1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
48 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
50 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
70 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
71 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
72 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
73 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
74 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
75 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
76 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
77 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
78 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
81 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
82 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
83 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
84 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
85 crate::sign::KeysManager,
89 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
90 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
93 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
96 use crate::prelude::*;
98 use core::cell::RefCell;
100 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
101 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
102 use core::time::Duration;
103 use core::ops::Deref;
105 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
106 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
107 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
109 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
111 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
112 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
113 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
115 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
116 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
117 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
118 // before we forward it.
120 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
121 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
122 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
123 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
124 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
126 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
129 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
130 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
132 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
133 /// do with the HTLC.
134 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
135 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
137 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
138 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
139 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
140 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
141 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
142 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
144 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
146 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
147 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
149 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
150 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
151 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
152 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
153 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
155 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
156 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
157 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
158 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
159 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
161 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
162 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
163 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
164 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
166 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
167 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
169 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
170 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
171 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
172 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
173 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
174 requires_blinded_error: bool,
176 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
177 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
178 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
180 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
181 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
183 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
184 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
185 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
187 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
188 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
189 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
191 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
192 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
193 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
194 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
196 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
197 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
198 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
200 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
201 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
202 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
203 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
204 requires_blinded_error: bool,
208 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
209 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
210 pub struct BlindedForward {
211 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
212 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
213 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
214 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
215 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
216 /// the introduction node.
217 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
220 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
221 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
222 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
224 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
225 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
226 Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
232 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
234 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
235 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
236 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
237 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
238 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
239 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
241 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
242 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
243 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
244 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
245 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
247 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
249 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
250 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
251 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
253 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
254 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
255 /// it along another path).
257 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
258 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
259 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
260 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
261 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
262 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
263 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
264 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
265 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
267 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
270 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
272 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
274 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
277 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
278 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
279 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
280 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
283 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
284 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
285 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
286 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
287 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
290 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
291 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
292 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
294 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
295 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
296 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
299 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
300 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
302 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
303 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
304 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
307 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
308 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
309 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
312 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
317 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
321 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
322 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
323 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
324 pub enum BlindedFailure {
325 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
326 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
327 FromIntroductionNode,
328 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
329 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
333 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
334 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
335 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
336 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
337 short_channel_id: u64,
338 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
340 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
341 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
342 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
343 channel_id: ChannelId,
345 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
346 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
351 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
353 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
354 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
355 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
357 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
358 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
361 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
362 struct ClaimableHTLC {
363 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
365 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
367 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
368 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
369 sender_intended_value: u64,
370 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
372 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
373 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
374 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
375 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
377 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
378 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
381 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
382 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
383 events::ClaimedHTLC {
384 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
385 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
386 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
387 value_msat: val.value,
388 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
393 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
394 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
396 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
397 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
398 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
401 /// Number of bytes in the id.
402 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
405 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
406 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
411 impl Readable for PaymentId {
412 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
413 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
418 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
419 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
420 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
424 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
426 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
427 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
428 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
430 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
431 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
436 impl Readable for InterceptId {
437 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
438 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
443 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
444 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
445 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
446 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
447 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
450 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
452 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
453 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
454 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
456 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
457 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
461 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
462 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
463 (0, short_channel_id, required),
464 (2, htlc_id, required),
466 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
467 (0, session_priv, required),
472 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
473 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
474 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
475 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
476 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
479 session_priv: SecretKey,
480 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
481 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
482 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
483 payment_id: PaymentId,
486 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
487 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
488 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
490 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
492 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
494 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
497 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
498 payment_id.hash(hasher);
499 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
505 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
507 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
508 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
509 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
510 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
511 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
512 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
516 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
517 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
518 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
519 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
520 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
521 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
523 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
529 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
530 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
532 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
533 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
534 pub enum FailureCode {
535 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
536 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
537 TemporaryNodeFailure,
538 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
539 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
540 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
541 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
542 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
543 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
544 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
545 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
546 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
547 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
549 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
550 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
551 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
554 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
555 fn into(self) -> u16 {
557 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
558 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
559 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
560 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
565 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
566 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
567 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
568 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
569 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
571 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
572 err: msgs::LightningError,
573 closes_channel: bool,
574 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
576 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
578 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
580 err: LightningError {
582 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
583 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
589 closes_channel: false,
590 shutdown_finish: None,
594 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
595 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
598 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
599 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
600 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
601 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
602 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
603 // commitment upon reconnecting.
604 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
606 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
609 err: LightningError { err, action },
610 closes_channel: true,
611 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
615 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
618 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
620 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
621 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
625 log_level: Level::Warn,
628 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
630 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
632 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
634 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
635 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
642 closes_channel: false,
643 shutdown_finish: None,
647 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
652 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
653 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
654 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
655 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
656 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
658 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
659 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
660 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
661 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
662 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
663 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
664 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
666 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
670 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
671 struct ClaimingPayment {
673 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
674 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
675 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
676 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
678 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
679 (0, amount_msat, required),
680 (2, payment_purpose, required),
681 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
682 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
683 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
686 struct ClaimablePayment {
687 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
688 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
689 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
692 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
693 struct ClaimablePayments {
694 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
695 /// failed/claimed by the user.
697 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
698 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
700 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
701 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
702 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
704 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
705 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
706 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
707 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
710 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
711 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
712 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
713 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
715 enum BackgroundEvent {
716 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
717 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
718 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
719 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
721 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
722 /// are regenerated on startup.
723 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
724 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
725 /// channel to continue normal operation.
727 /// In general this should be used rather than
728 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
729 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
730 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
732 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
733 /// are regenerated on startup.
734 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
735 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
736 funding_txo: OutPoint,
737 channel_id: ChannelId,
738 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
740 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
741 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
743 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
744 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
745 channel_id: ChannelId,
750 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
751 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
752 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
753 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
754 /// event can be generated.
755 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
756 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
757 /// operation of another channel.
759 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
760 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
761 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
762 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
764 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
765 event: events::Event,
766 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
768 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
769 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
770 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
772 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
773 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
774 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
775 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
776 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
778 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
779 /// stored for later processing.
780 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
781 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
782 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
783 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
784 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
788 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
789 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
790 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
791 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
792 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
793 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
794 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
795 (4, blocking_action, required),
796 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
797 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
798 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
800 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
801 (0, event, upgradable_required),
802 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
803 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
804 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
805 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
806 // downgrades to prior versions.
807 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
811 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
812 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
813 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
814 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
815 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
816 channel_id: ChannelId,
819 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
820 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
821 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
822 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
823 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
824 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
825 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
829 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
830 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
831 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
832 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
833 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
834 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
836 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
837 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
838 channel_id: ChannelId,
839 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
844 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
845 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
846 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
847 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
848 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
853 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
854 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
858 /// State we hold per-peer.
859 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
860 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
862 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
863 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
864 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
866 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
867 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
868 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
869 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
870 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
871 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
872 latest_features: InitFeatures,
873 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
874 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
875 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
876 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
877 /// user but which have not yet completed.
879 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
880 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
881 /// for a missing channel.
882 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
883 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
884 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
886 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
887 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
888 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
889 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
891 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
892 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
893 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
894 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
895 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
896 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
897 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
898 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
899 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
900 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
901 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
902 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
903 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
904 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
905 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
909 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
910 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
911 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
912 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
913 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
914 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
917 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
919 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
920 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
922 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
924 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
927 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
928 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
931 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
932 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
933 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
936 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
937 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
938 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
939 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
943 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
944 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
945 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
946 /// The original OpenChannel message.
947 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
948 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
949 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
952 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
953 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
954 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
956 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
957 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
959 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
962 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
963 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
964 struct PendingInboundPayment {
965 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
966 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
967 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
968 /// this payment being removed.
970 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
971 user_payment_id: u64,
972 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
973 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
974 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
977 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
978 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
979 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
980 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
981 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
982 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
983 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
984 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
986 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
987 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
988 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
996 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
999 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1000 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1001 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1006 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1007 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1008 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1009 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1010 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1011 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1012 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1013 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1014 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1016 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1017 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1018 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1027 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1030 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1031 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1032 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1037 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1039 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1041 pub trait AChannelManager {
1042 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1043 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1044 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1045 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1046 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1047 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1048 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1049 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1050 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1051 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1052 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1053 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1054 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1055 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1056 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1057 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1058 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1059 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1060 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1061 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1062 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1063 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1064 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1065 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1066 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1067 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1068 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1069 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1070 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1071 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1072 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1073 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1074 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1075 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1076 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1077 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1080 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1081 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1083 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1084 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1085 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1086 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1087 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1088 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1092 type Watch = M::Target;
1094 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1096 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1098 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1100 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1101 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1103 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1105 type Router = R::Target;
1107 type Logger = L::Target;
1109 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1112 /// A lightning node's channel state machine and payment management logic, which facilitates
1113 /// sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through lightning channels.
1115 /// [`ChannelManager`] is parameterized by a number of components to achieve this.
1116 /// - [`chain::Watch`] (typically [`ChainMonitor`]) for on-chain monitoring and enforcement of each
1118 /// - [`BroadcasterInterface`] for broadcasting transactions related to opening, funding, and
1119 /// closing channels
1120 /// - [`EntropySource`] for providing random data needed for cryptographic operations
1121 /// - [`NodeSigner`] for cryptographic operations scoped to the node
1122 /// - [`SignerProvider`] for providing signers whose operations are scoped to individual channels
1123 /// - [`FeeEstimator`] to determine transaction fee rates needed to have a transaction mined in a
1125 /// - [`Router`] for finding payment paths when initiating and retrying payments
1126 /// - [`Logger`] for logging operational information of varying degrees
1128 /// Additionally, it implements the following traits:
1129 /// - [`ChannelMessageHandler`] to handle off-chain channel activity from peers
1130 /// - [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] to similarly send such messages to peers
1131 /// - [`OffersMessageHandler`] for BOLT 12 message handling and sending
1132 /// - [`EventsProvider`] to generate user-actionable [`Event`]s
1133 /// - [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for notification of on-chain activity
1135 /// Thus, [`ChannelManager`] is typically used to parameterize a [`MessageHandler`] and an
1136 /// [`OnionMessenger`]. The latter is required to support BOLT 12 functionality.
1138 /// # `ChannelManager` vs `ChannelMonitor`
1140 /// It's important to distinguish between the *off-chain* management and *on-chain* enforcement of
1141 /// lightning channels. [`ChannelManager`] exchanges messages with peers to manage the off-chain
1142 /// state of each channel. During this process, it generates a [`ChannelMonitor`] for each channel
1143 /// and a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] for each relevant change, notifying its parameterized
1144 /// [`chain::Watch`] of them.
1146 /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`], such as [`ChainMonitor`], is responsible for aggregating
1147 /// these [`ChannelMonitor`]s and applying any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to them. It then monitors
1148 /// for any pertinent on-chain activity, enforcing claims as needed.
1150 /// This division of off-chain management and on-chain enforcement allows for interesting node
1151 /// setups. For instance, on-chain enforcement could be moved to a separate host or have added
1152 /// redundancy, possibly as a watchtower. See [`chain::Watch`] for the relevant interface.
1154 /// # Initialization
1156 /// Use [`ChannelManager::new`] with the most recent [`BlockHash`] when creating a fresh instance.
1157 /// Otherwise, if restarting, construct [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] with the necessary parameters and
1158 /// references to any deserialized [`ChannelMonitor`]s that were previously persisted. Use this to
1159 /// deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] and feed it any new chain data since it was last online, as
1160 /// detailed in the [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] documentation.
1163 /// use bitcoin::BlockHash;
1164 /// use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1165 /// use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
1166 /// # use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1167 /// use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
1168 /// # use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
1169 /// use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
1170 /// use lightning::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
1172 /// # fn read_channel_monitors() -> Vec<ChannelMonitor<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>> { vec![] }
1175 /// # L: lightning::util::logger::Logger,
1176 /// # ES: lightning::sign::EntropySource,
1177 /// # S: for <'b> lightning::routing::scoring::LockableScore<'b, ScoreLookUp = SL>,
1178 /// # SL: lightning::routing::scoring::ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>,
1180 /// # R: lightning::io::Read,
1182 /// # fee_estimator: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator,
1183 /// # chain_monitor: &dyn lightning::chain::Watch<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>,
1184 /// # tx_broadcaster: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface,
1185 /// # router: &lightning::routing::router::DefaultRouter<&NetworkGraph<&'a L>, &'a L, &ES, &S, SP, SL>,
1187 /// # entropy_source: &ES,
1188 /// # node_signer: &dyn lightning::sign::NodeSigner,
1189 /// # signer_provider: &lightning::sign::DynSignerProvider,
1190 /// # best_block: lightning::chain::BestBlock,
1191 /// # current_timestamp: u32,
1192 /// # mut reader: R,
1193 /// # ) -> Result<(), lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
1194 /// // Fresh start with no channels
1195 /// let params = ChainParameters {
1196 /// network: Network::Bitcoin,
1199 /// let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1200 /// let channel_manager = ChannelManager::new(
1201 /// fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, entropy_source, node_signer,
1202 /// signer_provider, default_config, params, current_timestamp
1205 /// // Restart from deserialized data
1206 /// let mut channel_monitors = read_channel_monitors();
1207 /// let args = ChannelManagerReadArgs::new(
1208 /// entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster,
1209 /// router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors.iter_mut().collect()
1211 /// let (block_hash, channel_manager) =
1212 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<_, _, _, _, _, _, _, _>)>::read(&mut reader, args)?;
1214 /// // Update the ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors with the latest chain data
1217 /// // Move the monitors to the ChannelManager's chain::Watch parameter
1218 /// for monitor in channel_monitors {
1219 /// chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
1227 /// The following is required for [`ChannelManager`] to function properly:
1228 /// - Handle messages from peers using its [`ChannelMessageHandler`] implementation (typically
1229 /// called by [`PeerManager::read_event`] when processing network I/O)
1230 /// - Send messages to peers obtained via its [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] implementation
1231 /// (typically initiated when [`PeerManager::process_events`] is called)
1232 /// - Feed on-chain activity using either its [`chain::Listen`] or [`chain::Confirm`] implementation
1233 /// as documented by those traits
1234 /// - Perform any periodic channel and payment checks by calling [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly
1236 /// - Persist to disk whenever [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`] returns `true` using a
1237 /// [`Persister`] such as a [`KVStore`] implementation
1238 /// - Handle [`Event`]s obtained via its [`EventsProvider`] implementation
1240 /// The [`Future`] returned by [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] is useful in determining
1241 /// when the last two requirements need to be checked.
1243 /// The [`lightning-block-sync`] and [`lightning-transaction-sync`] crates provide utilities that
1244 /// simplify feeding in on-chain activity using the [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] traits,
1245 /// respectively. The remaining requirements can be met using the [`lightning-background-processor`]
1246 /// crate. For languages other than Rust, the availability of similar utilities may vary.
1250 /// [`ChannelManager`]'s primary function involves managing a channel state. Without channels,
1251 /// payments can't be sent. Use [`list_channels`] or [`list_usable_channels`] for a snapshot of the
1252 /// currently open channels.
1255 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1257 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1258 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1259 /// let channels = channel_manager.list_usable_channels();
1260 /// for details in channels {
1261 /// println!("{:?}", details);
1266 /// Each channel is identified using a [`ChannelId`], which will change throughout the channel's
1267 /// life cycle. Additionally, channels are assigned a `user_channel_id`, which is given in
1268 /// [`Event`]s associated with the channel and serves as a fixed identifier but is otherwise unused
1269 /// by [`ChannelManager`].
1271 /// ## Opening Channels
1273 /// To an open a channel with a peer, call [`create_channel`]. This will initiate the process of
1274 /// opening an outbound channel, which requires self-funding when handling
1275 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1278 /// # use bitcoin::{ScriptBuf, Transaction};
1279 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1280 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1281 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1283 /// # trait Wallet {
1284 /// # fn create_funding_transaction(
1285 /// # &self, _amount_sats: u64, _output_script: ScriptBuf
1286 /// # ) -> Transaction;
1289 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager, W: Wallet>(channel_manager: T, wallet: W, peer_id: PublicKey) {
1290 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1291 /// let value_sats = 1_000_000;
1292 /// let push_msats = 10_000_000;
1293 /// match channel_manager.create_channel(peer_id, value_sats, push_msats, 42, None, None) {
1294 /// Ok(channel_id) => println!("Opening channel {}", channel_id),
1295 /// Err(e) => println!("Error opening channel: {:?}", e),
1298 /// // On the event processing thread once the peer has responded
1299 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1300 /// Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1301 /// temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script,
1302 /// user_channel_id, ..
1304 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1305 /// let funding_transaction = wallet.create_funding_transaction(
1306 /// channel_value_satoshis, output_script
1308 /// match channel_manager.funding_transaction_generated(
1309 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction
1311 /// Ok(()) => println!("Funding channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1312 /// Err(e) => println!("Error funding channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1315 /// Event::ChannelPending { channel_id, user_channel_id, former_temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
1316 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1318 /// "Channel {} now {} pending (funding transaction has been broadcasted)", channel_id,
1319 /// former_temporary_channel_id.unwrap()
1322 /// Event::ChannelReady { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1323 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1324 /// println!("Channel {} ready", channel_id);
1332 /// ## Accepting Channels
1334 /// Inbound channels are initiated by peers and are automatically accepted unless [`ChannelManager`]
1335 /// has [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] set. In that case, the channel may be
1336 /// either accepted or rejected when handling [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
1339 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1340 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1341 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1343 /// # fn is_trusted(counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> bool {
1345 /// # unimplemented!()
1348 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1349 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1350 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1351 /// Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
1352 /// if !is_trusted(counterparty_node_id) {
1353 /// match channel_manager.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(
1354 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id
1356 /// Ok(()) => println!("Rejecting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1357 /// Err(e) => println!("Error rejecting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1362 /// let user_channel_id = 43;
1363 /// match channel_manager.accept_inbound_channel(
1364 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, user_channel_id
1366 /// Ok(()) => println!("Accepting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1367 /// Err(e) => println!("Error accepting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1376 /// ## Closing Channels
1378 /// There are two ways to close a channel: either cooperatively using [`close_channel`] or
1379 /// unilaterally using [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]. The former is ideal as it makes for
1380 /// lower fees and immediate access to funds. However, the latter may be necessary if the
1381 /// counterparty isn't behaving properly or has gone offline. [`Event::ChannelClosed`] is generated
1382 /// once the channel has been closed successfully.
1385 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1386 /// # use lightning::ln::ChannelId;
1387 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1388 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1390 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1391 /// # channel_manager: T, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
1393 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1394 /// match channel_manager.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id) {
1395 /// Ok(()) => println!("Closing channel {}", channel_id),
1396 /// Err(e) => println!("Error closing channel {}: {:?}", channel_id, e),
1399 /// // On the event processing thread
1400 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1401 /// Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1402 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1403 /// println!("Channel {} closed", channel_id);
1413 /// [`ChannelManager`] is responsible for sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through its
1414 /// channels. A payment is typically initiated from a [BOLT 11] invoice or a [BOLT 12] offer, though
1415 /// spontaneous (i.e., keysend) payments are also possible. Incoming payments don't require
1416 /// maintaining any additional state as [`ChannelManager`] can reconstruct the [`PaymentPreimage`]
1417 /// from the [`PaymentSecret`]. Sending payments, however, require tracking in order to retry failed
1420 /// After a payment is initiated, it will appear in [`list_recent_payments`] until a short time
1421 /// after either an [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is handled. Failed HTLCs
1422 /// for a payment will be retried according to the payment's [`Retry`] strategy or until
1423 /// [`abandon_payment`] is called.
1425 /// ## BOLT 11 Invoices
1427 /// The [`lightning-invoice`] crate is useful for creating BOLT 11 invoices. Specifically, use the
1428 /// functions in its `utils` module for constructing invoices that are compatible with
1429 /// [`ChannelManager`]. These functions serve as a convenience for building invoices with the
1430 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentSecret`] returned from [`create_inbound_payment`]. To provide your
1431 /// own [`PaymentHash`], use [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] or the corresponding functions in
1432 /// the [`lightning-invoice`] `utils` module.
1434 /// [`ChannelManager`] generates an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`] once the full payment has been
1435 /// received. Call [`claim_funds`] to release the [`PaymentPreimage`], which in turn will result in
1436 /// an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`].
1439 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1440 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1442 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1443 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1444 /// // Or use utils::create_invoice_from_channelmanager
1445 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.create_inbound_payment(
1446 /// Some(10_000_000), 3600, None
1448 /// Ok((payment_hash, _payment_secret)) => {
1449 /// println!("Creating inbound payment {}", payment_hash);
1452 /// Err(()) => panic!("Error creating inbound payment"),
1455 /// // On the event processing thread
1456 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1457 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1458 /// PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1459 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1460 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1461 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1463 /// PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1464 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1466 /// PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(payment_preimage) => {
1467 /// assert_ne!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1468 /// println!("Claiming spontaneous payment {}", payment_hash);
1469 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1472 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1473 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1474 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1482 /// For paying an invoice, [`lightning-invoice`] provides a `payment` module with convenience
1483 /// functions for use with [`send_payment`].
1486 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1487 /// # use lightning::ln::PaymentHash;
1488 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
1489 /// # use lightning::routing::router::RouteParameters;
1491 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1492 /// # channel_manager: T, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields,
1493 /// # route_params: RouteParameters, retry: Retry
1495 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1496 /// // let (payment_hash, recipient_onion, route_params) =
1497 /// // payment::payment_parameters_from_invoice(&invoice);
1498 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1499 /// match channel_manager.send_payment(
1500 /// payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route_params, retry
1502 /// Ok(()) => println!("Sending payment with hash {}", payment_hash),
1503 /// Err(e) => println!("Failed sending payment with hash {}: {:?}", payment_hash, e),
1506 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1507 /// let expected_payment_hash = payment_hash;
1509 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1511 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1512 /// payment_id: expected_payment_id,
1513 /// payment_hash: expected_payment_hash,
1519 /// // On the event processing thread
1520 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1521 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_hash),
1522 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_hash),
1529 /// ## BOLT 12 Offers
1531 /// The [`offers`] module is useful for creating BOLT 12 offers. An [`Offer`] is a precursor to a
1532 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`], which must first be requested by the payer. The interchange of these messages
1533 /// as defined in the specification is handled by [`ChannelManager`] and its implementation of
1534 /// [`OffersMessageHandler`]. However, this only works with an [`Offer`] created using a builder
1535 /// returned by [`create_offer_builder`]. With this approach, BOLT 12 offers and invoices are
1536 /// stateless just as BOLT 11 invoices are.
1539 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1540 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1541 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1543 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1544 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1545 /// let offer = channel_manager
1546 /// .create_offer_builder("coffee".to_string())?
1548 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1549 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::offer::OfferBuilder<_, _> = offer.into();
1550 /// # let offer = builder
1551 /// .amount_msats(10_000_000)
1553 /// let bech32_offer = offer.to_string();
1555 /// // On the event processing thread
1556 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1557 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1558 /// PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1559 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1560 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1562 /// PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1563 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1568 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1569 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1578 /// Use [`pay_for_offer`] to initiated payment, which sends an [`InvoiceRequest`] for an [`Offer`]
1579 /// and pays the [`Bolt12Invoice`] response. In addition to success and failure events,
1580 /// [`ChannelManager`] may also generate an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
1583 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1584 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1585 /// # use lightning::offers::offer::Offer;
1587 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1588 /// # channel_manager: T, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
1589 /// # payer_note: Option<String>, retry: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1591 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1592 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1593 /// match channel_manager.pay_for_offer(
1594 /// offer, quantity, amount_msats, payer_note, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1596 /// Ok(()) => println!("Requesting invoice for offer"),
1597 /// Err(e) => println!("Unable to request invoice for offer: {:?}", e),
1600 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1601 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1603 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1605 /// RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1609 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1611 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1613 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, .. }
1617 /// // On the event processing thread
1618 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1619 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1620 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1621 /// Event::InvoiceRequestFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1628 /// ## BOLT 12 Refunds
1630 /// A [`Refund`] is a request for an invoice to be paid. Like *paying* for an [`Offer`], *creating*
1631 /// a [`Refund`] involves maintaining state since it represents a future outbound payment.
1632 /// Therefore, use [`create_refund_builder`] when creating one, otherwise [`ChannelManager`] will
1633 /// refuse to pay any corresponding [`Bolt12Invoice`] that it receives.
1636 /// # use core::time::Duration;
1637 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1638 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1639 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1641 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1642 /// # channel_manager: T, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, retry: Retry,
1643 /// # max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1644 /// # ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1645 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1646 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1647 /// let refund = channel_manager
1648 /// .create_refund_builder(
1649 /// "coffee".to_string(), amount_msats, absolute_expiry, payment_id, retry,
1650 /// max_total_routing_fee_msat
1653 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1654 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::refund::RefundBuilder<_> = refund.into();
1655 /// # let refund = builder
1656 /// .payer_note("refund for order 1234".to_string())
1658 /// let bech32_refund = refund.to_string();
1660 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1661 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1663 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1665 /// RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1669 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1671 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1673 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, .. }
1677 /// // On the event processing thread
1678 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1679 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1680 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1688 /// Use [`request_refund_payment`] to send a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for receiving the refund. Similar to
1689 /// *creating* an [`Offer`], this is stateless as it represents an inbound payment.
1692 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1693 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1694 /// # use lightning::offers::refund::Refund;
1696 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T, refund: &Refund) {
1697 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1698 /// match channel_manager.request_refund_payment(refund) {
1699 /// Ok(()) => println!("Requesting payment for refund"),
1700 /// Err(e) => println!("Unable to request payment for refund: {:?}", e),
1703 /// // On the event processing thread
1704 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1705 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1706 /// PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1707 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1708 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1710 /// PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1711 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1716 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1717 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1727 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1728 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1729 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1730 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1732 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1733 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1734 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1735 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1736 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1737 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1738 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1739 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1740 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1742 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1743 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1744 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1746 /// # `ChannelUpdate` Messages
1748 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1749 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1750 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1751 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1752 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1754 /// # DoS Mitigation
1756 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1757 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1758 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1759 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1761 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1762 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1763 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1767 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1768 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1769 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1770 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1771 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1773 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1774 /// [`MessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::MessageHandler
1775 /// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::messenger::OnionMessenger
1776 /// [`PeerManager::read_event`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::read_event
1777 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
1778 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1779 /// [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`]: Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence
1780 /// [`Persister`]: crate::util::persist::Persister
1781 /// [`KVStore`]: crate::util::persist::KVStore
1782 /// [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`]: Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future
1783 /// [`lightning-block-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_block_sync/latest/lightning_block_sync
1784 /// [`lightning-transaction-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_transaction_sync/latest/lightning_transaction_sync
1785 /// [`lightning-background-processor`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_background_processor/lightning_background_processor
1786 /// [`list_channels`]: Self::list_channels
1787 /// [`list_usable_channels`]: Self::list_usable_channels
1788 /// [`create_channel`]: Self::create_channel
1789 /// [`close_channel`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1790 /// [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1791 /// [BOLT 11]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/11-payment-encoding.md
1792 /// [BOLT 12]: https://github.com/rustyrussell/lightning-rfc/blob/guilt/offers/12-offer-encoding.md
1793 /// [`list_recent_payments`]: Self::list_recent_payments
1794 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
1795 /// [`lightning-invoice`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_invoice/latest/lightning_invoice
1796 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
1797 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
1798 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
1799 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1800 /// [`offers`]: crate::offers
1801 /// [`create_offer_builder`]: Self::create_offer_builder
1802 /// [`pay_for_offer`]: Self::pay_for_offer
1803 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
1804 /// [`create_refund_builder`]: Self::create_refund_builder
1805 /// [`request_refund_payment`]: Self::request_refund_payment
1806 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1807 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1808 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1809 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1810 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1811 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1812 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1815 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1816 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1817 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1818 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1819 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1823 // `pending_offers_messages`
1825 // `total_consistency_lock`
1827 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1829 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1831 // |__`per_peer_state`
1833 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1835 // |__`claimable_payments`
1837 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1841 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1843 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1845 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1849 // |__`pending_events`
1851 // |__`pending_background_events`
1853 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1855 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1856 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1857 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1858 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1859 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1860 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1864 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1865 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1866 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1872 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1874 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1876 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1877 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1879 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1880 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1881 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1882 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1884 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1885 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1887 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1888 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1889 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1890 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1891 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1892 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1893 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1894 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1896 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1898 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1899 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1901 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1903 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1904 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1905 /// and via the classic SCID.
1907 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1908 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1910 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1912 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1914 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1915 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1916 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1918 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1919 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1921 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1922 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1924 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1925 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1927 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1928 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1929 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1930 /// active channel list on load.
1932 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1933 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1935 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1937 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1938 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1939 /// the handling of the events.
1941 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1942 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1945 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1946 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1947 /// would break backwards compatability.
1948 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1949 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1950 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1952 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1954 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1956 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1958 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1960 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1961 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1962 /// confirmation depth.
1964 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1965 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1966 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1968 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1970 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1972 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1974 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1976 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1978 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1979 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1980 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1982 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1983 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1985 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1986 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1987 /// keeping additional state.
1988 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1990 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1991 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1992 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1993 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1995 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1996 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1998 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1999 /// are currently open with that peer.
2001 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
2002 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
2005 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
2007 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2008 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2009 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2010 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2011 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2013 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
2014 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
2015 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
2016 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
2017 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
2019 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
2020 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
2022 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2023 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2024 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2025 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2026 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2028 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
2029 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
2031 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
2032 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
2033 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
2034 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
2035 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
2037 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
2039 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2041 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
2042 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
2043 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
2044 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
2045 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
2046 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
2047 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
2048 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
2049 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
2050 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
2051 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
2053 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
2054 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
2055 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
2057 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
2059 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
2060 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
2062 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
2066 signer_provider: SP,
2071 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
2073 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
2074 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
2075 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
2076 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
2077 pub struct ChainParameters {
2078 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
2079 pub network: Network,
2081 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
2083 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
2084 pub best_block: BestBlock,
2087 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
2091 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2092 SkipPersistNoEvents,
2095 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
2096 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
2097 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
2098 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
2099 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
2100 /// updates are ready for persistence).
2102 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
2103 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
2104 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
2105 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2106 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
2107 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
2109 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
2110 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
2113 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
2114 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
2115 /// events to handle.
2117 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
2118 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
2120 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2121 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
2124 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
2125 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2126 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2127 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
2129 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2130 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2131 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2132 should_persist: move || {
2133 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
2134 // processing and return that.
2135 let notify = persist_check();
2136 match (notify, force_notify) {
2137 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2138 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2139 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2140 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2141 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
2144 _read_guard: read_guard,
2148 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
2149 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
2150 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
2151 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
2152 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2153 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2155 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2156 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2157 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2158 should_persist: persist_check,
2159 _read_guard: read_guard,
2164 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2165 fn drop(&mut self) {
2166 match (self.should_persist)() {
2167 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2168 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2169 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
2171 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2172 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2173 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2178 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
2179 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
2181 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
2183 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
2184 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
2185 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
2186 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
2187 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
2189 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
2190 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
2192 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
2194 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2195 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
2196 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
2197 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
2198 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
2199 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
2200 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
2201 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
2202 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
2203 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
2204 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
2205 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
2206 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
2208 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
2209 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
2211 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
2212 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
2213 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
2214 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
2216 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
2217 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
2218 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
2219 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
2220 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
2221 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
2223 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
2225 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
2226 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
2228 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
2230 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
2231 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
2233 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
2234 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
2235 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
2237 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
2238 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
2239 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
2241 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
2242 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
2243 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
2244 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
2246 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
2247 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
2248 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
2250 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
2251 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
2252 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
2254 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
2255 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2256 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
2257 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
2258 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
2259 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
2260 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
2261 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
2262 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
2263 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
2264 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
2267 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
2268 /// to better separate parameters.
2269 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2270 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
2271 /// The node_id of our counterparty
2272 pub node_id: PublicKey,
2273 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
2274 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
2275 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
2276 pub features: InitFeatures,
2277 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
2278 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
2279 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
2281 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2283 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
2284 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
2285 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
2286 /// payments to us through this channel.
2287 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
2288 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
2289 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
2290 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
2291 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2292 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
2293 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2296 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
2297 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2298 pub struct ChannelDetails {
2299 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
2300 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
2301 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
2302 /// lifetime of the channel.
2303 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
2304 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
2305 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
2306 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
2307 /// our counterparty already.
2308 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
2309 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
2311 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
2312 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
2313 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
2314 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
2316 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
2317 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
2319 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
2320 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
2322 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
2323 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
2324 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
2325 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
2326 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2327 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
2328 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
2329 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
2330 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
2333 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
2335 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2336 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2337 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2338 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
2339 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
2340 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
2341 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
2343 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
2344 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
2346 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2347 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2348 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
2349 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
2350 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
2351 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
2352 /// this value on chain.
2354 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2356 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2358 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
2359 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
2360 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
2361 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
2362 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
2363 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
2364 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2366 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
2367 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
2368 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
2369 pub user_channel_id: u128,
2370 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
2371 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
2373 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
2374 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
2375 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
2376 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
2377 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
2379 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
2380 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
2381 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2382 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
2384 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
2385 pub balance_msat: u64,
2386 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
2387 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2388 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
2389 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2391 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
2393 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2394 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
2395 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2396 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2397 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
2398 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
2399 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
2400 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
2402 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
2403 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
2404 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
2405 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
2406 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
2407 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
2408 /// route which is valid.
2409 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
2410 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
2411 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2412 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
2413 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
2414 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
2416 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2417 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
2418 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2419 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2420 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
2421 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
2422 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
2423 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
2424 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
2426 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2428 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
2429 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
2430 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
2431 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
2432 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2434 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2435 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
2436 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
2437 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
2438 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
2439 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
2440 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
2442 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2443 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
2444 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
2445 pub is_outbound: bool,
2446 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
2447 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
2448 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
2449 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
2450 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
2452 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
2453 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
2454 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
2455 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
2456 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
2457 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
2458 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
2460 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
2461 pub is_usable: bool,
2462 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
2463 pub is_public: bool,
2464 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
2465 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
2466 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2467 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
2468 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2469 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
2471 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
2472 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
2473 /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
2475 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2476 pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
2477 /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
2479 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2480 pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
2483 impl ChannelDetails {
2484 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
2485 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
2486 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
2488 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
2489 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
2490 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2491 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
2494 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
2495 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
2496 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
2498 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
2499 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
2500 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2501 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
2504 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
2505 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
2506 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
2509 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2510 F::Target: FeeEstimator
2512 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
2513 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
2514 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
2516 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2517 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
2518 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2519 features: latest_features,
2520 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
2521 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
2522 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
2523 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
2524 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
2525 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
2526 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
2527 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
2528 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
2529 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2531 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
2532 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
2533 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
2534 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
2535 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
2536 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
2537 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
2538 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
2539 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
2540 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
2541 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
2542 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
2543 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
2544 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
2545 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2546 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2547 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
2548 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
2549 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
2550 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
2551 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
2552 is_usable: context.is_live(),
2553 is_public: context.should_announce(),
2554 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
2555 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2556 config: Some(context.config()),
2557 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
2558 pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
2559 pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
2564 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
2565 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
2566 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
2567 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
2568 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
2569 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
2570 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
2571 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
2572 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
2574 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
2576 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
2577 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
2579 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
2580 NegotiatingClosingFee,
2581 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
2582 /// to drop the channel.
2586 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
2587 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2588 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
2589 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
2590 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
2592 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2593 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2594 payment_id: PaymentId,
2596 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
2598 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2599 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2600 payment_id: PaymentId,
2601 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
2603 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2604 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
2605 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
2608 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
2609 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
2610 /// payment is removed from tracking.
2612 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2613 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2614 payment_id: PaymentId,
2615 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
2616 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
2617 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
2619 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
2620 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
2621 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
2623 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2624 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2625 payment_id: PaymentId,
2626 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
2627 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2631 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2633 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2635 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2636 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2637 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2638 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2640 pub phantom_scid: u64,
2641 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2642 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2645 macro_rules! handle_error {
2646 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2647 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2648 // entering the macro.
2649 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2650 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2654 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2655 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2657 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2658 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2659 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2660 let logger = WithContext::from(
2661 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
2663 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2665 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2666 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2667 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2672 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2675 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2677 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2678 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2679 action: err.action.clone()
2683 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
2684 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2685 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2686 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2687 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2691 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2698 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2699 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2700 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2701 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2703 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2704 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2705 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2707 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2708 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2709 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2710 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2711 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2713 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2714 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2716 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2720 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2721 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2722 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2724 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2725 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2727 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2728 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2730 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2731 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2732 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2733 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2734 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2735 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2737 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2742 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2743 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2745 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2746 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2748 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2749 match $channel_phase {
2750 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2751 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2753 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2754 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2756 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2757 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2759 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2760 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2761 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2763 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2764 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2765 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2771 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2772 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2776 let key = *$entry.key();
2777 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2779 $entry.remove_entry();
2787 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2788 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2792 let key = *$entry.key();
2793 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2795 $entry.remove_entry();
2803 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2804 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2806 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2807 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2813 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2814 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2815 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2816 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2817 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2819 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2820 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2821 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2822 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2823 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2824 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2825 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2826 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2827 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2828 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2833 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2834 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2835 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2836 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2837 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2838 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2839 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2840 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2841 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2842 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2844 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2849 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2850 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2851 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2852 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2853 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2854 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2855 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2856 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2857 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2859 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2864 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2865 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2866 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2867 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2868 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2869 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2870 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2871 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2872 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2873 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2874 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2875 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2877 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2878 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2879 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2885 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2886 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2888 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2889 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2890 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2891 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2892 updates.announcement_sigs);
2893 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2894 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2897 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2898 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2899 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2900 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2902 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2903 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2904 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2905 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2906 let mut batch_completed = false;
2907 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2908 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2909 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2910 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2912 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2913 channel_state.2 = true;
2915 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2917 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2919 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2922 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2923 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2924 if batch_completed {
2925 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2926 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2927 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2928 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2929 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2930 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2931 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2932 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2933 chan.set_batch_ready();
2934 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2935 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2939 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2940 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2941 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2946 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2948 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2949 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2951 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2952 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2953 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2954 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2959 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2960 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2961 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2962 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2964 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2965 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2966 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2967 panic!("{}", err_str);
2969 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2970 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2971 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2974 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2980 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2981 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2982 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2984 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2985 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2986 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2987 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2988 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2989 // filter for uniqueness here.
2990 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2991 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2992 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2993 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2995 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2996 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2998 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2999 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
3000 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
3006 macro_rules! process_events_body {
3007 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
3008 let mut processed_all_events = false;
3009 while !processed_all_events {
3010 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
3017 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
3018 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
3019 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3021 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
3022 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
3023 result = $self.process_background_events();
3025 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3026 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3027 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3028 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3032 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
3033 let num_events = pending_events.len();
3034 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3035 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3038 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
3040 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
3041 $event_to_handle = event;
3043 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
3044 post_event_actions.push(action);
3049 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3050 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
3051 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
3052 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
3053 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
3054 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
3057 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
3058 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
3059 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
3060 processed_all_events = false;
3064 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
3065 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
3066 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
3068 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
3069 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
3070 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
3076 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
3078 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
3079 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3080 ES::Target: EntropySource,
3081 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3082 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3083 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3087 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
3089 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
3091 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
3092 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
3094 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
3096 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
3097 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
3098 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
3101 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
3102 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
3103 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
3105 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
3106 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
3107 current_timestamp: u32,
3109 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3110 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
3111 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
3112 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
3114 default_configuration: config.clone(),
3115 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
3116 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
3121 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
3123 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
3124 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3125 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
3126 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3127 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
3128 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3129 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3130 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
3132 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
3135 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
3136 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
3138 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
3140 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
3142 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
3144 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
3145 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
3146 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3147 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3148 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
3149 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
3150 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
3151 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
3153 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3163 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
3164 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
3165 &self.default_configuration
3168 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
3169 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3170 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
3173 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
3174 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
3176 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
3178 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
3182 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
3187 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
3189 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
3190 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
3191 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
3192 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
3193 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
3195 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
3196 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
3198 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
3199 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3200 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
3202 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
3203 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
3204 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
3206 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
3207 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
3209 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
3210 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
3211 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
3212 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
3213 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
3214 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
3216 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
3217 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
3218 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
3219 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
3220 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
3221 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
3224 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3225 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
3226 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3228 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3230 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
3231 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
3233 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3235 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
3236 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
3237 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
3242 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
3243 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3244 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
3245 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
3246 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
3247 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
3251 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
3256 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
3258 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
3259 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
3260 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3262 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
3264 panic!("RNG is bad???");
3267 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
3270 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
3271 node_id: their_network_key,
3274 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
3277 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3278 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3279 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3280 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3281 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3282 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3283 // the same channel.
3284 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3286 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3287 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3288 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3289 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3290 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3291 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
3292 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
3293 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
3294 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
3298 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
3299 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
3300 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3308 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
3309 /// more information.
3310 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3311 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3312 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3313 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3314 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3315 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3316 // the same channel.
3317 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3319 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3320 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3321 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3322 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3323 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3324 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
3325 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
3326 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
3334 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
3335 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
3337 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
3338 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
3340 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3341 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
3342 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
3343 // really wanted anyway.
3344 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
3347 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
3348 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3349 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3350 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3352 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3353 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3354 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3355 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3356 let context_to_details = |context| {
3357 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3359 return peer_state.channel_by_id
3361 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
3362 .map(context_to_details)
3368 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
3369 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
3371 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
3372 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
3373 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
3375 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3376 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
3377 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
3378 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
3379 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
3380 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3382 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
3383 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
3384 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3386 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
3387 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
3388 payment_id: *payment_id,
3389 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
3390 total_msat: *total_msat,
3393 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
3394 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3396 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
3397 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3399 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
3404 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3405 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3407 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
3408 let mut shutdown_result = None;
3411 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3413 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3414 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3416 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3417 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3419 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3420 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
3421 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3422 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
3423 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3424 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
3425 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
3426 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
3428 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
3429 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
3430 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
3431 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3432 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3436 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
3437 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
3439 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3440 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
3441 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
3442 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
3445 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3446 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
3449 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3450 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3452 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3453 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
3460 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3461 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3462 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
3463 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3466 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
3467 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3473 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3474 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3475 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3477 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
3478 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3480 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
3481 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
3482 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
3483 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
3485 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3487 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3488 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3489 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3492 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3493 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
3494 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3495 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3496 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3497 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
3500 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3501 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3502 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3504 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
3505 /// the channel being closed or not:
3506 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
3507 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
3508 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3509 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
3510 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
3511 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
3512 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
3514 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
3515 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
3516 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
3517 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
3519 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3521 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3522 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3523 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3526 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3527 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3528 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3529 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3530 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
3533 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
3534 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3535 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3536 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3537 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3540 let logger = WithContext::from(
3541 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
3544 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
3545 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
3546 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3547 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
3548 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3549 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
3550 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3552 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
3553 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
3554 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
3555 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
3556 // ignore the result here.
3557 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
3559 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3560 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
3561 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
3562 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
3563 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3564 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
3565 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
3566 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3567 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3568 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
3569 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3570 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
3573 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
3576 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
3577 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
3582 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3583 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
3584 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
3585 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
3586 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
3587 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
3588 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
3589 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
3592 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
3593 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
3594 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
3598 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3599 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3603 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
3604 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
3605 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
3606 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
3607 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3608 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3609 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
3610 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
3611 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3612 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
3613 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
3615 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
3617 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
3618 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3619 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
3620 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3621 mem::drop(peer_state);
3622 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3624 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
3625 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
3626 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
3628 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3629 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3630 // Unfunded channel has no update
3631 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3633 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
3634 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
3635 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3636 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3637 // Unfunded channel has no update
3638 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3641 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3642 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3643 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3644 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3646 (None, *peer_node_id)
3648 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3651 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3652 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
3653 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
3654 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3655 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3656 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
3657 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
3658 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3659 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3665 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3668 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3669 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3670 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3671 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3672 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3673 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3674 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3675 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3676 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3677 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3678 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3679 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3690 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3691 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3692 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3694 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3695 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3696 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3699 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3700 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3701 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3703 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3704 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3705 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3706 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3707 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3710 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3711 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3712 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3713 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3714 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3718 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3719 /// local transaction(s).
3720 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3721 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3722 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3726 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3727 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3729 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3731 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3732 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3735 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3736 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3737 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
3738 intro_node_blinding_point: Some(_), ..
3744 macro_rules! return_err {
3745 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3748 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3749 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3751 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3752 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3753 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3754 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3755 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3756 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3757 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3761 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3762 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3763 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3764 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3765 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3766 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3767 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3768 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3774 let NextPacketDetails {
3775 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3776 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3777 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3778 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3779 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3782 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3783 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3784 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3785 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3786 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3787 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3788 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3789 // phantom or an intercept.
3790 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3791 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3792 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3796 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3799 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3801 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3802 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3803 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3804 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3805 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3807 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3808 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3809 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3810 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3813 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3814 // have no consistency guarantees.
3815 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3819 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3820 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3821 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3822 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3823 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3825 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3826 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3827 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3828 // we don't have the channel here.
3829 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3831 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3833 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3834 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3835 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3836 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3837 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3838 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3839 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3840 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3841 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3842 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3843 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3845 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3848 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3849 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3851 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3852 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3859 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3861 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3862 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3864 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3865 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3866 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3867 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3868 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3870 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3871 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3877 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3878 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3879 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3880 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3882 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3883 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3885 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3886 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3887 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3889 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3890 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3891 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3892 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3893 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3894 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3895 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3899 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3901 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3904 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3905 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3906 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3907 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3908 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3909 macro_rules! return_err {
3910 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3912 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3913 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3914 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3915 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3916 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3917 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3918 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3919 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3920 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3924 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3925 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3926 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3927 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3928 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3934 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3936 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3937 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3938 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3939 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3942 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3943 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3944 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3945 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3946 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3948 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3951 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3952 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3953 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3954 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3955 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3961 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3962 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3963 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3965 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3966 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3967 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3969 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3970 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3971 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3972 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3973 return Err(LightningError {
3974 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3975 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3978 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3979 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3981 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3982 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3983 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3986 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3987 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3988 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3989 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3991 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3992 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3993 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3995 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3996 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3997 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3998 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3999 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
4000 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
4001 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
4005 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
4008 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4009 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4010 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
4011 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4013 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
4014 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
4015 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
4016 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
4017 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
4020 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
4021 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
4023 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
4024 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
4025 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
4026 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
4027 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
4028 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
4029 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
4030 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4032 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
4033 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
4034 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
4036 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
4038 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
4045 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4046 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4047 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
4048 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
4053 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4054 let SendAlongPathArgs {
4055 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
4058 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
4059 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
4060 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
4061 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
4063 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
4064 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
4065 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
4067 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
4068 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
4072 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
4073 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
4075 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
4076 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
4077 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
4079 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4082 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
4084 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
4085 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
4087 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4088 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4089 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
4090 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4091 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4092 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
4093 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
4094 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4095 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4096 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
4098 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
4099 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4100 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
4101 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4103 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
4104 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
4106 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4107 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
4108 Some(monitor_update) => {
4109 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
4111 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
4112 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
4113 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
4114 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
4115 // which we do in the send_payment check for
4116 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
4117 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
4125 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
4128 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
4129 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
4130 // `channel_by_id` map.
4131 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
4132 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
4136 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
4137 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
4139 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
4144 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
4146 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
4147 /// fields for more info.
4149 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
4150 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
4152 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
4154 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
4155 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
4156 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
4157 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
4158 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
4160 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
4161 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
4162 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
4163 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
4164 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
4166 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
4167 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
4168 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
4169 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
4171 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
4173 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
4174 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
4175 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
4177 /// In general, a path may raise:
4178 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
4179 /// node public key) is specified.
4180 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
4181 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
4182 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
4183 /// relevant updates.
4185 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
4186 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
4187 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
4189 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
4190 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
4191 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
4192 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
4193 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
4194 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4195 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
4196 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4197 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4198 self.pending_outbound_payments
4199 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
4200 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4201 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4204 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
4205 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4206 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
4207 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4208 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4209 self.pending_outbound_payments
4210 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
4211 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
4212 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
4213 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4217 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
4218 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4219 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4220 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
4221 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
4222 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4226 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
4227 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4228 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
4232 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
4233 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
4236 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
4237 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4238 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4239 self.pending_outbound_payments
4240 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
4241 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4242 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
4243 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
4244 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
4248 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
4249 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
4250 /// retries are exhausted.
4252 /// # Event Generation
4254 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
4255 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
4257 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
4258 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
4259 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
4261 /// # Requested Invoices
4263 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
4264 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
4265 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
4266 /// once the invoice has been received.
4268 /// # Restart Behavior
4270 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
4271 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
4272 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
4274 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
4275 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
4276 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4277 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
4280 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
4281 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
4282 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
4283 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
4284 /// never reach the recipient.
4286 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
4287 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
4289 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
4290 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
4292 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
4293 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
4294 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4295 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4296 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
4297 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
4298 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4301 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
4302 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4304 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
4307 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
4308 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
4309 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4310 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4311 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
4312 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4313 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4314 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4317 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
4318 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
4319 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
4320 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
4321 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4322 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4323 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
4324 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4325 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4328 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
4331 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
4332 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
4335 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
4336 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
4338 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
4339 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
4340 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
4341 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4342 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4343 let payment_params =
4344 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
4346 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
4348 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
4351 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
4352 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
4354 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
4355 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
4356 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
4357 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
4359 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
4360 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
4361 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
4362 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
4363 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
4364 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
4365 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
4366 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4367 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4368 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
4370 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
4371 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
4372 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
4373 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
4377 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
4379 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
4380 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
4383 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
4385 let mut res = Vec::new();
4387 for mut path in route.paths {
4388 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
4389 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
4390 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
4391 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
4392 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
4395 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
4398 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
4399 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
4401 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
4403 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
4404 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
4409 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
4412 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
4417 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
4418 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
4419 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
4421 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
4422 let used_liquidity =
4423 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
4425 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
4426 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
4428 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
4431 *used_liquidity += path_value;
4436 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
4437 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
4438 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
4445 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
4446 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
4447 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
4448 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
4449 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
4450 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4451 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4452 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4453 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4455 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4456 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4458 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
4459 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
4460 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
4462 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4463 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
4464 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
4465 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
4466 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
4467 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
4468 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
4469 } else { unreachable!(); });
4471 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
4472 Err((chan, err)) => {
4473 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4474 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4475 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4476 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4477 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
4483 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
4484 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4486 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
4487 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4490 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
4491 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4492 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4496 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4497 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
4498 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4502 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
4503 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4504 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
4506 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4507 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4508 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
4509 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
4510 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
4512 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
4513 funding_txo, o.get()
4515 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
4516 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4517 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4518 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
4519 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
4520 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
4523 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
4530 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4531 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
4532 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
4536 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
4538 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
4539 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
4541 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
4542 /// across the p2p network.
4544 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
4545 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
4547 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
4548 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
4549 /// keys per-channel).
4551 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
4552 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
4553 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
4555 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
4556 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
4557 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
4559 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
4560 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
4561 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
4562 /// for more details.
4564 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
4565 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
4566 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4567 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
4570 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
4572 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
4573 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
4575 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
4576 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
4577 /// signature for each channel.
4579 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
4580 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4581 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4582 let mut result = Ok(());
4584 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
4585 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
4586 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
4587 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4588 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
4593 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
4594 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4595 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
4599 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4600 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
4601 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
4602 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
4603 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
4604 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
4605 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
4606 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
4608 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4609 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
4614 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
4615 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
4616 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
4617 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
4621 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4622 match states.entry(txid) {
4623 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4624 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4625 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4629 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4632 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4633 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4634 temporary_channel_id,
4635 counterparty_node_id,
4636 funding_transaction.clone(),
4639 let mut output_index = None;
4640 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
4641 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4642 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4643 if output_index.is_some() {
4644 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4645 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
4648 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4651 if output_index.is_none() {
4652 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4653 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
4656 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4657 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4658 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4659 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4660 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4661 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4667 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4668 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4669 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4670 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4671 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4672 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4673 .into_iter().flatten()
4674 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4676 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4677 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4679 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4681 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4682 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4683 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4684 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4685 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4687 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4688 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4689 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4693 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4694 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4695 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4701 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4703 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4704 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4705 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4706 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4708 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4709 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4711 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4712 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4714 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4716 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4717 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4718 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4719 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4720 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4721 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4722 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4723 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4724 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4725 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4726 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4727 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4728 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4732 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4733 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4734 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4735 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4736 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4737 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4738 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4739 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4740 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4741 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4745 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4746 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4747 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4748 config.apply(config_update);
4749 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4752 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4753 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4754 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4755 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4756 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4757 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4764 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4765 debug_assert!(false);
4766 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4768 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4769 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4776 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4778 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4779 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4780 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4781 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4783 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4784 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4786 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4787 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4789 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4791 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4792 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4793 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4794 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4795 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4796 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4797 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4798 pub fn update_channel_config(
4799 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4800 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4801 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4804 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4805 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4807 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4808 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4810 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4811 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4812 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4813 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4814 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4816 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4817 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4818 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4821 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4824 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4825 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4826 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4827 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4828 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4829 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4830 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4832 let next_hop_scid = {
4833 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4834 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4835 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4836 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4837 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4838 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4839 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4840 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4841 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4842 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4845 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4847 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4848 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4849 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4852 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4853 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4854 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4855 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4856 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4863 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4864 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4865 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4868 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4869 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4870 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4871 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4874 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4876 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4877 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4878 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4879 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4880 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4883 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4884 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4885 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4886 payment.prev_channel_id,
4887 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4888 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4890 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4894 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4895 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4897 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4900 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4901 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4902 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4904 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4905 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4906 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4909 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4910 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4911 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4912 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4913 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4914 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4915 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4916 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4917 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4918 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4921 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4922 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4923 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4924 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4929 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4931 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4932 /// Will likely generate further events.
4933 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4934 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4936 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4937 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4938 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4940 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4941 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4943 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4944 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4945 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4946 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4948 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4949 match forward_info {
4950 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4951 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4952 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4953 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4954 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4957 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4958 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4959 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
4960 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4962 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4963 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4964 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4965 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4966 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4967 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4968 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4969 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4970 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4973 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4974 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4976 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4979 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4980 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4986 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4987 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4989 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4993 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4994 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4996 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
5000 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
5001 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
5002 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
5003 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
5004 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
5005 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
5006 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
5009 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
5010 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
5011 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
5012 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
5013 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
5015 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
5017 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
5018 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
5022 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
5023 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5024 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
5025 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
5026 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
5027 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
5029 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
5030 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
5036 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
5039 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
5042 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5043 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
5044 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
5045 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
5046 // problem, not ours.
5052 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
5053 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
5054 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
5056 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5060 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
5061 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5062 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5063 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5064 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5067 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5068 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5069 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
5070 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5071 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5072 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
5073 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5074 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5075 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5076 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
5077 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
5078 onion_packet, blinded, ..
5079 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5082 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
5083 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5084 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5085 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5086 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5087 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5088 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5089 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5090 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
5091 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5092 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
5094 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
5095 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
5096 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
5097 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
5098 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
5099 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
5102 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
5103 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
5104 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
5107 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5108 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
5110 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
5112 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
5113 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5114 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5115 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
5121 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
5122 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
5124 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
5125 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5126 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
5128 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
5129 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5130 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
5131 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
5133 Some((res, htlc_id))
5136 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5137 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5138 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5139 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
5141 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
5143 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
5144 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
5145 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
5151 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5155 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5156 match forward_info {
5157 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5158 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5159 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5160 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
5161 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5164 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
5165 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
5166 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
5167 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
5168 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
5170 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
5171 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
5172 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
5173 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
5174 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
5176 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
5177 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
5178 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
5180 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
5181 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
5185 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
5186 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
5189 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
5192 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
5193 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
5194 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5195 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5196 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5197 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5198 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5199 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5200 phantom_shared_secret,
5203 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
5204 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
5205 // if routing nodes overpay
5206 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
5207 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
5209 total_value_received: None,
5210 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
5213 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
5216 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
5218 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
5219 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
5220 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
5221 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5222 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
5223 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
5225 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5226 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
5227 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
5228 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5229 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5230 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
5231 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5232 phantom_shared_secret,
5235 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5236 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
5238 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
5241 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
5242 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5243 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5244 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5245 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5248 macro_rules! check_total_value {
5249 ($purpose: expr) => {{
5250 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
5251 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
5252 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
5253 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
5255 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5256 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
5257 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5259 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
5260 .entry(payment_hash)
5261 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
5262 .or_insert_with(|| {
5263 committed_to_claimable = true;
5265 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
5268 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
5269 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
5270 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
5271 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5273 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5274 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
5275 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5277 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
5278 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
5279 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5282 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
5284 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
5285 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
5286 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
5287 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
5288 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
5289 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
5290 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5291 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
5292 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
5293 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
5295 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
5297 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
5298 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
5299 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5300 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5301 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5302 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
5304 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5305 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5306 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5307 committed_to_claimable = true;
5309 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5310 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
5311 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
5312 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
5313 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
5314 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
5315 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
5316 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
5317 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5321 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
5322 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5323 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5324 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
5325 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
5327 payment_claimable_generated = true;
5329 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
5330 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
5332 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5333 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5334 committed_to_claimable = true;
5337 payment_claimable_generated
5341 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
5342 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
5343 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
5344 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
5345 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
5346 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
5347 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5348 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5349 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5350 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5351 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
5352 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5353 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
5354 Ok(result) => result,
5356 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
5357 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5360 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
5361 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
5362 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
5363 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
5364 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
5365 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5368 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
5369 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
5370 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
5372 check_total_value!(purpose);
5374 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
5375 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
5376 check_total_value!(purpose);
5380 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
5381 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5382 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
5383 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5385 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5386 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
5387 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
5388 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5389 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
5390 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
5391 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
5392 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5394 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
5395 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
5396 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
5398 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
5399 if payment_claimable_generated {
5400 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
5406 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5407 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
5415 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5416 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
5417 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
5418 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
5420 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
5421 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5423 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
5425 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
5426 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
5427 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
5429 self.check_free_holding_cells();
5431 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
5432 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5433 events.append(&mut new_events);
5436 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
5438 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
5439 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
5440 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
5442 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
5444 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
5445 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
5446 if background_events.is_empty() {
5447 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5450 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
5452 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
5453 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
5454 // monitor updating completing.
5455 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5457 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
5458 let mut updated_chan = false;
5460 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5461 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5462 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5463 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5464 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5465 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
5466 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
5467 updated_chan = true;
5468 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
5469 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5471 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
5474 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
5479 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
5480 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5483 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
5484 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5485 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5486 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5487 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5488 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
5489 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5491 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5492 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5493 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5494 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5495 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5501 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5504 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5505 /// Process background events, for functional testing
5506 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
5507 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5508 let _ = self.process_background_events();
5511 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
5512 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
5514 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5516 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
5517 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
5518 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5520 if !chan.context.is_live() {
5521 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
5522 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5523 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5525 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
5526 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5528 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
5529 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5533 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
5534 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
5535 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
5536 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
5537 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
5538 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5539 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5541 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5542 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5544 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5545 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5546 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5547 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5548 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
5549 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
5551 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5556 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5557 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5565 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
5567 /// This currently includes:
5568 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
5569 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
5570 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
5572 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
5573 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
5574 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
5575 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
5576 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
5577 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
5578 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
5579 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
5581 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
5582 /// estimate fetches.
5584 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
5585 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
5586 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
5587 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5588 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5590 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5591 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5593 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
5594 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
5595 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
5596 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
5598 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
5599 chan_id: &ChannelId,
5600 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
5601 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
5602 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5603 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
5605 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5606 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
5607 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
5609 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
5610 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
5611 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
5612 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5613 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5614 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5615 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5616 channel_id: *chan_id,
5617 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5628 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5629 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5630 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5631 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5632 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5633 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5634 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5636 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5637 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5642 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5643 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5645 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5646 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5647 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5648 if needs_close { return false; }
5651 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5652 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5653 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5654 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5655 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5656 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5657 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5658 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5660 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5661 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5662 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5663 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5667 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5669 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5672 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5674 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5675 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5676 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5677 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5681 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5683 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5689 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5691 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5692 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5693 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5694 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5695 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5696 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5697 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5698 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5699 channel_id: *chan_id,
5700 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5708 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5709 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5710 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5712 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5713 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5714 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5716 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5717 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5718 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5719 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5721 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5722 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5723 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5724 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5729 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5730 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5731 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5732 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5733 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5734 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5735 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5736 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5737 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5743 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5745 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5746 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5751 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5752 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5753 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5754 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5755 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5756 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5757 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5758 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5759 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5760 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5761 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5762 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5763 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5764 // have no channels to the peer.
5765 let remove_entry = {
5766 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5767 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5770 entry.remove_entry();
5773 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5778 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5779 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5780 // This should be unreachable
5781 debug_assert!(false);
5784 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5785 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5786 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5787 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5788 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5789 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5790 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5793 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5794 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5795 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5797 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5798 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5805 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5806 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5807 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5808 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5809 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5812 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5813 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5816 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5817 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5820 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5821 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5822 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5823 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5824 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5825 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5826 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5829 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5830 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5833 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5834 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5835 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5836 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5837 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5844 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5845 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5846 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5848 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5849 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5850 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5851 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5853 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5854 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5855 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5856 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5857 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5858 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5861 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5862 /// reason for the failure.
5864 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5865 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5866 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5868 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5869 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5870 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5871 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5872 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5873 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5874 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5879 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5880 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5881 match failure_code {
5882 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5883 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5884 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5885 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5886 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5887 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5889 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5890 let fail_data = match data {
5891 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5894 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5899 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5900 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5902 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5904 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5905 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5906 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5907 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5908 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5909 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5910 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5912 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5914 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5915 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5917 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5922 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5923 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5924 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5925 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5926 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5927 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5928 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5929 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5930 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5931 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5933 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5934 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5935 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5936 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5938 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5939 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5940 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5941 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5942 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5946 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5947 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5948 // be surfaced to the user.
5949 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5950 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5951 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5953 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5954 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5955 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5956 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5957 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5958 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5959 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5960 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5961 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5963 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5964 debug_assert!(false);
5965 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5968 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5970 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5973 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5974 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5975 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5976 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5980 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5981 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5982 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5983 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5984 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5985 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5986 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5987 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5988 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5989 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5992 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5993 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5994 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5997 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5998 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5999 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6001 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
6002 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
6003 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
6004 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
6005 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
6007 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6008 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
6009 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
6012 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
6013 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
6014 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
6016 let failure = match blinded_failure {
6017 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
6018 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
6019 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
6020 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
6022 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
6024 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
6025 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
6027 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6028 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
6032 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
6033 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
6035 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
6039 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
6040 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6041 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
6042 push_forward_ev = true;
6044 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
6045 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6046 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
6048 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6049 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
6052 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
6053 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
6054 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6055 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
6056 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
6057 failed_next_destination: destination,
6063 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
6064 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
6066 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
6067 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
6068 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
6069 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
6071 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
6072 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
6073 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
6074 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
6076 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
6077 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
6078 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
6080 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6081 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
6082 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
6083 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
6084 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6085 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6086 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
6087 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6088 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
6091 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
6092 /// even type numbers.
6096 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
6097 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
6099 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6100 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6101 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
6104 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
6105 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
6107 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6110 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6111 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
6112 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
6113 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
6114 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
6115 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
6116 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
6117 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
6122 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
6123 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
6124 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
6125 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
6126 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
6128 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
6129 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
6130 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
6134 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
6135 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
6136 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
6137 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
6138 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6139 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
6140 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6141 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
6142 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6143 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6144 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6153 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
6155 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
6156 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
6157 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
6158 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
6159 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
6160 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
6161 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
6162 let mut valid_mpp = true;
6163 let mut errs = Vec::new();
6164 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6165 for htlc in sources.iter() {
6166 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
6167 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6168 debug_assert!(false);
6172 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
6174 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
6175 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6176 debug_assert!(false);
6180 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
6181 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
6183 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6184 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
6185 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6186 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
6189 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
6190 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6191 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
6192 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
6196 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6197 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
6198 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
6199 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
6200 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
6201 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
6202 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
6205 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
6206 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
6207 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
6208 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
6209 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
6210 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
6215 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6216 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6217 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6218 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6219 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
6220 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6221 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6223 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6226 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
6227 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
6228 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6229 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6233 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
6234 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
6235 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
6236 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
6238 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
6239 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
6240 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
6241 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6243 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
6244 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
6245 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6246 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6249 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6250 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
6251 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
6252 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
6256 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
6257 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6258 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
6261 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
6262 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
6263 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6264 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6265 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6266 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6267 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6268 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
6271 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
6272 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
6273 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
6275 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
6278 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6279 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6281 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
6282 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
6283 // monitor update as a background event.
6284 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6285 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6286 counterparty_node_id,
6287 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
6288 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
6289 update: monitor_update.clone(),
6293 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
6294 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
6299 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6301 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
6303 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
6304 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6305 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
6306 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
6307 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
6309 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
6311 debug_assert!(false,
6312 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
6315 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
6316 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6317 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
6318 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6319 .get_mut(&channel_id)
6321 let mut found_blocker = false;
6322 blockers.retain(|iter| {
6323 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
6324 // which case we need to only remove the one
6325 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
6326 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
6327 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
6328 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
6330 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
6333 debug_assert!(false);
6342 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6343 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
6344 counterparty_node_id: None,
6345 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6348 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
6352 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
6353 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
6354 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
6355 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
6356 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
6357 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
6358 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
6359 // again on restart.
6360 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
6361 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
6362 payment_preimage, update_res);
6365 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
6366 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
6368 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
6369 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
6370 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
6371 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
6372 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
6373 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
6374 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
6375 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6376 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
6377 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
6380 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
6381 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
6382 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
6383 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
6384 // `PaymentForwarded`).
6385 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
6389 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
6390 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
6393 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
6394 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
6395 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
6396 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
6399 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
6400 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
6401 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
6402 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6403 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
6405 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6406 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
6407 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
6409 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
6410 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
6413 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
6414 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
6415 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
6416 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
6417 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6418 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
6419 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
6420 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
6421 let chan_to_release =
6422 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6423 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
6425 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
6426 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
6427 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
6428 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
6433 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
6434 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
6435 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
6436 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
6437 // in the background.
6438 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
6439 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6440 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
6441 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
6443 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
6444 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6445 funding_txo, update, ..
6447 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
6448 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
6449 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6450 payment_preimage: update_preimage
6452 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
6458 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
6459 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
6460 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
6462 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
6463 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
6465 monitor_update.updates[0],
6466 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
6471 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
6472 // immediately once we get going.
6473 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
6476 *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
6478 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
6481 } else if definitely_duplicate {
6482 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
6483 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6484 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
6485 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
6486 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
6487 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
6491 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
6492 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
6493 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
6496 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
6497 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
6498 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6499 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
6500 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
6501 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
6502 prev_user_channel_id,
6503 next_user_channel_id,
6504 total_fee_earned_msat,
6506 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
6507 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
6509 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
6513 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
6514 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6515 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
6521 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
6522 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
6523 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
6526 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
6527 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6528 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6529 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6531 for action in actions.into_iter() {
6533 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
6534 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6535 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
6537 payment_purpose: purpose,
6540 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
6542 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
6546 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
6548 sender_intended_total_msat,
6552 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6553 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
6555 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
6556 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
6557 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
6560 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6561 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
6563 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
6564 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
6565 downstream_funding_outpoint,
6566 downstream_channel_id,
6567 Some(blocking_action),
6574 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
6575 /// update completion.
6576 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
6577 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
6578 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
6579 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
6580 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
6581 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
6582 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6583 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
6584 &channel.context.channel_id(),
6585 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
6586 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
6587 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
6588 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
6589 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
6591 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
6593 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6594 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6595 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
6596 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
6599 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
6600 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
6602 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
6603 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6604 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6609 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6610 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6611 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6612 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6617 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6618 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6619 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6620 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6621 msg: revoke_and_ack,
6626 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6630 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6636 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6637 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6638 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6642 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6643 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6644 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6650 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6651 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6653 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6654 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6656 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6657 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6658 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6659 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6660 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6665 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6666 let mut peer_state_lock;
6667 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6668 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6669 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6670 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6672 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6675 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6676 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6677 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6678 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6679 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6682 let remaining_in_flight =
6683 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6684 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6687 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6688 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6689 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6690 remaining_in_flight);
6691 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6694 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6697 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6699 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6700 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6703 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6704 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6705 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6707 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6708 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6709 /// used to accept such channels.
6711 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6712 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6713 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6714 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6717 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6718 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6720 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6721 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6722 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6724 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6725 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6727 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6728 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6730 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6731 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6733 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6734 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6735 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6736 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6739 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6741 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6742 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6744 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6745 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6746 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6747 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6749 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6750 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6752 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6754 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6755 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6756 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6758 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6759 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6760 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6762 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6763 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6764 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6765 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6766 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6767 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6768 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6771 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6772 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6774 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6780 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6781 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6782 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6783 Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6785 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6789 Ok(mut channel) => {
6791 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6792 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6793 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6794 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6795 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6796 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6797 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6800 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6801 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6802 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6804 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6806 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6807 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6808 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6809 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6810 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6811 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6812 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6813 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6816 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6817 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6818 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6820 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6824 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6825 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6826 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6828 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6829 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6830 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6833 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6840 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6841 /// or 0-conf channels.
6843 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6844 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6845 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6846 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6847 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6848 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6850 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6851 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6852 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6853 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6854 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6855 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6856 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6860 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6863 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6864 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6866 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6867 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6869 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6870 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6871 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6872 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6873 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6875 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6878 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6879 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6880 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6883 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6884 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6885 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
6886 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
6887 // included in the unfunded count.
6888 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6889 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
6890 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6893 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6894 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6897 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6898 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6899 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6900 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6905 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6908 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6909 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6910 // likely to be lost on restart!
6911 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6912 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
6913 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6916 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6917 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
6918 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6921 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6922 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6923 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6924 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6925 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6927 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6928 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6930 debug_assert!(false);
6931 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6932 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6933 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6935 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6936 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6938 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6939 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6940 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6941 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6942 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6943 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6945 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6946 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6947 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6950 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6951 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6952 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6953 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6954 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6957 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
6958 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6960 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6961 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
6962 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6965 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6966 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6967 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6968 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6970 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6972 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6973 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6974 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6975 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6976 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
6977 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6980 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6981 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6982 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6987 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6988 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6989 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6990 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6991 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6992 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6993 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6996 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7001 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
7002 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
7003 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7004 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
7005 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7007 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7008 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7009 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
7010 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7013 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
7014 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7016 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
7017 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7018 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
7020 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
7024 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7025 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
7026 // likely to be lost on restart!
7027 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
7028 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7029 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7031 debug_assert!(false);
7032 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
7034 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7035 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7036 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
7037 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
7038 match phase.get_mut() {
7039 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7040 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
7041 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
7044 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7048 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
7051 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7052 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
7053 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
7054 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7055 channel_value_satoshis: value,
7057 user_channel_id: user_id,
7062 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7063 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7065 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7066 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7068 debug_assert!(false);
7069 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
7072 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7073 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7074 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
7075 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
7076 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
7077 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
7078 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
7080 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
7081 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
7082 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
7083 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7084 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
7085 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
7086 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
7087 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
7088 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7092 Some(mut phase) => {
7093 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
7094 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
7095 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7097 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
7100 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
7102 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
7103 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
7104 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
7105 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
7106 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
7107 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
7109 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
7110 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
7111 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
7114 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
7115 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7116 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
7118 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7119 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7120 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
7121 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7122 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
7124 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
7125 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
7126 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
7127 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
7128 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
7130 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
7131 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
7132 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
7133 // until we have persisted our monitor.
7134 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
7135 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7136 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7141 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
7142 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
7143 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7145 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
7149 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7150 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
7151 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
7159 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7160 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7161 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7162 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7164 debug_assert!(false);
7165 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7168 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7169 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7170 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7171 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
7172 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
7173 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
7174 let logger = WithContext::from(
7176 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
7177 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
7180 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
7182 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
7183 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
7184 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
7185 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
7186 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
7187 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
7188 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
7189 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7190 } else { unreachable!(); }
7193 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
7194 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
7195 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
7196 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
7197 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
7198 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
7199 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7203 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
7204 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
7205 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
7206 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
7207 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7208 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7212 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
7215 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
7219 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7220 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7221 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7222 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7223 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7225 debug_assert!(false);
7226 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7228 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7229 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7230 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7231 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7232 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7233 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7234 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
7235 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7236 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
7237 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7238 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7239 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7240 msg: announcement_sigs,
7242 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7243 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
7244 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
7245 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
7246 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
7247 // announcement_signatures.
7248 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7249 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7250 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7251 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7258 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7259 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
7264 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7265 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
7268 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7269 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7274 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7275 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
7276 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
7278 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7279 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7281 debug_assert!(false);
7282 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7284 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7285 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7286 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7287 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
7289 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7290 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
7291 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7292 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
7294 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
7297 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7298 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7299 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7300 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
7302 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
7303 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
7304 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
7305 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
7306 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7307 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7311 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
7312 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7313 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7314 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7317 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7318 let context = phase.context_mut();
7319 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
7320 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7321 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7322 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7324 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
7325 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
7326 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7327 let context = phase.context_mut();
7328 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7329 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7330 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7334 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7337 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
7338 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
7339 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7340 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
7342 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
7343 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
7349 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7350 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7351 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7353 debug_assert!(false);
7354 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7356 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
7357 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7358 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7359 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7360 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7361 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7362 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7363 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7364 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
7365 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7366 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7371 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
7372 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
7373 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
7374 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
7375 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
7376 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
7377 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
7379 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7380 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7383 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7386 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
7387 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
7388 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
7389 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
7391 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
7392 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7393 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7394 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7395 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7400 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7401 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
7402 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7407 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7408 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
7409 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
7410 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
7412 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
7413 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
7414 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
7415 //but we should prevent it anyway.
7417 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7418 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7420 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
7421 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7422 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7424 debug_assert!(false);
7425 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7427 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7428 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7429 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7430 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7431 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7432 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
7433 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
7434 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
7435 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
7436 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
7438 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
7440 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
7441 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
7442 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
7443 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7444 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7445 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7446 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
7447 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
7451 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
7452 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
7453 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
7454 match pending_forward_info {
7455 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
7456 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
7458 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
7459 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
7460 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
7461 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
7462 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
7464 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
7465 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
7466 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7467 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7468 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7471 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
7473 _ => pending_forward_info
7476 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7477 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7479 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7480 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7483 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7488 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7490 let next_user_channel_id;
7491 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
7492 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7493 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7495 debug_assert!(false);
7496 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7498 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7499 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7500 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7501 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7502 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7503 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7504 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
7505 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7507 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
7509 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
7510 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7511 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
7513 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
7514 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
7515 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
7516 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
7517 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
7518 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
7519 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
7520 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
7523 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7524 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7527 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7530 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
7531 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
7532 funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
7538 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7539 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7540 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7541 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7542 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7544 debug_assert!(false);
7545 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7547 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7548 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7549 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7550 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7551 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7552 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
7554 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7555 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7558 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7563 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7564 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7565 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7566 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7567 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7569 debug_assert!(false);
7570 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7572 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7573 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7574 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7575 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7576 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
7577 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
7578 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
7580 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7581 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
7583 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7584 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7588 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7592 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7593 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7594 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7596 debug_assert!(false);
7597 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7599 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7600 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7601 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7602 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7603 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7604 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7605 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7606 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7607 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7608 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7609 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7613 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7614 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7617 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7622 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7623 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7624 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7625 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7626 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7627 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7628 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7629 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7630 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7631 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7632 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7634 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7635 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7637 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7638 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7639 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7640 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7641 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7642 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7644 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7645 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7646 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7648 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7649 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7650 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7651 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7652 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7653 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7654 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7655 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7656 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7659 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7660 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7662 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7663 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
7664 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7665 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7666 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7667 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7668 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7669 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7670 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7671 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7672 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7673 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7676 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7677 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7678 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7683 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7684 // payments are being processed.
7685 if forward_htlcs_empty {
7686 push_forward_event = true;
7688 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7689 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7696 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7697 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7700 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7701 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7702 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7704 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7708 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7709 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7710 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7711 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7712 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7714 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7715 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7716 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7717 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7718 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7719 // real by taking more time.
7720 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7721 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7722 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7727 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7728 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7729 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7730 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7731 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7732 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7733 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7735 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7736 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7737 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7738 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7739 channel_funding_outpoint,
7741 counterparty_node_id,
7746 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7747 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7748 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7750 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7751 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7752 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7753 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7755 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7756 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7757 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7763 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7764 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7765 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7766 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7768 debug_assert!(false);
7769 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7770 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7771 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7772 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7773 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7774 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7775 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7776 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7777 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7778 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7779 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7780 *counterparty_node_id)
7782 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7783 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7784 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7785 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7786 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7787 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7788 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7792 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7793 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7796 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7799 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7803 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7804 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7805 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7807 debug_assert!(false);
7808 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7810 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7811 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7812 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7813 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7814 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7815 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7816 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7818 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7819 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7822 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7827 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7828 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7829 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7831 debug_assert!(false);
7832 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7834 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7835 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7836 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7837 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7838 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7839 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7840 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7843 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7844 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7845 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
7846 msg, &self.default_configuration
7847 ), chan_phase_entry),
7848 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7849 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7850 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7853 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7854 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7857 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7862 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7863 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7864 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7865 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7867 // It's not a local channel
7868 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7871 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7872 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7873 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7874 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7876 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7877 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7878 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7879 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7880 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7881 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7882 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7883 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7884 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7885 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7886 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7888 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7890 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7891 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7892 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7893 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7895 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7896 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7897 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7898 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7901 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7905 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7906 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7909 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7911 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7914 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7916 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7917 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7919 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7921 debug_assert!(false);
7922 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7923 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7927 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7928 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7929 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7930 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7931 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7932 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7933 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7934 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7935 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7936 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7937 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7938 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7939 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7940 let mut channel_update = None;
7941 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7942 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7943 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7946 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7947 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7948 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7949 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7950 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7951 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7952 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7957 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7958 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7959 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7960 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7961 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7962 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7966 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7967 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7970 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7971 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7973 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7974 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7975 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7976 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7977 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7978 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7980 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7981 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7982 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7983 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7984 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7985 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7986 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7987 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7988 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7989 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7990 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7991 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7992 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7993 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7994 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7995 next_funding_txid: None,
7998 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7999 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
8000 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8006 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8007 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
8008 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
8009 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8012 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
8013 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
8018 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
8019 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
8020 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
8022 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8023 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
8024 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
8025 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
8026 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
8027 match monitor_event {
8028 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
8029 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
8030 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
8031 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
8032 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
8033 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
8034 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8036 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
8037 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
8038 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8039 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8042 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
8043 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
8044 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
8046 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
8047 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
8048 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8049 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
8052 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
8053 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8054 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8055 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8056 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8057 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8058 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
8059 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
8060 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
8063 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
8065 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
8066 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8067 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8071 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8072 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8073 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8074 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
8082 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
8083 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
8089 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8090 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8093 has_pending_monitor_events
8096 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
8097 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
8098 /// update events as a separate process method here.
8100 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
8101 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8102 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
8105 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
8106 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
8107 /// update was applied.
8108 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
8109 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
8110 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8112 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
8113 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
8114 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
8115 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
8117 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8118 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8120 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8121 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8122 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
8123 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
8125 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
8126 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8127 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
8128 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
8129 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
8130 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
8132 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
8133 has_monitor_update = true;
8135 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
8136 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8137 continue 'peer_loop;
8146 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
8147 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8148 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
8154 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
8155 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
8157 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
8158 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
8160 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
8161 #[cfg(async_signing)]
8162 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
8163 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8165 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
8166 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
8168 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8169 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
8170 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
8171 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
8176 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
8177 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
8182 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
8183 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
8186 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8187 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
8188 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
8194 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
8198 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8199 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
8200 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8201 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8202 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8203 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
8204 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8208 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8209 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8210 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8211 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8212 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8218 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
8219 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
8220 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
8221 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
8222 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
8223 let mut has_update = false;
8224 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
8226 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8228 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8229 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8230 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8231 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8232 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
8234 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8235 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8236 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
8237 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
8238 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
8240 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
8241 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
8244 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
8245 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
8246 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
8248 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
8249 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
8250 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
8251 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8252 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8257 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
8258 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
8259 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
8265 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
8266 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
8271 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
8277 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
8278 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
8281 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
8282 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
8288 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
8289 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
8291 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
8292 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8293 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
8294 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
8295 // reorganized out of the main chain.
8296 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
8297 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
8298 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
8299 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
8300 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
8301 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
8302 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
8303 assert!(should_broadcast);
8304 } else { unreachable!(); }
8305 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
8306 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8307 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
8310 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8315 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8316 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
8317 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
8318 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
8322 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
8323 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8324 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8325 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8326 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
8328 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
8332 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
8337 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
8339 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
8341 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
8342 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8343 pub fn create_offer_builder(
8344 &$self, description: String
8345 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8346 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8347 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8348 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8349 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8351 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8352 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
8353 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
8355 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8362 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8363 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
8364 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
8368 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
8369 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
8371 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
8372 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
8373 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
8376 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8377 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
8378 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8380 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8381 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8385 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
8386 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8387 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8388 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8389 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8391 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
8395 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
8396 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8401 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8402 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
8403 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
8405 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
8407 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
8408 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8409 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8410 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8411 pub fn create_refund_builder(
8412 &$self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
8413 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8414 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8415 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8416 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8417 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8418 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8420 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8421 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
8422 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
8424 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8425 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
8428 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
8430 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
8431 $self.pending_outbound_payments
8432 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8433 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
8435 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8441 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8443 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8444 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8445 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8446 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8447 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8448 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8452 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8453 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
8454 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8455 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
8458 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8460 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8462 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
8463 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
8464 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
8466 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
8467 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
8468 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
8469 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
8470 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
8471 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
8472 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
8474 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8475 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8479 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
8480 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
8483 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8484 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
8485 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8489 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
8490 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
8491 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
8492 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8496 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
8497 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
8498 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8503 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8504 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
8505 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
8506 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
8509 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8510 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
8511 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
8512 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
8513 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8514 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8515 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8516 pub fn pay_for_offer(
8517 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
8518 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
8519 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8520 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8521 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8522 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8523 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8525 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
8526 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
8528 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
8530 let builder = match quantity {
8532 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
8534 let builder = match amount_msats {
8536 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
8538 let builder = match payer_note {
8540 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
8542 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
8543 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8545 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8547 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
8548 self.pending_outbound_payments
8549 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8550 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
8552 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8554 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8555 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
8556 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8557 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
8558 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
8561 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8563 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
8564 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
8565 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
8566 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
8567 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
8568 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8569 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
8570 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8571 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8573 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8580 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
8583 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
8584 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
8585 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
8589 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
8590 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
8591 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
8592 /// received and no retries will be made.
8597 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
8598 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
8601 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8602 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8603 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8604 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8605 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8607 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8608 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8610 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8611 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8614 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8616 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8617 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8618 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
8619 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8621 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8622 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8623 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8625 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8626 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8627 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8629 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8630 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8631 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8633 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8634 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8635 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8636 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8638 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8639 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8640 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8641 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
8642 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8645 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8647 for path in refund.paths() {
8648 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8649 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8650 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8651 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8653 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8659 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8663 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8666 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8667 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8669 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
8670 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
8671 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
8672 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8674 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8676 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8677 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8681 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8682 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8684 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8686 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8687 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8689 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8690 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8691 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8692 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
8693 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
8694 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8695 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8696 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8697 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8698 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8699 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8702 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8703 /// stored external to LDK.
8705 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8706 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8707 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8709 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8710 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8713 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8714 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8715 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8716 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8718 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8719 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8720 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8721 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8722 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8724 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8725 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8726 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8727 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8728 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8730 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8731 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8733 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8734 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8738 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8739 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8741 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8743 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8744 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8746 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8747 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8748 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8749 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8750 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8751 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8752 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8755 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8756 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8758 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8759 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8760 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8763 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8765 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8766 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8767 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8768 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8770 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8772 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8773 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8774 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8777 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8778 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8781 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8782 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8783 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8784 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
8785 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8786 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8788 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8789 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8790 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8791 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8792 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8794 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8796 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8799 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8800 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8804 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8805 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8807 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8808 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8809 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8810 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8812 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8813 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8814 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8815 Some(_) => continue,
8816 None => return scid_candidate
8821 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8823 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8824 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8826 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8827 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8828 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8832 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8833 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8834 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8836 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8837 /// times to get a unique scid.
8838 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8839 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8840 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8842 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8843 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8844 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8845 return scid_candidate
8849 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8850 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8851 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8852 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8854 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8855 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8856 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8857 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8858 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8859 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8861 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8862 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8863 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8872 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8873 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8874 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8875 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8876 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8880 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8881 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8882 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8883 events.push_back((event, None));
8887 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8888 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8889 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8893 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8894 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8898 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8899 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8902 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8903 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8904 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8905 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8906 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
8907 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
8908 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8910 let logger = WithContext::from(
8911 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
8914 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8915 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8916 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8917 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8918 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8919 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8920 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8921 .get_mut(&channel_id)
8923 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8927 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8928 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
8929 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8930 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8931 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8932 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8937 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
8939 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8940 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8941 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8942 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8944 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8945 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8946 if further_update_exists {
8947 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8952 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8959 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8960 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8966 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8967 for action in actions {
8969 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8970 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
8972 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8978 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8979 /// using the given event handler.
8981 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8982 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8986 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8990 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8992 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8993 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8994 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8995 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8996 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8997 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9001 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
9002 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
9003 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
9004 /// is always placed next to each other.
9006 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
9007 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
9008 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
9009 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
9011 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
9012 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
9013 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
9014 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
9015 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
9016 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9017 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9019 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
9020 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
9021 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
9022 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9025 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
9026 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9028 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
9029 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9032 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
9033 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9034 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9035 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9036 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9037 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
9038 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
9042 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
9043 events.replace(pending_events);
9052 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9054 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9055 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9056 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9057 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9058 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9059 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9063 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
9065 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
9066 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
9067 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
9069 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
9073 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9075 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9076 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9077 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9078 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9079 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9080 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9084 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9086 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9087 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
9088 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
9089 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
9090 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
9093 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
9094 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
9097 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9098 let _persistence_guard =
9099 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9100 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9101 let new_height = height - 1;
9103 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
9104 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
9105 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
9106 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
9107 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
9108 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
9111 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9115 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9117 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9118 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9119 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9120 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9121 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9122 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9126 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9127 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9128 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9129 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9131 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9132 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
9134 let _persistence_guard =
9135 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9136 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9137 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
9138 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
9140 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9141 if height < last_best_block_height {
9142 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9143 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9147 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9148 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9149 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9150 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9152 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9153 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
9155 let _persistence_guard =
9156 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9157 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9158 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
9160 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9162 macro_rules! max_time {
9163 ($timestamp: expr) => {
9165 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
9166 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
9167 // having an explicit local time source.
9168 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
9169 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
9170 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9171 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
9172 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
9178 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
9179 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9180 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
9181 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
9185 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
9186 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
9187 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
9188 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9189 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9190 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
9191 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
9192 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
9193 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
9194 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
9195 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
9202 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
9203 let _persistence_guard =
9204 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9205 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9206 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
9207 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
9208 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
9209 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
9210 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9211 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9216 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9218 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9219 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9220 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9221 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9222 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9223 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9227 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
9228 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
9230 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
9231 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
9232 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9233 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9234 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9236 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9237 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
9239 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9240 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9241 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9242 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9243 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9244 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9246 // Retain unfunded channels.
9247 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
9248 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
9249 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9250 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
9251 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
9252 let res = f(channel);
9253 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
9254 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
9255 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
9256 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
9257 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
9259 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
9260 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
9261 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
9262 if channel.context.is_usable() {
9263 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9264 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
9265 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
9266 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9271 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9276 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9277 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
9280 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
9281 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9282 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
9283 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9284 msg: announcement_sigs,
9286 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9287 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
9288 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
9290 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
9291 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
9292 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
9297 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
9298 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9299 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
9300 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
9301 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
9302 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
9303 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
9304 // is always consistent.
9305 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
9306 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9307 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
9308 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
9309 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
9312 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
9313 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
9314 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
9315 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
9316 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
9317 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
9318 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
9319 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
9323 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9324 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9325 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
9326 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
9327 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9328 data: reason_message,
9341 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9342 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
9343 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
9344 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
9345 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
9346 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
9347 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
9348 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9349 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
9350 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
9352 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
9353 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
9354 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
9358 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
9361 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9362 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
9363 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9364 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
9365 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
9366 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
9367 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
9368 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
9369 phantom_shared_secret: None,
9370 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
9371 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
9372 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
9375 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
9376 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
9377 _ => unreachable!(),
9379 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
9380 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
9381 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
9382 let logger = WithContext::from(
9383 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
9385 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
9391 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
9393 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
9394 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
9398 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
9399 /// may have events that need processing.
9401 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
9402 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
9404 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
9405 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
9406 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
9407 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
9410 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
9412 /// See [`Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] for retrieving a [`Future`] that
9413 /// indicates this should be checked.
9414 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
9415 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
9418 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9419 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
9420 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
9423 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
9424 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
9425 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
9426 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
9429 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9430 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9431 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9432 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9435 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9436 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9438 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9439 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9440 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9441 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9442 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9445 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9446 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9447 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9448 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9451 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9452 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9453 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
9454 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
9457 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9458 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9459 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9460 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
9463 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9464 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9465 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
9466 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9470 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9471 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9473 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9474 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9475 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9476 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9477 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9478 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9482 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
9483 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9484 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9485 // change to the contents.
9486 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9487 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9488 let persist = match &res {
9489 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
9490 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
9491 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9493 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9495 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9500 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
9501 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9502 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9503 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9506 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
9507 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9508 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9509 // change to the contents.
9510 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9511 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9512 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
9516 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
9517 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9518 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9519 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9522 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
9523 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9524 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9527 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
9528 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9529 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9532 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
9533 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9534 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
9535 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
9536 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
9537 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9538 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9539 let persist = match &res {
9540 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9541 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9543 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9548 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
9549 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9550 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
9551 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9554 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
9555 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9556 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
9557 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9560 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
9561 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9562 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
9563 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9566 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
9567 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9568 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
9569 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9572 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
9573 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9574 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9577 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
9578 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9579 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9582 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
9583 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9584 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9585 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9586 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9587 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9588 let persist = match &res {
9589 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9590 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9591 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9593 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9598 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
9599 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9600 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9603 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
9604 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9605 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9606 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9607 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9608 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9609 let persist = match &res {
9610 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9611 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9612 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9614 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9619 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9620 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9621 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9622 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9623 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9624 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9625 let persist = match &res {
9626 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9627 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9628 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9630 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9635 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9636 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9637 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9640 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9641 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9642 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9645 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9646 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9647 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9648 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9649 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9650 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9651 let persist = match &res {
9652 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9653 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9654 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9656 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9661 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9662 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9663 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9666 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9667 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9668 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9671 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9676 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9677 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9678 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9679 let persist = match &res {
9680 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9681 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9682 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9684 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9689 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9690 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9691 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9692 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9693 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9696 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
9697 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9698 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9700 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9701 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9702 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9703 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9704 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9705 let context = match phase {
9706 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9707 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9708 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9709 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9714 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
9715 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
9716 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
9719 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9720 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9723 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9724 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9727 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9728 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9732 // Clean up for removal.
9733 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9734 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9737 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9738 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9739 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9740 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9742 // V1 Channel Establishment
9743 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9744 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9745 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9746 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9747 // V2 Channel Establishment
9748 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9749 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9750 // Common Channel Establishment
9751 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9752 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9754 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9756 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9757 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9758 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9759 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9760 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9761 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9762 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9763 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9764 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9765 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9766 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9767 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9768 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9769 // Channel Operations
9770 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9771 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9772 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9773 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9774 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9775 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
9777 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
9778 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9779 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
9780 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9781 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
9782 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
9783 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
9784 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
9785 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
9788 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
9789 peer_state.is_connected = false;
9790 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
9791 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
9794 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
9796 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
9798 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
9799 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
9803 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
9804 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
9805 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
9806 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9810 let mut res = Ok(());
9812 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9813 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9814 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9815 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9816 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9817 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9818 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9821 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9822 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9823 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9824 if inbound_peer_limited {
9826 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9828 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9829 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9830 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9831 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9832 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9833 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9834 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9835 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9839 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9840 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9841 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9843 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9844 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9845 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9846 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9849 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9852 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9853 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9858 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9860 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9861 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9862 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9863 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9864 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9866 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9868 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9869 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9870 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9871 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9872 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9876 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9877 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9878 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9879 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
9883 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9884 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9885 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9886 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9887 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9888 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
9892 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
9893 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9894 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9895 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9896 debug_assert!(false);
9899 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9900 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9901 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
9902 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9903 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9904 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9905 debug_assert!(false);
9911 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9912 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9917 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9918 match &msg.data as &str {
9919 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9920 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9922 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9923 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9924 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9925 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9926 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9927 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9928 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9929 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9930 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9932 || -> NotifyOption {
9933 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9934 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9935 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
9936 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9937 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9938 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9939 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9940 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9944 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9945 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9946 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9947 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9948 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9949 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9951 log_level: Level::Trace,
9954 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
9955 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
9956 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9958 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
9967 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9969 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9970 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9971 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9972 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9973 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9974 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9975 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9976 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9977 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9978 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9979 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9981 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9982 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9983 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9987 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9988 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9989 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9990 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9991 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9992 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9993 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9994 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
9995 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9996 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9997 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10003 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
10004 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
10005 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10006 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10007 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10013 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
10014 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
10015 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
10019 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10020 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10024 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
10025 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
10028 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
10029 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
10032 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
10033 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
10036 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
10037 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10038 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10039 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10042 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
10043 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10044 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10045 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10048 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
10049 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10050 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10051 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10054 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
10055 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10056 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10057 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10060 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
10061 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10062 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10063 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10066 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
10067 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10068 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10069 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10072 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
10073 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10074 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10075 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10078 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
10079 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10080 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10081 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10084 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
10085 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10086 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10087 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10091 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10092 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10094 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10095 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10096 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10097 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10098 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10099 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10103 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
10104 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
10105 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
10108 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
10109 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
10112 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
10113 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10115 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
10116 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
10118 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
10119 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10123 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
10124 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
10125 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
10127 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
10129 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
10130 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10134 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
10135 amount_msats, payment_secret
10137 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
10139 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
10140 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10144 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10145 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
10146 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
10149 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
10150 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10151 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
10152 payment_paths, payment_hash
10154 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10155 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
10156 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10158 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey>, _> =
10159 builder.map(|b| b.into());
10160 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
10161 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
10162 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10165 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10166 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
10167 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10168 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
10169 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10171 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<ExplicitSigningPubkey>, _> =
10172 builder.map(|b| b.into());
10173 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
10174 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
10175 .and_then(|invoice| {
10177 let mut invoice = invoice;
10178 match invoice.sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
10179 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
10181 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
10182 Err(SignError::Signing) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
10183 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
10185 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
10186 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
10191 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
10192 Err(error) => Some(error),
10196 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
10197 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
10199 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
10201 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
10202 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
10204 Ok(payment_id) => {
10205 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
10206 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
10207 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
10214 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
10215 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
10221 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
10222 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
10226 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10227 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10228 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
10229 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
10230 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
10234 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10235 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10237 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
10238 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
10239 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
10240 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
10241 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10244 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10245 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10246 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
10247 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10250 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10251 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10252 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
10253 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10256 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10257 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10258 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
10259 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
10262 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10263 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10264 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
10265 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
10266 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
10267 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
10268 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
10269 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
10270 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
10271 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
10272 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
10273 features.set_payment_secret_required();
10274 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
10275 features.set_wumbo_optional();
10276 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
10277 features.set_channel_type_optional();
10278 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
10279 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
10280 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
10281 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
10282 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
10287 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10288 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10290 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
10291 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
10292 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
10293 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
10296 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
10297 (2, node_id, required),
10298 (4, features, required),
10299 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
10300 (8, forwarding_info, option),
10301 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10302 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10305 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
10306 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10307 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10308 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10309 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
10310 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
10311 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10312 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
10313 (2, self.channel_id, required),
10314 (3, self.channel_type, option),
10315 (4, self.counterparty, required),
10316 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
10317 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
10318 (7, self.config, option),
10319 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
10320 (9, self.confirmations, option),
10321 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
10322 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10323 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10324 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
10325 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10326 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
10327 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10328 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
10329 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
10330 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
10331 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
10332 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
10333 (30, self.is_usable, required),
10334 (32, self.is_public, required),
10335 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10336 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10337 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10338 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10339 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
10340 (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10341 (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10347 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
10348 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10349 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10350 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
10351 (2, channel_id, required),
10352 (3, channel_type, option),
10353 (4, counterparty, required),
10354 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
10355 (6, funding_txo, option),
10356 (7, config, option),
10357 (8, short_channel_id, option),
10358 (9, confirmations, option),
10359 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
10360 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10361 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10362 (16, balance_msat, required),
10363 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10364 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
10365 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10366 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
10367 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10368 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
10369 (22, confirmations_required, option),
10370 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
10371 (26, is_outbound, required),
10372 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
10373 (30, is_usable, required),
10374 (32, is_public, required),
10375 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10376 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10377 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10378 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10379 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
10380 (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10381 (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10384 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10385 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10386 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
10387 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
10388 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
10391 inbound_scid_alias,
10392 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
10394 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
10395 outbound_scid_alias,
10399 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
10400 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
10402 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
10403 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10404 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
10405 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
10406 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10407 confirmations_required,
10409 force_close_spend_delay,
10410 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
10411 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
10412 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
10413 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
10414 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
10415 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
10416 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
10417 channel_shutdown_state,
10418 pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10419 pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10424 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
10425 (2, channels, required_vec),
10426 (4, phantom_scid, required),
10427 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
10430 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
10431 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
10432 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
10435 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
10437 (0, onion_packet, required),
10438 (1, blinded, option),
10439 (2, short_channel_id, required),
10442 (0, payment_data, required),
10443 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10444 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10445 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10446 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10447 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10449 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
10450 (0, payment_preimage, required),
10451 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10452 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10453 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10454 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
10455 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10459 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
10460 (0, routing, required),
10461 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
10462 (4, payment_hash, required),
10463 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
10464 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
10465 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
10466 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10470 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10471 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10473 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
10474 0u8.write(writer)?;
10475 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10476 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10477 reason.write(writer)?;
10479 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10480 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
10482 1u8.write(writer)?;
10483 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10484 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10485 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
10486 failure_code.write(writer)?;
10493 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10494 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10495 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10498 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
10499 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10500 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10501 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
10505 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10506 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10507 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10508 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
10509 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
10512 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
10513 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
10514 // messages contained in the variants.
10515 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
10516 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
10517 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
10519 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10520 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10521 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10522 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10523 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
10526 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10527 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10528 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10529 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10530 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
10532 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10537 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
10542 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
10543 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
10544 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
10547 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
10548 (0, short_channel_id, required),
10549 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10550 (2, outpoint, required),
10551 (3, blinded_failure, option),
10552 (4, htlc_id, required),
10553 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
10554 (7, user_channel_id, option),
10555 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
10556 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10557 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10560 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
10561 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10562 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
10563 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
10564 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
10566 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10567 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
10568 (1, self.total_msat, required),
10569 (2, self.value, required),
10570 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
10571 (4, payment_data, option),
10572 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
10573 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
10574 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10575 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10581 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
10582 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10583 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10584 (0, prev_hop, required),
10585 (1, total_msat, option),
10586 (2, value_ser, required),
10587 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
10588 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
10589 (5, total_value_received, option),
10590 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
10591 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10592 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10594 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
10595 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
10596 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
10598 if payment_data.is_some() {
10599 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10601 if total_msat.is_none() {
10602 total_msat = Some(value);
10604 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
10607 if total_msat.is_none() {
10608 if payment_data.is_none() {
10609 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10611 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10613 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
10617 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10620 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10621 total_value_received,
10622 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10624 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10625 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10630 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10631 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10632 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10635 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10636 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10637 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10638 let mut payment_id = None;
10639 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10640 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10641 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10642 (0, session_priv, required),
10643 (1, payment_id, option),
10644 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10645 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10646 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10647 (6, blinded_tail, option),
10649 if payment_id.is_none() {
10650 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10652 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10654 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10655 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10656 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10658 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10659 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10660 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10661 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10665 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10666 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10667 first_hop_htlc_msat,
10669 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10672 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10673 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10678 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10679 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10681 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10682 0u8.write(writer)?;
10683 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10684 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10685 (0, session_priv, required),
10686 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10687 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10688 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10689 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10690 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10691 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10694 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10695 1u8.write(writer)?;
10696 field.write(writer)?;
10703 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10704 (0, forward_info, required),
10705 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10706 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10707 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10708 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10709 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10710 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10711 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10714 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10715 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10716 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10718 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10722 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10723 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10724 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10725 (0, htlc_id, required),
10726 (2, err_packet, required),
10729 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10730 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10731 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10732 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10733 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10734 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10735 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10736 (0, htlc_id, required),
10737 (1, failure_code, required),
10738 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10739 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10747 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10748 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10749 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
10751 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
10753 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
10754 (0, htlc_id, required),
10755 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
10756 (2, err_packet, required),
10757 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
10759 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
10760 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
10761 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10763 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
10767 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10768 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
10772 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10777 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
10778 (0, payment_secret, required),
10779 (2, expiry_time, required),
10780 (4, user_payment_id, required),
10781 (6, payment_preimage, required),
10782 (8, min_value_msat, required),
10785 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10787 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10788 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10789 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10790 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10791 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10792 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10796 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10797 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
10799 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10801 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
10803 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
10804 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
10805 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
10808 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
10810 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10811 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
10812 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10813 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10814 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10815 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10816 serializable_peer_count += 1;
10819 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
10820 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
10824 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
10826 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10827 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10828 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10829 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
10830 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
10831 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
10834 channel.write(writer)?;
10840 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10841 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10842 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
10843 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
10844 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10845 for forward in pending_forwards {
10846 forward.write(writer)?;
10851 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10853 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10854 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
10855 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10857 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
10858 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
10859 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10860 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
10861 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
10862 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10863 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
10864 htlc.write(writer)?;
10866 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
10867 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
10870 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
10871 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
10872 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10873 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
10874 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
10875 // per_peer_state lock at all.
10876 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
10879 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
10880 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10881 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
10882 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
10883 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10885 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10886 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10887 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10888 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10889 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10890 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10891 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10896 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10897 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10898 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10899 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10900 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10901 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10902 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10903 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10904 0u64.write(writer)?;
10906 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10907 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10908 event.write(writer)?;
10912 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10913 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10914 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10915 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10916 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10917 0u64.write(writer)?;
10919 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10920 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10921 // likely to be identical.
10922 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10923 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10925 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10926 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10927 hash.write(writer)?;
10928 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10931 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10932 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10933 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10934 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10935 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10938 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10939 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10941 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10942 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10943 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10944 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10947 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10948 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10949 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10950 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10954 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10955 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
10956 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10958 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10959 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10960 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10966 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10967 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10968 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10969 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10972 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10973 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10974 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10975 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10976 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10979 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10980 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10981 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10982 if !updates.is_empty() {
10983 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
10984 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10989 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10990 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10991 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10992 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10993 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10994 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10995 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10996 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10997 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10998 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10999 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11000 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
11001 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11008 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11009 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
11010 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
11011 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
11014 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
11015 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
11016 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
11017 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
11018 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
11019 // check that the event is sane here.
11020 let event_encoded = event.encode();
11021 let event_read: Option<Event> =
11022 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
11023 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
11029 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11030 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11031 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11032 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
11033 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
11034 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
11037 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
11038 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
11039 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
11040 events.push_back((ev, action));
11041 } else if action.is_some() {
11042 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11049 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
11050 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
11051 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
11052 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
11053 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
11054 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
11057 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
11059 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
11061 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11062 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
11063 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
11064 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
11065 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
11066 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
11067 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
11068 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
11069 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11070 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
11071 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
11072 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
11073 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
11075 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
11076 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
11078 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
11079 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
11081 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
11082 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
11083 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
11084 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
11085 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
11086 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
11088 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
11089 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11091 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11092 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11093 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11094 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11095 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11096 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11100 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
11101 pub entropy_source: ES,
11103 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
11104 pub node_signer: NS,
11106 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
11107 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
11109 pub signer_provider: SP,
11111 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11113 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
11114 pub fee_estimator: F,
11115 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11117 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
11118 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
11119 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
11120 pub chain_monitor: M,
11122 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
11123 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
11124 /// force-closed during deserialization.
11125 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
11126 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
11127 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
11129 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
11131 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
11132 /// deserialization.
11134 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
11135 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
11136 pub default_config: UserConfig,
11138 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
11139 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
11141 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
11142 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
11143 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
11144 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
11146 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
11149 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
11150 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
11153 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11154 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11156 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11157 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11158 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11159 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11160 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11161 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11165 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
11166 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
11167 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
11168 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
11169 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
11171 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
11172 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
11173 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
11179 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
11180 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
11181 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11182 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
11184 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11185 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11186 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11187 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11188 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11189 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11193 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11194 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
11195 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
11199 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11200 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
11202 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11203 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11204 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11205 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11206 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11207 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11211 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11212 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11214 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11215 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11216 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11218 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
11220 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11221 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11222 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11223 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11224 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11225 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
11226 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
11227 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
11228 for _ in 0..channel_count {
11229 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
11230 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
11232 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11233 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11234 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
11235 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
11236 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
11237 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
11238 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
11239 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
11240 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11241 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
11242 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
11243 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
11244 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11245 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
11246 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
11248 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
11249 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
11250 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
11252 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
11253 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
11254 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11256 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
11257 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
11258 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11260 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
11261 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
11262 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11264 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
11265 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11266 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
11269 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
11270 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11271 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11272 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11273 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
11274 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11275 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11276 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11278 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
11279 let mut found_htlc = false;
11280 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11281 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
11284 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
11285 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
11286 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
11287 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
11288 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
11289 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
11290 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
11292 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
11293 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
11294 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11298 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
11299 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
11300 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11301 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
11302 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11304 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
11305 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
11307 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
11308 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11309 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
11310 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11312 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11313 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
11314 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11315 entry.insert(by_id_map);
11319 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
11320 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
11321 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
11322 // safely discard the channel.
11323 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
11324 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11325 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11326 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11327 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
11328 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11329 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11330 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11333 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
11334 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11335 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11336 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11337 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11338 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11342 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11343 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
11344 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11345 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
11346 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
11348 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
11349 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
11350 counterparty_node_id: None,
11351 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
11352 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
11354 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
11358 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
11359 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11360 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11361 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
11362 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
11363 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11364 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
11365 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
11366 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
11368 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
11371 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11372 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11373 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
11374 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11375 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11376 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
11377 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
11378 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
11380 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
11383 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
11386 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
11387 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
11388 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
11389 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11390 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
11391 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11392 is_connected: false,
11396 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11397 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
11398 for _ in 0..peer_count {
11399 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
11400 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
11401 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
11402 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
11403 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
11406 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11407 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
11408 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
11409 for _ in 0..event_count {
11410 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
11411 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
11416 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11417 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
11418 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
11420 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
11421 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
11422 // on-startup monitor updates.
11423 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
11424 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
11426 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11430 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
11431 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11433 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11434 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
11435 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
11436 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
11437 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11441 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11442 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
11443 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
11444 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
11445 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
11446 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
11447 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
11449 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
11450 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11454 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
11455 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
11456 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
11457 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
11458 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
11459 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11460 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11461 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
11462 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
11463 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
11464 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
11465 let mut events_override = None;
11466 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11467 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
11468 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
11469 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11470 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
11471 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11472 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
11473 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11474 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
11475 (8, events_override, option),
11476 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
11477 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11478 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
11479 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11481 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
11482 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11485 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
11486 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11489 if let Some(events) = events_override {
11490 pending_events_read = events;
11493 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
11494 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
11497 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
11498 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
11499 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
11500 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
11501 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
11502 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
11504 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
11506 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
11507 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
11508 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
11511 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
11512 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
11513 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
11514 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
11515 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
11517 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
11518 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
11519 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
11521 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
11522 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
11523 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
11524 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
11525 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
11527 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
11528 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11529 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
11530 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
11531 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
11532 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
11533 pending_background_events.push(
11534 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11535 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11536 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
11537 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11538 update: update.clone(),
11541 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
11542 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
11543 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
11544 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
11545 pending_background_events.push(
11546 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
11547 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11548 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11551 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
11552 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
11553 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11555 max_in_flight_update_id
11559 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11560 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
11561 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11562 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
11563 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11564 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11566 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
11568 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11569 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
11570 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
11571 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
11572 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
11573 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
11574 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
11575 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
11576 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
11579 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
11580 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
11581 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11582 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
11583 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
11584 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
11585 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11586 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11587 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11588 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11589 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11592 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11593 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11594 debug_assert!(false);
11595 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11600 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11601 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11602 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11603 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
11604 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11605 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11606 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11607 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11608 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11609 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11611 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11612 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11613 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11615 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11616 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11617 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11618 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11619 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11620 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11621 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11622 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11627 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11628 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11630 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11631 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11632 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11633 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11636 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11637 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11638 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11639 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11640 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11641 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11642 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11644 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11645 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11646 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11647 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11648 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11649 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11650 if path.hops.is_empty() {
11651 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11652 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11655 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11656 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11657 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11658 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11659 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11660 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11661 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11662 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11664 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11665 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11666 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11667 retry_strategy: None,
11668 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11669 payment_params: None,
11670 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11671 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11672 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11673 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11674 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11675 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11676 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11677 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11678 total_msat: path_amt,
11679 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11680 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11682 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11683 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11688 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11689 match htlc_source {
11690 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11691 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11692 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11693 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11695 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11696 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11697 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11698 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11699 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11700 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11701 forwards.retain(|forward| {
11702 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11703 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11704 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11705 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11710 !forwards.is_empty()
11712 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11713 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11714 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11715 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11716 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11717 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11718 intercepted_id != ev_id
11725 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11726 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
11727 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
11728 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
11729 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
11730 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
11731 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
11732 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
11733 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
11734 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
11735 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
11737 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
11738 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
11739 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
11740 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
11742 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
11743 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
11744 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
11751 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
11752 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
11754 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
11756 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
11757 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
11758 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
11759 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
11760 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
11761 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
11762 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
11763 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
11764 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11765 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
11768 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
11769 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
11770 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
11771 // channel still live case here.
11775 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
11776 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
11781 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
11782 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
11783 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
11784 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
11785 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
11786 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
11787 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
11788 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
11792 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
11793 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
11795 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
11796 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
11797 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11798 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11800 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
11801 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11802 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11804 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
11805 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
11807 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11808 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
11810 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11813 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
11814 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11815 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11817 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11821 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
11822 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
11823 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
11824 if htlcs.is_empty() {
11825 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11827 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
11828 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
11829 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
11830 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
11831 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
11832 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
11833 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
11834 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
11836 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
11837 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11841 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
11843 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11845 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
11846 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
11848 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11849 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11854 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11855 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11857 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
11859 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11861 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
11862 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
11863 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
11864 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11868 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
11869 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11870 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11871 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11872 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
11873 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11874 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11875 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
11876 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
11878 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
11879 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
11880 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
11882 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
11883 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
11884 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11885 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11886 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11887 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11889 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11890 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11891 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11892 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11893 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11894 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11898 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11899 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11900 debug_assert!(false);
11901 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11906 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11908 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11909 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11910 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11911 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11912 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11913 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11914 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11915 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11916 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11917 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11918 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11920 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11921 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11923 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11924 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11925 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11926 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11928 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11929 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11930 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11931 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11933 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11934 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11935 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11936 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11938 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
11939 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11940 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11941 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11942 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11943 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11944 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11945 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11948 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11949 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11952 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11955 purpose: payment.purpose,
11956 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11957 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11958 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11964 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11965 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11966 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11967 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11968 for action in actions.iter() {
11969 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11970 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11971 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
11973 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
11975 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11976 blocked_channel_id);
11977 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11978 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
11979 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11981 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11982 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11983 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11984 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11988 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11989 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11993 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11995 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11996 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12000 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
12002 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
12003 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
12004 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
12005 router: args.router,
12007 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
12009 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
12010 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
12011 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
12012 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
12014 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
12015 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
12016 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
12017 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
12018 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
12019 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
12021 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
12023 our_network_pubkey,
12026 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
12028 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
12030 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
12031 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
12032 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
12033 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
12034 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
12036 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
12037 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
12039 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
12041 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12043 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
12044 node_signer: args.node_signer,
12045 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
12047 logger: args.logger,
12048 default_configuration: args.default_config,
12051 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
12052 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
12053 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
12054 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
12055 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
12058 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
12059 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
12060 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
12061 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
12062 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
12063 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
12064 downstream_channel_id, None
12068 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
12069 //connection or two.
12071 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
12077 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12078 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12079 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
12080 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
12081 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
12082 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
12083 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
12084 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
12085 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12086 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
12087 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
12088 use crate::prelude::*;
12089 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
12090 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
12091 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
12092 use crate::util::test_utils;
12093 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
12094 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
12097 fn test_notify_limits() {
12098 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
12099 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
12100 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12101 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12102 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12103 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12105 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
12106 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
12107 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12108 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12109 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12111 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12113 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
12114 // to connect messages with new values
12115 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12116 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12117 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12118 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12119 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12120 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12122 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
12123 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12124 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12125 // ... but the last node should not.
12126 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12127 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
12128 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12129 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12131 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
12132 // about the channel.
12133 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12134 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12135 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12137 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
12139 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12140 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12141 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12142 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12143 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12144 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12146 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
12147 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12148 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12150 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
12151 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
12152 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
12153 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
12154 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
12155 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
12157 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
12158 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
12159 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12160 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12161 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12162 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12163 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12164 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12166 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
12167 // the channel info has updated.
12168 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12169 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12170 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12171 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12172 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12173 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12177 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
12178 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
12180 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12181 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12182 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12183 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12184 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12186 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
12187 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
12188 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
12189 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
12191 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12192 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
12193 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
12194 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
12195 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
12196 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
12197 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
12198 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
12199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12200 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12201 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12202 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
12204 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
12205 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12206 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12207 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12208 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12209 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12210 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12211 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12212 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12214 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12215 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12216 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
12217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12218 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12219 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12220 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12221 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12222 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12223 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12224 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12225 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12226 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
12228 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
12229 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
12230 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
12231 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12232 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12233 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12234 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
12236 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
12237 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
12238 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
12239 // lightning messages manually.
12240 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12241 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
12242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
12244 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12245 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12246 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
12247 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
12248 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12249 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12250 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
12251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12252 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12253 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
12254 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12255 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12256 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12257 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12259 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12260 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
12261 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12262 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12263 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
12264 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12265 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12267 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12268 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
12269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12271 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
12272 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
12273 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12274 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
12276 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12277 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12278 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12279 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12281 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12284 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12285 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12286 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12287 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12289 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12294 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
12295 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
12296 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
12299 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
12300 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
12301 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
12302 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
12303 // fails as expected.
12304 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
12305 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
12306 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
12307 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
12308 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
12309 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
12310 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12311 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12312 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12313 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
12314 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12315 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12316 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12317 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12318 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12320 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
12321 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
12322 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
12324 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12325 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12326 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
12327 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
12328 let route = find_route(
12329 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12330 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12332 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12333 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12334 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12335 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12336 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12337 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12338 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12339 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12341 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12342 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
12343 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
12344 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12345 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12347 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12348 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12349 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12350 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12351 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12352 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12353 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12354 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12355 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12357 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12358 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12360 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12361 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12362 let route = find_route(
12363 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12364 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12366 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12367 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12369 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12370 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12371 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12372 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12373 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12375 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
12376 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12377 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12378 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
12379 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12380 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12381 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12382 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12383 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12384 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12386 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12387 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12388 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12390 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12391 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12392 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12393 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12394 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12395 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12396 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12397 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12398 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12400 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
12401 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12403 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12404 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
12405 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12406 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
12407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12408 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12409 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12410 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12411 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12412 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12414 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12415 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12416 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
12419 let route = find_route(
12420 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12421 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12423 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
12424 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12425 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
12426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12427 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12428 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12429 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12430 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12431 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12433 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12434 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12435 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12436 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12437 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12438 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12439 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12440 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12441 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12442 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12443 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12444 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12445 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12447 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12448 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12452 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
12453 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
12454 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
12455 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12456 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12457 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12458 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12460 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12461 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12463 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12464 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12465 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12466 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12467 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12468 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12469 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12470 let route = find_route(
12471 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12472 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12475 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12476 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
12477 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
12478 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12479 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
12480 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12483 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12484 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12485 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12486 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12487 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12488 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12489 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12491 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
12495 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
12496 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
12497 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
12498 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12499 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
12500 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12501 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12502 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12503 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12505 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12506 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12508 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12509 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12510 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12511 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12512 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12513 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12514 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12515 let route = find_route(
12516 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12517 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12520 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12521 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12522 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
12523 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
12524 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12525 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
12526 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
12527 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12528 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12530 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12531 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12532 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12533 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12534 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12535 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12536 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12538 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
12542 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
12543 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
12544 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
12545 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
12546 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12548 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12549 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12550 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12551 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12553 // Marshall an MPP route.
12554 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
12555 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
12556 route.paths.push(path);
12557 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12558 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
12559 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
12560 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
12561 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
12562 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
12564 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12565 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
12567 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
12568 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
12570 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
12575 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
12576 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12577 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12578 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12579 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12581 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12583 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12584 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12586 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12587 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
12588 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12589 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12592 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
12593 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
12594 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
12595 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
12596 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12597 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12600 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12603 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12604 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12609 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12610 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12611 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12612 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12613 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12614 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12616 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12617 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12619 total_msat: 100_000,
12622 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12623 // payment verification fails as expected.
12624 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12625 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12626 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12627 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12629 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12633 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12634 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12638 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12639 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12640 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12641 // the channel is successfully closed.
12642 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12643 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12644 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12645 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12647 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12648 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12649 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12650 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12651 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12653 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
12654 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
12656 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
12657 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
12658 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12659 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12662 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12664 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
12665 // as it has the funding transaction.
12666 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12667 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12668 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12671 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12673 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12675 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12677 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12678 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12679 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12681 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12684 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
12685 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
12686 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12687 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12688 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12690 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12691 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12692 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12694 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12695 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
12696 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
12697 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
12699 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12700 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
12701 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12702 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
12704 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12705 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
12707 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
12708 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
12709 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
12710 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
12711 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12712 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12713 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12717 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
12718 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
12719 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
12720 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
12721 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12722 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12723 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12726 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
12728 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
12729 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
12730 // closing transaction).
12731 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
12732 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
12733 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12735 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
12736 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
12737 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12738 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12739 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12742 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12744 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
12746 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
12747 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
12748 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12750 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12752 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12753 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12756 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12757 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
12758 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12761 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12762 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
12763 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12766 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
12767 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
12768 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12771 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12772 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
12773 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12776 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12778 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
12779 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12781 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
12782 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12784 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
12785 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
12790 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
12791 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
12792 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
12793 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
12794 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12795 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12796 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12797 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12800 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12801 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
12802 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
12804 // Test the API functions.
12805 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
12807 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
12809 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12811 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12813 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12815 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
12817 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
12821 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
12822 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
12823 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
12824 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
12825 // the given `channel_id`.
12826 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12827 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12828 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12829 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12831 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12834 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12836 // Test the API functions.
12837 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
12839 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12841 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12843 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12845 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12847 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12851 fn test_connection_limiting() {
12852 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
12853 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12854 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12855 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12856 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12858 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12860 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12861 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12863 let mut funding_tx = None;
12864 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12865 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12866 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12869 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12870 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
12871 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
12872 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
12873 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12875 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12877 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12879 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12881 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12883 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12885 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12888 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
12889 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
12890 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
12891 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12892 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12893 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12895 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
12896 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
12898 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
12899 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
12900 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12901 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12902 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
12903 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12904 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12907 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12908 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12909 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12910 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12911 }, true).unwrap_err();
12913 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12914 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12915 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12916 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12917 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12918 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12919 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12921 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12922 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12924 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12925 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12926 }, true).unwrap_err();
12928 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12929 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12930 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12931 }, false).unwrap();
12932 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12934 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12935 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12937 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12938 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12939 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12940 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12941 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12943 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12944 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12945 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12947 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12948 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12949 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12951 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12952 // "protected" and can connect again.
12953 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12954 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12955 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12957 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12959 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12961 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12962 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12966 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12967 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12968 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12969 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12970 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12971 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12973 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12975 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12976 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12978 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12979 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12980 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12981 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12984 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12986 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12987 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12988 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12990 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12991 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12992 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12994 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12995 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12996 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12997 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13001 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
13002 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13003 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13004 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13005 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13006 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
13007 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13008 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
13009 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13011 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13013 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13014 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13016 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
13017 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13018 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13019 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13020 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13021 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13024 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13025 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13027 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13028 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13030 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13032 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
13033 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13036 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
13037 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13038 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13039 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13040 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13042 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13043 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13045 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13046 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
13047 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
13048 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
13052 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13054 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13055 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13057 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
13058 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13059 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13061 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13062 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13064 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13066 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13070 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
13071 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13072 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13073 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13074 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13075 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
13076 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
13077 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13078 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13079 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13080 payment_metadata: None,
13081 keysend_preimage: None,
13082 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13083 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13085 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13087 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
13088 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
13089 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13090 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
13091 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13092 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13093 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
13095 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
13096 } else { panic!(); }
13098 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
13099 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
13100 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13101 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13102 payment_metadata: None,
13103 keysend_preimage: None,
13104 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13105 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13107 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13109 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13110 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13111 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13112 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
13116 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
13117 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13118 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13119 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13120 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13122 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13123 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13124 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13125 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
13126 payment_metadata: None,
13127 keysend_preimage: None,
13128 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13129 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
13131 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13132 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
13133 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
13135 // Should not return an error as this condition:
13136 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
13137 // is not satisfied.
13138 assert!(result.is_ok());
13142 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
13143 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13144 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13145 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
13146 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13148 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
13149 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13151 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
13152 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
13153 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
13154 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
13155 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13157 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13158 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13160 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13161 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13162 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13163 match &msg_events[0] {
13164 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
13165 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13167 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
13168 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
13169 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
13172 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13175 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13176 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13178 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
13179 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
13180 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13182 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13186 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
13187 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
13188 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
13189 // the channel without the anchors feature.
13190 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13191 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13192 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
13193 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13194 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13195 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
13196 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13198 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
13199 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13200 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13202 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13203 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13205 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13206 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13208 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13211 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13212 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
13214 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13215 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13217 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
13218 // not have generated any events.
13219 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13223 fn test_update_channel_config() {
13224 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13225 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13226 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13227 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13228 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13229 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13230 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
13232 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13233 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13234 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13236 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
13237 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13238 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
13239 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13240 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13242 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13243 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13246 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
13247 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13248 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13250 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
13251 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13252 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
13253 ..Default::default()
13255 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13256 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13257 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13259 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13260 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13263 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
13264 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13265 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13266 ..Default::default()
13268 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13269 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
13270 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13271 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13273 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13274 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13277 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
13278 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
13279 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
13280 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
13281 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
13284 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13285 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13286 ..Default::default()
13288 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
13291 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
13292 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
13293 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13294 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13298 fn test_payment_display() {
13299 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
13300 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13301 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
13302 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13303 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
13304 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13308 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
13309 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13310 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13311 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13312 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13313 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13315 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
13316 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13317 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13318 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13319 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13320 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
13321 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
13322 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13324 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13325 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13326 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13329 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
13330 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
13332 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13333 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13335 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13336 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13337 }, false).unwrap();
13338 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
13339 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
13340 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
13342 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
13344 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
13345 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
13346 // close even if it was an lnd node.
13347 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13348 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13349 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
13350 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13351 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
13352 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
13353 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
13354 } else { panic!() };
13355 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
13356 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
13357 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
13358 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
13360 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13362 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13363 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13364 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13369 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
13370 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
13371 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13372 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13375 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13376 let deserialized_chanmgr;
13377 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
13379 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13380 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
13382 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13383 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
13386 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13387 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
13388 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13390 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13394 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13395 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
13396 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13398 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13403 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
13404 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
13405 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
13406 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
13408 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13409 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
13410 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
13412 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
13414 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13415 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
13416 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
13417 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
13419 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
13420 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
13422 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
13428 use crate::chain::Listen;
13429 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
13430 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
13431 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
13432 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
13433 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
13434 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
13435 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
13436 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
13437 use crate::util::test_utils;
13438 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
13440 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
13441 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
13442 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13443 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
13445 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
13447 use criterion::Criterion;
13449 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
13450 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
13451 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
13452 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
13453 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
13454 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
13455 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
13457 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
13458 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
13460 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
13461 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
13463 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
13465 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
13468 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
13469 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
13472 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
13473 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
13474 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
13476 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
13477 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
13479 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
13480 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
13481 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13482 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
13483 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
13485 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
13486 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
13487 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
13489 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
13490 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
13491 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
13492 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13494 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13495 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13496 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
13498 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13499 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
13500 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
13501 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
13502 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13504 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13505 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13506 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
13508 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13509 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13511 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13512 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13513 }, false).unwrap();
13514 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13515 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13516 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13519 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
13520 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
13521 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
13523 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13524 } else { panic!(); }
13526 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13527 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13528 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13529 match events_b[0] {
13530 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13531 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13533 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13536 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13537 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13538 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13539 match events_a[0] {
13540 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13541 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13543 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13546 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
13548 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
13549 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
13550 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
13552 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13553 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13554 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13555 match msg_events[0] {
13556 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
13557 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
13558 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13562 match msg_events[1] {
13563 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13567 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13568 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13569 match events_a[0] {
13570 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13571 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13573 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13576 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13577 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13578 match events_b[0] {
13579 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13580 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13582 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13585 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
13586 macro_rules! send_payment {
13587 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
13588 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
13589 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
13590 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
13591 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
13592 payment_count += 1;
13593 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
13594 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
13596 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13597 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13598 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13599 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13600 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13601 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13602 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13603 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13604 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13605 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13606 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13608 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13609 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13610 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13611 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13613 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13614 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13615 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13616 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13617 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13619 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13622 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13623 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13624 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13625 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13627 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13631 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13632 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13633 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);