1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
48 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
50 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
70 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
71 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
72 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
73 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
74 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
75 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
76 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
77 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
78 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
81 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
82 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
83 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
84 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
85 crate::sign::KeysManager,
89 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
90 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
93 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
96 use crate::prelude::*;
98 use core::cell::RefCell;
100 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
101 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
102 use core::time::Duration;
103 use core::ops::Deref;
105 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
106 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
107 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
109 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
111 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
112 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
113 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
115 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
116 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
117 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
118 // before we forward it.
120 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
121 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
122 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
123 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
124 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
126 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
129 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
130 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
132 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
133 /// do with the HTLC.
134 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
135 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
137 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
138 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
139 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
140 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
141 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
142 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
144 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
146 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
147 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
149 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
150 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
151 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
152 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
153 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
155 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
156 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
157 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
158 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
159 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
161 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
162 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
163 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
164 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
166 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
167 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
169 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
170 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
171 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
172 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
173 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
174 requires_blinded_error: bool,
176 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
177 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
178 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
180 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
181 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
183 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
184 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
185 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
187 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
188 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
189 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
191 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
192 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
193 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
194 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
196 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
197 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
198 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
200 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
201 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
202 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
203 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
204 requires_blinded_error: bool,
208 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
209 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
210 pub struct BlindedForward {
211 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
212 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
213 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
214 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
215 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
216 /// the introduction node.
217 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
220 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
221 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
222 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
224 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
225 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
226 Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
232 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
234 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
235 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
236 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
237 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
238 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
239 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
241 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
242 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
243 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
244 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
245 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
247 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
249 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
250 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
251 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
253 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
254 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
255 /// it along another path).
257 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
258 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
259 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
260 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
261 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
262 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
263 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
264 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
265 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
267 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
270 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
272 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
274 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
277 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
278 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
279 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
280 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
283 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
284 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
285 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
286 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
287 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
290 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
291 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
292 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
294 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
295 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
296 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
299 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
300 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
302 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
303 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
304 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
307 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
308 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
309 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
312 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
317 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
321 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
322 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
323 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
324 pub enum BlindedFailure {
325 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
326 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
327 FromIntroductionNode,
328 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
329 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
333 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
334 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
335 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
336 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
337 short_channel_id: u64,
338 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
340 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
341 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
342 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
343 channel_id: ChannelId,
345 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
346 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
351 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
353 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
354 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
355 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
357 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
358 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
361 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
362 struct ClaimableHTLC {
363 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
365 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
367 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
368 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
369 sender_intended_value: u64,
370 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
372 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
373 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
374 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
375 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
377 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
378 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
381 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
382 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
383 events::ClaimedHTLC {
384 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
385 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
386 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
387 value_msat: val.value,
388 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
393 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
394 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
396 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
397 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
398 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
401 /// Number of bytes in the id.
402 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
405 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
406 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
411 impl Readable for PaymentId {
412 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
413 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
418 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
419 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
420 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
424 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
426 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
427 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
428 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
430 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
431 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
436 impl Readable for InterceptId {
437 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
438 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
443 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
444 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
445 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
446 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
447 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
450 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
452 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
453 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
454 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
456 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
457 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
461 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
462 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
463 (0, short_channel_id, required),
464 (2, htlc_id, required),
466 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
467 (0, session_priv, required),
472 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
473 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
474 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
475 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
476 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
479 session_priv: SecretKey,
480 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
481 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
482 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
483 payment_id: PaymentId,
486 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
487 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
488 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
490 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
492 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
494 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
497 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
498 payment_id.hash(hasher);
499 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
505 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
507 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
508 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
509 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
510 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
511 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
512 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
516 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
517 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
518 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
519 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
520 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
521 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
523 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
529 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
530 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
532 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
533 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
534 pub enum FailureCode {
535 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
536 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
537 TemporaryNodeFailure,
538 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
539 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
540 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
541 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
542 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
543 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
544 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
545 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
546 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
547 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
549 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
550 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
551 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
554 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
555 fn into(self) -> u16 {
557 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
558 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
559 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
560 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
565 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
566 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
567 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
568 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
569 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
571 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
572 err: msgs::LightningError,
573 closes_channel: bool,
574 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
576 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
578 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
580 err: LightningError {
582 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
583 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
589 closes_channel: false,
590 shutdown_finish: None,
594 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
595 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
598 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
599 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
600 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
601 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
602 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
603 // commitment upon reconnecting.
604 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
606 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
609 err: LightningError { err, action },
610 closes_channel: true,
611 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
615 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
618 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
620 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
621 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
625 log_level: Level::Warn,
628 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
630 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
632 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
634 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
635 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
642 closes_channel: false,
643 shutdown_finish: None,
647 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
652 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
653 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
654 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
655 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
656 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
658 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
659 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
660 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
661 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
662 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
663 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
664 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
666 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
670 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
671 struct ClaimingPayment {
673 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
674 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
675 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
676 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
678 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
679 (0, amount_msat, required),
680 (2, payment_purpose, required),
681 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
682 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
683 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
686 struct ClaimablePayment {
687 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
688 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
689 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
692 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
693 struct ClaimablePayments {
694 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
695 /// failed/claimed by the user.
697 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
698 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
700 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
701 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
702 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
704 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
705 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
706 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
707 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
710 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
711 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
712 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
713 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
715 enum BackgroundEvent {
716 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
717 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
718 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
719 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
721 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
722 /// are regenerated on startup.
723 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
724 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
725 /// channel to continue normal operation.
727 /// In general this should be used rather than
728 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
729 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
730 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
732 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
733 /// are regenerated on startup.
734 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
735 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
736 funding_txo: OutPoint,
737 channel_id: ChannelId,
738 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
740 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
741 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
743 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
744 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
745 channel_id: ChannelId,
750 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
751 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
752 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
753 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
754 /// event can be generated.
755 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
756 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
757 /// operation of another channel.
759 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
760 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
761 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
762 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
764 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
765 event: events::Event,
766 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
768 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
769 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
770 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
772 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
773 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
774 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
775 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
776 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
778 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
779 /// stored for later processing.
780 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
781 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
782 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
783 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
784 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
788 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
789 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
790 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
791 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
792 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
793 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
794 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
795 (4, blocking_action, required),
796 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
797 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
798 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
800 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
801 (0, event, upgradable_required),
802 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
803 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
804 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
805 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
806 // downgrades to prior versions.
807 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
811 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
812 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
813 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
814 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
815 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
816 channel_id: ChannelId,
819 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
820 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
821 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
822 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
823 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
824 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
825 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
829 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
830 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
831 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
832 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
833 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
834 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
836 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
837 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
838 channel_id: ChannelId,
839 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
844 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
845 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
846 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
847 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
848 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
853 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
854 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
858 /// State we hold per-peer.
859 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
860 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
862 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
863 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
864 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
866 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
867 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
868 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
869 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
870 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
871 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
872 latest_features: InitFeatures,
873 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
874 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
875 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
876 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
877 /// user but which have not yet completed.
879 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
880 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
881 /// for a missing channel.
882 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
883 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
884 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
886 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
887 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
888 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
889 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
891 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
892 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
893 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
894 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
895 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
896 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
897 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
898 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
899 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
900 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
901 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
902 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
903 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
904 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
905 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
909 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
910 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
911 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
912 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
913 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
914 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
917 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
919 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
920 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
922 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
924 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
927 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
928 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
931 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
932 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
933 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
936 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
937 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
938 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
939 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
943 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
944 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
945 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
946 /// The original OpenChannel message.
947 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
948 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
949 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
952 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
953 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
954 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
956 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
957 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
959 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
962 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
963 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
964 struct PendingInboundPayment {
965 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
966 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
967 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
968 /// this payment being removed.
970 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
971 user_payment_id: u64,
972 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
973 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
974 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
977 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
978 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
979 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
980 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
981 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
982 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
983 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
984 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
986 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
987 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
988 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
996 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
999 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1000 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1001 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1006 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1007 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1008 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1009 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1010 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1011 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1012 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1013 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1014 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1016 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1017 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1018 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1027 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1030 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1031 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1032 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1037 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1039 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1041 pub trait AChannelManager {
1042 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1043 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1044 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1045 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1046 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1047 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1048 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1049 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1050 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1051 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1052 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1053 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1054 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1055 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1056 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1057 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1058 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1059 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1060 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1061 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1062 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1063 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1064 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1065 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1066 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1067 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1068 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1069 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1070 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1071 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1072 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1073 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1074 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1075 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1076 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1077 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1080 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1081 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1083 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1084 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1085 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1086 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1087 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1088 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1092 type Watch = M::Target;
1094 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1096 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1098 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1100 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1101 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1103 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1105 type Router = R::Target;
1107 type Logger = L::Target;
1109 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1112 /// A lightning node's channel state machine and payment management logic, which facilitates
1113 /// sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through lightning channels.
1115 /// [`ChannelManager`] is parameterized by a number of components to achieve this.
1116 /// - [`chain::Watch`] (typically [`ChainMonitor`]) for on-chain monitoring and enforcement of each
1118 /// - [`BroadcasterInterface`] for broadcasting transactions related to opening, funding, and
1119 /// closing channels
1120 /// - [`EntropySource`] for providing random data needed for cryptographic operations
1121 /// - [`NodeSigner`] for cryptographic operations scoped to the node
1122 /// - [`SignerProvider`] for providing signers whose operations are scoped to individual channels
1123 /// - [`FeeEstimator`] to determine transaction fee rates needed to have a transaction mined in a
1125 /// - [`Router`] for finding payment paths when initiating and retrying payments
1126 /// - [`Logger`] for logging operational information of varying degrees
1128 /// Additionally, it implements the following traits:
1129 /// - [`ChannelMessageHandler`] to handle off-chain channel activity from peers
1130 /// - [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] to similarly send such messages to peers
1131 /// - [`OffersMessageHandler`] for BOLT 12 message handling and sending
1132 /// - [`EventsProvider`] to generate user-actionable [`Event`]s
1133 /// - [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for notification of on-chain activity
1135 /// Thus, [`ChannelManager`] is typically used to parameterize a [`MessageHandler`] and an
1136 /// [`OnionMessenger`]. The latter is required to support BOLT 12 functionality.
1138 /// # `ChannelManager` vs `ChannelMonitor`
1140 /// It's important to distinguish between the *off-chain* management and *on-chain* enforcement of
1141 /// lightning channels. [`ChannelManager`] exchanges messages with peers to manage the off-chain
1142 /// state of each channel. During this process, it generates a [`ChannelMonitor`] for each channel
1143 /// and a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] for each relevant change, notifying its parameterized
1144 /// [`chain::Watch`] of them.
1146 /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`], such as [`ChainMonitor`], is responsible for aggregating
1147 /// these [`ChannelMonitor`]s and applying any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to them. It then monitors
1148 /// for any pertinent on-chain activity, enforcing claims as needed.
1150 /// This division of off-chain management and on-chain enforcement allows for interesting node
1151 /// setups. For instance, on-chain enforcement could be moved to a separate host or have added
1152 /// redundancy, possibly as a watchtower. See [`chain::Watch`] for the relevant interface.
1156 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1157 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1158 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1159 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1161 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1162 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1163 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1164 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1165 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1166 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1167 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1168 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1169 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1171 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1172 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1173 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1175 /// # `ChannelUpdate` Messages
1177 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1178 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1179 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1180 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1181 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1183 /// # DoS Mitigation
1185 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1186 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1187 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1188 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1190 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1191 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1192 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1196 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1197 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1198 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1199 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1200 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1202 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1203 /// [`MessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::MessageHandler
1204 /// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::messenger::OnionMessenger
1205 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1206 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1207 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1208 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1209 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1210 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1211 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1212 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1215 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1216 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1217 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1218 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1219 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1223 // `pending_offers_messages`
1225 // `total_consistency_lock`
1227 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1229 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1231 // |__`per_peer_state`
1233 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1235 // |__`claimable_payments`
1237 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1241 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1243 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1245 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1249 // |__`pending_events`
1251 // |__`pending_background_events`
1253 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1255 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1256 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1257 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1258 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1259 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1260 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1264 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1265 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1266 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1272 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1274 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1276 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1277 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1279 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1280 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1281 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1282 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1284 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1285 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1287 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1288 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1289 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1290 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1291 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1292 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1293 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1294 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1296 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1298 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1299 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1301 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1303 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1304 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1305 /// and via the classic SCID.
1307 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1308 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1310 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1312 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1314 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1315 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1316 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1318 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1319 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1321 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1322 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1324 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1325 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1327 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1328 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1329 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1330 /// active channel list on load.
1332 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1333 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1335 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1337 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1338 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1339 /// the handling of the events.
1341 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1342 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1345 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1346 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1347 /// would break backwards compatability.
1348 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1349 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1350 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1352 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1354 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1356 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1358 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1360 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1361 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1362 /// confirmation depth.
1364 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1365 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1366 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1368 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1370 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1372 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1374 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1376 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1378 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1379 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1380 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1382 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1383 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1385 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1386 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1387 /// keeping additional state.
1388 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1390 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1391 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1392 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1393 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1395 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1396 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1398 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1399 /// are currently open with that peer.
1401 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1402 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1405 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1407 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1408 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1409 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1410 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1411 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1413 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1414 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1415 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1416 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1417 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1419 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1420 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1422 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1423 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1424 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1425 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1426 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1428 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1429 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1431 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1432 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1433 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1434 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1435 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1437 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1439 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1441 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1442 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1443 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1444 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1445 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1446 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1447 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1448 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1449 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1450 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1451 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1453 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1454 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1455 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1457 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1459 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1460 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1462 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1466 signer_provider: SP,
1471 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1473 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1474 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1475 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1476 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1477 pub struct ChainParameters {
1478 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1479 pub network: Network,
1481 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1483 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1484 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1487 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1491 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1492 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1495 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1496 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1497 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1498 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1499 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1500 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1502 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1503 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1504 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1505 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1506 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1507 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1509 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1510 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1513 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1514 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1515 /// events to handle.
1517 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1518 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1520 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1521 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1524 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1525 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1526 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1527 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1529 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1530 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1531 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1532 should_persist: move || {
1533 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1534 // processing and return that.
1535 let notify = persist_check();
1536 match (notify, force_notify) {
1537 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1538 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1539 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1540 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1541 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1544 _read_guard: read_guard,
1548 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1549 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1550 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1551 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1552 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1553 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1555 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1556 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1557 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1558 should_persist: persist_check,
1559 _read_guard: read_guard,
1564 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1565 fn drop(&mut self) {
1566 match (self.should_persist)() {
1567 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1568 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1569 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1571 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1572 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1573 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1578 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1579 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1581 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1583 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1584 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1585 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1586 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1587 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1589 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1590 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1592 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1594 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1595 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1596 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1597 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1598 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1599 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1600 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1601 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1602 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1603 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1604 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1605 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1606 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1608 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1609 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1611 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1612 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1613 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1614 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1616 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1617 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1618 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1619 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1620 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1621 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1623 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1625 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1626 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1628 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1630 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1631 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1633 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1634 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1635 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1637 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1638 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1639 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1641 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1642 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1643 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1644 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1646 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1647 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1648 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1650 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1651 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1652 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1654 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1655 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1656 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1657 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1658 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1659 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1660 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1661 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1662 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1663 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1664 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1667 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1668 /// to better separate parameters.
1669 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1670 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1671 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1672 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1673 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1674 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1675 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1676 pub features: InitFeatures,
1677 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1678 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1679 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1681 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1683 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1684 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1685 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1686 /// payments to us through this channel.
1687 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1688 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1689 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1690 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1691 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1692 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1693 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1696 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1697 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1698 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1699 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1700 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1701 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1702 /// lifetime of the channel.
1703 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1704 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1705 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1706 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1707 /// our counterparty already.
1708 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1709 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1711 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1712 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1713 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1714 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1716 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1717 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1719 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1720 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1722 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1723 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1724 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1725 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1726 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1727 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1728 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1729 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1730 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1733 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1735 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1736 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1737 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1738 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1739 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1740 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1741 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1743 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1744 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1746 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1747 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1748 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1749 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1750 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1751 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1752 /// this value on chain.
1754 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1756 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1758 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1759 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1760 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1761 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1762 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1763 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1764 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1766 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1767 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1768 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1769 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1770 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1771 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1773 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1774 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1775 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1776 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1777 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1779 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1780 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1781 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1782 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1784 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1785 pub balance_msat: u64,
1786 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1787 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1788 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1789 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1791 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1793 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1794 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1795 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1796 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1797 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1798 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1799 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1800 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1802 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1803 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1804 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1805 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1806 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1807 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1808 /// route which is valid.
1809 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1810 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1811 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1812 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1813 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1814 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1816 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1817 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1818 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1819 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1820 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1821 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1822 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1823 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1824 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1826 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1828 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1829 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1830 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1831 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1832 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1834 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1835 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1836 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1837 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1838 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1839 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1840 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1842 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1843 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1844 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1845 pub is_outbound: bool,
1846 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1847 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1848 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1849 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1850 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1852 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1853 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1854 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1855 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1856 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1857 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1858 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1860 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1861 pub is_usable: bool,
1862 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1863 pub is_public: bool,
1864 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1865 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1866 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1867 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1868 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1869 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1871 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1872 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1873 /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
1875 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1876 pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
1877 /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
1879 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1880 pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
1883 impl ChannelDetails {
1884 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1885 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1886 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1888 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1889 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1890 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1891 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1894 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1895 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1896 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1898 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1899 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1900 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1901 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1904 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1905 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1906 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1909 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1910 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1912 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1913 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1914 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1916 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1917 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1918 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1919 features: latest_features,
1920 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1921 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1922 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1923 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1924 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1925 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1926 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1927 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1928 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1929 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1931 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1932 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1933 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1934 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1935 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1936 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1937 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1938 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1939 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1940 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1941 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1942 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1943 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1944 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1945 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1946 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1947 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1948 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1949 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1950 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1951 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1952 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1953 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1954 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1955 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1956 config: Some(context.config()),
1957 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1958 pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
1959 pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
1964 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1965 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1966 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1967 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1968 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1969 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1970 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1971 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1972 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1974 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1976 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1977 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1979 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1980 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1981 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1982 /// to drop the channel.
1986 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1987 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1988 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1989 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1990 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1992 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1993 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1994 payment_id: PaymentId,
1996 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1998 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1999 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2000 payment_id: PaymentId,
2001 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
2003 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2004 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
2005 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
2008 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
2009 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
2010 /// payment is removed from tracking.
2012 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2013 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2014 payment_id: PaymentId,
2015 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
2016 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
2017 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
2019 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
2020 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
2021 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
2023 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2024 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2025 payment_id: PaymentId,
2026 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
2027 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2031 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2033 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2035 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2036 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2037 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2038 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2040 pub phantom_scid: u64,
2041 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2042 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2045 macro_rules! handle_error {
2046 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2047 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2048 // entering the macro.
2049 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2050 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2054 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2055 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2057 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2058 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2059 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2060 let logger = WithContext::from(
2061 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
2063 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2065 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2066 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2067 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2072 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2075 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2077 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2078 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2079 action: err.action.clone()
2083 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
2084 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2085 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2086 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2087 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2091 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2098 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2099 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2100 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2101 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2103 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2104 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2105 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2107 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2108 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2109 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2110 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2111 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2113 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2114 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2116 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2120 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2121 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2122 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2124 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2125 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2127 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2128 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2130 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2131 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2132 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2133 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2134 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2135 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2137 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2142 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2143 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2145 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2146 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2148 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2149 match $channel_phase {
2150 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2151 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2153 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2154 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2156 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2157 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2159 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2160 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2161 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2163 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2164 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2165 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2171 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2172 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2176 let key = *$entry.key();
2177 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2179 $entry.remove_entry();
2187 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2188 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2192 let key = *$entry.key();
2193 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2195 $entry.remove_entry();
2203 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2204 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2206 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2207 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2213 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2214 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2215 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2216 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2217 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2219 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2220 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2221 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2222 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2223 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2224 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2225 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2226 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2227 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2228 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2233 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2234 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2235 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2236 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2237 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2238 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2239 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2240 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2241 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2242 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2244 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2249 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2250 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2251 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2252 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2253 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2254 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2255 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2256 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2257 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2259 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2264 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2265 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2266 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2267 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2268 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2269 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2270 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2271 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2272 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2273 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2274 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2275 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2277 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2278 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2279 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2285 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2286 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2288 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2289 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2290 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2291 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2292 updates.announcement_sigs);
2293 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2294 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2297 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2298 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2299 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2300 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2302 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2303 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2304 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2305 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2306 let mut batch_completed = false;
2307 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2308 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2309 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2310 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2312 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2313 channel_state.2 = true;
2315 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2317 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2319 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2322 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2323 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2324 if batch_completed {
2325 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2326 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2327 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2328 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2329 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2330 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2331 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2332 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2333 chan.set_batch_ready();
2334 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2335 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2339 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2340 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2341 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2346 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2348 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2349 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2351 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2352 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2353 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2354 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2359 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2360 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2361 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2362 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2364 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2365 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2366 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2367 panic!("{}", err_str);
2369 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2370 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2371 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2374 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2380 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2381 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2382 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2384 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2385 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2386 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2387 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2388 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2389 // filter for uniqueness here.
2390 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2391 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2392 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2393 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2395 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2396 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2398 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2399 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2400 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2406 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2407 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2408 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2409 while !processed_all_events {
2410 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2417 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2418 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2419 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2421 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2422 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2423 result = $self.process_background_events();
2425 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2426 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2427 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2428 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2432 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2433 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2434 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2435 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2438 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2440 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2441 $event_to_handle = event;
2443 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2444 post_event_actions.push(action);
2449 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2450 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2451 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2452 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2453 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2454 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2457 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2458 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2459 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2460 processed_all_events = false;
2464 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2465 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2466 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2468 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2469 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2470 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2476 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2478 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2479 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2480 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2481 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2482 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2483 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2487 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2489 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2491 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2492 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2494 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2496 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2497 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2498 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2501 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2502 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2503 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2505 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2506 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2507 current_timestamp: u32,
2509 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2510 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2511 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2512 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2514 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2515 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2516 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2521 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2523 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
2524 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2525 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2526 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2527 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
2528 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2529 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2530 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2532 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2535 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2536 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2538 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2540 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2542 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2544 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2545 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2546 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2547 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2548 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2549 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2550 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2551 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2553 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2563 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2564 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2565 &self.default_configuration
2568 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2569 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2570 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2573 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2574 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2576 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2578 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2582 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2587 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2589 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2590 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2591 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2592 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2593 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2595 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2596 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2598 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2599 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2600 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2602 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2603 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2604 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2606 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2607 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2609 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2610 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2611 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2612 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2613 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2614 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2616 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2617 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2618 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2619 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2620 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2621 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2624 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2625 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2626 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2628 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2630 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2631 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2633 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2635 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2636 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2637 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2642 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2643 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2644 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2645 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2646 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2647 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2651 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2656 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2658 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2659 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2660 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2662 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2664 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2667 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2670 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2671 node_id: their_network_key,
2674 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2677 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2678 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2679 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2680 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2681 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2682 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2683 // the same channel.
2684 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2686 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2687 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2688 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2689 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2690 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2691 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2692 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2693 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2694 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2698 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2699 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2700 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2708 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2709 /// more information.
2710 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2711 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2712 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2713 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2714 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2715 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2716 // the same channel.
2717 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2719 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2720 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2721 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2722 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2723 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2724 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2725 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2726 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2734 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2735 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2737 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2738 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2740 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2741 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2742 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2743 // really wanted anyway.
2744 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2747 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2748 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2749 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2750 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2752 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2753 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2754 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2755 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2756 let context_to_details = |context| {
2757 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2759 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2761 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2762 .map(context_to_details)
2768 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2769 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2771 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2772 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2773 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2775 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2776 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2777 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2778 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2779 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2780 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2782 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2783 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2784 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2786 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2787 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2788 payment_id: *payment_id,
2789 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2790 total_msat: *total_msat,
2793 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2794 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2796 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2797 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2799 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2804 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2805 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2807 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2808 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2811 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2813 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2814 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2816 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2817 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2819 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2820 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2821 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2822 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2823 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2824 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2825 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2826 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2828 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2829 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2830 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2831 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2832 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2836 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2837 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2839 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2840 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2841 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2842 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2845 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2846 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
2849 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2850 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2852 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2853 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2860 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2861 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2862 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2863 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2866 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2867 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2873 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2874 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2875 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2877 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2878 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2880 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2881 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2882 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2883 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2885 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2887 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2888 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2889 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2892 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2893 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2894 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2895 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2896 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2897 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2900 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2901 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2902 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2904 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2905 /// the channel being closed or not:
2906 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2907 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2908 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2909 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2910 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2911 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2912 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2914 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2915 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2916 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2917 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2919 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2921 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2922 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2923 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2926 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2927 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2928 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2929 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2930 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2933 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2934 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2935 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2936 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2937 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2940 let logger = WithContext::from(
2941 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2944 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
2945 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2946 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2947 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2948 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2949 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2950 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2952 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2953 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2954 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2955 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2956 // ignore the result here.
2957 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2959 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2960 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2961 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2962 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2963 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2964 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2965 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2966 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2967 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2968 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2969 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2970 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
2973 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2976 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2977 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2982 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2983 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2984 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
2985 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
2986 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
2987 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
2988 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
2989 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
2992 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
2993 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2994 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
2998 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2999 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3003 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
3004 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
3005 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
3006 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
3007 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3008 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3009 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
3010 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
3011 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3012 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
3013 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
3015 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
3017 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
3018 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3019 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
3020 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3021 mem::drop(peer_state);
3022 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3024 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
3025 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
3026 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
3028 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3029 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3030 // Unfunded channel has no update
3031 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3033 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
3034 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
3035 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3036 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3037 // Unfunded channel has no update
3038 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3041 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3042 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3043 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3044 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3046 (None, *peer_node_id)
3048 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3051 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3052 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
3053 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
3054 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3055 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3056 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
3057 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
3058 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3059 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3065 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3068 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3069 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3070 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3071 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3072 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3073 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3074 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3075 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3076 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3077 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3078 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3079 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3090 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3091 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3092 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3094 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3095 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3096 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3099 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3100 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3101 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3103 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3104 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3105 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3106 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3107 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3110 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3111 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3112 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3113 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3114 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3118 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3119 /// local transaction(s).
3120 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3121 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3122 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3126 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3127 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3129 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3131 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3132 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3135 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3136 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3137 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
3138 intro_node_blinding_point: Some(_), ..
3144 macro_rules! return_err {
3145 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3148 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3149 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3151 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3152 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3153 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3154 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3155 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3156 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3157 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3161 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3162 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3163 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3164 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3165 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3166 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3167 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3168 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3174 let NextPacketDetails {
3175 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3176 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3177 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3178 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3179 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3182 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3183 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3184 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3185 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3186 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3187 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3188 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3189 // phantom or an intercept.
3190 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3191 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3192 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3196 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3199 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3201 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3202 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3203 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3204 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3205 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3207 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3208 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3209 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3210 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3213 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3214 // have no consistency guarantees.
3215 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3219 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3220 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3221 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3222 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3223 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3225 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3226 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3227 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3228 // we don't have the channel here.
3229 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3231 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3233 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3234 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3235 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3236 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3237 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3238 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3239 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3240 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3241 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3242 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3243 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3245 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3248 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3249 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3251 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3252 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3259 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3261 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3262 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3264 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3265 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3266 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3267 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3268 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3270 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3271 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3277 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3278 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3279 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3280 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3282 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3283 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3285 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3286 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3287 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3289 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3290 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3291 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3292 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3293 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3294 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3295 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3299 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3301 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3304 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3305 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3306 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3307 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3308 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3309 macro_rules! return_err {
3310 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3312 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3313 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3314 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3315 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3316 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3317 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3318 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3319 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3320 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3324 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3325 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3326 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3327 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3328 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3334 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3336 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3337 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3338 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3339 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3342 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3343 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3344 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3345 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3346 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3348 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3351 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3352 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3353 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3354 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3355 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3361 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3362 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3363 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3365 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3366 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3367 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3369 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3370 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3371 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3372 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3373 return Err(LightningError {
3374 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3375 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3378 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3379 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3381 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3382 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3383 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3386 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3387 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3388 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3389 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3391 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3392 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3393 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3395 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3396 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3397 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3398 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3399 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3400 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3401 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3405 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3408 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3409 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3410 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3411 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3413 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3414 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3415 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3416 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3417 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3420 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3421 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3423 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3424 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3425 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3426 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3427 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3428 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3429 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3430 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3432 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3433 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3434 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3436 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3438 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3445 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3446 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3447 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3448 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3453 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3454 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3455 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3458 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3459 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3460 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3461 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3463 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3464 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3465 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3467 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3468 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3472 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3473 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3475 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3476 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3477 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3479 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3482 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3484 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3485 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3487 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3488 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3489 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3490 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3491 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3492 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3493 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3494 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3495 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3496 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3498 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3499 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3500 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3501 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3503 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3504 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3506 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3507 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3508 Some(monitor_update) => {
3509 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3511 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3512 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3513 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3514 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3515 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3516 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3517 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3525 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3528 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3529 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3530 // `channel_by_id` map.
3531 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3532 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3536 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3537 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3539 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3544 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3546 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3547 /// fields for more info.
3549 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3550 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3552 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3554 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3555 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3556 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3557 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3558 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3560 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3561 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3562 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3563 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3564 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3566 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3567 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3568 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3569 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3571 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3573 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3574 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3575 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3577 /// In general, a path may raise:
3578 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3579 /// node public key) is specified.
3580 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3581 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3582 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3583 /// relevant updates.
3585 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3586 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3587 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3589 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3590 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3591 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3592 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3593 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3594 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3595 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3596 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3597 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3598 self.pending_outbound_payments
3599 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3600 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3601 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3604 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3605 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3606 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3607 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3608 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3609 self.pending_outbound_payments
3610 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3611 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3612 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3613 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3617 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3618 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3619 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3620 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3621 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3622 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3626 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3627 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3628 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3632 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3633 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3636 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3637 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3638 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3639 self.pending_outbound_payments
3640 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3641 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3642 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3643 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3644 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3648 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3649 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3650 /// retries are exhausted.
3652 /// # Event Generation
3654 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3655 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3657 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3658 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3659 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3661 /// # Requested Invoices
3663 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3664 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3665 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3666 /// once the invoice has been received.
3668 /// # Restart Behavior
3670 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3671 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3672 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3674 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3675 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3676 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3677 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3680 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3681 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3682 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3683 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3684 /// never reach the recipient.
3686 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3687 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3689 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3690 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3692 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3693 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3694 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3695 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3696 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3697 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3698 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3701 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3702 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3704 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3707 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3708 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3709 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3710 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3711 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3712 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3713 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3714 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3717 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3718 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3719 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3720 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3721 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3722 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3723 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3724 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3725 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3728 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3731 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3732 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3735 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3736 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3738 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3739 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3740 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3741 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3742 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3743 let payment_params =
3744 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3746 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3748 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3751 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3752 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3754 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3755 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3756 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3757 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3759 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3760 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3761 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3762 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3763 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3764 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3765 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3766 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3767 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3768 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3770 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3771 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3772 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3773 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3777 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3779 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3780 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3783 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3785 let mut res = Vec::new();
3787 for mut path in route.paths {
3788 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3789 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3790 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3791 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3792 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3795 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3798 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3799 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3801 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3803 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3804 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3809 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3812 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3817 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3818 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3819 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3821 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3822 let used_liquidity =
3823 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3825 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3826 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3828 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3831 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3836 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3837 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3838 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3845 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3846 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3847 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3848 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3849 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3850 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3851 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3852 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3853 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3855 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3856 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3858 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3859 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3860 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3862 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3863 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3864 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3865 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3866 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
3867 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
3868 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
3869 } else { unreachable!(); });
3871 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3872 Err((chan, err)) => {
3873 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3874 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3875 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3876 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3877 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3883 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3884 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3886 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3887 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3890 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3891 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3892 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3896 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3897 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3898 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3902 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3903 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3904 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3906 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3907 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3908 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
3909 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
3910 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
3912 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
3913 funding_txo, o.get()
3915 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
3916 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3917 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3918 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
3919 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
3920 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
3923 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3930 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3931 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3932 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3936 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3938 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3939 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3941 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3942 /// across the p2p network.
3944 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3945 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3947 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3948 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3949 /// keys per-channel).
3951 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3952 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3953 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3955 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3956 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3957 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3959 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3960 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3961 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3962 /// for more details.
3964 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3965 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3966 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3967 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3970 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3972 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3973 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3975 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3976 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3977 /// signature for each channel.
3979 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3980 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3981 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3982 let mut result = Ok(());
3984 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3985 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3986 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3987 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3988 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3993 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3994 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3995 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3999 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4000 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
4001 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
4002 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
4003 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
4004 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
4005 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
4006 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
4008 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4009 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
4014 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
4015 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
4016 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
4017 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
4021 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4022 match states.entry(txid) {
4023 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4024 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4025 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4029 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4032 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4033 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4034 temporary_channel_id,
4035 counterparty_node_id,
4036 funding_transaction.clone(),
4039 let mut output_index = None;
4040 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
4041 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4042 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4043 if output_index.is_some() {
4044 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4045 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
4048 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4051 if output_index.is_none() {
4052 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4053 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
4056 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4057 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4058 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4059 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4060 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4061 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4067 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4068 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4069 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4070 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4071 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4072 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4073 .into_iter().flatten()
4074 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4076 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4077 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4079 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4081 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4082 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4083 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4084 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4085 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4087 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4088 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4089 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4093 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4094 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4095 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4101 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4103 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4104 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4105 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4106 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4108 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4109 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4111 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4112 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4114 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4116 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4117 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4118 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4119 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4120 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4121 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4122 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4123 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4124 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4125 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4126 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4127 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4128 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4132 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4133 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4134 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4135 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4136 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4137 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4138 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4139 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4140 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4141 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4145 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4146 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4147 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4148 config.apply(config_update);
4149 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4152 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4153 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4154 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4155 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4156 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4157 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4164 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4165 debug_assert!(false);
4166 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4168 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4169 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4176 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4178 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4179 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4180 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4181 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4183 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4184 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4186 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4187 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4189 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4191 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4192 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4193 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4194 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4195 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4196 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4197 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4198 pub fn update_channel_config(
4199 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4200 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4201 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4204 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4205 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4207 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4208 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4210 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4211 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4212 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4213 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4214 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4216 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4217 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4218 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4221 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4224 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4225 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4226 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4227 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4228 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4229 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4230 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4232 let next_hop_scid = {
4233 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4234 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4235 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4236 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4237 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4238 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4239 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4240 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4241 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4242 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4245 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4247 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4248 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4249 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4252 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4253 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4254 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4255 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4256 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4263 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4264 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4265 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4268 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4269 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4270 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4271 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4274 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4276 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4277 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4278 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4279 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4280 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4283 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4284 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4285 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4286 payment.prev_channel_id,
4287 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4288 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4290 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4294 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4295 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4297 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4300 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4301 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4302 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4304 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4305 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4306 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4309 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4310 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4311 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4312 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4313 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4314 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4315 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4316 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4317 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4318 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4321 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4322 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4323 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4324 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4329 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4331 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4332 /// Will likely generate further events.
4333 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4334 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4336 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4337 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4338 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4340 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4341 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4343 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4344 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4345 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4346 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4348 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4349 match forward_info {
4350 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4351 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4352 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4353 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4354 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4357 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4358 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4359 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
4360 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4362 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4363 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4364 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4365 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4366 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4367 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4368 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4369 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4370 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4373 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4374 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4376 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4379 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4380 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4386 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4387 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4389 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4393 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4394 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4396 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4400 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4401 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4402 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4403 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4404 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4405 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4406 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4409 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4410 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4411 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4412 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4413 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4415 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4417 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4418 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4422 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4423 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4424 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4425 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4426 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4427 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4429 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4430 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4436 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4439 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4442 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4443 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4444 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4445 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4446 // problem, not ours.
4452 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4453 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4454 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4456 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4460 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4461 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4462 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4463 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4464 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4467 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4468 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4469 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4470 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4471 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4472 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4473 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4474 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4475 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4476 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4477 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4478 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4479 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4482 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4483 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4484 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4485 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4486 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4487 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4488 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4489 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4490 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4491 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4492 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4494 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4495 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4496 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4497 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4498 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4499 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4502 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4503 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4504 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4507 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4508 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4510 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4512 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4513 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4514 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4515 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4521 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4522 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4524 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4525 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4526 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4528 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4529 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4530 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4531 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4533 Some((res, htlc_id))
4536 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4537 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4538 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4539 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4541 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4543 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4544 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4545 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4551 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4555 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4556 match forward_info {
4557 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4558 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4559 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4560 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4561 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4564 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4565 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4566 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4567 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4568 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4570 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4571 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4572 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4573 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4574 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4576 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
4577 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
4578 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4580 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4581 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4585 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4586 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4589 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4592 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4593 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4594 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4595 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4596 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4597 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4598 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4599 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4600 phantom_shared_secret,
4603 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4604 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4605 // if routing nodes overpay
4606 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4607 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4609 total_value_received: None,
4610 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4613 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4616 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4618 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4619 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4620 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4621 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4622 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4623 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
4625 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4626 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4627 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4628 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4629 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4630 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4631 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4632 phantom_shared_secret,
4635 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4636 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4638 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4641 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4642 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4643 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4644 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4645 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4648 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4649 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4650 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4651 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4652 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4653 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4655 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4656 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4657 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4659 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4660 .entry(payment_hash)
4661 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4662 .or_insert_with(|| {
4663 committed_to_claimable = true;
4665 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4668 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4669 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4670 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4671 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4673 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4674 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4675 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4677 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4678 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4679 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4682 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4684 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4685 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4686 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4687 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4688 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4689 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4690 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4691 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4692 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4693 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4695 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4697 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4698 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4699 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4700 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4701 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4702 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4704 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4705 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4706 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4707 committed_to_claimable = true;
4709 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4710 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4711 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4712 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4713 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4714 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4715 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4716 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4717 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4721 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4722 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4723 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4724 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4725 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4727 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4729 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4730 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4732 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4733 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4734 committed_to_claimable = true;
4737 payment_claimable_generated
4741 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4742 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4743 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4744 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4745 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4746 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4747 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4748 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4749 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4750 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4751 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4752 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4753 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4754 Ok(result) => result,
4756 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4757 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4760 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4761 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4762 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4763 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4764 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4765 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4768 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4769 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4770 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4772 check_total_value!(purpose);
4774 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4775 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4776 check_total_value!(purpose);
4780 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4781 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4782 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4783 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4785 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4786 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4787 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4788 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4789 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4790 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4791 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4792 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4794 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4795 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4796 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4798 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4799 if payment_claimable_generated {
4800 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4806 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4807 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4815 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4816 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4817 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4818 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4820 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4821 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4823 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4825 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4826 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4827 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4829 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4831 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4832 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4833 events.append(&mut new_events);
4836 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4838 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4839 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4840 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4842 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4844 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4845 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4846 if background_events.is_empty() {
4847 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4850 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4852 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
4853 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4854 // monitor updating completing.
4855 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4857 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
4858 let mut updated_chan = false;
4860 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4861 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4862 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4863 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4864 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4865 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4866 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4867 updated_chan = true;
4868 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4869 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4871 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4874 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4879 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4880 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4883 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4884 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4885 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4886 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4887 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4888 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4889 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4891 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4892 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4893 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4894 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4895 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4901 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4904 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4905 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4906 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4907 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4908 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4911 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4912 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4914 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4916 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4917 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4918 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4920 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4921 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4922 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4923 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4925 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4926 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4928 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4929 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4933 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4934 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4935 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4936 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4937 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4938 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4939 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4941 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4942 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4944 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4945 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4946 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4947 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4948 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4949 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4951 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4956 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4957 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4965 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4967 /// This currently includes:
4968 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4969 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4970 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4972 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4973 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4974 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4975 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4976 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4977 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4978 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4979 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4981 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4982 /// estimate fetches.
4984 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4985 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4986 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4987 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4988 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4990 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4991 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4993 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4994 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4995 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4996 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4998 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4999 chan_id: &ChannelId,
5000 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
5001 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
5002 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5003 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
5005 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5006 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
5007 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
5009 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
5010 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
5011 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
5012 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5013 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5014 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5015 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5016 channel_id: *chan_id,
5017 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5028 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5029 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5030 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5031 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5032 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5033 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5034 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5036 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5037 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5042 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5043 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5045 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5046 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5047 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5048 if needs_close { return false; }
5051 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5052 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5053 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5054 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5055 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5056 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5057 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5058 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5060 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5061 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5062 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5063 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5067 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5069 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5072 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5074 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5075 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5076 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5077 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5081 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5083 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5089 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5091 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5092 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5093 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5094 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5095 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5096 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5097 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5098 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5099 channel_id: *chan_id,
5100 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5108 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5109 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5110 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5112 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5113 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5114 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5116 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5117 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5118 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5119 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5121 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5122 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5123 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5124 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5129 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5130 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5131 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5132 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5133 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5134 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5135 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5136 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5137 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5143 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5145 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5146 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5151 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5152 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5153 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5154 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5155 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5156 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5157 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5158 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5159 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5160 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5161 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5162 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5163 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5164 // have no channels to the peer.
5165 let remove_entry = {
5166 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5167 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5170 entry.remove_entry();
5173 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5178 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5179 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5180 // This should be unreachable
5181 debug_assert!(false);
5184 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5185 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5186 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5187 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5188 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5189 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5190 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5193 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5194 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5195 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5197 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5198 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5205 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5206 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5207 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5208 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5209 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5212 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5213 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5216 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5217 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5220 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5221 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5222 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5223 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5224 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5225 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5226 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5229 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5230 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5233 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5234 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5235 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5236 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5237 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5244 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5245 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5246 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5248 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5249 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5250 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5251 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5253 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5254 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5255 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5256 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5257 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5258 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5261 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5262 /// reason for the failure.
5264 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5265 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5266 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5268 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5269 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5270 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5271 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5272 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5273 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5274 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5279 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5280 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5281 match failure_code {
5282 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5283 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5284 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5285 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5286 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5287 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5289 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5290 let fail_data = match data {
5291 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5294 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5299 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5300 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5302 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5304 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5305 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5306 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5307 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5308 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5309 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5310 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5312 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5314 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5315 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5317 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5322 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5323 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5324 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5325 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5326 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5327 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5328 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5329 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5330 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5331 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5333 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5334 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5335 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5336 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5338 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5339 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5340 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5341 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5342 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5346 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5347 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5348 // be surfaced to the user.
5349 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5350 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5351 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5353 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5354 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5355 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5356 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5357 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5358 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5359 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5360 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5361 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5363 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5364 debug_assert!(false);
5365 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5368 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5370 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5373 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5374 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5375 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5376 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5380 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5381 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5382 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5383 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5384 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5385 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5386 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5387 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5388 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5389 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5392 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5393 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5394 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5397 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5398 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5399 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5401 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5402 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5403 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5404 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5405 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5407 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5408 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5409 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
5412 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
5413 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5414 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5416 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5417 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5418 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5419 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5420 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5422 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5424 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5425 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5427 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5428 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5432 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5433 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5435 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5439 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5440 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5441 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5442 push_forward_ev = true;
5444 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5445 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5446 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5448 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5449 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5452 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5453 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5454 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5455 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5456 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
5457 failed_next_destination: destination,
5463 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5464 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5466 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5467 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5468 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5469 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5471 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5472 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5473 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5474 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5476 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5477 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5478 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5480 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5481 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5482 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5483 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5484 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5485 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5486 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5487 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5488 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5491 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5492 /// even type numbers.
5496 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5497 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5499 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5500 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5501 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5504 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5505 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5507 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5510 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5511 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5512 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5513 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5514 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5515 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5516 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5517 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5522 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5523 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5524 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5525 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5526 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5528 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5529 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5530 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5534 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5535 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5536 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5537 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5538 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5539 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5540 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5541 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5542 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5543 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5544 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5553 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5555 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5556 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5557 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5558 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5559 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5560 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5561 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5562 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5563 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5564 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5565 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5566 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5567 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5568 debug_assert!(false);
5572 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5574 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5575 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5576 debug_assert!(false);
5580 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5581 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5583 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5584 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5585 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5586 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5589 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5590 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5591 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5592 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5596 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5597 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
5598 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5599 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5600 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5601 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5602 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5605 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5606 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5607 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5608 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5609 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5610 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5615 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5616 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5617 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5618 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5619 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5620 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5621 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5623 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5626 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5627 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5628 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5629 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5633 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5634 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5635 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5636 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5638 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5639 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5640 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5641 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5643 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5644 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5645 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5646 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5649 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5650 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
5651 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5652 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5656 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5657 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5658 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5661 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5662 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5663 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5664 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5665 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5666 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5667 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5668 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5671 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5672 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5673 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5675 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5678 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5679 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5681 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5682 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5683 // monitor update as a background event.
5684 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5685 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5686 counterparty_node_id,
5687 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5688 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
5689 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5693 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5694 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5699 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5701 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5703 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
5704 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5705 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5706 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5707 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
5709 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
5711 debug_assert!(false,
5712 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5715 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5716 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5717 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5718 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5719 .get_mut(&channel_id)
5721 let mut found_blocker = false;
5722 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5723 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5724 // which case we need to only remove the one
5725 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5726 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5727 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5728 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5730 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5733 debug_assert!(false);
5742 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5743 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5744 counterparty_node_id: None,
5745 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5748 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
5752 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5753 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5754 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5755 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5756 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5757 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5758 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5759 // again on restart.
5760 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
5761 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5762 payment_preimage, update_res);
5765 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5766 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5768 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5769 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5770 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5771 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5772 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5773 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5774 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5775 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5776 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5777 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
5780 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5781 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5782 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5783 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5784 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5785 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5789 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5790 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5793 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5794 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5795 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
5796 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
5799 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5800 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5801 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5802 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5803 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5805 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5806 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
5807 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5809 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5810 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5813 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5814 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
5815 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
5816 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5817 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5818 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5819 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5820 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5821 let chan_to_release =
5822 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5823 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
5825 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5826 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5827 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5828 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5833 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5834 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5835 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5836 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5837 // in the background.
5838 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5839 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5840 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5841 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5843 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5844 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5845 funding_txo, update, ..
5847 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5848 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5849 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5850 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5852 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5858 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5859 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5860 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
5862 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5863 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5865 monitor_update.updates[0],
5866 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5871 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5872 // immediately once we get going.
5873 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5876 *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
5878 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5881 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5882 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5883 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5884 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5885 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5886 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
5887 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
5891 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5892 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5893 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5896 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
5897 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
5898 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5899 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5900 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5901 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
5902 prev_user_channel_id,
5903 next_user_channel_id,
5904 total_fee_earned_msat,
5906 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5907 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5909 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5913 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5914 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5915 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5921 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5922 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5923 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5926 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5927 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5928 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5929 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5931 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5933 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5934 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5935 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5937 payment_purpose: purpose,
5940 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5942 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5946 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5948 sender_intended_total_msat,
5952 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5953 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5955 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5956 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5957 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
5960 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5961 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
5963 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5964 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5965 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5966 downstream_channel_id,
5967 Some(blocking_action),
5974 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5975 /// update completion.
5976 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5977 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5978 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5979 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5980 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5981 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5982 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5983 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5984 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5985 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5986 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5987 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5988 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5989 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5991 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5993 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5994 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5995 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5996 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5999 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
6000 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
6002 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
6003 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6004 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6009 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6010 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6011 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6012 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6017 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6018 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6019 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6020 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6021 msg: revoke_and_ack,
6026 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6030 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6036 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6037 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6038 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6042 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6043 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6044 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6050 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6051 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6053 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6054 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6056 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6057 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6058 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6059 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6060 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6065 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6066 let mut peer_state_lock;
6067 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6068 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6069 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6070 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6072 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6075 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6076 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6077 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6078 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6079 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6082 let remaining_in_flight =
6083 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6084 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6087 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6088 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6089 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6090 remaining_in_flight);
6091 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6094 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6097 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6099 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6100 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6103 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6104 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6105 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6107 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6108 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6109 /// used to accept such channels.
6111 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6112 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6113 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6114 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6117 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6118 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6120 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6121 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6122 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6124 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6125 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6127 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6128 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6130 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6131 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6133 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6134 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6135 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6136 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6139 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6141 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6142 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6144 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6145 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6146 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6147 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6149 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6150 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6152 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6154 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6155 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6156 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6158 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6159 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6160 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6162 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6163 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6164 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6165 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6166 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6167 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6168 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6171 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6172 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6174 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6180 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6181 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6182 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6183 Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6185 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6189 Ok(mut channel) => {
6191 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6192 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6193 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6194 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6195 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6196 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6197 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6200 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6201 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6202 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6204 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6206 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6207 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6208 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6209 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6210 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6211 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6212 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6213 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6216 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6217 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6218 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6220 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6224 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6225 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6226 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6228 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6229 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6230 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6233 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6240 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6241 /// or 0-conf channels.
6243 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6244 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6245 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6246 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6247 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6248 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6250 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6251 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6252 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6253 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6254 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6255 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6256 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6260 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6263 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6264 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6266 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6267 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6269 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6270 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6271 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6272 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6273 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6275 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6278 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6279 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6280 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6283 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6284 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6285 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
6286 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
6287 // included in the unfunded count.
6288 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6289 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
6290 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6293 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6294 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6297 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6298 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6299 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6300 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6305 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6308 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6309 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6310 // likely to be lost on restart!
6311 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6312 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
6313 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6316 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6317 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
6318 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6321 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6322 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6323 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6324 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6325 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6327 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6328 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6330 debug_assert!(false);
6331 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6332 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6333 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6335 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6336 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6338 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6339 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6340 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6341 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6342 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6343 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6345 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6346 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6347 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6350 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6351 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6352 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6353 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6354 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6357 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
6358 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6360 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6361 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
6362 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6365 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6366 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6367 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6368 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6370 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6372 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6373 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6374 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6375 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6376 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
6377 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6380 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6381 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6382 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6387 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6388 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6389 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6390 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6391 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6392 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6393 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6396 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6401 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6402 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6403 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6404 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
6405 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6407 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6408 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6409 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
6410 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6413 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6414 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6416 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6417 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6418 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6420 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6424 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6425 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6426 // likely to be lost on restart!
6427 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6428 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6429 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6431 debug_assert!(false);
6432 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6434 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6435 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6436 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
6437 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6438 match phase.get_mut() {
6439 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6440 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6441 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6444 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6448 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
6451 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6452 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6453 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
6454 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6455 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6457 user_channel_id: user_id,
6462 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6463 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6465 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6466 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6468 debug_assert!(false);
6469 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6472 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6473 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6474 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6475 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6476 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6477 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6478 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6480 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6481 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6482 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6483 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6484 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6485 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6486 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6487 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6488 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6492 Some(mut phase) => {
6493 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6494 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6495 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6497 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6500 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6502 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6503 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6504 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6505 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6506 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6507 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6509 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6510 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6511 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6514 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6515 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6516 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6518 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6519 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6520 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6521 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6522 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6524 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6525 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6526 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6527 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6528 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6530 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6531 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6532 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6533 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6534 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6535 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6536 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6541 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6542 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6543 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6545 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6549 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6550 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6551 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6559 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6560 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6561 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6562 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6564 debug_assert!(false);
6565 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6568 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6569 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6570 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6571 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6572 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6573 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6574 let logger = WithContext::from(
6576 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6577 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6580 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6582 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
6583 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6584 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6585 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6586 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6587 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6588 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6589 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6590 } else { unreachable!(); }
6593 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6594 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
6595 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
6596 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
6597 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
6598 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
6599 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6603 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6604 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6605 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6606 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6607 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6608 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6612 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6615 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6619 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6620 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6621 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6622 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6623 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6625 debug_assert!(false);
6626 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6628 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6629 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6630 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6631 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6632 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6633 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6634 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6635 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6636 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6637 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6638 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6639 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6640 msg: announcement_sigs,
6642 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6643 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6644 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6645 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6646 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6647 // announcement_signatures.
6648 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6649 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6650 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6651 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6658 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6659 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6664 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6665 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6668 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6669 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6674 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6675 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6676 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6678 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6679 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6681 debug_assert!(false);
6682 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6684 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6685 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6686 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6687 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6689 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6690 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6691 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6692 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6694 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6697 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6698 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6699 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6700 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6702 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6703 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6704 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6705 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6706 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6707 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6711 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6712 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6713 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6714 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6717 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6718 let context = phase.context_mut();
6719 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6720 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6721 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6722 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6724 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
6725 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6726 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6727 let context = phase.context_mut();
6728 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6729 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6730 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6734 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6737 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6738 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6739 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6740 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6742 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6743 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6749 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6750 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6751 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6753 debug_assert!(false);
6754 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6756 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6757 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6758 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6759 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6760 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6761 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6762 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6763 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6764 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6765 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6766 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6771 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6772 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6773 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6774 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6775 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6776 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6777 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6779 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6780 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6783 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6786 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6787 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6788 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6789 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6791 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6792 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6793 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6794 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6795 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6800 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6801 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6802 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6807 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6808 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6809 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6810 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6812 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6813 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6814 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6815 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6817 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6818 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6820 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6821 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6822 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6824 debug_assert!(false);
6825 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6827 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6828 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6829 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6830 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6831 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6832 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6833 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6834 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6835 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6836 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6838 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6840 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6841 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6842 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6843 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6844 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6845 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6846 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6847 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6851 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6852 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6853 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6854 match pending_forward_info {
6855 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6856 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6858 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6859 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6860 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6861 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6862 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6864 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6865 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6866 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6867 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6868 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6871 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6873 _ => pending_forward_info
6876 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6877 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6879 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6880 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6883 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6888 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6890 let next_user_channel_id;
6891 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
6892 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6893 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6895 debug_assert!(false);
6896 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6898 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6899 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6900 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6901 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6902 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6903 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6904 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6905 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6907 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6909 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6910 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6911 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6913 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6914 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6915 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6916 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6917 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6918 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6919 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6920 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
6923 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6924 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6927 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6930 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
6931 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
6932 funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
6938 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6939 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6940 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6941 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6942 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6944 debug_assert!(false);
6945 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6947 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6948 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6949 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6950 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6951 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6952 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6954 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6955 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6958 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6963 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6964 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6965 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6966 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6967 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6969 debug_assert!(false);
6970 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6972 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6973 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6974 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6975 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6976 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6977 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6978 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6980 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6981 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6983 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6984 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6988 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6992 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6993 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6994 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6996 debug_assert!(false);
6997 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6999 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7000 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7001 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7002 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7003 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7004 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7005 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7006 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7007 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7008 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7009 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7013 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7014 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7017 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7022 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7023 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7024 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7025 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7026 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7027 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7028 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7029 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7030 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7031 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7032 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7034 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7035 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7037 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7038 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7039 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7040 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7041 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7042 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7044 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7045 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7046 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7048 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7049 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7050 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7051 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7052 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7053 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7054 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7055 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7056 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7059 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7060 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7062 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7063 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
7064 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7065 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7066 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7067 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7068 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7069 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7070 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7071 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7072 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7073 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7076 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7077 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7078 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7083 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7084 // payments are being processed.
7085 if forward_htlcs_empty {
7086 push_forward_event = true;
7088 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7089 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7096 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7097 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7100 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7101 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7102 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7104 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7108 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7109 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7110 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7111 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7112 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7114 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7115 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7116 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7117 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7118 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7119 // real by taking more time.
7120 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7121 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7122 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7127 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7128 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7129 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7130 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7131 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7132 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7133 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7135 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7136 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7137 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7138 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7139 channel_funding_outpoint,
7141 counterparty_node_id,
7146 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7147 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7148 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7150 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7151 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7152 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7153 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7155 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7156 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7157 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7163 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7164 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7165 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7166 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7168 debug_assert!(false);
7169 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7170 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7171 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7172 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7173 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7174 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7175 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7176 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7177 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7178 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7179 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7180 *counterparty_node_id)
7182 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7183 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7184 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7185 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7186 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7187 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7188 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7192 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7193 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7196 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7199 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7203 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7204 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7205 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7207 debug_assert!(false);
7208 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7210 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7211 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7212 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7213 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7214 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7215 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7216 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7218 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7219 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7222 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7227 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7228 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7229 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7231 debug_assert!(false);
7232 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7234 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7235 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7236 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7237 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7238 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7239 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7240 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7243 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7244 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7245 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
7246 msg, &self.default_configuration
7247 ), chan_phase_entry),
7248 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7249 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7250 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7253 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7254 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7257 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7262 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7263 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7264 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7265 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7267 // It's not a local channel
7268 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7271 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7272 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7273 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7274 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7276 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7277 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7278 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7279 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7280 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7281 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7282 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7283 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7284 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7285 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7286 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7288 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7290 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7291 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7292 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7293 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7295 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7296 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7297 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7298 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7301 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7305 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7306 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7309 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7311 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7314 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7316 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7317 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7319 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7321 debug_assert!(false);
7322 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7323 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7327 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7328 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7329 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7330 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7331 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7332 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7333 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7334 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7335 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7336 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7337 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7338 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7339 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7340 let mut channel_update = None;
7341 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7342 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7343 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7346 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7347 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7348 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7349 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7350 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7351 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7352 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7357 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7358 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7359 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7360 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7361 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7362 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7366 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7367 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7370 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7371 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7373 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7374 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7375 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7376 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7377 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7378 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7380 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7381 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7382 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7383 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7384 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7385 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7386 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7387 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7388 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7389 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7390 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7391 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7392 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7393 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7394 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7395 next_funding_txid: None,
7398 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7399 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7400 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7406 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7407 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7408 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7409 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7412 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7413 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7418 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7419 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7420 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7422 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7423 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7424 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7425 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7426 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7427 match monitor_event {
7428 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7429 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
7430 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7431 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7432 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
7433 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
7434 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
7436 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7437 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
7438 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7439 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7442 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
7443 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7444 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7446 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7447 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7448 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7449 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7452 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7453 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7454 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7455 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7456 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7457 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7458 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
7459 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7460 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
7463 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
7465 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
7466 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7467 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7471 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7472 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7473 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7474 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
7482 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
7483 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7489 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7490 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7493 has_pending_monitor_events
7496 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7497 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7498 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7500 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7501 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7502 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7505 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7506 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7507 /// update was applied.
7508 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7509 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7510 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7512 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7513 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7514 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7515 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7517 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7518 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7520 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7521 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7522 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7523 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7525 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7526 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7527 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7528 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7529 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7530 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7532 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7533 has_monitor_update = true;
7535 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7536 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7537 continue 'peer_loop;
7546 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7547 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7548 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7554 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7555 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7557 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7558 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7560 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7561 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7562 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7563 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7565 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7566 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7568 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7569 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7570 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7571 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7576 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7577 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7582 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7583 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7586 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7587 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7588 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7594 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7598 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7599 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7600 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7601 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7602 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7603 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7604 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7608 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7609 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7610 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7611 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7612 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7618 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7619 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7620 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7621 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7622 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7623 let mut has_update = false;
7624 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7626 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7628 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7629 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7630 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7631 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7632 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7634 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7635 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7636 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7637 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7638 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7640 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7641 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7644 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7645 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7646 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7648 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7649 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7650 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7651 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7652 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7657 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7658 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7659 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7665 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7666 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7671 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7677 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7678 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7681 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7682 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7688 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7689 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7691 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7692 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7693 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7694 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7695 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7696 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7697 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7698 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7699 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7700 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7701 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7702 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7703 assert!(should_broadcast);
7704 } else { unreachable!(); }
7705 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7706 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7707 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
7710 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7715 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7716 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7717 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7718 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7722 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7723 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7724 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7725 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7726 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7728 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7732 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7737 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7739 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7741 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7742 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7743 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7744 &$self, description: String
7745 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7746 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7747 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7748 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7749 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7751 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7752 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7753 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7755 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7762 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7763 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7764 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7768 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7769 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7771 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7772 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7773 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7776 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7777 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7778 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7780 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7781 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7785 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7786 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7787 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7788 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7789 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7791 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7795 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7796 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7801 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7802 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7803 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7805 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7807 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7808 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7809 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7810 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7811 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7812 &$self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7813 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7814 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7815 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7816 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7817 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7818 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7820 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7821 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7822 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7824 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7825 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7828 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
7830 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7831 $self.pending_outbound_payments
7832 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7833 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7835 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7841 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7843 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7844 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7845 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7846 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7847 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7848 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7852 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7853 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
7854 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7855 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
7858 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7860 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7862 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7863 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7864 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7866 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7867 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7868 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7869 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7870 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7871 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7872 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7874 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7875 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7879 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7880 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7883 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7884 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7885 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7889 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7890 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7891 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7892 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7896 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7897 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7898 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7903 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7904 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
7905 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
7906 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
7909 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7910 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7911 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7912 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7913 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7914 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7915 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7916 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7917 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7918 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7919 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7920 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7921 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7922 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7923 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7925 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
7926 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7928 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7930 let builder = match quantity {
7932 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7934 let builder = match amount_msats {
7936 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7938 let builder = match payer_note {
7940 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7942 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7943 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7945 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7947 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7948 self.pending_outbound_payments
7949 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7950 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7952 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7954 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7955 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7956 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7957 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7958 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7961 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7963 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7964 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7965 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7966 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7967 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7968 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7969 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7970 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7971 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7973 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7980 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7983 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7984 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7985 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7989 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7990 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7991 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7992 /// received and no retries will be made.
7997 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
7998 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
8001 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8002 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8003 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8004 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8005 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8007 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8008 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8010 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8011 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8014 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8016 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8017 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8018 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
8019 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8021 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8022 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8023 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8025 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8026 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8027 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8029 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8030 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8031 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8033 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8034 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8035 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8036 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8038 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8039 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8040 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8041 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
8042 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8045 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8047 for path in refund.paths() {
8048 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8049 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8050 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8051 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8053 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8059 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8063 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8066 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8067 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8069 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
8070 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
8071 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
8072 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8074 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8076 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8077 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8081 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8082 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8084 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8086 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8087 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8089 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8090 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8091 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8092 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
8093 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
8094 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8095 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8096 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8097 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8098 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8099 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8102 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8103 /// stored external to LDK.
8105 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8106 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8107 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8109 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8110 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8113 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8114 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8115 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8116 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8118 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8119 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8120 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8121 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8122 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8124 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8125 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8126 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8127 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8128 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8130 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8131 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8133 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8134 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8138 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8139 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8141 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8143 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8144 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8146 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8147 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8148 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8149 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8150 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8151 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8152 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8155 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8156 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8158 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8159 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8160 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8163 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8165 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8166 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8167 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8168 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8170 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8172 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8173 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8174 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8177 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8178 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8181 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8182 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8183 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8184 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
8185 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8186 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8188 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8189 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8190 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8191 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8192 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8194 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8196 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8199 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8200 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8204 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8205 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8207 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8208 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8209 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8210 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8212 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8213 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8214 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8215 Some(_) => continue,
8216 None => return scid_candidate
8221 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8223 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8224 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8226 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8227 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8228 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8232 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8233 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8234 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8236 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8237 /// times to get a unique scid.
8238 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8239 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8240 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8242 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8243 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8244 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8245 return scid_candidate
8249 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8250 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8251 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8252 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8254 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8255 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8256 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8257 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8258 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8259 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8261 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8262 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8263 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8272 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8273 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8274 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8275 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8276 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8280 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8281 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8282 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8283 events.push_back((event, None));
8287 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8288 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8289 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8293 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8294 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8298 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8299 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8302 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8303 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8304 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8305 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8306 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
8307 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
8308 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8310 let logger = WithContext::from(
8311 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
8314 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8315 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8316 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8317 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8318 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8319 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8320 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8321 .get_mut(&channel_id)
8323 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8327 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8328 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
8329 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8330 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8331 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8332 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8337 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
8339 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8340 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8341 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8342 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8344 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8345 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8346 if further_update_exists {
8347 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8352 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8359 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8360 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8366 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8367 for action in actions {
8369 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8370 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
8372 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8378 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8379 /// using the given event handler.
8381 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8382 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8386 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8390 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8392 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8393 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8394 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8395 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8396 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8397 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8401 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8402 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8403 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8404 /// is always placed next to each other.
8406 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8407 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8408 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8409 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8411 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8412 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8413 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8414 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8415 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8416 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8417 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8419 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8420 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8421 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8422 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8425 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8426 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8428 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8429 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8432 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8433 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8434 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8435 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8436 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8437 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8438 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8442 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8443 events.replace(pending_events);
8452 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8454 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8455 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8456 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8457 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8458 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8459 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8463 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8465 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8466 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8467 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8469 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8473 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8475 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8476 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8477 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8478 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8479 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8480 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8484 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8486 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8487 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
8488 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8489 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
8490 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8493 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8494 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8497 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8498 let _persistence_guard =
8499 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8500 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8501 let new_height = height - 1;
8503 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8504 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
8505 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8506 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
8507 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8508 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8511 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8515 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8517 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8518 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8519 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8520 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8521 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8522 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8526 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8527 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8528 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8529 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8531 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8532 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8534 let _persistence_guard =
8535 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8536 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8537 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8538 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8540 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8541 if height < last_best_block_height {
8542 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8543 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8547 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8548 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8549 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8550 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8552 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8553 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8555 let _persistence_guard =
8556 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8557 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8558 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8560 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8562 macro_rules! max_time {
8563 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8565 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8566 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8567 // having an explicit local time source.
8568 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8569 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8570 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8571 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8572 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8578 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8579 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8580 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8581 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8585 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8586 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8587 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8588 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8589 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8590 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8591 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8592 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8593 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8594 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8595 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8602 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8603 let _persistence_guard =
8604 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8605 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8606 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8607 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8608 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8609 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8610 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8611 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8616 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8618 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8619 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8620 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8621 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8622 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8623 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8627 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8628 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8630 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8631 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8632 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8633 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8634 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8636 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8637 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8639 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8640 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8641 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8642 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8643 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8644 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8646 // Retain unfunded channels.
8647 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8648 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
8649 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
8650 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
8651 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8652 let res = f(channel);
8653 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8654 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8655 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8656 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8657 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8659 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8660 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8661 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8662 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8663 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8664 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8665 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8666 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8671 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8676 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8677 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8680 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8681 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8682 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8683 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8684 msg: announcement_sigs,
8686 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8687 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8688 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8690 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8691 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8692 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8697 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8698 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8699 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8700 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8701 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8702 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8703 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8704 // is always consistent.
8705 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8706 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8707 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8708 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8709 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8712 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8713 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8714 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8715 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8716 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8717 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8718 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8719 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8723 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8724 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8725 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8726 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8727 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8728 data: reason_message,
8741 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8742 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8743 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8744 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8745 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8746 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8747 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8748 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8749 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8750 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8752 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8753 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8754 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8758 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8761 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8762 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8763 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8764 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8765 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8766 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8767 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8768 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8769 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8770 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8771 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
8772 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8775 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8776 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8777 _ => unreachable!(),
8779 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8780 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8781 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8782 let logger = WithContext::from(
8783 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
8785 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8791 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8793 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8794 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8798 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8799 /// may have events that need processing.
8801 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8802 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8804 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8805 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8806 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8807 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8810 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8811 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8812 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8815 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8816 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8817 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8820 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8821 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8822 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8823 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8826 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8827 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8828 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8829 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8832 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8833 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8835 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8836 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8837 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8838 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8839 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8842 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8843 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8844 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8845 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8848 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8849 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8850 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8851 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8854 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8855 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8856 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8857 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8860 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8861 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8862 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8863 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8867 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8868 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8870 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8871 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8872 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8873 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8874 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8875 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8879 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8880 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8881 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8882 // change to the contents.
8883 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8884 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8885 let persist = match &res {
8886 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8887 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8888 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8890 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8892 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8897 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8898 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8899 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8900 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8903 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8904 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8905 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8906 // change to the contents.
8907 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8908 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8909 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8913 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8914 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8915 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8916 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8919 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8920 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8921 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8924 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8925 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8926 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8929 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8930 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8931 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8932 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8933 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8934 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8935 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8936 let persist = match &res {
8937 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8938 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8940 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8945 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8946 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8947 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8948 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8951 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8952 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8953 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8954 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8957 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8958 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8959 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8960 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8963 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8964 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8965 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8966 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8969 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8970 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8971 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8974 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8975 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8976 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8979 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8980 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8981 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8982 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8983 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8984 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8985 let persist = match &res {
8986 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8987 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8988 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8990 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8995 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8996 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8997 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9000 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
9001 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9002 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9003 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9004 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9005 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9006 let persist = match &res {
9007 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9008 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9009 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9011 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9016 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9017 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9018 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9019 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9020 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9021 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9022 let persist = match &res {
9023 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9024 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9025 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9027 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9032 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9033 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9034 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9037 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9038 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9039 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9042 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9043 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9044 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9045 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9046 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9047 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9048 let persist = match &res {
9049 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9050 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9051 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9053 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9058 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9059 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9060 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9063 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9064 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9065 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9068 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9073 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9074 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9075 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9076 let persist = match &res {
9077 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9078 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9079 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9081 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9086 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9087 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9088 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9089 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9090 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9093 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
9094 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9095 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9097 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9098 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9099 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9100 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9101 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9102 let context = match phase {
9103 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9104 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9105 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9106 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9111 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
9112 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
9113 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
9116 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9117 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9120 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9121 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9124 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9125 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9129 // Clean up for removal.
9130 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9131 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9134 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9135 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9136 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9137 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9139 // V1 Channel Establishment
9140 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9141 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9142 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9143 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9144 // V2 Channel Establishment
9145 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9146 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9147 // Common Channel Establishment
9148 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9149 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9151 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9153 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9154 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9155 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9156 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9157 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9158 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9159 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9160 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9161 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9162 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9163 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9164 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9165 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9166 // Channel Operations
9167 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9168 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9169 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9170 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9171 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9172 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
9174 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
9175 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9176 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
9177 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9178 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
9179 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
9180 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
9181 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
9182 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
9185 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
9186 peer_state.is_connected = false;
9187 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
9188 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
9191 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
9193 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
9195 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
9196 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
9200 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
9201 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
9202 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
9203 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9207 let mut res = Ok(());
9209 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9210 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9211 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9212 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9213 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9214 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9215 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9218 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9219 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9220 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9221 if inbound_peer_limited {
9223 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9225 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9226 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9227 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9228 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9229 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9230 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9231 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9232 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9236 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9237 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9238 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9240 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9241 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9242 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9243 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9246 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9249 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9250 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9255 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9257 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9258 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9259 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9260 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9261 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9263 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9265 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9266 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9267 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9268 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9269 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9273 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9274 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9275 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9276 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
9280 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9281 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9282 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9283 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9284 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9285 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
9289 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
9290 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9291 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9292 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9293 debug_assert!(false);
9296 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9297 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9298 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
9299 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9300 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9301 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9302 debug_assert!(false);
9308 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9309 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9314 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9315 match &msg.data as &str {
9316 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9317 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9319 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9320 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9321 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9322 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9323 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9324 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9325 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9326 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9327 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9329 || -> NotifyOption {
9330 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9331 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9332 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
9333 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9334 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9335 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9336 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9337 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9341 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9342 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9343 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9344 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9345 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9346 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9348 log_level: Level::Trace,
9351 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
9352 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
9353 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9355 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
9364 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9366 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9367 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9368 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9369 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9370 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9371 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9372 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9373 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9374 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9375 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9376 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9378 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9379 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9380 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9384 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9385 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9386 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9387 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9388 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9389 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9390 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9391 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
9392 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9393 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9394 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9400 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9401 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
9402 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9403 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9404 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9410 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
9411 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9412 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
9416 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9417 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9421 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9422 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9425 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9426 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9429 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9430 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9433 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9434 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9435 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9436 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9439 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9440 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9441 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9442 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9445 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9446 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9447 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9448 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9451 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9452 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9453 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9454 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9457 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9458 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9459 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9460 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9463 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9464 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9465 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9466 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9469 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9470 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9471 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9472 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9475 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9476 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9477 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9478 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9481 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9482 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9483 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9484 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9488 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9489 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9491 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9492 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9493 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9494 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9495 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9496 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9500 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9501 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9502 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9505 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9506 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9509 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9510 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9512 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9513 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9515 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9516 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9520 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9521 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9522 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9524 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9526 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9527 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9531 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9532 amount_msats, payment_secret
9534 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9536 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9537 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9541 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9542 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9543 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9546 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9547 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9548 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9549 payment_paths, payment_hash
9551 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9552 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9553 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9555 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey>, _> =
9556 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9557 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9558 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9559 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9562 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9563 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9564 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9565 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9566 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9568 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<ExplicitSigningPubkey>, _> =
9569 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9570 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9571 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9572 .and_then(|invoice| {
9574 let mut invoice = invoice;
9575 match invoice.sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
9576 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
9578 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9579 Err(SignError::Signing) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9580 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9582 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9583 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9588 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9589 Err(error) => Some(error),
9593 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9594 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9596 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9598 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9599 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9602 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9603 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9604 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9611 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9612 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9618 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9619 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9623 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9624 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9625 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9626 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9627 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9631 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9632 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9634 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9635 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9636 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9637 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9638 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9641 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9642 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9643 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9644 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9647 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9648 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9649 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9650 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9653 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9654 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9655 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9656 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9659 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9660 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9661 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9662 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9663 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9664 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9665 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9666 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9667 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9668 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9669 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9670 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9671 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9672 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9673 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9674 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9675 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9676 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9677 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
9678 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9679 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9684 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9685 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9687 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9688 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9689 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9690 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9693 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9694 (2, node_id, required),
9695 (4, features, required),
9696 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9697 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9698 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9699 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9702 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9703 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9704 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9705 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9706 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9707 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9708 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9709 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9710 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9711 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9712 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9713 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9714 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9715 (7, self.config, option),
9716 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9717 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9718 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9719 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9720 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9721 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9722 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9723 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9724 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9725 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9726 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9727 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9728 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9729 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9730 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9731 (32, self.is_public, required),
9732 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9733 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9734 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9735 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9736 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9737 (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9738 (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9744 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9745 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9746 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9747 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9748 (2, channel_id, required),
9749 (3, channel_type, option),
9750 (4, counterparty, required),
9751 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9752 (6, funding_txo, option),
9753 (7, config, option),
9754 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9755 (9, confirmations, option),
9756 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9757 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9758 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9759 (16, balance_msat, required),
9760 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9761 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9762 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9763 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9764 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9765 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9766 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9767 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9768 (26, is_outbound, required),
9769 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9770 (30, is_usable, required),
9771 (32, is_public, required),
9772 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9773 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9774 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9775 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9776 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9777 (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9778 (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9781 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9782 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9783 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9784 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9785 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9789 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9791 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9792 outbound_scid_alias,
9796 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9797 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9799 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9800 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9801 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9802 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9803 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9804 confirmations_required,
9806 force_close_spend_delay,
9807 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9808 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9809 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9810 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9811 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9812 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9813 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9814 channel_shutdown_state,
9815 pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9816 pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9821 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9822 (2, channels, required_vec),
9823 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9824 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9827 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9828 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9829 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
9832 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9834 (0, onion_packet, required),
9835 (1, blinded, option),
9836 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9839 (0, payment_data, required),
9840 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9841 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9842 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9843 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9844 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9846 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9847 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9848 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9849 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9850 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9851 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9852 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9856 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9857 (0, routing, required),
9858 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9859 (4, payment_hash, required),
9860 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9861 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9862 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9863 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9867 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9868 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9870 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9872 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9873 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9874 reason.write(writer)?;
9876 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9877 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9880 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9881 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9882 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9883 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9890 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9891 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9892 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9895 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9896 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9897 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9898 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9902 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9903 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9904 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9905 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9906 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9909 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9910 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9911 // messages contained in the variants.
9912 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9913 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9914 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9916 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9917 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9918 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9919 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9920 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9923 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9924 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9925 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9926 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9927 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9929 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9934 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9939 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9940 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9941 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9944 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9945 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9946 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9947 (2, outpoint, required),
9948 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9949 (4, htlc_id, required),
9950 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9951 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9952 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
9953 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9954 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
9957 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9958 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9959 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9960 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9961 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9963 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9964 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9965 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9966 (2, self.value, required),
9967 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9968 (4, payment_data, option),
9969 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9970 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9971 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9972 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9978 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9979 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9980 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9981 (0, prev_hop, required),
9982 (1, total_msat, option),
9983 (2, value_ser, required),
9984 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9985 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9986 (5, total_value_received, option),
9987 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9988 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9989 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9991 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9992 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9993 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9995 if payment_data.is_some() {
9996 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9998 if total_msat.is_none() {
9999 total_msat = Some(value);
10001 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
10004 if total_msat.is_none() {
10005 if payment_data.is_none() {
10006 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10008 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10010 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
10014 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10017 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10018 total_value_received,
10019 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10021 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10022 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10027 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10028 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10029 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10032 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10033 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10034 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10035 let mut payment_id = None;
10036 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10037 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10038 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10039 (0, session_priv, required),
10040 (1, payment_id, option),
10041 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10042 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10043 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10044 (6, blinded_tail, option),
10046 if payment_id.is_none() {
10047 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10049 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10051 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10052 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10053 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10055 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10056 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10057 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10058 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10062 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10063 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10064 first_hop_htlc_msat,
10066 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10069 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10070 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10075 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10076 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10078 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10079 0u8.write(writer)?;
10080 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10081 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10082 (0, session_priv, required),
10083 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10084 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10085 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10086 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10087 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10088 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10091 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10092 1u8.write(writer)?;
10093 field.write(writer)?;
10100 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10101 (0, forward_info, required),
10102 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10103 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10104 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10105 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10106 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10107 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10108 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10111 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10112 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10113 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10115 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10119 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10120 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10121 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10122 (0, htlc_id, required),
10123 (2, err_packet, required),
10126 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10127 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10128 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10129 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10130 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10131 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10132 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10133 (0, htlc_id, required),
10134 (1, failure_code, required),
10135 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10136 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10144 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10145 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10146 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
10148 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
10150 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
10151 (0, htlc_id, required),
10152 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
10153 (2, err_packet, required),
10154 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
10156 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
10157 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
10158 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10160 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
10164 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10165 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
10169 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10174 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
10175 (0, payment_secret, required),
10176 (2, expiry_time, required),
10177 (4, user_payment_id, required),
10178 (6, payment_preimage, required),
10179 (8, min_value_msat, required),
10182 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10184 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10185 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10186 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10187 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10188 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10189 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10193 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10194 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
10196 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10198 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
10200 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
10201 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
10202 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
10205 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
10207 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10208 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
10209 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10210 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10211 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10212 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10213 serializable_peer_count += 1;
10216 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
10217 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
10221 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
10223 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10224 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10225 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10226 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
10227 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
10228 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
10231 channel.write(writer)?;
10237 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10238 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10239 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
10240 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
10241 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10242 for forward in pending_forwards {
10243 forward.write(writer)?;
10248 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10250 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10251 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
10252 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10254 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
10255 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
10256 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10257 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
10258 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
10259 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10260 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
10261 htlc.write(writer)?;
10263 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
10264 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
10267 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
10268 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
10269 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10270 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
10271 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
10272 // per_peer_state lock at all.
10273 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
10276 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
10277 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10278 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
10279 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
10280 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10282 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10283 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10284 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10285 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10286 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10287 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10288 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10293 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10294 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10295 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10296 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10297 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10298 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10299 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10300 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10301 0u64.write(writer)?;
10303 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10304 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10305 event.write(writer)?;
10309 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10310 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10311 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10312 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10313 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10314 0u64.write(writer)?;
10316 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10317 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10318 // likely to be identical.
10319 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10320 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10322 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10323 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10324 hash.write(writer)?;
10325 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10328 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10329 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10330 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10331 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10332 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10335 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10336 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10338 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10339 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10340 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10341 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10344 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10345 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10346 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10347 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10351 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10352 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
10353 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10355 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10356 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10357 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10363 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10364 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10365 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10366 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10369 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10370 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10371 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10372 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10373 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10376 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10377 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10378 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10379 if !updates.is_empty() {
10380 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
10381 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10386 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10387 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10388 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10389 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10390 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10391 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10392 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10393 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10394 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10395 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10396 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10397 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10398 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10405 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10406 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10407 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10408 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10411 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10412 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10413 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10414 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10415 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10416 // check that the event is sane here.
10417 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10418 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10419 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10420 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10426 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10427 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10428 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10429 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10430 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10431 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10434 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10435 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10436 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10437 events.push_back((ev, action));
10438 } else if action.is_some() {
10439 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10446 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10447 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10448 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10449 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10450 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10451 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10454 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10456 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10458 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10459 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10460 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10461 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10462 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10463 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10464 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10465 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10466 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10467 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10468 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10469 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10470 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10472 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10473 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10475 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10476 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10478 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10479 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10480 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10481 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10482 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10483 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10485 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10486 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10488 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10489 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10490 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10491 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10492 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10493 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10497 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10498 pub entropy_source: ES,
10500 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10501 pub node_signer: NS,
10503 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10504 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10506 pub signer_provider: SP,
10508 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10510 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10511 pub fee_estimator: F,
10512 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10514 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10515 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10516 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10517 pub chain_monitor: M,
10519 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10520 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10521 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10522 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10523 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10524 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10526 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10528 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10529 /// deserialization.
10531 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10532 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10533 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10535 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10536 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10538 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10539 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10540 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10541 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10543 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10546 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10547 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10550 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10551 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10553 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10554 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10555 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10556 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10557 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10558 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10562 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10563 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10564 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10565 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10566 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10568 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10569 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
10570 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
10576 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10577 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10578 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10579 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10581 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10582 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10583 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10584 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10585 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10586 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10590 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10591 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10592 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10596 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10597 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10599 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10600 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10601 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10602 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10603 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10604 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10608 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10609 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10611 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10612 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10613 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10615 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10617 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10618 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10619 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10620 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10621 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10622 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10623 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10624 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
10625 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10626 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10627 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10629 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10630 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10631 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
10632 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10633 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10634 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10635 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10636 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10637 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10638 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10639 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10640 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10641 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10642 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10643 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10645 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10646 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10647 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10649 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10650 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10651 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10653 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10654 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10655 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10657 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10658 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10659 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10661 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10662 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10663 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
10666 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10667 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10668 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10669 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10670 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10671 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10672 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10673 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10675 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10676 let mut found_htlc = false;
10677 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10678 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10681 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10682 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10683 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10684 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10685 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10686 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10687 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10689 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10690 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10691 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10695 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10696 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10697 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10698 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10699 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10701 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10702 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10704 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10705 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10706 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10707 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10709 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10710 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
10711 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10712 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10716 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10717 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10718 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10719 // safely discard the channel.
10720 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10721 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10722 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10723 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10724 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10725 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10726 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10727 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10730 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10731 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10732 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10733 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10734 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10735 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10739 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10740 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10741 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10742 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
10743 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10745 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10746 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10747 counterparty_node_id: None,
10748 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10749 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
10751 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
10755 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10756 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10757 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10758 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10759 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10760 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10761 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10762 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10763 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10765 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10768 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10769 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10770 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10771 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10772 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10773 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10774 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10775 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10777 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10780 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10783 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10784 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10785 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10786 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10787 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10788 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10789 is_connected: false,
10793 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10794 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10795 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10796 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10797 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
10798 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10799 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10800 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10803 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10804 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10805 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10806 for _ in 0..event_count {
10807 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10808 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10813 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10814 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10815 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10817 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10818 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10819 // on-startup monitor updates.
10820 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10821 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10823 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10827 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10828 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10830 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10831 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10832 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10833 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10834 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10838 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10839 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10840 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10841 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10842 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10843 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10844 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
10846 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10847 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10851 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10852 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10853 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10854 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
10855 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10856 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10857 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10858 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10859 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10860 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
10861 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10862 let mut events_override = None;
10863 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10864 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10865 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10866 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10867 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10868 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10869 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10870 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10871 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10872 (8, events_override, option),
10873 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10874 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10875 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10876 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10878 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10879 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10882 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10883 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10886 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10887 pending_events_read = events;
10890 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10891 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10894 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10895 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10896 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10897 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
10898 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10899 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10901 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10903 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10904 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10905 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10908 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10909 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10910 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10911 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10912 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10914 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10915 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10916 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10918 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10919 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10920 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10921 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10922 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10924 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10925 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10926 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10927 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10928 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
10929 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10930 pending_background_events.push(
10931 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10932 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10933 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10934 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
10935 update: update.clone(),
10938 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10939 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10940 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10941 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10942 pending_background_events.push(
10943 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10944 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10945 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
10948 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10949 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10950 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10952 max_in_flight_update_id
10956 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10957 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10958 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10959 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10960 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10961 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10963 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10965 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10966 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10967 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10968 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10969 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10970 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10971 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10972 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10973 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10976 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10977 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10978 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10979 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10980 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10981 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10982 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10983 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10984 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10985 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10986 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10989 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10990 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10991 debug_assert!(false);
10992 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10997 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10998 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10999 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11000 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
11001 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11002 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11003 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11004 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11005 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11006 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11008 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11009 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11010 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11012 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11013 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11014 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11015 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11016 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11017 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11018 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11019 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11024 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11025 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11027 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11028 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11029 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11030 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11033 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11034 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11035 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11036 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11037 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11038 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11039 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11041 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11042 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11043 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11044 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11045 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11046 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11047 if path.hops.is_empty() {
11048 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11049 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11052 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11053 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11054 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11055 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11056 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11057 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11058 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11059 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11061 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11062 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11063 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11064 retry_strategy: None,
11065 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11066 payment_params: None,
11067 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11068 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11069 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11070 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11071 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11072 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11073 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11074 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11075 total_msat: path_amt,
11076 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11077 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11079 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11080 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11085 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11086 match htlc_source {
11087 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11088 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11089 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11090 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11092 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11093 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11094 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11095 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11096 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11097 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11098 forwards.retain(|forward| {
11099 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11100 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11101 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11102 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11107 !forwards.is_empty()
11109 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11110 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11111 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11112 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11113 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11114 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11115 intercepted_id != ev_id
11122 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11123 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
11124 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
11125 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
11126 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
11127 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
11128 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
11129 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
11130 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
11131 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
11132 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
11134 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
11135 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
11136 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
11137 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
11139 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
11140 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
11141 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
11148 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
11149 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
11151 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
11153 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
11154 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
11155 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
11156 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
11157 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
11158 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
11159 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
11160 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
11161 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11162 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
11165 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
11166 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
11167 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
11168 // channel still live case here.
11172 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
11173 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
11178 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
11179 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
11180 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
11181 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
11182 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
11183 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
11184 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
11185 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
11189 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
11190 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
11192 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
11193 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
11194 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11195 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11197 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
11198 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11199 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11201 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
11202 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
11204 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11205 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
11207 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11210 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
11211 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11212 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11214 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11218 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
11219 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
11220 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
11221 if htlcs.is_empty() {
11222 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11224 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
11225 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
11226 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
11227 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
11228 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
11229 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
11230 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
11231 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
11233 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
11234 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11238 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
11240 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11242 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
11243 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
11245 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11246 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11251 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11252 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11254 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
11256 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11258 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
11259 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
11260 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
11261 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11265 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
11266 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11267 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11268 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11269 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
11270 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11271 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11272 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
11273 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
11275 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
11276 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
11277 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
11279 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
11280 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
11281 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11282 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11283 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11284 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11286 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11287 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11288 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11289 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11290 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11291 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11295 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11296 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11297 debug_assert!(false);
11298 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11303 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11305 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11306 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11307 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11308 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11309 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11310 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11311 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11312 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11313 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11314 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11315 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11317 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11318 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11320 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11321 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11322 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11323 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11325 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11326 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11327 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11328 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11330 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11331 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11332 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11333 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11335 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
11336 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11337 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11338 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11339 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11340 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11341 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11342 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11345 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11346 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11349 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11352 purpose: payment.purpose,
11353 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11354 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11355 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11361 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11362 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11363 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11364 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11365 for action in actions.iter() {
11366 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11367 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11368 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
11370 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
11372 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11373 blocked_channel_id);
11374 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11375 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
11376 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11378 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11379 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11380 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11381 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11385 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11386 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11390 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11392 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11393 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11397 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11399 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11400 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11401 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11402 router: args.router,
11404 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11406 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11407 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11408 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11409 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11411 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11412 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11413 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11414 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11415 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11416 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11418 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11420 our_network_pubkey,
11423 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11425 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11427 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11428 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11429 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11430 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11431 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11433 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11434 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11436 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11438 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11440 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11441 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11442 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11444 logger: args.logger,
11445 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11448 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11449 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11450 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11451 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11452 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11455 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11456 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11457 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11458 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11459 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
11460 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
11461 downstream_channel_id, None
11465 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11466 //connection or two.
11468 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11474 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11475 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11476 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11477 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11478 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11479 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11480 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11481 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11482 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11483 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11484 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11485 use crate::prelude::*;
11486 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11487 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11488 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11489 use crate::util::test_utils;
11490 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11491 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11494 fn test_notify_limits() {
11495 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11496 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11497 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11498 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11499 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11500 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11502 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11503 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11504 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11505 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11506 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11508 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11510 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11511 // to connect messages with new values
11512 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11513 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11514 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11515 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11516 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11517 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11519 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11520 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11521 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11522 // ... but the last node should not.
11523 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11524 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11525 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11526 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11528 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11529 // about the channel.
11530 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11531 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11532 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11534 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11536 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11537 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11538 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11539 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11540 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11541 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11543 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11544 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11545 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11547 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11548 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11549 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11550 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11551 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11552 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11554 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11555 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11556 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11557 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11558 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11559 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11560 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11561 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11563 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11564 // the channel info has updated.
11565 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11566 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11567 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11568 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11569 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11570 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11574 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11575 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11577 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11578 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11579 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11580 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11581 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11583 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11584 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11585 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11586 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11588 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11589 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11590 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11591 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11592 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11593 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11594 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11595 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11596 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11597 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11598 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11599 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11601 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11602 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11603 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11604 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11605 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11606 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11607 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11608 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11609 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11610 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11611 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11612 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11613 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11615 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11616 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11617 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11618 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11619 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11620 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11621 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11622 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11623 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11625 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11626 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11627 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11629 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11630 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11631 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11633 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11634 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11635 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11636 // lightning messages manually.
11637 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11638 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11639 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11641 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11642 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11643 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11644 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11645 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11646 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11647 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11649 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11650 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11651 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11652 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11653 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11654 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11656 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11657 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11658 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11659 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11660 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11661 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11662 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11664 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11665 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11666 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11668 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11669 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11670 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11671 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11673 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11674 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11675 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11676 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11678 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11681 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11682 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11683 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11684 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11686 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11691 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11692 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11693 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11696 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11697 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11698 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11699 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11700 // fails as expected.
11701 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11702 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11703 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11704 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11705 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11706 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11707 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11708 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11709 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11710 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11711 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11712 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11713 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11714 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11715 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11717 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11718 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11719 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11721 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11722 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11723 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11724 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11725 let route = find_route(
11726 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11727 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11729 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11730 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11732 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11733 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11734 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11735 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11736 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11738 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11739 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11740 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11741 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11742 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11744 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11745 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11746 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11747 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11748 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11749 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11750 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11751 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11752 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11754 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11755 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11757 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11758 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11759 let route = find_route(
11760 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11761 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11763 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11764 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11766 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11767 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11768 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11769 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11770 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11772 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11773 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11774 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11775 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11776 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11777 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11778 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11779 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11780 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11781 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11783 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11784 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11785 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11787 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11788 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11789 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11790 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11791 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11792 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11793 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11794 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11795 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11797 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11798 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11800 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11801 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11802 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11803 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11805 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11806 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11807 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11808 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11809 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11811 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11812 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11813 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11816 let route = find_route(
11817 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11818 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11820 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11821 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11822 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11824 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11825 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11826 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11827 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11828 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11830 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11831 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11832 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11833 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11834 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11835 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11836 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11837 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11838 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11839 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11840 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11841 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11842 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11844 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11845 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11849 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11850 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11851 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11852 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11853 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11854 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11855 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11857 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11858 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11860 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11861 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11862 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11863 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11864 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11865 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11866 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11867 let route = find_route(
11868 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11869 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11872 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11873 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11874 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11875 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11876 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11877 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11878 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11880 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11881 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11882 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11883 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11884 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11885 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11886 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11888 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11892 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11893 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11894 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11895 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11896 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11897 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11898 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11899 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11900 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11902 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11903 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11905 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11906 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11907 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11908 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11909 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11910 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11911 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11912 let route = find_route(
11913 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11914 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11917 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11918 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11919 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11920 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11921 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11922 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11923 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11924 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11927 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11928 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11929 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11930 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11931 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11932 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11933 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11935 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11939 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11940 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11941 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11942 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11943 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11945 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11946 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11947 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11948 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11950 // Marshall an MPP route.
11951 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11952 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11953 route.paths.push(path);
11954 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11955 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11956 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11957 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11958 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11959 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11961 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11962 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11964 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11965 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11967 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11972 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11973 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11974 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11975 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11976 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11978 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11980 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11981 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11983 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11984 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11985 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11986 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11989 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11990 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11991 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11992 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11993 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11994 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11997 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12000 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12001 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12006 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12007 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12008 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12009 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12010 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12011 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12013 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12014 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12016 total_msat: 100_000,
12019 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12020 // payment verification fails as expected.
12021 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12022 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12023 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12024 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12026 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12030 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12031 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12035 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12036 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12037 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12038 // the channel is successfully closed.
12039 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12040 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12041 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12042 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12044 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12045 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12046 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12047 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12048 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12050 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
12051 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
12053 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
12054 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
12055 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12056 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12059 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12061 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
12062 // as it has the funding transaction.
12063 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12064 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12065 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12068 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12070 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12072 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12074 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12075 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12076 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12078 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12081 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
12082 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
12083 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12084 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12085 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12088 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12089 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12091 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12092 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
12093 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
12094 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
12096 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12097 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
12098 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12099 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
12101 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12102 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
12104 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
12105 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
12106 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
12107 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
12108 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12109 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12110 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12114 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
12115 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
12116 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
12117 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
12118 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12119 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12120 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12123 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
12125 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
12126 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
12127 // closing transaction).
12128 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
12129 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
12130 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12132 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
12133 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
12134 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12135 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12136 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12139 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12141 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
12143 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
12144 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
12145 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12147 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12149 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12150 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12153 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12154 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
12155 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12158 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12159 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
12160 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12163 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
12164 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
12165 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12168 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12169 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
12170 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12173 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12175 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
12176 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12178 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
12179 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12181 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
12182 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
12187 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
12188 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
12189 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
12190 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
12191 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12192 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12193 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12194 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12197 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12198 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
12199 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
12201 // Test the API functions.
12202 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
12204 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
12206 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12208 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12210 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12212 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
12214 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
12218 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
12219 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
12220 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
12221 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
12222 // the given `channel_id`.
12223 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12224 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12225 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12226 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12228 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12231 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12233 // Test the API functions.
12234 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
12236 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12238 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12240 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12242 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12244 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12248 fn test_connection_limiting() {
12249 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
12250 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12251 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12252 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12253 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12255 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12257 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12258 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12260 let mut funding_tx = None;
12261 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12262 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12263 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12266 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12267 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
12268 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
12269 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
12270 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12272 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12274 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12276 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12278 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12280 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12282 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12285 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
12286 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
12287 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
12288 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12289 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12290 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12292 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
12293 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
12295 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
12296 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
12297 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12298 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12299 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
12300 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12301 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12304 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12305 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12306 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12307 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12308 }, true).unwrap_err();
12310 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12311 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12312 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12313 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12314 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12315 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12316 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12318 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12319 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12321 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12322 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12323 }, true).unwrap_err();
12325 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12326 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12327 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12328 }, false).unwrap();
12329 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12331 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12332 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12334 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12335 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12336 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12337 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12338 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12340 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12341 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12342 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12344 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12345 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12346 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12348 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12349 // "protected" and can connect again.
12350 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12351 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12352 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12354 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12356 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12358 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12359 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12363 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12364 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12365 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12366 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12367 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12368 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12370 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12372 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12373 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12375 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12376 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12377 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12378 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12381 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12383 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12384 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12385 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12387 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12388 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12389 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12391 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12392 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12393 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12394 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12398 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12399 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12400 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12401 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12402 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12403 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12404 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12405 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12406 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12408 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12410 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12411 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12413 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12414 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12415 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12416 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12417 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12418 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12421 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12422 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12424 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12425 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12427 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12429 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12430 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12433 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12434 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12435 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12436 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12437 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12439 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12440 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12442 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12443 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12444 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12445 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12449 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12451 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12452 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12454 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12455 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12456 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12458 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12459 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12461 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12463 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12467 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12468 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12469 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12470 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12471 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12472 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12473 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12474 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12475 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12476 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12477 payment_metadata: None,
12478 keysend_preimage: None,
12479 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12480 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12482 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12484 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12485 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12486 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12487 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
12488 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12489 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12490 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12492 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12493 } else { panic!(); }
12495 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12496 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12497 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12498 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12499 payment_metadata: None,
12500 keysend_preimage: None,
12501 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12502 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12504 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12506 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12507 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12508 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12509 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12513 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12514 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12515 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12516 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12517 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12519 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12520 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12521 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12522 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
12523 payment_metadata: None,
12524 keysend_preimage: None,
12525 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12526 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12528 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12529 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12530 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12532 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12533 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12534 // is not satisfied.
12535 assert!(result.is_ok());
12539 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12540 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12541 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12542 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12543 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12545 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12546 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12548 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12549 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12550 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12551 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12552 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12554 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12555 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12557 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12558 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12559 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12560 match &msg_events[0] {
12561 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12562 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12564 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12565 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12566 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12569 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12572 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12573 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12575 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12576 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12577 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12579 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12583 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12584 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12585 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12586 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12587 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12588 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12589 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12590 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12591 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12592 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12593 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12595 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12596 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12597 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12599 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12600 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12602 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12603 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12605 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12608 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12609 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12611 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12612 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12614 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12615 // not have generated any events.
12616 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12620 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12621 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12622 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12623 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12624 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12625 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12626 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12627 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12629 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12630 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12631 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12633 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12634 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12635 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12636 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12637 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12639 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12640 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12643 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12644 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12645 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12647 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12648 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12649 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12650 ..Default::default()
12652 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12653 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12654 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12656 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12657 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12660 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12661 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12662 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12663 ..Default::default()
12665 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12666 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12667 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12668 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12670 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12671 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12674 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12675 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12676 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12677 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12678 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12681 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12682 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12683 ..Default::default()
12685 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12688 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12689 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12690 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12691 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12695 fn test_payment_display() {
12696 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12697 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12698 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12699 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12700 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12701 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12705 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12706 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12707 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12708 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12709 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12710 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12712 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12713 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12714 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12715 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12716 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12717 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12718 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12719 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12721 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12722 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12723 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12726 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12727 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12729 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12730 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12732 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12733 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12734 }, false).unwrap();
12735 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12736 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12737 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12739 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12741 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12742 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12743 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12744 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12745 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12746 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12747 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12748 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12749 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12750 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12751 } else { panic!() };
12752 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12753 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12754 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12755 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12757 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12759 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12760 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12761 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12766 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12767 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12768 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12769 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12772 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12773 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12774 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12776 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12777 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12779 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12780 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12783 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12784 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12785 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12787 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12791 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12792 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12793 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12795 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12800 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12801 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
12802 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12803 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12805 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12806 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12807 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12809 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12811 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12812 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12813 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12814 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12816 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12817 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12819 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12825 use crate::chain::Listen;
12826 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12827 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12828 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12829 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12830 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12831 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12832 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12833 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12834 use crate::util::test_utils;
12835 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12837 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12838 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12839 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12840 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
12842 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12844 use criterion::Criterion;
12846 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12847 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12848 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12849 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12850 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12851 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12852 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12854 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12855 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12857 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12858 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12860 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12862 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12865 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12866 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12869 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12870 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12871 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12873 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12874 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12876 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12877 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12878 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12879 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12880 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
12882 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12883 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12884 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12886 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12887 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12888 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12889 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12891 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12892 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12893 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12895 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12896 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12897 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12898 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12899 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12901 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12902 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12903 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12905 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12906 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12908 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12909 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12910 }, false).unwrap();
12911 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12912 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12913 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12916 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12917 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12918 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12920 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12921 } else { panic!(); }
12923 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12924 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12925 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12926 match events_b[0] {
12927 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12928 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12930 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12933 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12934 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12935 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12936 match events_a[0] {
12937 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12938 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12940 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12943 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12945 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
12946 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12947 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12949 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12950 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12951 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12952 match msg_events[0] {
12953 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12954 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12955 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12959 match msg_events[1] {
12960 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12964 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12965 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12966 match events_a[0] {
12967 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12968 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12970 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12973 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12974 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12975 match events_b[0] {
12976 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12977 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12979 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12982 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12983 macro_rules! send_payment {
12984 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12985 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12986 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12987 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12988 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12989 payment_count += 1;
12990 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12991 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12993 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12994 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12995 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12996 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12997 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12998 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12999 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13000 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13001 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13002 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13003 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13005 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13006 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13007 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13008 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13010 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13011 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13012 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13013 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13014 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13016 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13019 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13020 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13021 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13022 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13024 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13028 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13029 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13030 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);