1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
47 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
48 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
51 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
53 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
54 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
55 use util::config::UserConfig;
56 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
57 use util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
59 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
60 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
61 use util::errors::APIError;
66 use core::cell::RefCell;
67 use io::{Cursor, Read};
68 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
69 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
70 use core::time::Duration;
71 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
72 use std::time::Instant;
75 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
77 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
78 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
79 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
81 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
82 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
83 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
84 // before we forward it.
86 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
87 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
88 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
89 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
90 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
95 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
96 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
99 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
100 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
103 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
104 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
108 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
109 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
110 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
111 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
112 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
113 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
114 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
119 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
120 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
123 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
124 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
125 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
126 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
127 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
130 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
132 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
134 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
135 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
136 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
138 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
140 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
144 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
148 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
149 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
150 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
151 short_channel_id: u64,
153 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
155 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
156 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
161 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
162 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
163 /// are part of the same payment.
164 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
165 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
166 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
169 struct ClaimableHTLC {
170 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
173 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
176 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
177 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
178 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
179 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
182 session_priv: SecretKey,
183 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
184 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
185 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
190 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
191 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
193 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
194 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
199 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
200 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
202 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
210 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
211 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
213 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
218 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
220 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
221 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
222 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
223 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
224 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
226 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
227 err: msgs::LightningError,
228 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
230 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
232 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
234 err: LightningError {
236 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
237 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
243 shutdown_finish: None,
247 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
249 err: LightningError {
251 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
253 shutdown_finish: None,
257 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
258 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
261 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
263 err: LightningError {
265 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
266 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
272 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
276 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
279 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
281 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
283 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
285 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
286 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
292 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
294 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
295 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
302 shutdown_finish: None,
307 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
308 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
309 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
310 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
311 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
313 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
314 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
315 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
316 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
317 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
318 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
319 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
321 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
325 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
326 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
327 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
328 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
329 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
330 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
331 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
332 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
333 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
334 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
335 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
336 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
338 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
339 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
340 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
341 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
344 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
345 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
346 /// quite some time lag.
347 enum BackgroundEvent {
348 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
349 /// commitment transaction.
350 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
353 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
354 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
356 latest_features: InitFeatures,
359 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
360 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
362 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
364 struct PendingInboundPayment {
365 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
366 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
367 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
368 /// this payment being removed.
370 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
371 user_payment_id: u64,
372 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
373 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
374 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
377 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
378 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
379 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
380 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
381 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
382 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
383 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
384 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
386 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
387 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
388 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
389 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
390 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
391 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
392 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
393 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
394 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
396 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
397 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
399 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
400 /// to individual Channels.
402 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
403 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
404 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
405 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
407 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
408 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
409 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
410 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
411 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
412 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
413 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
415 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
416 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
417 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
418 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
421 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
422 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
423 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
424 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
425 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
427 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
428 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
429 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
430 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
431 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
432 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
433 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
434 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
435 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
436 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
439 default_configuration: UserConfig,
440 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
446 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
448 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
449 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
451 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
452 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
453 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
454 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
456 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
457 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
458 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
459 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
460 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
461 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
463 /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
464 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
465 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
466 /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
467 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
468 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
469 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
470 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
472 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
473 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashSet<[u8; 32]>>,
475 our_network_key: SecretKey,
476 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
478 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
479 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
480 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
482 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
483 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
484 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
485 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
487 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
488 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
489 /// are currently open with that peer.
490 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
491 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
494 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
495 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
497 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
498 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
499 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
500 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
501 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
502 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
503 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
504 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
505 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
507 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
514 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
516 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
517 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
518 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
519 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
520 pub struct ChainParameters {
521 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
522 pub network: Network,
524 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
526 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
527 pub best_block: BestBlock,
530 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
536 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
537 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
538 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
539 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
540 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
541 /// updates are ready for persistence).
543 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
544 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
545 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
546 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
547 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
549 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
550 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
553 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
554 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
555 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
558 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
559 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
561 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
562 persistence_notifier: notifier,
563 should_persist: persist_check,
564 _read_guard: read_guard,
569 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
571 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
572 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
577 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
578 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
580 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
582 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
583 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
584 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
585 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
586 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
588 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
589 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
591 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
593 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
594 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
595 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
596 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
597 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
598 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
599 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
601 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
602 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
604 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
605 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
606 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
607 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
609 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
610 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
611 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
612 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
613 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
614 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
617 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
619 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
620 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
623 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
625 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
626 /// to better separate parameters.
627 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
628 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
629 /// The node_id of our counterparty
630 pub node_id: PublicKey,
631 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
632 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
633 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
634 pub features: InitFeatures,
635 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
636 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
637 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
639 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
641 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
642 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
643 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
644 /// payments to us through this channel.
645 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
648 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
649 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
650 pub struct ChannelDetails {
651 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
652 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
653 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
654 /// lifetime of the channel.
655 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
656 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
657 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
658 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
659 /// our counterparty already.
661 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
662 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
663 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
664 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
665 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
666 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
667 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
668 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
669 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
670 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
671 /// this value on chain.
673 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
675 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
677 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
678 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
679 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
681 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
682 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
683 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
684 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
686 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
687 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
688 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
689 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
690 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
691 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
692 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
693 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
694 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
696 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
697 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
698 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
699 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
700 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
701 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
702 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
703 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
704 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
706 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
708 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
709 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
710 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
711 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
712 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
713 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
714 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
715 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
716 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
718 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
719 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
720 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
721 pub is_outbound: bool,
722 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
723 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
724 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
725 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
726 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
728 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
729 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
730 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
731 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
733 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
735 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
739 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
740 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
742 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
743 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
744 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
745 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
746 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
747 ParameterError(APIError),
748 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
749 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
750 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
753 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
755 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
756 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
757 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
758 /// paths than the ones selected).
759 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
760 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
761 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
762 /// in over-/re-payment.
764 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
765 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
766 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
768 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
769 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
770 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
771 /// with the latest update_id.
772 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
775 macro_rules! handle_error {
776 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
779 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
780 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
782 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
783 // entering the macro.
784 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
787 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
789 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
790 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
791 if let Some(update) = update_option {
792 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
798 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
799 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
801 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
802 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
803 action: err.action.clone()
807 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
808 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
811 // Return error in case higher-API need one
818 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
819 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
820 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
822 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
823 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
825 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
826 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
827 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
828 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
830 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
831 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
833 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
834 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
835 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
836 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
838 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
839 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
845 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
846 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
850 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
852 $entry.remove_entry();
860 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
861 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
865 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
867 $entry.remove_entry();
875 macro_rules! remove_channel {
876 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
878 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
879 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
880 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
887 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
888 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
889 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
891 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
893 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
894 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
895 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
896 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
898 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
899 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
900 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
901 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
902 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
903 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
904 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
905 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
906 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
907 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id,
908 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
911 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
912 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
913 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
914 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
916 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
917 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
919 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
920 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
922 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
923 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
924 if !$resend_commitment {
925 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
928 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
930 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
931 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
935 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
936 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
938 $entry.remove_entry();
944 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
945 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
946 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
948 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
949 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
953 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
954 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
955 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
956 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
957 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
960 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
965 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
966 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
967 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
968 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
969 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
970 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
972 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
973 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
975 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
976 if !forwards.is_empty() {
977 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
978 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
981 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
982 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
983 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
984 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
985 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
986 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
987 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
988 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
989 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
990 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
991 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
992 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
995 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
996 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
997 // before it should be allowed to.
998 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
999 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1000 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1003 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1004 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1005 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1006 msg: announcement_sigs,
1009 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1012 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1013 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1014 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1015 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1016 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1017 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1018 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1019 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1020 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1021 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1022 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1023 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1024 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1025 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1026 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1027 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1028 let mut order = $order;
1030 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1032 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1036 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1037 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1038 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1039 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1044 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1045 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1046 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1047 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1048 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1053 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1057 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1062 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1063 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1064 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1069 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1070 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1071 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1072 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1073 assert!(res.is_ok());
1076 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1080 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1081 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1082 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1084 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1086 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1087 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1092 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1093 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1094 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1095 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1096 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1099 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1101 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1102 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1104 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1106 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1108 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1109 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1110 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1111 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1112 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1113 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1116 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1117 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1118 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1122 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1124 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1125 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1126 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1127 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1128 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1129 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1131 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1132 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1134 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1135 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1138 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1139 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1141 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1143 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1144 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1145 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1146 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1154 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1155 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1156 &self.default_configuration
1159 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1161 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1162 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1163 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1164 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1165 /// otherwise ignored.
1167 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1168 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1170 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1171 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1173 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1174 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1175 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten.
1176 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1177 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1178 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1182 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1183 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1184 Some(peer_state) => {
1185 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1186 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1187 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1188 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?
1190 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1193 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1195 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1196 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1197 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1199 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1200 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1201 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1202 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1203 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1205 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1208 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1210 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1211 node_id: their_network_key,
1217 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1218 let mut res = Vec::new();
1220 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1221 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1222 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1223 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1224 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1225 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1226 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1227 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1228 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1229 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1230 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1231 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1232 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1234 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1235 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1236 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1237 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1238 inbound_capacity_msat,
1239 outbound_capacity_msat,
1240 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1241 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1242 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1243 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1244 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1245 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1246 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1250 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1251 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1252 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1253 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1259 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1260 /// more information.
1261 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1262 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1265 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1266 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1268 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1269 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1271 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1272 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1273 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1274 // really wanted anyway.
1275 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1278 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1279 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1280 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1282 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1283 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1284 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1286 let counterparty_node_id;
1287 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1288 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1289 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1290 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1291 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1292 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1293 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1294 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1295 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1296 Some(peer_state) => {
1297 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1298 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1299 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features)?
1301 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1303 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1305 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1306 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1307 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1308 let (result, is_permanent) =
1309 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1311 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1317 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1318 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1322 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1323 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1324 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1325 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1332 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1336 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1337 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1340 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1345 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1346 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1347 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1348 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1349 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1351 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1352 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1353 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1354 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1355 // ignore the result here.
1356 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1360 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1362 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1363 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1364 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1365 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1366 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1367 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1370 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1371 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1373 chan.remove_entry().1
1375 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1378 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1379 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1380 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1381 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1382 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1387 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1390 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1391 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1392 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1393 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1394 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1395 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1396 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1397 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1398 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1399 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1400 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1410 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1411 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1412 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1413 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1414 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1418 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1419 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1420 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1422 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1423 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1424 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1425 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1426 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1427 failure_code: $err_code,
1428 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1433 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1434 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1437 let shared_secret = {
1438 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1439 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1442 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1444 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1445 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1446 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1447 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1448 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1449 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1450 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1451 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1454 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1455 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1456 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1457 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1458 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1461 let mut channel_state = None;
1462 macro_rules! return_err {
1463 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1465 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1466 if channel_state.is_none() {
1467 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1469 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1470 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1471 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1472 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1473 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1478 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1479 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1480 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1481 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1483 let error_code = match err {
1484 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1485 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1486 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1487 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1488 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1490 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1493 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1494 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1495 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1502 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1505 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1506 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1507 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1508 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1509 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1510 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1511 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1512 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1513 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1514 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1515 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1516 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1520 // final_expiry_too_soon
1521 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1522 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1523 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1524 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1525 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1526 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1527 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1529 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1530 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1531 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1533 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1534 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1535 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1538 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1539 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1540 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1541 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1542 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1543 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1544 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1545 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1547 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1549 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1550 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1551 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1552 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1553 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1554 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1555 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1556 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1557 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1560 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1562 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1565 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1570 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1571 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1572 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1573 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1575 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1577 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1578 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1579 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1580 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1583 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1584 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1585 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1587 // Check two things:
1588 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1589 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1590 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1592 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1594 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1595 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1596 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1598 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1600 let blinding_factor = {
1601 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1602 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1603 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1604 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1607 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1609 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1611 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1614 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1615 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1618 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1619 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1620 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1621 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1622 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1626 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1627 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1628 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1631 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1632 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1633 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1634 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1638 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1639 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1640 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1641 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1642 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1643 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1644 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1645 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1646 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1647 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1648 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1650 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1653 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1655 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1656 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1657 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1658 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1659 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1662 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1663 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1664 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1665 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1666 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1667 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1668 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1670 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1671 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1673 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1674 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1675 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1676 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1677 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1679 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1680 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1682 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1683 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1684 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1685 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1686 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1688 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1689 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1691 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1692 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1693 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1694 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1700 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1701 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1702 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1703 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1705 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1706 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1708 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1709 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1710 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1712 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1714 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1719 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1722 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1723 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1724 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1726 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1727 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1728 if !chan.should_announce() {
1729 return Err(LightningError {
1730 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1731 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1734 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1735 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1738 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1739 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1740 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1741 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1742 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1743 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1744 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1745 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1746 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1750 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1752 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1753 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1755 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1756 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1757 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1758 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1759 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1760 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
1761 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1762 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1765 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1766 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1768 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1774 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1775 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1776 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1777 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1778 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1779 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1781 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1782 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1783 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
1784 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1785 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1787 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1789 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1790 assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().insert(session_priv_bytes));
1792 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1793 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1794 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1795 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1796 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1799 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1800 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1802 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1803 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1805 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1806 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1808 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1810 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1811 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1812 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1814 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1815 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1816 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1817 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1818 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1819 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1820 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1821 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1822 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1825 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
1826 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1827 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1828 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1829 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1830 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1831 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1832 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1840 } else { unreachable!(); }
1844 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1845 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1847 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1852 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1854 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1855 /// fields for more info.
1857 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1858 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1859 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1860 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1861 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1862 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1864 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1866 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1867 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1868 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1870 /// In general, a path may raise:
1871 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1872 /// node public key) is specified.
1873 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1874 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1876 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1877 /// relevant updates.
1879 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1880 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1881 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1883 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1884 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1885 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1886 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1888 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1889 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1890 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1891 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1892 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None)
1895 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1896 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1897 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1899 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1900 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1901 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1902 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1903 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1905 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
1906 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
1908 let mut total_value = 0;
1909 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1910 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1911 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1912 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1913 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1914 continue 'path_check;
1916 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1917 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1918 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1919 continue 'path_check;
1922 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1923 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1925 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1926 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1929 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1930 let mut results = Vec::new();
1931 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1932 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, &keysend_preimage));
1934 let mut has_ok = false;
1935 let mut has_err = false;
1936 for res in results.iter() {
1937 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1938 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1939 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1940 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1947 if has_err && has_ok {
1948 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1950 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1956 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
1957 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
1958 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
1959 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
1960 /// never reach the recipient.
1962 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
1964 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
1965 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
1967 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
1969 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1970 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
1971 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
1973 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
1975 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
1976 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage)) {
1977 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
1982 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
1983 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
1984 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
1985 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1987 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1989 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
1991 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1992 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1993 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1994 } else { unreachable!(); })
1997 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1999 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2000 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2003 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2004 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2009 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2010 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2011 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2014 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2015 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2016 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2018 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2026 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2027 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2028 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2032 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2034 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2035 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2037 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2039 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2040 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2041 /// keys per-channel).
2043 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2044 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2045 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2047 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2048 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2049 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2051 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2052 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2053 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2055 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2056 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2057 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2058 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2062 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2063 let mut output_index = None;
2064 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2065 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2066 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2067 if output_index.is_some() {
2068 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2069 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2072 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2073 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2074 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2077 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2080 if output_index.is_none() {
2081 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2082 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2085 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2089 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2090 if !chan.should_announce() {
2091 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2095 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2097 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2099 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2100 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2102 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2103 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2104 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2105 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2106 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2111 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2112 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2113 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2115 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2118 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2119 // smaller than 500:
2120 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2122 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2123 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2124 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2125 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2126 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2127 /// our network addresses.
2129 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2130 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2132 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2133 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2134 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2135 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2137 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2139 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2140 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2141 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2143 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2144 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2147 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2148 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2149 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2151 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2152 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2153 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2154 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2155 rgb, alias, addresses,
2156 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2157 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2159 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2160 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2162 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2163 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2165 let mut announced_chans = false;
2166 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2167 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2168 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2170 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2175 announced_chans = true;
2177 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2178 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2179 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2183 if announced_chans {
2184 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2185 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2186 signature: node_announce_sig,
2187 contents: announcement
2193 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2195 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2196 /// Will likely generate further events.
2197 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2198 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2200 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2201 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2202 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2204 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2205 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2207 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2208 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2209 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2210 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2212 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2213 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2214 match forward_info {
2215 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2216 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2217 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2218 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2219 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2220 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2221 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2223 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2224 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2227 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2228 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2229 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2230 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2231 // problem, not ours.
2238 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2239 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2240 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2241 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2242 match forward_info {
2243 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2244 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2246 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2247 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2248 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2249 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2250 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2251 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2252 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2253 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2255 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2257 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2258 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2260 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2262 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2263 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2264 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2270 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2272 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2273 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2274 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2275 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2276 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2277 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2278 // this channel currently :/.
2284 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2285 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2287 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2288 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2289 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2291 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2292 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2294 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2296 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2297 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2298 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2301 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2303 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2304 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2305 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2306 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2307 // messages when we can.
2308 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2309 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2310 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2317 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2318 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2321 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2322 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2323 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2324 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2325 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
2326 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2328 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2329 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2330 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2331 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2332 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2334 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2336 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2338 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2342 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2343 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2346 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2347 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2348 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2349 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2350 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2351 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2352 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2353 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2354 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2356 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2364 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2365 match forward_info {
2366 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2367 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2368 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2369 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2370 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2371 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2372 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2373 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2375 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2378 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2379 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2380 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2381 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2382 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2383 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2385 value: amt_to_forward,
2390 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2392 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2393 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2394 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2396 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2397 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2398 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2399 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2400 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2402 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2407 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2408 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2409 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2410 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2411 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2412 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2413 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2414 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2415 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2416 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2417 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2418 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2419 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2421 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2422 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2423 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2424 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2425 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2427 amt: amt_to_forward,
2428 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2431 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2432 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2433 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2439 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2441 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2444 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2445 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2448 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2449 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2450 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2451 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2452 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2453 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2454 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2456 let mut total_value = 0;
2457 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2458 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2459 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2460 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2461 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2462 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2466 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2467 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2468 total_value += htlc.value;
2469 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2470 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2471 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2472 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2473 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2474 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2476 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2478 _ => unreachable!(),
2481 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2482 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2483 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2484 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2487 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2488 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2490 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2491 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2492 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2493 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2497 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2498 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2500 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2502 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2503 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2510 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2511 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2519 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2520 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2523 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2524 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2527 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2528 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2529 events.append(&mut new_events);
2532 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2534 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2535 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2537 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2538 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2539 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2540 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2541 if background_events.is_empty() {
2545 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2547 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2548 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2549 // monitor updating completing.
2550 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2557 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2558 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2559 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2560 self.process_background_events();
2563 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
2564 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
2565 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
2566 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
2567 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2568 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2569 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2571 if !chan.is_live() {
2572 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
2573 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2574 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2576 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2577 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2579 let mut retain_channel = true;
2580 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
2583 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2584 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2588 let ret_err = match res {
2589 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
2590 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2591 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
2592 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2595 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2596 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2597 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2598 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2599 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2600 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2601 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2602 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2612 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
2616 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
2617 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
2618 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
2619 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
2620 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
2621 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2622 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2624 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2626 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2628 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2629 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2630 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2631 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2632 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2633 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2634 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2636 handle_errors.push(err);
2646 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
2648 /// This currently includes:
2649 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
2650 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
2651 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
2654 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
2655 /// estimate fetches.
2656 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2657 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2658 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2659 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2661 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2663 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2665 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2666 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2667 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2668 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2669 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2670 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2671 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2672 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2673 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2674 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2675 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2676 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2677 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2681 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2682 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2684 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2685 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2686 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2690 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2691 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2696 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
2697 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2698 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2700 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
2706 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2707 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2714 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2715 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2716 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2717 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2718 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2719 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2720 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2722 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2723 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2724 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2725 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2726 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2727 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2728 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2729 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2730 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2731 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2732 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2738 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2739 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2740 // be surfaced to the user.
2741 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2742 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2744 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2745 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2746 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2747 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2748 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
2749 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2751 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2754 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2756 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2757 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2758 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2760 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2762 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2763 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2764 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2766 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2767 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2769 rejected_by_dest: false,
2777 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2784 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2785 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2786 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2787 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2788 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2789 /// still-available channels.
2790 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2791 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2792 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2793 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2796 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2797 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2798 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2800 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, .. } => {
2802 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2803 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2804 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2806 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2809 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2810 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2811 match &onion_error {
2812 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2814 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2816 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2817 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2818 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2819 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2820 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2821 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2822 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2827 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2828 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2829 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2830 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2832 error_code: onion_error_code,
2834 error_data: onion_error_data
2838 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2844 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2845 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2846 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2847 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2849 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2850 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2851 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2852 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2853 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2854 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2856 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2858 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2864 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2865 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2866 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2867 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2868 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2869 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2871 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2872 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2873 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2877 let mut forward_event = None;
2878 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2879 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2881 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2882 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2883 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2885 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2886 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2889 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2890 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2891 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2892 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2893 time_forwardable: time
2900 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2901 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2902 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2904 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
2905 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
2906 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
2907 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
2909 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2911 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
2912 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
2913 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
2914 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2916 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2918 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2919 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
2920 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2921 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2923 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2924 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2925 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2926 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2928 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2929 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2930 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2931 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2932 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2934 let mut valid_mpp = true;
2935 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2936 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2942 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2943 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2944 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2946 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2947 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2948 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2949 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2950 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2951 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2952 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2954 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2955 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
2956 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
2957 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2958 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2959 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
2960 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2961 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
2963 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2964 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
2965 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
2966 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
2967 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
2968 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
2970 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2975 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2976 // which were generated.
2977 channel_state.take();
2979 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2980 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2981 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2988 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
2989 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2990 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2991 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2992 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2994 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
2998 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2999 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3000 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3001 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3002 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3003 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3004 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3005 payment_preimage, e);
3006 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3007 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3008 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3009 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3012 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3013 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3014 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3015 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3016 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3017 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3018 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3019 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3020 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3021 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3027 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3029 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3032 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3033 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3034 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3035 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3036 payment_preimage, e);
3038 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3039 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3041 chan.remove_entry();
3043 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3046 } else { unreachable!(); }
3049 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3051 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
3052 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3054 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3055 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3056 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
3058 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3059 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
3063 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3066 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3067 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3068 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3069 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3070 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3071 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3072 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3075 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3076 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3077 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3078 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3079 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3082 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3083 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3084 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3085 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3086 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3087 payment_preimage, e);
3089 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3090 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3091 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3092 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3095 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3096 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3097 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3098 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3102 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3103 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3104 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3107 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3108 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3110 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3118 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3119 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3120 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3123 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
3124 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
3127 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
3128 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
3130 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
3131 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
3132 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
3133 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
3135 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
3136 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
3137 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
3138 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
3139 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
3140 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
3141 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
3142 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
3143 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3144 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3146 let chan_restoration_res;
3147 let mut pending_failures = {
3148 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3149 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3150 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3151 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3152 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3154 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3158 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3159 let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3160 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3161 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3162 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3163 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3164 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3165 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3166 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3169 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
3170 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3171 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3175 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3176 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3177 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3181 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3182 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3183 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3186 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
3187 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3188 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3189 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3190 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3191 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3192 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3193 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3194 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3195 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3197 entry.insert(channel);
3203 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3204 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3205 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3206 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3207 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3208 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3209 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3210 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3212 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3213 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3215 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3218 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3219 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3220 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3221 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3223 user_channel_id: user_id,
3228 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3229 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3230 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3231 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3232 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3233 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3234 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3235 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3236 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3238 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3240 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3243 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3244 // lock before watch_channel
3245 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3247 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3248 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3249 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3250 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3251 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3252 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3253 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3254 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3255 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3256 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3257 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3259 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3260 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3261 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3262 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3263 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3264 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3268 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3269 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3270 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3271 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3272 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3274 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3275 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3276 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3285 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3287 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3288 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3289 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3290 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3291 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3292 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3293 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3295 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3296 Ok(update) => update,
3297 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3299 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3300 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3304 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3307 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3308 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3312 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3313 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3314 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3315 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3316 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3317 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3318 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3320 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3321 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3322 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3323 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3324 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3325 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3326 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3327 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3328 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3329 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3330 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3331 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3332 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3333 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3334 msg: announcement_sigs,
3336 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3337 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3338 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3339 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3344 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3348 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3349 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3350 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3351 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3352 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3354 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3355 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3356 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3357 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3360 let (shutdown, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3361 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3363 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3364 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3365 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3366 let (result, is_permanent) =
3367 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3369 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3375 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3376 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3377 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3381 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3382 // TODO: Do not send this if the monitor update failed.
3383 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3384 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3391 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3394 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3395 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3398 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3402 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3403 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3404 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3405 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3406 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3407 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3408 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3409 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3411 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3412 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3413 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3414 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3419 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3420 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3421 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3422 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3423 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3424 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3425 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3427 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3428 } else { (tx, None) }
3430 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3433 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3434 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3435 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3437 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3438 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3439 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3440 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3448 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3449 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3450 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3451 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3453 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3454 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3455 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3456 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3458 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3459 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3461 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3462 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3463 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3464 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3467 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3468 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
3469 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
3470 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
3471 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3472 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3473 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3474 match pending_forward_info {
3475 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3476 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3477 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3478 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3479 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3480 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3481 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3485 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3486 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3487 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3488 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3489 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3490 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
3491 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3492 // no problem just calling this
3493 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3494 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3496 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3497 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3498 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3501 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3503 _ => pending_forward_info
3506 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3508 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3513 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3514 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3515 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3516 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3517 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3518 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3519 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3520 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3522 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3524 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3527 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
3531 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3532 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3533 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3534 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3535 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3536 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3537 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3539 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3541 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3546 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3547 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3548 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3549 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3550 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3551 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3552 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3554 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3555 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3556 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3558 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3561 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3565 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3566 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3567 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3568 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3569 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3570 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3571 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3573 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
3574 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
3575 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3576 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3577 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3578 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3579 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3584 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3585 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3586 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
3588 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3589 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3590 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3592 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3593 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3594 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3595 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3596 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3597 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3598 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3599 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3601 commitment_signed: msg,
3605 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3606 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3607 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3613 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3618 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3619 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3620 let mut forward_event = None;
3621 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3622 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3623 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3624 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3626 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3627 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3628 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3629 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3630 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
3632 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3633 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3634 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3636 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3637 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3638 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3643 match forward_event {
3645 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3646 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3647 time_forwardable: time
3655 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3656 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3658 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3659 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3660 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3661 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3662 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3663 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3665 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3666 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3667 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3668 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3669 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3670 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3671 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3672 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3674 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3676 } else { unreachable!(); }
3679 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3680 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3681 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3685 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3686 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3687 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3691 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3693 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3696 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3698 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3699 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3700 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3702 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3709 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3710 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3711 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3712 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3713 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3714 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3715 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3717 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3719 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3724 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3725 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3726 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3728 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3729 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3730 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3731 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3733 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3734 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3737 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3738 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3739 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
3740 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
3741 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3744 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3749 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
3750 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3751 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3752 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3753 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3754 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3756 // It's not a local channel
3757 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
3760 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3761 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3762 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3763 if chan.get().should_announce() {
3764 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
3765 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
3766 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
3767 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3769 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3771 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3772 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
3773 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
3774 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3776 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3779 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3781 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
3784 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3785 let chan_restoration_res;
3786 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
3787 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3788 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3790 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3791 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3792 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3793 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3795 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3796 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3797 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3798 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3799 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
3800 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3801 let mut channel_update = None;
3802 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3803 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3804 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3807 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3808 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
3809 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
3810 // they have the latest channel parameters.
3811 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3812 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3813 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3816 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
3817 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
3818 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3819 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3821 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
3823 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3826 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3827 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
3829 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
3830 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
3835 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
3836 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
3837 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3838 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
3839 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
3840 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
3841 match monitor_event {
3842 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3843 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3844 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3845 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
3847 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3848 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3851 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3852 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3853 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3854 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3855 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3856 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3857 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3858 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3859 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3861 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3862 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3863 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3867 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3868 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3869 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3870 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3878 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3879 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3882 has_pending_monitor_events
3885 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
3886 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
3887 /// update was applied.
3889 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
3890 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
3891 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
3892 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
3893 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
3894 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
3895 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3896 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3898 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3899 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3900 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3901 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3902 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3904 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
3905 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
3906 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3907 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
3908 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
3910 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
3911 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3912 has_monitor_update = true;
3913 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
3914 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
3915 if close_channel { return false; }
3917 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3918 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3919 updates: commitment_update,
3926 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
3927 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
3934 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
3935 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3936 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
3939 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3940 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3946 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3947 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3949 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3950 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3951 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3952 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3953 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3954 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3955 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3956 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3957 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3958 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3959 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3960 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3961 assert!(should_broadcast);
3962 } else { unreachable!(); }
3963 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3965 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3969 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3970 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
3972 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3974 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3975 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3976 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3977 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3978 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
3979 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
3980 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
3981 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
3982 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
3983 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
3984 // never fail a payment too early.
3985 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
3987 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
3990 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
3995 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
3998 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
3999 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4001 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4002 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4003 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4005 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4007 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4008 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4009 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4010 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4011 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4012 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4013 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4016 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4017 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4020 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4021 /// stored external to LDK.
4023 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4024 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4025 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4027 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4028 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4030 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
4031 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
4032 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
4033 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
4034 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
4036 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4037 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4038 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4039 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4041 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4042 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4043 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4044 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4045 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4047 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4048 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4049 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4050 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4051 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4053 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4054 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4055 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4057 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4059 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4060 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4062 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4063 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4064 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
4065 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4066 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4069 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4070 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4071 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4072 let event_handler = |event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
4073 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4078 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4079 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4080 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4081 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4082 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4085 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4086 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4087 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4088 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4090 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4091 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4092 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4093 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4096 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4097 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4100 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4101 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4102 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4104 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4105 events.replace(pending_events);
4114 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4116 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4117 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4118 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4119 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4122 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4124 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4125 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4127 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4128 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4129 /// restarting from an old state.
4130 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4131 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4132 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4134 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4135 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4136 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4137 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4140 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4141 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4142 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4145 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4146 handler.handle_event(event);
4154 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4156 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4157 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4158 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4159 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4162 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4164 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4165 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4166 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4167 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4168 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4171 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4172 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4173 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4176 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4177 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4178 let new_height = height - 1;
4180 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4181 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4182 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4183 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4184 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4185 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4188 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4192 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4194 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4195 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4196 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4197 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4200 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4201 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4202 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4203 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4205 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4206 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4208 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4209 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4212 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4213 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4214 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4215 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4217 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4218 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4220 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4222 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4224 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4226 macro_rules! max_time {
4227 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4229 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4230 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4231 // having an explicit local time source.
4232 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4233 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4234 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4235 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4236 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4242 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4243 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4244 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4245 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4246 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4250 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4251 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4252 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4253 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4254 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4255 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4261 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4262 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4263 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4264 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4265 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4266 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4267 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4268 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4273 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4275 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4276 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4277 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4278 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4281 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4282 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4284 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4285 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4286 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4287 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4288 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4290 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4291 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4293 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4294 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4295 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4296 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4297 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4298 let res = f(channel);
4299 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4300 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4301 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4302 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4303 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4307 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4308 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4309 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4310 msg: funding_locked,
4312 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4313 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4314 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4315 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4316 msg: announcement_sigs,
4318 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4319 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4320 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4321 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4322 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4325 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4327 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4329 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4330 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4331 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4333 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4334 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4335 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4336 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4337 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4341 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4342 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4343 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4350 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4351 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4352 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4353 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4354 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4355 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4356 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4357 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4358 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4359 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4360 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4361 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4362 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4367 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4372 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4374 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4375 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4379 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4380 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4381 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4383 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4384 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4385 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4386 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4389 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4390 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4392 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4393 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4396 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4397 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4398 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4399 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4400 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4404 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4405 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4406 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4407 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4411 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4412 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4413 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4414 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4415 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4416 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4419 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4420 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4421 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4424 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4425 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4426 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4429 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4430 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4431 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4434 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4435 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4436 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4439 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4440 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4441 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4444 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4445 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4446 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4449 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4450 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4451 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4454 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4455 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4456 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4459 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4460 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4461 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4464 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4465 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4466 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4469 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4470 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4471 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4474 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4475 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4476 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4479 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4480 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4481 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4484 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4485 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4486 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4489 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4490 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4491 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4494 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4495 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4496 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4499 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4504 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4505 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4506 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4509 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4510 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4511 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4512 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4514 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4515 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4516 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4517 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4518 if no_connection_possible {
4519 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4520 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4521 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4522 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4523 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4525 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4526 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4527 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4537 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4538 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4539 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4540 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4541 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4542 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4543 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4547 no_channels_remain = false;
4553 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4555 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4556 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4557 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4558 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4559 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4560 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4561 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4562 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4563 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4564 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4565 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4566 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4567 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4568 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4569 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4570 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4571 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
4572 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4573 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4574 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4578 if no_channels_remain {
4579 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4582 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4583 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4587 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4588 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4590 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4593 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4594 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4595 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4596 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4597 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4600 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4601 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4606 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4607 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4608 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4609 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4610 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4611 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4612 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4613 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4614 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4618 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4619 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4620 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4626 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4629 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4630 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4632 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4633 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4634 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4635 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4636 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4640 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4641 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4646 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4647 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4648 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4649 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4650 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4651 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4654 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4657 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4663 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4664 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4669 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4670 let result = *guard;
4678 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4679 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4680 let current_time = Instant::now();
4682 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4683 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4688 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4689 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4690 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4691 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4692 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4694 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4695 let result = *guard;
4696 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4700 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4701 None => return result,
4707 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4709 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4710 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4711 *persistence_lock = true;
4712 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4717 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4718 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4720 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
4722 (0, onion_packet, required),
4723 (2, short_channel_id, required),
4726 (0, payment_data, required),
4727 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4729 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
4730 (0, payment_preimage, required),
4731 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4735 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
4736 (0, routing, required),
4737 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
4738 (4, payment_hash, required),
4739 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
4740 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
4743 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailureMsg, ;
4747 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
4752 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
4753 (0, short_channel_id, required),
4754 (2, outpoint, required),
4755 (4, htlc_id, required),
4756 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
4759 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
4760 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4761 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
4762 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
4765 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
4766 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
4767 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
4772 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
4773 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
4774 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
4780 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
4781 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4782 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
4784 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
4785 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
4786 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4790 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
4791 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
4792 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
4794 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
4796 if payment_data.is_some() {
4797 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4799 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
4802 if payment_data.is_none() {
4803 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4805 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
4809 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
4817 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCSource,
4818 (0, OutboundRoute) => {
4819 (0, session_priv, required),
4820 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
4821 (4, path, vec_type),
4823 (1, PreviousHopData)
4826 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
4827 (0, LightningError) => {
4831 (0, failure_code, required),
4832 (2, data, vec_type),
4836 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
4838 (0, forward_info, required),
4839 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
4840 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
4841 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
4844 (0, htlc_id, required),
4845 (2, err_packet, required),
4849 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
4850 (0, payment_secret, required),
4851 (2, expiry_time, required),
4852 (4, user_payment_id, required),
4853 (6, payment_preimage, required),
4854 (8, min_value_msat, required),
4857 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4858 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4859 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4860 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4861 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4864 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4865 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4867 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4869 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4871 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4872 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4873 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4876 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4877 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4878 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4879 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4880 unfunded_channels += 1;
4883 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4884 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4885 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4886 channel.write(writer)?;
4890 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4891 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4892 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4893 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4894 for forward in pending_forwards {
4895 forward.write(writer)?;
4899 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4900 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4901 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4902 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4903 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4904 htlc.write(writer)?;
4908 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4909 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4910 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4911 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4912 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4913 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4916 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4917 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4918 for event in events.iter() {
4919 event.write(writer)?;
4922 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4923 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4924 for event in background_events.iter() {
4926 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4928 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4929 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4934 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4935 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4937 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4938 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4939 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
4940 hash.write(writer)?;
4941 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
4944 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4945 (pending_outbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4946 for session_priv in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
4947 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4950 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
4956 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4958 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4960 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4961 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4962 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4963 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4964 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4965 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4966 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4967 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4968 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4969 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4970 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4972 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4973 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4975 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4976 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4977 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4978 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4979 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4980 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4981 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4982 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4983 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4984 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4985 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4988 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4989 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4991 pub keys_manager: K,
4993 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4995 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4996 pub fee_estimator: F,
4997 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4999 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5000 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5001 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5002 pub chain_monitor: M,
5004 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5005 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5006 /// force-closed during deserialization.
5007 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5008 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5009 /// deserialization.
5011 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5012 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5013 pub default_config: UserConfig,
5015 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5016 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5018 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5019 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5020 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5021 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5023 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5026 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5027 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5030 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5031 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5032 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5033 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5034 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5035 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5038 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5039 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5040 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5041 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5042 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5044 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5045 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5050 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5051 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5052 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5053 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5054 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5055 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5056 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5057 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5060 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5061 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5062 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5066 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5067 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5068 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5069 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5070 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5071 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5074 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5075 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5077 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5078 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5079 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5081 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5083 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5084 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5085 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5086 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5087 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5088 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
5089 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5090 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5091 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5092 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5093 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5094 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5095 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5096 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5097 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5098 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5099 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5100 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5101 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5102 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5103 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5104 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5105 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5106 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5107 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5108 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5109 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5110 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5111 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5112 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5113 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5114 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5115 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5116 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5118 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5119 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5121 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5124 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5125 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5126 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5127 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5128 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5129 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5133 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5134 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5135 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5139 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5140 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5141 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5142 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5143 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5144 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5145 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5146 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5147 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5149 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5152 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5153 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5154 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5155 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5156 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5157 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5158 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5159 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5161 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5164 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5165 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5166 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5167 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5168 let peer_state = PeerState {
5169 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5171 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5174 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5175 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5176 for _ in 0..event_count {
5177 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5178 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5183 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5184 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5185 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5186 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5187 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5188 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5192 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5193 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5195 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5196 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5197 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5198 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5199 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5203 let pending_outbound_payments_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5204 let mut pending_outbound_payments: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5205 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count {
5206 if !pending_outbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?) {
5207 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5211 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
5213 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5214 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5216 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
5218 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
5219 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
5220 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
5222 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
5224 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
5229 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
5231 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
5232 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments),
5234 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
5235 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
5238 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
5239 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
5241 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
5243 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
5244 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
5245 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
5246 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
5248 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
5249 logger: args.logger,
5250 default_configuration: args.default_config,
5253 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5254 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5257 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
5258 //connection or two.
5260 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
5266 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5267 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5268 use core::time::Duration;
5269 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
5270 use ln::channelmanager::PaymentSendFailure;
5271 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5272 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5274 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5275 use routing::router::{get_keysend_route, get_route};
5276 use util::errors::APIError;
5277 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
5278 use util::test_utils;
5280 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5282 fn test_wait_timeout() {
5283 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
5285 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
5288 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
5289 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
5291 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
5292 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
5293 thread::spawn(move || {
5295 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
5296 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5297 *persistence_lock = true;
5300 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
5306 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
5307 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
5309 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
5312 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5317 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
5319 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
5322 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5329 fn test_notify_limits() {
5330 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
5331 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
5332 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5333 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5334 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5335 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5337 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
5338 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
5339 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5340 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5341 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5343 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5345 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
5346 // to connect messages with new values
5347 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5348 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5349 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5350 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5352 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
5353 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5354 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5355 // ... but the last node should not.
5356 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5357 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
5358 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5359 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5361 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
5362 // about the channel.
5363 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5364 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5365 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5367 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
5369 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5370 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5371 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5372 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5373 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5374 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5376 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
5377 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5378 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5380 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
5381 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
5382 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
5383 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
5384 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
5385 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
5387 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
5388 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
5389 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5390 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5391 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5392 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5393 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5394 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5396 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
5397 // the channel info has updated.
5398 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5399 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5400 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5401 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5402 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5403 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5407 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
5408 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
5410 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5411 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5412 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5413 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5414 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5415 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5417 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
5418 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5419 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5420 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
5421 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
5422 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
5423 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
5424 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
5425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5426 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5427 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5428 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
5430 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
5431 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5433 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5434 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5435 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5436 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5437 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5438 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5439 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5440 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5441 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5442 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5443 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5444 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5445 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5446 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5447 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5448 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5449 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5450 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5451 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5453 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
5454 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
5455 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5456 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5457 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5458 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
5460 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
5461 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
5462 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
5463 // lightning messages manually.
5464 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5465 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5466 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5467 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5468 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
5469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5470 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5471 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
5472 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5473 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5474 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
5475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5476 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5477 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5478 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5480 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5481 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
5482 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5484 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
5485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5486 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5488 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5489 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
5490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5492 // There's an existing bug that generates a PaymentSent event for each MPP path, so handle that here.
5493 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5495 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5496 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5498 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5501 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5502 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5504 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5509 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
5510 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
5511 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
5512 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
5513 // fails as expected.
5514 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5515 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5516 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5517 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5518 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5519 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5521 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
5522 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
5523 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
5525 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
5526 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5527 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5528 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5529 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5530 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5531 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5532 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5533 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5534 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5535 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5536 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5537 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5538 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5539 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5540 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5541 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5542 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5543 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5544 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5545 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5546 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5547 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5549 // Finally, claim the original payment.
5550 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5552 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
5553 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5554 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5555 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5556 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5557 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5558 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5559 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
5560 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
5561 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
5563 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
5564 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5565 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5567 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5568 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5569 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5570 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5571 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5572 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5573 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5574 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5575 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5576 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5577 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5578 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5579 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5580 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5581 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5582 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5583 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5584 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5585 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5587 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
5588 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5592 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
5593 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
5594 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
5595 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5596 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5597 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5598 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5600 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5601 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5602 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5603 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5605 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5606 let network_graph = nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
5607 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5608 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5609 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5610 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5612 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5613 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
5614 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5615 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5617 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5618 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5619 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5620 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5621 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5622 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5623 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5625 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
5629 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
5630 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
5631 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5632 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5633 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5634 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5636 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5637 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5638 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5639 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5641 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5642 let network_graph = nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
5643 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5644 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5645 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5646 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5648 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5649 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5650 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
5651 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5652 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5654 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5655 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5656 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5657 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5658 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5659 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5660 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5662 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
5666 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
5667 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5668 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5669 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
5670 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5672 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5673 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5674 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5675 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5676 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5678 // Marshall an MPP route.
5679 let (_, payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
5680 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5681 let mut route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5682 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
5683 route.paths.push(path);
5684 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5685 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
5686 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
5687 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
5688 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
5689 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
5691 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
5692 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
5693 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
5694 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
5699 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
5702 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
5703 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
5704 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
5705 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
5706 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5707 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5708 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
5709 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
5710 use routing::router::get_route;
5711 use util::test_utils;
5712 use util::config::UserConfig;
5713 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
5715 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5716 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5717 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
5719 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
5723 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
5724 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
5725 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
5726 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
5727 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
5728 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
5729 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
5734 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
5735 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
5738 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
5739 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
5740 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
5742 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
5743 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5745 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
5746 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
5748 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
5749 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
5751 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5752 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
5753 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
5754 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
5755 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5757 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5759 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
5761 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5762 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
5763 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
5764 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
5765 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5767 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5769 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
5771 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5772 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5773 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
5774 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5775 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5778 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
5779 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5780 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
5782 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
5783 } else { panic!(); }
5785 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5786 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5788 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
5791 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5794 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
5795 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
5797 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5798 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5799 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
5800 match msg_events[0] {
5801 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
5802 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
5803 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
5807 match msg_events[1] {
5808 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5812 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
5814 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
5815 macro_rules! send_payment {
5816 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
5817 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
5818 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
5819 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
5821 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
5822 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
5824 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
5825 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
5827 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5828 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
5829 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5830 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
5831 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5832 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5833 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5834 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5836 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
5837 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
5838 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5840 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
5841 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
5842 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5843 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5844 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
5846 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
5849 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
5850 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5851 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5852 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5854 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
5859 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
5860 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);