1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
48 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
50 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
70 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
71 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
72 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
73 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
74 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
75 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
76 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
77 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
78 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
81 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
82 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
83 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
84 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
85 crate::sign::KeysManager,
89 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
90 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
93 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
96 use crate::prelude::*;
98 use core::cell::RefCell;
100 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
101 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
102 use core::time::Duration;
103 use core::ops::Deref;
105 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
106 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
107 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
109 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
111 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
112 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
113 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
115 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
116 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
117 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
118 // before we forward it.
120 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
121 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
122 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
123 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
124 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
126 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
129 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
130 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
132 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
133 /// do with the HTLC.
134 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
135 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
137 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
138 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
139 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
140 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
141 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
142 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
144 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
146 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
147 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
149 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
150 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
151 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
152 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
153 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
155 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
156 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
157 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
158 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
159 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
161 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
162 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
163 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
164 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
166 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
167 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
169 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
170 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
171 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
172 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
173 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
174 requires_blinded_error: bool,
176 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
177 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
178 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
180 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
181 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
183 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
184 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
185 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
187 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
188 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
189 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
191 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
192 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
193 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
194 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
196 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
197 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
198 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
200 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
201 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
202 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
203 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
204 requires_blinded_error: bool,
208 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
209 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
210 pub struct BlindedForward {
211 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
212 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
213 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
214 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
215 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
216 /// the introduction node.
217 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
220 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
221 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
222 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
224 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
225 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
226 Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
232 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
234 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
235 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
236 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
237 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
238 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
239 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
241 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
242 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
243 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
244 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
245 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
247 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
249 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
250 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
251 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
253 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
254 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
255 /// it along another path).
257 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
258 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
259 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
260 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
261 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
262 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
263 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
264 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
265 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
267 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
270 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
272 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
274 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
277 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
278 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
279 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
280 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
283 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
284 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
285 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
286 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
287 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
290 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
291 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
292 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
294 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
295 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
296 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
299 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
300 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
302 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
303 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
304 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
307 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
308 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
309 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
312 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
317 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
321 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
322 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
323 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
324 pub enum BlindedFailure {
325 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
326 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
327 FromIntroductionNode,
328 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
329 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
333 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
334 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
335 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
336 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
337 short_channel_id: u64,
338 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
340 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
341 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
342 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
343 channel_id: ChannelId,
345 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
346 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
351 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
353 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
354 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
355 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
357 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
358 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
361 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
362 struct ClaimableHTLC {
363 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
365 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
367 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
368 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
369 sender_intended_value: u64,
370 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
372 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
373 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
374 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
375 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
377 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
378 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
381 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
382 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
383 events::ClaimedHTLC {
384 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
385 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
386 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
387 value_msat: val.value,
388 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
393 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
394 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
396 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
397 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
398 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
401 /// Number of bytes in the id.
402 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
405 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
406 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
411 impl Readable for PaymentId {
412 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
413 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
418 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
419 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
420 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
424 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
426 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
427 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
428 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
430 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
431 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
436 impl Readable for InterceptId {
437 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
438 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
443 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
444 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
445 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
446 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
447 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
450 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
452 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
453 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
454 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
456 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
457 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
461 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
462 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
463 (0, short_channel_id, required),
464 (2, htlc_id, required),
466 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
467 (0, session_priv, required),
472 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
473 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
474 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
475 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
476 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
479 session_priv: SecretKey,
480 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
481 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
482 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
483 payment_id: PaymentId,
486 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
487 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
488 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
490 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
492 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
494 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
497 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
498 payment_id.hash(hasher);
499 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
505 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
507 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
508 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
509 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
510 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
511 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
512 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
516 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
517 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
518 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
519 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
520 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
521 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
523 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
529 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
530 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
532 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
533 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
534 pub enum FailureCode {
535 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
536 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
537 TemporaryNodeFailure,
538 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
539 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
540 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
541 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
542 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
543 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
544 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
545 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
546 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
547 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
549 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
550 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
551 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
554 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
555 fn into(self) -> u16 {
557 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
558 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
559 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
560 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
565 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
566 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
567 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
568 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
569 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
571 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
572 err: msgs::LightningError,
573 closes_channel: bool,
574 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
576 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
578 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
580 err: LightningError {
582 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
583 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
589 closes_channel: false,
590 shutdown_finish: None,
594 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
595 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
598 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
599 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
600 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
601 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
602 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
603 // commitment upon reconnecting.
604 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
606 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
609 err: LightningError { err, action },
610 closes_channel: true,
611 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
615 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
618 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
620 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
621 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
625 log_level: Level::Warn,
628 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
630 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
632 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
634 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
635 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
642 closes_channel: false,
643 shutdown_finish: None,
647 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
652 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
653 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
654 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
655 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
656 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
658 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
659 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
660 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
661 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
662 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
663 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
664 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
666 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
670 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
671 struct ClaimingPayment {
673 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
674 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
675 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
676 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
678 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
679 (0, amount_msat, required),
680 (2, payment_purpose, required),
681 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
682 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
683 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
686 struct ClaimablePayment {
687 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
688 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
689 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
692 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
693 struct ClaimablePayments {
694 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
695 /// failed/claimed by the user.
697 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
698 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
700 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
701 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
702 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
704 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
705 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
706 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
707 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
710 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
711 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
712 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
713 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
715 enum BackgroundEvent {
716 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
717 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
718 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
719 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
721 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
722 /// are regenerated on startup.
723 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
724 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
725 /// channel to continue normal operation.
727 /// In general this should be used rather than
728 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
729 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
730 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
732 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
733 /// are regenerated on startup.
734 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
735 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
736 funding_txo: OutPoint,
737 channel_id: ChannelId,
738 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
740 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
741 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
743 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
744 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
745 channel_id: ChannelId,
750 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
751 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
752 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
753 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
754 /// event can be generated.
755 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
756 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
757 /// operation of another channel.
759 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
760 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
761 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
762 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
764 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
765 event: events::Event,
766 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
768 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
769 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
770 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
772 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
773 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
774 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
775 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
776 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
778 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
779 /// stored for later processing.
780 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
781 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
782 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
783 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
784 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
788 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
789 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
790 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
791 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
792 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
793 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
794 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
795 (4, blocking_action, required),
796 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
797 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
798 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
800 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
801 (0, event, upgradable_required),
802 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
803 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
804 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
805 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
806 // downgrades to prior versions.
807 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
811 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
812 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
813 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
814 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
815 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
816 channel_id: ChannelId,
819 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
820 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
821 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
822 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
823 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
824 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
825 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
829 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
830 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
831 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
832 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
833 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
834 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
836 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
837 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
838 channel_id: ChannelId,
839 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
844 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
845 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
846 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
847 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
848 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
853 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
854 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
858 /// State we hold per-peer.
859 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
860 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
862 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
863 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
864 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
866 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
867 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
868 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
869 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
870 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
871 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
872 latest_features: InitFeatures,
873 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
874 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
875 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
876 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
877 /// user but which have not yet completed.
879 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
880 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
881 /// for a missing channel.
882 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
883 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
884 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
886 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
887 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
888 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
889 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
891 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
892 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
893 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
894 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
895 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
896 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
897 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
898 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
899 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
900 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
901 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
902 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
903 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
904 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
905 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
909 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
910 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
911 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
912 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
913 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
914 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
917 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
919 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
920 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
922 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
924 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
927 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
928 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
931 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
932 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
933 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
936 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
937 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
938 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
939 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
943 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
944 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
945 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
946 /// The original OpenChannel message.
947 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
948 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
949 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
952 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
953 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
954 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
956 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
957 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
959 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
962 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
963 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
964 struct PendingInboundPayment {
965 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
966 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
967 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
968 /// this payment being removed.
970 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
971 user_payment_id: u64,
972 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
973 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
974 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
977 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
978 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
979 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
980 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
981 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
982 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
983 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
984 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
986 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
987 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
988 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
996 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
999 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1000 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1001 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1006 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1007 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1008 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1009 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1010 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1011 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1012 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1013 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1014 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1016 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1017 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1018 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1027 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1030 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1031 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1032 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1037 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1039 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1041 pub trait AChannelManager {
1042 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1043 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1044 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1045 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1046 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1047 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1048 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1049 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1050 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1051 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1052 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1053 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1054 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1055 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1056 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1057 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1058 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1059 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1060 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1061 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1062 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1063 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1064 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1065 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1066 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1067 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1068 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1069 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1070 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1071 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1072 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1073 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1074 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1075 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1076 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1077 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1080 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1081 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1083 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1084 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1085 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1086 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1087 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1088 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1092 type Watch = M::Target;
1094 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1096 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1098 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1100 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1101 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1103 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1105 type Router = R::Target;
1107 type Logger = L::Target;
1109 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1112 /// A lightning node's channel state machine and payment management logic, which facilitates
1113 /// sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through lightning channels.
1115 /// [`ChannelManager`] is parameterized by a number of components to achieve this.
1116 /// - [`chain::Watch`] (typically [`ChainMonitor`]) for on-chain monitoring and enforcement of each
1118 /// - [`BroadcasterInterface`] for broadcasting transactions related to opening, funding, and
1119 /// closing channels
1120 /// - [`EntropySource`] for providing random data needed for cryptographic operations
1121 /// - [`NodeSigner`] for cryptographic operations scoped to the node
1122 /// - [`SignerProvider`] for providing signers whose operations are scoped to individual channels
1123 /// - [`FeeEstimator`] to determine transaction fee rates needed to have a transaction mined in a
1125 /// - [`Router`] for finding payment paths when initiating and retrying payments
1126 /// - [`Logger`] for logging operational information of varying degrees
1128 /// Additionally, it implements the following traits:
1129 /// - [`ChannelMessageHandler`] to handle off-chain channel activity from peers
1130 /// - [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] to similarly send such messages to peers
1131 /// - [`OffersMessageHandler`] for BOLT 12 message handling and sending
1132 /// - [`EventsProvider`] to generate user-actionable [`Event`]s
1133 /// - [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for notification of on-chain activity
1135 /// Thus, [`ChannelManager`] is typically used to parameterize a [`MessageHandler`] and an
1136 /// [`OnionMessenger`]. The latter is required to support BOLT 12 functionality.
1138 /// # `ChannelManager` vs `ChannelMonitor`
1140 /// It's important to distinguish between the *off-chain* management and *on-chain* enforcement of
1141 /// lightning channels. [`ChannelManager`] exchanges messages with peers to manage the off-chain
1142 /// state of each channel. During this process, it generates a [`ChannelMonitor`] for each channel
1143 /// and a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] for each relevant change, notifying its parameterized
1144 /// [`chain::Watch`] of them.
1146 /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`], such as [`ChainMonitor`], is responsible for aggregating
1147 /// these [`ChannelMonitor`]s and applying any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to them. It then monitors
1148 /// for any pertinent on-chain activity, enforcing claims as needed.
1150 /// This division of off-chain management and on-chain enforcement allows for interesting node
1151 /// setups. For instance, on-chain enforcement could be moved to a separate host or have added
1152 /// redundancy, possibly as a watchtower. See [`chain::Watch`] for the relevant interface.
1154 /// # Initialization
1156 /// Use [`ChannelManager::new`] with the most recent [`BlockHash`] when creating a fresh instance.
1157 /// Otherwise, if restarting, construct [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] with the necessary parameters and
1158 /// references to any deserialized [`ChannelMonitor`]s that were previously persisted. Use this to
1159 /// deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] and feed it any new chain data since it was last online, as
1160 /// detailed in the [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] documentation.
1163 /// use bitcoin::BlockHash;
1164 /// use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1165 /// use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
1166 /// # use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1167 /// use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
1168 /// # use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
1169 /// use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
1170 /// use lightning::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
1172 /// # fn read_channel_monitors() -> Vec<ChannelMonitor<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>> { vec![] }
1175 /// # L: lightning::util::logger::Logger,
1176 /// # ES: lightning::sign::EntropySource,
1177 /// # S: for <'b> lightning::routing::scoring::LockableScore<'b, ScoreLookUp = SL>,
1178 /// # SL: lightning::routing::scoring::ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>,
1180 /// # R: lightning::io::Read,
1182 /// # fee_estimator: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator,
1183 /// # chain_monitor: &dyn lightning::chain::Watch<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>,
1184 /// # tx_broadcaster: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface,
1185 /// # router: &lightning::routing::router::DefaultRouter<&NetworkGraph<&'a L>, &'a L, &ES, &S, SP, SL>,
1187 /// # entropy_source: &ES,
1188 /// # node_signer: &dyn lightning::sign::NodeSigner,
1189 /// # signer_provider: &lightning::sign::DynSignerProvider,
1190 /// # best_block: lightning::chain::BestBlock,
1191 /// # current_timestamp: u32,
1192 /// # mut reader: R,
1193 /// # ) -> Result<(), lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
1194 /// // Fresh start with no channels
1195 /// let params = ChainParameters {
1196 /// network: Network::Bitcoin,
1199 /// let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1200 /// let channel_manager = ChannelManager::new(
1201 /// fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, entropy_source, node_signer,
1202 /// signer_provider, default_config, params, current_timestamp
1205 /// // Restart from deserialized data
1206 /// let mut channel_monitors = read_channel_monitors();
1207 /// let args = ChannelManagerReadArgs::new(
1208 /// entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster,
1209 /// router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors.iter_mut().collect()
1211 /// let (block_hash, channel_manager) =
1212 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<_, _, _, _, _, _, _, _>)>::read(&mut reader, args)?;
1214 /// // Update the ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors with the latest chain data
1217 /// // Move the monitors to the ChannelManager's chain::Watch parameter
1218 /// for monitor in channel_monitors {
1219 /// chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
1227 /// The following is required for [`ChannelManager`] to function properly:
1228 /// - Handle messages from peers using its [`ChannelMessageHandler`] implementation (typically
1229 /// called by [`PeerManager::read_event`] when processing network I/O)
1230 /// - Send messages to peers obtained via its [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] implementation
1231 /// (typically initiated when [`PeerManager::process_events`] is called)
1232 /// - Feed on-chain activity using either its [`chain::Listen`] or [`chain::Confirm`] implementation
1233 /// as documented by those traits
1234 /// - Perform any periodic channel and payment checks by calling [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly
1236 /// - Persist to disk whenever [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`] returns `true` using a
1237 /// [`Persister`] such as a [`KVStore`] implementation
1238 /// - Handle [`Event`]s obtained via its [`EventsProvider`] implementation
1240 /// The [`Future`] returned by [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] is useful in determining
1241 /// when the last two requirements need to be checked.
1243 /// The [`lightning-block-sync`] and [`lightning-transaction-sync`] crates provide utilities that
1244 /// simplify feeding in on-chain activity using the [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] traits,
1245 /// respectively. The remaining requirements can be met using the [`lightning-background-processor`]
1246 /// crate. For languages other than Rust, the availability of similar utilities may vary.
1250 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1251 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1252 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1253 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1255 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1256 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1257 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1258 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1259 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1260 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1261 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1262 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1263 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1265 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1266 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1267 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1269 /// # `ChannelUpdate` Messages
1271 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1272 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1273 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1274 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1275 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1277 /// # DoS Mitigation
1279 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1280 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1281 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1282 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1284 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1285 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1286 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1290 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1291 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1292 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1293 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1294 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1296 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1297 /// [`MessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::MessageHandler
1298 /// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::messenger::OnionMessenger
1299 /// [`PeerManager::read_event`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::read_event
1300 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
1301 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1302 /// [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`]: Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence
1303 /// [`Persister`]: crate::util::persist::Persister
1304 /// [`KVStore`]: crate::util::persist::KVStore
1305 /// [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`]: Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future
1306 /// [`lightning-block-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_block_sync/latest/lightning_block_sync
1307 /// [`lightning-transaction-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_transaction_sync/latest/lightning_transaction_sync
1308 /// [`lightning-background-processor`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_background_processor/lightning_background_processor
1309 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1310 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1311 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1312 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1313 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1314 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1315 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1318 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1319 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1320 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1321 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1322 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1326 // `pending_offers_messages`
1328 // `total_consistency_lock`
1330 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1332 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1334 // |__`per_peer_state`
1336 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1338 // |__`claimable_payments`
1340 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1344 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1346 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1348 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1352 // |__`pending_events`
1354 // |__`pending_background_events`
1356 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1358 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1359 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1360 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1361 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1362 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1363 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1367 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1368 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1369 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1375 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1377 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1379 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1380 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1382 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1383 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1384 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1385 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1387 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1388 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1390 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1391 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1392 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1393 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1394 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1395 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1396 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1397 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1399 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1401 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1402 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1404 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1406 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1407 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1408 /// and via the classic SCID.
1410 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1411 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1413 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1415 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1417 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1418 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1419 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1421 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1422 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1424 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1425 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1427 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1428 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1430 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1431 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1432 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1433 /// active channel list on load.
1435 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1436 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1438 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1440 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1441 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1442 /// the handling of the events.
1444 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1445 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1448 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1449 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1450 /// would break backwards compatability.
1451 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1452 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1453 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1455 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1457 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1459 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1461 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1463 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1464 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1465 /// confirmation depth.
1467 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1468 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1469 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1471 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1473 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1475 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1477 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1479 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1481 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1482 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1483 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1485 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1486 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1488 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1489 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1490 /// keeping additional state.
1491 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1493 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1494 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1495 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1496 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1498 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1499 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1501 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1502 /// are currently open with that peer.
1504 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1505 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1508 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1510 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1511 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1512 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1513 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1514 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1516 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1517 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1518 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1519 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1520 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1522 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1523 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1525 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1526 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1527 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1528 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1529 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1531 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1532 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1534 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1535 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1536 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1537 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1538 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1540 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1542 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1544 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1545 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1546 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1547 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1548 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1549 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1550 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1551 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1552 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1553 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1554 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1556 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1557 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1558 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1560 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1562 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1563 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1565 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1569 signer_provider: SP,
1574 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1576 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1577 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1578 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1579 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1580 pub struct ChainParameters {
1581 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1582 pub network: Network,
1584 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1586 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1587 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1590 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1594 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1595 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1598 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1599 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1600 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1601 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1602 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1603 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1605 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1606 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1607 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1608 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1609 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1610 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1612 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1613 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1616 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1617 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1618 /// events to handle.
1620 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1621 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1623 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1624 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1627 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1628 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1629 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1630 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1632 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1633 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1634 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1635 should_persist: move || {
1636 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1637 // processing and return that.
1638 let notify = persist_check();
1639 match (notify, force_notify) {
1640 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1641 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1642 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1643 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1644 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1647 _read_guard: read_guard,
1651 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1652 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1653 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1654 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1655 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1656 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1658 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1659 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1660 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1661 should_persist: persist_check,
1662 _read_guard: read_guard,
1667 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1668 fn drop(&mut self) {
1669 match (self.should_persist)() {
1670 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1671 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1672 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1674 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1675 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1676 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1681 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1682 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1684 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1686 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1687 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1688 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1689 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1690 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1692 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1693 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1695 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1697 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1698 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1699 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1700 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1701 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1702 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1703 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1704 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1705 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1706 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1707 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1708 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1709 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1711 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1712 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1714 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1715 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1716 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1717 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1719 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1720 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1721 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1722 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1723 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1724 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1726 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1728 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1729 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1731 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1733 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1734 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1736 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1737 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1738 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1740 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1741 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1742 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1744 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1745 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1746 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1747 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1749 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1750 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1751 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1753 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1754 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1755 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1757 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1758 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1759 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1760 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1761 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1762 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1763 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1764 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1765 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1766 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1767 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1770 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1771 /// to better separate parameters.
1772 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1773 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1774 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1775 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1776 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1777 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1778 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1779 pub features: InitFeatures,
1780 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1781 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1782 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1784 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1786 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1787 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1788 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1789 /// payments to us through this channel.
1790 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1791 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1792 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1793 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1794 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1795 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1796 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1799 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1800 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1801 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1802 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1803 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1804 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1805 /// lifetime of the channel.
1806 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1807 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1808 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1809 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1810 /// our counterparty already.
1811 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1812 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1814 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1815 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1816 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1817 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1819 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1820 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1822 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1823 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1825 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1826 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1827 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1828 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1829 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1830 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1831 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1832 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1833 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1836 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1838 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1839 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1840 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1841 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1842 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1843 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1844 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1846 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1847 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1849 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1850 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1851 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1852 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1853 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1854 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1855 /// this value on chain.
1857 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1859 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1861 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1862 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1863 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1864 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1865 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1866 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1867 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1869 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1870 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1871 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1872 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1873 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1874 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1876 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1877 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1878 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1879 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1880 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1882 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1883 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1884 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1885 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1887 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1888 pub balance_msat: u64,
1889 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1890 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1891 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1892 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1894 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1896 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1897 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1898 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1899 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1900 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1901 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1902 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1903 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1905 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1906 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1907 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1908 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1909 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1910 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1911 /// route which is valid.
1912 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1913 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1914 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1915 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1916 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1917 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1919 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1920 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1921 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1922 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1923 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1924 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1925 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1926 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1927 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1929 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1931 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1932 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1933 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1934 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1935 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1937 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1938 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1939 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1940 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1941 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1942 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1943 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1945 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1946 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1947 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1948 pub is_outbound: bool,
1949 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1950 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1951 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1952 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1953 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1955 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1956 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1957 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1958 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1959 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1960 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1961 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1963 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1964 pub is_usable: bool,
1965 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1966 pub is_public: bool,
1967 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1968 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1969 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1970 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1971 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1972 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1974 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1975 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1976 /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
1978 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1979 pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
1980 /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
1982 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1983 pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
1986 impl ChannelDetails {
1987 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1988 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1989 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1991 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1992 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1993 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1994 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1997 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1998 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1999 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
2001 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
2002 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
2003 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2004 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
2007 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
2008 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
2009 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
2012 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2013 F::Target: FeeEstimator
2015 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
2016 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
2017 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
2019 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2020 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
2021 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2022 features: latest_features,
2023 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
2024 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
2025 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
2026 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
2027 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
2028 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
2029 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
2030 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
2031 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
2032 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2034 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
2035 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
2036 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
2037 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
2038 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
2039 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
2040 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
2041 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
2042 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
2043 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
2044 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
2045 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
2046 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
2047 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
2048 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2049 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2050 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
2051 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
2052 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
2053 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
2054 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
2055 is_usable: context.is_live(),
2056 is_public: context.should_announce(),
2057 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
2058 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2059 config: Some(context.config()),
2060 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
2061 pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
2062 pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
2067 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
2068 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
2069 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
2070 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
2071 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
2072 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
2073 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
2074 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
2075 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
2077 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
2079 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
2080 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
2082 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
2083 NegotiatingClosingFee,
2084 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
2085 /// to drop the channel.
2089 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
2090 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2091 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
2092 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
2093 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
2095 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2096 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2097 payment_id: PaymentId,
2099 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
2101 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2102 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2103 payment_id: PaymentId,
2104 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
2106 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2107 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
2108 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
2111 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
2112 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
2113 /// payment is removed from tracking.
2115 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2116 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2117 payment_id: PaymentId,
2118 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
2119 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
2120 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
2122 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
2123 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
2124 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
2126 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2127 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2128 payment_id: PaymentId,
2129 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
2130 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2134 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2136 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2138 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2139 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2140 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2141 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2143 pub phantom_scid: u64,
2144 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2145 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2148 macro_rules! handle_error {
2149 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2150 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2151 // entering the macro.
2152 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2153 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2157 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2158 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2160 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2161 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2162 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2163 let logger = WithContext::from(
2164 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
2166 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2168 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2169 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2170 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2175 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2178 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2180 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2181 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2182 action: err.action.clone()
2186 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
2187 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2188 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2189 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2190 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2194 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2201 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2202 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2203 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2204 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2206 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2207 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2208 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2210 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2211 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2212 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2213 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2214 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2216 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2217 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2219 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2223 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2224 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2225 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2227 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2228 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2230 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2231 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2233 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2234 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2235 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2236 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2237 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2238 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2240 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2245 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2246 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2248 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2249 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2251 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2252 match $channel_phase {
2253 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2254 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2256 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2257 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2259 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2260 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2262 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2263 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2264 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2266 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2267 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2268 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2274 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2275 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2279 let key = *$entry.key();
2280 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2282 $entry.remove_entry();
2290 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2291 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2295 let key = *$entry.key();
2296 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2298 $entry.remove_entry();
2306 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2307 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2309 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2310 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2316 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2317 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2318 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2319 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2320 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2322 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2323 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2324 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2325 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2326 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2327 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2328 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2329 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2330 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2331 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2336 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2337 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2338 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2339 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2340 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2341 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2342 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2343 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2344 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2345 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2347 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2352 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2353 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2354 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2355 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2356 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2357 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2358 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2359 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2360 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2362 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2367 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2368 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2369 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2370 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2371 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2372 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2373 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2374 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2375 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2376 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2377 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2378 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2380 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2381 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2382 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2388 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2389 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2391 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2392 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2393 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2394 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2395 updates.announcement_sigs);
2396 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2397 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2400 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2401 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2402 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2403 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2405 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2406 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2407 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2408 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2409 let mut batch_completed = false;
2410 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2411 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2412 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2413 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2415 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2416 channel_state.2 = true;
2418 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2420 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2422 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2425 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2426 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2427 if batch_completed {
2428 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2429 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2430 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2431 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2432 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2433 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2434 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2435 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2436 chan.set_batch_ready();
2437 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2438 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2442 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2443 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2444 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2449 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2451 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2452 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2454 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2455 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2456 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2457 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2462 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2463 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2464 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2465 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2467 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2468 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2469 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2470 panic!("{}", err_str);
2472 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2473 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2474 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2477 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2483 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2484 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2485 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2487 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2488 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2489 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2490 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2491 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2492 // filter for uniqueness here.
2493 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2494 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2495 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2496 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2498 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2499 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2501 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2502 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2503 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2509 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2510 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2511 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2512 while !processed_all_events {
2513 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2520 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2521 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2522 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2524 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2525 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2526 result = $self.process_background_events();
2528 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2529 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2530 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2531 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2535 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2536 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2537 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2538 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2541 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2543 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2544 $event_to_handle = event;
2546 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2547 post_event_actions.push(action);
2552 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2553 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2554 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2555 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2556 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2557 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2560 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2561 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2562 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2563 processed_all_events = false;
2567 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2568 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2569 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2571 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2572 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2573 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2579 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2581 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2582 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2583 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2584 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2585 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2586 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2590 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2592 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2594 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2595 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2597 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2599 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2600 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2601 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2604 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2605 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2606 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2608 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2609 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2610 current_timestamp: u32,
2612 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2613 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2614 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2615 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2617 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2618 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2619 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2624 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2626 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
2627 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2628 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2629 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2630 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
2631 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2632 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2633 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2635 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2638 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2639 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2641 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2643 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2645 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2647 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2648 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2649 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2650 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2651 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2652 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2653 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2654 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2656 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2666 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2667 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2668 &self.default_configuration
2671 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2672 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2673 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2676 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2677 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2679 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2681 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2685 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2690 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2692 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2693 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2694 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2695 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2696 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2698 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2699 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2701 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2702 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2703 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2705 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2706 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2707 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2709 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2710 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2712 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2713 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2714 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2715 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2716 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2717 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2719 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2720 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2721 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2722 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2723 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2724 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2727 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2728 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2729 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2731 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2733 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2734 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2736 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2738 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2739 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2740 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2745 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2746 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2747 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2748 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2749 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2750 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2754 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2759 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2761 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2762 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2763 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2765 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2767 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2770 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2773 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2774 node_id: their_network_key,
2777 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2780 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2781 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2782 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2783 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2784 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2785 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2786 // the same channel.
2787 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2789 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2790 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2791 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2792 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2793 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2794 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2795 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2796 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2797 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2801 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2802 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2803 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2811 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2812 /// more information.
2813 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2814 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2815 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2816 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2817 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2818 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2819 // the same channel.
2820 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2822 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2823 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2824 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2825 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2826 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2827 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2828 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2829 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2837 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2838 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2840 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2841 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2843 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2844 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2845 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2846 // really wanted anyway.
2847 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2850 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2851 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2852 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2853 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2855 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2856 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2857 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2858 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2859 let context_to_details = |context| {
2860 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2862 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2864 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2865 .map(context_to_details)
2871 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2872 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2874 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2875 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2876 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2878 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2879 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2880 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2881 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2882 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2883 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2885 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2886 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2887 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2889 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2890 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2891 payment_id: *payment_id,
2892 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2893 total_msat: *total_msat,
2896 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2897 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2899 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2900 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2902 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2907 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2908 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2910 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2911 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2914 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2916 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2917 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2919 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2920 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2922 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2923 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2924 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2925 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2926 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2927 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2928 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2929 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2931 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2932 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2933 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2934 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2935 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2939 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2940 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2942 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2943 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2944 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2945 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2948 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2949 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
2952 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2953 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2955 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2956 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2963 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2964 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2965 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2966 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2969 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2970 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2976 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2977 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2978 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2980 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2981 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2983 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2984 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2985 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2986 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2988 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2990 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2991 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2992 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2995 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2996 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2997 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2998 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2999 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3000 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
3003 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3004 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3005 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3007 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
3008 /// the channel being closed or not:
3009 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
3010 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
3011 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3012 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
3013 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
3014 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
3015 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
3017 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
3018 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
3019 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
3020 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
3022 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3024 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3025 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3026 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3029 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3030 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3031 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3032 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3033 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
3036 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
3037 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3038 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3039 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3040 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3043 let logger = WithContext::from(
3044 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
3047 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
3048 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
3049 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3050 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
3051 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3052 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
3053 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3055 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
3056 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
3057 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
3058 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
3059 // ignore the result here.
3060 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
3062 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3063 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
3064 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
3065 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
3066 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3067 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
3068 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
3069 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3070 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3071 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
3072 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3073 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
3076 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
3079 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
3080 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
3085 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3086 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
3087 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
3088 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
3089 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
3090 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
3091 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
3092 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
3095 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
3096 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
3097 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
3101 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3102 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3106 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
3107 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
3108 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
3109 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
3110 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3111 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3112 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
3113 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
3114 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3115 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
3116 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
3118 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
3120 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
3121 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3122 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
3123 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3124 mem::drop(peer_state);
3125 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3127 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
3128 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
3129 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
3131 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3132 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3133 // Unfunded channel has no update
3134 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3136 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
3137 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
3138 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3139 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3140 // Unfunded channel has no update
3141 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3144 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3145 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3146 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3147 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3149 (None, *peer_node_id)
3151 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3154 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3155 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
3156 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
3157 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3158 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3159 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
3160 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
3161 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3162 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3168 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3171 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3172 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3173 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3174 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3175 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3176 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3177 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3178 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3179 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3180 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3181 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3182 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3193 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3194 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3195 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3197 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3198 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3199 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3202 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3203 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3204 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3206 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3207 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3208 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3209 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3210 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3213 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3214 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3215 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3216 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3217 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3221 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3222 /// local transaction(s).
3223 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3224 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3225 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3229 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3230 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3232 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3234 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3235 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3238 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3239 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3240 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
3241 intro_node_blinding_point: Some(_), ..
3247 macro_rules! return_err {
3248 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3251 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3252 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3254 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3255 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3256 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3257 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3258 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3259 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3260 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3264 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3265 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3266 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3267 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3268 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3269 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3270 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3271 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3277 let NextPacketDetails {
3278 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3279 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3280 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3281 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3282 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3285 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3286 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3287 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3288 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3289 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3290 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3291 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3292 // phantom or an intercept.
3293 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3294 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3295 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3299 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3302 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3304 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3305 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3306 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3307 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3308 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3310 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3311 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3312 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3313 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3316 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3317 // have no consistency guarantees.
3318 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3322 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3323 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3324 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3325 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3326 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3328 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3329 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3330 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3331 // we don't have the channel here.
3332 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3334 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3336 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3337 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3338 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3339 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3340 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3341 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3342 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3343 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3344 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3345 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3346 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3348 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3351 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3352 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3354 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3355 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3362 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3364 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3365 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3367 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3368 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3369 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3370 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3371 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3373 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3374 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3380 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3381 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3382 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3383 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3385 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3386 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3388 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3389 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3390 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3392 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3393 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3394 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3395 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3396 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3397 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3398 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3402 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3404 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3407 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3408 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3409 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3410 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3411 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3412 macro_rules! return_err {
3413 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3415 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3416 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3417 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3418 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3419 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3420 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3421 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3422 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3423 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3427 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3428 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3429 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3430 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3431 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3437 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3439 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3440 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3441 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3442 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3445 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3446 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3447 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3448 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3449 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3451 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3454 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3455 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3456 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3457 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3458 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3464 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3465 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3466 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3468 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3469 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3470 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3472 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3473 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3474 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3475 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3476 return Err(LightningError {
3477 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3478 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3481 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3482 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3484 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3485 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3486 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3489 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3490 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3491 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3492 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3494 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3495 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3496 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3498 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3499 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3500 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3501 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3502 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3503 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3504 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3508 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3511 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3512 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3513 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3514 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3516 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3517 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3518 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3519 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3520 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3523 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3524 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3526 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3527 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3528 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3529 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3530 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3531 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3532 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3533 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3535 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3536 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3537 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3539 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3541 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3548 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3549 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3550 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3551 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3556 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3557 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3558 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3561 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3562 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3563 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3564 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3566 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3567 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3568 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3570 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3571 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3575 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3576 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3578 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3579 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3580 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3582 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3585 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3587 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3588 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3590 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3591 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3592 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3593 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3594 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3595 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3596 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3597 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3598 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3599 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3601 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3602 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3603 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3604 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3606 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3607 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3609 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3610 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3611 Some(monitor_update) => {
3612 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3614 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3615 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3616 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3617 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3618 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3619 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3620 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3628 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3631 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3632 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3633 // `channel_by_id` map.
3634 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3635 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3639 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3640 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3642 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3647 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3649 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3650 /// fields for more info.
3652 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3653 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3655 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3657 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3658 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3659 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3660 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3661 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3663 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3664 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3665 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3666 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3667 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3669 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3670 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3671 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3672 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3674 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3676 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3677 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3678 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3680 /// In general, a path may raise:
3681 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3682 /// node public key) is specified.
3683 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3684 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3685 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3686 /// relevant updates.
3688 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3689 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3690 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3692 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3693 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3694 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3695 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3696 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3697 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3698 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3699 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3700 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3701 self.pending_outbound_payments
3702 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3703 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3704 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3707 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3708 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3709 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3710 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3711 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3712 self.pending_outbound_payments
3713 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3714 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3715 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3716 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3720 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3721 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3722 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3723 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3724 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3725 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3729 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3730 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3731 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3735 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3736 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3739 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3740 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3741 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3742 self.pending_outbound_payments
3743 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3744 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3745 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3746 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3747 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3751 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3752 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3753 /// retries are exhausted.
3755 /// # Event Generation
3757 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3758 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3760 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3761 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3762 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3764 /// # Requested Invoices
3766 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3767 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3768 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3769 /// once the invoice has been received.
3771 /// # Restart Behavior
3773 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3774 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3775 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3777 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3778 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3779 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3780 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3783 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3784 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3785 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3786 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3787 /// never reach the recipient.
3789 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3790 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3792 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3793 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3795 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3796 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3797 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3798 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3799 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3800 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3801 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3804 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3805 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3807 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3810 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3811 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3812 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3813 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3814 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3815 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3816 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3817 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3820 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3821 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3822 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3823 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3824 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3825 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3826 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3827 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3828 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3831 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3834 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3835 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3838 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3839 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3841 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3842 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3843 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3844 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3845 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3846 let payment_params =
3847 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3849 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3851 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3854 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3855 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3857 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3858 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3859 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3860 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3862 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3863 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3864 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3865 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3866 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3867 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3868 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3869 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3870 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3871 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3873 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3874 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3875 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3876 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3880 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3882 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3883 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3886 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3888 let mut res = Vec::new();
3890 for mut path in route.paths {
3891 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3892 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3893 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3894 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3895 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3898 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3901 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3902 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3904 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3906 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3907 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3912 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3915 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3920 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3921 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3922 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3924 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3925 let used_liquidity =
3926 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3928 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3929 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3931 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3934 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3939 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3940 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3941 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3948 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3949 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3950 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3951 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3952 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3953 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3954 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3955 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3956 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3958 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3959 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3961 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3962 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3963 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3965 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3966 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3967 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3968 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3969 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
3970 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
3971 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
3972 } else { unreachable!(); });
3974 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3975 Err((chan, err)) => {
3976 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3977 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3978 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3979 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3980 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3986 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3987 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3989 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3990 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3993 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3994 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3995 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3999 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4000 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
4001 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4005 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
4006 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4007 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
4009 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4010 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4011 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
4012 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
4013 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
4015 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
4016 funding_txo, o.get()
4018 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
4019 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4020 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4021 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
4022 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
4023 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
4026 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
4033 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4034 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
4035 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
4039 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
4041 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
4042 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
4044 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
4045 /// across the p2p network.
4047 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
4048 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
4050 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
4051 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
4052 /// keys per-channel).
4054 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
4055 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
4056 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
4058 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
4059 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
4060 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
4062 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
4063 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
4064 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
4065 /// for more details.
4067 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
4068 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
4069 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4070 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
4073 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
4075 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
4076 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
4078 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
4079 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
4080 /// signature for each channel.
4082 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
4083 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4084 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4085 let mut result = Ok(());
4087 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
4088 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
4089 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
4090 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4091 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
4096 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
4097 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4098 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
4102 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4103 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
4104 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
4105 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
4106 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
4107 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
4108 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
4109 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
4111 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4112 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
4117 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
4118 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
4119 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
4120 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
4124 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4125 match states.entry(txid) {
4126 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4127 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4128 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4132 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4135 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4136 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4137 temporary_channel_id,
4138 counterparty_node_id,
4139 funding_transaction.clone(),
4142 let mut output_index = None;
4143 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
4144 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4145 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4146 if output_index.is_some() {
4147 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4148 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
4151 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4154 if output_index.is_none() {
4155 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4156 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
4159 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4160 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4161 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4162 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4163 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4164 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4170 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4171 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4172 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4173 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4174 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4175 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4176 .into_iter().flatten()
4177 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4179 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4180 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4182 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4184 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4185 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4186 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4187 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4188 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4190 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4191 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4192 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4196 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4197 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4198 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4204 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4206 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4207 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4208 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4209 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4211 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4212 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4214 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4215 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4217 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4219 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4220 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4221 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4222 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4223 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4224 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4225 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4226 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4227 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4228 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4229 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4230 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4231 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4235 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4236 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4237 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4238 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4239 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4240 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4241 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4242 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4243 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4244 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4248 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4249 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4250 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4251 config.apply(config_update);
4252 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4255 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4256 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4257 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4258 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4259 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4260 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4267 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4268 debug_assert!(false);
4269 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4271 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4272 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4279 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4281 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4282 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4283 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4284 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4286 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4287 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4289 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4290 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4292 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4294 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4295 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4296 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4297 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4298 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4299 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4300 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4301 pub fn update_channel_config(
4302 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4303 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4304 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4307 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4308 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4310 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4311 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4313 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4314 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4315 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4316 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4317 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4319 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4320 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4321 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4324 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4327 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4328 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4329 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4330 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4331 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4332 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4333 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4335 let next_hop_scid = {
4336 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4337 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4338 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4339 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4340 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4341 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4342 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4343 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4344 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4345 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4348 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4350 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4351 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4352 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4355 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4356 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4357 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4358 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4359 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4366 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4367 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4368 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4371 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4372 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4373 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4374 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4377 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4379 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4380 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4381 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4382 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4383 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4386 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4387 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4388 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4389 payment.prev_channel_id,
4390 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4391 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4393 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4397 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4398 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4400 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4403 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4404 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4405 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4407 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4408 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4409 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4412 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4413 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4414 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4415 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4416 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4417 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4418 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4419 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4420 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4421 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4424 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4425 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4426 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4427 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4432 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4434 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4435 /// Will likely generate further events.
4436 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4437 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4439 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4440 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4441 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4443 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4444 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4446 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4447 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4448 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4449 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4451 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4452 match forward_info {
4453 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4454 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4455 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4456 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4457 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4460 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4461 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4462 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
4463 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4465 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4466 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4467 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4468 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4469 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4470 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4471 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4472 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4473 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4476 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4477 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4479 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4482 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4483 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4489 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4490 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4492 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4496 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4497 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4499 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4503 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4504 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4505 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4506 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4507 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4508 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4509 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4512 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4513 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4514 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4515 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4516 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4518 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4520 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4521 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4525 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4526 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4527 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4528 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4529 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4530 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4532 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4533 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4539 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4542 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4545 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4546 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4547 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4548 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4549 // problem, not ours.
4555 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4556 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4557 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4559 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4563 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4564 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4565 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4566 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4567 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4570 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4571 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4572 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4573 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4574 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4575 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4576 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4577 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4578 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4579 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4580 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4581 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4582 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4585 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4586 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4587 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4588 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4589 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4590 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4591 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4592 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4593 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4594 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4595 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4597 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4598 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4599 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4600 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4601 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4602 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4605 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4606 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4607 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4610 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4611 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4613 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4615 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4616 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4617 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4618 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4624 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4625 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4627 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4628 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4629 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4631 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4632 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4633 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4634 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4636 Some((res, htlc_id))
4639 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4640 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4641 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4642 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4644 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4646 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4647 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4648 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4654 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4658 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4659 match forward_info {
4660 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4661 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4662 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4663 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4664 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4667 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4668 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4669 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4670 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4671 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4673 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4674 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4675 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4676 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4677 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4679 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
4680 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
4681 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4683 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4684 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4688 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4689 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4692 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4695 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4696 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4697 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4698 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4699 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4700 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4701 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4702 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4703 phantom_shared_secret,
4706 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4707 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4708 // if routing nodes overpay
4709 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4710 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4712 total_value_received: None,
4713 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4716 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4719 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4721 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4722 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4723 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4724 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4725 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4726 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
4728 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4729 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4730 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4731 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4732 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4733 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4734 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4735 phantom_shared_secret,
4738 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4739 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4741 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4744 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4745 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4746 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4747 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4748 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4751 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4752 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4753 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4754 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4755 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4756 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4758 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4759 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4760 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4762 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4763 .entry(payment_hash)
4764 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4765 .or_insert_with(|| {
4766 committed_to_claimable = true;
4768 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4771 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4772 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4773 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4774 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4776 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4777 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4778 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4780 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4781 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4782 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4785 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4787 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4788 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4789 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4790 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4791 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4792 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4793 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4794 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4795 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4796 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4798 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4800 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4801 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4802 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4803 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4804 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4805 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4807 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4808 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4809 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4810 committed_to_claimable = true;
4812 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4813 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4814 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4815 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4816 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4817 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4818 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4819 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4820 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4824 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4825 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4826 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4827 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4828 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4830 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4832 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4833 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4835 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4836 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4837 committed_to_claimable = true;
4840 payment_claimable_generated
4844 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4845 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4846 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4847 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4848 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4849 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4850 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4851 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4852 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4853 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4854 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4855 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4856 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4857 Ok(result) => result,
4859 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4860 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4863 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4864 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4865 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4866 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4867 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4868 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4871 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4872 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4873 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4875 check_total_value!(purpose);
4877 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4878 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4879 check_total_value!(purpose);
4883 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4884 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4885 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4886 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4888 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4889 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4890 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4891 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4892 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4893 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4894 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4895 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4897 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4898 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4899 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4901 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4902 if payment_claimable_generated {
4903 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4909 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4910 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4918 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4919 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4920 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4921 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4923 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4924 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4926 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4928 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4929 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4930 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4932 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4934 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4935 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4936 events.append(&mut new_events);
4939 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4941 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4942 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4943 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4945 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4947 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4948 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4949 if background_events.is_empty() {
4950 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4953 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4955 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
4956 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4957 // monitor updating completing.
4958 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4960 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
4961 let mut updated_chan = false;
4963 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4964 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4965 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4966 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4967 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4968 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4969 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4970 updated_chan = true;
4971 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4972 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4974 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4977 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4982 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4983 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4986 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4987 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4988 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4989 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4990 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4991 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4992 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4994 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4995 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4996 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4997 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4998 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5004 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5007 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5008 /// Process background events, for functional testing
5009 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
5010 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5011 let _ = self.process_background_events();
5014 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
5015 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
5017 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5019 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
5020 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
5021 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5023 if !chan.context.is_live() {
5024 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
5025 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5026 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5028 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
5029 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5031 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
5032 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5036 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
5037 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
5038 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
5039 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
5040 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
5041 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5042 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5044 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5045 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5047 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5048 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5049 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5050 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5051 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
5052 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
5054 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5059 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5060 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5068 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
5070 /// This currently includes:
5071 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
5072 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
5073 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
5075 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
5076 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
5077 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
5078 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
5079 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
5080 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
5081 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
5082 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
5084 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
5085 /// estimate fetches.
5087 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
5088 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
5089 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
5090 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5091 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5093 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5094 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5096 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
5097 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
5098 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
5099 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
5101 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
5102 chan_id: &ChannelId,
5103 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
5104 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
5105 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5106 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
5108 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5109 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
5110 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
5112 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
5113 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
5114 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
5115 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5116 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5117 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5118 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5119 channel_id: *chan_id,
5120 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5131 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5132 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5133 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5134 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5135 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5136 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5137 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5139 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5140 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5145 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5146 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5148 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5149 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5150 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5151 if needs_close { return false; }
5154 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5155 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5156 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5157 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5158 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5159 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5160 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5161 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5163 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5164 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5165 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5166 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5170 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5172 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5175 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5177 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5178 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5179 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5180 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5184 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5186 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5192 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5194 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5195 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5196 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5197 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5198 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5199 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5200 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5201 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5202 channel_id: *chan_id,
5203 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5211 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5212 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5213 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5215 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5216 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5217 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5219 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5220 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5221 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5222 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5224 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5225 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5226 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5227 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5232 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5233 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5234 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5235 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5236 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5237 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5238 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5239 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5240 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5246 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5248 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5249 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5254 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5255 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5256 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5257 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5258 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5259 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5260 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5261 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5262 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5263 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5264 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5265 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5266 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5267 // have no channels to the peer.
5268 let remove_entry = {
5269 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5270 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5273 entry.remove_entry();
5276 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5281 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5282 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5283 // This should be unreachable
5284 debug_assert!(false);
5287 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5288 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5289 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5290 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5291 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5292 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5293 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5296 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5297 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5298 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5300 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5301 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5308 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5309 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5310 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5311 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5312 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5315 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5316 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5319 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5320 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5323 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5324 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5325 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5326 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5327 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5328 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5329 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5332 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5333 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5336 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5337 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5338 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5339 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5340 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5347 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5348 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5349 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5351 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5352 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5353 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5354 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5356 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5357 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5358 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5359 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5360 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5361 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5364 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5365 /// reason for the failure.
5367 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5368 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5369 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5371 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5372 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5373 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5374 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5375 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5376 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5377 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5382 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5383 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5384 match failure_code {
5385 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5386 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5387 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5388 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5389 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5390 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5392 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5393 let fail_data = match data {
5394 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5397 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5402 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5403 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5405 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5407 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5408 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5409 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5410 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5411 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5412 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5413 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5415 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5417 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5418 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5420 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5425 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5426 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5427 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5428 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5429 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5430 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5431 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5432 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5433 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5434 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5436 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5437 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5438 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5439 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5441 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5442 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5443 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5444 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5445 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5449 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5450 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5451 // be surfaced to the user.
5452 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5453 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5454 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5456 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5457 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5458 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5459 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5460 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5461 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5462 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5463 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5464 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5466 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5467 debug_assert!(false);
5468 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5471 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5473 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5476 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5477 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5478 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5479 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5483 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5484 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5485 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5486 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5487 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5488 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5489 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5490 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5491 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5492 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5495 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5496 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5497 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5500 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5501 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5502 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5504 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5505 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5506 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5507 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5508 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5510 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5511 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5512 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
5515 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
5516 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5517 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5519 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5520 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5521 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5522 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5523 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5525 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5527 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5528 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5530 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5531 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5535 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5536 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5538 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5542 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5543 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5544 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5545 push_forward_ev = true;
5547 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5548 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5549 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5551 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5552 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5555 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5556 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5557 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5558 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5559 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
5560 failed_next_destination: destination,
5566 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5567 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5569 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5570 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5571 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5572 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5574 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5575 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5576 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5577 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5579 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5580 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5581 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5583 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5584 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5585 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5586 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5587 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5588 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5589 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5590 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5591 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5594 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5595 /// even type numbers.
5599 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5600 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5602 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5603 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5604 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5607 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5608 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5610 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5613 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5614 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5615 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5616 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5617 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5618 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5619 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5620 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5625 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5626 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5627 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5628 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5629 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5631 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5632 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5633 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5637 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5638 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5639 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5640 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5641 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5642 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5643 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5644 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5645 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5646 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5647 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5656 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5658 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5659 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5660 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5661 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5662 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5663 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5664 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5665 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5666 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5667 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5668 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5669 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5670 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5671 debug_assert!(false);
5675 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5677 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5678 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5679 debug_assert!(false);
5683 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5684 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5686 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5687 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5688 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5689 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5692 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5693 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5694 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5695 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5699 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5700 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
5701 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5702 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5703 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5704 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5705 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5708 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5709 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5710 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5711 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5712 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5713 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5718 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5719 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5720 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5721 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5722 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5723 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5724 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5726 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5729 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5730 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5731 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5732 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5736 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5737 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5738 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5739 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5741 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5742 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5743 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5744 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5746 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5747 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5748 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5749 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5752 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5753 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
5754 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5755 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5759 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5760 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5761 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5764 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5765 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5766 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5767 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5768 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5769 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5770 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5771 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5774 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5775 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5776 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5778 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5781 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5782 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5784 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5785 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5786 // monitor update as a background event.
5787 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5788 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5789 counterparty_node_id,
5790 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5791 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
5792 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5796 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5797 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5802 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5804 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5806 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
5807 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5808 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5809 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5810 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
5812 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
5814 debug_assert!(false,
5815 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5818 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5819 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5820 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5821 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5822 .get_mut(&channel_id)
5824 let mut found_blocker = false;
5825 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5826 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5827 // which case we need to only remove the one
5828 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5829 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5830 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5831 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5833 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5836 debug_assert!(false);
5845 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5846 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5847 counterparty_node_id: None,
5848 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5851 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
5855 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5856 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5857 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5858 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5859 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5860 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5861 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5862 // again on restart.
5863 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
5864 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5865 payment_preimage, update_res);
5868 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5869 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5871 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5872 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5873 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5874 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5875 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5876 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5877 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5878 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5879 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5880 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
5883 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5884 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5885 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5886 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5887 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5888 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5892 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5893 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5896 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5897 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5898 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
5899 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
5902 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5903 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5904 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5905 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5906 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5908 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5909 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
5910 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5912 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5913 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5916 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5917 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
5918 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
5919 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5920 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5921 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5922 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5923 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5924 let chan_to_release =
5925 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5926 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
5928 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5929 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5930 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5931 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5936 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5937 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5938 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5939 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5940 // in the background.
5941 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5942 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5943 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5944 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5946 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5947 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5948 funding_txo, update, ..
5950 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5951 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5952 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5953 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5955 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5961 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5962 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5963 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
5965 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5966 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5968 monitor_update.updates[0],
5969 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5974 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5975 // immediately once we get going.
5976 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5979 *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
5981 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5984 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5985 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5986 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5987 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5988 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5989 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
5990 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
5994 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5995 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5996 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5999 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
6000 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
6001 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6002 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
6003 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
6004 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
6005 prev_user_channel_id,
6006 next_user_channel_id,
6007 total_fee_earned_msat,
6009 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
6010 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
6012 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
6016 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
6017 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6018 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
6024 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
6025 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
6026 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
6029 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
6030 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6031 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6032 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6034 for action in actions.into_iter() {
6036 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
6037 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6038 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
6040 payment_purpose: purpose,
6043 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
6045 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
6049 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
6051 sender_intended_total_msat,
6055 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6056 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
6058 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
6059 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
6060 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
6063 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6064 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
6066 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
6067 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
6068 downstream_funding_outpoint,
6069 downstream_channel_id,
6070 Some(blocking_action),
6077 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
6078 /// update completion.
6079 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
6080 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
6081 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
6082 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
6083 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
6084 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
6085 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6086 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
6087 &channel.context.channel_id(),
6088 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
6089 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
6090 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
6091 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
6092 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
6094 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
6096 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6097 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6098 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
6099 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
6102 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
6103 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
6105 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
6106 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6107 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6112 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6113 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6114 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6115 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6120 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6121 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6122 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6123 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6124 msg: revoke_and_ack,
6129 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6133 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6139 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6140 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6141 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6145 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6146 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6147 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6153 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6154 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6156 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6157 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6159 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6160 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6161 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6162 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6163 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6168 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6169 let mut peer_state_lock;
6170 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6171 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6172 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6173 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6175 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6178 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6179 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6180 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6181 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6182 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6185 let remaining_in_flight =
6186 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6187 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6190 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6191 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6192 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6193 remaining_in_flight);
6194 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6197 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6200 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6202 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6203 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6206 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6207 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6208 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6210 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6211 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6212 /// used to accept such channels.
6214 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6215 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6216 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6217 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6220 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6221 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6223 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6224 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6225 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6227 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6228 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6230 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6231 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6233 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6234 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6236 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6237 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6238 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6239 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6242 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6244 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6245 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6247 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6248 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6249 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6250 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6252 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6253 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6255 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6257 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6258 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6259 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6261 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6262 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6263 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6265 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6266 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6267 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6268 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6269 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6270 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6271 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6274 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6275 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6277 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6283 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6284 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6285 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6286 Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6288 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6292 Ok(mut channel) => {
6294 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6295 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6296 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6297 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6298 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6299 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6300 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6303 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6304 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6305 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6307 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6309 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6310 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6311 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6312 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6313 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6314 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6315 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6316 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6319 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6320 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6321 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6323 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6327 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6328 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6329 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6331 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6332 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6333 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6336 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6343 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6344 /// or 0-conf channels.
6346 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6347 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6348 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6349 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6350 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6351 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6353 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6354 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6355 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6356 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6357 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6358 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6359 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6363 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6366 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6367 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6369 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6370 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6372 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6373 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6374 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6375 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6376 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6378 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6381 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6382 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6383 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6386 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6387 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6388 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
6389 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
6390 // included in the unfunded count.
6391 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6392 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
6393 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6396 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6397 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6400 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6401 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6402 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6403 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6408 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6411 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6412 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6413 // likely to be lost on restart!
6414 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6415 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
6416 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6419 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6420 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
6421 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6424 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6425 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6426 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6427 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6428 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6430 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6431 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6433 debug_assert!(false);
6434 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6435 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6436 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6438 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6439 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6441 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6442 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6443 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6444 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6445 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6446 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6448 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6449 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6450 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6453 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6454 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6455 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6456 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6457 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6460 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
6461 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6463 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6464 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
6465 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6468 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6469 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6470 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6471 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6473 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6475 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6476 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6477 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6478 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6479 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
6480 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6483 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6484 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6485 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6490 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6491 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6492 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6493 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6494 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6495 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6496 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6499 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6504 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6505 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6506 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6507 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
6508 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6510 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6511 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6512 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
6513 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6516 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6517 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6519 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6520 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6521 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6523 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6527 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6528 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6529 // likely to be lost on restart!
6530 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6531 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6532 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6534 debug_assert!(false);
6535 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6537 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6538 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6539 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
6540 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6541 match phase.get_mut() {
6542 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6543 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6544 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6547 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6551 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
6554 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6555 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6556 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
6557 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6558 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6560 user_channel_id: user_id,
6565 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6566 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6568 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6569 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6571 debug_assert!(false);
6572 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6575 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6576 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6577 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6578 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6579 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6580 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6581 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6583 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6584 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6585 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6586 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6587 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6588 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6589 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6590 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6591 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6595 Some(mut phase) => {
6596 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6597 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6598 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6600 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6603 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6605 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6606 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6607 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6608 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6609 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6610 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6612 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6613 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6614 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6617 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6618 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6619 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6621 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6622 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6623 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6624 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6625 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6627 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6628 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6629 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6630 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6631 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6633 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6634 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6635 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6636 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6637 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6638 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6639 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6644 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6645 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6646 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6648 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6652 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6653 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6654 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6662 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6663 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6664 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6665 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6667 debug_assert!(false);
6668 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6671 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6672 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6673 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6674 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6675 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6676 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6677 let logger = WithContext::from(
6679 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6680 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6683 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6685 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
6686 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6687 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6688 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6689 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6690 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6691 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6692 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6693 } else { unreachable!(); }
6696 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6697 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
6698 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
6699 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
6700 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
6701 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
6702 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6706 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6707 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6708 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6709 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6710 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6711 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6715 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6718 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6722 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6723 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6724 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6725 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6726 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6728 debug_assert!(false);
6729 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6731 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6732 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6733 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6734 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6735 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6736 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6737 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6738 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6739 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6740 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6741 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6742 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6743 msg: announcement_sigs,
6745 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6746 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6747 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6748 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6749 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6750 // announcement_signatures.
6751 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6752 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6753 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6754 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6761 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6762 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6767 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6768 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6771 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6772 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6777 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6778 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6779 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6781 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6782 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6784 debug_assert!(false);
6785 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6787 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6788 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6789 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6790 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6792 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6793 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6794 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6795 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6797 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6800 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6801 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6802 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6803 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6805 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6806 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6807 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6808 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6809 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6810 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6814 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6815 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6816 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6817 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6820 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6821 let context = phase.context_mut();
6822 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6823 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6824 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6825 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6827 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
6828 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6829 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6830 let context = phase.context_mut();
6831 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6832 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6833 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6837 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6840 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6841 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6842 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6843 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6845 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6846 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6852 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6853 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6854 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6856 debug_assert!(false);
6857 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6859 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6860 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6861 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6862 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6863 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6864 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6865 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6866 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6867 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6868 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6869 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6874 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6875 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6876 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6877 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6878 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6879 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6880 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6882 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6883 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6886 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6889 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6890 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6891 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6892 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6894 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6895 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6896 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6897 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6898 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6903 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6904 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6905 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6910 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6911 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6912 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6913 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6915 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6916 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6917 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6918 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6920 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6921 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6923 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6924 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6925 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6927 debug_assert!(false);
6928 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6930 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6931 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6932 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6933 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6934 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6935 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6936 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6937 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6938 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6939 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6941 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6943 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6944 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6945 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6946 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6947 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6948 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6949 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6950 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6954 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6955 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6956 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6957 match pending_forward_info {
6958 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6959 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6961 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6962 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6963 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6964 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6965 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6967 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6968 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6969 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6970 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6971 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6974 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6976 _ => pending_forward_info
6979 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6980 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6982 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6983 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6986 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6991 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6993 let next_user_channel_id;
6994 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
6995 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6996 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6998 debug_assert!(false);
6999 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7001 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7002 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7003 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7004 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7005 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7006 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7007 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
7008 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7010 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
7012 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
7013 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7014 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
7016 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
7017 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
7018 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
7019 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
7020 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
7021 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
7022 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
7023 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
7026 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7027 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7030 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7033 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
7034 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
7035 funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
7041 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7042 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7043 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7044 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7045 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7047 debug_assert!(false);
7048 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7050 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7051 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7052 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7053 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7054 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7055 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
7057 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7058 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7061 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7066 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7067 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7068 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7069 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7070 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7072 debug_assert!(false);
7073 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7075 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7076 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7077 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7078 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7079 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
7080 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
7081 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
7083 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7084 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
7086 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7087 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7091 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7095 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7096 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7097 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7099 debug_assert!(false);
7100 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7102 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7103 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7104 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7105 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7106 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7107 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7108 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7109 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7110 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7111 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7112 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7116 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7117 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7120 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7125 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7126 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7127 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7128 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7129 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7130 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7131 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7132 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7133 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7134 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7135 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7137 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7138 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7140 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7141 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7142 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7143 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7144 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7145 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7147 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7148 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7149 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7151 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7152 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7153 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7154 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7155 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7156 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7157 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7158 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7159 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7162 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7163 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7165 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7166 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
7167 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7168 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7169 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7170 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7171 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7172 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7173 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7174 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7175 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7176 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7179 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7180 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7181 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7186 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7187 // payments are being processed.
7188 if forward_htlcs_empty {
7189 push_forward_event = true;
7191 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7192 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7199 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7200 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7203 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7204 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7205 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7207 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7211 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7212 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7213 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7214 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7215 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7217 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7218 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7219 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7220 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7221 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7222 // real by taking more time.
7223 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7224 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7225 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7230 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7231 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7232 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7233 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7234 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7235 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7236 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7238 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7239 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7240 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7241 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7242 channel_funding_outpoint,
7244 counterparty_node_id,
7249 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7250 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7251 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7253 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7254 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7255 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7256 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7258 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7259 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7260 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7266 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7267 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7268 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7269 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7271 debug_assert!(false);
7272 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7273 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7274 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7275 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7276 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7277 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7278 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7279 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7280 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7281 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7282 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7283 *counterparty_node_id)
7285 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7286 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7287 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7288 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7289 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7290 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7291 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7295 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7296 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7299 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7302 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7306 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7307 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7308 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7310 debug_assert!(false);
7311 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7313 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7314 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7315 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7316 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7317 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7318 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7319 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7321 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7322 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7325 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7330 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7331 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7332 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7334 debug_assert!(false);
7335 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7337 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7338 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7339 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7340 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7341 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7342 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7343 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7346 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7347 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7348 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
7349 msg, &self.default_configuration
7350 ), chan_phase_entry),
7351 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7352 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7353 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7356 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7357 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7360 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7365 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7366 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7367 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7368 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7370 // It's not a local channel
7371 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7374 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7375 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7376 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7377 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7379 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7380 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7381 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7382 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7383 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7384 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7385 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7386 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7387 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7388 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7389 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7391 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7393 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7394 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7395 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7396 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7398 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7399 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7400 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7401 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7404 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7408 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7409 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7412 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7414 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7417 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7419 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7420 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7422 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7424 debug_assert!(false);
7425 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7426 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7430 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7431 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7432 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7433 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7434 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7435 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7436 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7437 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7438 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7439 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7440 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7441 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7442 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7443 let mut channel_update = None;
7444 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7445 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7446 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7449 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7450 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7451 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7452 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7453 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7454 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7455 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7460 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7461 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7462 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7463 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7464 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7465 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7469 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7470 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7473 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7474 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7476 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7477 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7478 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7479 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7480 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7481 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7483 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7484 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7485 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7486 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7487 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7488 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7489 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7490 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7491 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7492 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7493 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7494 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7495 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7496 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7497 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7498 next_funding_txid: None,
7501 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7502 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7503 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7509 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7510 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7511 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7512 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7515 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7516 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7521 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7522 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7523 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7525 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7526 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7527 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7528 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7529 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7530 match monitor_event {
7531 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7532 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
7533 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7534 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7535 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
7536 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
7537 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
7539 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7540 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
7541 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7542 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7545 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
7546 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7547 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7549 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7550 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7551 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7552 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7555 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7556 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7557 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7558 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7559 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7560 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7561 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
7562 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7563 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
7566 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
7568 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
7569 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7570 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7574 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7575 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7576 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7577 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
7585 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
7586 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7592 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7593 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7596 has_pending_monitor_events
7599 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7600 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7601 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7603 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7604 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7605 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7608 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7609 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7610 /// update was applied.
7611 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7612 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7613 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7615 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7616 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7617 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7618 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7620 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7621 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7623 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7624 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7625 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7626 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7628 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7629 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7630 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7631 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7632 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7633 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7635 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7636 has_monitor_update = true;
7638 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7639 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7640 continue 'peer_loop;
7649 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7650 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7651 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7657 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7658 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7660 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7661 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7663 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7664 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7665 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7666 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7668 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7669 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7671 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7672 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7673 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7674 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7679 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7680 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7685 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7686 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7689 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7690 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7691 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7697 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7701 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7702 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7703 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7704 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7705 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7706 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7707 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7711 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7712 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7713 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7714 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7715 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7721 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7722 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7723 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7724 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7725 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7726 let mut has_update = false;
7727 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7729 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7731 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7732 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7733 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7734 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7735 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7737 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7738 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7739 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7740 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7741 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7743 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7744 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7747 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7748 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7749 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7751 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7752 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7753 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7754 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7755 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7760 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7761 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7762 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7768 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7769 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7774 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7780 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7781 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7784 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7785 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7791 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7792 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7794 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7795 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7796 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7797 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7798 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7799 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7800 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7801 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7802 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7803 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7804 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7805 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7806 assert!(should_broadcast);
7807 } else { unreachable!(); }
7808 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7809 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7810 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
7813 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7818 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7819 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7820 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7821 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7825 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7826 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7827 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7828 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7829 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7831 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7835 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7840 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7842 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7844 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7845 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7846 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7847 &$self, description: String
7848 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7849 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7850 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7851 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7852 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7854 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7855 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7856 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7858 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7865 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7866 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7867 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7871 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7872 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7874 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7875 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7876 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7879 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7880 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7881 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7883 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7884 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7888 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7889 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7890 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7891 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7892 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7894 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7898 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7899 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7904 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7905 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7906 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7908 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7910 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7911 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7912 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7913 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7914 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7915 &$self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7916 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7917 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7918 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7919 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7920 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7921 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7923 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7924 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7925 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7927 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7928 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7931 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
7933 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7934 $self.pending_outbound_payments
7935 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7936 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7938 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7944 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7946 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7947 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7948 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7949 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7950 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7951 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7955 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7956 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
7957 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7958 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
7961 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7963 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7965 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7966 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7967 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7969 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7970 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7971 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7972 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7973 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7974 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7975 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7977 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7978 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7982 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7983 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7986 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7987 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7988 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7992 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7993 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7994 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7995 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7999 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
8000 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
8001 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8006 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8007 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
8008 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
8009 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
8012 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8013 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
8014 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
8015 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
8016 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8017 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8018 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8019 pub fn pay_for_offer(
8020 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
8021 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
8022 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8023 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8024 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8025 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8026 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8028 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
8029 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
8031 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
8033 let builder = match quantity {
8035 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
8037 let builder = match amount_msats {
8039 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
8041 let builder = match payer_note {
8043 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
8045 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
8046 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8048 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8050 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
8051 self.pending_outbound_payments
8052 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8053 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
8055 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8057 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8058 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
8059 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8060 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
8061 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
8064 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8066 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
8067 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
8068 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
8069 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
8070 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
8071 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8072 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
8073 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8074 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8076 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8083 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
8086 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
8087 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
8088 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
8092 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
8093 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
8094 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
8095 /// received and no retries will be made.
8100 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
8101 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
8104 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8105 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8106 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8107 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8108 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8110 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8111 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8113 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8114 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8117 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8119 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8120 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8121 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
8122 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8124 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8125 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8126 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8128 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8129 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8130 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8132 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8133 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8134 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8136 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8137 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8138 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8139 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8141 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8142 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8143 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8144 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
8145 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8148 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8150 for path in refund.paths() {
8151 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8152 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8153 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8154 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8156 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8162 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8166 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8169 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8170 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8172 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
8173 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
8174 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
8175 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8177 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8179 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8180 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8184 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8185 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8187 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8189 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8190 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8192 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8193 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8194 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8195 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
8196 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
8197 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8198 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8199 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8200 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8201 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8202 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8205 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8206 /// stored external to LDK.
8208 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8209 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8210 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8212 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8213 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8216 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8217 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8218 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8219 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8221 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8222 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8223 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8224 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8225 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8227 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8228 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8229 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8230 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8231 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8233 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8234 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8236 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8237 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8241 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8242 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8244 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8246 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8247 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8249 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8250 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8251 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8252 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8253 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8254 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8255 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8258 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8259 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8261 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8262 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8263 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8266 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8268 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8269 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8270 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8271 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8273 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8275 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8276 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8277 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8280 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8281 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8284 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8285 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8286 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8287 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
8288 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8289 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8291 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8292 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8293 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8294 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8295 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8297 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8299 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8302 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8303 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8307 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8308 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8310 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8311 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8312 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8313 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8315 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8316 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8317 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8318 Some(_) => continue,
8319 None => return scid_candidate
8324 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8326 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8327 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8329 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8330 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8331 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8335 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8336 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8337 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8339 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8340 /// times to get a unique scid.
8341 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8342 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8343 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8345 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8346 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8347 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8348 return scid_candidate
8352 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8353 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8354 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8355 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8357 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8358 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8359 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8360 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8361 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8362 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8364 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8365 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8366 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8375 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8376 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8377 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8378 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8379 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8383 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8384 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8385 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8386 events.push_back((event, None));
8390 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8391 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8392 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8396 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8397 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8401 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8402 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8405 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8406 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8407 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8408 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8409 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
8410 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
8411 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8413 let logger = WithContext::from(
8414 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
8417 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8418 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8419 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8420 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8421 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8422 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8423 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8424 .get_mut(&channel_id)
8426 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8430 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8431 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
8432 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8433 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8434 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8435 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8440 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
8442 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8443 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8444 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8445 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8447 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8448 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8449 if further_update_exists {
8450 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8455 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8462 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8463 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8469 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8470 for action in actions {
8472 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8473 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
8475 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8481 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8482 /// using the given event handler.
8484 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8485 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8489 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8493 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8495 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8496 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8497 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8498 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8499 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8500 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8504 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8505 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8506 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8507 /// is always placed next to each other.
8509 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8510 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8511 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8512 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8514 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8515 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8516 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8517 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8518 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8519 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8520 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8522 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8523 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8524 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8525 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8528 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8529 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8531 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8532 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8535 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8536 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8537 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8538 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8539 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8540 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8541 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8545 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8546 events.replace(pending_events);
8555 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8557 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8558 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8559 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8560 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8561 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8562 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8566 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8568 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8569 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8570 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8572 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8576 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8578 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8579 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8580 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8581 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8582 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8583 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8587 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8589 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8590 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
8591 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8592 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
8593 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8596 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8597 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8600 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8601 let _persistence_guard =
8602 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8603 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8604 let new_height = height - 1;
8606 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8607 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
8608 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8609 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
8610 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8611 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8614 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8618 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8620 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8621 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8622 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8623 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8624 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8625 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8629 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8630 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8631 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8632 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8634 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8635 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8637 let _persistence_guard =
8638 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8639 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8640 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8641 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8643 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8644 if height < last_best_block_height {
8645 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8646 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8650 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8651 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8652 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8653 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8655 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8656 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8658 let _persistence_guard =
8659 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8660 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8661 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8663 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8665 macro_rules! max_time {
8666 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8668 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8669 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8670 // having an explicit local time source.
8671 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8672 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8673 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8674 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8675 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8681 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8682 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8683 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8684 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8688 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8689 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8690 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8691 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8692 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8693 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8694 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8695 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8696 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8697 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8698 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8705 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8706 let _persistence_guard =
8707 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8708 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8709 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8710 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8711 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8712 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8713 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8714 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8719 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8721 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8722 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8723 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8724 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8725 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8726 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8730 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8731 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8733 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8734 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8735 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8736 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8737 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8739 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8740 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8742 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8743 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8744 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8745 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8746 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8747 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8749 // Retain unfunded channels.
8750 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8751 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
8752 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
8753 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
8754 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8755 let res = f(channel);
8756 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8757 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8758 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8759 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8760 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8762 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8763 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8764 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8765 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8766 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8767 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8768 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8769 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8774 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8779 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8780 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8783 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8784 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8785 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8786 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8787 msg: announcement_sigs,
8789 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8790 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8791 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8793 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8794 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8795 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8800 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8801 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8802 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8803 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8804 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8805 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8806 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8807 // is always consistent.
8808 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8809 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8810 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8811 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8812 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8815 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8816 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8817 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8818 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8819 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8820 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8821 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8822 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8826 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8827 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8828 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8829 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8830 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8831 data: reason_message,
8844 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8845 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8846 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8847 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8848 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8849 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8850 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8851 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8852 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8853 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8855 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8856 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8857 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8861 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8864 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8865 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8866 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8867 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8868 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8869 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8870 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8871 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8872 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8873 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8874 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
8875 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8878 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8879 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8880 _ => unreachable!(),
8882 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8883 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8884 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8885 let logger = WithContext::from(
8886 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
8888 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8894 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8896 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8897 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8901 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8902 /// may have events that need processing.
8904 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8905 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8907 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8908 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8909 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8910 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8913 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8915 /// See [`Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] for retrieving a [`Future`] that
8916 /// indicates this should be checked.
8917 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8918 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8921 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8922 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8923 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8926 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8927 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8928 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8929 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8932 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8933 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8934 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8935 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8938 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8939 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8941 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8942 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8943 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8944 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8945 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8948 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8949 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8950 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8951 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8954 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8955 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8956 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8957 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8960 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8961 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8962 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8963 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8966 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8967 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8968 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8969 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8973 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8974 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8976 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8977 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8978 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8979 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8980 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8981 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8985 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8986 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8987 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8988 // change to the contents.
8989 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8990 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8991 let persist = match &res {
8992 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8993 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8994 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8996 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8998 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9003 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
9004 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9005 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9006 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9009 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
9010 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9011 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9012 // change to the contents.
9013 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9014 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9015 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
9019 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
9020 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9021 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9022 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9025 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
9026 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9027 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9030 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
9031 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9032 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9035 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
9036 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9037 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
9038 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
9039 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
9040 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9041 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9042 let persist = match &res {
9043 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9044 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9046 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9051 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
9052 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9053 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
9054 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9057 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
9058 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9059 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
9060 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9063 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
9064 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9065 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
9066 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9069 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
9070 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9071 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
9072 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9075 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
9076 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9077 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9080 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
9081 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9082 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9085 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
9086 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9087 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9088 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9089 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9090 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9091 let persist = match &res {
9092 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9093 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9094 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9096 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9101 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
9102 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9103 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9106 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
9107 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9108 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9109 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9110 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9111 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9112 let persist = match &res {
9113 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9114 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9115 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9117 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9122 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9123 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9124 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9125 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9126 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9127 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9128 let persist = match &res {
9129 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9130 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9131 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9133 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9138 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9139 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9140 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9143 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9144 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9145 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9148 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9149 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9150 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9151 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9152 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9153 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9154 let persist = match &res {
9155 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9156 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9157 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9159 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9164 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9165 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9166 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9169 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9170 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9171 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9174 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9179 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9180 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9181 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9182 let persist = match &res {
9183 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9184 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9185 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9187 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9192 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9193 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9194 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9195 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9196 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9199 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
9200 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9201 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9203 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9204 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9205 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9206 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9207 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9208 let context = match phase {
9209 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9210 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9211 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9212 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9217 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
9218 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
9219 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
9222 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9223 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9226 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9227 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9230 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9231 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9235 // Clean up for removal.
9236 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9237 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9240 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9241 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9242 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9243 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9245 // V1 Channel Establishment
9246 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9247 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9248 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9249 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9250 // V2 Channel Establishment
9251 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9252 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9253 // Common Channel Establishment
9254 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9255 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9257 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9259 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9260 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9261 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9262 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9263 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9264 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9265 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9266 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9267 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9268 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9269 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9270 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9271 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9272 // Channel Operations
9273 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9274 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9275 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9276 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9277 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9278 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
9280 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
9281 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9282 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
9283 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9284 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
9285 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
9286 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
9287 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
9288 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
9291 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
9292 peer_state.is_connected = false;
9293 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
9294 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
9297 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
9299 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
9301 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
9302 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
9306 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
9307 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
9308 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
9309 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9313 let mut res = Ok(());
9315 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9316 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9317 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9318 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9319 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9320 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9321 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9324 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9325 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9326 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9327 if inbound_peer_limited {
9329 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9331 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9332 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9333 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9334 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9335 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9336 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9337 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9338 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9342 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9343 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9344 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9346 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9347 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9348 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9349 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9352 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9355 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9356 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9361 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9363 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9364 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9365 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9366 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9367 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9369 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9371 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9372 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9373 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9374 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9375 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9379 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9380 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9381 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9382 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
9386 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9387 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9388 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9389 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9390 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9391 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
9395 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
9396 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9397 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9398 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9399 debug_assert!(false);
9402 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9403 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9404 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
9405 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9406 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9407 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9408 debug_assert!(false);
9414 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9415 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9420 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9421 match &msg.data as &str {
9422 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9423 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9425 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9426 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9427 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9428 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9429 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9430 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9431 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9432 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9433 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9435 || -> NotifyOption {
9436 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9437 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9438 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
9439 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9440 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9441 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9442 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9443 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9447 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9448 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9449 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9450 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9451 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9452 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9454 log_level: Level::Trace,
9457 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
9458 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
9459 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9461 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
9470 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9472 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9473 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9474 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9475 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9476 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9477 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9478 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9479 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9480 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9481 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9482 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9484 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9485 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9486 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9490 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9491 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9492 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9493 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9494 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9495 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9496 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9497 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
9498 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9499 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9500 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9506 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9507 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
9508 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9509 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9510 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9516 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
9517 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9518 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
9522 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9523 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9527 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9528 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9531 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9532 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9535 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9536 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9539 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9540 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9541 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9542 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9545 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9546 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9547 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9548 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9551 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9552 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9553 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9554 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9557 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9558 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9559 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9560 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9563 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9564 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9565 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9566 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9569 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9570 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9571 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9572 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9575 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9576 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9577 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9578 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9581 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9582 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9583 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9584 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9587 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9588 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9589 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9590 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9594 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9595 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9597 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9598 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9599 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9600 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9601 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9602 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9606 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9607 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9608 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9611 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9612 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9615 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9616 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9618 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9619 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9621 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9622 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9626 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9627 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9628 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9630 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9632 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9633 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9637 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9638 amount_msats, payment_secret
9640 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9642 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9643 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9647 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9648 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9649 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9652 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9653 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9654 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9655 payment_paths, payment_hash
9657 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9658 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9659 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9661 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey>, _> =
9662 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9663 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9664 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9665 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9668 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9669 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9670 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9671 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9672 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9674 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<ExplicitSigningPubkey>, _> =
9675 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9676 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9677 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9678 .and_then(|invoice| {
9680 let mut invoice = invoice;
9681 match invoice.sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
9682 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
9684 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9685 Err(SignError::Signing) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9686 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9688 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9689 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9694 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9695 Err(error) => Some(error),
9699 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9700 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9702 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9704 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9705 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9708 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9709 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9710 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9717 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9718 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9724 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9725 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9729 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9730 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9731 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9732 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9733 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9737 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9738 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9740 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9741 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9742 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9743 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9744 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9747 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9748 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9749 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9750 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9753 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9754 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9755 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9756 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9759 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9760 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9761 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9762 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9765 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9766 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9767 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9768 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9769 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9770 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9771 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9772 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9773 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9774 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9775 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9776 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9777 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9778 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9779 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9780 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9781 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9782 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9783 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
9784 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9785 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9790 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9791 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9793 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9794 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9795 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9796 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9799 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9800 (2, node_id, required),
9801 (4, features, required),
9802 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9803 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9804 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9805 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9808 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9809 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9810 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9811 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9812 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9813 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9814 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9815 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9816 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9817 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9818 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9819 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9820 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9821 (7, self.config, option),
9822 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9823 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9824 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9825 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9826 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9827 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9828 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9829 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9830 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9831 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9832 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9833 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9834 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9835 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9836 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9837 (32, self.is_public, required),
9838 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9839 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9840 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9841 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9842 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9843 (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9844 (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9850 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9851 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9852 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9853 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9854 (2, channel_id, required),
9855 (3, channel_type, option),
9856 (4, counterparty, required),
9857 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9858 (6, funding_txo, option),
9859 (7, config, option),
9860 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9861 (9, confirmations, option),
9862 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9863 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9864 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9865 (16, balance_msat, required),
9866 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9867 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9868 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9869 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9870 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9871 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9872 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9873 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9874 (26, is_outbound, required),
9875 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9876 (30, is_usable, required),
9877 (32, is_public, required),
9878 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9879 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9880 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9881 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9882 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9883 (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9884 (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9887 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9888 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9889 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9890 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9891 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9895 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9897 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9898 outbound_scid_alias,
9902 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9903 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9905 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9906 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9907 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9908 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9909 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9910 confirmations_required,
9912 force_close_spend_delay,
9913 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9914 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9915 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9916 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9917 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9918 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9919 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9920 channel_shutdown_state,
9921 pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9922 pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9927 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9928 (2, channels, required_vec),
9929 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9930 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9933 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9934 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9935 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
9938 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9940 (0, onion_packet, required),
9941 (1, blinded, option),
9942 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9945 (0, payment_data, required),
9946 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9947 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9948 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9949 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9950 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9952 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9953 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9954 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9955 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9956 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9957 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9958 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9962 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9963 (0, routing, required),
9964 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9965 (4, payment_hash, required),
9966 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9967 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9968 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9969 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9973 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9974 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9976 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9978 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9979 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9980 reason.write(writer)?;
9982 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9983 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9986 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9987 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9988 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9989 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9996 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9997 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9998 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10001 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
10002 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10003 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10004 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
10008 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10009 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10010 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10011 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
10012 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
10015 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
10016 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
10017 // messages contained in the variants.
10018 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
10019 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
10020 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
10022 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10023 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10024 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10025 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10026 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
10029 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10030 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10031 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10032 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10033 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
10035 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10040 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
10045 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
10046 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
10047 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
10050 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
10051 (0, short_channel_id, required),
10052 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10053 (2, outpoint, required),
10054 (3, blinded_failure, option),
10055 (4, htlc_id, required),
10056 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
10057 (7, user_channel_id, option),
10058 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
10059 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10060 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10063 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
10064 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10065 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
10066 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
10067 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
10069 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10070 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
10071 (1, self.total_msat, required),
10072 (2, self.value, required),
10073 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
10074 (4, payment_data, option),
10075 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
10076 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
10077 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10078 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10084 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
10085 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10086 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10087 (0, prev_hop, required),
10088 (1, total_msat, option),
10089 (2, value_ser, required),
10090 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
10091 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
10092 (5, total_value_received, option),
10093 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
10094 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10095 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10097 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
10098 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
10099 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
10101 if payment_data.is_some() {
10102 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10104 if total_msat.is_none() {
10105 total_msat = Some(value);
10107 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
10110 if total_msat.is_none() {
10111 if payment_data.is_none() {
10112 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10114 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10116 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
10120 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10123 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10124 total_value_received,
10125 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10127 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10128 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10133 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10134 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10135 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10138 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10139 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10140 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10141 let mut payment_id = None;
10142 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10143 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10144 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10145 (0, session_priv, required),
10146 (1, payment_id, option),
10147 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10148 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10149 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10150 (6, blinded_tail, option),
10152 if payment_id.is_none() {
10153 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10155 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10157 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10158 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10159 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10161 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10162 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10163 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10164 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10168 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10169 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10170 first_hop_htlc_msat,
10172 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10175 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10176 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10181 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10182 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10184 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10185 0u8.write(writer)?;
10186 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10187 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10188 (0, session_priv, required),
10189 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10190 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10191 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10192 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10193 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10194 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10197 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10198 1u8.write(writer)?;
10199 field.write(writer)?;
10206 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10207 (0, forward_info, required),
10208 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10209 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10210 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10211 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10212 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10213 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10214 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10217 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10218 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10219 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10221 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10225 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10226 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10227 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10228 (0, htlc_id, required),
10229 (2, err_packet, required),
10232 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10233 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10234 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10235 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10236 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10237 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10238 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10239 (0, htlc_id, required),
10240 (1, failure_code, required),
10241 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10242 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10250 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10251 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10252 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
10254 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
10256 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
10257 (0, htlc_id, required),
10258 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
10259 (2, err_packet, required),
10260 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
10262 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
10263 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
10264 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10266 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
10270 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10271 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
10275 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10280 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
10281 (0, payment_secret, required),
10282 (2, expiry_time, required),
10283 (4, user_payment_id, required),
10284 (6, payment_preimage, required),
10285 (8, min_value_msat, required),
10288 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10290 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10291 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10292 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10293 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10294 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10295 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10299 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10300 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
10302 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10304 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
10306 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
10307 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
10308 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
10311 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
10313 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10314 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
10315 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10316 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10317 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10318 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10319 serializable_peer_count += 1;
10322 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
10323 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
10327 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
10329 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10330 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10331 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10332 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
10333 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
10334 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
10337 channel.write(writer)?;
10343 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10344 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10345 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
10346 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
10347 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10348 for forward in pending_forwards {
10349 forward.write(writer)?;
10354 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10356 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10357 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
10358 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10360 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
10361 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
10362 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10363 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
10364 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
10365 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10366 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
10367 htlc.write(writer)?;
10369 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
10370 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
10373 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
10374 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
10375 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10376 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
10377 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
10378 // per_peer_state lock at all.
10379 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
10382 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
10383 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10384 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
10385 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
10386 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10388 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10389 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10390 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10391 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10392 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10393 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10394 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10399 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10400 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10401 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10402 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10403 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10404 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10405 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10406 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10407 0u64.write(writer)?;
10409 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10410 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10411 event.write(writer)?;
10415 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10416 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10417 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10418 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10419 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10420 0u64.write(writer)?;
10422 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10423 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10424 // likely to be identical.
10425 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10426 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10428 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10429 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10430 hash.write(writer)?;
10431 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10434 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10435 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10436 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10437 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10438 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10441 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10442 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10444 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10445 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10446 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10447 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10450 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10451 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10452 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10453 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10457 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10458 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
10459 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10461 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10462 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10463 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10469 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10470 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10471 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10472 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10475 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10476 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10477 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10478 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10479 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10482 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10483 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10484 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10485 if !updates.is_empty() {
10486 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
10487 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10492 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10493 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10494 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10495 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10496 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10497 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10498 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10499 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10500 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10501 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10502 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10503 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10504 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10511 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10512 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10513 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10514 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10517 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10518 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10519 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10520 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10521 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10522 // check that the event is sane here.
10523 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10524 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10525 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10526 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10532 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10533 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10534 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10535 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10536 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10537 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10540 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10541 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10542 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10543 events.push_back((ev, action));
10544 } else if action.is_some() {
10545 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10552 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10553 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10554 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10555 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10556 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10557 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10560 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10562 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10564 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10565 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10566 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10567 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10568 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10569 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10570 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10571 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10572 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10573 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10574 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10575 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10576 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10578 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10579 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10581 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10582 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10584 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10585 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10586 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10587 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10588 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10589 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10591 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10592 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10594 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10595 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10596 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10597 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10598 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10599 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10603 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10604 pub entropy_source: ES,
10606 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10607 pub node_signer: NS,
10609 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10610 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10612 pub signer_provider: SP,
10614 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10616 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10617 pub fee_estimator: F,
10618 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10620 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10621 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10622 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10623 pub chain_monitor: M,
10625 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10626 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10627 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10628 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10629 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10630 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10632 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10634 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10635 /// deserialization.
10637 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10638 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10639 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10641 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10642 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10644 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10645 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10646 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10647 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10649 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10652 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10653 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10656 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10657 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10659 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10660 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10661 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10662 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10663 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10664 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10668 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10669 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10670 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10671 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10672 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10674 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10675 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
10676 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
10682 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10683 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10684 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10685 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10687 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10688 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10689 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10690 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10691 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10692 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10696 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10697 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10698 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10702 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10703 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10705 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10706 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10707 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10708 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10709 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10710 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10714 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10715 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10717 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10718 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10719 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10721 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10723 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10724 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10725 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10726 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10727 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10728 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10729 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10730 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
10731 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10732 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10733 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10735 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10736 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10737 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
10738 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10739 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10740 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10741 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10742 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10743 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10744 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10745 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10746 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10747 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10748 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10749 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10751 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10752 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10753 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10755 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10756 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10757 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10759 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10760 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10761 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10763 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10764 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10765 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10767 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10768 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10769 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
10772 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10773 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10774 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10775 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10776 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10777 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10778 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10779 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10781 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10782 let mut found_htlc = false;
10783 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10784 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10787 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10788 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10789 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10790 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10791 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10792 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10793 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10795 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10796 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10797 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10801 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10802 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10803 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10804 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10805 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10807 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10808 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10810 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10811 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10812 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10813 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10815 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10816 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
10817 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10818 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10822 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10823 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10824 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10825 // safely discard the channel.
10826 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10827 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10828 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10829 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10830 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10831 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10832 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10833 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10836 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10837 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10838 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10839 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10840 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10841 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10845 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10846 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10847 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10848 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
10849 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10851 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10852 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10853 counterparty_node_id: None,
10854 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10855 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
10857 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
10861 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10862 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10863 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10864 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10865 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10866 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10867 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10868 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10869 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10871 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10874 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10875 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10876 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10877 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10878 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10879 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10880 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10881 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10883 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10886 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10889 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10890 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10891 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10892 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10893 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10894 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10895 is_connected: false,
10899 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10900 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10901 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10902 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10903 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
10904 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10905 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10906 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10909 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10910 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10911 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10912 for _ in 0..event_count {
10913 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10914 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10919 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10920 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10921 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10923 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10924 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10925 // on-startup monitor updates.
10926 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10927 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10929 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10933 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10934 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10936 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10937 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10938 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10939 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10940 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10944 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10945 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10946 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10947 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10948 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10949 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10950 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
10952 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10953 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10957 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10958 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10959 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10960 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
10961 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10962 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10963 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10964 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10965 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10966 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
10967 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10968 let mut events_override = None;
10969 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10970 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10971 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10972 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10973 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10974 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10975 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10976 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10977 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10978 (8, events_override, option),
10979 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10980 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10981 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10982 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10984 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10985 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10988 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10989 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10992 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10993 pending_events_read = events;
10996 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10997 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
11000 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
11001 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
11002 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
11003 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
11004 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
11005 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
11007 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
11009 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
11010 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
11011 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
11014 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
11015 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
11016 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
11017 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
11018 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
11020 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
11021 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
11022 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
11024 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
11025 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
11026 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
11027 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
11028 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
11030 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
11031 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11032 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
11033 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
11034 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
11035 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
11036 pending_background_events.push(
11037 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11038 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11039 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
11040 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11041 update: update.clone(),
11044 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
11045 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
11046 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
11047 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
11048 pending_background_events.push(
11049 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
11050 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11051 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11054 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
11055 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
11056 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11058 max_in_flight_update_id
11062 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11063 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
11064 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11065 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
11066 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11067 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11069 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
11071 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11072 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
11073 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
11074 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
11075 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
11076 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
11077 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
11078 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
11079 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
11082 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
11083 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
11084 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11085 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
11086 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
11087 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
11088 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11089 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11090 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11091 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11092 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11095 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11096 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11097 debug_assert!(false);
11098 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11103 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11104 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11105 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11106 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
11107 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11108 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11109 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11110 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11111 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11112 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11114 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11115 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11116 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11118 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11119 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11120 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11121 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11122 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11123 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11124 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11125 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11130 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11131 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11133 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11134 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11135 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11136 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11139 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11140 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11141 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11142 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11143 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11144 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11145 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11147 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11148 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11149 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11150 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11151 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11152 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11153 if path.hops.is_empty() {
11154 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11155 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11158 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11159 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11160 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11161 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11162 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11163 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11164 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11165 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11167 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11168 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11169 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11170 retry_strategy: None,
11171 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11172 payment_params: None,
11173 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11174 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11175 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11176 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11177 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11178 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11179 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11180 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11181 total_msat: path_amt,
11182 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11183 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11185 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11186 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11191 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11192 match htlc_source {
11193 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11194 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11195 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11196 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11198 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11199 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11200 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11201 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11202 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11203 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11204 forwards.retain(|forward| {
11205 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11206 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11207 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11208 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11213 !forwards.is_empty()
11215 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11216 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11217 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11218 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11219 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11220 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11221 intercepted_id != ev_id
11228 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11229 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
11230 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
11231 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
11232 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
11233 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
11234 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
11235 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
11236 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
11237 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
11238 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
11240 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
11241 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
11242 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
11243 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
11245 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
11246 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
11247 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
11254 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
11255 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
11257 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
11259 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
11260 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
11261 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
11262 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
11263 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
11264 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
11265 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
11266 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
11267 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11268 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
11271 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
11272 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
11273 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
11274 // channel still live case here.
11278 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
11279 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
11284 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
11285 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
11286 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
11287 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
11288 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
11289 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
11290 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
11291 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
11295 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
11296 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
11298 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
11299 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
11300 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11301 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11303 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
11304 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11305 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11307 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
11308 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
11310 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11311 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
11313 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11316 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
11317 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11318 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11320 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11324 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
11325 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
11326 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
11327 if htlcs.is_empty() {
11328 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11330 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
11331 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
11332 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
11333 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
11334 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
11335 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
11336 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
11337 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
11339 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
11340 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11344 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
11346 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11348 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
11349 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
11351 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11352 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11357 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11358 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11360 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
11362 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11364 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
11365 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
11366 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
11367 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11371 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
11372 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11373 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11374 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11375 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
11376 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11377 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11378 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
11379 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
11381 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
11382 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
11383 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
11385 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
11386 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
11387 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11388 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11389 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11390 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11392 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11393 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11394 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11395 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11396 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11397 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11401 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11402 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11403 debug_assert!(false);
11404 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11409 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11411 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11412 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11413 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11414 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11415 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11416 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11417 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11418 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11419 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11420 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11421 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11423 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11424 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11426 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11427 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11428 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11429 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11431 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11432 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11433 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11434 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11436 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11437 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11438 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11439 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11441 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
11442 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11443 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11444 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11445 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11446 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11447 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11448 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11451 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11452 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11455 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11458 purpose: payment.purpose,
11459 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11460 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11461 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11467 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11468 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11469 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11470 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11471 for action in actions.iter() {
11472 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11473 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11474 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
11476 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
11478 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11479 blocked_channel_id);
11480 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11481 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
11482 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11484 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11485 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11486 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11487 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11491 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11492 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11496 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11498 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11499 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11503 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11505 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11506 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11507 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11508 router: args.router,
11510 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11512 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11513 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11514 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11515 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11517 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11518 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11519 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11520 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11521 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11522 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11524 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11526 our_network_pubkey,
11529 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11531 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11533 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11534 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11535 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11536 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11537 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11539 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11540 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11542 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11544 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11546 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11547 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11548 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11550 logger: args.logger,
11551 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11554 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11555 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11556 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11557 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11558 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11561 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11562 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11563 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11564 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11565 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
11566 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
11567 downstream_channel_id, None
11571 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11572 //connection or two.
11574 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11580 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11581 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11582 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11583 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11584 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11585 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11586 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11587 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11588 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11589 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11590 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11591 use crate::prelude::*;
11592 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11593 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11594 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11595 use crate::util::test_utils;
11596 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11597 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11600 fn test_notify_limits() {
11601 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11602 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11603 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11604 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11605 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11606 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11608 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11609 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11610 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11611 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11612 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11614 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11616 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11617 // to connect messages with new values
11618 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11619 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11620 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11621 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11622 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11623 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11625 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11626 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11627 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11628 // ... but the last node should not.
11629 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11630 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11631 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11632 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11634 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11635 // about the channel.
11636 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11637 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11638 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11640 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11642 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11643 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11644 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11645 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11646 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11647 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11649 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11650 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11651 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11653 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11654 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11655 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11656 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11657 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11658 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11660 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11661 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11662 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11663 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11664 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11665 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11666 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11667 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11669 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11670 // the channel info has updated.
11671 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11672 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11673 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11674 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11675 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11676 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11680 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11681 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11683 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11684 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11685 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11686 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11687 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11689 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11690 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11691 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11692 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11694 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11695 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11696 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11697 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11698 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11699 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11700 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11701 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11703 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11704 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11705 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11707 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11708 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11709 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11711 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11712 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11713 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11714 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11715 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11716 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11717 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11718 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11719 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11720 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11721 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11722 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11723 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11724 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11725 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11726 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11727 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11728 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11729 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11731 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11732 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11733 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11735 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11736 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11737 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11739 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11740 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11741 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11742 // lightning messages manually.
11743 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11744 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11747 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11748 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11749 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11750 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11752 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11753 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11755 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11756 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11757 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11758 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11759 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11760 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11762 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11763 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11764 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11766 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11767 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11768 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11770 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11771 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11774 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11775 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11776 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11777 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11779 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11780 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11781 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11782 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11784 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11787 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11788 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11789 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11790 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11792 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11797 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11798 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11799 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11802 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11803 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11804 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11805 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11806 // fails as expected.
11807 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11808 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11809 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11810 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11811 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11812 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11813 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11814 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11815 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11816 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11817 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11818 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11819 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11820 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11821 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11823 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11824 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11825 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11827 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11828 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11829 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11830 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11831 let route = find_route(
11832 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11833 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11835 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11836 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11837 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11838 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11839 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11840 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11841 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11842 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11843 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11844 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11845 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11846 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11847 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11848 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11850 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11851 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11852 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11853 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11854 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11855 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11856 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11857 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11858 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11860 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11861 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11863 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11864 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11865 let route = find_route(
11866 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11867 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11869 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11870 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11872 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11873 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11874 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11875 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11876 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11878 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11879 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11880 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11881 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11883 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11884 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11885 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11886 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11887 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11888 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11889 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11890 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11891 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11892 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11893 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11894 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11895 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11896 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11897 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11898 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11899 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11900 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11901 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11903 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11904 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11906 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11907 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11908 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11909 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11911 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11912 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11913 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11914 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11915 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11917 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11918 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11919 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11922 let route = find_route(
11923 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11924 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11926 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11927 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11928 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11930 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11931 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11932 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11933 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11934 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11936 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11937 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11938 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11940 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11941 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11942 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11943 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11944 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11945 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11946 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11947 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11948 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11950 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11951 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11955 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11956 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11957 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11958 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11959 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11960 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11961 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11963 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11964 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11966 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11967 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11968 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11969 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11970 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11971 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11972 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11973 let route = find_route(
11974 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11975 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11978 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11979 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11980 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11981 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11982 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11983 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11986 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11987 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11988 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11989 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11990 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11991 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11992 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11994 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11998 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11999 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
12000 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
12001 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12002 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
12003 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12004 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12005 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12006 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12008 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12009 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12011 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12012 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12013 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12014 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12015 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12016 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12017 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12018 let route = find_route(
12019 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12020 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12023 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12024 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12025 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
12026 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
12027 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12028 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
12029 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
12030 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12033 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12034 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12035 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12036 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12037 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12038 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12039 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12041 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
12045 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
12046 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
12047 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
12048 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
12049 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12051 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12052 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12053 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12054 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12056 // Marshall an MPP route.
12057 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
12058 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
12059 route.paths.push(path);
12060 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12061 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
12062 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
12063 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
12064 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
12065 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
12067 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12068 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
12070 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
12071 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
12073 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
12078 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
12079 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12080 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12081 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12082 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12084 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12086 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12087 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12089 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12090 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
12091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12092 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12095 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
12096 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
12097 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
12098 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
12099 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12100 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12103 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12106 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12107 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12112 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12113 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12114 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12115 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12116 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12117 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12119 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12120 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12122 total_msat: 100_000,
12125 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12126 // payment verification fails as expected.
12127 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12128 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12129 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12130 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12132 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12136 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12137 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12141 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12142 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12143 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12144 // the channel is successfully closed.
12145 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12146 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12147 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12148 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12150 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12151 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12152 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12153 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12154 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12156 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
12157 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
12159 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
12160 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
12161 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12162 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12165 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12167 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
12168 // as it has the funding transaction.
12169 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12170 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12171 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12174 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12176 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12178 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12180 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12181 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12182 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12184 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12187 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
12188 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
12189 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12190 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12191 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12194 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12195 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12197 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12198 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
12199 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
12200 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
12202 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12203 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
12204 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12205 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
12207 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12208 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
12210 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
12211 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
12212 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
12213 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
12214 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12215 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12216 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12220 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
12221 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
12222 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
12223 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
12224 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12225 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12226 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12229 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
12231 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
12232 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
12233 // closing transaction).
12234 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
12235 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
12236 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12238 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
12239 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
12240 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12241 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12242 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12245 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12247 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
12249 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
12250 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
12251 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12253 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12255 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12256 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12259 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12260 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
12261 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12264 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12265 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
12266 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12269 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
12270 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
12271 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12274 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12275 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
12276 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12279 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12281 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
12282 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12284 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
12285 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12287 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
12288 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
12293 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
12294 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
12295 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
12296 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
12297 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12298 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12299 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12300 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12303 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12304 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
12305 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
12307 // Test the API functions.
12308 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
12310 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
12312 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12314 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12316 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12318 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
12320 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
12324 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
12325 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
12326 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
12327 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
12328 // the given `channel_id`.
12329 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12330 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12331 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12332 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12334 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12337 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12339 // Test the API functions.
12340 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
12342 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12344 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12346 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12348 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12350 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12354 fn test_connection_limiting() {
12355 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
12356 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12357 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12358 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12359 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12361 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12363 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12364 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12366 let mut funding_tx = None;
12367 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12368 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12369 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12372 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12373 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
12374 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
12375 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
12376 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12378 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12379 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12380 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12382 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12384 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12386 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12388 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12391 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
12392 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
12393 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
12394 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12395 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12396 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12398 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
12399 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
12401 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
12402 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
12403 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12404 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12405 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
12406 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12407 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12410 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12411 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12412 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12413 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12414 }, true).unwrap_err();
12416 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12417 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12418 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12419 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12420 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12421 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12422 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12424 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12425 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12427 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12428 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12429 }, true).unwrap_err();
12431 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12432 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12433 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12434 }, false).unwrap();
12435 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12437 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12438 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12440 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12441 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12442 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12443 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12444 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12446 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12447 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12448 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12450 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12451 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12452 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12454 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12455 // "protected" and can connect again.
12456 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12457 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12458 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12460 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12462 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12464 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12465 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12469 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12470 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12471 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12472 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12473 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12474 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12476 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12478 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12479 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12481 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12482 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12483 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12484 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12487 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12489 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12490 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12491 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12493 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12494 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12495 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12497 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12498 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12499 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12500 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12504 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12505 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12506 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12507 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12508 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12509 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12510 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12511 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12512 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12514 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12516 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12517 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12519 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12520 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12521 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12522 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12523 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12524 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12527 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12528 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12530 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12531 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12533 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12535 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12536 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12539 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12540 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12541 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12542 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12543 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12545 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12546 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12548 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12549 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12550 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12551 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12555 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12557 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12558 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12560 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12561 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12562 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12564 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12565 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12567 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12569 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12573 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12574 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12575 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12576 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12577 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12578 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12579 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12580 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12581 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12582 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12583 payment_metadata: None,
12584 keysend_preimage: None,
12585 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12586 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12588 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12590 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12591 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12592 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12593 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
12594 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12595 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12596 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12598 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12599 } else { panic!(); }
12601 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12602 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12603 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12604 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12605 payment_metadata: None,
12606 keysend_preimage: None,
12607 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12608 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12610 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12612 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12613 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12614 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12615 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12619 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12620 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12621 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12622 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12623 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12625 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12626 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12627 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12628 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
12629 payment_metadata: None,
12630 keysend_preimage: None,
12631 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12632 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12634 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12635 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12636 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12638 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12639 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12640 // is not satisfied.
12641 assert!(result.is_ok());
12645 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12646 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12647 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12648 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12649 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12651 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12652 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12654 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12655 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12656 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12657 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12658 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12660 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12661 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12663 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12664 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12665 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12666 match &msg_events[0] {
12667 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12668 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12670 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12671 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12672 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12675 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12678 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12679 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12681 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12682 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12683 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12685 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12689 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12690 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12691 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12692 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12693 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12694 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12695 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12696 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12697 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12698 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12699 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12701 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12702 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12703 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12705 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12706 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12708 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12709 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12711 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12714 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12715 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12717 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12718 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12720 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12721 // not have generated any events.
12722 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12726 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12727 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12728 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12729 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12730 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12731 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12732 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12733 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12735 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12736 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12737 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12739 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12740 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12741 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12742 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12743 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12745 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12746 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12749 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12750 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12751 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12753 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12754 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12755 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12756 ..Default::default()
12758 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12759 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12760 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12762 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12763 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12766 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12767 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12768 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12769 ..Default::default()
12771 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12772 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12773 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12774 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12776 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12777 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12780 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12781 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12782 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12783 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12784 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12787 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12788 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12789 ..Default::default()
12791 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12794 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12795 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12796 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12797 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12801 fn test_payment_display() {
12802 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12803 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12804 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12805 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12806 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12807 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12811 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12812 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12813 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12814 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12815 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12816 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12818 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12819 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12820 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12821 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12822 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12823 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12824 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12825 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12827 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12828 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12829 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12832 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12833 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12835 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12836 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12838 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12839 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12840 }, false).unwrap();
12841 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12842 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12843 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12845 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12847 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12848 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12849 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12850 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12851 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12852 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12853 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12854 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12855 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12856 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12857 } else { panic!() };
12858 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12859 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12860 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12861 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12863 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12865 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12866 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12867 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12872 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12873 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12874 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12875 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12878 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12879 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12880 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12882 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12883 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12885 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12886 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12889 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12890 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12891 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12893 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12897 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12898 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12899 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12901 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12906 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12907 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
12908 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12909 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12911 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12912 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12913 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12915 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12917 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12918 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12919 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12920 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12922 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12923 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12925 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12931 use crate::chain::Listen;
12932 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12933 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12934 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12935 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12936 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12937 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12938 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12939 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12940 use crate::util::test_utils;
12941 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12943 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12944 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12945 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12946 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
12948 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12950 use criterion::Criterion;
12952 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12953 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12954 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12955 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12956 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12957 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12958 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12960 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12961 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12963 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12964 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12966 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12968 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12971 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12972 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12975 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12976 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12977 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12979 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12980 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12982 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12983 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12984 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12985 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12986 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
12988 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12989 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12990 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12992 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12993 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12994 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12995 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12997 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12998 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12999 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
13001 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13002 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
13003 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
13004 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
13005 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13007 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13008 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13009 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
13011 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13012 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13014 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13015 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13016 }, false).unwrap();
13017 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13018 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13019 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13022 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
13023 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
13024 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
13026 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13027 } else { panic!(); }
13029 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13030 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13031 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13032 match events_b[0] {
13033 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13034 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13036 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13039 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13040 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13041 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13042 match events_a[0] {
13043 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13044 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13046 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13049 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
13051 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
13052 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
13053 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
13055 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13056 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13057 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13058 match msg_events[0] {
13059 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
13060 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
13061 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13065 match msg_events[1] {
13066 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13070 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13071 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13072 match events_a[0] {
13073 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13074 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13076 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13079 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13080 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13081 match events_b[0] {
13082 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13083 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13085 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13088 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
13089 macro_rules! send_payment {
13090 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
13091 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
13092 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
13093 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
13094 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
13095 payment_count += 1;
13096 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
13097 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
13099 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13100 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13101 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13102 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13103 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13104 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13105 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13106 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13107 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13108 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13109 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13111 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13112 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13113 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13114 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13116 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13117 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13118 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13119 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13120 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13122 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13125 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13126 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13127 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13128 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13130 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13134 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13135 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13136 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);