1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
47 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus};
48 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
51 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
53 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
54 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
55 use util::config::UserConfig;
56 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
57 use util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
59 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
60 use util::logger::Logger;
61 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
73 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
75 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
77 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
78 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
79 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
81 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
82 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
83 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
84 // before we forward it.
86 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
87 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
88 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
89 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
90 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
95 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
96 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
99 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
100 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
103 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
104 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
108 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
109 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
110 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
111 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
112 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
113 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
114 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
119 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
120 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
123 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
124 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
125 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
126 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
127 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
130 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
132 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
134 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
135 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
136 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
138 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
140 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
144 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
148 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
149 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
150 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
151 short_channel_id: u64,
153 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
155 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
156 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
161 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
162 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
163 /// are part of the same payment.
164 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
165 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
166 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
169 struct ClaimableHTLC {
170 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
173 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
176 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
177 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
178 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
179 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
182 session_priv: SecretKey,
183 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
184 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
185 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
190 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
191 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
193 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
194 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
199 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
200 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
202 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
210 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
212 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
213 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
214 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
215 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
216 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
218 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
219 err: msgs::LightningError,
220 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
222 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
224 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
226 err: LightningError {
228 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
229 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
235 shutdown_finish: None,
239 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
241 err: LightningError {
243 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
245 shutdown_finish: None,
249 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
250 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
253 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
255 err: LightningError {
257 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
258 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
264 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
268 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
271 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
273 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
275 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
277 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
278 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
284 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
286 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
287 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
294 shutdown_finish: None,
299 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
300 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
301 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
302 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
303 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
305 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
306 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
307 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
308 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
309 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
310 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
311 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
313 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
317 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
318 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
319 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
320 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
321 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
322 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
323 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
324 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
325 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
326 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
327 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
328 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
330 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
331 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
332 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
333 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
336 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
337 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
338 /// quite some time lag.
339 enum BackgroundEvent {
340 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
341 /// commitment transaction.
342 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
345 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
346 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
348 latest_features: InitFeatures,
351 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
352 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
354 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
356 struct PendingInboundPayment {
357 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
358 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
359 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
360 /// this payment being removed.
362 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
363 user_payment_id: u64,
364 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
365 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
366 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
369 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
370 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
371 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
372 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
373 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
374 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
375 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
376 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
378 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
379 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
380 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
381 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
382 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
383 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
384 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
385 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
386 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
388 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
389 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
391 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
392 /// to individual Channels.
394 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
395 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
396 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
397 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
399 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
400 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
401 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
402 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
403 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
404 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
405 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
407 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
408 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
409 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
410 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
413 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
414 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
415 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
416 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
417 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
419 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
420 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
421 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
422 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
423 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
424 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
425 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
426 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
427 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
428 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
431 default_configuration: UserConfig,
432 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
438 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
440 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
441 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
443 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
444 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
445 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
446 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
448 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
449 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
450 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
451 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
452 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
453 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
455 /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
456 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
457 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
458 /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
459 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
460 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
461 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
462 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
464 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
465 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashSet<[u8; 32]>>,
467 our_network_key: SecretKey,
468 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
470 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
471 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
472 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
474 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
475 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
476 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
477 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
479 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
480 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
481 /// are currently open with that peer.
482 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
483 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
485 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
487 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
488 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
489 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
490 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
491 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
492 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
493 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
494 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
495 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
497 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
504 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
506 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
507 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
508 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
509 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
510 pub struct ChainParameters {
511 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
512 pub network: Network,
514 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
516 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
517 pub best_block: BestBlock,
520 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
526 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
527 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
528 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
529 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
530 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
531 /// updates are ready for persistence).
533 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
534 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
535 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
536 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
537 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
539 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
540 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
543 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
544 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
545 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
548 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
549 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
551 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
552 persistence_notifier: notifier,
553 should_persist: persist_check,
554 _read_guard: read_guard,
559 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
561 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
562 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
567 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
568 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
570 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
572 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
573 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
574 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
575 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
576 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
578 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
579 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
581 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
583 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
584 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
585 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
586 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
587 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
588 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
589 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
591 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
592 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
594 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
595 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
596 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
597 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
599 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
600 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
601 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
602 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
603 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
604 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
607 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
609 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
610 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
613 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
615 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
616 /// to better separate parameters.
617 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
618 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
619 /// The node_id of our counterparty
620 pub node_id: PublicKey,
621 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
622 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
623 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
624 pub features: InitFeatures,
625 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
626 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
627 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
629 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
631 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
632 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
633 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
634 /// payments to us through this channel.
635 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
638 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
639 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
640 pub struct ChannelDetails {
641 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
642 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
643 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
644 /// lifetime of the channel.
645 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
646 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
647 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
648 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
649 /// our counterparty already.
651 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
652 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
653 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
654 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
655 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
656 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
657 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
658 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
659 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
660 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
661 /// this value on chain.
663 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
665 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
667 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
668 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
669 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
671 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
672 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
673 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
674 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
676 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
677 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
678 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
679 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
680 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
681 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
682 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
683 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
684 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
686 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
687 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
688 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
689 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
690 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
691 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
692 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
693 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
694 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
696 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
698 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
699 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
700 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
701 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
702 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
703 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
704 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
705 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
706 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
708 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
709 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
710 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
711 pub is_outbound: bool,
712 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
713 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
714 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
715 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
716 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
718 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
719 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
720 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
721 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
723 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
725 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
729 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
730 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
732 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
733 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
734 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
735 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
736 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
737 ParameterError(APIError),
738 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
739 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
740 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
743 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
745 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
746 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
747 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
748 /// paths than the ones selected).
749 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
750 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
751 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
752 /// in over-/re-payment.
754 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
755 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
756 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
758 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
759 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
760 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
761 /// with the latest update_id.
762 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
765 macro_rules! handle_error {
766 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
769 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
770 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
772 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
773 // entering the macro.
774 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
777 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
779 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
780 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
781 if let Some(update) = update_option {
782 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
788 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
789 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
791 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
792 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
793 action: err.action.clone()
797 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
798 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
801 // Return error in case higher-API need one
808 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
809 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
810 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
812 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
813 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
815 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
816 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
817 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
818 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
820 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
821 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
823 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
824 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
825 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
826 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
828 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
829 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
835 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
836 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
840 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
842 $entry.remove_entry();
850 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
851 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
855 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
857 $entry.remove_entry();
865 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
866 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
867 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
869 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
871 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
872 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
873 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
874 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
876 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
877 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
878 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
879 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
880 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
881 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
882 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
883 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
884 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
885 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id,
886 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
889 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
890 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
891 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
892 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
894 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
895 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
897 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
898 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
900 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
901 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
902 if !$resend_commitment {
903 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
906 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
908 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
909 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
913 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
914 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
916 $entry.remove_entry();
922 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
923 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
924 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
926 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
927 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
931 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
932 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
933 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
934 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
935 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
938 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
943 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
944 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
945 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
946 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
947 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
948 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
950 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
951 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
953 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
954 if !forwards.is_empty() {
955 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
956 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
959 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
960 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
961 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
962 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
963 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
964 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
965 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
966 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
967 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
968 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
969 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
970 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
973 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
974 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
975 // before it should be allowed to.
976 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
977 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
978 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
981 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
982 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
983 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
984 msg: announcement_sigs,
987 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
990 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
991 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
992 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
993 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
994 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
995 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
996 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
997 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
998 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
999 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1000 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1001 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1002 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1003 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1004 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1005 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1006 let mut order = $order;
1008 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1010 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1014 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1015 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1016 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1017 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1022 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1023 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1024 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1025 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1026 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1031 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1035 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1040 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1041 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1042 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1047 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1048 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1049 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1050 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1051 assert!(res.is_ok());
1054 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1058 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1059 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1060 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1062 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1064 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1065 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1070 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1071 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1072 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1073 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1074 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1077 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1079 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1080 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1082 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1084 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1086 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1087 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1088 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1089 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1090 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1091 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1094 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1095 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1096 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1100 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1102 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1103 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1104 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1105 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1106 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1107 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1109 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1110 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1112 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1113 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1116 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1117 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1119 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1121 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1122 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1123 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1124 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1132 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1133 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1134 &self.default_configuration
1137 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1139 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1140 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1141 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1142 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1143 /// otherwise ignored.
1145 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1146 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1148 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1149 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1151 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1152 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1153 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten.
1154 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1155 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1156 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1159 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1160 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
1161 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1163 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1164 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1165 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1167 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1168 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1169 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1170 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1171 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1173 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1176 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1178 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1179 node_id: their_network_key,
1185 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1186 let mut res = Vec::new();
1188 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1189 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1190 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1191 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1192 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1193 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1194 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1195 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1196 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1197 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1198 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1199 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1200 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1202 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1203 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1204 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1205 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1206 inbound_capacity_msat,
1207 outbound_capacity_msat,
1208 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1209 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1210 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1211 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1212 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1213 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1214 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1218 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1219 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1220 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1221 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1227 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1228 /// more information.
1229 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1230 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1233 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1234 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1236 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1237 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1239 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1240 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1241 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1242 // really wanted anyway.
1243 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1246 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1247 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1248 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1250 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1251 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1252 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1254 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1255 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1256 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1257 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1258 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1259 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
1260 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1261 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1264 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1265 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1266 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1268 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1269 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
1271 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1274 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1275 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1277 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1278 self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok()
1281 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
1282 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1283 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1292 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1293 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1294 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1295 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1296 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1298 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1299 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1300 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1301 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1302 // ignore the result here.
1303 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1307 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1309 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1310 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1311 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1312 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1313 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1314 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1317 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1318 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1320 chan.remove_entry().1
1322 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1325 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1326 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1327 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1328 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1329 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1334 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1337 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1338 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1339 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1340 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1341 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1342 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1343 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1344 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1345 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1346 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1347 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1357 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1358 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1359 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1360 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1361 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1365 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1366 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1367 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1369 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1370 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1371 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1372 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1373 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1374 failure_code: $err_code,
1375 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1380 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1381 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1384 let shared_secret = {
1385 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1386 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1389 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1391 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1392 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1393 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1394 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1395 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1396 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1397 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1398 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1401 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1402 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1403 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1404 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1405 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1408 let mut channel_state = None;
1409 macro_rules! return_err {
1410 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1412 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1413 if channel_state.is_none() {
1414 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1416 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1417 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1418 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1419 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1420 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1425 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1426 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1427 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1428 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1430 let error_code = match err {
1431 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1432 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1433 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1434 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1435 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1437 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1440 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1441 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1442 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1449 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1452 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1453 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1454 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1455 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1456 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1457 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1458 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1459 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1460 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1461 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1462 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1463 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1467 // final_expiry_too_soon
1468 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1469 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1470 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1471 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1472 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1473 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1475 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1476 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1477 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1479 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1480 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1481 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1484 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1485 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1486 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1487 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1488 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1489 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1490 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1491 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1493 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1495 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1496 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1497 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1498 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1499 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1500 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1501 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1502 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1503 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1506 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1508 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1511 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1516 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1517 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1518 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1519 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1521 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1523 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1524 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1525 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1526 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1529 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1530 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1531 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1533 // Check two things:
1534 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1535 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1536 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1538 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1540 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1541 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1542 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1544 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1546 let blinding_factor = {
1547 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1548 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1549 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1550 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1553 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1555 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1557 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1560 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1561 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1564 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1565 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1566 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1567 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1568 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1572 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1573 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1574 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1577 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1578 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1579 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1580 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1584 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1585 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1586 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1587 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1588 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1589 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1590 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1591 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1592 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1593 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1594 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1596 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1599 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1601 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1602 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1603 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1604 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1605 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1608 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1609 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1610 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1611 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1612 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1613 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1614 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1616 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1617 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1619 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1620 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1621 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1622 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1623 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1625 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1626 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1628 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1629 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1630 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1631 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1632 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1634 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1635 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1637 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1638 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1639 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1640 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1646 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1647 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1648 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1649 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1651 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1652 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1654 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1655 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1656 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1658 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1660 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1665 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1668 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1669 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1670 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1672 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1673 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1674 if !chan.should_announce() {
1675 return Err(LightningError {
1676 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1677 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1680 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1681 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1684 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1685 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1686 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1687 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1688 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1689 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1690 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1691 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1692 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1696 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1698 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1699 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1701 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1702 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1703 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1704 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1705 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1706 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
1707 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1708 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1711 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1712 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1714 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1720 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1721 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1722 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1723 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1724 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1725 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1727 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1728 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1729 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1730 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1731 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1733 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1735 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1736 assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().insert(session_priv_bytes));
1738 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1739 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1740 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1741 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1742 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1745 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1746 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1748 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1749 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1751 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1752 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1754 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1756 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1757 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1758 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1760 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1761 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1762 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1763 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1764 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1765 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1766 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1767 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1768 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1771 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
1772 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1773 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1774 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1775 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1776 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1777 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1778 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1786 } else { unreachable!(); }
1790 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1791 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1793 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1798 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1800 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1801 /// fields for more info.
1803 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1804 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1805 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1806 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1807 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1808 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1810 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1812 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1813 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1814 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1816 /// In general, a path may raise:
1817 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1818 /// node public key) is specified.
1819 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1820 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1822 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1823 /// relevant updates.
1825 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1826 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1827 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1829 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1830 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1831 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1832 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1834 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1835 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1836 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1837 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1838 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1839 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1841 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1842 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1843 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1844 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1845 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1847 let mut total_value = 0;
1848 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1849 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1850 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1851 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1852 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1853 continue 'path_check;
1855 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1856 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1857 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1858 continue 'path_check;
1861 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1862 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1864 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1865 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1868 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1869 let mut results = Vec::new();
1870 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1871 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1873 let mut has_ok = false;
1874 let mut has_err = false;
1875 for res in results.iter() {
1876 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1877 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1878 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1879 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1886 if has_err && has_ok {
1887 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1889 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1895 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
1896 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
1897 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
1898 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1900 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1902 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
1904 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1905 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1906 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1907 } else { unreachable!(); })
1910 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1912 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1913 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1916 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1917 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
1922 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1923 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1924 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1927 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1928 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1929 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1931 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1939 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1940 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
1941 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
1945 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1947 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
1948 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1950 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1952 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
1953 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
1954 /// keys per-channel).
1956 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
1957 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
1958 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
1960 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
1961 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
1962 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
1964 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
1965 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1966 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1968 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
1969 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
1970 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1971 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
1975 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
1976 let mut output_index = None;
1977 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1978 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1979 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
1980 if output_index.is_some() {
1981 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1982 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
1985 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
1986 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1987 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
1990 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
1993 if output_index.is_none() {
1994 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1995 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
1998 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2002 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2003 if !chan.should_announce() {
2004 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2008 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2010 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2012 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2013 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2015 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2016 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2017 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2018 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2019 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2024 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2025 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2026 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2028 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2031 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2032 // smaller than 500:
2033 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2035 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2036 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2037 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2038 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2039 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2040 /// our network addresses.
2042 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2043 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2045 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2046 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2047 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2048 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2050 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2052 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2053 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2054 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2056 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2057 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2060 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2061 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2062 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2064 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2065 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2066 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2067 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2068 rgb, alias, addresses,
2069 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2070 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2072 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2073 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2075 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2076 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2078 let mut announced_chans = false;
2079 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2080 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2081 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2083 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2088 announced_chans = true;
2090 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2091 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2092 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2096 if announced_chans {
2097 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2098 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2099 signature: node_announce_sig,
2100 contents: announcement
2106 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2108 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2109 /// Will likely generate further events.
2110 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2111 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2113 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2114 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2115 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2117 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2118 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2120 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2121 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2122 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2123 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2125 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2126 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2127 match forward_info {
2128 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2129 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2130 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2131 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2132 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2133 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2134 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2136 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2137 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2140 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2141 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2142 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2143 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2144 // problem, not ours.
2151 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2152 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2153 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2154 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2155 match forward_info {
2156 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2157 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2159 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2160 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2161 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2162 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2163 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2164 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2165 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2166 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2168 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2170 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2171 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2173 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2175 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2176 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2177 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2183 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2185 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2186 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2187 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2188 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2189 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2190 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2191 // this channel currently :/.
2197 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2198 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2200 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2201 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2202 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2204 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2205 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2207 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2209 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2210 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2211 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2214 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2216 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2217 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2218 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2219 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2220 // messages when we can.
2221 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2222 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2223 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2230 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2231 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2234 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2235 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2236 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2237 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2238 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
2239 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2241 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2242 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2243 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2244 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2245 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2247 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2249 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2251 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2255 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2256 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2259 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2260 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2261 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2262 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2263 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2264 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2265 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2266 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2267 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2269 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2277 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2278 match forward_info {
2279 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2280 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2281 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2282 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2283 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2284 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2285 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2286 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2288 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2291 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2292 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2293 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2294 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2295 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2296 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2298 value: amt_to_forward,
2303 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2305 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2306 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2307 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2309 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2310 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2311 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2312 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2313 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2315 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2320 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2321 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2322 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2323 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2324 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2325 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2326 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2327 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2328 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2329 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2330 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2331 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2332 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2334 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2335 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2336 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2337 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2338 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2340 amt: amt_to_forward,
2341 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2344 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2345 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2346 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2352 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2354 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2357 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2358 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2361 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2362 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2363 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2364 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2365 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2366 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2367 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2369 let mut total_value = 0;
2370 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2371 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2372 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2373 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2374 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2375 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2379 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2380 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2381 total_value += htlc.value;
2382 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2383 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2384 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2385 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2386 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2387 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2389 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2391 _ => unreachable!(),
2394 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2395 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2396 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2397 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2400 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2401 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2403 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2404 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2405 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2406 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2410 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2411 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2413 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2415 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2416 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2423 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2424 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2432 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2433 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2436 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2437 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2440 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2441 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2442 events.append(&mut new_events);
2445 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2447 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2448 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2450 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2451 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2452 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2453 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2454 if background_events.is_empty() {
2458 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2460 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2461 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2462 // monitor updating completing.
2463 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2470 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2471 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2472 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2473 self.process_background_events();
2476 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
2477 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
2478 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
2480 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
2482 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
2483 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2484 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2485 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2486 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2488 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2489 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2490 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2491 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2492 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2493 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2494 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2495 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2496 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2497 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2498 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2502 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2503 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2505 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2506 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2507 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2511 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2512 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2522 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2523 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2524 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2525 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2526 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2527 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2528 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2530 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2531 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2532 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2533 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2534 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2535 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2536 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2537 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2538 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2539 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2540 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2546 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2547 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2548 // be surfaced to the user.
2549 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2550 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2552 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2553 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2554 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2555 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2556 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
2557 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2559 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2562 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2564 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2565 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2566 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2568 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2570 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2571 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2572 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2574 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2575 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2577 rejected_by_dest: false,
2585 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2592 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2593 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2594 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2595 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2596 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2597 /// still-available channels.
2598 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2599 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2600 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2601 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2604 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2605 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2606 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2608 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, .. } => {
2610 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2611 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2612 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2614 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2617 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2618 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2619 match &onion_error {
2620 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2622 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2624 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2625 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2626 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2627 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2628 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2629 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2630 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2635 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2636 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2637 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2638 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2640 error_code: onion_error_code,
2642 error_data: onion_error_data
2646 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2652 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2653 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2654 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2655 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2657 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2658 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2659 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2660 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2661 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2662 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2664 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2666 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2672 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2673 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2674 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2675 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2676 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2677 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2679 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2680 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2681 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2685 let mut forward_event = None;
2686 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2687 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2689 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2690 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2691 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2693 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2694 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2697 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2698 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2699 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2700 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2701 time_forwardable: time
2708 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2709 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2710 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2712 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
2713 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
2714 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
2715 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
2717 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2719 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
2720 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
2721 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
2722 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2724 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2726 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2727 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
2728 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2729 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2731 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2732 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2733 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2734 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2736 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2737 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2738 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2739 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2740 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2742 let mut valid_mpp = true;
2743 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2744 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2750 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2751 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2752 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2754 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2755 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2756 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2757 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2758 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2759 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2760 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2762 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2764 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2765 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2766 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2767 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2768 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2769 } else { errs.push(e); }
2771 Err(None) => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2772 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2777 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2778 // which were generated.
2779 channel_state.take();
2781 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2782 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2783 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2790 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2791 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2792 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2793 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2794 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2800 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2801 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2802 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2803 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2804 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2805 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2806 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2807 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2809 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2813 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2814 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
2815 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2816 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2817 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2818 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2819 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2820 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2821 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2822 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2831 // TODO: Do something with e?
2832 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2833 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2834 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2835 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2836 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2837 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2838 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2842 } else { unreachable!(); }
2845 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2847 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2848 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2850 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2851 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2852 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2854 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2855 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2859 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
2862 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2863 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2864 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2867 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2868 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2869 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2870 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2873 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2874 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2875 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2876 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2877 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2878 payment_preimage, e);
2882 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2884 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2885 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2886 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2892 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2893 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2894 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2897 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2898 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2901 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2902 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2904 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2905 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2906 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2907 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2909 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2910 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2911 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2912 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2913 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2914 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2915 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2916 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2917 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2918 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2920 let chan_restoration_res;
2921 let mut pending_failures = {
2922 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2923 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2924 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2925 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
2926 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
2928 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2932 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2933 let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
2934 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2935 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
2936 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
2937 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
2938 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2939 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2940 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
2943 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
2944 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2945 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2949 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
2950 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2951 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2955 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2956 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2957 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2960 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2961 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2962 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2963 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2964 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2965 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2966 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2967 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2968 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2969 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2971 entry.insert(channel);
2977 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2978 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2979 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2980 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2981 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2982 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2983 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2984 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2986 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2987 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2989 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2992 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2993 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2994 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2995 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2997 user_channel_id: user_id,
3002 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3003 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3004 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3005 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3006 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3007 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3008 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3009 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3010 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3012 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3014 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3017 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3018 // lock before watch_channel
3019 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3021 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3022 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3023 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3024 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3025 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3026 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3027 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3028 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3029 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3030 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3031 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3033 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3034 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3035 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3036 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3037 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3038 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3042 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3043 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3044 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3045 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3046 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3048 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3049 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3050 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3059 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3061 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3062 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3063 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3064 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3065 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3066 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3067 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3069 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3070 Ok(update) => update,
3071 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3073 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3074 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3078 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3081 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3082 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3086 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3087 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3088 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3089 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3090 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3091 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3092 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3094 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3095 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3096 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3097 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3098 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3099 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3100 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3101 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3102 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3103 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3104 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3105 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3106 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3107 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3108 msg: announcement_sigs,
3110 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3111 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3112 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3113 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3118 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3122 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3123 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
3124 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3125 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3127 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3128 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3129 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3130 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3132 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3133 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3134 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3135 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3139 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3140 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3141 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3145 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
3146 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3147 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3149 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3150 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
3152 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3155 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3156 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3158 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3159 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3160 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3161 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3169 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3170 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3171 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3172 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3173 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3174 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3175 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3176 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3178 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3179 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3180 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3181 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3186 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3187 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3188 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3189 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3190 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3191 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3192 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3194 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3195 } else { (tx, None) }
3197 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3200 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3201 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3202 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3204 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3205 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3206 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3207 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3215 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3216 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3217 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3218 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3220 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3221 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3222 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3223 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3225 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3226 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3228 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3229 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3230 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3231 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3234 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3235 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
3236 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
3237 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
3238 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3239 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3240 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3241 match pending_forward_info {
3242 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3243 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3244 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3245 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3246 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3247 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3248 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3252 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3253 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3254 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3255 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3256 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3257 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
3258 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3259 // no problem just calling this
3260 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3261 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3263 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3264 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3265 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3268 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3270 _ => pending_forward_info
3273 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3275 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3280 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3281 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3283 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3284 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3285 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3286 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3287 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3289 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3291 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3294 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
3298 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3299 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3300 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3301 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3302 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3303 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3304 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3306 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3308 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3313 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3314 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3315 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3316 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3317 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3318 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3319 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3321 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3322 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3323 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3325 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3328 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3332 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3333 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3334 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3335 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3336 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3337 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3338 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3340 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
3341 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
3342 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3343 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3344 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3345 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3346 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3351 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3352 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3353 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
3355 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3356 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3357 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3359 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3360 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3361 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3362 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3363 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3364 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3365 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3366 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3368 commitment_signed: msg,
3372 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3373 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3374 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3380 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3385 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3386 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3387 let mut forward_event = None;
3388 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3389 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3390 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3391 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3393 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3394 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3395 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3396 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3397 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
3399 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3400 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3401 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3403 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3404 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3405 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3410 match forward_event {
3412 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3413 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3414 time_forwardable: time
3422 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3423 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3425 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3426 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3427 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3428 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3429 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3430 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3432 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3433 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3434 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3435 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3436 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3437 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3438 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3439 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3441 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3443 } else { unreachable!(); }
3446 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3447 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3448 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3452 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3453 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3454 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3458 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3460 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3463 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3465 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3466 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3467 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3469 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3476 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3477 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3478 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3479 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3480 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3481 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3482 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3484 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3486 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3491 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3492 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3493 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3495 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3496 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3497 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3498 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3500 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3501 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3504 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3505 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3506 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
3507 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
3508 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3511 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3516 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
3517 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3518 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3519 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3520 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3521 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3523 // It's not a local channel
3524 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
3527 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3528 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3529 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3530 if chan.get().should_announce() {
3531 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
3532 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
3533 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
3534 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3536 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3538 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3539 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
3540 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
3541 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3543 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3546 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3548 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
3551 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3552 let chan_restoration_res;
3553 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
3554 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3555 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3557 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3558 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3559 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3560 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3562 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3563 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3564 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3565 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3566 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
3567 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3568 let mut channel_update = None;
3569 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3570 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3571 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3574 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3575 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
3576 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
3577 // they have the latest channel parameters.
3578 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3579 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3580 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3583 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
3584 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
3585 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3586 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3588 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
3590 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3593 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3594 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
3596 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
3597 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
3602 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3603 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3604 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3605 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3606 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3608 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3609 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3610 let counterparty_node_id;
3611 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3612 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3613 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3615 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3616 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3617 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3618 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3619 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3621 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3622 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3624 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3625 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3627 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3628 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3629 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3631 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3634 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating fee resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3635 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3636 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3637 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3638 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3639 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3640 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3641 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3642 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3652 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3653 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3654 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3658 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
3659 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
3660 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3661 let pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
3662 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
3663 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events {
3664 match monitor_event {
3665 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3666 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3667 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3668 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3670 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3671 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3674 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3675 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3676 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3677 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3678 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3679 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3680 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3681 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3682 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3684 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3685 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3686 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3690 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3691 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3692 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3693 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3701 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3702 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3705 has_pending_monitor_events
3708 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
3709 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
3710 /// update was applied.
3712 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
3713 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
3714 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
3715 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
3716 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
3717 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
3718 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3719 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3721 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3722 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3723 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3724 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3725 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3727 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
3728 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
3729 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3730 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
3731 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
3733 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
3734 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3735 has_monitor_update = true;
3736 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
3737 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
3738 if close_channel { return false; }
3740 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3741 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3742 updates: commitment_update,
3749 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
3750 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
3757 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
3758 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3759 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
3762 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3763 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3769 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3770 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3772 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3773 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3774 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3775 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3776 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3777 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3778 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3779 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3780 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3781 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3782 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3783 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3784 assert!(should_broadcast);
3785 } else { unreachable!(); }
3786 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3788 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3792 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3793 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
3795 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3797 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3798 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3799 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3800 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3801 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
3802 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
3803 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
3804 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
3805 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
3806 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
3807 // never fail a payment too early.
3808 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
3810 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
3813 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
3818 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
3821 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
3822 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
3824 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
3825 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
3826 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
3828 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
3830 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
3831 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3832 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
3833 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3834 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
3835 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3836 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3839 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3840 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
3843 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
3844 /// stored external to LDK.
3846 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
3847 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
3848 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
3850 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
3851 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
3853 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
3854 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
3855 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
3856 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
3857 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
3859 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
3860 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
3861 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
3862 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
3864 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
3865 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
3866 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
3867 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
3868 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
3870 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
3871 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
3872 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
3873 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
3874 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
3876 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
3877 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
3878 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
3880 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
3882 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
3883 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
3885 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3886 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3887 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
3888 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3889 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3892 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
3893 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
3894 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3895 let event_handler = |event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
3896 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
3901 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3902 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3903 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3904 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3905 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3908 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3909 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3910 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3911 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3913 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3914 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3915 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3916 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3919 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3920 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3923 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
3924 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3925 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3927 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3928 events.replace(pending_events);
3937 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3939 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3940 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3941 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3942 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3945 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
3947 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
3948 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
3950 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
3951 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
3952 /// restarting from an old state.
3953 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
3954 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3955 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3957 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3958 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3959 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3960 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3963 let mut pending_events = std::mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
3964 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3965 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3968 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
3969 handler.handle_event(event);
3977 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3979 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3980 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3981 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3982 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3985 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
3987 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3988 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
3989 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
3990 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
3991 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
3994 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
3995 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
3996 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
3999 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4000 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4001 let new_height = height - 1;
4003 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4004 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4005 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4006 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4007 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4008 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4011 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4015 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4017 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4018 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4019 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4020 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4023 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4024 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4025 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4026 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4028 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4029 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4031 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4032 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4035 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4036 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4037 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4038 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4040 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4041 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4043 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4045 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4047 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4049 macro_rules! max_time {
4050 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4052 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4053 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4054 // having an explicit local time source.
4055 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4056 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4057 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4058 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4059 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4065 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4066 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4067 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4068 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4069 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4073 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4074 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4075 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4076 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4077 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4078 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4084 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4085 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4086 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4087 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4088 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4089 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4090 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4091 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4096 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4098 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4099 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4100 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4101 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4104 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4105 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4107 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4108 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4109 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4110 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4111 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4113 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4114 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4116 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4117 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4118 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4119 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4120 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4121 let res = f(channel);
4122 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4123 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4124 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4125 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4126 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4130 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4131 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4132 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4133 msg: funding_locked,
4135 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4136 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4137 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4138 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4139 msg: announcement_sigs,
4141 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4142 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4143 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4144 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4145 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4148 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4150 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4152 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4153 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4154 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4156 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4157 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4158 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4159 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4160 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4164 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4165 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4166 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4173 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4174 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4175 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4176 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4177 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4178 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4179 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4180 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4181 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4182 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4183 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4184 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4185 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4190 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4195 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4197 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4198 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4202 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4203 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4204 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4206 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4207 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4208 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4209 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4212 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4213 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4215 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4216 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4219 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4220 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4221 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4222 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4223 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4227 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4228 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4229 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4230 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4234 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4235 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4236 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4237 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4238 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4239 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4242 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4243 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4244 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4247 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4248 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4249 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4252 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4253 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4254 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4257 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4258 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4259 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4262 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4263 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4264 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4267 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4268 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4269 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4272 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4273 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4274 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4277 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4278 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4279 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4282 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4283 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4284 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4287 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4288 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4289 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4292 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4293 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4294 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4297 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4298 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4299 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4302 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4303 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4304 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4307 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4308 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4309 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4312 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4313 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4314 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4317 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4318 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4319 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4322 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4327 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4328 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4329 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4332 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4333 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4334 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4335 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4337 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4338 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4339 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4340 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4341 if no_connection_possible {
4342 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4343 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4344 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4345 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4346 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4348 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4349 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4350 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4360 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4361 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4362 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4363 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4364 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4365 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4366 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4370 no_channels_remain = false;
4376 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4378 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4379 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4380 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4381 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4382 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4383 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4384 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4385 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4386 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4387 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4388 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4389 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4390 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4391 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4392 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4393 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4394 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
4395 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4396 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4397 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4401 if no_channels_remain {
4402 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4405 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4406 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4410 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4411 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4413 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4416 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4417 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4418 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4419 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4420 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4423 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4424 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4429 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4430 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4431 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4432 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4433 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4434 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4435 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4436 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4437 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4441 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4442 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4443 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4449 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4452 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4453 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4455 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4456 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4457 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4458 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4459 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4463 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4464 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4469 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4470 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4471 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4472 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4473 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4474 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4477 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4480 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4486 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4487 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4492 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4493 let result = *guard;
4501 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4502 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4503 let current_time = Instant::now();
4505 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4506 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4511 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4512 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4513 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4514 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4515 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4517 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4518 let result = *guard;
4519 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4523 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4524 None => return result,
4530 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4532 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4533 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4534 *persistence_lock = true;
4535 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4540 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4541 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4543 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
4545 (0, onion_packet, required),
4546 (2, short_channel_id, required),
4549 (0, payment_data, required),
4550 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4552 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
4553 (0, payment_preimage, required),
4554 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4558 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
4559 (0, routing, required),
4560 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
4561 (4, payment_hash, required),
4562 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
4563 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
4566 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailureMsg, ;
4570 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
4575 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
4576 (0, short_channel_id, required),
4577 (2, outpoint, required),
4578 (4, htlc_id, required),
4579 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
4582 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
4583 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4584 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
4585 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
4588 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
4589 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
4590 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
4595 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
4596 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
4597 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
4603 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
4604 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4605 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
4607 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
4608 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
4609 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4613 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
4614 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
4615 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
4617 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
4619 if payment_data.is_some() {
4620 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4622 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
4625 if payment_data.is_none() {
4626 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4628 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
4632 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
4640 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCSource,
4641 (0, OutboundRoute) => {
4642 (0, session_priv, required),
4643 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
4644 (4, path, vec_type),
4646 (1, PreviousHopData)
4649 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
4650 (0, LightningError) => {
4654 (0, failure_code, required),
4655 (2, data, vec_type),
4659 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
4661 (0, forward_info, required),
4662 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
4663 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
4664 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
4667 (0, htlc_id, required),
4668 (2, err_packet, required),
4672 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
4673 (0, payment_secret, required),
4674 (2, expiry_time, required),
4675 (4, user_payment_id, required),
4676 (6, payment_preimage, required),
4677 (8, min_value_msat, required),
4680 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4681 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4682 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4683 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4684 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4687 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4688 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4690 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4692 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4694 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4695 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4696 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4699 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4700 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4701 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4702 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4703 unfunded_channels += 1;
4706 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4707 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4708 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4709 channel.write(writer)?;
4713 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4714 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4715 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4716 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4717 for forward in pending_forwards {
4718 forward.write(writer)?;
4722 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4723 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4724 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4725 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4726 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4727 htlc.write(writer)?;
4731 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4732 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4733 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4734 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4735 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4736 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4739 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4740 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4741 for event in events.iter() {
4742 event.write(writer)?;
4745 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4746 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4747 for event in background_events.iter() {
4749 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4751 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4752 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4757 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4758 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4760 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4761 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4762 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
4763 hash.write(writer)?;
4764 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
4767 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4768 (pending_outbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4769 for session_priv in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
4770 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4773 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
4779 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4781 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4783 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4784 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4785 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4786 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4787 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4788 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4789 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4790 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4791 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4792 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4793 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4795 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4796 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4798 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4799 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4800 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4801 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4802 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4803 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4804 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4805 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4806 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4807 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4808 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4811 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4812 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4814 pub keys_manager: K,
4816 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4818 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4819 pub fee_estimator: F,
4820 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4822 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4823 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4824 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4825 pub chain_monitor: M,
4827 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4828 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4829 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4830 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4831 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4832 /// deserialization.
4834 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4835 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4836 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4838 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4839 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4841 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4842 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4843 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4844 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4846 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4849 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4850 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4853 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4854 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4855 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4856 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4857 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4858 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4861 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4862 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4863 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4864 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4865 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4867 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4868 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4873 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4874 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4875 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4876 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4877 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4878 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4879 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4880 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4883 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4884 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4885 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4889 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4890 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4891 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4892 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4893 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4894 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4897 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4898 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4900 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4901 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4902 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4904 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4906 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4907 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4908 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4909 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4910 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4911 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4912 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4913 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4914 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4915 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4916 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4917 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4918 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4919 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4920 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
4921 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
4922 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4923 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
4924 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
4925 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
4926 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
4927 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4928 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4929 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4930 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4931 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4932 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4933 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4934 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4935 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4937 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4938 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4940 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4943 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4944 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
4945 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
4946 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
4947 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
4948 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4952 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4953 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4954 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4958 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4959 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4960 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4961 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4962 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4963 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4964 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4965 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4966 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4968 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
4971 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4972 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4973 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
4974 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4975 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4976 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
4977 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
4978 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4980 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
4983 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4984 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
4985 for _ in 0..peer_count {
4986 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4987 let peer_state = PeerState {
4988 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
4990 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
4993 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4994 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
4995 for _ in 0..event_count {
4996 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4997 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5002 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5003 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5004 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5005 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5006 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5007 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5011 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5012 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5014 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5015 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5016 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5017 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5018 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5022 let pending_outbound_payments_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5023 let mut pending_outbound_payments: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5024 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count {
5025 if !pending_outbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?) {
5026 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5030 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
5032 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5033 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5035 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
5037 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
5038 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
5039 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
5041 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
5043 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
5048 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
5050 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
5051 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments),
5053 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
5054 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
5057 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
5058 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
5060 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
5062 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
5063 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
5064 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
5065 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
5067 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
5068 logger: args.logger,
5069 default_configuration: args.default_config,
5072 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5073 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5076 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
5077 //connection or two.
5079 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
5085 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
5087 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
5089 use core::time::Duration;
5090 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5091 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
5092 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5094 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5096 fn test_wait_timeout() {
5097 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
5098 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
5100 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
5101 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
5102 thread::spawn(move || {
5104 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
5105 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5106 *persistence_lock = true;
5109 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
5115 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
5116 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
5118 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
5121 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5126 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
5128 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
5131 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5138 fn test_notify_limits() {
5139 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
5140 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
5141 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5142 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5143 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5144 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5146 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5148 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
5149 // to connect messages with new values
5150 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5151 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5152 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5153 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5155 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
5156 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5157 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5158 // ... but the last node should not.
5159 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5160 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
5161 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5162 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5164 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
5165 // about the channel.
5166 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5167 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5168 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5170 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
5172 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5173 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5174 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5175 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5176 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5177 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5179 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
5180 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5181 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5183 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
5184 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
5185 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
5186 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
5187 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
5188 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
5190 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
5191 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
5192 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5193 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5194 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5195 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5196 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5197 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5199 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
5200 // the channel info has updated.
5201 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5202 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5203 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5204 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5205 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5206 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5210 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
5213 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
5214 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
5215 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
5216 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
5217 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5218 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5219 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5220 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
5221 use routing::router::get_route;
5222 use util::test_utils;
5223 use util::config::UserConfig;
5224 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
5226 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5227 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5228 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
5230 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
5234 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
5235 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
5236 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
5237 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
5238 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
5239 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
5240 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
5245 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
5246 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
5249 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
5250 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
5251 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
5253 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
5254 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5256 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
5257 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
5259 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
5260 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
5262 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5263 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
5264 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
5265 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
5266 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5268 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5270 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
5272 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5273 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
5274 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
5275 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
5276 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5278 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5280 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
5282 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
5283 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5284 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5287 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
5288 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5289 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
5291 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
5292 } else { panic!(); }
5294 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5295 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5297 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
5300 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5303 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
5304 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
5306 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5307 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5308 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
5309 match msg_events[0] {
5310 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
5311 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
5312 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
5316 match msg_events[1] {
5317 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5321 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
5323 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
5324 macro_rules! send_payment {
5325 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
5326 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
5327 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
5328 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
5330 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
5331 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
5333 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
5334 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
5336 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5337 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
5338 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5339 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
5340 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5341 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5342 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5343 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5345 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
5346 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
5347 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5349 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
5350 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
5351 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5352 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5353 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
5355 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
5358 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
5359 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5360 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5361 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5363 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
5368 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
5369 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);