1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
41 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
42 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
43 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
44 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
45 // construct one themselves.
46 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
47 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
48 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus};
49 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
50 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
52 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
54 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
55 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
56 use util::config::UserConfig;
57 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
58 use util::{byte_utils, events};
59 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
60 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
61 use util::logger::Logger;
62 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use std::cell::RefCell;
66 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
67 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
68 use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
69 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
70 use core::time::Duration;
71 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
72 use std::time::Instant;
74 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
76 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
78 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
79 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
80 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
82 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
83 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
84 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
85 // before we forward it.
87 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
88 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
89 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
90 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
91 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
93 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
94 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
96 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
105 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
106 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
107 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
108 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
109 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
110 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
111 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
114 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
115 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
116 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
117 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
120 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
123 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
124 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
127 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
129 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
131 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
132 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
133 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
135 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
137 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
141 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
145 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
146 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
147 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
148 short_channel_id: u64,
150 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
152 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
153 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
157 struct ClaimableHTLC {
158 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
160 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162 /// are part of the same payment.
163 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
167 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
168 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
169 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
170 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
173 session_priv: SecretKey,
174 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
175 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
176 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
181 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
182 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
184 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
185 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
190 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
191 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
193 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
201 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
203 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
204 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
205 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
206 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
207 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
209 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
210 err: msgs::LightningError,
211 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
213 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
215 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
217 err: LightningError {
219 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
220 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
226 shutdown_finish: None,
230 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
232 err: LightningError {
234 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
236 shutdown_finish: None,
240 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
241 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
244 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
246 err: LightningError {
248 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
249 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
255 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
259 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
262 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
264 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
266 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
268 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
269 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
275 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
277 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
278 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
285 shutdown_finish: None,
290 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
291 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
292 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
293 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
294 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
296 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
297 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
298 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
299 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
300 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
301 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
302 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
304 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
308 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
309 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
310 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
311 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
312 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
313 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
314 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
315 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
316 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
317 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
318 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
319 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
321 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
322 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
323 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
324 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
327 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
328 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
329 /// quite some time lag.
330 enum BackgroundEvent {
331 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
332 /// commitment transaction.
333 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
336 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
337 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
339 latest_features: InitFeatures,
342 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
343 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
345 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
347 struct PendingInboundPayment {
348 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
349 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
350 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
351 /// this payment being removed.
353 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
354 user_payment_id: u64,
355 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
356 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
357 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
360 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
361 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
362 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
363 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
364 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
365 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
366 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
367 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
369 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
370 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
371 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
372 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
373 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
374 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
375 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
376 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
377 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
379 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
380 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
382 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
383 /// to individual Channels.
385 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
386 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
387 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
388 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
390 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
391 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
392 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
393 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
394 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
395 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
396 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
398 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
399 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
400 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
401 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
404 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
405 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
406 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
407 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
408 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
410 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
411 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
412 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
413 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
414 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
415 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
416 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
417 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
418 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
419 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
422 default_configuration: UserConfig,
423 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
429 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
431 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
432 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
434 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
435 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
436 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
437 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
439 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
440 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
441 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
442 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
443 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
444 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
446 /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
447 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
448 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
449 /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
450 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
451 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
452 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
453 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
455 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
456 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashSet<[u8; 32]>>,
458 our_network_key: SecretKey,
459 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
461 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
462 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
463 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
465 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
466 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
467 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
468 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
470 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
471 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
472 /// are currently open with that peer.
473 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
474 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
476 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
478 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
479 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
480 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
481 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
482 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
483 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
484 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
485 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
486 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
488 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
495 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
497 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
498 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
499 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
500 pub struct ChainParameters {
501 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
502 pub network: Network,
504 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
506 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
507 pub best_block: BestBlock,
510 /// The best known block as identified by its hash and height.
511 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
512 pub struct BestBlock {
513 block_hash: BlockHash,
518 /// Returns the best block from the genesis of the given network.
519 pub fn from_genesis(network: Network) -> Self {
521 block_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(),
526 /// Returns the best block as identified by the given block hash and height.
527 pub fn new(block_hash: BlockHash, height: u32) -> Self {
528 BestBlock { block_hash, height }
531 /// Returns the best block hash.
532 pub fn block_hash(&self) -> BlockHash { self.block_hash }
534 /// Returns the best block height.
535 pub fn height(&self) -> u32 { self.height }
538 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
544 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
545 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
546 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
547 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
548 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
549 /// updates are ready for persistence).
551 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
552 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
553 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
554 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
555 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
557 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
558 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
561 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
562 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
563 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
566 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
567 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
569 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
570 persistence_notifier: notifier,
571 should_persist: persist_check,
572 _read_guard: read_guard,
577 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
579 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
580 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
585 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
586 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
588 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
590 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
591 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
592 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
593 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
594 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
596 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
597 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
599 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
601 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
602 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
603 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
604 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
605 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
606 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
607 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
609 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
610 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
612 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
613 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
614 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
615 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
617 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
618 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
619 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
620 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
621 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
622 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
625 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
627 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
628 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
631 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
633 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
635 pub struct ChannelDetails {
636 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
637 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
638 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
639 /// lifetime of the channel.
640 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
641 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
642 /// our counterparty already.
644 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
645 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
646 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
647 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
648 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
649 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
650 /// The node_id of our counterparty
651 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
652 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
653 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
654 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
655 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
656 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
657 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
658 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
660 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
661 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
662 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
663 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
664 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
665 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
666 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
667 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
668 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
669 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
670 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
671 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
672 pub is_outbound: bool,
673 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
674 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
675 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
676 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations).
677 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
678 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
679 /// the peer is connected, (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution, and (d) the
680 /// channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
682 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
684 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
686 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
687 /// payments to us through this channel.
688 pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
691 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
692 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
694 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
695 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
696 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
697 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
698 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
699 ParameterError(APIError),
700 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
701 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
702 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
705 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
707 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
708 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
709 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
710 /// paths than the ones selected).
711 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
712 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
713 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
714 /// in over-/re-payment.
716 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
717 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
718 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
720 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
721 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
722 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
723 /// with the latest update_id.
724 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
727 macro_rules! handle_error {
728 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
731 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
732 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
734 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
735 // entering the macro.
736 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
739 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
741 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
742 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
743 if let Some(update) = update_option {
744 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
750 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
751 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
753 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
754 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
755 action: err.action.clone()
759 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
760 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
763 // Return error in case higher-API need one
770 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
771 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
772 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
774 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
775 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
777 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
778 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
779 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
780 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
782 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
783 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&$channel).ok()))
785 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
786 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
787 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
788 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
790 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
791 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&$channel).ok()))
797 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
798 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
802 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
804 $entry.remove_entry();
812 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
813 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
817 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
819 $entry.remove_entry();
827 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
828 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
829 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
831 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
833 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
834 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
835 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
836 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
838 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
839 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
840 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
841 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
842 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
843 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
844 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
845 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
846 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
847 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&$chan).ok()));
850 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
851 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
852 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
853 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
855 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
856 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
858 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
859 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
861 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
862 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
863 if !$resend_commitment {
864 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
867 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
869 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
870 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
874 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
875 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
877 $entry.remove_entry();
883 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
884 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
885 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
887 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
888 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
892 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
893 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
894 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
895 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
896 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
899 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
904 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
905 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
906 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
907 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
908 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
909 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
911 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
912 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
914 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
915 if !forwards.is_empty() {
916 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
917 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
920 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
921 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
922 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
923 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
924 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
925 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
926 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
927 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
928 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
929 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
930 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
931 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
934 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
935 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
936 // before it should be allowed to.
937 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
938 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
939 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
942 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
943 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
944 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
945 msg: announcement_sigs,
948 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
951 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
952 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
953 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
954 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
955 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
956 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
957 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
958 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
959 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
960 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
961 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
962 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
963 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
964 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
965 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
966 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
967 let mut order = $order;
969 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
971 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
975 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
976 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
977 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
978 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
983 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
984 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
985 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
986 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
992 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
996 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1001 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1002 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1003 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1008 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1009 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1010 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1011 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1012 assert!(res.is_ok());
1015 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1019 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1020 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1021 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1023 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1025 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1026 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1031 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1032 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1033 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1034 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1035 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1038 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1040 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1041 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1043 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1045 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1047 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1048 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1049 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1050 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1051 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1052 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1055 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1056 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1057 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1061 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1063 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1064 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1065 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1066 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1067 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1068 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1070 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1071 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1073 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1074 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1077 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1078 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1080 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1082 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1083 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1084 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1085 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1093 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1094 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1095 &self.default_configuration
1098 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1100 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1101 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1102 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1103 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1104 /// otherwise ignored.
1106 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1107 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1109 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1110 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1111 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1112 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1113 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1116 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1117 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
1118 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1120 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1121 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1122 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1124 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1125 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1126 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1127 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1128 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1130 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1133 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1135 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1136 node_id: their_network_key,
1142 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1143 let mut res = Vec::new();
1145 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1146 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1147 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1148 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1149 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1150 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1151 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1152 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1153 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1154 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1155 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1156 inbound_capacity_msat,
1157 outbound_capacity_msat,
1158 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1159 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1160 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1161 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1162 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1163 counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1167 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1168 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1169 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
1170 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1176 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1177 /// more information.
1178 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1179 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1182 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1183 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1185 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1186 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1188 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1189 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1190 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1191 // really wanted anyway.
1192 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1195 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1196 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1197 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1199 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1200 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1201 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1203 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1204 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1205 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1206 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1207 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1208 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
1209 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1210 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1213 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1214 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1215 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1217 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1218 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
1220 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1223 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1224 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1226 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1227 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1232 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
1233 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1234 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1243 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1244 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1245 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1246 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1247 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1249 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1250 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1251 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1252 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1253 // ignore the result here.
1254 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1258 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1260 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1261 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1262 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1263 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1264 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1265 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1268 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1269 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1271 chan.remove_entry().1
1273 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1276 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1277 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1278 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1279 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1280 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1285 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1288 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1289 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1290 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1291 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1292 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1293 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1294 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1295 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1296 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1297 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1298 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1308 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1309 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1310 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1311 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1312 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1316 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1317 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1318 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1320 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1321 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1322 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1323 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1324 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1325 failure_code: $err_code,
1326 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1331 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1332 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1335 let shared_secret = {
1336 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1337 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1340 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1342 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1343 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1344 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1345 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1346 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1347 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1348 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1349 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1352 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1353 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1354 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1355 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1356 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1359 let mut channel_state = None;
1360 macro_rules! return_err {
1361 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1363 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1364 if channel_state.is_none() {
1365 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1367 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1368 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1369 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1370 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1371 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1376 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1377 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1378 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1379 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1381 let error_code = match err {
1382 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1383 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1384 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1385 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1386 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1388 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1391 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1392 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1393 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1400 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1403 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1404 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1405 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1406 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1407 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1408 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1409 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1410 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1411 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1412 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1413 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1414 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1418 // final_expiry_too_soon
1419 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1420 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1421 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1422 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1423 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1424 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1426 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1427 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1428 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1430 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1431 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1432 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1435 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1436 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1437 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1438 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1441 if payment_data.is_none() {
1442 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1445 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1446 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1447 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1448 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1450 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1451 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1452 payment_data: payment_data.unwrap(),
1453 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1455 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1456 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1457 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1458 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1461 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1462 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1463 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1465 // Check two things:
1466 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1467 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1468 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1470 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1472 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1473 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1474 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1476 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1478 let blinding_factor = {
1479 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1480 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1481 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1482 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1485 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1487 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1489 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1492 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1493 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1496 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1497 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1498 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1499 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1500 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1504 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1505 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1506 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1509 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1510 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1511 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1512 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1516 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1517 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1518 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1519 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1520 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1521 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1522 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1523 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1524 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1525 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1527 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1529 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1530 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1532 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1533 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1534 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1535 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1536 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1537 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1538 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1540 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1541 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1543 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1544 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1545 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1547 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1548 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1550 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1551 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1552 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1553 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1554 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1556 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1557 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1559 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1560 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1561 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1562 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1568 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1569 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1570 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1571 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1573 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1574 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1576 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1577 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1578 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1580 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1582 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1587 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1590 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1591 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1592 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1593 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1594 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1598 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1600 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1601 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1603 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1604 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1605 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1606 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1607 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1608 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1609 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1610 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1613 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1614 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1616 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1622 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1623 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1624 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1625 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1626 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1627 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1629 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1630 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1631 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1632 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1633 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1635 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1637 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1638 assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().insert(session_priv_bytes));
1640 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1641 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1642 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1643 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1644 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1647 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1648 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1650 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1651 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1653 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1654 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1656 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1658 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1659 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1660 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1662 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1663 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1664 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1665 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1666 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1667 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1668 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1669 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1670 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1673 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1674 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1675 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1676 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1677 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1678 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1679 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1687 } else { unreachable!(); }
1691 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1692 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1694 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1699 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1701 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1702 /// fields for more info.
1704 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1705 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1706 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1707 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1708 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1709 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1711 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1713 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1714 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1715 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1717 /// In general, a path may raise:
1718 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1719 /// node public key) is specified.
1720 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1721 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1723 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1724 /// relevant updates.
1726 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1727 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1728 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1730 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1731 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1732 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1733 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1735 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1736 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1737 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1738 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1739 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1740 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1742 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1743 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1744 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1745 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1746 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1748 let mut total_value = 0;
1749 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1750 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1751 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1752 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1753 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1754 continue 'path_check;
1756 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1757 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1758 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1759 continue 'path_check;
1762 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1763 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1765 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1766 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1769 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1770 let mut results = Vec::new();
1771 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1772 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1774 let mut has_ok = false;
1775 let mut has_err = false;
1776 for res in results.iter() {
1777 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1778 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1779 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1780 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1787 if has_err && has_ok {
1788 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1790 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1796 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
1797 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
1798 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
1799 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1801 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1803 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
1805 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1806 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1807 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1808 } else { unreachable!(); })
1811 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1813 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1814 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1817 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1818 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
1823 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1824 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1825 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1828 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1829 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1830 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1832 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1840 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1841 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
1842 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
1846 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1848 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
1849 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1851 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1853 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
1854 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
1855 /// keys per-channel).
1857 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
1858 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
1859 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
1861 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
1862 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
1863 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
1865 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
1866 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1867 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1869 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
1870 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
1871 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1872 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
1876 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
1877 let mut output_index = None;
1878 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1879 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1880 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
1881 if output_index.is_some() {
1882 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1883 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
1886 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
1887 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1888 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
1891 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
1894 if output_index.is_none() {
1895 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1896 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
1899 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
1903 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1904 if !chan.should_announce() {
1905 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1909 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1911 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1913 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1914 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1916 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1917 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1918 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1919 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1920 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1925 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1926 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1927 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1929 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1932 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1933 // smaller than 500:
1934 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1936 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
1937 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
1938 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
1939 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
1940 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
1941 /// our network addresses.
1943 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
1944 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1946 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
1947 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
1948 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
1949 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
1951 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
1953 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
1954 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1955 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1957 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1958 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1961 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
1962 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
1963 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
1965 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1966 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1967 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1968 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1969 rgb, alias, addresses,
1970 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1971 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1973 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1974 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1976 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1977 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1979 let mut announced_chans = false;
1980 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
1981 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1982 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
1984 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update(chan) {
1989 announced_chans = true;
1991 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
1992 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
1993 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
1997 if announced_chans {
1998 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1999 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2000 signature: node_announce_sig,
2001 contents: announcement
2007 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2009 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2010 /// Will likely generate further events.
2011 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2012 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2014 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2015 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2016 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2018 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2019 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2021 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2022 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2023 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2024 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2026 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2027 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2028 match forward_info {
2029 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2030 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2031 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2032 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2033 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2034 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2035 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2037 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2038 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2041 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2042 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2043 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2044 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2045 // problem, not ours.
2052 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2053 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2054 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2055 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2056 match forward_info {
2057 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2058 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2060 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2061 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2062 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
2063 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2064 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2065 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2066 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2067 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2069 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2071 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2072 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2074 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2076 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
2077 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2078 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2084 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2086 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2087 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2088 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2089 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2090 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2091 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2092 // this channel currently :/.
2098 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2099 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2101 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2102 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
2103 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2105 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2106 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
2108 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2110 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2111 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2112 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2115 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2117 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2118 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2119 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2120 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2121 // messages when we can.
2122 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2123 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2124 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2131 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2132 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2135 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2136 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2137 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2138 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2139 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
2140 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2142 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2143 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2144 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2145 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2146 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2148 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
2150 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2152 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2156 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2157 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2160 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2161 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2162 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2163 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2164 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2165 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2166 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2168 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2176 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2177 match forward_info {
2178 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2179 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
2180 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2181 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2182 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2183 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2184 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2185 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2186 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2187 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2189 value: amt_to_forward,
2190 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
2191 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
2194 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2196 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2197 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2198 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2200 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2201 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2202 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2203 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2204 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2206 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2211 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2212 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2213 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2214 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2215 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2216 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2217 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2218 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2219 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2220 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2221 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2223 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2224 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2225 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2226 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2227 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2228 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2229 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2230 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2232 let mut total_value = 0;
2233 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2234 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2235 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2236 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2237 total_value += htlc.value;
2238 if htlc.payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2239 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2240 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc.payment_data.total_msat);
2241 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2243 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2245 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2246 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2247 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2248 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2251 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2252 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2254 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2255 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2257 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2259 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2260 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2262 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2264 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2265 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2272 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2273 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2275 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2276 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2284 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2285 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2288 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2289 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2292 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2293 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2294 events.append(&mut new_events);
2297 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2299 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2300 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2302 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2303 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2304 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2305 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2306 if background_events.is_empty() {
2310 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2312 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2313 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2314 // monitor updating completing.
2315 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2322 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2323 pub(crate) fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2324 self.process_background_events();
2327 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
2328 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
2329 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
2331 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
2333 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
2334 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2335 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2336 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2337 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2339 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2340 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2341 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2342 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2343 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2344 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2345 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2346 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2347 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2348 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2349 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2353 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2354 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2356 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2357 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2358 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2362 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2363 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2373 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2374 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2375 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2376 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2377 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2378 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2379 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2381 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2382 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2383 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2384 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2385 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2386 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2387 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2388 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2389 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2390 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2391 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2397 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2398 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2399 // be surfaced to the user.
2400 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2401 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2403 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2404 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2405 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2406 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2407 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
2408 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2410 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2413 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2415 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2416 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2417 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2419 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2421 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2422 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2423 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2425 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2426 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2428 rejected_by_dest: false,
2436 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2443 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2444 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2445 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2446 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2447 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2448 /// still-available channels.
2449 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2450 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2451 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2452 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2455 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2456 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2457 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2459 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, .. } => {
2461 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2462 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2463 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2465 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2468 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2469 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2470 match &onion_error {
2471 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2473 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2475 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2476 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2477 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2478 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2479 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2480 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2481 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2486 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2487 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2488 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2489 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2491 error_code: onion_error_code,
2493 error_data: onion_error_data
2497 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2503 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2504 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2505 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2506 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2508 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2509 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2510 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2511 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2512 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2513 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2515 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2517 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2523 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2524 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2525 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2526 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2527 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2528 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2530 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2531 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2532 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2536 let mut forward_event = None;
2537 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2538 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2540 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2541 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2542 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2544 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2545 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2548 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2549 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2550 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2551 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2552 time_forwardable: time
2559 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2560 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2561 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2563 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
2564 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
2565 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
2566 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
2568 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2570 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
2571 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
2572 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
2573 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2575 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2577 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2578 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
2579 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2580 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2582 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2583 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2584 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2585 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2587 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2588 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2589 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2590 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2591 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2593 let mut valid_mpp = true;
2594 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2595 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2601 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2602 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2603 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2605 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2606 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2607 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2608 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2609 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2610 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2611 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2613 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2615 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2616 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2617 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2618 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2619 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2620 } else { errs.push(e); }
2622 Err(None) => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2623 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2628 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2629 // which were generated.
2630 channel_state.take();
2632 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2633 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2634 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2641 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2642 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2643 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2644 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2645 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2651 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2652 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2653 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2654 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2655 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2656 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2657 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2658 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2660 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2664 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2665 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2666 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2667 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2668 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2669 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2670 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2671 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2680 // TODO: Do something with e?
2681 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2682 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2683 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2684 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2685 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2686 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2687 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2691 } else { unreachable!(); }
2694 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2696 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2697 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2699 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2700 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2701 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2703 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2704 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2708 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
2711 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2712 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2713 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2716 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2717 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2718 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2719 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2722 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2723 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2724 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2725 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2726 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2727 payment_preimage, e);
2731 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2733 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2734 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2735 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2741 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2742 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2743 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2746 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2747 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2750 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2751 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2753 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2754 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2755 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2756 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2758 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2759 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2760 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2761 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2762 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2763 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2764 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2765 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2766 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2767 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2769 let (mut pending_failures, chan_restoration_res) = {
2770 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2771 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2772 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2773 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
2774 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
2776 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2780 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2781 (pending_failures, handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked))
2783 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
2784 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2785 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2789 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2790 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2791 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2794 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2795 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2796 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2797 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2798 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2799 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2800 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2801 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2802 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2803 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2805 entry.insert(channel);
2811 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2812 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2813 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2814 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2815 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2816 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2817 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2818 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2820 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2821 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2823 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2826 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2827 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2828 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2829 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2831 user_channel_id: user_id,
2836 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2837 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2838 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2839 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2840 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2841 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2842 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2843 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2844 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2846 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2848 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2851 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2852 // lock before watch_channel
2853 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2855 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2856 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2857 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2858 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2859 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2860 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
2861 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
2862 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
2863 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
2864 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
2865 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
2867 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2868 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2869 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2870 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2871 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2872 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2876 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2877 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2878 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2879 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2880 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2882 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2883 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2884 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2893 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2895 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2896 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2897 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2898 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2899 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2900 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2901 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2903 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
2904 Ok(update) => update,
2905 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2907 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2908 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2912 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2915 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
2916 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
2920 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2921 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2922 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2923 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2924 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2925 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2926 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2928 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2929 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2930 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2931 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2932 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2933 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2934 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2935 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2936 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2937 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2938 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2939 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2940 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2941 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2942 msg: announcement_sigs,
2947 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2951 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2952 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2953 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2954 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2956 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2957 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2958 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2959 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2961 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2962 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2963 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2964 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2968 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2969 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2970 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2974 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2975 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2976 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2978 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2979 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2981 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2984 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2985 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2987 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2988 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2989 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2990 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2998 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2999 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3000 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3001 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3002 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3003 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3004 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3005 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3007 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3008 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3009 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3010 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3015 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3016 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3017 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3018 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3019 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3020 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3021 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3023 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3024 } else { (tx, None) }
3026 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3029 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3030 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3031 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3033 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3034 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3035 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3036 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3044 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3045 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3046 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3047 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3049 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3050 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3051 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3052 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3054 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3055 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3057 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3058 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3059 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3060 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3063 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3064 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
3065 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
3066 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
3067 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3068 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3069 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3070 match pending_forward_info {
3071 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3072 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
3073 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3074 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3075 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3076 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3077 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3081 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3082 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3083 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3084 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3085 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3086 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
3087 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3088 // no problem just calling this
3089 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3090 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3092 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3093 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3094 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3097 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3099 _ => pending_forward_info
3102 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3104 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3109 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3110 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3112 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3113 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3114 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3115 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3116 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3118 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3120 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3123 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
3127 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3128 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3129 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3130 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3131 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3132 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3133 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3135 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3137 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3142 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3143 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3144 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3145 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3146 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3147 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3148 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3150 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3151 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3152 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3154 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3157 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3161 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3162 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3163 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3164 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3165 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3166 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3167 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3169 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
3170 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
3171 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3172 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3173 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3174 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3175 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3180 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3181 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3182 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
3184 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3185 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3186 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3188 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3189 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3190 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3191 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3192 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3193 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3194 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3195 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3197 commitment_signed: msg,
3201 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3202 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3203 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3209 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3214 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3215 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3216 let mut forward_event = None;
3217 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3218 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3219 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3220 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3222 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3223 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3224 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3225 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3227 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3228 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3229 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3231 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3232 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3233 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3238 match forward_event {
3240 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3241 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3242 time_forwardable: time
3250 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3251 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3253 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3254 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3255 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3256 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3257 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3258 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3260 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3261 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3262 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3263 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3264 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3265 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3266 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3267 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3269 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3271 } else { unreachable!(); }
3274 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3275 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3276 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3280 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3281 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3282 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3286 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3288 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3291 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3293 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3294 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3295 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3297 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3304 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3305 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3306 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3307 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3308 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3309 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3310 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3312 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3314 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3319 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3320 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3321 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3323 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3324 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3325 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3326 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3328 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3329 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3332 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3333 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3334 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
3337 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3342 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3343 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3344 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3345 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3346 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3348 // It's not a local channel
3352 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3353 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3354 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3355 // TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
3356 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3358 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3360 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3365 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3366 let (htlcs_failed_forward, chan_restoration_res) = {
3367 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3368 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3370 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3371 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3372 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3373 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3375 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3376 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3377 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3378 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3379 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
3380 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3381 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3382 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3383 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3387 (htlcs_failed_forward, handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked))
3389 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3392 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3393 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
3397 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3398 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3399 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3400 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3401 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3403 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3404 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3405 let counterparty_node_id;
3406 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3407 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3408 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3410 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3411 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3412 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3413 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3414 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3416 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3417 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3419 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3420 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3422 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3423 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3424 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3426 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3429 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3430 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3431 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3432 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3433 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3434 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3435 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3436 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3446 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3447 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3448 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3452 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
3453 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
3454 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3455 let pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
3456 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
3457 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events {
3458 match monitor_event {
3459 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3460 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3461 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3462 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3464 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3465 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3468 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3469 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3470 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3471 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3472 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3473 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3474 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3475 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3476 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3478 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3479 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3480 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3484 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3485 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3486 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3487 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3495 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3496 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3499 has_pending_monitor_events
3502 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
3503 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
3504 /// update was applied.
3506 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
3507 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
3508 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
3509 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
3510 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
3511 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
3512 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3513 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3515 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3516 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3517 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3518 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3519 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3521 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
3522 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
3523 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3524 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
3525 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
3527 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
3528 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3529 has_monitor_update = true;
3530 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
3531 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
3532 if close_channel { return false; }
3534 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3535 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3536 updates: commitment_update,
3543 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
3544 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
3551 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
3552 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3553 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
3556 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3557 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3563 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3564 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3566 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3567 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3568 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3569 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3570 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3571 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3572 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3573 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3574 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3575 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3576 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3577 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3578 assert!(should_broadcast);
3579 } else { unreachable!(); }
3580 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3582 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3586 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3587 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
3589 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3591 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3592 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3593 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3594 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3595 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
3596 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
3597 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
3598 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
3599 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
3600 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
3601 // never fail a payment too early.
3602 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
3604 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
3607 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
3612 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
3615 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
3616 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
3618 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
3619 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
3620 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
3622 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
3624 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
3625 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3626 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
3627 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3628 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
3629 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3630 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3633 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3634 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
3637 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
3638 /// stored external to LDK.
3640 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
3641 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
3642 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
3644 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
3645 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
3647 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`] events to
3648 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
3649 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
3650 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
3651 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
3653 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
3654 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
3655 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
3656 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
3658 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
3659 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
3660 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
3661 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
3662 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
3664 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
3665 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
3666 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
3667 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
3668 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
3670 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
3671 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
3672 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
3674 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
3676 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
3677 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
3679 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3680 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3681 /// [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::user_payment_id
3682 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3683 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3686 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
3687 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
3688 let events = std::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3689 let event_handler = |event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
3690 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
3695 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3696 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3697 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3698 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3699 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3702 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3703 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3704 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3705 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3707 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3708 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3709 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3710 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3713 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3714 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3717 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
3718 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3719 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3721 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3722 events.replace(pending_events);
3731 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3733 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3734 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3735 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3736 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3739 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
3741 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
3742 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
3744 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
3745 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
3746 /// restarting from an old state.
3747 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
3748 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3749 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3751 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3752 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3753 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3754 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3757 let mut pending_events = std::mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
3758 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3759 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3762 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
3763 handler.handle_event(event);
3771 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3773 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3774 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3775 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3776 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3779 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
3781 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3782 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
3783 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
3784 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
3785 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
3788 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
3789 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
3790 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
3793 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3794 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3795 let new_height = height - 1;
3797 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
3798 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
3799 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
3800 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
3801 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
3802 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
3805 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time));
3809 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3811 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3812 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3813 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3814 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3817 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3818 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3819 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3820 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3822 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3823 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
3825 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3826 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
3829 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3830 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3831 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3832 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3834 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3835 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3837 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3839 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3841 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time));
3843 macro_rules! max_time {
3844 ($timestamp: expr) => {
3846 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
3847 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3848 // having an explicit local time source.
3849 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
3850 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
3851 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3852 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3853 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3859 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
3860 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
3861 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3862 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
3863 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
3867 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3868 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3869 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
3870 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
3871 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
3872 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
3878 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3879 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3880 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
3881 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3882 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
3883 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed().map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
3884 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3885 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3890 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3892 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3893 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3894 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3895 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3898 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
3899 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
3901 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
3902 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
3903 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3904 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3905 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3907 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3908 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3910 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3911 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3912 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3913 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3914 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3915 let res = f(channel);
3916 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3917 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3918 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3919 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3920 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3924 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3925 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3926 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3927 msg: funding_locked,
3929 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3930 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3931 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3932 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3933 msg: announcement_sigs,
3936 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3938 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3940 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3941 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3942 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3944 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
3945 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
3946 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3947 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3948 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3952 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3953 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3954 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3961 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
3962 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
3963 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3964 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3965 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3966 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3967 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3968 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3969 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3970 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3971 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3972 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3973 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3978 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3983 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
3985 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3986 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3990 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
3991 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
3992 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3994 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
3995 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3996 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3997 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4000 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4001 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4003 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4004 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4007 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4008 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4009 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4010 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4011 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4016 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4017 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4018 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4019 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4020 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4021 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4024 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4025 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4026 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4029 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4030 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4031 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4034 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4035 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4036 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4039 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4040 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4041 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4044 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4045 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4046 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4049 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4050 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4051 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4054 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4055 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4056 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4059 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4060 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4061 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4064 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4065 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4066 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4069 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4070 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4071 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4074 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4075 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4076 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4079 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4080 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4081 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4084 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4085 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4086 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4089 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4090 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4091 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4094 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4095 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4096 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4099 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4100 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4101 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4104 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4105 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4106 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4109 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4110 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4111 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4112 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4114 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4115 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4116 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4117 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4118 if no_connection_possible {
4119 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4120 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4121 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4122 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4123 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4125 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4126 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
4127 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4137 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4138 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4139 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4140 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4141 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4142 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4143 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4147 no_channels_remain = false;
4153 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4155 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4156 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4157 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4158 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4159 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4160 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4161 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4162 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4163 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4164 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4165 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4166 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4167 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4168 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4169 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4170 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
4171 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4172 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4173 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4177 if no_channels_remain {
4178 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4181 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4182 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4186 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4187 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4189 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4192 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4193 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4195 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4196 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4199 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4200 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4205 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4206 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4207 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4208 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4209 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4210 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4211 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4212 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4213 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4217 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4218 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4219 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4225 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4228 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4229 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4231 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4232 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4233 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4234 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4235 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4239 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4240 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4245 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4246 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4247 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4248 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4249 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4250 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4253 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4256 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4262 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4263 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4268 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4269 let result = *guard;
4277 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4278 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4279 let current_time = Instant::now();
4281 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4282 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4287 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4288 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4289 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4290 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4291 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4293 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4294 let result = *guard;
4295 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4299 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4300 None => return result,
4306 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4308 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4309 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4310 *persistence_lock = true;
4311 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4316 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4317 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4319 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
4320 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4321 match &self.routing {
4322 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
4324 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4325 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4327 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
4329 payment_data.payment_secret.write(writer)?;
4330 payment_data.total_msat.write(writer)?;
4331 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4334 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
4335 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4336 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
4337 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
4342 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
4343 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
4344 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
4345 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
4346 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4347 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4348 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4350 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4351 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
4352 payment_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
4353 total_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4355 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4357 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4359 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
4360 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4361 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
4362 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
4367 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
4368 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4370 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
4372 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
4374 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
4376 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
4383 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
4384 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
4385 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4386 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4387 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4388 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4393 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
4394 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4396 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
4398 forward_info.write(writer)?;
4400 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
4402 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
4409 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
4410 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
4411 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4412 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4413 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4414 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4419 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
4423 incoming_packet_shared_secret
4426 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
4427 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4428 self.prev_hop.write(writer)?;
4429 self.value.write(writer)?;
4430 self.payment_data.payment_secret.write(writer)?;
4431 self.payment_data.total_msat.write(writer)?;
4432 self.cltv_expiry.write(writer)
4436 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
4437 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4439 prev_hop: Readable::read(reader)?,
4440 value: Readable::read(reader)?,
4441 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
4442 payment_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
4443 total_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4445 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4450 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
4451 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4453 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
4455 hop_data.write(writer)?;
4457 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
4459 path.write(writer)?;
4460 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4461 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
4468 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
4469 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
4470 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4471 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4472 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4473 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
4474 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
4475 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4477 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4482 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
4483 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4485 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
4489 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
4491 failure_code.write(writer)?;
4492 data.write(writer)?;
4499 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
4500 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
4501 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4502 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
4503 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4504 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
4505 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
4507 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4512 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
4513 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4515 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_funding_outpoint, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
4517 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4518 prev_funding_outpoint.write(writer)?;
4519 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4520 forward_info.write(writer)?;
4522 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4524 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4525 err_packet.write(writer)?;
4532 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
4533 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
4534 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4535 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
4536 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4537 prev_funding_outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
4538 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4539 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
4541 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
4542 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4543 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4545 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4550 impl_writeable!(PendingInboundPayment, 0, {
4558 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4559 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4560 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4561 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4562 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4565 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4566 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4568 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4570 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4572 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4573 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4574 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4577 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4578 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4579 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4580 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4581 unfunded_channels += 1;
4584 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4585 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4586 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4587 channel.write(writer)?;
4591 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4592 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4593 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4594 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4595 for forward in pending_forwards {
4596 forward.write(writer)?;
4600 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4601 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4602 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4603 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4604 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4605 htlc.write(writer)?;
4609 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4610 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4611 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4612 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4613 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4614 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4617 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4618 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4619 for event in events.iter() {
4620 event.write(writer)?;
4623 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4624 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4625 for event in background_events.iter() {
4627 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4629 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4630 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4635 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4636 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4638 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4639 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4640 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
4641 hash.write(writer)?;
4642 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
4645 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4646 (pending_outbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4647 for session_priv in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
4648 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4651 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {}, {});
4657 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4659 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4661 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4662 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4663 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4664 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4665 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4666 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4667 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4668 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4669 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4670 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4671 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4673 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4674 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4676 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4677 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4678 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4679 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4680 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4681 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4682 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4683 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4684 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4685 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4686 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4689 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4690 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4692 pub keys_manager: K,
4694 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4696 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4697 pub fee_estimator: F,
4698 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4700 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4701 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4702 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4703 pub chain_monitor: M,
4705 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4706 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4707 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4708 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4709 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4710 /// deserialization.
4712 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4713 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4714 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4716 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4717 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4719 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4720 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4721 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4722 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4724 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4727 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4728 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4731 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4732 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4733 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4734 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4735 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4736 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4739 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4740 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4741 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4742 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4743 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4745 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4746 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4751 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4752 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4753 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4754 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4755 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4756 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4757 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4758 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4761 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4762 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4763 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4767 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4768 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4769 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4770 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4771 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4772 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4775 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4776 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4778 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4779 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4780 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4782 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4784 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4785 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4786 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4787 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4788 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4789 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4790 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4791 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4792 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4793 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4794 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4795 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4796 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4797 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4798 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4799 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4800 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4801 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4802 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4803 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4804 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4805 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4806 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4808 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4809 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4811 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4814 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4818 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4819 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4820 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4824 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4825 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4826 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4827 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4828 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4829 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4830 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4831 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4832 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4834 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
4837 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4838 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4839 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
4840 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4841 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4842 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
4843 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
4844 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4846 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
4849 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4850 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
4851 for _ in 0..peer_count {
4852 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4853 let peer_state = PeerState {
4854 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
4856 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
4859 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4860 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
4861 for _ in 0..event_count {
4862 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4863 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
4868 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4869 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
4870 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
4871 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4872 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
4873 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4877 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4878 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4880 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4881 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
4882 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
4883 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
4884 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4888 let pending_outbound_payments_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4889 let mut pending_outbound_payments: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
4890 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count {
4891 if !pending_outbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?) {
4892 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4896 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {}, {});
4898 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4899 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4901 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
4903 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
4904 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
4905 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
4907 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
4909 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
4914 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
4916 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
4917 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments),
4919 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
4920 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
4923 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
4924 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
4926 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
4928 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
4929 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
4930 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
4931 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
4933 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
4934 logger: args.logger,
4935 default_configuration: args.default_config,
4938 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4939 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4942 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4943 //connection or two.
4945 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
4951 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
4953 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
4955 use core::time::Duration;
4958 fn test_wait_timeout() {
4959 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
4960 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
4962 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
4963 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
4964 thread::spawn(move || {
4966 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
4967 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4968 *persistence_lock = true;
4971 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
4977 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
4978 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
4980 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
4983 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4988 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
4990 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
4993 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5000 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
5003 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
5004 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
5005 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
5006 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
5007 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5008 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5009 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5010 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
5011 use routing::router::get_route;
5012 use util::test_utils;
5013 use util::config::UserConfig;
5014 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
5016 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5017 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5018 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
5020 use std::sync::Mutex;
5024 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
5025 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
5026 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
5027 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
5028 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
5029 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
5030 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
5035 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
5036 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
5039 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
5040 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
5041 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
5043 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
5044 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5046 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())};
5047 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
5049 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
5050 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
5052 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5053 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
5054 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
5055 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
5056 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5058 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5060 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
5062 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5063 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
5064 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
5065 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
5066 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5068 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5070 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
5072 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
5073 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5074 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5077 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
5078 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5079 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
5081 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
5082 } else { panic!(); }
5084 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5085 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5087 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
5090 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5093 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
5094 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
5096 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5097 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5099 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
5101 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
5102 macro_rules! send_payment {
5103 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
5104 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
5105 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
5106 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
5108 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
5109 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
5111 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
5112 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
5114 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5115 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
5116 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5117 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
5118 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5119 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5120 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5121 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5123 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
5124 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
5125 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5127 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
5128 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
5129 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5130 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5131 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
5133 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
5136 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
5137 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5138 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5139 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5141 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
5146 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
5147 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);