1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
47 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
48 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
51 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
53 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
54 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
55 use util::config::UserConfig;
56 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
57 use util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
59 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
60 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
61 use util::errors::APIError;
66 use core::cell::RefCell;
67 use io::{Cursor, Read};
68 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
69 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
70 use core::time::Duration;
71 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
72 use std::time::Instant;
74 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
76 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
78 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
79 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
80 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
82 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
83 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
84 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
85 // before we forward it.
87 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
88 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
89 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
90 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
91 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
93 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
94 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
96 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
105 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
109 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
110 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
111 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
112 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
113 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
114 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
115 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
120 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
121 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
124 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
125 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
126 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
127 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
128 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
131 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
133 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
135 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
136 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
137 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
139 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
141 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
145 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
149 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
150 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
151 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
152 short_channel_id: u64,
154 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
156 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
157 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
162 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
163 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
164 /// are part of the same payment.
165 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
166 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
167 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
170 struct ClaimableHTLC {
171 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
174 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
177 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
178 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
179 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
180 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
183 session_priv: SecretKey,
184 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
185 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
186 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
191 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
192 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
194 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
195 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
200 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
201 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
203 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
211 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
213 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
214 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
215 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
216 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
217 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
219 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
220 err: msgs::LightningError,
221 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
223 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
225 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
227 err: LightningError {
229 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
230 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
236 shutdown_finish: None,
240 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
242 err: LightningError {
244 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
246 shutdown_finish: None,
250 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
251 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
254 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
256 err: LightningError {
258 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
259 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
265 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
269 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
272 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
274 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
276 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
278 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
279 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
285 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
287 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
288 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
295 shutdown_finish: None,
300 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
301 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
302 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
303 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
304 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
306 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
307 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
308 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
309 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
310 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
311 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
312 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
314 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
318 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
319 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
320 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
321 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
322 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
323 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
324 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
325 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
326 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
327 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
328 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
329 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
331 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
332 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
333 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
334 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
337 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
338 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
339 /// quite some time lag.
340 enum BackgroundEvent {
341 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
342 /// commitment transaction.
343 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
346 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
347 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
349 latest_features: InitFeatures,
352 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
353 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
355 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
357 struct PendingInboundPayment {
358 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
359 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
360 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
361 /// this payment being removed.
363 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
364 user_payment_id: u64,
365 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
366 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
367 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
370 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
371 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
372 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
373 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
374 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
375 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
376 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
377 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
379 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
380 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
381 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
382 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
383 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
384 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
385 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
386 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
387 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
389 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
390 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
392 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
393 /// to individual Channels.
395 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
396 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
397 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
398 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
400 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
401 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
402 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
403 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
404 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
405 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
406 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
408 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
409 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
410 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
411 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
414 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
415 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
416 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
417 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
418 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
420 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
421 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
422 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
423 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
424 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
425 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
426 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
427 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
428 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
429 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
432 default_configuration: UserConfig,
433 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
439 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
441 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
442 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
444 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
445 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
446 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
447 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
449 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
450 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
451 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
452 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
453 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
454 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
456 /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
457 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
458 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
459 /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
460 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
461 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
462 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
463 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
465 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
466 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashSet<[u8; 32]>>,
468 our_network_key: SecretKey,
469 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
471 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
472 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
473 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
475 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
476 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
477 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
478 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
480 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
481 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
482 /// are currently open with that peer.
483 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
484 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
486 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
488 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
489 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
490 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
491 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
492 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
493 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
494 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
495 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
496 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
498 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
505 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
507 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
508 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
509 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
510 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
511 pub struct ChainParameters {
512 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
513 pub network: Network,
515 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
517 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
518 pub best_block: BestBlock,
521 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
527 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
528 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
529 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
530 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
531 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
532 /// updates are ready for persistence).
534 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
535 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
536 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
537 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
538 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
540 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
541 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
544 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
545 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
546 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
549 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
550 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
552 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
553 persistence_notifier: notifier,
554 should_persist: persist_check,
555 _read_guard: read_guard,
560 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
562 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
563 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
568 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
569 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
571 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
573 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
574 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
575 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
576 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
577 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
579 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
580 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
582 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
584 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
585 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
586 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
587 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
588 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
589 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
590 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
592 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
593 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
595 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
596 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
597 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
598 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
600 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
601 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
602 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
603 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
604 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
605 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
608 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
610 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
611 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
614 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
616 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
617 /// to better separate parameters.
618 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
619 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
620 /// The node_id of our counterparty
621 pub node_id: PublicKey,
622 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
623 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
624 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
625 pub features: InitFeatures,
626 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
627 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
628 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
630 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
632 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
633 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
634 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
635 /// payments to us through this channel.
636 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
639 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
640 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
641 pub struct ChannelDetails {
642 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
643 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
644 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
645 /// lifetime of the channel.
646 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
647 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
648 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
649 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
650 /// our counterparty already.
652 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
653 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
654 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
655 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
656 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
657 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
658 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
659 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
660 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
661 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
662 /// this value on chain.
664 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
666 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
668 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
669 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
670 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
672 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
673 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
674 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
675 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
677 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
678 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
679 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
680 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
681 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
682 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
683 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
684 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
685 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
687 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
688 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
689 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
690 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
691 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
692 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
693 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
694 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
695 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
697 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
699 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
700 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
701 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
702 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
703 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
704 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
705 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
706 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
707 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
709 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
710 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
711 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
712 pub is_outbound: bool,
713 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
714 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
715 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
716 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
717 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
719 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
720 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
721 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
722 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
724 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
726 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
730 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
731 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
733 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
734 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
735 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
736 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
737 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
738 ParameterError(APIError),
739 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
740 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
741 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
744 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
746 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
747 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
748 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
749 /// paths than the ones selected).
750 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
751 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
752 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
753 /// in over-/re-payment.
755 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
756 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
757 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
759 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
760 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
761 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
762 /// with the latest update_id.
763 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
766 macro_rules! handle_error {
767 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
770 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
771 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
773 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
774 // entering the macro.
775 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
778 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
780 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
781 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
782 if let Some(update) = update_option {
783 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
789 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
790 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
792 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
793 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
794 action: err.action.clone()
798 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
799 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
802 // Return error in case higher-API need one
809 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
810 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
811 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
813 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
814 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
816 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
817 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
818 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
819 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
821 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
822 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
824 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
825 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
826 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
827 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
829 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
830 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
836 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
837 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
841 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
843 $entry.remove_entry();
851 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
852 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
856 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
858 $entry.remove_entry();
866 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
867 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
868 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
870 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
872 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
873 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
874 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
875 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
877 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
878 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
879 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
880 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
881 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
882 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
883 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
884 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
885 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
886 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id,
887 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
890 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
891 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
892 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
893 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
895 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
896 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
898 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
899 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
901 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
902 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
903 if !$resend_commitment {
904 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
907 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
909 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
910 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
914 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
915 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
917 $entry.remove_entry();
923 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
924 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
925 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
927 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
928 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
932 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
933 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
934 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
935 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
936 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
939 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
944 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
945 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
946 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
947 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
948 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
949 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
951 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
952 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
954 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
955 if !forwards.is_empty() {
956 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
957 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
960 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
961 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
962 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
963 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
964 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
965 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
966 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
967 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
968 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
969 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
970 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
971 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
974 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
975 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
976 // before it should be allowed to.
977 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
978 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
979 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
982 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
983 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
984 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
985 msg: announcement_sigs,
988 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
991 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
992 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
993 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
994 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
995 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
996 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
997 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
998 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
999 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1000 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1001 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1002 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1003 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1004 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1005 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1006 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1007 let mut order = $order;
1009 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1011 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1015 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1016 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1017 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1018 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1023 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1024 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1025 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1026 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1027 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1032 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1036 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1041 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1042 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1043 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1048 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1049 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1050 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1051 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1052 assert!(res.is_ok());
1055 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1059 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1060 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1061 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1063 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1065 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1066 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1071 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1072 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1073 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1074 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1075 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1078 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1080 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1081 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1083 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1085 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1087 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1088 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1089 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1090 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1091 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1092 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1095 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1096 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1097 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1101 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1103 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1104 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1105 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1106 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1107 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1108 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1110 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1111 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1113 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1114 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1117 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1118 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1120 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1122 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1123 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1124 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1125 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1133 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1134 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1135 &self.default_configuration
1138 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1140 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1141 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1142 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1143 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1144 /// otherwise ignored.
1146 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1147 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1149 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1150 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1152 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1153 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1154 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten.
1155 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1156 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1157 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1160 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1161 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
1162 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1164 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1165 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1166 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1168 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1169 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1170 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1171 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1172 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1174 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1177 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1179 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1180 node_id: their_network_key,
1186 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1187 let mut res = Vec::new();
1189 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1190 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1191 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1192 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1193 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1194 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1195 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1196 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1197 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1198 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1199 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1200 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1201 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1203 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1204 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1205 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1206 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1207 inbound_capacity_msat,
1208 outbound_capacity_msat,
1209 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1210 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1211 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1212 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1213 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1214 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1215 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1219 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1220 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1221 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1222 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1228 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1229 /// more information.
1230 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1231 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1234 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1235 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1237 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1238 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1240 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1241 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1242 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1243 // really wanted anyway.
1244 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1247 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1248 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1249 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1251 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1252 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1253 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1255 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1256 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1257 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1258 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1259 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1260 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
1261 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1262 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1265 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1266 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1267 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1269 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1270 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
1272 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1275 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1276 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1278 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1279 self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok()
1282 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
1283 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1284 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1293 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1294 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1295 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1296 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1297 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1299 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1300 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1301 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1302 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1303 // ignore the result here.
1304 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1308 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1310 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1311 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1312 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1313 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1314 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1315 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1318 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1319 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1321 chan.remove_entry().1
1323 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1326 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1327 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1328 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1329 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1330 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1335 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1338 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1339 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1340 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1341 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1342 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1343 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1344 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1345 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1346 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1347 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1348 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1358 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1359 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1360 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1361 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1362 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1366 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1367 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1368 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1370 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1371 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1372 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1373 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1374 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1375 failure_code: $err_code,
1376 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1381 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1382 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1385 let shared_secret = {
1386 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1387 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1390 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1392 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1393 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1394 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1395 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1396 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1397 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1398 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1399 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1402 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1403 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1404 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1405 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1406 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1409 let mut channel_state = None;
1410 macro_rules! return_err {
1411 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1413 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1414 if channel_state.is_none() {
1415 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1417 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1418 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1419 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1420 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1421 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1426 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1427 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1428 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1429 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1431 let error_code = match err {
1432 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1433 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1434 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1435 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1436 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1438 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1441 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1442 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1443 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1450 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1453 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1454 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1455 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1456 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1457 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1458 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1459 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1460 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1461 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1462 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1463 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1464 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1468 // final_expiry_too_soon
1469 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1470 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1471 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1472 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1473 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1474 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1475 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1477 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1478 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1479 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1481 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1482 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1483 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1486 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1487 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1488 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1489 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1490 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1491 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1492 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1493 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1495 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1497 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1498 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1499 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1500 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1501 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1502 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1503 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1504 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1505 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1508 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1510 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1513 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1518 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1519 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1520 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1521 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1523 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1525 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1526 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1527 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1528 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1531 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1532 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1533 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1535 // Check two things:
1536 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1537 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1538 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1540 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1542 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1543 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1544 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1546 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1548 let blinding_factor = {
1549 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1550 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1551 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1552 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1555 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1557 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1559 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1562 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1563 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1566 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1567 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1568 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1569 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1570 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1574 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1575 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1576 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1579 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1580 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1581 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1582 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1586 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1587 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1588 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1589 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1590 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1591 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1592 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1593 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1594 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1595 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1596 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1598 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1601 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1603 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1604 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1605 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1606 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1607 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1610 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1611 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1612 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1613 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1614 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1615 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1616 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1618 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1619 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1621 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1622 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1623 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1624 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1625 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1627 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1628 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1630 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1631 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1632 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1633 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1634 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1636 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1637 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1639 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1640 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1641 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1642 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1648 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1649 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1650 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1651 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1653 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1654 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1656 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1657 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1658 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1660 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1662 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1667 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1670 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1671 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1672 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1674 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1675 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1676 if !chan.should_announce() {
1677 return Err(LightningError {
1678 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1679 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1682 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1683 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1686 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1687 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1688 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1689 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1690 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1691 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1692 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1693 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1694 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1698 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1700 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1701 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1703 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1704 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1705 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1706 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1707 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1708 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
1709 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1710 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1713 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1714 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1716 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1722 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1723 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1724 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1725 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1726 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1727 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1729 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1730 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1731 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
1732 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1733 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1735 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1737 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1738 assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().insert(session_priv_bytes));
1740 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1741 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1742 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1743 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1744 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1747 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1748 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1750 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1751 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1753 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1754 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1756 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1758 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1759 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1760 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1762 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1763 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1764 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1765 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1766 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1767 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1768 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1769 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1770 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1773 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
1774 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1775 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1776 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1777 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1778 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1779 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1780 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1788 } else { unreachable!(); }
1792 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1793 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1795 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1800 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1802 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1803 /// fields for more info.
1805 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1806 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1807 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1808 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1809 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1810 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1812 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1814 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1815 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1816 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1818 /// In general, a path may raise:
1819 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1820 /// node public key) is specified.
1821 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1822 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1824 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1825 /// relevant updates.
1827 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1828 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1829 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1831 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1832 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1833 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1834 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1836 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1837 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1838 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1839 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1840 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None)
1843 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1844 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1845 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1847 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1848 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1849 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1850 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1851 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1853 let mut total_value = 0;
1854 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1855 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1856 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1857 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1858 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1859 continue 'path_check;
1861 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1862 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1863 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1864 continue 'path_check;
1867 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1868 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1870 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1871 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1874 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1875 let mut results = Vec::new();
1876 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1877 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, &keysend_preimage));
1879 let mut has_ok = false;
1880 let mut has_err = false;
1881 for res in results.iter() {
1882 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1883 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1884 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1885 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1892 if has_err && has_ok {
1893 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1895 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1901 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
1902 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
1903 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
1904 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
1905 /// never reach the recipient.
1907 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
1908 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
1910 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1911 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
1912 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
1914 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
1916 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
1917 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage)) {
1918 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
1923 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
1924 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
1925 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
1926 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1928 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1930 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
1932 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1933 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1934 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1935 } else { unreachable!(); })
1938 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1940 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1941 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1944 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1945 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
1950 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1951 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1952 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1955 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1956 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1957 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1959 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1967 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1968 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
1969 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
1973 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1975 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
1976 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1978 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1980 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
1981 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
1982 /// keys per-channel).
1984 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
1985 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
1986 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
1988 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
1989 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
1990 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
1992 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
1993 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1994 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1996 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
1997 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
1998 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1999 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2003 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2004 let mut output_index = None;
2005 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2006 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2007 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2008 if output_index.is_some() {
2009 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2010 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2013 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2014 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2015 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2018 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2021 if output_index.is_none() {
2022 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2023 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2026 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2030 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2031 if !chan.should_announce() {
2032 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2036 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2038 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2040 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2041 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2043 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2044 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2045 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2046 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2047 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2052 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2053 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2054 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2056 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2059 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2060 // smaller than 500:
2061 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2063 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2064 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2065 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2066 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2067 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2068 /// our network addresses.
2070 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2071 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2073 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2074 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2075 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2076 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2078 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2080 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2081 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2082 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2084 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2085 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2088 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2089 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2090 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2092 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2093 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2094 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2095 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2096 rgb, alias, addresses,
2097 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2098 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2100 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2101 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2103 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2104 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2106 let mut announced_chans = false;
2107 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2108 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2109 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2111 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2116 announced_chans = true;
2118 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2119 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2120 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2124 if announced_chans {
2125 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2126 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2127 signature: node_announce_sig,
2128 contents: announcement
2134 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2136 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2137 /// Will likely generate further events.
2138 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2139 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2141 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2142 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2143 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2145 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2146 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2148 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2149 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2150 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2151 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2153 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2154 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2155 match forward_info {
2156 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2157 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2158 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2159 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2160 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2161 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2162 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2164 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2165 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2168 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2169 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2170 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2171 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2172 // problem, not ours.
2179 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2180 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2181 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2182 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2183 match forward_info {
2184 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2185 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2187 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2188 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2189 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2190 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2191 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2192 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2193 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2194 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2196 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2198 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2199 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2201 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2203 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2204 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2205 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2211 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2213 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2214 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2215 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2216 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2217 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2218 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2219 // this channel currently :/.
2225 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2226 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2228 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2229 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2230 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2232 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2233 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2235 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2237 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2238 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2239 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2242 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2244 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2245 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2246 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2247 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2248 // messages when we can.
2249 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2250 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2251 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2258 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2259 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2262 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2263 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2264 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2265 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2266 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
2267 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2269 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2270 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2271 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2272 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2273 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2275 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2277 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2279 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2283 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2284 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2287 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2288 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2289 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2290 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2291 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2292 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2293 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2294 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2295 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2297 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2305 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2306 match forward_info {
2307 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2308 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2309 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2310 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2311 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2312 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2313 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2314 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2316 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2319 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2320 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2321 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2322 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2323 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2324 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2326 value: amt_to_forward,
2331 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2333 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2334 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2335 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2337 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2338 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2339 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2340 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2341 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2343 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2348 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2349 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2350 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2351 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2352 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2353 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2354 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2355 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2356 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2357 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2358 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2359 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2360 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2362 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2363 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2364 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2365 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2366 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2368 amt: amt_to_forward,
2369 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2372 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2373 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2374 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2380 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2382 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2385 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2386 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2389 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2390 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2391 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2392 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2393 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2394 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2395 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2397 let mut total_value = 0;
2398 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2399 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2400 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2401 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2402 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2403 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2407 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2408 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2409 total_value += htlc.value;
2410 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2411 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2412 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2413 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2414 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2415 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2417 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2419 _ => unreachable!(),
2422 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2423 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2424 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2425 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2428 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2429 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2431 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2432 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2433 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2434 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2438 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2439 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2441 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2443 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2444 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2451 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2452 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2460 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2461 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2464 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2465 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2468 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2469 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2470 events.append(&mut new_events);
2473 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2475 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2476 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2478 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2479 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2480 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2481 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2482 if background_events.is_empty() {
2486 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2488 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2489 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2490 // monitor updating completing.
2491 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2498 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2499 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2500 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2501 self.process_background_events();
2504 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
2505 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
2506 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
2508 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
2510 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
2511 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2512 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2513 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2514 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2516 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2517 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2518 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2519 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2520 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2521 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2522 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2523 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2524 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2525 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2526 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2530 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2531 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2533 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2534 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2535 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2539 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2540 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2550 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2551 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2552 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2553 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2554 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2555 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2556 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2558 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2559 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2560 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2561 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2562 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2563 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2564 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2565 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2566 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2567 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2568 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2574 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2575 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2576 // be surfaced to the user.
2577 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2578 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2580 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2581 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2582 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2583 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2584 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
2585 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2587 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2590 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2592 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2593 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2594 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2596 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2598 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2599 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2600 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2602 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2603 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2605 rejected_by_dest: false,
2613 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2620 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2621 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2622 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2623 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2624 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2625 /// still-available channels.
2626 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2627 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2628 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2629 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2632 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2633 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2634 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2636 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, .. } => {
2638 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2639 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2640 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2642 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2645 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2646 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2647 match &onion_error {
2648 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2650 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2652 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2653 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2654 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2655 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2656 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2657 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2658 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2663 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2664 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2665 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2666 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2668 error_code: onion_error_code,
2670 error_data: onion_error_data
2674 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2680 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2681 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2682 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2683 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2685 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2686 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2687 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2688 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2689 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2690 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2692 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2694 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2700 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2701 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2702 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2703 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2704 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2705 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2707 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2708 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2709 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2713 let mut forward_event = None;
2714 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2715 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2717 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2718 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2719 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2721 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2722 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2725 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2726 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2727 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2728 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2729 time_forwardable: time
2736 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2737 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2738 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2740 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
2741 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
2742 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
2743 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
2745 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2747 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
2748 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
2749 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
2750 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2752 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2754 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2755 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
2756 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2757 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2759 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2760 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2761 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2762 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2764 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2765 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2766 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2767 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2768 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2770 let mut valid_mpp = true;
2771 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2772 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2778 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2779 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2780 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2782 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2783 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2784 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2785 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2786 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2787 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2788 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2790 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2792 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2793 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2794 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2795 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2796 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2797 } else { errs.push(e); }
2799 Err(None) => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2800 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2805 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2806 // which were generated.
2807 channel_state.take();
2809 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2810 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2811 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2818 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2819 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2820 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2821 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2822 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2828 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2829 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2830 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
2831 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
2832 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2833 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
2834 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2835 payment_preimage, e);
2837 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2838 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
2841 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2842 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
2843 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2844 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2845 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2846 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2847 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2848 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2849 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2850 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2859 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
2860 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2861 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
2862 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
2863 payment_preimage, e);
2865 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2866 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
2868 chan.remove_entry();
2870 return Err(Some((counterparty_node_id, res)));
2873 } else { unreachable!(); }
2876 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2878 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2879 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2881 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2882 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2883 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2885 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2886 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2890 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
2893 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2894 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2895 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2898 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2899 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2900 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2901 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2904 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2905 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2906 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2907 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2908 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2909 payment_preimage, e);
2913 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2915 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2916 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2917 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2923 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2924 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2925 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2928 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2929 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2932 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2933 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2935 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2936 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2937 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2938 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2940 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2941 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2942 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2943 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2944 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2945 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2946 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2947 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2948 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2949 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2951 let chan_restoration_res;
2952 let mut pending_failures = {
2953 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2954 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2955 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2956 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
2957 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
2959 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2963 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2964 let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
2965 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2966 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
2967 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
2968 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
2969 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2970 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2971 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
2974 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
2975 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2976 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2980 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
2981 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2982 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2986 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2987 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2988 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2991 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2992 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2993 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2994 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2995 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2996 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2997 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2998 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2999 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3000 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3002 entry.insert(channel);
3008 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3009 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3010 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3011 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3012 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3013 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3014 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3015 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3017 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
3018 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3020 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3023 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3024 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3025 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3026 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3028 user_channel_id: user_id,
3033 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3034 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3035 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3036 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3037 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3038 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3039 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3040 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3041 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3043 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3045 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3048 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3049 // lock before watch_channel
3050 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3052 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3053 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3054 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3055 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3056 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3057 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3058 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3059 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3060 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3061 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3062 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3064 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3065 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3066 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3067 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3068 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3069 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3073 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3074 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3075 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3076 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3077 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3079 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3080 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3081 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3090 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3092 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3093 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3094 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3095 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3096 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3097 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3098 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3100 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3101 Ok(update) => update,
3102 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3104 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3105 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3109 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3112 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3113 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3117 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3118 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3119 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3120 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3121 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3122 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3123 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3125 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3126 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3127 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3128 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3129 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3130 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3131 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3132 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3133 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3134 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3135 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3136 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3137 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3138 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3139 msg: announcement_sigs,
3141 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3142 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3143 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3144 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3149 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3153 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3154 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
3155 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3156 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3158 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3159 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3160 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3161 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3163 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3164 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3165 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3166 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3170 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3171 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3172 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3176 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
3177 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3178 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3180 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3181 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
3183 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3186 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3187 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3189 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3190 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3191 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3192 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3200 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3201 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3202 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3203 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3204 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3205 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3206 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3207 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3209 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3210 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3211 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3212 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3217 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3218 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3219 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3220 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3221 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3222 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3223 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3225 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3226 } else { (tx, None) }
3228 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3231 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3232 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3233 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3235 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3236 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3237 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3238 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3246 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3247 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3248 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3249 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3251 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3252 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3253 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3254 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3256 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3257 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3259 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3260 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3261 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3262 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3265 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3266 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
3267 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
3268 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
3269 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3270 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3271 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3272 match pending_forward_info {
3273 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3274 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3275 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3276 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3277 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3278 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3279 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3283 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3284 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3285 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3286 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3287 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3288 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
3289 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3290 // no problem just calling this
3291 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3292 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3294 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3295 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3296 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3299 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3301 _ => pending_forward_info
3304 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3306 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3311 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3312 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3314 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3315 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3316 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3317 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3318 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3320 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3322 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3325 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
3329 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3330 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3331 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3332 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3333 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3334 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3335 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3337 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3339 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3344 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3345 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3346 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3347 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3348 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3349 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3350 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3352 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3353 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3354 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3356 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3359 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3363 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3364 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3365 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3366 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3367 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3368 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3369 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3371 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
3372 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
3373 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3374 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3375 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3376 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3377 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3382 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3383 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3384 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
3386 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3387 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3388 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3390 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3391 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3392 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3393 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3394 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3395 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3396 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3397 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3399 commitment_signed: msg,
3403 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3404 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3405 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3411 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3416 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3417 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3418 let mut forward_event = None;
3419 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3420 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3421 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3422 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3424 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3425 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3426 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3427 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3428 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
3430 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3431 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3432 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3434 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3435 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3436 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3441 match forward_event {
3443 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3444 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3445 time_forwardable: time
3453 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3454 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3456 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3457 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3458 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3459 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3460 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3461 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3463 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3464 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3465 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3466 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3467 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3468 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3469 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3470 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3472 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3474 } else { unreachable!(); }
3477 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3478 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3479 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3483 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3484 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3485 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3489 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3491 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3494 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3496 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3497 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3498 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3500 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3507 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3508 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3509 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3510 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3511 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3512 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3513 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3515 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3517 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3522 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3523 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3524 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3526 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3527 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3528 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3529 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3531 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3532 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3535 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3536 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3537 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
3538 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
3539 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3542 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3547 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
3548 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3549 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3550 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3551 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3552 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3554 // It's not a local channel
3555 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
3558 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3559 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3560 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3561 if chan.get().should_announce() {
3562 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
3563 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
3564 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
3565 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3567 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3569 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3570 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
3571 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
3572 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3574 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3577 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3579 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
3582 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3583 let chan_restoration_res;
3584 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
3585 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3586 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3588 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3589 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3590 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3591 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3593 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3594 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3595 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3596 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3597 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
3598 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3599 let mut channel_update = None;
3600 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3601 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3602 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3605 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3606 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
3607 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
3608 // they have the latest channel parameters.
3609 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3610 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3611 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3614 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
3615 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
3616 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3617 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3619 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
3621 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3624 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3625 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
3627 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
3628 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
3633 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3634 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3635 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3636 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3637 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3639 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3640 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3641 let counterparty_node_id;
3642 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3643 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3644 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3646 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3647 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3648 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3649 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3650 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3652 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3653 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3655 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3656 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3658 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3659 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3660 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3662 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3665 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating fee resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3666 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3667 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3668 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3669 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3670 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3671 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3672 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3673 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3683 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3684 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3685 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3689 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
3690 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
3691 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3692 let pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
3693 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
3694 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events {
3695 match monitor_event {
3696 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3697 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3698 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3699 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3701 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3702 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3705 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3706 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3707 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3708 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3709 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3710 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3711 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3712 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3713 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3715 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3716 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3717 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3721 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3722 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3723 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3724 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3732 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3733 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3736 has_pending_monitor_events
3739 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
3740 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
3741 /// update was applied.
3743 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
3744 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
3745 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
3746 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
3747 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
3748 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
3749 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3750 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3752 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3753 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3754 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3755 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3756 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3758 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
3759 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
3760 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3761 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
3762 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
3764 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
3765 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3766 has_monitor_update = true;
3767 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
3768 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
3769 if close_channel { return false; }
3771 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3772 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3773 updates: commitment_update,
3780 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
3781 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
3788 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
3789 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3790 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
3793 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3794 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3800 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3801 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3803 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3804 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3805 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3806 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3807 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3808 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3809 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3810 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3811 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3812 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3813 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3814 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3815 assert!(should_broadcast);
3816 } else { unreachable!(); }
3817 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3819 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3823 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3824 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
3826 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3828 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3829 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3830 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3831 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3832 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
3833 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
3834 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
3835 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
3836 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
3837 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
3838 // never fail a payment too early.
3839 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
3841 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
3844 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
3849 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
3852 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
3853 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
3855 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
3856 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
3857 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
3859 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
3861 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
3862 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3863 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
3864 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3865 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
3866 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3867 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3870 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3871 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
3874 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
3875 /// stored external to LDK.
3877 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
3878 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
3879 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
3881 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
3882 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
3884 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
3885 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
3886 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
3887 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
3888 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
3890 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
3891 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
3892 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
3893 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
3895 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
3896 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
3897 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
3898 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
3899 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
3901 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
3902 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
3903 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
3904 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
3905 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
3907 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
3908 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
3909 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
3911 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
3913 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
3914 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
3916 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3917 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3918 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
3919 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3920 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3923 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
3924 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
3925 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3926 let event_handler = |event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
3927 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
3932 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3933 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3934 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3935 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3936 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3939 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3940 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3941 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3942 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3944 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3945 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3946 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3947 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3950 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3951 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3954 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
3955 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3956 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3958 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3959 events.replace(pending_events);
3968 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3970 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3971 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3972 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3973 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3976 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
3978 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
3979 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
3981 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
3982 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
3983 /// restarting from an old state.
3984 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
3985 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3986 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3988 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3989 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3990 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3991 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3994 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
3995 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3996 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3999 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4000 handler.handle_event(event);
4008 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4010 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4011 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4012 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4013 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4016 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4018 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4019 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4020 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4021 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4022 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4025 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4026 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4027 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4030 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4031 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4032 let new_height = height - 1;
4034 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4035 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4036 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4037 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4038 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4039 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4042 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4046 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4048 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4049 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4050 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4051 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4054 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4055 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4056 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4057 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4059 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4060 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4062 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4063 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4066 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4067 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4068 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4069 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4071 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4072 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4074 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4076 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4078 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4080 macro_rules! max_time {
4081 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4083 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4084 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4085 // having an explicit local time source.
4086 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4087 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4088 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4089 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4090 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4096 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4097 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4098 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4099 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4100 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4104 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4105 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4106 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4107 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4108 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4109 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4115 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4116 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4117 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4118 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4119 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4120 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4121 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4122 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4127 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4129 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4130 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4131 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4132 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4135 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4136 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4138 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4139 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4140 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4141 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4142 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4144 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4145 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4147 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4148 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4149 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4150 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4151 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4152 let res = f(channel);
4153 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4154 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4155 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4156 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4157 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4161 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4162 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4163 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4164 msg: funding_locked,
4166 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4167 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4168 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4169 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4170 msg: announcement_sigs,
4172 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4173 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4174 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4175 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4176 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4179 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4181 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4183 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4184 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4185 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4187 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4188 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4189 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4190 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4191 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4195 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4196 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4197 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4204 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4205 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4206 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4207 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4208 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4209 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4210 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4211 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4212 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4213 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4214 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4215 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4216 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4221 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4226 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4228 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4229 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4233 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4234 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4235 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4237 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4238 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4239 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4240 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4243 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4244 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4246 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4247 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4250 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4251 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4252 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4253 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4254 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4258 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4259 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4260 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4261 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4265 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4266 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4267 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4268 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4269 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4270 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4273 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4274 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4275 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4278 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4279 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4280 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4283 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4284 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4285 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4288 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4289 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4290 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4293 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4294 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4295 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4298 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4299 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4300 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4303 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4304 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4305 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4308 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4309 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4310 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4313 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4314 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4315 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4318 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4319 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4320 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4323 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4324 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4325 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4328 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4329 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4330 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4333 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4334 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4335 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4338 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4339 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4340 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4343 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4344 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4345 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4348 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4349 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4350 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4353 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4358 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4359 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4360 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4363 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4364 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4365 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4366 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4368 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4369 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4370 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4371 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4372 if no_connection_possible {
4373 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4374 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4375 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4376 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4377 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4379 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4380 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4381 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4391 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4392 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4393 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4394 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4395 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4396 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4397 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4401 no_channels_remain = false;
4407 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4409 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4410 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4411 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4412 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4413 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4414 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4415 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4416 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4417 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4418 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4419 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4420 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4421 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4422 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4423 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4424 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4425 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
4426 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4427 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4428 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4432 if no_channels_remain {
4433 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4436 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4437 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4441 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4442 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4444 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4447 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4448 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4449 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4450 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4451 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4454 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4455 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4460 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4461 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4462 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4463 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4464 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4465 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4466 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4467 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4468 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4472 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4473 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4474 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4480 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4483 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4484 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4486 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4487 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4488 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4489 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4490 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4494 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4495 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4500 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4501 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4502 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4503 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4504 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4505 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4508 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4511 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4517 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4518 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4523 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4524 let result = *guard;
4532 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4533 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4534 let current_time = Instant::now();
4536 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4537 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4542 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4543 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4544 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4545 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4546 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4548 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4549 let result = *guard;
4550 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4554 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4555 None => return result,
4561 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4563 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4564 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4565 *persistence_lock = true;
4566 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4571 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4572 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4574 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
4576 (0, onion_packet, required),
4577 (2, short_channel_id, required),
4580 (0, payment_data, required),
4581 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4583 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
4584 (0, payment_preimage, required),
4585 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4589 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
4590 (0, routing, required),
4591 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
4592 (4, payment_hash, required),
4593 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
4594 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
4597 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailureMsg, ;
4601 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
4606 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
4607 (0, short_channel_id, required),
4608 (2, outpoint, required),
4609 (4, htlc_id, required),
4610 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
4613 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
4614 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4615 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
4616 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
4619 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
4620 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
4621 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
4626 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
4627 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
4628 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
4634 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
4635 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4636 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
4638 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
4639 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
4640 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4644 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
4645 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
4646 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
4648 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
4650 if payment_data.is_some() {
4651 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4653 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
4656 if payment_data.is_none() {
4657 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4659 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
4663 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
4671 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCSource,
4672 (0, OutboundRoute) => {
4673 (0, session_priv, required),
4674 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
4675 (4, path, vec_type),
4677 (1, PreviousHopData)
4680 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
4681 (0, LightningError) => {
4685 (0, failure_code, required),
4686 (2, data, vec_type),
4690 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
4692 (0, forward_info, required),
4693 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
4694 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
4695 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
4698 (0, htlc_id, required),
4699 (2, err_packet, required),
4703 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
4704 (0, payment_secret, required),
4705 (2, expiry_time, required),
4706 (4, user_payment_id, required),
4707 (6, payment_preimage, required),
4708 (8, min_value_msat, required),
4711 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4712 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4713 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4714 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4715 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4718 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4719 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4721 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4723 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4725 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4726 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4727 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4730 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4731 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4732 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4733 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4734 unfunded_channels += 1;
4737 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4738 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4739 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4740 channel.write(writer)?;
4744 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4745 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4746 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4747 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4748 for forward in pending_forwards {
4749 forward.write(writer)?;
4753 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4754 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4755 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4756 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4757 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4758 htlc.write(writer)?;
4762 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4763 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4764 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4765 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4766 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4767 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4770 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4771 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4772 for event in events.iter() {
4773 event.write(writer)?;
4776 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4777 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4778 for event in background_events.iter() {
4780 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4782 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4783 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4788 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4789 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4791 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4792 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4793 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
4794 hash.write(writer)?;
4795 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
4798 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4799 (pending_outbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4800 for session_priv in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
4801 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4804 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
4810 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4812 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4814 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4815 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4816 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4817 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4818 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4819 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4820 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4821 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4822 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4823 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4824 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4826 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4827 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4829 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4830 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4831 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4832 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4833 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4834 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4835 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4836 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4837 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4838 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4839 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4842 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4843 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4845 pub keys_manager: K,
4847 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4849 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4850 pub fee_estimator: F,
4851 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4853 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4854 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4855 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4856 pub chain_monitor: M,
4858 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4859 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4860 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4861 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4862 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4863 /// deserialization.
4865 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4866 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4867 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4869 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4870 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4872 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4873 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4874 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4875 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4877 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4880 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4881 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4884 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4885 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4886 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4887 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4888 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4889 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4892 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4893 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4894 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4895 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4896 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4898 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4899 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4904 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4905 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4906 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4907 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4908 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4909 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4910 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4911 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4914 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4915 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4916 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4920 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4921 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4922 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4923 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4924 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4925 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4928 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4929 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4931 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4932 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4933 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4935 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4937 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4938 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4939 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4940 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4941 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4942 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4943 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4944 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4945 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4946 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4947 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4948 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4949 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4950 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4951 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
4952 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
4953 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4954 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
4955 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
4956 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
4957 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
4958 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4959 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4960 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4961 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4962 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4963 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4964 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4965 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4966 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4968 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4969 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4971 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4974 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4975 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
4976 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
4977 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
4978 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
4979 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4983 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4984 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4985 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4989 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4990 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4991 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4992 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4993 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4994 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4995 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4996 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4997 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4999 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5002 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5003 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5004 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5005 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5006 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5007 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5008 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5009 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5011 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5014 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5015 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5016 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5017 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5018 let peer_state = PeerState {
5019 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5021 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5024 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5025 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5026 for _ in 0..event_count {
5027 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5028 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5033 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5034 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5035 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5036 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5037 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5038 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5042 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5043 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5045 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5046 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5047 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5048 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5049 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5053 let pending_outbound_payments_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5054 let mut pending_outbound_payments: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5055 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count {
5056 if !pending_outbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?) {
5057 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5061 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
5063 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5064 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5066 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
5068 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
5069 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
5070 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
5072 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
5074 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
5079 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
5081 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
5082 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments),
5084 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
5085 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
5088 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
5089 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
5091 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
5093 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
5094 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
5095 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
5096 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
5098 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
5099 logger: args.logger,
5100 default_configuration: args.default_config,
5103 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5104 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5107 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
5108 //connection or two.
5110 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
5116 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5117 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5118 use core::time::Duration;
5119 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
5120 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5121 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5123 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5124 use routing::router::{get_keysend_route, get_route};
5125 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
5126 use util::test_utils;
5128 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5130 fn test_wait_timeout() {
5131 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
5133 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
5136 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
5137 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
5139 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
5140 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
5141 thread::spawn(move || {
5143 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
5144 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5145 *persistence_lock = true;
5148 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
5154 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
5155 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
5157 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
5160 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5165 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
5167 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
5170 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5177 fn test_notify_limits() {
5178 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
5179 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
5180 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5181 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5182 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5183 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5185 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
5186 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
5187 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5188 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5189 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5191 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5193 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
5194 // to connect messages with new values
5195 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5196 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5197 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5198 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5200 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
5201 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5202 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5203 // ... but the last node should not.
5204 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5205 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
5206 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5207 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5209 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
5210 // about the channel.
5211 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5212 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5213 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5215 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
5217 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5218 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5219 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5220 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5221 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5222 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5224 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
5225 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5226 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5228 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
5229 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
5230 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
5231 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
5232 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
5233 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
5235 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
5236 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
5237 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5238 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5239 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5240 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5241 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5242 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5244 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
5245 // the channel info has updated.
5246 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5247 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5248 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5249 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5250 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5251 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5255 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
5256 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
5258 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5259 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5260 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5261 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5262 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5263 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5265 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
5266 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5267 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5268 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
5269 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
5270 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
5271 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
5272 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
5273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5274 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5275 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5276 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
5278 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
5279 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5281 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5282 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5283 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5284 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5285 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5286 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5287 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5288 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5289 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5291 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5292 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5293 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5294 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5295 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5296 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5297 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5298 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5299 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5301 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
5302 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
5303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5304 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5305 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5306 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
5308 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
5309 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
5310 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
5311 // lightning messages manually.
5312 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5313 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5314 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5315 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5316 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
5317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5318 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5319 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
5320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5321 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5322 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
5323 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5324 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5325 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5326 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5328 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5329 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
5330 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5331 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5332 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
5333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5334 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5335 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5336 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5337 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
5338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5340 // There's an existing bug that generates a PaymentSent event for each MPP path, so handle that here.
5341 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5343 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5344 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5346 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5349 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5350 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5352 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5357 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
5358 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
5359 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
5360 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
5361 // fails as expected.
5362 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5363 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5364 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5365 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5366 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5367 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5369 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
5370 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
5371 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
5373 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
5374 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5375 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5376 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5377 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5378 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5379 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5380 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5381 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5382 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5383 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5384 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5385 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5387 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5388 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5389 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5390 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5391 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5392 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5393 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5394 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5395 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5397 // Finally, claim the original payment.
5398 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5400 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
5401 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5402 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5403 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5405 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5406 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5407 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
5408 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
5409 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
5411 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
5412 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5413 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5415 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5416 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5417 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5418 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5419 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5421 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5422 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5423 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5424 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5425 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5426 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5427 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5428 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5429 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5430 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5431 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5432 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5433 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5435 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
5436 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5440 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
5441 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
5442 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
5443 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5444 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5445 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5446 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5448 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5449 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5450 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5451 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5453 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5454 let network_graph = nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
5455 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5456 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5457 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5458 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5460 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5461 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
5462 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5465 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5466 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5467 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5468 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5469 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5470 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5471 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5473 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
5477 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
5478 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
5479 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5480 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5481 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5482 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5484 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5485 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5486 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5487 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5489 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5490 let network_graph = nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
5491 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5492 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5493 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5494 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5496 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5497 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5498 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
5499 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5502 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5503 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5504 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5505 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5506 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5507 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5508 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5510 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
5514 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
5517 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
5518 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
5519 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
5520 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
5521 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5522 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5523 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5524 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
5525 use routing::router::get_route;
5526 use util::test_utils;
5527 use util::config::UserConfig;
5528 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
5530 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5531 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5532 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
5534 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
5538 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
5539 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
5540 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
5541 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
5542 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
5543 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
5544 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
5549 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
5550 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
5553 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
5554 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
5555 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
5557 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
5558 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5560 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
5561 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
5563 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
5564 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
5566 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5567 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
5568 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
5569 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
5570 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5572 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5574 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
5576 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5577 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
5578 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
5579 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
5580 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5582 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5584 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
5586 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
5587 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5588 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5591 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
5592 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5593 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
5595 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
5596 } else { panic!(); }
5598 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5599 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5601 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
5604 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5607 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
5608 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
5610 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5611 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5612 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
5613 match msg_events[0] {
5614 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
5615 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
5616 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
5620 match msg_events[1] {
5621 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5625 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
5627 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
5628 macro_rules! send_payment {
5629 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
5630 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
5631 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
5632 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
5634 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
5635 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
5637 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
5638 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
5640 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5641 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
5642 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5643 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
5644 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5645 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5646 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5647 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5649 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
5650 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
5651 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5653 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
5654 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
5655 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5656 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5657 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
5659 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
5662 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
5663 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5664 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5665 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5667 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
5672 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
5673 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);