1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
41 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
42 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
43 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
44 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
45 // construct one themselves.
46 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
47 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
48 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
51 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
53 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
54 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
55 use util::config::UserConfig;
56 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
57 use util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
59 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
60 use util::logger::Logger;
61 use util::errors::APIError;
64 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
65 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
66 use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
67 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
68 use std::time::Duration;
69 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
70 use std::time::Instant;
71 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
73 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
75 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
77 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
78 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
79 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
81 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
82 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
83 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
84 // before we forward it.
86 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
87 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
88 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
89 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
90 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
95 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
96 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
99 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
100 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
105 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
106 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
107 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
108 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
109 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
110 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
115 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
116 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
119 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
122 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
123 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
126 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
128 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
130 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
131 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
132 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
134 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
136 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
140 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
144 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
145 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
146 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
147 short_channel_id: u64,
149 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
151 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
152 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
156 struct ClaimableHTLC {
157 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
159 /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a
160 /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162 /// are part of the same payment.
163 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
167 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
168 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
169 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
170 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
173 session_priv: SecretKey,
174 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
175 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
176 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
181 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
182 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
184 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
185 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
190 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
191 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
193 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
201 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
202 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
203 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
204 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
205 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
206 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
207 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
208 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
209 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
210 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
211 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
212 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
214 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
216 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
217 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
218 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
219 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
220 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
222 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
223 err: msgs::LightningError,
224 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
226 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
228 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
230 err: LightningError {
232 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
233 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
239 shutdown_finish: None,
243 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
245 err: LightningError {
247 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
249 shutdown_finish: None,
253 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
254 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
257 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
259 err: LightningError {
261 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
262 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
268 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
272 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
275 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
277 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
279 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
281 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
282 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
288 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
290 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
291 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
298 shutdown_finish: None,
303 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
304 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
305 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
306 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
307 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
309 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
310 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
311 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
312 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
313 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
314 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
315 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
317 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
321 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
322 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
323 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
324 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
325 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
326 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
327 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
328 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
329 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
330 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking HTLCs that
331 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
332 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
333 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
335 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
336 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
337 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
338 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
341 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
342 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
343 /// quite some time lag.
344 enum BackgroundEvent {
345 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
346 /// commitment transaction.
347 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
350 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
351 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
353 latest_features: InitFeatures,
356 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
357 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
358 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
359 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
360 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
361 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
362 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
363 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
365 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
366 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
367 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
368 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
369 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
370 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
371 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
372 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
373 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
375 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
376 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
378 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
379 /// to individual Channels.
381 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
382 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
383 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
384 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
386 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
387 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
388 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
389 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
390 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
391 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
392 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
394 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
395 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
396 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
397 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
400 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
401 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
402 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
403 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
404 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
406 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
407 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
408 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
409 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
410 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
411 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
412 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
413 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
414 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
415 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
418 default_configuration: UserConfig,
419 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
425 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
427 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
428 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
430 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
431 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
432 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
433 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
434 our_network_key: SecretKey,
435 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
437 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
438 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
439 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
441 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
442 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
443 /// are currently open with that peer.
444 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
445 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
447 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
449 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
450 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
451 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
452 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
453 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
454 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
455 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the PersistenceNotifier
456 /// the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
457 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
459 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
466 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
468 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
469 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
470 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
471 pub struct ChainParameters {
472 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
473 pub network: Network,
475 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
477 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
478 pub best_block: BestBlock,
481 /// The best known block as identified by its hash and height.
482 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
483 pub struct BestBlock {
484 block_hash: BlockHash,
489 /// Returns the best block from the genesis of the given network.
490 pub fn from_genesis(network: Network) -> Self {
492 block_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(),
497 /// Returns the best block as identified by the given block hash and height.
498 pub fn new(block_hash: BlockHash, height: u32) -> Self {
499 BestBlock { block_hash, height }
502 /// Returns the best block hash.
503 pub fn block_hash(&self) -> BlockHash { self.block_hash }
505 /// Returns the best block height.
506 pub fn height(&self) -> u32 { self.height }
509 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
510 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
511 /// `await_persistable_update` that new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
512 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
513 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
514 /// updates are ready for persistence).
515 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
516 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
517 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
518 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
521 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
522 fn new(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> Self {
523 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
526 persistence_notifier: notifier,
527 _read_guard: read_guard,
532 impl<'a> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
534 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
538 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
539 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
541 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
543 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
544 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
545 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
546 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
547 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
549 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
550 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly six hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
552 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
554 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
555 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
556 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
557 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
558 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
559 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 6;
560 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
562 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
563 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
564 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
565 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
566 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
567 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
570 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
572 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
573 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
576 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
578 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
580 pub struct ChannelDetails {
581 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
582 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
583 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
584 /// lifetime of the channel.
585 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
586 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
587 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
588 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
589 /// The node_id of our counterparty
590 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
591 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
592 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
593 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
594 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
595 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
596 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
597 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
599 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
600 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
601 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
602 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
603 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
604 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
605 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
606 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
607 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
608 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
609 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
610 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
611 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
614 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
615 /// payments to us through this channel.
616 pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
619 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
620 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
622 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
623 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
624 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
625 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
626 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
627 ParameterError(APIError),
628 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
629 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
630 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
633 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
635 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
636 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
637 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
638 /// paths than the ones selected).
639 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
640 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
641 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
642 /// in over-/re-payment.
644 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
645 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
646 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
648 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
649 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
650 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
651 /// with the latest update_id.
652 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
655 macro_rules! handle_error {
656 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
659 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
660 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
662 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
663 // entering the macro.
664 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
667 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
669 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
670 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
671 if let Some(update) = update_option {
672 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
678 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
679 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
681 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
682 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
683 action: err.action.clone()
687 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
688 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
691 // Return error in case higher-API need one
698 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
699 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
702 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
703 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
705 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
706 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
707 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
708 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
709 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
711 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
713 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
718 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
719 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
722 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
723 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
725 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
726 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
727 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
728 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
729 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
731 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
733 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
734 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
735 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
736 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
737 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
739 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
740 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
746 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
747 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
748 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
750 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
752 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
753 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
754 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
755 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
756 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
758 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
759 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
760 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
761 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
762 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
763 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
764 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
765 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
766 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
767 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
770 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
771 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
772 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
773 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
775 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
776 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
778 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
779 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
781 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
782 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
783 if !$resend_commitment {
784 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
787 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
789 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
790 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key()))
796 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
797 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
798 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
800 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
801 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
805 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
806 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
807 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
808 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
809 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
812 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
817 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
818 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
819 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
820 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
821 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
824 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
826 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
827 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
829 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
831 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
833 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
834 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
835 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
836 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
837 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
838 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
841 default_configuration: config.clone(),
842 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
843 fee_estimator: fee_est,
847 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
849 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
850 by_id: HashMap::new(),
851 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
852 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
853 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
854 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
856 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
857 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
860 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
862 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
864 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
865 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
866 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
867 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
875 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
876 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
877 &self.default_configuration
880 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
882 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
883 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
884 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
885 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
886 /// otherwise ignored.
888 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
889 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
891 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
892 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
893 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
894 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
895 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
898 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
899 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
900 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
902 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
903 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
904 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
906 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
907 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
908 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
909 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
910 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
912 panic!("RNG is bad???");
915 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
917 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
918 node_id: their_network_key,
924 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
925 let mut res = Vec::new();
927 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
928 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
929 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
930 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
931 res.push(ChannelDetails {
932 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
933 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
934 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
935 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
936 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
937 inbound_capacity_msat,
938 outbound_capacity_msat,
939 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
940 is_live: channel.is_live(),
941 counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
945 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
946 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
947 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
948 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
954 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
955 /// more information.
956 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
957 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
960 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
961 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
963 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
964 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
965 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
966 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
967 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
968 // really wanted anyway.
969 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
972 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
973 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
974 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
976 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
977 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
978 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
980 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
981 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
982 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
983 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
984 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
985 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
986 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
987 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
990 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
991 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
992 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
994 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
995 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
997 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1000 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1001 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1003 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1004 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1009 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
1010 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1011 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1020 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1021 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1022 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1023 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1024 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1026 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1027 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1028 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1029 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1030 // ignore the result here.
1031 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1035 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1037 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1038 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1039 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1040 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1041 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1042 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1045 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1046 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1048 chan.remove_entry().1
1050 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1053 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1054 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1055 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1056 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1057 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1062 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1065 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1066 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1067 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1068 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1069 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1070 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1071 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1072 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1073 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1074 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1075 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1085 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1086 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1087 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1088 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1089 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1093 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1094 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1095 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1097 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1098 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1099 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1100 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1101 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1102 failure_code: $err_code,
1103 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1108 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1109 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1112 let shared_secret = {
1113 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1114 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1117 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1119 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1120 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1121 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1122 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1123 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1124 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1125 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1126 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1129 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1130 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1131 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1132 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1133 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1136 let mut channel_state = None;
1137 macro_rules! return_err {
1138 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1140 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1141 if channel_state.is_none() {
1142 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1144 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1145 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1146 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1147 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1148 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1153 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1154 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1155 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1156 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1158 let error_code = match err {
1159 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1160 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1161 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1162 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1163 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1165 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1168 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1169 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1170 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1177 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1180 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1181 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1182 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1183 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1184 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1185 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1186 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1187 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1188 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1189 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1190 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1191 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1195 // final_expiry_too_soon
1196 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1197 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1198 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1199 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1200 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1201 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1203 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1204 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1205 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1207 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1208 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1209 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1212 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1213 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1214 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1215 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1218 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1219 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1220 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1221 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1223 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1224 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1226 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1228 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1229 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1230 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1231 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1234 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1235 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1236 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1238 // Check two things:
1239 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1240 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1241 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1243 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1245 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1246 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1247 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1249 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1251 let blinding_factor = {
1252 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1253 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1254 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1255 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1258 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1260 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1262 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1265 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1266 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1269 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1270 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1271 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1272 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1273 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1277 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1278 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1279 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1282 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1283 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1284 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1285 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1289 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1290 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1291 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1292 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1293 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1294 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1295 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1296 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1297 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1298 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1300 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1302 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1303 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1305 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1306 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1307 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1308 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1309 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1310 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1311 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1313 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1314 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1316 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1317 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1318 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1320 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1321 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1323 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1324 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1325 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1326 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1327 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1329 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1330 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1332 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1333 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1334 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1335 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1341 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1342 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1343 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1344 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1346 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1347 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1349 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1350 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1351 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1353 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1355 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1360 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1363 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1364 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1365 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1366 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1367 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1371 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1373 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1374 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1376 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1377 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1378 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1379 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1380 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1381 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1382 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1383 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1386 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1387 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1389 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1395 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1396 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1397 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1398 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1399 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1401 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1402 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1403 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1404 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1405 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1407 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1409 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1411 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1412 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1413 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1414 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1415 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1418 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1419 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1421 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1422 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1424 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1425 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1427 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1429 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1430 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1431 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1433 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1434 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1435 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1436 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1437 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1438 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1439 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1440 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1441 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1444 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1445 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1446 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1447 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1448 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1449 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1450 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1458 } else { unreachable!(); }
1462 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1463 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1465 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1470 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1472 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1473 /// fields for more info.
1475 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1476 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1477 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1478 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1479 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1480 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1482 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1484 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1485 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1486 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1488 /// In general, a path may raise:
1489 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1490 /// node public key) is specified.
1491 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1492 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1494 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1495 /// relevant updates.
1497 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1498 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1499 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1501 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1502 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1503 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1504 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1506 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1507 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1508 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1509 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1510 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1511 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1513 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1514 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1515 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1516 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1517 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1519 let mut total_value = 0;
1520 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1521 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1522 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1523 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1524 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1525 continue 'path_check;
1527 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1528 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1529 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1530 continue 'path_check;
1533 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1534 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1536 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1537 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1540 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1541 let mut results = Vec::new();
1542 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1543 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1545 let mut has_ok = false;
1546 let mut has_err = false;
1547 for res in results.iter() {
1548 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1549 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1550 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1551 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1558 if has_err && has_ok {
1559 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1561 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1567 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1569 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
1570 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1572 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1574 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
1575 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
1576 /// keys per-channel).
1578 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
1579 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
1580 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
1582 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
1583 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
1584 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
1585 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1586 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1588 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
1589 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
1590 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1591 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
1597 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1599 let mut output_index = None;
1600 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1601 for (idx, outp) in funding_transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
1602 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
1603 if output_index.is_some() {
1604 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1605 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
1608 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
1609 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1610 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
1613 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
1616 if output_index.is_none() {
1617 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1618 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
1621 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: funding_transaction.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
1623 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1624 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1625 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1626 } else { unreachable!(); })
1629 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1631 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1632 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1635 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1636 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
1641 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1642 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1643 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1646 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1647 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1648 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1650 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1657 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1658 if !chan.should_announce() {
1659 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1663 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1665 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1667 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1668 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1670 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1671 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1672 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1673 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1674 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1679 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1680 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1681 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1683 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1686 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1687 // smaller than 500:
1688 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1690 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1691 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1692 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1694 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1695 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1697 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1698 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1699 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1700 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1702 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1703 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1704 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1706 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1707 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1710 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1711 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1712 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1713 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1714 rgb, alias, addresses,
1715 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1716 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1718 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1720 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1721 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1722 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1723 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1724 contents: announcement
1729 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1731 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1732 /// Will likely generate further events.
1733 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1734 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1736 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1737 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1738 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1740 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1741 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1743 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1744 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1745 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1746 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1748 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1749 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1750 match forward_info {
1751 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
1752 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1753 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1754 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1755 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1756 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1757 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1759 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1760 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1763 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1764 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1765 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1766 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1767 // problem, not ours.
1774 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1775 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1776 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1777 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1778 match forward_info {
1779 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1780 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1782 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
1783 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1784 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1785 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1786 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1787 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1788 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1789 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1791 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1793 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1794 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1796 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1798 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1799 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1800 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1806 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1808 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1809 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1810 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1811 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1812 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1813 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1814 // this channel currently :/.
1820 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1821 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1823 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1824 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1825 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1827 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1828 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1830 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1832 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1833 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1834 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1837 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1839 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1840 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1841 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1842 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1843 // messages when we can.
1844 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1845 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1846 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1853 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1854 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
1857 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1858 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1859 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1860 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1861 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1862 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1864 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1865 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1866 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1867 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1868 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1870 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1872 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1874 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
1878 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1879 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1882 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1883 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1884 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1885 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1886 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1887 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1888 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1890 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1898 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1899 match forward_info {
1900 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1901 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1902 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
1903 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1904 let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1905 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1906 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1907 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1908 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1911 let mut total_value = 0;
1912 let payment_secret_opt =
1913 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None };
1914 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt))
1915 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1916 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1918 value: amt_to_forward,
1919 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1920 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
1922 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1923 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1924 total_value += htlc.value;
1925 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1926 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1928 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1930 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
1931 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1932 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1933 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
1934 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
1936 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1937 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1938 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1939 htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1940 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1942 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
1945 } else if total_value == data.total_msat {
1946 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1948 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1953 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1955 payment_secret: None,
1956 amt: amt_to_forward,
1960 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1961 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1963 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1964 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1972 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1973 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1976 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1977 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
1980 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1981 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1982 events.append(&mut new_events);
1985 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
1987 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
1988 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
1990 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
1991 fn process_background_events(&self) {
1992 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
1993 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
1994 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
1996 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
1997 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
1998 // monitor updating completing.
1999 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2005 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2006 pub(crate) fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2007 self.process_background_events();
2010 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
2011 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
2012 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
2014 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
2016 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
2017 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2018 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2019 self.process_background_events();
2021 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2022 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2023 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2024 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
2025 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2026 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2031 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
2033 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
2034 chan.to_disabled_staged();
2039 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2040 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2041 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2042 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2043 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2044 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
2045 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2047 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2048 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
2049 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2050 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2051 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2052 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2053 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2054 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2055 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2056 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2057 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2063 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2064 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2065 // be surfaced to the user.
2066 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2067 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2069 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2070 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2071 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2072 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2073 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
2074 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2076 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2079 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2081 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2082 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2083 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2085 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2086 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2087 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2089 rejected_by_dest: false,
2101 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2102 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2103 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2104 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2105 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2106 /// still-available channels.
2107 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2108 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2109 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2110 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2113 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2114 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2115 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2117 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
2118 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2119 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2120 match &onion_error {
2121 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2123 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2125 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2126 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2127 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2128 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2129 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2130 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2131 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2136 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2137 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2138 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2139 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2141 error_code: onion_error_code,
2143 error_data: onion_error_data
2147 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2153 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2154 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2155 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2156 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2158 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2159 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2160 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2161 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2162 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2163 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2165 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2167 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2173 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2174 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2175 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2176 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2177 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2178 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2180 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2181 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2182 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2186 let mut forward_event = None;
2187 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2188 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2190 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2191 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2192 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2195 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2198 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2199 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2200 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2201 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2202 time_forwardable: time
2209 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2210 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2211 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2213 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
2214 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
2215 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
2216 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
2217 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
2218 /// motivated attackers.
2220 /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
2221 /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
2223 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2224 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
2225 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2227 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2229 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2230 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
2231 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2232 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2234 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2235 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2236 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2237 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2239 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2240 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2241 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2242 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2243 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2246 let (is_mpp, mut valid_mpp) = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
2247 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
2248 (true, data.total_msat >= expected_amount)
2250 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
2254 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2255 if !is_mpp || !valid_mpp { break; }
2256 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2261 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2262 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2263 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2264 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2265 if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) {
2266 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2267 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2268 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2269 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2270 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2271 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2273 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2275 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2276 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2277 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2278 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2279 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2280 } else { errs.push(e); }
2282 Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2284 log_warn!(self.logger, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed.");
2286 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2291 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2292 // which were generated.
2293 channel_state.take();
2295 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2296 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2297 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2304 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2305 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2306 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2307 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2308 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2314 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2315 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2316 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2317 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2318 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2319 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2320 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2321 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2323 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2327 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2328 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2329 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2330 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2331 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2332 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2333 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2334 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2343 // TODO: Do something with e?
2344 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2345 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2346 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2347 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2348 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2349 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2350 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2354 } else { unreachable!(); }
2357 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2359 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2360 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2361 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2362 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2366 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2367 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2368 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2371 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2372 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2373 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2374 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2377 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2378 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2379 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2380 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2381 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2382 payment_preimage, e);
2386 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2388 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2389 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2390 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2396 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2397 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2398 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2401 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2402 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2405 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2406 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2408 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2409 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2410 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2411 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2413 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2414 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2415 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2416 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2417 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2418 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2419 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2420 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2421 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2422 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2424 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2425 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2426 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2427 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2430 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2431 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2432 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2433 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2434 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2438 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2442 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2443 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2444 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), funding_txo.clone(), pending_forwards));
2446 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2448 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2449 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2450 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2451 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2456 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2457 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2458 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2459 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2460 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2465 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2469 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2474 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
2475 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2477 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2478 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2479 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2482 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2483 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2484 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2485 msg: announcement_sigs,
2488 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2492 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2494 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2495 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2497 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2499 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2500 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2504 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2505 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2506 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2509 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2510 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2511 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2512 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2513 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2514 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2515 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2516 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2517 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2518 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2520 entry.insert(channel);
2526 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2527 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2528 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2529 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2530 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2531 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2532 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2533 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2535 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2536 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2538 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2541 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2542 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2543 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2544 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2546 user_channel_id: user_id,
2551 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2552 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2553 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2554 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2555 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2556 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2557 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2558 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2559 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2561 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2563 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2566 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2567 // lock before watch_channel
2568 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2570 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2571 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2572 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2573 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2574 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2575 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
2576 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
2577 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
2578 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
2579 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
2580 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
2582 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2583 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2584 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2585 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2586 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2587 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2591 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2592 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2593 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2594 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2595 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2597 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2598 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2599 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2608 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2610 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2611 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2612 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2613 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2614 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2615 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2616 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2618 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
2619 Ok(update) => update,
2620 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2622 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2623 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2627 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2630 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
2634 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2635 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2636 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2637 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2638 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2639 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2640 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2642 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2643 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2644 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2645 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2646 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2647 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2648 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2649 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2650 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2651 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2652 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2653 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2654 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2655 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2656 msg: announcement_sigs,
2661 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2665 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2666 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2667 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2668 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2670 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2671 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2672 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2673 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2675 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2676 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2677 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2678 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2682 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2683 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2684 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2688 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2689 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2690 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2692 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2693 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2695 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2698 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2699 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2701 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2702 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2703 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2704 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2712 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2713 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2714 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2715 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2716 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2717 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2718 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2719 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2721 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2722 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2723 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2724 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2729 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2730 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2731 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2732 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2733 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2734 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2735 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2737 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2738 } else { (tx, None) }
2740 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2743 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2744 log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2745 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2747 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2748 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2749 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2750 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2758 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2759 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2760 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2761 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2763 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2764 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2765 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2766 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2768 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2769 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2771 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2772 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2773 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2774 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2777 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
2778 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
2779 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
2780 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
2781 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2782 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2783 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2784 match pending_forward_info {
2785 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2786 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
2787 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
2788 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2789 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2790 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2791 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
2795 // The only case where we'd be unable to
2796 // successfully get a channel update is if the
2797 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
2798 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
2799 // payments over the channel back to themselves
2800 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
2801 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
2802 // no problem just calling this
2803 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
2804 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2806 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2807 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2808 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2811 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
2813 _ => pending_forward_info
2816 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2818 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2823 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2824 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2826 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2827 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2828 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2829 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2830 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2832 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2834 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2837 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2841 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2842 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2843 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2844 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2845 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2846 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2847 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2849 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2851 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2856 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2857 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2858 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2859 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2860 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2861 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2862 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2864 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2865 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
2866 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2868 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2871 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2875 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2876 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2877 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2878 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2879 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2880 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2881 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2883 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2884 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
2885 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2886 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2887 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2888 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2889 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2894 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2895 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2896 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2898 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2899 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2900 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2902 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2903 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2904 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2905 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2906 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2907 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2908 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2909 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2911 commitment_signed: msg,
2915 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2916 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2917 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2923 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2928 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2929 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2930 let mut forward_event = None;
2931 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2932 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2933 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2934 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2936 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2937 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
2938 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2939 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
2941 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2942 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2943 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2945 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2946 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2947 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2952 match forward_event {
2954 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2955 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2956 time_forwardable: time
2964 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2965 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2967 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2968 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2969 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2970 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2971 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2972 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2974 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2975 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
2976 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2977 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
2978 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2979 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2980 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2981 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
2983 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
2985 } else { unreachable!(); }
2988 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2989 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2990 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2994 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2995 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2996 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3000 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3002 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3005 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3007 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3008 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3009 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3011 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3018 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3019 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3020 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3021 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3022 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3023 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3024 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3026 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3028 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3033 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3034 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3035 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3037 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3038 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3039 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3040 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3042 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3043 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3046 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
3047 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
3048 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
3050 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
3051 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
3053 let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 };
3054 let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 };
3055 match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key),
3056 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) {
3058 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key));
3059 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3062 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key));
3063 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3069 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
3071 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3072 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3073 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
3074 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
3075 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
3076 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
3077 contents: announcement,
3079 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
3082 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3087 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3088 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3089 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3090 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3091 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3093 // It's not a local channel
3097 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3098 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3099 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3100 // TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
3101 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3103 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3105 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3110 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3111 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3112 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3114 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3115 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3116 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3117 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3119 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3120 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3121 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3122 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3123 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
3124 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3125 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
3126 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3127 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
3128 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
3129 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
3130 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
3131 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3133 if commitment_update.is_none() {
3134 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3136 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
3137 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
3140 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
3141 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3142 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3146 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
3147 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
3148 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3149 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3154 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
3155 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3156 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3157 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3163 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
3167 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
3172 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3173 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3174 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3180 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3184 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3185 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3186 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3187 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3188 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3190 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3191 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3192 let counterparty_node_id;
3193 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3194 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3195 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3197 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3198 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3199 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3200 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3201 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3203 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3204 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3206 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3207 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3209 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3210 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3211 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3213 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3216 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3217 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3218 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3219 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3220 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3221 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3222 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3223 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3233 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3234 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3235 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3239 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`.
3240 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) {
3241 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3243 for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() {
3244 match monitor_event {
3245 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3246 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3247 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3248 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3250 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3251 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3254 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3255 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3256 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3257 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3258 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3259 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3260 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3261 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3262 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3264 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3265 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3266 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3270 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3271 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3272 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3273 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3282 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3283 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3287 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3288 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3290 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3291 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3292 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3293 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3294 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3295 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3296 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3297 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3298 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3299 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3300 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3301 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3302 assert!(should_broadcast);
3303 } else { unreachable!(); }
3304 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3306 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3311 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3312 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3313 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3314 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3315 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3318 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3319 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3320 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3321 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3323 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3324 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3325 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3330 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3331 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3332 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3333 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3334 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3337 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
3338 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3339 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3340 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3342 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3343 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3344 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
3349 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3351 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3352 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3353 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3354 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3357 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
3359 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3360 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
3361 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
3362 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
3363 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
3366 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
3367 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
3368 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
3371 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3372 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3373 let new_height = height - 1;
3375 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
3376 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
3377 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
3378 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
3379 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
3380 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
3383 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time));
3387 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3389 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3390 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3391 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3392 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3395 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3396 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3397 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3398 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3400 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3401 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
3403 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3404 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
3407 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3408 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3409 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3410 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3412 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3413 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3415 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3417 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3419 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time));
3422 // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
3423 // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3424 // having an explicit local time source.
3425 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
3426 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
3427 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3428 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3429 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3435 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3436 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3437 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
3438 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
3439 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
3440 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
3446 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3447 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3448 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
3449 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3450 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
3451 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed().map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
3452 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3453 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3458 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3460 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3461 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3462 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3463 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3466 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
3467 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
3469 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
3470 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
3471 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3472 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3473 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3475 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3476 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3478 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3479 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3480 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3481 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3482 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3483 let res = f(channel);
3484 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3485 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3486 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3487 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3488 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3492 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3493 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3494 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3495 msg: funding_locked,
3497 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3498 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3499 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3500 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3501 msg: announcement_sigs,
3504 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3506 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3508 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3509 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3510 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3512 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
3513 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
3514 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3515 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3516 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3520 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3521 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3522 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3529 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
3530 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| {
3531 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3532 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3533 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3534 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3535 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3536 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3537 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3538 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3539 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3540 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3541 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3546 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3551 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
3553 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3554 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3558 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
3559 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
3560 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3562 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
3563 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3564 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3565 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
3568 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
3569 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3571 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
3572 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
3575 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3576 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
3577 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
3578 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
3579 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3584 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
3585 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3586 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3587 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3588 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3589 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3592 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3593 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3594 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3597 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3598 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3599 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3602 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3603 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3604 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3607 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3608 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3609 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3612 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3613 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3614 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3617 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3618 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3619 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3622 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3623 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3624 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3627 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3628 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3629 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3632 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3633 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3634 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3637 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3638 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3639 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3642 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3643 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3644 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3647 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3648 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3649 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3652 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3653 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3654 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3657 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3658 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3659 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3662 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3663 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3664 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3667 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3668 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3669 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3672 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3673 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3674 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3677 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3678 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3679 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3680 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3681 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3683 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3684 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3685 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3686 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3687 if no_connection_possible {
3688 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3689 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3690 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3691 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3692 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3694 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3695 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3696 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3706 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3707 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3708 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3709 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are no
3710 // holding cell add-HTLCs, so if in the future we stop removing uncommitted HTLCs
3711 // on peer disconnect here, there will need to be corresponding changes in
3712 // reestablish logic.
3713 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
3714 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3715 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3716 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3717 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3719 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3720 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3721 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3725 no_channels_remain = false;
3731 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3733 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3734 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3735 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3736 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3737 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3738 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3739 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3740 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3741 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3742 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3743 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3744 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3745 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3746 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3747 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3748 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3749 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
3750 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
3751 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
3755 if no_channels_remain {
3756 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
3759 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3760 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3762 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3763 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3764 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3769 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3770 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3772 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3775 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3776 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
3777 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3778 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3779 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3782 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3783 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3788 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3789 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3790 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3791 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3792 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3793 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3794 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3795 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3796 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3800 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3801 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3802 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
3808 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3811 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3812 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3814 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3815 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3816 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
3817 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
3818 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
3822 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
3823 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
3828 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
3829 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
3830 struct PersistenceNotifier {
3831 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
3832 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
3833 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
3836 impl PersistenceNotifier {
3839 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
3845 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
3846 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3847 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
3848 let result = *guard;
3856 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3857 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3858 let current_time = Instant::now();
3860 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
3861 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3862 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
3863 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
3864 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
3865 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
3866 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
3868 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
3869 let result = *guard;
3870 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
3874 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
3875 None => return result,
3881 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
3883 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
3884 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
3885 *persistence_lock = true;
3886 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
3891 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3892 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3894 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3895 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3896 match &self.routing {
3897 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3899 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3900 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3902 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3904 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3905 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3908 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3909 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3910 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3911 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3916 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3917 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3918 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3919 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3920 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3921 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3922 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3924 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3925 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3926 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3928 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3930 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3931 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3932 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3933 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3938 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3939 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3941 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3943 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3945 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3947 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3954 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3955 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3956 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3957 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3958 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3959 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3964 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3965 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3967 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3969 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3971 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3973 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3980 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3981 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3982 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3983 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3984 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3985 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3990 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3994 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3997 impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
4004 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
4005 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4007 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
4009 hop_data.write(writer)?;
4011 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
4013 path.write(writer)?;
4014 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4015 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
4022 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
4023 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
4024 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4025 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4026 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4027 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
4028 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
4029 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4031 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4036 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
4037 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4039 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
4043 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
4045 failure_code.write(writer)?;
4046 data.write(writer)?;
4053 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
4054 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
4055 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4056 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
4057 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4058 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
4059 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
4061 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4066 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
4067 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4069 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_funding_outpoint, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
4071 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4072 prev_funding_outpoint.write(writer)?;
4073 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4074 forward_info.write(writer)?;
4076 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4078 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4079 err_packet.write(writer)?;
4086 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
4087 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
4088 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4089 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
4090 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4091 prev_funding_outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
4092 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4093 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
4095 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
4096 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4097 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4099 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4104 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4105 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4106 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4107 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4108 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4111 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4112 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4114 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4115 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4117 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4119 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4120 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4121 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4124 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4125 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4126 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4127 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4128 unfunded_channels += 1;
4131 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4132 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4133 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4134 channel.write(writer)?;
4138 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4139 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4140 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4141 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4142 for forward in pending_forwards {
4143 forward.write(writer)?;
4147 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4148 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4149 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4150 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4151 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4152 htlc.write(writer)?;
4156 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4157 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4158 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4159 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4160 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4161 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4164 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4165 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4166 for event in events.iter() {
4167 event.write(writer)?;
4170 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4171 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4172 for event in background_events.iter() {
4174 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4176 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4177 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4182 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4188 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4190 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4192 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4193 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4194 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4195 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4196 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4197 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4198 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4199 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4200 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4201 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4202 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4204 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4205 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4207 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4208 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4209 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4210 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4211 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4212 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4213 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4214 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4215 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4216 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4217 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4220 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4221 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4223 pub keys_manager: K,
4225 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4227 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4228 pub fee_estimator: F,
4229 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4231 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4232 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4233 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4234 pub chain_monitor: M,
4236 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4237 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4238 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4239 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4240 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4241 /// deserialization.
4243 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4244 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4245 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4247 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4248 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4250 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4251 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4252 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4253 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4255 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4258 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4259 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4262 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4263 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4264 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4265 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4266 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4267 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4270 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4271 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4272 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4273 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4274 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4276 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4277 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4282 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4283 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4284 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4285 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4286 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4287 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4288 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4289 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4292 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4293 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4294 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4298 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4299 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4300 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4301 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4302 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4303 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4306 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4307 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4308 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4309 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4310 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4313 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4314 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4315 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4317 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4319 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4320 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4321 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4322 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4323 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4324 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4325 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4326 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4327 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4328 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4329 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4330 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4331 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4332 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4333 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4334 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4335 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4336 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4337 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4338 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4339 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4340 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4341 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4343 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4344 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4346 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4349 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4353 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4354 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4355 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4359 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4360 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4361 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4362 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4363 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4364 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4365 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4366 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4367 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4369 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
4372 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4373 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4374 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
4375 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4376 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4377 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
4378 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
4379 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4381 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
4384 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4385 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
4386 for _ in 0..peer_count {
4387 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4388 let peer_state = PeerState {
4389 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
4391 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
4394 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4395 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
4396 for _ in 0..event_count {
4397 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4398 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
4403 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4404 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
4405 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
4406 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4407 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
4408 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4412 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4414 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4415 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4417 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
4419 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
4420 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
4421 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
4423 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
4425 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
4430 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
4432 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
4433 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
4436 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
4438 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
4440 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
4441 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
4442 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
4443 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
4445 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
4446 logger: args.logger,
4447 default_configuration: args.default_config,
4450 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4451 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4454 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4455 //connection or two.
4457 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
4463 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
4465 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
4467 use std::time::Duration;
4470 fn test_wait_timeout() {
4471 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
4472 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
4474 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
4475 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
4476 thread::spawn(move || {
4478 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
4479 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4480 *persistence_lock = true;
4483 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
4489 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
4490 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
4492 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
4495 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4500 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
4502 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
4505 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4512 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
4515 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
4516 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
4517 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
4518 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
4519 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4520 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4521 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
4522 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
4523 use routing::router::get_route;
4524 use util::test_utils;
4525 use util::config::UserConfig;
4526 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
4528 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4529 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4530 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
4532 use std::sync::Mutex;
4536 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
4537 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
4538 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
4539 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
4540 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
4541 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
4542 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
4547 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
4548 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
4551 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
4552 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
4553 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
4555 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
4556 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
4558 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())};
4559 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
4561 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
4562 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
4564 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4565 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
4566 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
4567 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
4568 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4570 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
4572 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
4574 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4575 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
4576 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
4577 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
4578 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4580 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
4582 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
4584 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
4585 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4586 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4589 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
4590 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4591 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
4593 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4594 } else { panic!(); }
4596 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4597 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4599 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
4602 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4605 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
4606 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
4608 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4609 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4611 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
4613 macro_rules! send_payment {
4614 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
4615 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
4616 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), None, Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
4618 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
4619 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
4621 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap();
4622 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
4623 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4624 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
4625 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4626 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4627 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4628 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4630 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
4631 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
4632 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage, &None, 10_000));
4634 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
4635 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
4636 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4637 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4638 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
4640 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
4643 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
4644 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4645 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4646 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4648 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
4653 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
4654 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);