1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
33 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop};
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemoryChannelKeys};
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
51 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
54 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
56 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
57 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
58 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
60 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
61 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
62 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
63 // before we forward it.
65 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
66 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
67 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
68 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
69 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
71 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
72 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
74 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
75 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
78 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
79 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
83 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
84 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
85 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
86 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
87 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
88 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
89 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
94 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
95 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
98 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
101 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
102 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
105 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
107 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
109 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
113 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
117 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
118 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
119 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
120 short_channel_id: u64,
122 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
125 struct ClaimableHTLC {
126 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
128 /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a
129 /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
130 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
131 /// are part of the same payment.
132 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
136 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
137 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
138 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
139 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
142 session_priv: SecretKey,
143 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
144 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
145 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
150 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
151 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
153 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
154 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
159 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
160 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
162 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
170 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
171 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
172 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
173 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
174 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
175 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
176 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
177 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
178 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
180 type ShutdownResult = (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
182 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
183 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
184 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
185 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
186 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
188 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
189 err: msgs::LightningError,
190 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
192 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
194 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
196 err: LightningError {
198 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
199 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
201 data: err.to_string()
205 shutdown_finish: None,
209 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
211 err: LightningError {
213 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
215 shutdown_finish: None,
219 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
220 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
223 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
225 err: LightningError {
227 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
228 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
230 data: err.to_string()
234 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
238 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
241 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
243 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
245 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
247 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
248 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
250 data: msg.to_string()
254 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
256 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
257 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
259 data: msg.to_string()
264 shutdown_finish: None,
269 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
270 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
271 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
272 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
273 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
275 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
276 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
277 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
278 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
279 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
280 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
281 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
283 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
287 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
288 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
289 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
290 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
291 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
292 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
293 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
294 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
295 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
296 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking HTLCs that
297 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
298 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
299 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
301 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
302 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
303 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
304 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
307 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
308 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
310 latest_features: InitFeatures,
313 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
314 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
316 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
317 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
318 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
319 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
320 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
321 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
322 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
323 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>>>;
325 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
326 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
327 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
328 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
329 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
330 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
331 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
332 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
333 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, M, T, F> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F>;
335 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
336 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
338 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
339 /// to individual Channels.
341 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
342 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
343 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
344 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
346 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
347 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
348 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_/update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
349 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
350 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
351 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
352 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
354 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
355 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
356 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
357 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
360 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
361 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
362 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
363 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
364 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
366 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
367 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
368 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
369 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
370 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
371 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
372 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
373 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
374 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
375 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
377 default_configuration: UserConfig,
378 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
384 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
386 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
387 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
388 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
391 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
393 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
394 our_network_key: SecretKey,
396 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
397 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
398 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
400 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
401 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
402 /// are currently open with that peer.
403 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
404 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
406 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
408 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
409 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
410 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
411 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
412 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
419 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
420 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
421 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
422 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
423 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
425 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
426 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
427 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
428 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
429 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
430 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
431 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
433 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
434 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
435 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
436 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
437 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
438 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
441 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
443 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
444 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
447 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
449 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
450 pub struct ChannelDetails {
451 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
452 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
453 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
454 /// lifetime of the channel.
455 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
456 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
457 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
458 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
459 /// The node_id of our counterparty
460 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
461 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
462 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
463 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
464 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
465 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
466 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
467 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
469 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
470 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
471 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
472 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
473 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
474 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
475 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
476 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
477 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
478 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
479 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
480 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
481 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
485 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
486 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
489 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
490 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
491 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
492 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
493 ParameterError(APIError),
494 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
495 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
496 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
499 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
501 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
502 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
503 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
504 /// paths than the ones selected).
505 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
506 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
507 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
508 /// in over-/re-payment.
510 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
511 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
512 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
514 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
515 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
516 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
517 /// with the latest update_id.
518 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
521 macro_rules! handle_error {
522 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
525 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
526 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
528 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
529 // entering the macro.
530 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
533 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
535 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
536 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
537 if let Some(update) = update_option {
538 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
544 log_error!($self, "{}", err.err);
545 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
547 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
548 node_id: $their_node_id,
549 action: err.action.clone()
553 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
554 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
557 // Return error in case higher-API need one
564 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
565 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
568 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
569 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
571 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
572 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
573 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
574 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
575 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
577 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok())) },
578 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
583 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
584 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
587 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
588 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
590 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
591 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
592 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
593 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
594 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
596 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
598 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
599 log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
600 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
601 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
602 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
604 if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
606 // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
607 // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
608 // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
609 // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
610 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
611 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
614 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
615 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
621 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
622 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
623 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
625 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
627 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
628 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
629 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
630 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
631 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
633 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
634 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
635 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
636 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
637 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
638 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
639 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
640 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
641 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
642 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
645 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
646 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
647 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
648 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
650 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
651 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
653 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
654 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
656 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
657 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
658 if !$resend_commitment {
659 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
662 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
664 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
665 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
671 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
672 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
673 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
675 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
676 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
680 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
681 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
682 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
683 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
684 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
687 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
692 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
693 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
694 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
695 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
696 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
698 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
700 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
701 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
703 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
705 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
707 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
708 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
710 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
711 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
712 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
713 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
714 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
716 pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: Arc<Logger>, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>, secp256k1::Error> {
717 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
719 let res = ChannelManager {
720 default_configuration: config.clone(),
721 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
722 fee_estimator: fee_est,
726 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
727 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
730 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
731 by_id: HashMap::new(),
732 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
733 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
734 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
735 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
737 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
739 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
741 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
743 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
744 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
754 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
756 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
757 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
758 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
759 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
761 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
762 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
764 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
765 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
766 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
767 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
768 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
771 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
772 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), config)?;
773 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
775 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
776 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
777 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
778 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
779 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
780 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
782 panic!("RNG is bad???");
785 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
787 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
788 node_id: their_network_key,
794 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
795 let mut res = Vec::new();
797 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
798 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
799 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
800 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
801 res.push(ChannelDetails {
802 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
803 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
804 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
805 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
806 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
807 inbound_capacity_msat,
808 outbound_capacity_msat,
809 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
810 is_live: channel.is_live(),
814 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
815 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
816 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
817 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
823 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
824 /// more information.
825 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
826 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
829 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
830 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
832 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
833 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
834 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
835 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
836 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
837 // really wanted anyway.
838 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
841 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
842 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
843 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
845 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
846 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
847 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
849 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
850 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
851 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
852 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
853 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
854 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
855 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
856 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
859 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
860 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
861 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
863 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
864 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
866 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
869 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
870 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
872 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
873 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
878 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
879 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
880 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
889 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
890 let (funding_txo_option, monitor_update, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
891 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
892 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
893 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
895 if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_option {
896 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
897 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
898 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
899 // ignore the result here.
900 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(funding_txo, monitor_update);
904 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
905 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
906 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
907 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
910 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
911 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
912 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
913 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
914 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
921 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
922 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
923 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
924 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
925 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
931 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
932 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
933 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
934 for chan in self.list_channels() {
935 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
939 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
940 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
941 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
943 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
944 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
945 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
946 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
947 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
948 failure_code: $err_code,
949 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
954 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
955 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
958 let shared_secret = {
959 let mut arr = [0; 32];
960 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
963 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
965 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
966 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
967 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
968 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
969 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
970 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
971 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
972 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
975 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
976 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
977 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
978 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
979 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
982 let mut channel_state = None;
983 macro_rules! return_err {
984 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
986 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
987 if channel_state.is_none() {
988 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
990 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
991 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
992 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
993 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
994 })), channel_state.unwrap());
999 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1000 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1001 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1002 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1004 let error_code = match err {
1005 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1006 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1007 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1008 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1009 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1011 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1014 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1015 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1016 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1023 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1026 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1027 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1028 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1029 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1030 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1031 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1032 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1033 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1034 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1035 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1036 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1037 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1041 // final_expiry_too_soon
1042 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1043 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1045 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1046 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1047 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1049 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1050 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1051 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1054 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1055 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1056 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1057 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1060 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1061 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1062 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1063 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1065 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1066 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1068 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1070 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1071 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1072 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1073 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1076 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1077 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1078 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1080 // Check two things:
1081 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1082 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1083 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1085 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1087 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1088 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1089 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1091 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1093 let blinding_factor = {
1094 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1095 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1096 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1097 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1100 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1102 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1104 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1107 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1108 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1111 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1112 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1113 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1114 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1115 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1119 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1120 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1121 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1122 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1124 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1125 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1126 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1127 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1131 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1132 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1133 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1134 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1135 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1136 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1137 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1138 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1139 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1140 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1142 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1144 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1145 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1147 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1148 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1149 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1150 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1151 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1152 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1153 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1155 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1156 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1158 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1159 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1160 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1162 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1163 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1165 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1166 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1167 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1168 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1169 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1171 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1172 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1177 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1178 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1179 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1180 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1182 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1183 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1185 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1186 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1188 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1190 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1195 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1198 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1199 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1200 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1201 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1202 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1206 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1208 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1209 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1210 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1211 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1212 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1213 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1214 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1215 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1216 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1217 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1220 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1221 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1223 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1229 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1230 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1231 log_trace!(self, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1232 let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
1234 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1235 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1236 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1237 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1238 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1240 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1242 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1244 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1245 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1246 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1247 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1248 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1251 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1252 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1254 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1255 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1257 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1258 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1260 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1262 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1263 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1264 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1266 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1267 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1268 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1269 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1270 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1271 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1272 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1273 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1274 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1277 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1278 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1279 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1280 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1281 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1282 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1283 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1291 } else { unreachable!(); }
1295 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1296 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1298 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1303 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1305 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1306 /// fields for more info.
1308 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1309 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1310 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1311 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1312 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1313 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1315 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1317 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1318 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1319 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1321 /// In general, a path may raise:
1322 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1323 /// node public key) is specified.
1324 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1325 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1327 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1328 /// relevant updates.
1330 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1331 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1332 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1334 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1335 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1336 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1337 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1339 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1340 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1341 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1342 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1343 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1344 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1346 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1347 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1348 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1349 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1350 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1352 let mut total_value = 0;
1353 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1354 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1355 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1356 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1357 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1358 continue 'path_check;
1360 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1361 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1362 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1363 continue 'path_check;
1366 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1367 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1369 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1370 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1373 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1374 let mut results = Vec::new();
1375 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1376 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1378 let mut has_ok = false;
1379 let mut has_err = false;
1380 for res in results.iter() {
1381 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1382 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1383 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1384 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1391 if has_err && has_ok {
1392 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1394 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1400 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1402 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1403 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1405 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1407 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1408 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1409 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1410 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1413 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1415 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1416 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1417 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1418 } else { unreachable!(); })
1423 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1424 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1427 Err(_) => { return; }
1431 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1432 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1433 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1436 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1437 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1438 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1440 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1446 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1447 if !chan.should_announce() {
1448 log_trace!(self, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1452 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1454 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1456 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1457 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1459 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1460 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1461 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1462 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1463 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1468 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1469 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1470 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1472 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (msgs::NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1475 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1476 // smaller than 500:
1477 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1479 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1480 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1481 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1483 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1484 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1486 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1487 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1488 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1489 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1491 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1492 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<msgs::NetAddress>) {
1493 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1495 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1496 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1499 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1500 features: NodeFeatures::supported(),
1501 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1502 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1503 rgb, alias, addresses,
1504 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1505 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1507 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1509 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1510 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1511 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1512 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1513 contents: announcement
1518 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1520 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1521 /// Will likely generate further events.
1522 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1523 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1525 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1526 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1527 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1529 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1530 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1532 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1533 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1534 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1535 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1537 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1538 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1539 match forward_info {
1540 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1541 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1542 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1543 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1544 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1546 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1547 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1550 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1551 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1552 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1553 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1554 // problem, not ours.
1561 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1562 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1563 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1564 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1565 match forward_info {
1566 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1567 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1569 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, } => {
1570 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1571 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1572 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1573 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1574 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1576 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1578 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1579 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1581 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1583 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1584 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1585 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1591 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1593 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1594 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1595 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1596 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1597 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1598 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1599 // this channel currently :/.
1605 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1606 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1608 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1609 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1610 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1612 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1613 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1615 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1617 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1618 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1619 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1622 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1624 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1625 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1626 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1627 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1628 // messages when we can.
1629 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1630 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1631 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1638 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1639 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1642 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1643 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1644 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1645 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1646 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1647 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1649 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1650 log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1651 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1652 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1653 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1655 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1657 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1659 handle_errors.push((their_node_id, err));
1663 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1664 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1667 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1668 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1669 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1670 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1671 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1672 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1673 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1675 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1683 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1684 match forward_info {
1685 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1686 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1687 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, } => {
1688 let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1689 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1690 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1691 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1694 let mut total_value = 0;
1695 let payment_secret_opt =
1696 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None };
1697 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt))
1698 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1699 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1701 value: amt_to_forward,
1702 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1703 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
1705 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1706 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1707 total_value += htlc.value;
1708 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1709 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1711 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1713 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
1714 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1715 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1716 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
1717 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1718 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire)
1722 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1723 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1724 htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1725 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1727 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
1730 } else if total_value == data.total_msat {
1731 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1732 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1733 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1738 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1739 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1740 payment_secret: None,
1741 amt: amt_to_forward,
1745 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1746 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1748 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1749 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1757 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1758 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1761 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1762 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id);
1765 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1766 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1767 events.append(&mut new_events);
1770 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1771 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1772 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1774 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1775 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1776 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1777 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1778 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1779 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1780 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1781 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1782 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1787 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1789 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1790 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1795 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1796 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1797 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1798 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1799 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1800 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
1801 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1803 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1804 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1805 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1806 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1807 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1808 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1809 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1810 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
1812 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1813 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
1814 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
1820 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1821 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1822 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1823 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1824 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1825 /// still-available channels.
1826 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1827 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1828 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1829 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1832 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
1833 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1834 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1835 match &onion_error {
1836 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1838 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1840 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1841 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1842 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1843 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1844 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1845 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1846 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1851 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1852 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1853 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1854 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1856 error_code: onion_error_code,
1858 error_data: onion_error_data
1862 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1868 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1869 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1870 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1871 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1873 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1874 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1875 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1876 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1877 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1878 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
1880 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1882 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
1888 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1889 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1890 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1891 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1892 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1893 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1895 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1896 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1897 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1901 let mut forward_event = None;
1902 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1903 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1905 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1906 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1907 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1909 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1910 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1913 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1914 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1915 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1916 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1917 time_forwardable: time
1924 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1925 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1926 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1928 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1929 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1930 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1931 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1932 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1933 /// motivated attackers.
1935 /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
1936 /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
1938 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1939 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1940 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1942 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1944 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1945 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1946 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1947 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
1949 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
1950 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
1951 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
1952 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
1954 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
1955 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
1956 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
1957 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
1958 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
1961 let (is_mpp, mut valid_mpp) = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
1962 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
1963 (true, data.total_msat >= expected_amount)
1965 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
1969 for htlc in sources.iter() {
1970 if !is_mpp || !valid_mpp { break; }
1971 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
1976 let mut errs = Vec::new();
1977 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
1978 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1979 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1980 if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) {
1981 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1982 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1983 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
1985 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1986 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
1987 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
1989 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
1991 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
1992 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
1993 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
1994 log_error!(self, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
1995 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
1996 } else { errs.push(e); }
1998 Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2000 log_warn!(self, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed.");
2002 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2007 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2008 // which were generated.
2009 channel_state.take();
2011 for (their_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2012 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2013 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, their_node_id);
2020 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2021 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2022 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2023 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2024 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2030 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2031 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2032 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
2033 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2034 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2035 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2036 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2037 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2039 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2043 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2044 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2045 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2046 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2047 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2048 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2049 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2050 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2059 // TODO: Do something with e?
2060 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2061 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2062 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2063 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2064 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2065 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2066 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2070 } else { unreachable!(); }
2073 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2075 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2076 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2077 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2078 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2082 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2083 if let Err((their_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2086 // TODO: There is probably a channel monitor somewhere that needs to
2087 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
2088 // why it's missing.
2091 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2093 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2094 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2095 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, their_node_id);
2101 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2102 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2103 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
2106 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2107 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2110 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2111 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2113 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2114 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2115 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2116 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2118 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2119 /// 1) You register a ManyChannelMonitor with this ChannelManager,
2120 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2121 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2122 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2123 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2124 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2125 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2126 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2127 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2129 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2130 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2131 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2132 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2135 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2136 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2137 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2138 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2139 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2143 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2147 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
2148 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2149 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
2151 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2153 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2154 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2155 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2156 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2161 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2162 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2163 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2164 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2165 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2170 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2174 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2179 if needs_broadcast_safe {
2180 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2181 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
2182 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2185 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2186 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2187 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2190 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2191 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2192 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2193 msg: announcement_sigs,
2196 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2200 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2202 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2203 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2205 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2207 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2208 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2212 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2213 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2214 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2217 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
2218 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2219 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2220 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2221 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2222 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2223 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2224 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2225 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2226 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2228 entry.insert(channel);
2234 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2235 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2236 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2237 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2238 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2239 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2240 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2241 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
2243 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2244 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2246 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
2249 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2250 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2251 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2252 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2253 output_script: output_script,
2254 user_channel_id: user_id,
2259 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2260 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
2261 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2262 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2263 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2264 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2265 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2266 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
2268 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2270 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
2273 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2274 // lock before add_monitor
2275 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo(), monitor_update) {
2277 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2278 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2279 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2280 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2281 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2282 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), None));
2284 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2285 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2286 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2287 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2288 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2289 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2293 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2294 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2295 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2296 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2297 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
2299 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2300 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2301 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2310 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2311 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2312 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2313 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2314 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2315 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2316 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2317 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2319 let monitor = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg) {
2320 Ok(update) => update,
2321 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2323 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2324 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2326 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2328 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2331 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2332 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2333 funding_txo: funding_txo,
2334 user_channel_id: user_id,
2339 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2340 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2341 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2342 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2343 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2344 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2345 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2347 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2348 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2349 log_trace!(self, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2350 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2351 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2352 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2353 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2354 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2355 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2356 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2357 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2358 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2359 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2360 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2361 msg: announcement_sigs,
2366 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2370 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2371 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2372 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2373 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2375 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2376 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2377 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2378 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2380 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2381 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2382 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2383 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2387 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2388 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2389 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2393 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2394 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2395 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2397 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2398 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2400 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2403 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2404 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2406 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2407 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2408 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2409 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2417 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2418 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2419 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2420 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2421 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2422 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2423 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2424 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2426 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2427 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2428 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2429 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2434 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2435 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2436 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2437 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2438 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2439 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2440 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2442 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2443 } else { (tx, None) }
2445 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2448 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2449 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2450 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2452 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2453 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2454 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2455 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2463 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2464 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2465 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2466 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2468 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2469 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2470 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2471 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2473 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2474 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2476 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2477 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2478 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2479 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2481 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2482 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2483 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2484 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2485 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2486 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2487 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2488 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2489 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2490 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2491 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2492 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2493 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2494 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2496 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2497 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2498 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2499 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2503 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2504 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2505 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2506 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2507 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2508 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2513 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2515 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2520 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2521 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2523 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2524 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2525 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2526 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2527 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2529 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2531 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2534 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2538 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2539 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2540 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2541 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2542 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2543 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2544 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2546 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2548 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2553 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2554 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2555 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2556 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2557 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2558 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2559 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2561 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2562 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
2563 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2565 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2568 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2572 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2573 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2574 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2575 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2576 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2577 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2578 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2580 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2581 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator) {
2582 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2583 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2584 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2585 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2586 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2591 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2592 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2593 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2595 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2596 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2597 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2599 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2600 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2601 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2602 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2603 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2604 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2605 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2606 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2608 commitment_signed: msg,
2612 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2613 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2614 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2620 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2625 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2626 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2627 let mut forward_event = None;
2628 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2629 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2630 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2631 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2633 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2634 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
2635 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2636 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
2638 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2639 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2641 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2642 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2647 match forward_event {
2649 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2650 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2651 time_forwardable: time
2659 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2660 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2661 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2662 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2663 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2664 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2665 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2666 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2668 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2669 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2670 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2671 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2672 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2673 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2674 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2676 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2679 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2680 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2681 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2685 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2686 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2687 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2691 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2693 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2696 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2697 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2699 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2704 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2705 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2706 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2707 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2708 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2709 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2710 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2712 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2714 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2719 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2720 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2721 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2723 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2724 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2725 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2726 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2728 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2729 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2732 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2733 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2734 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2736 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2737 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2738 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2739 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2740 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature");
2741 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2744 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2746 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2747 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2748 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2749 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2750 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2751 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2752 contents: announcement,
2754 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2757 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2762 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2763 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2764 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2766 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2767 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2768 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2769 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2771 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
2772 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2773 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
2774 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2775 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2776 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2777 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2778 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2779 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2781 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2782 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2784 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2785 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2788 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2789 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2790 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2794 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2795 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2796 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2797 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2802 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2803 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2804 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2805 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2811 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2815 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2820 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2821 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2822 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2828 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2832 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2833 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2834 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2835 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2837 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2838 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2840 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2841 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2842 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2844 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2845 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2846 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2847 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2848 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2850 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2851 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2853 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2854 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2856 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2857 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
2858 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2860 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2863 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2864 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2865 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2866 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2867 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2868 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2869 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2870 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2880 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2881 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2882 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2887 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2888 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2889 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2890 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2891 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2893 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2894 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2895 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2896 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2898 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2899 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2900 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2901 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2902 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2904 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2905 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2910 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2911 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2912 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2917 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2918 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2919 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2920 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2921 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2923 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2924 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2925 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2926 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2928 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2929 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2930 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2931 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2932 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2934 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2935 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2940 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2941 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2942 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2947 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send>
2948 ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2949 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2950 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2951 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2952 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2954 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2955 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2956 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2957 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2958 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2959 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
2961 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2962 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2963 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2964 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2965 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2966 let res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2967 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
2968 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
2969 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2970 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2971 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
2975 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
2976 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2977 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2978 msg: funding_locked,
2980 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2981 log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2982 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2983 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2984 msg: announcement_sigs,
2987 log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2989 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2991 } else if let Err(e) = res {
2992 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2993 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2994 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
2998 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2999 for tx in txn_matched {
3000 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3001 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3002 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3003 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3004 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3006 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
3007 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
3008 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
3009 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3010 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3011 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3020 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
3021 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3022 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3024 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
3025 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
3026 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
3027 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(false));
3028 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3029 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3038 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| {
3039 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3040 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3041 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3042 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3043 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3044 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3045 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3046 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3047 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3048 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3049 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3054 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3057 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3058 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3061 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3062 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3064 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
3065 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
3067 // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
3068 // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3069 // having an explicit local time source.
3070 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
3071 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
3072 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3073 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3074 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3080 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
3081 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
3082 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3083 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3085 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3086 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3087 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3088 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3089 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
3090 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
3091 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
3092 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3094 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown(true));
3095 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
3096 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3106 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3107 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3109 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
3110 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
3114 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send>
3115 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
3116 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3117 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3118 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3119 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3121 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3122 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3123 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id);
3126 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3127 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3128 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id);
3131 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3132 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3133 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3136 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3137 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3138 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3141 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3142 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3143 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3146 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3147 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3148 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3151 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3152 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3153 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3156 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3157 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3158 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3161 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3162 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3163 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3166 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3167 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3168 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3171 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3172 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3173 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3176 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3177 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3178 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3181 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3182 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3183 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3186 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3187 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3188 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3191 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3192 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3193 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3196 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3197 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3198 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3201 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3202 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3203 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3204 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3205 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3207 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3208 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3209 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3210 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3211 if no_connection_possible {
3212 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3213 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3214 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3215 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3216 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3218 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3219 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3220 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3230 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3231 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3232 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3233 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
3234 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3235 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3236 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3237 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3239 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3240 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3241 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3245 no_channels_remain = false;
3251 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3253 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3254 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3255 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3256 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3257 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3258 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3259 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3260 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3261 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3262 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3263 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3264 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3265 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3266 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3267 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3268 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3272 if no_channels_remain {
3273 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id);
3276 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3277 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3279 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3280 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3281 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3286 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3287 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3289 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3292 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3293 match peer_state_lock.entry(their_node_id.clone()) {
3294 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3295 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3296 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3299 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3300 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3305 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3306 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3307 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3308 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3309 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3310 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3311 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3312 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3313 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3317 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3318 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
3319 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
3325 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3328 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3329 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3331 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3332 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3333 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
3334 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
3338 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3343 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3344 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3346 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3347 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3348 match &self.routing {
3349 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3351 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3352 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3354 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3356 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3357 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3360 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3361 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3362 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3363 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3368 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3369 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3370 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3371 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3372 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3373 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3374 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3376 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3377 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3378 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3380 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3382 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3383 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3384 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3385 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3390 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3391 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3393 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3395 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3397 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3399 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3406 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3407 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3408 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3409 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3410 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3411 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3416 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3417 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3419 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3421 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3423 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3425 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3432 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3433 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3434 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3435 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3436 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3437 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3442 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3445 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3448 impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
3455 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3456 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3458 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3460 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3462 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3464 path.write(writer)?;
3465 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3466 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3473 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
3474 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3475 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3476 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3477 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3478 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
3479 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3480 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3482 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3487 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3488 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3490 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3494 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3496 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3497 data.write(writer)?;
3504 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
3505 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3506 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3507 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3508 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3509 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3510 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3512 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3517 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3518 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3520 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3522 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3523 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3524 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3526 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3528 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3529 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3536 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3537 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3538 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3539 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3540 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3541 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3542 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3544 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3545 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3546 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3548 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3553 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
3554 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3555 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3556 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3557 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3559 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3560 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3562 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3563 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3565 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3566 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3567 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3569 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3570 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3571 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3572 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3573 unfunded_channels += 1;
3576 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3577 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3578 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3579 channel.write(writer)?;
3583 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3584 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3585 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3586 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3587 for forward in pending_forwards {
3588 forward.write(writer)?;
3592 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3593 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3594 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3595 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3596 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
3597 htlc.write(writer)?;
3601 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3602 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3603 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3604 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3605 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3606 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3609 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3615 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3617 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3619 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3620 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3621 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3622 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3623 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3624 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3625 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3626 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3627 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3628 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3629 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3630 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
3631 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3632 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3633 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3634 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3637 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3638 /// deserialization.
3639 pub keys_manager: K,
3641 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3643 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3644 pub fee_estimator: F,
3645 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3647 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3648 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3649 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3652 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3653 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3654 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3655 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
3656 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3657 /// deserialization.
3658 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3659 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3660 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3661 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3663 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3664 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3666 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3667 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3668 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3669 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3671 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3673 pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
3676 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
3677 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
3678 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
3679 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>> for (Sha256dHash, Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>>)
3680 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3681 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3682 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3683 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3685 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3686 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>)>::read(reader, args)?;
3687 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
3691 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
3692 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>)
3693 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3694 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3695 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3696 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3698 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3699 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3700 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3701 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3702 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3705 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3706 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3707 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3709 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3711 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3712 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3713 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3714 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3715 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3716 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3717 if channel.last_block_connected != Default::default() && channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3718 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3721 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3722 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3723 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3724 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3725 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3726 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() ||
3727 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3728 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
3729 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3730 } else if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3731 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3732 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() ||
3733 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3734 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
3735 let (_, _, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
3736 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
3737 monitor.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster);
3739 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3740 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3742 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3745 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3749 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3750 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3751 monitor.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster);
3755 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3756 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3757 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3758 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3759 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3760 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3761 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3762 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3764 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3767 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3768 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3769 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3770 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3771 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3772 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3773 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3774 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3776 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3779 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3780 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, 128));
3781 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3782 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3783 let peer_state = PeerState {
3784 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3786 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3789 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3791 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3793 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3794 monitor: args.monitor,
3795 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3797 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3798 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3799 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3801 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3806 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3808 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3810 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
3812 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3814 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3815 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3816 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3817 logger: args.logger,
3818 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3821 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3822 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3825 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3826 //connection or two.
3828 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))