 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10633 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10634 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10635 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10636 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10637 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10639 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10640 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
10641 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
10647 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10648 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10649 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10650 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10652 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10653 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10654 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10655 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10656 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10657 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10661 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10662 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10663 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10667 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10668 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10670 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10671 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10672 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10673 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10674 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10675 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10679 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10680 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10682 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10683 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10684 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10686 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10688 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10689 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10690 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10691 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10692 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10693 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10694 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10695 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
10696 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10697 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10698 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10700 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10701 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10702 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
10703 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10704 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10705 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10706 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10707 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10708 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10709 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10710 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10711 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10712 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10713 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10714 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10716 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10717 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10718 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10720 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10721 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10722 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10724 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10725 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10726 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10728 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10729 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10730 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10732 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10733 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10734 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
10737 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10738 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10739 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10740 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10741 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10742 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10743 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10744 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10746 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10747 let mut found_htlc = false;
10748 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10749 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10752 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10753 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10754 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10755 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10756 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10757 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10758 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10760 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10761 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10762 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10766 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10767 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10768 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10769 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10770 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10772 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10773 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10775 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10776 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10777 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10778 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10780 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10781 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
10782 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10783 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10787 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10788 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10789 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10790 // safely discard the channel.
10791 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10792 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10793 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10794 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10795 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10796 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10797 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10798 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10801 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10802 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10803 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10804 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10805 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10806 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10810 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10811 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10812 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10813 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
10814 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10816 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10817 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10818 counterparty_node_id: None,
10819 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10820 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
10822 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
10826 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10827 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10828 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10829 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10830 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10831 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10832 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10833 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10834 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10836 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10839 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10840 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10841 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10842 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10843 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10844 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10845 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10846 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10848 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10851 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10854 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10855 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10856 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10857 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10858 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10859 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10860 is_connected: false,
10864 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10865 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10866 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10867 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10868 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
10869 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10870 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10871 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10874 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10875 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10876 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10877 for _ in 0..event_count {
10878 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10879 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10884 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10885 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10886 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10888 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10889 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10890 // on-startup monitor updates.
10891 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10892 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10894 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10898 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10899 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10901 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10902 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10903 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10904 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10905 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10909 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10910 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10911 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10912 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10913 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10914 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10915 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
10917 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10918 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10922 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10923 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10924 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10925 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
10926 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10927 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10928 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10929 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10930 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10931 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
10932 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10933 let mut events_override = None;
10934 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10935 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10936 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10937 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10938 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10939 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10940 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10941 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10942 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10943 (8, events_override, option),
10944 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10945 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10946 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10947 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10949 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10950 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10953 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10954 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10957 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10958 pending_events_read = events;
10961 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10962 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10965 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10966 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10967 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10968 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
10969 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10970 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10972 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10974 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10975 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10976 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10979 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10980 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10981 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10982 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10983 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10985 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10986 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10987 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10989 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10990 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10991 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10992 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10993 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10995 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10996 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10997 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10998 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10999 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
11000 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
11001 pending_background_events.push(
11002 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11003 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11004 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
11005 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11006 update: update.clone(),
11009 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
11010 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
11011 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
11012 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
11013 pending_background_events.push(
11014 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
11015 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11016 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11019 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
11020 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
11021 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11023 max_in_flight_update_id
11027 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11028 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
11029 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11030 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
11031 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11032 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11034 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
11036 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11037 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
11038 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
11039 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
11040 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
11041 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
11042 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
11043 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
11044 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
11047 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
11048 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
11049 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11050 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
11051 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
11052 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
11053 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11054 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11055 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11056 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11057 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11060 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11061 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11062 debug_assert!(false);
11063 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11068 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11069 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11070 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11071 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
11072 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11073 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11074 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11075 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11076 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11077 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11079 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11080 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11081 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11083 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11084 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11085 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11086 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11087 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11088 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11089 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11090 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11095 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11096 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11098 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11099 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11100 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11101 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11104 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11105 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11106 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11107 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11108 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11109 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11110 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11112 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11113 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11114 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11115 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11116 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11117 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11118 if path.hops.is_empty() {
11119 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11120 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11123 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11124 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11125 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11126 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11127 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11128 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11129 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11130 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11132 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11133 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11134 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11135 retry_strategy: None,
11136 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11137 payment_params: None,
11138 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11139 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11140 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11141 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11142 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11143 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11144 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11145 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11146 total_msat: path_amt,
11147 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11148 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11150 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11151 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11156 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11157 match htlc_source {
11158 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11159 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11160 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11161 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11163 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11164 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11165 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11166 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11167 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11168 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11169 forwards.retain(|forward| {
11170 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11171 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11172 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11173 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11178 !forwards.is_empty()
11180 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11181 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11182 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11183 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11184 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11185 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11186 intercepted_id != ev_id
11193 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11194 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
11195 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
11196 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
11197 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
11198 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
11199 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
11200 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
11201 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
11202 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
11203 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
11205 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
11206 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
11207 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
11208 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
11210 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
11211 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
11212 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
11219 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
11220 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
11222 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
11224 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
11225 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
11226 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
11227 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
11228 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
11229 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
11230 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
11231 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
11232 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11233 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
11236 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
11237 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
11238 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
11239 // channel still live case here.
11243 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
11244 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
11249 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
11250 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
11251 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
11252 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
11253 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
11254 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
11255 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
11256 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
11260 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
11261 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
11263 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
11264 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
11265 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11266 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11268 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
11269 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11270 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11272 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
11273 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
11275 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11276 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
11278 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11281 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
11282 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11283 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11285 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11289 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
11290 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
11291 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
11292 if htlcs.is_empty() {
11293 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11295 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
11296 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
11297 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
11298 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
11299 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
11300 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
11301 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
11302 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
11304 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
11305 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11309 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
11311 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11313 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
11314 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
11316 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11317 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11322 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11323 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11325 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
11327 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11329 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
11330 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
11331 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
11332 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11336 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
11337 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11338 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11339 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11340 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
11341 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11342 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11343 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
11344 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
11346 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
11347 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
11348 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
11350 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
11351 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
11352 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11353 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11354 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11355 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11357 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11358 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11359 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11360 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11361 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11362 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11366 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11367 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11368 debug_assert!(false);
11369 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11374 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11376 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11377 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11378 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11379 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11380 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11381 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11382 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11383 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11384 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11385 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11386 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11388 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11389 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11391 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11392 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11393 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11394 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11396 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11397 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11398 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11399 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11401 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11402 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11403 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11404 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11406 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
11407 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11408 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11409 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11410 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11411 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11412 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11413 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11416 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11417 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11420 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11423 purpose: payment.purpose,
11424 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11425 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11426 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11432 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11433 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11434 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11435 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11436 for action in actions.iter() {
11437 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11438 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11439 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
11441 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
11443 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11444 blocked_channel_id);
11445 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11446 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
11447 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11449 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11450 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11451 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11452 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11456 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11457 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11461 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11463 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11464 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11468 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11470 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11471 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11472 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11473 router: args.router,
11475 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11477 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11478 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11479 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11480 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11482 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11483 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11484 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11485 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11486 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11487 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11489 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11491 our_network_pubkey,
11494 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11496 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11498 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11499 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11500 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11501 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11502 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11504 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11505 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11507 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11509 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11511 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11512 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11513 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11515 logger: args.logger,
11516 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11519 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11520 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11521 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11522 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11523 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11526 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11527 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11528 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11529 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11530 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
11531 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
11532 downstream_channel_id, None
11536 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11537 //connection or two.
11539 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11545 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11546 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11547 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11548 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11549 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11550 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11551 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11552 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11553 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11554 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11555 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11556 use crate::prelude::*;
11557 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11558 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11559 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11560 use crate::util::test_utils;
11561 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11562 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11565 fn test_notify_limits() {
11566 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11567 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11568 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11569 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11570 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11571 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11573 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11574 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11575 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11576 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11577 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11579 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11581 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11582 // to connect messages with new values
11583 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11584 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11585 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11586 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11587 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11588 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11590 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11591 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11592 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11593 // ... but the last node should not.
11594 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11595 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11596 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11597 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11599 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11600 // about the channel.
11601 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11602 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11603 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11605 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11607 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11608 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11609 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11610 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11611 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11612 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11614 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11615 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11616 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11618 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11619 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11620 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11621 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11622 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11623 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11625 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11626 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11627 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11628 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11629 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11630 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11631 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11632 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11634 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11635 // the channel info has updated.
11636 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11637 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11638 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11639 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11640 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11641 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11645 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11646 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11648 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11649 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11650 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11651 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11652 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11654 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11655 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11656 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11657 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11659 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11660 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11661 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11662 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11663 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11664 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11665 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11666 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11667 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11668 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11669 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11670 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11672 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11673 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11674 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11676 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11677 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11678 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11679 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11680 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11681 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11682 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11683 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11684 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11686 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11687 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11688 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11689 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11690 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11691 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11692 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11693 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11694 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11696 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11697 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11698 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11700 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11701 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11702 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11704 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11705 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11706 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11707 // lightning messages manually.
11708 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11709 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11712 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11713 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11714 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11715 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11716 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11717 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11718 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11719 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11720 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11721 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11722 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11723 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11724 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11725 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11726 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11727 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11728 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11729 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11731 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11733 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11735 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11736 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11739 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11740 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11741 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11742 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11744 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11745 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11746 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11747 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11749 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11752 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11753 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11754 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11755 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11757 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11762 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11763 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11764 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11767 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11768 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11769 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11770 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11771 // fails as expected.
11772 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11773 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11774 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11775 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11776 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11777 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11778 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11779 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11780 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11781 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11782 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11783 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11784 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11785 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11786 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11788 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11789 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11790 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11792 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11793 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11794 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11795 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11796 let route = find_route(
11797 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11798 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11800 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11801 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11803 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11804 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11805 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11806 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11807 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11808 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11809 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11810 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11811 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11812 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11813 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11814 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11815 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11816 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11817 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11818 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11819 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11820 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11821 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11822 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11823 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11825 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11826 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11828 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11829 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11830 let route = find_route(
11831 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11832 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11834 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11835 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11837 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11838 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11839 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11840 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11841 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11843 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11844 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11845 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11846 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11848 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11849 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11850 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11851 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11852 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11853 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11854 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11855 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11856 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11857 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11858 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11859 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11860 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11861 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11862 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11863 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11864 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11865 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11866 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11868 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11869 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11871 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11872 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11873 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11874 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11875 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11876 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11877 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11878 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11879 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11880 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11882 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11883 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11884 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11887 let route = find_route(
11888 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11889 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11891 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11892 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11893 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11895 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11896 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11897 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11898 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11899 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11901 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11902 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11903 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11905 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11906 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11907 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11908 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11909 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11910 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11911 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11912 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11913 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11915 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11916 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11920 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11921 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11922 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11923 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11924 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11925 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11926 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11928 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11929 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11931 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11932 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11933 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11934 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11935 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11936 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11937 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11938 let route = find_route(
11939 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11940 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11943 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11944 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11945 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11946 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11947 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11948 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11951 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11952 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11953 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11954 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11955 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11956 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11957 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11959 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11963 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11964 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11965 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11966 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11967 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11968 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11969 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11970 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11971 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11973 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11974 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11976 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11977 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11978 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11979 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11980 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11981 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11982 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11983 let route = find_route(
11984 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11985 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11988 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11989 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11990 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11991 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11992 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11993 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11994 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11995 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11996 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11998 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11999 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12000 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12001 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12002 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12003 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12004 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12006 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
12010 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
12011 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
12012 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
12013 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
12014 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12016 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12017 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12018 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12019 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12021 // Marshall an MPP route.
12022 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
12023 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
12024 route.paths.push(path);
12025 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12026 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
12027 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
12028 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
12029 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
12030 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
12032 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12033 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
12035 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
12036 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
12038 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
12043 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
12044 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12045 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12046 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12047 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12049 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12051 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12052 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12054 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12055 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
12056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12057 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12060 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
12061 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
12062 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
12063 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
12064 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12065 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12068 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12071 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12072 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12077 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12078 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12079 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12080 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12081 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12082 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12084 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12085 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12087 total_msat: 100_000,
12090 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12091 // payment verification fails as expected.
12092 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12093 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12094 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12095 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12097 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12101 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12102 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12106 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12107 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12108 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12109 // the channel is successfully closed.
12110 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12111 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12112 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12113 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12115 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12116 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12117 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12118 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12119 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12121 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
12122 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
12124 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
12125 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
12126 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12127 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12130 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12132 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
12133 // as it has the funding transaction.
12134 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12135 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12136 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12139 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12141 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12143 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12145 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12146 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12147 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12149 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12152 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
12153 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
12154 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12155 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12156 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12158 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12159 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12160 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12162 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12163 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
12164 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
12165 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
12167 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12168 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
12169 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12170 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
12172 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12173 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
12175 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
12176 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
12177 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
12178 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
12179 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12180 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12181 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12185 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
12186 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
12187 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
12188 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
12189 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12190 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12191 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12194 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
12196 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
12197 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
12198 // closing transaction).
12199 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
12200 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
12201 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12203 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
12204 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
12205 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12206 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12207 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12210 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12212 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
12214 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
12215 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
12216 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12218 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12220 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12221 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12224 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12225 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
12226 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12229 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12230 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
12231 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12234 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
12235 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
12236 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12239 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12240 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
12241 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12244 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12246 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
12247 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12249 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
12250 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12252 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
12253 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
12258 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
12259 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
12260 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
12261 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
12262 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12263 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12264 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12265 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12268 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12269 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
12270 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
12272 // Test the API functions.
12273 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
12275 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
12277 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12279 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12281 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12283 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
12285 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
12289 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
12290 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
12291 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
12292 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
12293 // the given `channel_id`.
12294 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12295 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12296 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12297 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12299 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12302 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12304 // Test the API functions.
12305 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
12307 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12309 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12311 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12313 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12315 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12319 fn test_connection_limiting() {
12320 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
12321 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12322 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12323 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12324 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12326 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12328 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12329 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12331 let mut funding_tx = None;
12332 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12333 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12334 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12337 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12338 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
12339 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
12340 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
12341 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12343 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12345 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12347 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12349 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12351 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12353 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12356 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
12357 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
12358 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
12359 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12360 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12361 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12363 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
12364 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
12366 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
12367 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
12368 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12369 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12370 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
12371 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12372 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12375 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12376 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12377 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12378 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12379 }, true).unwrap_err();
12381 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12382 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12383 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12384 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12385 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12386 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12387 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12389 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12390 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12392 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12393 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12394 }, true).unwrap_err();
12396 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12397 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12398 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12399 }, false).unwrap();
12400 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12402 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12403 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12405 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12406 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12407 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12408 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12409 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12411 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12412 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12413 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12415 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12416 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12417 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12419 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12420 // "protected" and can connect again.
12421 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12422 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12423 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12425 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12427 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12429 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12430 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12434 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12435 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12436 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12437 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12438 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12439 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12441 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12443 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12444 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12446 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12447 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12448 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12449 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12452 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12454 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12455 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12456 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12458 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12459 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12460 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12462 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12463 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12464 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12465 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12469 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12470 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12471 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12472 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12473 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12474 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12475 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12476 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12477 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12479 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12481 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12482 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12484 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12485 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12486 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12487 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12488 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12489 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12492 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12493 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12495 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12496 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12498 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12500 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12501 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12504 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12505 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12506 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12507 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12508 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12510 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12511 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12513 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12514 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12515 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12516 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12520 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12522 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12523 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12525 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12526 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12527 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12529 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12530 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12532 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12534 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12538 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12539 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12540 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12541 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12542 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12543 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12544 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12545 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12546 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12547 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12548 payment_metadata: None,
12549 keysend_preimage: None,
12550 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12551 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12553 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12555 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12556 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12557 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12558 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
12559 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12560 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12561 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12563 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12564 } else { panic!(); }
12566 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12567 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12568 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12569 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12570 payment_metadata: None,
12571 keysend_preimage: None,
12572 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12573 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12575 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12577 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12578 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12579 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12580 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12584 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12585 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12586 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12587 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12588 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12590 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12591 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12592 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12593 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
12594 payment_metadata: None,
12595 keysend_preimage: None,
12596 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12597 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12599 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12600 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12601 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12603 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12604 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12605 // is not satisfied.
12606 assert!(result.is_ok());
12610 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12611 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12612 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12613 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12614 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12616 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12617 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12619 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12620 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12621 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12622 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12623 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12625 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12626 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12628 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12629 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12630 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12631 match &msg_events[0] {
12632 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12633 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12635 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12636 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12637 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12640 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12643 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12644 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12646 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12647 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12648 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12650 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12654 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12655 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12656 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12657 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12658 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12659 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12660 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12661 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12662 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12663 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12664 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12666 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12667 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12668 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12670 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12671 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12673 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12674 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12676 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12679 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12680 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12682 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12683 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12685 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12686 // not have generated any events.
12687 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12691 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12692 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12693 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12694 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12695 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12696 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12697 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12698 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12700 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12701 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12702 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12704 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12705 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12706 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12707 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12708 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12710 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12711 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12714 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12715 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12716 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12718 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12719 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12720 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12721 ..Default::default()
12723 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12724 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12725 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12727 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12728 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12731 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12732 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12733 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12734 ..Default::default()
12736 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12737 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12738 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12739 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12741 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12742 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12745 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12746 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12747 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12748 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12749 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12752 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12753 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12754 ..Default::default()
12756 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12759 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12760 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12761 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12762 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12766 fn test_payment_display() {
12767 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12768 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12769 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12770 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12771 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12772 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12776 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12777 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12778 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12779 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12780 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12781 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12783 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12784 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12785 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12786 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12787 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12788 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12789 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12790 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12792 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12793 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12794 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12797 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12798 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12800 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12801 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12803 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12804 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12805 }, false).unwrap();
12806 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12807 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12808 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12810 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12812 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12813 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12814 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12815 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12816 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12817 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12818 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12819 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12820 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12821 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12822 } else { panic!() };
12823 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12824 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12825 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12826 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12828 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12830 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12831 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12832 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12837 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12838 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12839 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12840 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12843 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12844 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12845 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12847 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12848 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12850 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12851 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12854 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12855 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12856 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12858 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12862 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12863 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12864 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12866 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12871 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12872 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
12873 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12874 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12876 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12877 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12878 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12880 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12882 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12883 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12884 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12885 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12887 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12888 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12890 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12896 use crate::chain::Listen;
12897 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12898 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12899 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12900 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12901 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12902 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12903 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12904 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12905 use crate::util::test_utils;
12906 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12908 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12909 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12910 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12911 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
12913 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12915 use criterion::Criterion;
12917 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12918 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12919 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12920 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12921 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12922 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12923 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12925 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12926 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12928 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12929 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12931 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12933 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12936 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12937 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12940 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12941 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12942 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12944 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12945 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12947 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12948 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12949 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12950 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12951 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
12953 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12954 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12955 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12957 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12958 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12959 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12960 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12962 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12963 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12964 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12966 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12967 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12968 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12969 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12970 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12972 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12973 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12974 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12976 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12977 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12979 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12980 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12981 }, false).unwrap();
12982 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12983 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12984 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12987 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12988 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12989 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12991 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12992 } else { panic!(); }
12994 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12995 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12996 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12997 match events_b[0] {
12998 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12999 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13001 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13004 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13005 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13006 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13007 match events_a[0] {
13008 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13009 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13011 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13014 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
13016 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
13017 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
13018 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
13020 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13021 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13022 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13023 match msg_events[0] {
13024 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
13025 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
13026 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13030 match msg_events[1] {
13031 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13035 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13036 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13037 match events_a[0] {
13038 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13039 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13041 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13044 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13045 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13046 match events_b[0] {
13047 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13048 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13050 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13053 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
13054 macro_rules! send_payment {
13055 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
13056 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
13057 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
13058 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
13059 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
13060 payment_count += 1;
13061 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
13062 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
13064 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13065 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13066 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13067 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13068 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13069 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13070 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13071 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13072 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13073 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13074 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13076 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13077 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13078 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13079 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13081 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13082 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13083 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13084 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13085 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13087 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13090 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13091 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13092 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13093 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13095 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13099 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13100 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13101 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);