1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
47 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
48 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
51 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
53 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
54 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
55 use util::config::UserConfig;
56 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
57 use util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
59 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
60 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
61 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
73 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
75 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
77 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
78 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
79 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
81 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
82 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
83 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
84 // before we forward it.
86 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
87 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
88 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
89 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
90 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
95 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
96 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
99 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
100 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
103 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
104 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
108 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
109 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
110 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
111 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
112 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
113 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
114 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
119 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
120 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
123 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
124 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
125 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
126 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
127 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
130 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
132 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
134 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
135 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
136 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
138 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
140 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
144 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
148 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
149 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
150 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
151 short_channel_id: u64,
153 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
155 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
156 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
161 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
162 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
163 /// are part of the same payment.
164 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
165 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
166 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
169 struct ClaimableHTLC {
170 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
173 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
176 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
177 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
178 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
179 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
182 session_priv: SecretKey,
183 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
184 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
185 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
190 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
191 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
193 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
194 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
199 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
200 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
202 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
210 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
212 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
213 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
214 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
215 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
216 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
218 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
219 err: msgs::LightningError,
220 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
222 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
224 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
226 err: LightningError {
228 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
229 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
235 shutdown_finish: None,
239 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
241 err: LightningError {
243 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
245 shutdown_finish: None,
249 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
250 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
253 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
255 err: LightningError {
257 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
258 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
264 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
268 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
271 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
273 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
275 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
277 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
278 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
284 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
286 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
287 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
294 shutdown_finish: None,
299 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
300 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
301 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
302 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
303 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
305 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
306 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
307 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
308 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
309 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
310 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
311 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
313 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
317 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
318 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
319 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
320 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
321 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
322 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
323 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
324 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
325 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
326 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
327 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
328 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
330 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
331 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
332 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
333 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
336 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
337 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
338 /// quite some time lag.
339 enum BackgroundEvent {
340 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
341 /// commitment transaction.
342 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
345 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
346 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
348 latest_features: InitFeatures,
351 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
352 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
354 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
356 struct PendingInboundPayment {
357 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
358 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
359 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
360 /// this payment being removed.
362 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
363 user_payment_id: u64,
364 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
365 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
366 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
369 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
370 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
371 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
372 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
373 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
374 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
375 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
376 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
378 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
379 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
380 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
381 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
382 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
383 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
384 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
385 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
386 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
388 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
389 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
391 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
392 /// to individual Channels.
394 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
395 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
396 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
397 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
399 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
400 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
401 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
402 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
403 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
404 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
405 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
407 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
408 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
409 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
410 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
413 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
414 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
415 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
416 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
417 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
419 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
420 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
421 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
422 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
423 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
424 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
425 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
426 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
427 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
428 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
431 default_configuration: UserConfig,
432 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
438 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
440 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
441 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
443 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
444 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
445 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
446 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
448 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
449 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
450 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
451 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
452 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
453 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
455 /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
456 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
457 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
458 /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
459 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
460 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
461 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
462 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
464 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
465 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashSet<[u8; 32]>>,
467 our_network_key: SecretKey,
468 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
470 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
471 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
472 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
474 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
475 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
476 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
477 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
479 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
480 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
481 /// are currently open with that peer.
482 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
483 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
485 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
487 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
488 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
489 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
490 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
491 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
492 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
493 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
494 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
495 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
497 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
504 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
506 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
507 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
508 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
509 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
510 pub struct ChainParameters {
511 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
512 pub network: Network,
514 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
516 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
517 pub best_block: BestBlock,
520 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
526 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
527 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
528 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
529 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
530 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
531 /// updates are ready for persistence).
533 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
534 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
535 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
536 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
537 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
539 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
540 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
543 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
544 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
545 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
548 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
549 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
551 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
552 persistence_notifier: notifier,
553 should_persist: persist_check,
554 _read_guard: read_guard,
559 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
561 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
562 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
567 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
568 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
570 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
572 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
573 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
574 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
575 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
576 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
578 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
579 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
581 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
583 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
584 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
585 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
586 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
587 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
588 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
589 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
591 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
592 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
594 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
595 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
596 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
597 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
599 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
600 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
601 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
602 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
603 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
604 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
607 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
609 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
610 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
613 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
615 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
616 /// to better separate parameters.
617 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
618 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
619 /// The node_id of our counterparty
620 pub node_id: PublicKey,
621 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
622 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
623 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
624 pub features: InitFeatures,
625 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
626 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
627 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
629 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
631 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
632 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
633 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
634 /// payments to us through this channel.
635 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
638 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
639 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
640 pub struct ChannelDetails {
641 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
642 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
643 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
644 /// lifetime of the channel.
645 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
646 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
647 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
648 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
649 /// our counterparty already.
651 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
652 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
653 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
654 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
655 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
656 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
657 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
658 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
659 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
660 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
661 /// this value on chain.
663 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
665 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
667 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
668 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
669 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
671 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
672 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
673 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
674 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
676 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
677 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
678 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
679 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
680 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
681 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
682 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
683 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
684 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
686 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
687 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
688 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
689 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
690 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
691 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
692 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
693 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
694 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
696 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
698 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
699 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
700 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
701 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
702 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
703 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
704 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
705 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
706 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
708 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
709 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
710 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
711 pub is_outbound: bool,
712 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
713 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
714 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
715 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
716 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
718 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
719 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
720 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
721 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
723 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
725 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
729 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
730 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
732 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
733 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
734 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
735 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
736 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
737 ParameterError(APIError),
738 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
739 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
740 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
743 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
745 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
746 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
747 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
748 /// paths than the ones selected).
749 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
750 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
751 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
752 /// in over-/re-payment.
754 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
755 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
756 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
758 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
759 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
760 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
761 /// with the latest update_id.
762 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
765 macro_rules! handle_error {
766 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
769 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
770 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
772 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
773 // entering the macro.
774 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
777 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
779 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
780 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
781 if let Some(update) = update_option {
782 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
788 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
789 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
791 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
792 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
793 action: err.action.clone()
797 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
798 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
801 // Return error in case higher-API need one
808 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
809 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
810 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
812 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
813 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
815 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
816 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
817 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
818 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
820 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
821 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
823 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
824 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
825 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
826 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
828 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
829 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
835 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
836 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
840 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
842 $entry.remove_entry();
850 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
851 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
855 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
857 $entry.remove_entry();
865 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
866 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
867 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
869 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
871 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
872 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
873 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
874 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
876 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
877 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
878 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
879 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
880 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
881 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
882 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
883 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
884 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
885 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id,
886 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
889 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
890 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
891 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
892 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
894 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
895 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
897 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
898 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
900 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
901 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
902 if !$resend_commitment {
903 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
906 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
908 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
909 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
913 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
914 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
916 $entry.remove_entry();
922 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
923 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
924 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
926 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
927 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
931 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
932 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
933 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
934 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
935 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
938 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
943 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
944 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
945 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
946 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
947 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
948 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
950 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
951 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
953 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
954 if !forwards.is_empty() {
955 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
956 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
959 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
960 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
961 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
962 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
963 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
964 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
965 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
966 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
967 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
968 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
969 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
970 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
973 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
974 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
975 // before it should be allowed to.
976 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
977 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
978 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
981 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
982 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
983 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
984 msg: announcement_sigs,
987 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
990 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
991 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
992 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
993 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
994 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
995 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
996 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
997 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
998 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
999 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1000 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1001 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1002 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1003 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1004 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1005 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1006 let mut order = $order;
1008 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1010 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1014 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1015 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1016 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1017 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1022 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1023 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1024 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1025 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1026 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1031 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1035 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1040 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1041 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1042 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1047 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1048 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1049 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1050 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1051 assert!(res.is_ok());
1054 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1058 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1059 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1060 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1062 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1064 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1065 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1070 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1071 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1072 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1073 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1074 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1077 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1079 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1080 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1082 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1084 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1086 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1087 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1088 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1089 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1090 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1091 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1094 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1095 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1096 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1100 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1102 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1103 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1104 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1105 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1106 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1107 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1109 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1110 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1112 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1113 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1116 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1117 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1119 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1121 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1122 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1123 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1124 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1132 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1133 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1134 &self.default_configuration
1137 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1139 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1140 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1141 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1142 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1143 /// otherwise ignored.
1145 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1146 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1148 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1149 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1151 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1152 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1153 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten.
1154 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1155 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1156 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1159 let their_features = {
1160 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1161 let peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1162 peer_state.latest_features.clone()
1164 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1165 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
1166 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1168 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1169 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1170 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1172 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1173 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1174 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1175 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1176 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1178 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1181 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1183 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1184 node_id: their_network_key,
1190 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1191 let mut res = Vec::new();
1193 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1194 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1195 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1196 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1197 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1198 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1199 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1200 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1201 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1202 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1203 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1204 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1205 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1207 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1208 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1209 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1210 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1211 inbound_capacity_msat,
1212 outbound_capacity_msat,
1213 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1214 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1215 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1216 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1217 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1218 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1219 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1223 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1224 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1225 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1226 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1232 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1233 /// more information.
1234 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1235 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1238 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1239 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1241 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1242 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1244 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1245 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1246 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1247 // really wanted anyway.
1248 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1251 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1252 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1253 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1255 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1256 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1257 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1259 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1260 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1261 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1262 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1263 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1264 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager)?;
1265 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1266 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1269 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1270 if let Err(_) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1271 // TODO: How should this be handled?
1275 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1276 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1277 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1279 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1280 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
1282 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1285 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1286 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1288 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1289 self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok()
1292 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
1293 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1294 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1303 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1304 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1305 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1306 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1307 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1309 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1310 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1311 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1312 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1313 // ignore the result here.
1314 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1318 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1320 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1321 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1322 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1323 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1324 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1325 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1328 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1329 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1331 chan.remove_entry().1
1333 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1336 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1337 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1338 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1339 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1340 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1345 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1348 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1349 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1350 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1351 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1352 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1353 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1354 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1355 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1356 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1357 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1358 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1368 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1369 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1370 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1371 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1372 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1376 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1377 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1378 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1380 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1381 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1382 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1383 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1384 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1385 failure_code: $err_code,
1386 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1391 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1392 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1395 let shared_secret = {
1396 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1397 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1400 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1402 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1403 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1404 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1405 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1406 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1407 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1408 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1409 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1412 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1413 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1414 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1415 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1416 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1419 let mut channel_state = None;
1420 macro_rules! return_err {
1421 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1423 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1424 if channel_state.is_none() {
1425 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1427 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1428 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1429 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1430 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1431 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1436 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1437 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1438 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1439 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1441 let error_code = match err {
1442 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1443 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1444 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1445 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1446 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1448 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1451 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1452 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1453 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1460 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1463 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1464 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1465 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1466 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1467 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1468 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1469 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1470 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1471 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1472 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1473 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1474 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1478 // final_expiry_too_soon
1479 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1480 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1481 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1482 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1483 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1484 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1485 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1487 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1488 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1489 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1491 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1492 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1493 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1496 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1497 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1498 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1499 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1500 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1501 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1502 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1503 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1505 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1507 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1508 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1509 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1510 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1511 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1512 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1513 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1514 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1515 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1518 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1520 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1523 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1528 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1529 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1530 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1531 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1533 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1535 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1536 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1537 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1538 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1541 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1542 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1543 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1545 // Check two things:
1546 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1547 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1548 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1550 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1552 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1553 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1554 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1556 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1558 let blinding_factor = {
1559 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1560 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1561 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1562 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1565 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1567 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1569 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1572 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1573 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1576 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1577 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1578 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1579 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1580 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1584 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1585 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1586 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1589 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1590 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1591 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1592 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1596 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1597 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1598 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1599 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1600 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1601 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1602 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1603 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1604 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1605 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1606 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1608 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1611 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1613 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1614 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1615 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1616 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1617 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1620 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1621 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1622 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1623 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1624 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1625 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1626 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1628 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1629 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1631 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1632 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1633 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1634 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1635 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1637 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1638 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1640 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1641 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1642 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1643 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1644 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1646 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1647 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1649 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1650 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1651 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1652 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1658 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1659 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1660 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1661 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1663 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1664 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1666 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1667 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1668 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1670 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1672 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1677 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1680 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1681 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1682 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1684 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1685 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1686 if !chan.should_announce() {
1687 return Err(LightningError {
1688 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1689 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1692 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1693 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1696 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1697 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1698 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1699 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1700 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1701 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1702 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1703 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1704 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1708 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1710 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1711 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1713 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1714 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1715 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1716 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1717 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1718 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
1719 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1720 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1723 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1724 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1726 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1732 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1733 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1734 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1735 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1736 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1737 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1739 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1740 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1741 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
1742 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1743 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1745 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1747 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1748 assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().insert(session_priv_bytes));
1750 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1751 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1752 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1753 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1754 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1757 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1758 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1760 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1761 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1763 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1764 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1766 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1768 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1769 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1770 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1772 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1773 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1774 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1775 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1776 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1777 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1778 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1779 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1780 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1783 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
1784 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1785 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1786 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1787 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1788 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1789 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1790 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1798 } else { unreachable!(); }
1802 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1803 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1805 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1810 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1812 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1813 /// fields for more info.
1815 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1816 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1817 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1818 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1819 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1820 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1822 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1824 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1825 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1826 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1828 /// In general, a path may raise:
1829 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1830 /// node public key) is specified.
1831 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1832 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1834 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1835 /// relevant updates.
1837 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1838 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1839 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1841 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1842 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1843 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1844 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1846 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1847 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1848 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1849 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1850 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None)
1853 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1854 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1855 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1857 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1858 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1859 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1860 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1861 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1863 let mut total_value = 0;
1864 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1865 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1866 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1867 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1868 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1869 continue 'path_check;
1871 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1872 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1873 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1874 continue 'path_check;
1877 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1878 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1880 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1881 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1884 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1885 let mut results = Vec::new();
1886 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1887 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, &keysend_preimage));
1889 let mut has_ok = false;
1890 let mut has_err = false;
1891 for res in results.iter() {
1892 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1893 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1894 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1895 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1902 if has_err && has_ok {
1903 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1905 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1911 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
1912 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
1913 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
1914 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
1915 /// never reach the recipient.
1917 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
1918 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
1920 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1921 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
1922 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
1924 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
1926 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
1927 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage)) {
1928 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
1933 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
1934 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
1935 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
1936 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1938 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1940 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
1942 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1943 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1944 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1945 } else { unreachable!(); })
1948 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1950 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1951 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1954 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1955 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
1960 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1961 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1962 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1965 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1966 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1967 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1969 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1977 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1978 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
1979 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
1983 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1985 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
1986 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1988 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1990 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
1991 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
1992 /// keys per-channel).
1994 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
1995 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
1996 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
1998 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
1999 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2000 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2002 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2003 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2004 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2006 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2007 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2008 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2009 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2013 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2014 let mut output_index = None;
2015 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2016 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2017 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2018 if output_index.is_some() {
2019 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2020 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2023 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2024 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2025 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2028 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2031 if output_index.is_none() {
2032 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2033 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2036 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2040 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2041 if !chan.should_announce() {
2042 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2046 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2048 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2050 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2051 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2053 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2054 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2055 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2056 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2057 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2062 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2063 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2064 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2066 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2069 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2070 // smaller than 500:
2071 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2073 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2074 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2075 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2076 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2077 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2078 /// our network addresses.
2080 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2081 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2083 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2084 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2085 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2086 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2088 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2090 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2091 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2092 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2094 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2095 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2098 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2099 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2100 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2102 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2103 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2104 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2105 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2106 rgb, alias, addresses,
2107 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2108 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2110 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2111 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2113 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2114 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2116 let mut announced_chans = false;
2117 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2118 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2119 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2121 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2126 announced_chans = true;
2128 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2129 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2130 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2134 if announced_chans {
2135 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2136 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2137 signature: node_announce_sig,
2138 contents: announcement
2144 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2146 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2147 /// Will likely generate further events.
2148 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2149 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2151 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2152 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2153 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2155 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2156 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2158 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2159 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2160 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2161 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2163 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2164 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2165 match forward_info {
2166 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2167 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2168 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2169 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2170 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2171 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2172 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2174 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2175 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2178 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2179 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2180 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2181 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2182 // problem, not ours.
2189 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2190 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2191 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2192 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2193 match forward_info {
2194 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2195 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2197 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2198 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2199 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2200 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2201 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2202 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2203 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2204 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2206 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2208 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2209 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2211 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2213 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2214 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2215 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2221 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2223 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2224 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2225 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2226 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2227 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2228 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2229 // this channel currently :/.
2235 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2236 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2238 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2239 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2240 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2242 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2243 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2245 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2247 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2248 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2249 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2252 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2254 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2255 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2256 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2257 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2258 // messages when we can.
2259 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2260 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2261 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2268 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2269 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2272 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2273 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2274 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2275 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2276 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
2277 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2279 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2280 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2281 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2282 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2283 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2285 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2287 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2289 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2293 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2294 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2297 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2298 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2299 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2300 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2301 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2302 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2303 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2304 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2305 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2307 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2315 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2316 match forward_info {
2317 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2318 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2319 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2320 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2321 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2322 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2323 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2324 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2326 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2329 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2330 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2331 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2332 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2333 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2334 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2336 value: amt_to_forward,
2341 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2343 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2344 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2345 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2347 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2348 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2349 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2350 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2351 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2353 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2358 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2359 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2360 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2361 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2362 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2363 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2364 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2365 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2366 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2367 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2368 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2369 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2370 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2372 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2373 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2374 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2375 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2376 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2378 amt: amt_to_forward,
2379 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2382 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2383 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2384 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2390 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2392 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2395 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2396 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2399 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2400 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2401 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2402 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2403 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2404 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2405 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2407 let mut total_value = 0;
2408 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2409 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2410 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2411 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2412 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2413 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2417 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2418 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2419 total_value += htlc.value;
2420 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2421 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2422 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2423 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2424 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2425 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2427 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2429 _ => unreachable!(),
2432 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2433 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2434 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2435 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2438 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2439 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2441 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2442 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2443 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2444 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2448 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2449 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2451 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2453 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2454 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2461 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2462 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2470 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2471 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2474 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2475 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2478 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2479 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2480 events.append(&mut new_events);
2483 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2485 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2486 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2488 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2489 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2490 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2491 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2492 if background_events.is_empty() {
2496 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2498 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2499 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2500 // monitor updating completing.
2501 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2508 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2509 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2510 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2511 self.process_background_events();
2514 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
2515 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
2516 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
2518 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
2520 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
2521 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2522 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2523 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2524 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2526 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2527 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2528 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2529 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2530 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2531 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2532 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2533 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2534 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2535 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2536 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2540 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2541 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2543 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2544 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2545 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2549 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2550 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2560 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2561 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2562 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2563 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2564 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2565 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2566 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2568 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2569 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2570 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2571 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2572 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2573 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2574 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2575 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2576 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2577 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2578 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2584 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2585 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2586 // be surfaced to the user.
2587 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2588 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2590 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2591 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2592 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2593 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2594 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
2595 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2597 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2600 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2602 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2603 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2604 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2606 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2608 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2609 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2610 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2612 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2613 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2615 rejected_by_dest: false,
2623 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2630 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2631 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2632 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2633 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2634 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2635 /// still-available channels.
2636 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2637 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2638 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2639 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2642 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2643 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2644 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2646 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, .. } => {
2648 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2649 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2650 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2652 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2655 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2656 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2657 match &onion_error {
2658 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2660 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2662 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2663 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2664 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2665 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2666 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2667 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2668 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2673 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2674 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2675 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2676 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2678 error_code: onion_error_code,
2680 error_data: onion_error_data
2684 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2690 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2691 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2692 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2693 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2695 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2696 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2697 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2698 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2699 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2700 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2702 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2704 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2710 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2711 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2712 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2713 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2714 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2715 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2717 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2718 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2719 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2723 let mut forward_event = None;
2724 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2725 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2727 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2728 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2729 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2731 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2732 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2735 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2736 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2737 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2738 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2739 time_forwardable: time
2746 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2747 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2748 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2750 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
2751 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
2752 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
2753 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
2755 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2757 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
2758 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
2759 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
2760 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2762 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2764 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2765 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
2766 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2767 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2769 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2770 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2771 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2772 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2774 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2775 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2776 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2777 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2778 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2780 let mut valid_mpp = true;
2781 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2782 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2788 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2789 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2790 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2792 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2793 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2794 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2795 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2796 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2797 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2798 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2800 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2802 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2803 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2804 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2805 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2806 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2807 } else { errs.push(e); }
2809 Err(None) => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2810 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2815 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2816 // which were generated.
2817 channel_state.take();
2819 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2820 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2821 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2828 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2829 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2830 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2831 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2832 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2838 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2839 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2840 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
2841 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
2842 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2843 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
2844 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2845 payment_preimage, e);
2847 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2848 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
2851 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2852 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
2853 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2854 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2855 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2856 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2857 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2858 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2859 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2860 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2869 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
2870 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2871 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
2872 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
2873 payment_preimage, e);
2875 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2876 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
2878 chan.remove_entry();
2880 return Err(Some((counterparty_node_id, res)));
2883 } else { unreachable!(); }
2886 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2888 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2889 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2891 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2892 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2893 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2895 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2896 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2900 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
2903 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2904 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2905 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2908 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2909 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2910 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2911 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2914 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2915 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2916 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2917 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2918 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2919 payment_preimage, e);
2923 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2925 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2926 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2927 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2933 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2934 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2935 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2938 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2939 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2942 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2943 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2945 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2946 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2947 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2948 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2950 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2951 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2952 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2953 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2954 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2955 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2956 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2957 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2958 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2959 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2961 let chan_restoration_res;
2962 let mut pending_failures = {
2963 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2964 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2965 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2966 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
2967 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
2969 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2973 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2974 let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
2975 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2976 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
2977 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
2978 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
2979 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2980 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2981 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
2984 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
2985 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2986 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2990 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
2991 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2992 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2996 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2997 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2998 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3001 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
3002 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3003 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3004 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3005 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3006 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3007 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3008 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3009 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3010 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3012 entry.insert(channel);
3018 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3019 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3020 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3021 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3022 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3023 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3024 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3025 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3027 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
3028 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3030 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3033 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3034 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3035 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3036 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3038 user_channel_id: user_id,
3043 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3044 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3045 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3046 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3047 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3048 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3049 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3050 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3051 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3053 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3055 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3058 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3059 // lock before watch_channel
3060 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3062 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3063 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3064 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3065 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3066 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3067 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3068 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3069 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3070 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3071 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3072 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3074 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3075 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3076 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3077 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3078 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3079 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3083 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3084 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3085 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3086 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3087 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3089 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3090 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3091 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3100 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3102 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3103 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3104 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3105 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3106 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3107 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3108 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3110 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3111 Ok(update) => update,
3112 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3114 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3115 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3119 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3122 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3123 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3127 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3128 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3129 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3130 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3131 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3132 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3133 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3135 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3136 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3137 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3138 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3139 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3140 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3141 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3142 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3143 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3144 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3145 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3146 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3147 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3148 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3149 msg: announcement_sigs,
3151 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3152 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3153 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3154 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3159 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3163 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3164 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
3165 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3166 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3168 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3169 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3170 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3171 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3173 let (shutdown, closing_signed, monitor_update, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3174 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3175 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3176 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3180 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3181 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3182 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3186 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3187 if let Err(_) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3188 // TODO: How should this be handled?
3192 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
3193 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3194 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3196 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3197 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
3199 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3202 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3203 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3205 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3206 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3207 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3208 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3216 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3217 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3218 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3219 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3220 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3221 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3222 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3223 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3225 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3226 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3227 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3228 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3233 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3234 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3235 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3236 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3237 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3238 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3239 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3241 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3242 } else { (tx, None) }
3244 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3247 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3248 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3249 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3251 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3252 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3253 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3254 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3262 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3263 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3264 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3265 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3267 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3268 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3269 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3270 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3272 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3273 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3275 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3276 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3277 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3278 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3281 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3282 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
3283 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
3284 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
3285 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3286 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3287 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3288 match pending_forward_info {
3289 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3290 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3291 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3292 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3293 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3294 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3295 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3299 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3300 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3301 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3302 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3303 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3304 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
3305 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3306 // no problem just calling this
3307 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3308 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3310 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3311 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3312 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3315 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3317 _ => pending_forward_info
3320 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3322 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3327 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3328 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3330 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3331 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3332 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3333 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3334 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3336 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3338 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3341 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
3345 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3346 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3347 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3348 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3349 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3350 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3351 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3353 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3355 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3360 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3361 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3362 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3363 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3364 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3365 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3366 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3368 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3369 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3370 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3372 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3375 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3379 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3380 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3381 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3382 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3383 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3384 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3385 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3387 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
3388 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
3389 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3390 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3391 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3392 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3393 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3398 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3399 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3400 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
3402 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3403 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3404 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3406 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3407 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3408 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3409 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3410 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3411 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3412 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3413 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3415 commitment_signed: msg,
3419 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3420 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3421 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3427 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3432 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3433 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3434 let mut forward_event = None;
3435 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3436 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3437 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3438 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3440 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3441 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3442 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3443 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3444 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
3446 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3447 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3448 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3450 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3451 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3452 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3457 match forward_event {
3459 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3460 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3461 time_forwardable: time
3469 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3470 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3472 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3473 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3474 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3475 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3476 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3477 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3479 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3480 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3481 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3482 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3483 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3484 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3485 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3486 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3488 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3490 } else { unreachable!(); }
3493 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3494 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3495 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3499 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3500 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3501 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3505 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3507 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3510 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3512 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3513 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3514 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3516 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3523 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3524 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3525 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3526 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3527 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3528 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3529 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3531 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3533 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3538 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3539 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3540 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3542 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3543 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3544 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3545 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3547 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3548 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3551 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3552 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3553 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
3554 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
3555 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3558 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3563 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
3564 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3565 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3566 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3567 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3568 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3570 // It's not a local channel
3571 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
3574 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3575 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3576 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3577 if chan.get().should_announce() {
3578 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
3579 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
3580 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
3581 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3583 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3585 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3586 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
3587 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
3588 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3590 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3593 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3595 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
3598 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3599 let chan_restoration_res;
3600 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
3601 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3602 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3604 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3605 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3606 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3607 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3609 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3610 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3611 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3612 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3613 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
3614 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3615 let mut channel_update = None;
3616 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3617 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3618 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3621 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3622 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
3623 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
3624 // they have the latest channel parameters.
3625 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3626 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3627 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3630 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
3631 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
3632 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3633 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3635 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
3637 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3640 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3641 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
3643 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
3644 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
3649 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3650 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3651 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3652 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3653 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3655 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3656 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3657 let counterparty_node_id;
3658 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3659 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3660 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3662 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3663 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3664 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3665 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3666 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3668 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3669 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3671 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3672 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3674 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3675 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3676 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3678 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3681 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating fee resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3682 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3683 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3684 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3685 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3686 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3687 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3688 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3689 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3699 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3700 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3701 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3705 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
3706 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
3707 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3708 let pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
3709 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
3710 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events {
3711 match monitor_event {
3712 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3713 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3714 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3715 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3717 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3718 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3721 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3722 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3723 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3724 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3725 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3726 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3727 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3728 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3729 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3731 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3732 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3733 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3737 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3738 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3739 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3740 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3748 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3749 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3752 has_pending_monitor_events
3755 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
3756 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
3757 /// update was applied.
3759 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
3760 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
3761 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
3762 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
3763 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
3764 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
3765 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3766 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3768 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3769 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3770 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3771 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3772 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3774 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
3775 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
3776 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3777 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
3778 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
3780 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
3781 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3782 has_monitor_update = true;
3783 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
3784 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
3785 if close_channel { return false; }
3787 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3788 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3789 updates: commitment_update,
3796 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
3797 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
3804 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
3805 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3806 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
3809 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3810 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3816 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3817 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3819 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3820 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3821 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3822 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3823 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3824 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3825 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3826 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3827 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3828 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3829 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3830 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3831 assert!(should_broadcast);
3832 } else { unreachable!(); }
3833 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3835 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3839 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3840 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
3842 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3844 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3845 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3846 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3847 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3848 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
3849 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
3850 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
3851 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
3852 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
3853 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
3854 // never fail a payment too early.
3855 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
3857 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
3860 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
3865 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
3868 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
3869 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
3871 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
3872 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
3873 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
3875 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
3877 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
3878 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3879 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
3880 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3881 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
3882 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3883 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3886 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3887 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
3890 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
3891 /// stored external to LDK.
3893 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
3894 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
3895 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
3897 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
3898 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
3900 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
3901 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
3902 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
3903 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
3904 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
3906 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
3907 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
3908 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
3909 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
3911 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
3912 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
3913 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
3914 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
3915 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
3917 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
3918 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
3919 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
3920 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
3921 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
3923 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
3924 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
3925 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
3927 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
3929 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
3930 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
3932 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3933 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3934 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
3935 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3936 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3939 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
3940 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
3941 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3942 let event_handler = |event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
3943 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
3948 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3949 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3950 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3951 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3952 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3955 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3956 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3957 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3958 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3960 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3961 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3962 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3963 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3966 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3967 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3970 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
3971 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3972 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3974 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3975 events.replace(pending_events);
3984 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3986 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3987 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3988 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3989 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3992 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
3994 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
3995 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
3997 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
3998 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
3999 /// restarting from an old state.
4000 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4001 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4002 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4004 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4005 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4006 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4007 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4010 let mut pending_events = std::mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4011 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4012 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4015 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4016 handler.handle_event(event);
4024 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4026 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4027 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4028 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4029 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4032 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4034 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4035 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4036 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4037 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4038 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4041 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4042 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4043 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4046 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4047 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4048 let new_height = height - 1;
4050 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4051 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4052 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4053 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4054 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4055 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4058 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4062 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4064 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4065 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4066 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4067 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4070 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4071 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4072 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4073 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4075 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4076 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4078 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4079 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4082 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4083 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4084 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4085 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4087 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4088 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4090 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4092 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4094 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4096 macro_rules! max_time {
4097 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4099 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4100 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4101 // having an explicit local time source.
4102 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4103 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4104 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4105 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4106 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4112 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4113 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4114 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4115 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4116 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4120 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4121 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4122 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4123 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4124 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4125 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4131 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4132 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4133 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4134 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4135 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4136 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4137 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4138 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4143 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4145 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4146 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4147 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4148 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4151 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4152 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4154 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4155 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4156 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4157 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4158 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4160 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4161 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4163 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4164 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4165 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4166 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4167 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4168 let res = f(channel);
4169 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4170 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4171 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4172 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4173 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4177 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4178 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4179 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4180 msg: funding_locked,
4182 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4183 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4184 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4185 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4186 msg: announcement_sigs,
4188 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4189 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4190 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4191 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4192 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4195 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4197 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4199 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4200 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4201 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4203 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4204 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4205 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4206 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4207 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4211 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4212 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4213 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4220 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4221 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4222 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4223 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4224 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4225 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4226 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4227 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4228 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4229 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4230 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4231 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4232 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4237 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4242 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4244 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4245 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4249 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4250 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4251 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4253 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4254 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4255 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4256 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4259 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4260 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4262 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4263 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4266 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4267 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4268 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4269 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4270 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4274 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4275 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4276 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4277 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4281 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4282 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4283 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4284 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4285 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4286 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4289 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4290 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4291 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4294 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4295 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4296 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4299 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4300 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4301 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4304 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4305 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4306 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4309 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4310 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4311 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4314 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4315 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4316 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4319 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4320 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4321 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4324 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4325 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4326 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4329 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4330 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4331 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4334 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4335 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4336 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4339 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4340 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4341 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4344 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4345 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4346 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4349 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4350 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4351 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4354 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4355 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4356 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4359 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4360 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4361 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4364 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4365 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4366 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4369 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4374 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4375 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4376 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4379 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4380 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4381 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4382 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4384 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4385 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4386 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4387 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4388 if no_connection_possible {
4389 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4390 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4391 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4392 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4393 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4395 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4396 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4397 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4407 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4408 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4409 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4410 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4411 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4412 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4413 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4417 no_channels_remain = false;
4423 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4425 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4426 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4427 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4428 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4429 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4430 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4431 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4432 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4433 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4434 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4435 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4436 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4437 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4438 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4439 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4440 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4441 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
4442 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4443 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4444 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4448 if no_channels_remain {
4449 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4452 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4453 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4457 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4458 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4460 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4463 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4464 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4465 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4466 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4467 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4470 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4471 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4476 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4477 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4478 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4479 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4480 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4481 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4482 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4483 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4484 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4488 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4489 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4490 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4496 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4499 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4500 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4502 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4503 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4504 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4505 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4506 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4510 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4511 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4516 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4517 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4518 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4519 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4520 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4521 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4524 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4527 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4533 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4534 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4539 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4540 let result = *guard;
4548 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4549 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4550 let current_time = Instant::now();
4552 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4553 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4558 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4559 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4560 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4561 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4562 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4564 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4565 let result = *guard;
4566 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4570 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4571 None => return result,
4577 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4579 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4580 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4581 *persistence_lock = true;
4582 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4587 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4588 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4590 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
4592 (0, onion_packet, required),
4593 (2, short_channel_id, required),
4596 (0, payment_data, required),
4597 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4599 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
4600 (0, payment_preimage, required),
4601 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4605 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
4606 (0, routing, required),
4607 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
4608 (4, payment_hash, required),
4609 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
4610 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
4613 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailureMsg, ;
4617 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
4622 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
4623 (0, short_channel_id, required),
4624 (2, outpoint, required),
4625 (4, htlc_id, required),
4626 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
4629 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
4630 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4631 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
4632 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
4635 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
4636 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
4637 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
4642 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
4643 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
4644 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
4650 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
4651 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4652 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
4654 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
4655 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
4656 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4660 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
4661 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
4662 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
4664 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
4666 if payment_data.is_some() {
4667 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4669 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
4672 if payment_data.is_none() {
4673 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4675 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
4679 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
4687 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCSource,
4688 (0, OutboundRoute) => {
4689 (0, session_priv, required),
4690 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
4691 (4, path, vec_type),
4693 (1, PreviousHopData)
4696 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
4697 (0, LightningError) => {
4701 (0, failure_code, required),
4702 (2, data, vec_type),
4706 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
4708 (0, forward_info, required),
4709 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
4710 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
4711 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
4714 (0, htlc_id, required),
4715 (2, err_packet, required),
4719 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
4720 (0, payment_secret, required),
4721 (2, expiry_time, required),
4722 (4, user_payment_id, required),
4723 (6, payment_preimage, required),
4724 (8, min_value_msat, required),
4727 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4728 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4729 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4730 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4731 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4734 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4735 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4737 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4739 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4741 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4742 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4743 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4746 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4747 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4748 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4749 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4750 unfunded_channels += 1;
4753 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4754 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4755 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4756 channel.write(writer)?;
4760 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4761 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4762 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4763 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4764 for forward in pending_forwards {
4765 forward.write(writer)?;
4769 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4770 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4771 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4772 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4773 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4774 htlc.write(writer)?;
4778 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4779 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4780 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4781 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4782 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4783 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4786 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4787 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4788 for event in events.iter() {
4789 event.write(writer)?;
4792 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4793 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4794 for event in background_events.iter() {
4796 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4798 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4799 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4804 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4805 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4807 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4808 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4809 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
4810 hash.write(writer)?;
4811 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
4814 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4815 (pending_outbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4816 for session_priv in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
4817 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4820 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
4826 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4828 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4830 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4831 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4832 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4833 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4834 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4835 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4836 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4837 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4838 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4839 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4840 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4842 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4843 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4845 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4846 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4847 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4848 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4849 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4850 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4851 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4852 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4853 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4854 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4855 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4858 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4859 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4861 pub keys_manager: K,
4863 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4865 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4866 pub fee_estimator: F,
4867 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4869 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4870 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4871 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4872 pub chain_monitor: M,
4874 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4875 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4876 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4877 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4878 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4879 /// deserialization.
4881 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4882 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4883 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4885 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4886 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4888 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4889 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4890 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4891 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4893 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4896 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4897 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4900 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4901 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4902 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4903 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4904 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4905 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4908 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4909 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4910 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4911 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4912 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4914 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4915 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4920 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4921 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4922 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4923 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4924 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4925 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4926 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4927 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4930 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4931 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4932 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4936 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4937 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4938 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4939 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4940 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4941 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4944 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4945 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4947 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4948 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4949 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4951 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4953 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4954 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4955 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4956 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4957 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4958 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4959 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4960 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4961 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4962 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4963 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4964 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4965 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4966 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4967 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
4968 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
4969 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4970 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
4971 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
4972 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
4973 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
4974 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4975 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4976 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4977 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4978 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4979 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4980 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4981 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4982 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4984 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4985 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4987 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4990 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4991 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
4992 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
4993 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
4994 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
4995 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4999 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5000 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5001 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5005 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5006 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5007 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5008 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5009 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5010 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5011 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5012 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5013 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5015 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5018 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5019 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5020 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5021 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5022 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5023 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5024 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5025 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5027 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5030 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5031 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5032 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5033 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5034 let peer_state = PeerState {
5035 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5037 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5040 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5041 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5042 for _ in 0..event_count {
5043 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5044 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5049 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5050 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5051 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5052 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5053 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5054 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5058 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5059 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5061 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5062 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5063 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5064 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5065 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5069 let pending_outbound_payments_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5070 let mut pending_outbound_payments: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5071 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count {
5072 if !pending_outbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?) {
5073 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5077 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
5079 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5080 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5082 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
5084 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
5085 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
5086 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
5088 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
5090 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
5095 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
5097 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
5098 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments),
5100 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
5101 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
5104 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
5105 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
5107 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
5109 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
5110 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
5111 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
5112 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
5114 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
5115 logger: args.logger,
5116 default_configuration: args.default_config,
5119 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5120 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5123 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
5124 //connection or two.
5126 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
5132 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5133 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5134 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
5135 use core::time::Duration;
5136 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
5137 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
5138 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5139 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5141 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5142 use routing::router::{get_keysend_route, get_route};
5143 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
5144 use util::test_utils;
5148 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5150 fn test_wait_timeout() {
5151 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
5152 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
5154 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
5155 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
5156 thread::spawn(move || {
5158 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
5159 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5160 *persistence_lock = true;
5163 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
5169 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
5170 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
5172 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
5175 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5180 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
5182 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
5185 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5192 fn test_notify_limits() {
5193 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
5194 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
5195 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5196 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5197 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5198 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5200 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
5201 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
5202 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5203 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5204 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5206 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5208 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
5209 // to connect messages with new values
5210 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5211 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5212 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5213 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5215 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
5216 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5217 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5218 // ... but the last node should not.
5219 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5220 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
5221 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5222 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5224 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
5225 // about the channel.
5226 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5227 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5228 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5230 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
5232 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5233 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5234 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5235 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5236 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5237 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5239 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
5240 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5241 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5243 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
5244 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
5245 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
5246 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
5247 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
5248 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
5250 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
5251 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
5252 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5253 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5254 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5255 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5256 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5257 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5259 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
5260 // the channel info has updated.
5261 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5262 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5263 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5264 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5265 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5266 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5270 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
5271 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
5273 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5274 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5275 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5276 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5277 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5278 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5280 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
5281 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5282 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5283 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
5284 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
5285 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
5286 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
5287 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
5288 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5289 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5290 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5291 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
5293 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
5294 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5296 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5297 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5298 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5299 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5300 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5302 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5303 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5304 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5306 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5307 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5308 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5309 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5310 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5311 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5312 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5313 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5314 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5316 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
5317 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
5318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5319 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5320 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5321 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
5323 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
5324 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
5325 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
5326 // lightning messages manually.
5327 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5329 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5330 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5331 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
5332 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5333 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5334 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
5335 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5336 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5337 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
5338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5339 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5340 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5341 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5343 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5344 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
5345 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5347 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
5348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5349 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5351 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5352 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
5353 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5355 // There's an existing bug that generates a PaymentSent event for each MPP path, so handle that here.
5356 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5358 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5359 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5361 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5364 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5365 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5367 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5372 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
5373 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
5374 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
5375 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
5376 // fails as expected.
5377 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5378 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5379 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5380 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5381 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5382 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5384 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
5385 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
5386 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
5388 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
5389 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5390 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5391 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5392 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5393 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5394 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5395 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5396 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5398 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5399 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5400 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5402 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5403 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5404 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5405 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5406 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5407 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5408 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5409 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5410 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5412 // Finally, claim the original payment.
5413 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5415 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
5416 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5417 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5418 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5419 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5420 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5421 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5422 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
5423 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
5424 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
5426 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
5427 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5428 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5430 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5431 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5432 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5433 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5434 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5436 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5437 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5438 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5440 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5441 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5442 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5443 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5444 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5445 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5446 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5447 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5448 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5450 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
5451 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5455 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
5456 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
5457 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
5458 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5459 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5460 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5461 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5463 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5464 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5465 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5466 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5468 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5469 let network_graph = nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
5470 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5471 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5472 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5473 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5475 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5476 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
5477 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5480 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5481 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5482 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5483 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5484 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5485 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5486 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5488 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
5492 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
5493 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
5494 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5495 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5496 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5497 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5499 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5500 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5501 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5502 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5504 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5505 let network_graph = nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
5506 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5507 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5508 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5509 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5511 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5512 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5513 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
5514 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5517 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5518 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5519 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5520 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5521 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5522 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5523 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5525 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
5529 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
5532 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
5533 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
5534 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
5535 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
5536 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5537 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5538 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5539 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
5540 use routing::router::get_route;
5541 use util::test_utils;
5542 use util::config::UserConfig;
5543 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
5545 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5546 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5547 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
5549 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
5553 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
5554 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
5555 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
5556 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
5557 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
5558 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
5559 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
5564 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
5565 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
5568 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
5569 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
5570 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
5572 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
5573 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5575 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
5576 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
5578 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
5579 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
5581 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5582 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
5583 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
5584 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
5585 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5587 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5589 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
5591 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5592 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
5593 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
5594 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
5595 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5597 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5599 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
5601 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
5602 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5603 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5606 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
5607 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5608 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
5610 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
5611 } else { panic!(); }
5613 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5614 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5616 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
5619 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5622 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
5623 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
5625 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5626 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5627 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
5628 match msg_events[0] {
5629 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
5630 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
5631 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
5635 match msg_events[1] {
5636 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5640 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
5642 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
5643 macro_rules! send_payment {
5644 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
5645 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
5646 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
5647 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
5649 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
5650 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
5652 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
5653 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
5655 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5656 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
5657 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5658 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
5659 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5660 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5661 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5662 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5664 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
5665 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
5666 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5668 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
5669 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
5670 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5671 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5672 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
5674 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
5677 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
5678 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5679 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5680 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5682 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
5687 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
5688 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);